

Theophrastus of Eresus Commentary Volume 6.1

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VOLUME 123

Theophrastus of Eresus
Sources for His Life, Writings, Thought and Influence

Commentary Volume 6.1
Sources on Ethics

Theophrastus of Eresus Commentary Volume 6.1

Sources on Ethics

by

William W. Fortenbaugh,
with Contributions on the Arabic Material
by Dimitri Gutas



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for
Herwig Görgemanns
Scholar, Betreuer, Friend

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PREFACE

With the publication of this commentary my work on Theophrastus has come full circle. In 1984, *Quellen zur Ethik Theophrasts* was published by Grüner Verlag as volume 12 in the series Studien zur antiken Philosophie. The book contains a collection of the ethical fragments of Theophrastus (quotations, paraphrases, reports *etc.*) together with a commentary in German. For the briefest time, I thought that I might move on to entirely new challenges; certainly I would not write a second commentary on Theophrastus' ethics. Of that idea I was quickly disabused, for having organized a team of scholars, who were committed to collecting, translating and commenting on all the fragments of Theophrastus—often referred to as Project Theophrastus—it soon became clear that a rational division of tasks would not let me walk away from ethics. To be sure, participation in this larger project would lead me into new fields, in particular, rhetoric and poetics, but at the same time I became the person primarily responsible for revising the ethical fragments that had been published in *Quellen*. In addition, it fell to me to provide a translation, which was missing in *Quellen*, and to write a commentary that took account of our new and fuller collection of fragments. Now some twenty-seven years after the publication of *Quellen*, I have no regrets, for fragments missing in *Quellen* have been identified and included, the apparatus of parallel texts has been improved, the same is true of the apparatus of variant readings, and a facing translation (Greek, Latin and Arabic texts on the left, English on the right) has been added. These improvements are now available in the two volume work *Theophrastus of Eresus: Sources for His Life, Writings, Thought and Influence* (Brill 1992, reprint 1993).

The present commentary is considerably longer than that found in *Quellen*. That is hardly surprising, given the years that separate the two works. Texts not found in *Quellen* have been commented upon, new ideas set forth in the scholarly literature have been incorporated, and old ideas have been revised. Sometimes a comment has been dropped as marginal and other times as mistaken. In making these statements, I am not recommending that all copies of *Quellen* be destroyed. There are times when I found it economical to refer to *Quellen* regarding material

that has been excluded from the present commentary but is available in *Quellen* and may be important to someone approaching the ethics of Theophrastus with different needs and different interests.

Like the translation now available in *Sources*, the present commentary is written in English. That suits today's world. A half century ago, when I was in graduate school, a translation and commentary in German would have seemed quite normal and been welcome on both sides of the Atlantic. But in the meantime, the capacity to read German, at least in my country, has diminished significantly, so that important German, Austrian and Swiss scholars of the nineteenth and twentieth century tend to be ignored. It is my hope that the present commentary with its the numerous references to past greats like Zeller, von Arnim, Walzer, Regenbogen, Dirlmeier and Gigon will encourage renewed interest in their work.

The team that collaborated to produce a complete collection of Theophrastean fragments had a central core, often referred to by the initials FHS&G. They are myself, Pamela Huby, Bob Sharples and Dimitri Gutas. We have enjoyed working with each other over so many years, that it is quite impossible for me to remember, let alone to list, the many occasions that I have been assisted by HS&G. Moreover, we have become good friends and done fun things in common with our spouses. That has made my scholarly life especially meaningful. Not all head; a lot of heart as well.

Two bright graduate students who became scholars in their own right merit special mention. They are Michael Sollenberger, who edited and translated the "Vita" portion of the text-translation volumes (1–67), and David Mirhady, who did the same for the "Politics" portion (589–665) and will be writing the commentary on the titles and texts contained therein. Both have helped me with ethical material on many occasions. David Sedley worked on papyri and in regard to ethics was especially helpful in establishing and interpreting texts relevant to moral education (720, 721A). Andrew Barker had overall responsibility for the section on "Music" and was a resource regarding texts that relate music to emotional response (719A–B, 726A). Tiziano Dorandi, who has often offered assistance in regard to manuscripts and philological matters in general, must be mentioned and thanked; so too Eckart Schütrumpf, who has been generous with his extensive knowledge of Peripatetic philosophy and political theory in particular. There are also Richard Sorabji, whose work on Aristotle's psychology, both human and animal, has greatly interested me; Stephan White, whose thoughts on titles and the early Peripatos in general has stimulated my own thinking; and Stefan Schorn, who spent a year

at Rutgers, where he worked with me on various source authors including Athenaeus and Stobaeus. As I was finishing this commentary and preparing to send it to Brill for publication, Georgia Tsouni generously allowed me to see her Cambridge Dissertation on Antiochus of Ascalon (2010), so that I was able to refer to it in several places. And in regard to final preparation for publication, I am indebted to Charles George, a graduate student at Rutgers, who helped with proofreading and prepared the index of ancient sources.

Finally I come to Herwig Görgemanns, whom I first met when we were junior fellows together at The Center for Hellenic Studies in 1967–1968. I was just getting my academic feet on the ground. Herwig was further advanced, having already published his book on Plato's *Laws*. We hit it off, as the expression goes, and I visited Herwig in Heidelberg during the early summer of 1971. We discussed subjects of mutual interest, and I was able to improve my German. A second visit in Heidelberg and a lecture on Theophrastus' *Characters* in spring 1973 encouraged me to ask Herwig to support my application to the Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung for a fellowship to work on the ethics of Theophrastus. The application was successful, and with Herwig as my *Betreuer*, I began work on *Quellen* in the fall of 1976. Progress was slow, and over the entire period Herwig not only responded to questions concerning substance but also corrected numerous infelicities in my German prose. Moreover, Herwig put his weight behind the founding of Project Theophrastus and in 1991 came to Rutgers, where he delivered a paper on the Peripatetic theory of *oikeiôtês*, the natural relationship that exists between not only all men but also men and animals (531). Since then Herwig has remained a friend and colleague, always ready to offer assistance in matters philological. To him I dedicate this commentary. It is not too much to say that without his interest and help over decades my work on Theophrastus and that of Project Theophrastus would never have developed as it did.

WWF
Rutgers University
December 2010

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

This commentary on the ethical fragments¹ of Theophrastus is no. 6.1 in the series of commentaries that accompanies the two volume work *Theophrastus of Eresus: Sources for his Life, Writings, Thought and Influence* (often referred to as the text-translation volumes). When the latter was published (1992, reprint with corrections 1993), it was envisioned that commentary no. 6 would cover both the texts printed under the heading “Ethics” (436–579) and those printed under the heading “Religion” (580–588). That idea has now been abandoned in favor of separate volumes, for both areas are of such interest, that they merit individual commentaries of considerable length. Accordingly, the texts printed under “Ethics” are discussed in this volume, no. 6.1, and those printed under “Religion” will be discussed in no. 6.2 by Stefan Schorn.

The preceding statement may give the impression that the collected sources can be neatly divided by area or subject matter. That is, of course, false. Ethics and politics are not two quite distinct subjects and were not so regarded by either Aristotle or Theophrastus. Similarly ethics and religion overlap, which is one reason why we² originally thought it sensible to comment on both the ethics and religion texts within a single volume. Again, ethics and psychology overlap, as do ethics and rhetoric. In addition, sub-divisions within the area of ethics are not free of overlap. For example, texts dealing with the emotions have their own section (II.2 carries the heading “Emotions” 438–448), but related texts are found elsewhere (e.g., 526, which is printed in II.10, the section on “Kindness, Honor and Vengeance”³). This absence of neat

¹ As often “fragments” here is used inclusively. It covers not only quotations but also paraphrases, reports and other related material.

² Throughout the commentary, “we” refers generally to FHS&G = Fortenbaugh, Huby, Sharples and Gutas. In some cases, a subgroup might be more accurate, but either such precision seems unimportant or memories have faded, so that specifying a subgroup with confidence is no longer possible.

³ Within the section on “Emotions” and after text 441, which deals with rage and appetite, reference is made to text 526, which is located in the section on “Kindness, Honor and Vengeance” and deals with rage and revenge. The apparatus to 526 includes a reference to 441.

divisions is not to be regretted. It corresponds with the realities of life and makes for interesting discussion. In the text-translation volumes, we have taken account of overlap by introducing cross-references,⁴ and in this commentary, the cross-references are not ignored. In particular, when the reference is to a text located elsewhere (i.e., it is printed under a heading other than “Ethics”), the text will not only be mentioned at the appropriate place in this commentary, but it will also be discussed, sometimes quite briefly and sometimes at greater length.⁵

In this commentary, a separate chapter on “The Sources” (II) will be found after the “Introduction” and before the chapters on the “Titles of Books” (III) and “The Texts” (IV). In it I discuss the several Greek and Latin sources as well as a single Italian source. Comments on the Arabic sources are added by Dimitri Gutas. The reasons for creating a separate chapter and placing it immediately after the introduction have been stated in *Commentary* vol. 8 on the rhetorical and poetic texts (pp. 2–3). Here I repeat only that the prominent position is intended to emphasize that our knowledge of Theophrastus’ ethics is only as good as our sources, and not all sources are equally reliable. Some are careless, and others are drawing on earlier sources that may or may not have conveyed information accurately. Occasionally an author may be pushing an agenda and therefore would be apt to misrepresent Theophrastus in ways that suit his agenda. And, of course, Latin, Italian and Arabic texts involve translation, which opens the door to faulty renderings. In saying that, I am not suggesting that obtaining a satisfactory understanding of Theophrastus’ ethics is impossible. I am, however, urging that we be on our toes when dealing with sources. And that holds not only for minor sources, about which we may be largely uninformed, but also for major, well-known sources like Plutarch (c. 45–120 AD) and Athenaeus (fl. c. 200 AD).

The discussion of sources is divided into six parts. In the first and longest, thirty-eight authors including pseudonymi and anonymi are discussed in roughly chronological order. That is deliberate, for sources from the late Roman Republic and early Empire are closer in time to Theophrastus than those of the late Empire and the Middle Ages. Accordingly there is a *prima facie* reason for taking their reports seriously. Neverthe-

⁴ See the preceding note.

⁵ I.e., in this commentary the text is discussed in the place that corresponds to the place of the cross-reference in the text-translation volumes. E.g., 1.42–44 is discussed immediately after 577A–B and before 578; and 625–626 are discussed after 561 and before 562.

less, they can mislead us, and that is true not only of a minor source like Apollonius (2nd century BC) but also a major source like Cicero (106–43 BC).⁶ The next four parts, the second through the fifth, focus on special groups of sources: “Anthologies, Gnomologies and Other Collections,” “Lexicographers,” “Scholia” and a “Catalogue of Books.”⁷ The sixth and last part deals with Arabic material. At the very beginning of the chapter, i.e. prior to the first part, I have listed the sources in alphabetical order. Each source is given a number that identifies its place in the discussion that follows.

The treatment of the sources is uneven. In some cases, the comments run for several pages. In other cases, they are quite brief. Moreover, only those sources that are represented by texts actually printed in the text-translation volumes are discussed. The apparatus of parallel passages refers to numerous texts that name Theophrastus but have not been printed. Were the sources of these texts commented upon, the discussion of sources would be considerably longer. Indeed, it would require a separate volume and for most of us a lifetime of study. Hence, the goal in discussing the sources has been to provide the reader with a useful beginning: some reflections on the authors and texts in question, perhaps reasons for caution, and a limited bibliography that will assist the reader who wishes to investigate in greater detail a particular source.

The chapter on the “Titles of Books” (III) discusses the thirty-three titles that have been listed in the text-translation volumes at the head of the section on “Ethics” (436). In ten cases, alternate titles are recorded and marked by “a,” “b,” etc. These alternate titles may be simple variations on a Greek title, a Latin rendering of a Greek title, or an Arabic rendering. In one case we have only a Latin title with two variations (no. 17a–c). There is also discussion of two titles that have their primary listing elsewhere (666 no. 10 under “Rhetoric” and 727 no. 4 under “Miscellaneous

⁶ The issue is complicated by the story of Neleus and the alleged unavailability of the books of Aristotle and Theophrastus for much of the Hellenistic period. See below, the commentary on 437.

⁷ While the categories are distinct, an individual author may have composed works that belong to more than one category. That is true of Photius. His *Lexicon* places him among lexicographers, but his *Library* suggests that he belongs among anthologists and other collectors. Since a text from the *Lexicon* is printed in the ethical section (464) and none from the *Library* is, I have discussed Photius in the third part on “Lexicographers.” Nevertheless, a reference to this discussion has been included within the part dealing with “Anthologies, Gnomologies, and Other Collections,” for texts from the *Library* that are relevant to ethics will be found elsewhere in the text-translation volumes (362A and 365A; see the commentary on 531).

Items”). In the text-translation volumes, these titles are referred to within the list of ethical titles, and each is discussed at the corresponding point within this commentary (after 436 no. 22 and 30a–b, respectively).

The chapter on “The Texts” (IV) discusses the texts that are printed in the text-translation volumes within the section on “Ethics.” The discussion follows the order of the texts as printed (437–579A–B). There is also discussion of some thirteen texts that have their primary listing elsewhere (1.42–44 under “Life,” 271 and 323A–B under “Psychology,” 362A–I under “Living Creatures,” 584A–D under “Religion,” 590, 610, 625, 626, 661, 662 under “Politics,” and 720, 721A–B under “Music”)⁸ but are related to ethics and therefore have been referred to from within the section on “Ethics.” The chapter on “Ethics” has seventeen subdivisions, between which there are occasional cross-references. Discussion occurs in the places to which the references point.⁹

The chapters on the “Titles of Books” and “The Texts” (III and IV) are followed by a “Summary” (V), which is intended to offer a brief overview of what has been established or rendered plausible in the preceding chapters. The emphasis will be on substantive issues in Theophrastus’ ethical thought. Theophrastus’ relation to Aristotle will not be ignored, and some notice will be taken of other early Peripatetics. Although obvious, I want to underline that this summary statement is no substitute for the detailed discussion of individual titles and texts that precedes.

The “Summary” is followed by a “Bibliography of Modern Literature” (VI). It is intended both to include the most important scholarly literature on Theophrastus’ ethics and to simplify the references given in the preceding chapters, where references are limited most often to the name of the author (specified by date of publication, where necessary) and page or column numbers. Further details such as title, place of publication and (where applicable) date and place of reprint will be found in the bibliography. Works that are rarely referred to (typically on a single occasion) and that are of minor importance do not appear in the bibliography. References are given in full in the footnotes to the preceding chapters.¹⁰

⁸ In reporting the number thirteen, I am counting as one multiple texts that share one number: e.g., 323A–B is counted as one.

⁹ E.g., between 441 and 442, which occur in Section 2 on “Emotions,” reference is made to 526, which is printed in Section 10 on “Kindness, Honor and Vengeance.” In this commentary volume, discussion of 526 occurs among the comments on Section 10.

¹⁰ On rare occasions, I have used “*op. cit.*” or “*loc. cit.*” to refer to a work or specific place, details of which have been given either in the immediately preceding note or one in close proximity.

Next comes a series of “Indices to the Titles and Texts” (VII). First come three indices of “Important Words” that occur in the titles and texts (1). There is a Greek index followed by a Latin index and an Arabic index. The last has been prepared by Dimitri Gutas. The indices cover not only the titles and texts that have their primary location in the section on “Ethics” (436–579) but also titles and texts that occur elsewhere but are referred to from within the section on “Ethics.”¹¹ After that come indices that list the “Titles of Books” (2). Theophrastean titles enjoy pride of place; the non-Theophrastean titles are listed second. And within each division there are sub-divisions: the Theophrastean titles are divided into Greek, Latin and Arabic titles, while the non-Theophrastean titles are divided into Greek and Latin. The series of “Indices to the Titles and Texts” is rounded off by a listing of “Gods, Persons, Groups of People and Places Named or Referred to in either Greek or Latin or Arabic Texts” (3). The list is given in English and adopts the spelling found in the translations. That avoids the inconvenience of having to look at three different lists (Greek, Latin and Arabic) to determine where a single item is mentioned. A pronoun that has a clear reference (e.g. οὗτος 559.4 refers to Euripides) and a phrase like “the same” (e.g., ὁ αὐτός 510.1 refers to Theophrastus) have been treated as proper names in compiling the index. The same holds for the ending of a verb (e.g., ἐξεῦρε 511.3 gives us “he” referring to Diogenes of Sinope). The fact that the proper name is not stated explicitly is marked by the addition of “implied.”

There also two “Indices to the Commentary” (VIII). The first lists passages cited and/or discussed in Chapters II–V. The second is a subject index, which should help the reader find his way about the commentary with relative ease. In selecting subjects to include in the index, I have decided to err on the side of generosity, but I do not claim to have listed every subject that the curious reader might wish to investigate. Finally, there is a list of “Corrigenda and Addenda in the Text-Translation Volumes” (IX). Until there is a second edition (as against a reprint [1993] with some corrections), it seems prudent to provide such a list.

In writing the comments that appear in this volume, I have most often referred to ancient works by means of English titles. That may offend the

¹¹ Somewhat of an exception is the long text on piety (584A), which in the text-translation volumes is printed in the section on religion and in this commentary is referred to in Chapter IV, Section 12 on “Natural Relationship.” In this case, I have been highly selective in choosing the words to include in the index. A fuller listing will be found in *Commentary* vol. 6.2.

die-hard classicist, but considering today's readership and even more so tomorrow's, I think that the use of English titles rather than Greek or Latin titles is sensible. Similarly, I have often quoted in translation or added a translation to quotations. In addition, I have resisted excessive abbreviation. That is especially true in regard to scholarly journals. I have no difficulty with, e.g., *RhM* = *Rheinisches Museum*, but I am worried that many readers outside the field of classics will be puzzled. To be sure, a list of abbreviations might have been appended, but that would make the reader flip back and forth, and (heaven forbid) make xeroxing even more of a chore. In any case, I have tried for balance, while keeping the modern reader in mind.

When I began writing this commentary, I thought it advisable to make clear throughout the commentary that Books 5, 6 and 7 of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* are often referred to as the "common books." I.e., they are shared in common by the *Nicomachean* and *Eudemian Ethics*: *NE* 5–7 = *EE* 4–6. The idea that the books are to be so regarded is based on the three primary manuscripts of the *Eudemian Ethics*. In two of these manuscripts, the books are not written out within the body of the *Eudemian Ethics*. Only book numbers and incipits are given. The full texts are found in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, which occurs earlier in these manuscripts. In the other manuscript, the *Nicomachean Ethics* is omitted, and all three books are written out as part of the *Eudemian Ethics*.¹² There has been considerable scholarly discussion concerning the original position of these books. And on certain issues like pleasure and happiness, assigning the books to one treatise or the other is important for understanding Aristotle's development. Moreover, certain Theophrastean texts exhibit a close relationship to the *Eudemian Ethics*, which suggests that references to the common books ought to include mention of the *Eudemian Ethics*. For this reason, I initially decided always to signal the common status of the books by using an equals-sign: e.g., "*NE* 6.5 = *EE* 5.5." In time, however, the procedure became cumbersome and gave the impression of padding. Moreover, in a work focused on Theophrastus, it is not always of special importance where one locates the common books. For Theophrastus will have known them wherever they originally belonged. I have, therefore, abandoned my initial deci-

¹² See D. Harlfinger, "Die Überlieferungsgeschichte der Eudemischen Ethik," in *Untersuchungen zur Eudemischen Ethik* (Berlin: De Gruyter 1970) pp. 1–50 and the concise statement by P. Webb, "The Relative Dating of the Accounts of Pleasure in Aristotle's *Ethics*," *Phronesis* 22 (1977) pp. 243–247.

sion and adopted a more pragmatic approach. Most often I give only the Nicomachean reference when referring to the common books. That corresponds with all modern editions (the common books are printed as part of the *NE*) and is economical. Nevertheless, I have not hesitated to add a reference to the *Eudemian Ethics* (book and section numbers), whenever it seems important to underline the fact that on occasion Theophrastus aligns himself closely with what Aristotle says in the *Eudemian Ethics*.¹³

In the case of the *Ethics*, *Politics* and *Rhetoric* and certain other Aristotelian texts, my references are most often to the Oxford Classical Text. That may cause grumbling by those who possess Bekker's edition and regard it as the standard for references to a particular chapter or line. But today the OCT is more widely used, and in my circle it has become the standard. Indeed many libraries in America do not have Bekker's edition. An exception is the reference to the *Nicomachean Ethics* in the heading to texts drawn from an Aristotelian commentator. When the commentators were edited, Bekker was still king, and his chapter and line numbers are found in the editions (CAG) and in the text-translation volumes (FHS&G).¹⁴ Hence, I am guilty of an inconsistency, but it is a minor one that will cause no difficulty.¹⁵

In conclusion, I want to underline the fact that this commentary volume contains comments on Arabic material by Dimitri Gutas. I am grateful to Dimitri for his contributions and his collegiality over many years.

¹³ For completeness sake, I note that Aspasius (first half of the 2nd century AD) regarded Eudemus as the author of the *Eudemian Ethics*. The view is by no means foolish and was once defended by Harold Cherniss in private conversation with me.

¹⁴ See 554 and 555, where the Bekker chapter numbers are higher by one than those of the OCT.

¹⁵ The oft-repeated saying "consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds" remains as true today as it was when I first heard it some sixty years ago.

CHAPTER TWO

THE SOURCES

For the most part, the Greek and Latin sources as well as a single Italian source will be discussed in chronological order. Exceptional are the “Anthologies, Gnomologies and Other Collections,” the “Lexicographers,” the “Scholia,” a “Catalogue of Books” and the “Arabic Sources.” The sources belonging to these categories will be treated last. To facilitate finding a particular source, I provide here an alphabetical listing of the sources followed by the number of its position in the discussion that begins immediately after this list.

- | | |
|---|---|
| Abū-l-Farağ ibn-aṭ-Ṭayyib 68 | Damascius 31 |
| Aelian 21 | Denis the Carthusian 38 |
| Albert the Great 35 | <i>Depository of Wisdom Lit.</i> 66 |
| Alexander of Aphrodisias 19 | Diogenes Laertius 22 |
| Ambrose 28 | Engelbert of Admont 42 |
| Anonymous on Aristotle’s <i>NE</i> 18 | al-Fārābī 64 |
| <i>Antiatticist</i> 54 | <i>Fiori e vita</i> : see <i>Choice Sayings and Lives</i> |
| Antonius Melissa 41 | <i>Florilegium: Best and First Lessons</i> 46 |
| Aphthonius, Aelius Festus 25 | <i>Florilegium Monacense</i> 47 |
| Apollonius 2 | Fulgentius 30 |
| ps.-Aristotle 1 | Gellius 17 |
| Aspasius 15 | <i>Gnomologium Vaticanum</i> 48 |
| Athenaeus 20 | Hesychius 56 |
| Aurelius: see Marcus | Ḥunayn ibn-Ishāq 63 |
| Barlaam of Seminara | Jerome 29 |
| Bartholomew of Bruges 36 | John of Lydia 33 |
| Burley, Walter 44 | Julian 27 |
| Censorinus 23 | Libanius 26 |
| <i>Choice Sayings and Lives</i> 45 | <i>Light of the Soul</i> 49 |
| Cicero 4 | Marcus Aurelius 16 |
| Codex Neapolitanus II D 22 51 | ps.-Maximus Confessor 40 |
| Codex Vaticanus Gr. 1144 52 | Michael of Ephesus 34 |
| Codices Parisini Lat. 2772, 4718, 4887 50 | |

al-Mubaššir 67	Porphry 24
Ibn-an-Nadīm 65	Rutilius Lupus 8
Papyrus Pack ² 1574 53	Scholium on Aristotle's <i>NE</i> 60
Pap. Pack ² 2089: see Pap. Peters.	Scholium on Euripides' <i>Hipp.</i> 58
Pap. Petersburgiensis Gr. 13 62	Scholium on Plato's <i>Laws</i> 59
Parthenius 5	Scholium on Theocritus' <i>Id.</i> 4 61
Philodemus 3	Seneca 9
Photius 57	Simplicius 32
Phrynichus 55	Şiwān al-ḥikma: see <i>Depository</i>
Pliny the Elder 10	Stobaeus 39
Plutarch 11	Strabo 7
ps.-Plutarch (440A) 12	Thomas of Ireland 43
ps.-Plutarch (479) 13	Vitruvius 6
ps.-Plutarch (502) 14	az-Zawazani 69

1. *Authors Including Pseudonymi and
Anonymi Arranged Chronologically*

1 pseudo-Aristotle] 3rd–1st cent. BC.

Among the letters attributed to Aristotle some are genuine¹ and others are forgeries. Our concern is with the latter. That such letters existed and have been transmitted to us is hardly surprising, for in the Hellenistic period, the fabrication of letters allegedly written by well-known individuals became a quasi-art form.² On occasion, the fabricator will have wished to create or establish something as fact. On another occasion, he may have wished to develop a saying, genuine or spurious, into a mini-treatise. In addition to such substantive concerns, the fabricator may have wanted to reveal the character of the alleged author or recipient of both. He may also have been as much or even more concerned with exhibiting a particular prose style.³ An example of establishing a fact in combination

¹ Regarding the genuine letters, see the catalogues of Aristotelian writings (Diogenes Laertius no. 144 D and Hesychius no. 137) and the discussions of Düring (1968) col. 163–165 and Flashar (1983) p. 288.

² On forgeries in general, see Sykutris, “Epistolographie,” in *Paulys Realencyclopädie Suppl.* Bd. 5 (1931) col. 208–216. Citing Sykutris, Düring (1968) col. 165 speaks of “eine Literaturgattung, die bis ins 4. Jhdt. hinaufreicht.” Düring goes on to compare the fabrication of letters with that of speeches. See also Düring (1957) pp. 432–434.

³ The motives that I have mentioned are not intended to be exhaustive. For fuller discussion, see Sykutris col. 211–212. On style and the presentation of character, see

with noticeable style will be found in Aulus Gellius, who preserves two forged letters: one from Alexander the Great to Aristotle and a second by Aristotle in reply. Alexander is made to complain about the publication of Aristotle's "acroatic" writings, i.e. the writings that are the basis of Aristotle's lectures to advanced students. These writings were used by Aristotle in teaching Alexander, who expresses concern that he will be no different from other persons, who now have access to the writings. In reply, Aristotle is made to say that the writings will be intelligible only to those who have heard his lectures (*Attic Nights* 20.5.11–12 = Aristotle, fr. 662 Rose³ = letter no. 1 Plezia). The reply is by no means absurd (put an Aristotelian treatise in the hands of an ordinary person and he is likely to find the text less than perspicuous), but that does not make the reply genuine. Rather we have two forged letters that were composed by someone who wanted to establish the term "acroatic" as Aristotelian. In addition, the forger wanted to achieve a certain level of style, and in doing so he also succeeded in winning the approval of Gellius, who expresses his delight in the letters' "slender thread of elegant brevity."⁴

An example of a letter built around a saying is our text 518 (= letter no. 4 Plezia), in which Aristotle is made to address Philip of Macedon. In the middle of the letter, Aristotle praises his colleague Theophrastus for saying that favor, χάρις, "is not to be regretted and bears noble fruit (in) the praise of those who are well-treated" (lines 9–10). On both sides of this praise, the view expressed in the saying is developed, and Aristotle and Theophrastus are understood to be men of good character. For further discussion, see the comment on 518.

A letter addressed to Theophrastus concerns wrongs that occur among friends and the need to deal with these wrongs in an expeditious and sensible manner (no. 6 Plezia). No one line is identified or stands out as taken from either Aristotle or Theophrastus, but the advice given is in line with views held by the two Peripatetics. A clear concern with style is present: the use of καί—καί and μέν—δέ (section 1), the striking metaphor of a smooth and rough sea (also section 1), and the use of ἑταιρία (section 2), where ἑταῖροι might be clearer. For further remarks, see the comment on 543 *ad fin.*

Demetrius Rhetor, *On Expression* 223–239. The idea that Theophrastus actually addressed epistolary style in his Περί λέξεως cannot be documented and is firmly rejected by Sykutris col. 189.

⁴ Gellius tells us that he has taken the letters from a book of the philosopher Andronicus. That Andronicus was the author of the letters is possible but cannot be proven.

2 Apollonius] 2nd cent. BC.

The Apollonius under consideration is the paradoxographer, whose work has come down to us under the title Ἱστορίαι θαυμάσιαι, *Amazing Stories*.⁵ The work survives in a single manuscript, codex Palatinus Graecus 398 and is available in *Paradoxographorum Graecorum reliquiae* 1966, ed. Alexander Giannini, pp. 119–143. It contains fifty-one entries, each presenting something deemed θαυμαστόν. A few entries lack specific attribution, but most are attributed to a particular author. Thirty entries are explicitly referred to Peripatetics: fifteen to Aristotle,⁶ two to Aristoxenus⁷ and thirteen to Theophrastus.⁸

At the beginning of the text, we read: Βώλου Ἐπιμενίδης Κρής λέγεται ..., “Of Bolus Epimenides the Cretan is said ...”. Giannini comments that the beginning is clearly corrupt: *initium mutilum satis patet* (p. 120 in *app. crit.*). Apparently something has fallen out before the reference to Epimenides, leaving behind only a single proper name in the genitive case, Βώλου. In the context of a work entitled *Amazing Stories*, it seems certain that person referred to is Bolus of Mendes in Egypt. He was a contemporary of Callimachus, and like Apollonius he had an interest in paradoxographical material. That Apollonius paid attention to Bolus’ work and even drew upon it is quite likely. One possibility is that Bolus is Apollonius’ source for the first six entries, which are special in that the focus is on individuals who work wonders, θαυματουργοί.⁹ That may be

⁵ Our translation might be questioned, for in other Theophrastean titles we have translated ἱστορία with “research”: Περί ἱστορίας with *On Research* (727 no. 8), Ἱστορικὰ ὑπομνήματα with *Research Memoranda* (727 no. 7) and Περί φυτῶν ἱστορία with *Research on Plants* (384 no. 1a). And in putting together his *mirabilia*, Apollonius will have done some searching. But researching (as I use the word) would be overstatement or at least misleading. In the case of Theophrastus, Apollonius may well have read through the botanical works, searching for the marvelous, but the research was done by Theophrastus. Moreover, some, if not most, of his reports were part of local lore (cf. μυθολογεῖται. φασί at the beginning of entry 3) and many are likely to have been ready at hand in earlier collections.

⁶ Entries 6–7, 11, 21–22, 25–28, 35, 37, 39, 44, 51. I am not counting entries drawn from Aristotle but not explicitly attributed to him.

⁷ Entries 30 and 40. Entry 49 = 726A speaks of Aristoxenus but is attributed to Theophrastus.

⁸ Entries 16, 29, 31–34, 41, 43, 46–50. I am counting the phrase ὁ αὐτός, “the same,” in entry 34.

⁹ The individuals are Epimenides, Aristeia, Hermotimus, Abaris, Pherecydes and Pythagoras. In his edition of the paradoxographers, Giannini p. 377 lists Apollonius’ first six entries as *fragmenta dubia* under Bolus’ name (F 2–7).

correct,¹⁰ but it is also possible that Bolus is named in connection with material that preceded what is now the first entry, i.e., that which begins by naming Epimenides.

In regard to Bolus and his relationship to Apollonius, a passage in Stephanus of Byzantium is of special interest. I am thinking of what we read in the *Ethnica*, s.v. ἀψίνθιον (wormwood).¹¹ There Stephanus attributes to Bolus a report concerning Theophrastus that is found in Apollonius without variation. The passage in question is *Research on Plants* 9.17.4. Theophrastus is focused on habituation, ἔθος: he asserts its importance for ingestion and refers to sheep. He first mentions sheep that do not eat ἀψίνθιον, wormwood, and then tells us that “those in the Pontus eat (wormwood) and become fatter and better looking and, as some say, have no bile.” In both Apollonius and Bolus (as reported by Stephanus) this sentence is shortened by the omission of any reference to becoming fatter and better looking. Also omitted is the clause “as some say,” so that we are left with the simple assertion that the sheep “have no bile” (31). Given the two paradoxographers’ interest in the amazing, shortening the sentence makes sense (get to the point as quickly as possible) and omitting the qualifier “as some say” removes an important expression of caution that might lessen the impact of what is being reported. But there is a down side to omitting the qualifying phrase. Without it someone might believe that Theophrastus was reporting his own view, perhaps based on autopsy. But that would be an error.

Here, then, we have a case in which both paradoxographers present an identical report that may mislead the reader who is interested in Theophrastus. Should we say that Apollonius has done nothing more than copy Bolus, his predecessor, who is the original culprit? And if we do, should we take a further step and say that all of Apollonius’ reports concerning Theophrastus are taken from Bolus? We might posit as a principle, “If one report, then all reports,”¹² and proceed to eliminate Apollonius as an independent witness regarding Theophrastus. That is tempting, but since we have no second text of Bolus with which to test the application of the principle to Apollonius, I prefer to leave the matter undecided

¹⁰ M. Wellmann, “Bolos 3” *Paulys Realencyclopädie* vol. 3.1 (1897) col. 677 endorses the view; K. Ziegler “Paradoxographoi,” *Paulys Realencyclopädie* vol. 18.3 (1949) col. 1153–1154 is opposed. See A. Gianinni, “Studi sulla paradossographia greca,” *Acme* 17 (1964) pp. 123–124 n. 144.

¹¹ Stephanus p. 153.10–12 Meineke = fr. 1 G. The plant is *artemisia absinthium*.

¹² Cf. Diggle, p. 17 on the definitions that precede the character sketches of Theophrastus.

and to address a different question for which we have evidence: namely, are the excerpts or reports found in Apollonius free renderings of what Theophrastus says? The answer is yes: Apollonius varies the diction, rearranges the material and adds and subtracts.¹³ But we should also recognize degrees of departure from a given Theophrastean text, such that not all of Apollonius' reports involve (serious) misrepresentation. In support, I shall discuss two further texts from *Research on Plants*.

One text is found in *Research on Plants* 9.18.2. Theophrastus speaks of θηλύφονον, "woman-killer" (wolf's bane¹⁴), comments that some people call this plant σκορπίος, "scorpion," because it has a root like a scorpion, and goes on to say that it kills a scorpion if it is shredded over the animal. Apollonius reverses the names of the plant. He introduces the plant as "scorpion" and comments that some people call the plant "woman-killer." He drops the explanation concerning what some people say (it does not suit the name "woman-killer") and adds "plant" to the initial mention of scorpion to make clear that he is not talking about the animal. In addition, he replaces "shredded over" with "placed upon" and replaces "kills" with "dries up straightway" (41).¹⁵ Apollonius may have

¹³ In saying "Apollonius varies, rearranges" etc., I do not want to rule out the use of intermediate sources, from which Apollonius has taken over changes to the original Theophrastean text.

¹⁴ I.e. the poisonous plant *aconitum anthora*.

¹⁵ Apollonius refers to Book 8 of *Research on Plants*. That is an error and reason for caution when dealing with Apollonius' reports. But in fairness to Apollonius, we should allow the possibility of scribal error or that Apollonius consulted a copy of *Research on Plants*, in which material was organized differently. In this regard, two entries should be mentioned. One is entry 47, in which Apollonius refers to *Research on Plants* for the statement that certain kinds of truffle become harder when there is continuous thunder. That may be a simple error, but it should be observed that the reference to thunder and harder truffles invites comparison with a text in Athenaeus, according to which Theophrastus reported that certain truffles are said to come to be when thunder is hard or harsh (*The Sophists at Dinner* 2.60 62B = 400A.6). Perhaps Apollonius is not wrong to name Theophrastus, but he confuses hard thunder with hard truffles and gets the Theophrastean work wrong. Of greater interest is entry 29, for the text on which the entry is based occurs twice in *Research on Plants* and within sections that exhibit variation: i.e., in 9.13.3 and 9.20.4. Some editors, e.g., Wimmer and Hort condemn the earlier passage, but Amigues vol. 5 pp. xlv and 173–176 points to the second passage as the addition of a reviser. I am impressed by Amigues' argument but leave the issue to others.

For our purposes, it is sufficient to note that the manuscript tradition is complicated, so that a wrongheaded divergence by Apollonius from our received text need not be a simple error. For completeness' sake, I add that in both sections, 9.13.3 and 9.20.4, the sentence that underlies Apollonius' entry is the same: ἐὰν δὲ αἱ μήτραι προσπέσωσι, τῷ ὕδατι ἀποκλύζειν (understand κελεύουσι or χοή), "If *prolapsus uteri* occurs, wash off with water." Apollonius' changes are typical: for the sake of comprehension he adds a reference

thought the latter change an improvement (more remarkable and greater impact), but the former seems to gain nothing (“placed upon” is less interesting). All this seems harmless enough, though the initial reversal of “woman-killer” and “scorpion” introduces a difference in emphasis. In Theophrastus, “woman killer” enjoys pride of place and “scorpion” is secondary. Apollonius reverses that.

As a second text, I cite *Research on Plants* 9.17.2–3. Here (as in 9.17.4, see above) Theophrastus is interested in poisonous substances and in showing that habituation makes a difference in regard to their ingestion. By way of illustration, Theophrastus refers to two like-named persons: Eudemus the drug vendor and Eudemus the Chian.¹⁶ The former is said to have wagered that he would suffer no ill-effects, to have ingested moderately and nevertheless been overcome. The latter is said to have drunk hellebore without experiencing any ill-effect. And on one occasion, we are told, he spoke of consuming twenty-two cups on the same day without being overcome. However,¹⁷ he is said to have done this by means of an antidote containing pumice-stone that he took in the course of the day. What Apollonius does with this text does not inspire confidence. He makes the two persons called Eudemus into one: a person named Eunomus, who is a Chian and a drug vendor. In addition, Apollonius attributes both the wager (made by the first Eudemus) and the successful drinking of 22 cups (accomplished by the second Eudemus) to this combined figure. The wager is mentioned in connection with the consumption of 22 cups, which in Theophrastus are separate events. And the explanation in terms of pumice-stone is replaced with one based on habituation (50). Amigues thinks that the name “Eunomus” is preferable in regard to the second Eudemus and alters the Theophrastean text accordingly.¹⁸ Perhaps she is correct, but that does not explain collapsing two people into one, misplacing the wager and replacing pumice-stone with habituation.

to birthwort, expands the prepositional phrase, replaces an infinitive construction with an imperative, and adds a vague reference to time: ἐὰν αἱ μήτραι προσπέσωσι, ἀριστολογία ἐν ὕδατι βεβρεγμένη καταντλείσθωσαν πλείονας ἡμέρας, “If *prolapsus uteri* occurs, let (the prolapsed uterus) be bathed for several days with birthwort made wet in water.” In adding πλείονας ἡμέρας, Apollonius may intend to remove what he takes to be an unfortunate omission on the part of Theophrastus.

¹⁶ I am reporting the reading of the codices.

¹⁷ “However” here translates πλὴν, which is used to indicate that the following explanation is not what one might expect, i.e., habituation. Instead, we are told that Eudemus the Chian drank an antidote.

¹⁸ Amigues vol. 5 p. 212 n. 6.

Up to this point I have ignored the Apollonian text that especially concerns us. It is not a report of what Theophrastus says in *Research on Plants*. Rather, Apollonius refers to the work Περί ἐνθουσιασμῶν, *On (Types of) Inspiration* (328 no. 9b). This work has been lost except for three fragments. One is a longer text that deals with music as a means of treating bodily and psychic ills (726A). It is entry 49 in Apollonius' collection. The other two are shorter parallel texts that are found in Athenaeus (726B) and Aulus Gellius (726C). All three texts have been printed in the section on "Music." The longer text (A) has been referred to from the section on "Ethics," for it exhibits a clear interest in changing unwanted behavior. To what extent *On (Types of) Inspiration* exhibited a strong interest in natural science, i.e., the physiology of enthusiasm cannot be determined. In Diogenes' catalogue of Theophrastean writings, the work is reported to have been one book in length (5.43 = 1.102). That does not preclude multiple interests, but given the paucity of our evidence, we should hesitate before speaking of a full-blown account of inspiration/enthusiasm from many different angles.

Since the Theophrastean work has been lost, we cannot compare what Apollonius tells us in 726A with what Theophrastus actually wrote. But if we keep in mind the kinds of change that Apollonius was prepared to make in other entries, then we may be able to avoid error or at least pinpoint places where caution is called for. See the commentary on 726A.

3 Philodemus] c. 110–40 BC.

Philodemus was born in Gadara, Syria and studied philosophy under Zeno of Sidon, who was head of the Epicurean school in Athens. Philodemus subsequently went to Rome and then to Naples, where he enjoyed a close relationship with Lucius Calpurnius Piso Caesoninus, the father-in-law of Julius Caesar. Philodemus wrote extensively on a variety of subjects including ethics, religion, rhetoric, poetics and music. In his writings, he engages in debate with members of other schools, and like Epicurus, who wrote a work Πρὸς Θεόφραστον, *In Reply to Theophrastus* (280.1),¹⁹ he concerned himself with the doctrines of Theophrastus. Not surprisingly Philodemus argued against them (659.1–2), but he also

¹⁹ See P. Huby in *Commentary* 4 on psychology (1999) p. 66. Although the preposition πρὸς may express relationship in general, whether negative or positive, I agree with Huby that πρὸς in Philodemus' title is likely to have negative connotations (= "against"). See *Commentary* 8 (2005c) on rhetoric and poetics p. 8 n. 11.

recognized that some of the positions taken by Theophrastus were “not unworthy of consideration” (660.1–2).

Philodemus’ discussions of Theophrastean doctrine are largely lost. What does survive is found on badly damaged papyri, which were buried during the eruption of the volcano Vesuvius in 79 AD.²⁰ For the most part, the remains are quite brief. Context has been lost and lacunae occur, which make the texts difficult to interpret. Regarding brevity and therefore lost context, I cite three texts that have been relegated to the end of the text-translation volumes under the heading “Unassigned.” In 739 from Philodemus’ work *On Death*, we have only “Theophrastus denied these things,” and in 741 from *On Love of Reputation*, we have “according to Theophrastus.” From the titles of these two works of Philodemus, we might have hoped for fragments that report Theophrastus’ views on ethical issues, but we are disappointed. No better is 740 from the *Index of Academics*. We read that Diodorus “did his researches in the time of Theophrastus.” The Diodorus mentioned here is most likely the Diodorus who wrote a work entitled *Memorabilia*, in which he said that Speusippus was the first to posit the common element in all studies.²¹ We would like to know why Theophrastus is mentioned. Did Diodorus refer to Theophrastus simply to establish when Diodorus was doing research, or did he also discuss some Theophrastean doctrine? Perhaps the latter, but there is a more fundamental worry. We cannot exclude the possibility that the Theophrastus mentioned here is not the Peripatetic but the archon of 340/39.

Regarding lost context together with lacunae, I cite three examples. One is 261 from *On the Gods*. We read, “Theophrastus says the natural (philosophers?). We might at least then differ from him (?) either in having these concepts that we now have or those that introduce a god who exercises foresight wisely.” Understanding “philosophers” with “natural,” φυσικοῦς, is, I think, sound, but what follows is more difficult, for it depends upon reading τοῦτ[ου], “him,” when τοῦτ[ων], “them,” picking up the natural philosophers, is also possible.

A second example is 720. At the beginning we have, “Since Theophrastus sees that (rhythms barely) contribute to virtue and only for children, and perhaps they contribute to intemperance.” Understanding

²⁰ The villa in which the papyri were discovered in the middle of the 18th century is thought to be that of Piso Caesoninus.

²¹ Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 4.2.

“rhythms barely” is the suggestion of David Sedley,²² and the reference to “intemperance” has not always found favor. The letters]κολασίαν were at first emended to read]κολακίαν, which has an initial attraction given Theophrastus’ interest in κολακεία, “flattery.”²³ But careful inspection of the papyrus now confirms ἀ]κολασίαν, “intemperance.” The problems do not stop there. At the end of the text as printed in the text-translation volumes, we read, [παθῶν χαρί]εν εὐκοσμίαν, “gracefulness of the passions (produces) orderliness.” That makes sense, but as the square brackets show, the supplement is more than two or three letters.

For a third example, I call attention to a text found in Philodemus’ *Notebook on Rhetoric* (27). We are told, “Theophrastus spent his whole life in private and (in) philosophy and (in) ignorance of the affairs of monarchs” (lines 2–4). Assuming that what immediately precedes also applies to Theophrastus, then we are told that Theophrastus “was not capable of writing on government” (lines 1–2). If the assumption concerning what precedes is correct, and if the supplements that produce “ignorance of the affairs of monarchs,” βασι[λι]κ[ῶν ἀ]πειρ[ο]ίαι π[ρ]αγ[μα]τ[ῶν] (lines 3–4), are correct, then Philodemus labels Theophrastus incompetent to write on politics and justifies this label by calling him not only a private person but also ignorant or inexperienced. The criticism is striking coming from an Epicurean, for that school promoted a tranquil life. True, but Philodemus himself wrote a work *On the Good King according to Homer*, which he dedicated to Piso (consul 58 BC). Be that as it may, the criticism seems heavy handed when directed at a man who observed the rise of Macedon and the behavior of Alexander the Great. Moreover, Theophrastus is reported to have held that perfection involves not only investigating how one ought to rule and legislate but also investigating for the sake of action (479.2, 8–10). I do not want to call into question Theophrastus’ praise of the contemplative life (482), but more than likely Philodemus’ characterization of Theophrastus is unfair and perhaps influenced by Theophrastus’ quarrel with Dicaearchus (481).

Regarding Philodemus’ knowledge of Theophrastus’ *Characters*, see below, the commentary on 450 no. 1–4 in Chapter IV, Section 3 “Virtue and Vice.”

²² See below, the commentary on 720 in Chapter IV, Section 4 “Education, Exhortation and Censure.”

²³ Theophrastus wrote a work *Περὶ κολακείας*, *On Flattery* 436 no. 25, and his *Characters* includes a sketch of the flatterer (2). Of that sketch Philodemus took note in his own work *On Flattery* (450 no. 1 and 2). See below.

4 Cicero] 106–43 BC.

Cicero was not only an active politician but also a prolific writer. In addition to numerous speeches, he wrote on a variety of subjects including ethics and politics. He knew Greek well and often cites Greek authors including Aristotle and Theophrastus. My earlier work on Peripatetic rhetoric and in particular my studies of Cicero's reports concerning the rhetorical doctrines of Aristotle and Theophrastus have convinced me that Cicero is an important source for recovering the doctrines of Theophrastus. But these same studies have also convinced me that Cicero's reports must be viewed with caution. In the case of Aristotle, we have his *Rhetoric* and can check what Cicero says. The result can be disappointing. By way of illustration, I cite Cicero's remarks concerning prose rhythm. There are two reports found in works that are separated in time and different in form. The earlier report (55 BC) occurs in a dialogue entitled *On the Orator*. The dialogue is imagined to take place in 91 BC; the primary discussants are Crassus and Antonius. The work is generally and correctly admired, but that does not undo the fact that Aristotle's position is seriously misrepresented. It is uncertain whether the misrepresentation should be attributed to Cicero's own hasty (careless) reading of the *Rhetoric* or to a misleading secondary source (handbook or collection of excerpts). But either way, what is said is not an accurate statement of Aristotelian doctrine.²⁴ The later report (46 BC) occurs in a treatise entitled *Orator*. Here Cicero speaks in his own voice and in some respects exhibits improved knowledge of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. But mistakes remain,²⁵ and that speaks for caution when using Cicero as a source for an author, whose works have not survived. And that includes Theophrastus. For further discussion of Cicero's reports concerning Aristotle's and Theophrastus' rhetorical doctrines, I refer to *Commentary* volume 8 on rhetoric and poetics (pp. 9–14) and especially to my article "Cicero as a Reporter of Aristotelian and Theophrastean Rhetorical Doctrine" (2005a, reprint 2006).

Turning now to ethics, we can say that on occasion Cicero shows a faulty grasp of Aristotelian doctrine. For a clear example, I turn to

²⁴ A limited use of the heroic foot is erroneously recommended, the trochee is confused with the tribrach and a disruptive remark about the cretic is added (*On the Orator* 3.182–183).

²⁵ Cicero continues to confuse the trochee with the tribrach, and now Cicero has Aristotle call the trochee a cordax, i.e., a vulgar dance (*Orator* 193).

the dialogue *On Ends*, in which Cicero has Piso contrast Theophrastus with Aristotle. The former is said to attribute so much importance to fortune that wisdom and virtue are unable to guarantee a happy life. That view is described as overly delicate and soft. To be preferred is the view of Aristotle as expressed in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (498.9–14). The problem here is not what is said about Theophrastus but what is said about Aristotle. Had Cicero read the *Nicomachean Ethics* with care, he would have known that Aristotle too respects the power of fortune. Indeed, Aristotle emphatically denies that a good man can be happy in the midst of extreme misfortune (*NE* 7.13/*EE* 6.13 1153b17–21). On his view, nobody would call a man in such circumstances happy, unless he were defending a thesis (*NE* 1.5 1096a1–2, cf. 1.9 1100a5–9).²⁶

Earlier in the same passage, Cicero has Piso recognize two kinds of writings on the highest good. There are exoteric works that are written in a popular style and esoteric works (commentaries) that are described as more refined (498.1–3).²⁷ The *Nicomachean Ethics* belongs to the class of esoteric works. In regard to Theophrastus, Cicero cites the work *On Happiness* (436 no. 12), but he does not tell us to which class of writings it belongs. Scholars have judged it to be a dialogue and therefore an exoteric work that was written in a popular style. I am inclined to agree with that judgment²⁸ and to classify it together with the *Callisthenes* (436 no. 15), which was almost certainly an exoteric work. In his *Tusculan Disputations*, Cicero cites the *Callisthenes* and tells us that in it Theophrastus praised the maxim “Fortune rules life, not wisdom” (493.18–19). My guess is that Cicero knows Theophrastus’ views concerning fortune and happiness primarily through reading his popular works. But that may matter little, for Theophrastus is likely to have advanced sim-

²⁶ See, e.g., H. Rackham, *Cicero, De finibus bonorum et malorum* (London: Heinemann 1914, reprint 1951) p. 404 n. a, who comments, “It seems certain that Cicero had never read or had forgotten the book (the *NE*), for he entirely ignores its distinctive doctrines.” Annas (2001) p. xxii is more generous to Cicero. She tells us that he was “familiar with the work we call the *Nicomachean Ethics*.” Such a judgment makes me uneasy, for “familiar” often suggests closeness and knowledge in regard to a person or thing. In that sense, I find it hard to believe that Cicero was familiar with the *Nicomachean Ethics*, when he wrote *On Ends* 5.12 = 498.9–15.

²⁷ For fuller discussion of the distinction between exoteric and esoteric writings, see below, the introduction to Chapter III “Titles of Books.”

²⁸ See below, Chapter III “Titles of Books” no. 12 and Chapter IV “The Texts” on 475.

ilar views in his esoteric writings. He may have expressed himself with greater reserve, but he will not have denied that happiness cannot endure extreme misfortune.

In several of the texts that we have grouped together as ethical, Cicero characterizes Theophrastus, i.e., his style as attractive. It is said to be admirable (480A.2), brilliant and illustrious (482.4), most elegant (493.7) and sweet or pleasing (497.1). Similar assessments occur elsewhere (51.3–4, 52A3, 52B5), and while some may be *pro forma*, taken together these references to an attractive style suggest that Cicero was acquainted with Theophrastus' exoteric works. Few, if any, of the esoteric works will have been written in a style that could be credibly characterized as sweet and elegant.²⁹ In this regard, it is of some interest that Cicero refers by title to only three of Theophrastus' ethical works: *On Happiness*, *Callisthenes* and *On Wealth*. I have already indicated that the first two of these works were most likely exoteric. The same is true of *On Wealth*; see below the commentary on 436 no. 19. Here I observe only that in one of the two texts that refer to *On Wealth*, Cicero is quite unfair to Theophrastus. After saying that Theophrastus said many excellent things, Cicero immediately adds that Theophrastus praised in ridiculous fashion (*absurde*) the lavish expenditure of personal funds on public spectacles (514.8–12). There are two reasons to condemn this judgment. First, it certainly misrepresents Theophrastus' considered view concerning the proper use of wealth. Since *On Wealth* seems to have been a dialogue, we can imagine an interlocutor putting forth a wrong-headed view concerning expenditure, but in lecture within the Peripatos Theophrastus will not have praised such a use of personal wealth. Second, Cicero is almost certainly using Theophrastus *qua* well-respected philosopher in order to enhance his own image. He first offers a compliment and then delivers an attack. The compliment suggests that what follows will be unbiased and credible.³⁰ The listener or reader accepts the criticism that follows and is impressed with Cicero's own moral character. It is superior to that of Theophrastus.³¹ Here we have further reason for being cautious in

²⁹ Cf. *Commentary* vol. 8 on rhetoric and poetics pp. 10–11 n. 22.

³⁰ The trick here is well known. See Plutarch, *On the Malice of Herodotus* 9 856D–E, where we are told that it is malicious to put praise alongside censure. The praise is intended to make the censure appear credible.

³¹ The issue is complicated by the suspicion (belief) that in 514 Cicero is drawing on Panaetius and not reporting what he himself read in *On Wealth*. See below, Chapter IV on text 514.

dealing with Cicero's reports. Not only is he drawing on exoteric works that may contain passages that depart in one way or another from what is said in the esoteric works, but also Cicero may choose to use a prominent author like Theophrastus for his own enhancement.³²

Two paragraphs above, I said that Cicero's knowledge of Theophrastus' views concerning happiness and fortune are "primarily" attributable to his reading of exoteric writings. The qualifier "primarily" is important, for I do not want to exclude or even minimize the influence that Antiochus had on Cicero.³³ In 79 BC at the age of 27, Cicero went to Athens, where for six months he heard Antiochus lecture in the Ptolemaeum (*Brutus* 315, *On Ends* 5.1). Cicero was clearly impressed by Antiochus, whom he describes as outstanding in intellect and knowledge (*Lucullus* 4, *On Laws* 1.54). He also speaks of their mutual friendship (*Lucullus* 113, *Academics* 1.13, 43). In 68 or 67 BC, Antiochus died in Mesopotamia in the service of the politician-soldier Lucius Lucullus (*Index Academicorum* 34.39–42). Some 22 years later, Cicero wrote the *Academics* and *On Ends*. In the former, he has Varro present the ethical views of Antiochus, and in the latter Piso is made to do the same.³⁴ In some measure, Cicero will be recalling what he heard Antiochus say in lecture, but he is also drawing on conversations with Antiochus' brother Aristus³⁵ and on the writings of Antiochus himself. That Antiochus' writings were frequently consulted strikes me as likely. No text makes the point explicitly, but in the *Tusculan Disputations*, Cicero tells us that in several places, *locis pluribus*, Antiochus wrote about the relation of virtue to happiness (5.22). The plural suggests acquaintance with the writings of Antiochus, and we can imagine Cicero consulting different works or portions of works as needed. But that said, we should not assume that Cicero has simply reproduced what he found in one work or another. As Barnes argues, Cicero knew the teachings of

³² For a different example drawn from Cicero's *Orator*, see *Commentary* vol. 8 on rhetoric and poetics, pp. 327–328 with n. 497.

³³ Antiochus hailed from Ascalon in Syria. He was born c. 130 BC and died in 68/7. See Barnes (1989) pp. 52–53, 59.

³⁴ In the *Academics*, Cicero explicitly asks Varro to recount the arguments of Antiochus and the entire system of the Old Academy, with which he has been out of touch for a considerable period of time. This request is seconded by Atticus, who allows that it has been a long time since he heard Antiochus present the doctrines in question (1.14). In *On Ends*, Cicero urges Piso to expound the doctrine of the Old Academy and the Peripatetics on the ends of goods. Piso is said to be well suited to the task, for he has had the Peripatetic philosopher Staseas in his house for many years and has been studying the subject under Antiochus in Athens for several months (5.8).

³⁵ Cicero visited Aristus in Athens in 51 BC. (*Letters to Atticus* 5.10.5).

Antiochus well and was quite capable of making Piso (and Varro) present Antiochian doctrine without paraphrasing, let alone translating, written passages.³⁶

Of greater importance is whether Antiochus was a reliable reporter, on whom Cicero could draw without being seriously misled. I say “seriously,” for minor mistakes are obvious: e.g., the assertion that Plato advanced a tripartite division of philosophy, in which ethics was marked off from physics and logic (*Academics* 1.19).³⁷ More serious is whether Antiochus’ interest in finding agreement between the Academics, Peripatetics and Stoics occasionally involved misreporting the ethical doctrines of individual philosophers including Theophrastus. In response, I offer three reflections. First, Antiochus did not claim perfect agreement between the schools. Indeed, in the *Academics* Cicero has Varro take note of what he calls modifications or corrections (1.33, 35). In regard to Strato, Theophrastus’ successor as head of the Peripatetic school, Varro goes so far as to say that he should be totally set aside, for he ignored ethics, which is the most important part of philosophy (1.34). Second, some simplification on the part of Antiochus cannot be denied, but concerning the central issue of the value assigned to bodily and external goods, the Academics and the Peripatetics will have been in essential agreement.³⁸ For happiness, the goods of the soul, the moral and intellectual virtues, are most important, but happiness cannot be achieved in the total absence of bodily and external goods.³⁹ That the Stoics were different is recognized by Varro, who says that they tried to correct the Academic-Peripatetic ethical system by recognizing no other good but virtue (1.35–36). Third, Theophrastus is picked out and said to have done violence to the authority of the ancient system by denying that happiness is placed in virtue alone (1.33). This claim is problematic and will be discussed in the

³⁶ See Barnes (1989) pp. 65–66.

³⁷ Associating physics with the *Timaeus*, ethics with *Republic* and logic with the *Theaetetus* (Stobaeus 2.7.3 f. [vol. 2 p. 49.18–23 W]) is interesting, but it hardly establishes Plato as the originator of the threefold division of philosophy. For a nuanced treatment of the issue, see Tsouni pp. 21–28.

³⁸ The Peripatetic doctrine of three kinds of goods can be found already in Plato. See below, the introduction to Chapter IV, Section 7 “Fortune and Goods and Evils outside the Soul.”

³⁹ For an assessment of Antiochus’ synthesis of Academic and Peripatetic ethics, see Dillon (2003) pp. 136–150, along with Mejer (2009) p. 39 n. 43. Concerning Antiochus’ own distinction between two levels of happiness and the adequacy of virtue in the midst of misfortune to secure a happy life but not a most happy life, see below, the commentary to 480B, 492 and 493.

commentary on individual texts.⁴⁰ At this time I wish only to underline that the claim cannot be simply dismissed, for Antiochus was given to emphasizing agreement over disagreement. That he singled out Theophrastus in such an emphatic manner must have had some foundation in the writings of Theophrastus, even if Antiochus was heavy handed and less than fair in his treatment of Theophrastus.⁴¹

Finally it may be noted that while a comparatively large number of Ciceronian texts, sixteen by my count, are brought together within our Section on "Ethics" (vol. 2 pp. 254–399), the number of sub-sections in which the texts appear is limited to four out of seventeen: 5 "Happiness," 7 "Fortune and Goods and Evils outside the Soul," 8 "Fate, Nature and the Death of Callisthenes" and 9 "Wealth." That reflects the fact that in named texts (the basis of our collection), only a limited number of topics are discussed: 1) happiness in regard to virtue and misfortune, 2) happiness and contemplation; achieving a life similar to that of the gods, 3) wealth. To be sure, the texts might have been arranged differently, and on other topics Cicero may have drawn on Theophrastus without naming him, e.g., in regard to natural relationships and friendship (the topics of sections 12 and 13).⁴² Nevertheless, we can, I think, assert that Cicero is a limited witness in regard to the ethics of Theophrastus.

5 Parthenius] 1st century BC.

Parthenius was a Greek poet who hailed from Nicaea in Bithynia. He was captured during the third Mithridatic War and taken to Rome, where

⁴⁰ See the commentary on 492, 493, 498 and 499.

⁴¹ I have written "some foundation in the writings of Theophrastus," for the exoteric writings of Theophrastus and his criticisms not only of Dicaearchus, who championed the active life over that of quiet reflection, but also of Zeno, who founded the Stoa during Theophrastus' headship of the Peripatos, may have emphasized, even exaggerated, the power of bodily and external evils as part of a polemic or simply to capture attention.

⁴² An interesting case is provided by Aulus Gellius' discussion of helping a friend in violation of the law (534). After telling us that Theophrastus discussed the topic most diligently in his work *On Friendship*, (436 no. 23), Gellius says that Cicero seems to have read the Theophrastean work when he was composing his own like-named work. According to Gellius, Cicero took material from Theophrastus and translated it in a pleasing and apt manner. But in regard to helping a friend against the law, Cicero failed to pursue what Theophrastus had carefully and plainly written. The discussion being pedantic, Cicero merely took note of it in general terms and few words (534.15–27). How often Cicero rendered Theophrastus' Greek text in a pleasing manner without acknowledging his source and how often he skipped across a tightly argued passage are questions to which we would like to have answers, but I hazard no response on the basis of a single text or even two or three.

he was freed because of his learning. The date of his capture is disputed: 77 and 66 BC are candidates. If the former is correct, it is likely that he was born no later than 95 BC.⁴³ Be that as it may, Parthenius was a much appreciated poet, whose works included epicedia (most famous was that honoring Parthenius' deceased wife), hymns, a propemptikon (perhaps written for a patron whose travels would take him to Corycus in Cilicia⁴⁴) and *Metamorphoses*. Today only fragments of the poems survive.

What we do have is a collection of stories that concern sufferings involving love, ἐρωτικά παθήματα, written in prose and dedicated to Cornelius Gallus.⁴⁵ In the preface to the collection, Parthenius tells Gallus that he is to use the material in composing his own poems. Parthenius also says that the stories, as they appear in certain poets, do not stand on their own. Gallus will be better able to understand them by using the present collection. What Parthenius fails to say explicitly is that the stories are drawn not only from poets but also from historians and philosophers. Indeed, of the two stories that concern us one is said to be drawn from the historian Andriscus of Naxos and to have been written about by the philosopher Theophrastus (9 = 626.1–2), and the second is said to have been told by Theophrastus (18 = 625.1). But here we must be careful. For these reports concerning Andriscus and Theophrastus are not part of the main text of the stories that they accompany. Rather, they are marginalia, as are the other similar reports found in the manuscript of Parthenius' work. To be sure, they are written in the same hand as the main text, but it seems certain that these reports cannot be attributed to Parthenius. Moreover, ten out of the thirty-six stories in the collection lack a marginal note naming some work or works in which the story is reported to have occurred. And of the twenty-six that are accompanied by marginal notes, only one boasts a note in which it is clearly said that the story is drawn from a particular source. That is our text 626: ἡ ἱστορία αὕτη ἐλήφθη ἐκ τῆς α' Ἀνδρίσκου Ναξιῶν, "This story is taken from the first book of Andriscus' *Naxian Matters*." That does not mean that the marginalia are foolish notes without value for our purposes. On the whole, they may well be correct, but when we read ἱστορεῖ Θεόφραστος, "Theophrastus reports" (625.1), we cannot assume that what follows closely reflects Theophrastus' wording and organization of the story. The author of the marginal note may have referred to Theophrastus

⁴³ See the recent discussion of Parthenius' life by Francese pp. 17–28.

⁴⁴ Lightfoot pp. 40–41, 169–170.

⁴⁵ Gallus, 69–26 BC, was active both as a poet and in political life.

simply because he knew that Theophrastus had presented more or less the same story. And that is especially true of γράφει περὶ αὐτῆς καὶ Θεόφραστος, “Theophrastus also writes about it” (626.2). We might say that Theophrastus is being cited as a “parallel text.”⁴⁶

6 Vitruvius] 1st cent. BC.

The date of Vitruvius’ birth is unknown and the date of his death cannot be determined with exactitude. He was certainly active as a practicing architect and engineer during the late Roman Republic. The reason for placing him in the Augustan period is that his work *On Architecture* was dedicated to Caesar Augustus (Octavian). The fact that Vitruvius does not use the name Augustus but rather refers to Caesar (1.pref.1) has encouraged the view that Vitruvius wrote his work prior to 27 BC, when the name Augustus was officially conferred.⁴⁷ But other scholars suggest a later date: e.g., c. 25 BC and between 27 and 13 BC.⁴⁸

Vitruvius wrote *On Architecture* in Latin, but he knew Greek and does not hide the fact that he draws on Greek writings. Indeed, in Book 8 (there were ten books in all), Vitruvius, after discussing different kinds and sources of water, says that he has observed for himself some of the material included in the discussion, but other material has been found in the works of Greek authors. Thereupon he gives a list of seven Greek authors, of whom Theophrastus is given pride of place (8.3.27 = 210). Unfortunately Theophrastus is not named in the preceding discussion, but comparison with similar material found in later authors who do name Theophrastus enables us to identify certain passages in Vitruvius that contain Theophrastean material. It remains, however, uncertain whether Vitruvius has the material at second hand or through his own reading of Theophrastus.⁴⁹

There is only one other passage, in which Vitruvius names Theophrastus. It occurs in the preface to Book 6 and concerns fortune (*fortuna* = τύχη). We are told that the true defenses of life are found in

⁴⁶ On the marginal notes, see Lightfoot pp. 247–256. In the text-translation volumes, we printed the marginal notes as though they belong on an equal footing with the story that follows. That was a mistake. In the critical apparatus we should have called attention to the fact that the notes are marginalia. Alternatively or in addition, we might have used a smaller size font as Lightfoot does. In his translation, different is Francese, who encloses the marginal notes in parentheses.

⁴⁷ F. Granger in the introduction to the Loeb edition (1931) vol. 1 p. xiv.

⁴⁸ Kroh p. 660 and Grant p. 469.

⁴⁹ See Sharples in *Commenary* 3.1 on physics pp. 190–193.

things that cannot be harmed by adverse fortune. After that we read that Theophrastus develops the idea, urging men to put their trust in education. He (Theophrastus) says *inter alia* that the educated man alone is no stranger in a foreign land and that such a man can disdain without fear the hard accidents of fortune (6.pref.2 = 491). That is a strong claim that jars when compared with other texts that portray Theophrastus recognizing the control that fortune has over the lives of men (e.g., 493). That may be grounds for dismissing the report of Vitruvius, but the manner in which he introduces the report—*ita ponit*, “he (Theophrastus) puts it this way”—suggests a close rendering of a Theophrastean text or of an excerpt found in a secondary source. See the commentary on 491.

7 Strabo] c. 63 BC – 23/4 AD.

Born in Amasia in the Pontus region of northern Asia Minor, Strabo studied rhetoric under Aristodemus in Nysa in southwestern Asia Minor (14.1.48).⁵⁰ He subsequently moved to Rome, where his teachers included the Peripatetic philosopher Xenarchus of Seleucia (14.5.4) and the grammarian Tyrannio of Amisus (12.3.16). The latter was an admirer of Aristotle and gained access to the books of Aristotle and Theophrastus that Sulla brought to Rome (13.1.54).⁵¹ In addition, Strabo studied Aristotelian philosophy with Boethus (16.2.24), but later he adopted Stoicism (1.2.2, 34). He lived for a considerable period of time in Alexandria (2.3.5) and sailed up the Nile from there (11.11.5). Clearly he was well traveled and saw much for himself, but as he admits, the greater part of the material that he presents is dependent on second hand reports (2.5.11). At some point, he seems to have returned to Asia Minor, where he remained until his death.⁵²

⁵⁰ For the details of Strabo's life, we are dependent on what he says in his *Geography*. References are to that work.

⁵¹ In 12.3.16 Strabo is focused on the territory of Amisus and distinguished people who hailed from there. In this context he says that he studied under the grammarian Tyrannio. If I understand correctly, that justifies identifying this Tyrannio as the Elder. So N. Purcell, “Strabo” and N. Wilson *et al.*, “Tyrannio (1)” in the *Oxford Classical Dictionary* 3rd ed. (1966) pp. 1447 and 1567, respectively. A. Baumbach, “Tyrannion [1]” in *Der Neue Pauly* vol. 12/1 (2002) p. 948 is of like mind. (M. Grant [1980] p. 408 prefers the Younger.) In 13.1.54, Strabo refers to Tyrannio in connection with the manuscripts of Aristotle and Theophrastus. In the absence of any indication to the contrary, it is reasonable to regard the two Tyrannios as one and the same person.

⁵² Concerning these details and for others, see, e.g., Kroh pp. 585–586 and S. Radt, “Strabon” in *Der Neue Pauly* vol. 11 (2001) col. 1021–1022.

Strabo wrote a work entitled *Historical Memoranda* in 47 books that was intended to continue the *Histories* of Polybius, which ended with the year 144 BC. The work was carried through to Strabo's own time, but what we have today are only fragments. Strabo also wrote a *Geography* in 17 books, which survives albeit with gaps. It begins with an introductory discussion of geography and its practitioners (1–2) and continues with the lands of Europe (3–10), Asia (11–16) and Africa (17). Despite his wide travels, Strabo is often dependent upon secondary sources, among which Posidonius is prominent. In addition to geographical reports, Strabo has much to say on other subjects like history, prominent citizens, local lore and mythology. Our interest in the *Geography* concerns several passages in which Theophrastus is named. On each occasion, he is mentioned in an excursus, whose connection with the geography is a shared place. Hence when discussing Asia and in particular the town of Scepsis, we hear of Neleus of Scepsis, who studied under Theophrastus and inherited the books of Theophrastus and Aristotle, to which Tyrannio eventually gained access (13.1.54 = 37). In connection with Eresus on Lesbos, we are told that Theophrastus and Phantias were from Eresus and that Theophrastus received his name from Aristotle on account of his eloquent manner of speech (13.2.4 = 5A). Similarly when discussing Greece and in particular Attica, Strabo mentions the fact that Cassander turned over the rule of Athens to Demetrius of Phalerum, who is said to have belonged to the circle of Theophrastus (9.1.20 = Dem. Ph. fr. 19 SOD = 18 no. 5). Finally in connection with the port city of Leben on the southern coast of Crete, Strabo speaks of Leucocomas and Euxynthetus who hailed from Leben and were part of the local lore: Leucocomas was the beloved of Euxynthetus and set as task for his lover to bring back the dog from Prasus (10.4.12 = 560).

Among the above mentioned texts, the last is of interest for at least two reasons. First, from what immediately follows upon the report concerning Leucocomas and Euxynthetus, it is clear that Strabo (or at least our received text) confuses two cities that of Praesus and Priansus. Without overreacting to a simple confusion, we can say that what Strabo reports concerning Praesus can serve as a warning against accepting uncritically everything we read in the *Geography*. (See the commentary on 560.) Second, among the texts that name Theophrastus, the text concerning Leucocomas and Euxynthetus is unique in that it refers to a work of Theophrastus and does so in a way that agrees with what we read in Diogenes' catalogue of Theophrastean works: i.e., both use the phrase *περὶ ἔρωτος*, "on love" (5.43 = 1.98 = 436 no. 30a). If it is correct that Strabo studied

under Tyrannio the Elder, who inspected and worked on the manuscripts of Aristotle and Theophrastus (and I think it is correct),⁵³ then we may want to say that Strabo knew something about the Theophrastean work on eros, and if not by his own reading, then from what he heard from Tyrannio. In particular, he knew not only the story of Leucocomas and Euxynthetus but also the title of the work in question, i.e., Περί ἔρωτος, which marks off the work from the Ἐρωτικός, which precedes the Περί ἔρωτος in Diogenes' catalogue (5.43 = 1.97 = 436 no. 29). That is not unreasonable, but it is also not entirely certain. For even if it is true that Strabo heard Tyrannio speak of Theophrastus' writings on eros, we cannot be certain that Strabo uses the phrase περί ἔρωτος as a title. In the text-translation volumes, we printed Περί ἔρωτος (capital pi) thereby indicating that the phrase refers to a title. The most recent editor of Strabo, Stefan Radt (2004), has done the same. Nevertheless, it remains possible that Strabo's report goes back to the Ἐρωτικός, (*Dialogue*) *concerning Love* (436 no. 29), and that in writing περί ἔρωτος, Strabo is not giving a formal title. Rather, he uses περί ἔρωτος to describe a work: the phrase ἐν τῷ περὶ ἔρωτος λόγῳ means no more than "in the (his) work or discussion concerning eros."⁵⁴ But that said, I want to emphasize that the words ἄλλο περὶ ἔρωτος, as they occur in Diogenes' catalogue, are unlikely to refer to "another *copy* of the (*Dialogue*) *concerning Love*." In my judgment, Diogenes' catalogue lists two distinct works. See below, Chapter III "Titles of Works," on no. 19 and 20a–b.

8 Rutilius Lupus] fl. early 1st cent. AD.

Although no ancient source contains a life of Rutilius, we can say that he was born toward the end of the 1st cent. BC and lived well into the Augustan principate, which ended in 14 AD. He is the author of a work in two books or rolls entitled *De figuris sententiarum et elocutionis*, *On Figures of Thought and Style*. The work is a partial translation of a work in Greek by Gorgias of Athens, who for a short time seems to

⁵³ I add "and worked on the manuscripts" from Plutarch, *Sulla* 26,2 = 38.5–6, where we read that "Tyrannio the grammarian prepared many of the books." Given Tyrannio's interest in grammar, it is reasonable to suppose that he not only "got his hands on" the books (Strabo 13.1.54 = 37.26) but also worked on corrupt passages. Nevertheless, it must be recognized that the idea of Tyrannio working on the books, as against merely inspecting them, could be an imaginative addition based solely on his reputation as a grammarian.

⁵⁴ On λόγος, see Chapter III "Titles of Books" on 436 no. 29 and 30.

have been a teacher of Cicero's son.⁵⁵ Quintilian speaks of Gorgias as a contemporary of Rutilius and the author of a work in four books, which Rutilius transferred into one of his own: *cuius (sc. Rutilii) quattuor libros in unum suum transtulit*. Assuming that Quintilian has not nodded and that *unum* here means "one book" (or role), the present division into two books will postdate Quintilian. Be that as it may, the work that has come down to us appears to be an epitome or collection of excerpts from what was originally a longer work. The work is important as a witness to the complex theory of figures that developed during the Hellenistic period.

For scholars working on Greek authors whose writings are largely lost, Rutilius' work is a valuable source in that it preserves for us in translation Greeks texts that would otherwise be unknown. A Peripatetic example is Rutilius' description of the drunkard. The sketch is intended to illustrate the figure of *charakterismos* and Lyco is named (2.7 = Lyco fr. 12 SFOD). Although we miss the qualifier "of Ceus," scholars are agreed that the text is based on the Greek of Lyco the Peripatetic (c. 300–225 BC). The sketch is lengthy and well organized; it exhibits a clever use of details and a variety of stylistic features, some of which are likely to have been added to Lyco's text by Rutilius.⁵⁶

Much shorter is Rutilius' treatment of the figure called ἀντιμεταβολή. There is a lacuna at the beginning so that the name of the figure and its definition have been lost. But the figure under consideration is not in doubt. We have its name from the closely related *Carmen de figuris* v. 16, and from Quintilian 9.3.85 we know that the figure involves repetition and inflection, i.e., the same words recur in different cases and tenses, etc.⁵⁷ What survives are three short examples from Plato, Theophrastus and Aristotle, each of which involves a reversal in word order (ABBA) as well as difference in inflection. The Theophrastean example is our text 538D: *amicitiam probatam appetere, non appetitam probare*. In the parallel text in the *Carmen de figuris*, reversal in word order does not occur: *sumere iam cretos, non sumptos cernere amicos* (v. 17). Appar-

⁵⁵ On Gorgias and Rutilius, see K. Münscher, "Gorgias" 9 in *Paulys Realencyclopädie* 7 (1912) col. 1604–1619 and (for briefer remarks) Brooks p. xiv and Chr. Walde, "P.R. Lupus" in *Brill's New Pauly* 12 (2008) col. 797.

⁵⁶ On Rutilius' sketch of the drunkard, see my article "Lyco φραστικός, Comments on Ten Texts" in *Lyco of Troas and Hieronymus of Rhodes* = Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities 12 (New Brunswick: Transaction 2004) pp. 434–439.

⁵⁷ Quintilian 9.3.85: *verba declinata repetuntur*. We should understand *declinata* inclusively, so that it covers all kinds of inflections (declension, conjugation, etc.). See Liddell and Scott s.v. *declino* II.B.1.

ently reversal in word order, chiasmus, is not essential to ἀντιμεταβολή, though the two are frequently combined.⁵⁸ In discussing texts 538A–F, I shall not hesitate to call attention to reversal in word order, for it occurs frequently and should not be overlooked in characterizing the style of the several texts.

9 Seneca] c. 1 BC – 65 AD.

Lucius Annaeus Seneca, often referred to as Seneca the Younger to distinguish him from his father the rhetorician (c. 55 BC – 40 AD), was born in Corduba, Spain, was brought to Rome as an infant, and there enjoyed training in rhetoric and philosophy. He participated in politics and experienced swings of fortune under three Emperors. He was threatened with death under Caligula, was sent into exile under Claudius, and was forced to take his own life under Nero. His writings are varied. There are tragedies that are more rhetorical than dramatic, a Menippean satire on the apotheosis of the Emperor Claudius, writings on natural science,⁵⁹ and philosophic essays and letters. As a philosopher, Seneca was primarily concerned with ethics and in this field his orientation was Stoic.

Among the ethical sources for Theophrastus, two derive from Seneca. One is found in the first *Letter to Lucilius* (538B), in which Seneca refers to people who act contrary to the precepts of Theophrastus. Seneca has in mind Theophrastus' injunction to choose friends after having tested them (for Greek versions see 538A, E, F). Seneca does not quote/translate the injunction; instead he adapts the injunction, so that it speaks of people who get things backwards: i.e., choosing friends before testing/judging them.

The second source is found in Seneca's essay *On Anger* (446). The essay is a quasi-dialogue, in which Seneca contrives to have his own Stoic views challenged. In what immediately precedes our text, Seneca twice responds to an anonymous interlocutor, who is made to ask whether a good man is not angry if he sees his father, mother, son being harmed or murdered (1.12.1).⁶⁰ After that Seneca responds to Theophrastus,

⁵⁸ See R. Lanham, *A Handlist of Rhetorical Terms* (Berkeley: University of California Press 1991) p. 14.

⁵⁹ Our collection of Sources contains eight texts from *Questions about Nature*. All are found in volume 1 within the section on "Physics."

⁶⁰ The anonymous interlocutor might be identified as Theophrastus, especially if one follows Bourgery and resists emending the text of 1.12.3 = 446. See the commentary on that text. In any case, the anonymous interlocutor is made to say nothing that is out of line with Theophrastus' view of anger and moral goodness.

who is made to say, “Good men are angered on account of wrongs done to their own (relatives and friends).” Seneca’s response is a cavalier rejection (1.12.3 = 446.1–5). Not long afterwards, Theophrastus is again introduced. This time he is made to say, “It cannot happen that a good man is not angered by evil.” Seneca treats this assertion in much the same way (1.14.1 = 446.6–8). See the commentary on 446.

In regard to Seneca’s reliability as a source, we should take notice of Quintilian, who is both complimentary and critical of Seneca. On the one hand, he praises Seneca’s intelligence, industry and considerable learning, but on the other, he faults Seneca’s style, his lack of diligence in philosophy (*in philosophia parum diligens*) and his dependence upon the investigations of others who are said to have led him on occasion into error (*in qua [sc. rerum cognitione] aliquando ab his, quibus inquirenda quaedam mandabat, deceptus est*).⁶¹ As far as I can tell, what Seneca attributes to Theophrastus in 538B and in 446 involves no error, but there is little reason to think that it depends upon Seneca’s own reading of Theophrastus’ writings. 538B alludes to a saying that will have been available in contemporary anthologies, and 446 offers nothing that might be described as peculiarly Theophrastean. Bickel suggests that Seneca is dependent on Sotion,⁶² Chrysippus⁶³ or some other Stoic. Posidonius comes to mind.⁶⁴ Certainly the criticism directed against Theophrastus is that of a hard-line Stoic: it shows no appreciation of the doctrine of the mean and might be cited to illustrate lack of diligence in philosophy.

In his work *Against Jovinian*, Saint Jerome cites Theophrastus at the beginning and end of a long segment in which marriage and women are subjected to harsh criticism. Specific reference is made to Theophrastus’ *aureolus liber De nuptiis*, “little golden book *On Marriage*” (486.7). It

⁶¹ Quintilian, *Oratorical Education* 10.1.28.

⁶² Sotion was a pupil of Sextius. He was also the teacher of Seneca, who writes, *apud Sotionem philosophum puer sedi*, “In my youth I sat (as a student) in the presence of the philosopher Sotion” (*Epistle* 49.2). It is possible that the Sotion who taught Seneca is to be identified with the Sotion who wrote a work *Περὶ ὀργῆς*, *On Anger*, from which excerpts are preserved by Stobaeus, *Anthology* 3.14.10, 3.20.53–54, 4.44.59, 4.48.30. So Stenzel, “Sotion 3” in *Paulys Realencyclopädie*, zweite Reihe, Bd. 3 (1929) col. 1238. Bourguery, p. 19, expresses caution in view of our spotty evidence but nevertheless stresses the influence that Sotion seems to have had on Seneca. Caution is also expressed by Sharples, “Sotion 1” in *Brill’s New Pauly* vol. 13 (2008) p. 669.

⁶³ The influence of Chrysippus on Book 1 of *On Anger* appears to be significant (Fillione-Lahille pp. 39–47 and J. Pigeaud, “A propos de la thèse de J. Fillion-Lahille,” *Révue des Études Latines* 62 [1984] pp. 35–36), but that is different from being the source of two references to Theophrastus.

⁶⁴ Bourguery p. xix.

seems certain that Jerome is not drawing directly on Theophrastus. His source may be a work on marriage by Seneca, and if it is, then we might claim a clear example of Seneca getting things wrong (see the commentary on 486), perhaps because he depended on the investigation of others. But the identity of Jerome's source is problematic, as is what kind of work might be referred to by the phrase "little golden book *On Marriage*." See below, no. 29, on Jerome.

10 Pliny the Elder] 23–79 AD.

Gaius Plinius Secundus is tagged the Elder in order to distinguish him from his nephew and ward Gaius Plinius Caecilius Secundus, who is regularly referred to as the Younger. The elder Pliny was born at Como in northern Italy ten years after the death of Caesar Augustus. He moved early to Rome, where he began his formal education under Pomponius Secundus, who would become Pliny's patron. He experienced military service in Germany from c. 47 to 57 AD: first as a cohort commander under Domitius Corbulo, then as a military tribune under Pomponius, and finally as a commander of a calvary squandron. It was perhaps during this final period that he enjoyed a comradeship with the future Emperor Titus. Pliny held several procuratorships, and when Vespasian became Emperor in 70 AD, Pliny found himself in Rome, where he was a member of Vespasian's circle of friends and advisors.⁶⁵ In 79 AD when Vesuvius erupted, Pliny was commander of the fleet at Misenum. According to his nephew, Pliny sailed across the bay partly to obtain a better view of the eruption and partly to rescue persons who could not escape on their own. He died as result of toxic fumes (*Letters* 6.16.4–20).⁶⁶

The above details make clear that Pliny was a man given to action, but he was also a keen student of literature and a prolific author. Based on his military service in Germany, he wrote *On Throwing the Javelin from Horseback* in one book. He also wrote a biography of Pomponius, which was two books long, a work on the German wars in 20 books and one on recent Roman history in 31 books.⁶⁷ His longest work, the encyclopedic *Natural History*, runs 37 books and is dedicated to the future Emperor

⁶⁵ According to Pliny the Younger, his uncle would go to Vespasian before daybreak and then go to his assigned duties (*Letters* 3.5.9, cf. 18).

⁶⁶ For a succinct and cautious account of Pliny's life, see M. Beagon, *The Elder Pliny on the Human Animal* (Oxford: Clarendon Press 2005) pp. 1–5.

⁶⁷ In *Natural History*, preface 20, Pliny refers to the work as a "history of our times that begins where Aufidius' history leaves off."

Titus. There were also lesser works on oratory and grammar. This list of writings is provided by the younger Pliny in a letter to Baebius Macer, an admirer of his uncle (*Letters* 3.5.3–6). In the same letter, the nephew describes in detail the work habits of the uncle. It is an astounding account of a workaholic who slept little, was read to while eating, took copious notes, and in this way was able to mix business, private and public, with regular research and writing (*Letters* 3.5.7–16).

The sole surviving work is the *Natural History*, published in 77 AD two years before Pliny's death. The sheer wealth of material is mind-boggling. In the preface to the work, Pliny himself tells us that in preparing the work he perused c. 2,000 volumes, few of which were studied on account of the abstruseness of the material, and that he has brought together 20,000 noteworthy facts from 100 authors.⁶⁸ Book 1 is unique in that it lists not only the contents of the subsequent books but also the authorities whose works have been drawn upon for the material presented in each book. Theophrastus is named in regard to 27 books, but in 6 of these books he is in fact not mentioned by name. In one book, regarding which Theophrastus is not named, his name does in fact occur (see 138).⁶⁹

Pliny's citations of Theophrastus can be accurate. See, e.g., *Natural History* 33.113–114, where material from *On Stones* 58–59 is recorded.⁷⁰ See also *Natural History* 16.144 and 19.162 referring to *Research on Plants* 4.4.1 and 9.1.4 (413 no. 41 and 94). But it is well to note that there are occasions when Pliny is less than accurate and may be said to err. See, e.g., *Natural History* 15.138 and 27.63 referring to *Research on Plants* 2.1.3 and 3.15.6 (413 no. 13 and 32). In regard to ethics the issue of reliability is of little importance, for what Pliny offers is quite minimal. A single text, 9.27–28 = 568A, has been printed in the chapter on "Ethics," and it tells us only that Theophrastus said the same thing as Hegesidemus,⁷¹ who reported a poignant story concerning a boy and a dolphin. Lacking the original texts for both authors, we have nothing against which we can compare the words of Pliny.⁷²

⁶⁸ N. Purcell, "Pliny (1) the Elder" in the *Oxford Classical Dictionary*³ p. 1197 says that Pliny's numbers are "a severe underestimate."

⁶⁹ See also *Commentary* vol. 3.1 p. 30, where Sharples adds by implication Book 22 to the list of books in which Theophrastus is said to be cited as an authority.

⁷⁰ J. Healy, *Pliny the Elder on Science and Technology* (Oxford: University Press 1999) p. 59.

⁷¹ Hegesidemus, *FHG* vol. 4 p. 422 Müller.

⁷² Even if we had the text of Hegesidemus, it could only be used to prove or disprove the reliability of what Pliny reports concerning Hegesidemus. But if it were to show that

11 Plutarch] c. 45–120 AD.

Plutarch of Chaeronea in Boeotia was a Platonist, who wrote copiously on an impressive range of subjects. He studied in Athens and traveled widely, making several visits to Rome. He became a Roman citizen, but remained loyal to his home town in Boeotia. He was keenly interested in religion, became a priest of the temple of Apollo in Delphi and wrote several works that reflect his involvement with Delphi.⁷³

The Plutarchan corpus is bipartite. One part is composed of biographies that are largely concerned with soldiers and statesmen, and marked by an interest in moral character. They are organized in pairs: one Greek and one Roman life, which are joined by a concluding comparison. Twenty-three of these pairs survive, as do four separate biographies.⁷⁴ The other part of the Plutarchan corpus is traditionally referred to as the *Moralia*, but it would be a mistake to think that all the works focus narrowly on ethical issues. In fact, a wide range of topics is addressed and in a variety of literary forms: there are dialogues, treatises or essays, letters and collections.

A list of Plutarchan writings, dating from the third or fourth century AD and known as the *Lamprias Catalogue*,⁷⁵ reveals that our corpus is not complete. Some of the lost works will have focused either exclusively or in part on important ethical issues. E.g., *On What Lies in Our Power: a Reply to the Stoics* (no. 154) is likely to have discussed voluntary action in relation to fate, and in doing so it will have criticized the Stoics, perhaps opposing their views to those of the Academy and Peripatos. The *Lamprias Catalogue* also makes clear that works other than those concerned with ethics have been lost. For an overview of Plutarch's literary production, see Ziegler col. 66–71. He identifies 13 categories: 1) popular philosophic-ethical writings, 2) political writings, 3) scientific-philosophic writings, 4) theological writings, 5) writings on psychology, 6) on animal-psychology, 7) on natural science, 8) epideictic and

Pliny has misrepresented Hegesidemus, we would at least be alerted to the possibility that Pliny is moving too quickly and his use of *hoc idem*, "the same thing" (586A.5) may not be entirely accurate.

⁷³ *On the E at Delphi, On the Oracles at Delphi, On Isis and Osiris and On God's Late Judgment.*

⁷⁴ For a succinct overview, see Grant pp. 349–350 and Stadter (1989) pp. xxiv–ix.

⁷⁵ The *Lamprias Catalogue* most likely reflects the works possessed by a particular library. See M. Treu, *Der sogenannte Lampriaskatalog*, Progr. Waldenburg 1873 and Ziegler (1964) col. 60–61. The edition of F.H. Sandbach (1969) is readily available in the Loeb Library no. 429 = *Moralia* vol. 15 pp. 8–29. An introduction precedes on pp. 3–7.

rhetorical writings, 9) writings on rhetoric and poetics, 10) biographies and writings on biography, 11) antiquarian writings, 12) historical and exegetical writings on literature, 13) writings of mixed content.⁷⁶

Plutarch's familiarity with earlier Greek literature is not in doubt. For a survey that covers epic, lyric, tragedy, comedy, philosophy, oratory, history, medicine, mathematics and grammar, see Ziegler col. 277–289.⁷⁷ Plutarch names Theophrastus on numerous occasions. Indeed, our collection of sources contains sixty-seven Plutarchan texts: either printed as numbered texts, or mentioned in the apparatus of parallel texts, or referred to in a list.⁷⁸ Of these, twelve are printed in the section devoted to “Ethics.”⁷⁹ And within that section under the heading “Emotions,” there are also two references to relevant Plutarchan texts that are printed elsewhere: one in the section on “Living Creatures” and the other among texts concerned with “Music.”⁸⁰

According to the *Lamprias Catalogue* (no. 53), Plutarch wrote a work, now lost, in two books on Theophrastus' *Politics Regarding Crises* (589 no. 4).⁸¹ The work testifies to Plutarch's first-hand knowledge of Theophrastean writings.⁸² But it would be a mistake to assume that Plutarch always refers to Theophrastus on the basis of his own reading of some Theophrastean text.⁸³ I refer to the *Life of Demosthenes* 10.2–3 (706), where Theophrastus is said to have deemed Demosthenes an orator wor-

⁷⁶ To the last category belong, e.g., *The Dinner of the Seven Wise Men* and the nine books of *Table Talk*.

⁷⁷ Ziegler (1964) col. 277–289 = “Plutarchos 2” in Paulys Realencyclopädie 21.1 (1951) col. 914–926.

⁷⁸ I am not counting eight texts that modern scholars attribute to pseudo-Plutarch. Three are discussed in what follows under the collective name “pseudo-Plutarch.”

⁷⁹ The texts are 440B, 463, 467, 488, 501, 512A and B, 535, 538F, 542, 577A and B.

⁸⁰ After 445 there is a reference to 362H, which is printed in the section on “Living Creatures.” And after 448 there is a reference to 719A, which is printed in the section on “Music.” After 453 under the heading “Virtue and Vice,” we might have placed a reference to 711, which occurs in the section on “Rhetoric and Poetics” under the heading “The Ludicrous.” Instead, a reference to 711 will be found in the commentary on 453.

⁸¹ In the *Lamprias Catalogue*, the title is given as Πρὸς τοὺς καιροὺς, which corresponds to 589 no. 4b. Ziegler col. 61 supplies πολιτικῶν as the first word of the title. That brings the title into line with 589 no. 4a (= Diogenes Laertius 5.45 and Harpocration, *Lexicon s.v.* ἐπίσκοπος), but the supplement is hardly necessary. See texts 594.4–5, 625.1 and 626.2.

⁸² Concerning 719A.3: τὸ βιβλίον ἀνέγνω, see below, Chapter 4, Section 2 “Emotions” on text 719A–B.

⁸³ After noting that Plutarch calls Theophrastus “the most curious and inquisitive of the philosophers” (*Alcibiades* 10.4), Stadter (1989) p. lxxv. is careful to add that the extent of Plutarch's own reading of Theophrastus is uncertain.

thy of the city and Demades one superior to the city. Plutarch introduces this evaluation with the statement, “Ariston of Chios has also reported a certain opinion of Theophrastus concerning the (two) orators” (lines 1–2). Apparently Plutarch is reporting at second hand. What is not signaled clearly is where the report concerning Theophrastus leaves off. Plutarch continues with “the same philosopher reports” (line 4), and the incautious reader might think that the same philosopher is Theophrastus. But on reflection it seems clear that the repetition of “reports” (ιστορεῖ in line 4 picking up ἰστορήκε in line 1) indicates that “same” refers to Aristo and not to Theophrastus. A similar lack of clarity is found in Plutarch’s dialogue on *Whether Land or Sea Animals are Cleverer* 396A–B. Here we have a two-part argument intended to establish that perceiving does not occur without thinking. The first part is explicitly attributed to Strato,⁸⁴ and the second part, an example involving Cleomenes, follows smoothly, so that one is tempted to think that we have here a continuation of Strato’s argument. But that is not the case, for the example concerns Cleomenes III who post-dates Strato. (See below, section II.4 “Neoplatonists” on Porphyry, who reproduces the Plutarchan text.) A lack of immediate clarity of this kind is all too common in reports concerning fragmentary authors. Plutarch is no exception.

pseudo-Plutarch]

Among the ethical texts printed in the text-translation volumes, three—440A, 479 and 502—were at one time or another attributed to Plutarch, but they are not the work of Plutarch of Chaeronea. Hence, they are normally assigned to pseudo-Plutarch, who in regard to the texts before us is not one but three different authors. In what follows, the authors and their works are discussed briefly in order in which they appear in the text-translation volumes.

12 ps.-Plutarch, the author of 440A] 2nd or 4th–5th cent. AD.

An incomplete work attributed to Plutarch and entitled *On Desire and Grief* or more fully *Whether Desire and Grief Are of the Soul or Body*, Πότερον ψυχῆς ἢ σώματος ἐπιθυμία καὶ λύπη, was discovered by Thomas Tyrwhitt in a London manuscript along with a second work on the affective element in man. Hence the two works are frequently referred to as Tyrwhitt’s fragments (first published in 1773). *On Desire and Grief* also

⁸⁴ Strato fr. 62 Sharples in RUSCH vol. 16 (2010).

occurs in two Florence manuscripts. All three manuscripts date from the 15th century and contain works found in the *Moralia*.⁸⁵ In the past, certain scholars have held that *On Desire and Grief* is genuine. Ziegler suggested that it is a draft left unfinished by Plutarch at the time of his death.⁸⁶ That the work is a fragment is obvious, but that it is Plutarchan finds no defenders today. Nevertheless, there are clear connections to genuine works: coupling Democritus and Theophrastus (chap. 2, cf. *Recommendations on Preserving Health* 135E = 440A), the story of cutting up Horus (6, cf. *On Isis and Osiris* 19–20 358D–E), λόγος as a fine tool (7, cf. *Life of Phocion* 3), a verse from tragedy (8, cf. *Political Precepts* 17 813F), the contrast between young and old men, and the passions being rooted in the flesh (9, cf. *On Moral Virtue* 11 451A).⁸⁷

The work begins with an introduction that states the issue: whether desire and grief are passions of the body or the soul (chap. 1–3). Reference to Theophrastus occurs in the introduction (2). Divergent views are surveyed (4–8). The author acknowledges the attractiveness of a view that has clear points of contact with the Peripatos, but ultimately finds it lacking (7–8). Leaving these preliminaries behind, the author begins to express himself on the issue, focusing on the fact that the bodies of young and old people are different and that the difference is reflected in their desires. The text breaks off with an incomplete sentence (9).

13 ps.-Plutarch, the author of 479] 2nd cent. AD or later

The corpus of Plutarchan writings contains a doxographical work entitled Περί τῶν ἀρεσκόντων φιλοσόφοις φυσικῶν δογμάτων, βιβλία ε', *On the Physical Opinions Held by Philosophers*, 5 books. It is not the work of Plutarch but of an otherwise unknown epitomist, who drew on Aëtius' survey of opinions or tenets concerning natural philosophy. Aëtius, who lived between the middle of the 1st century BC and the end of the 1st century AD, made use of earlier doxographical works that date to the 1st century BC and earlier. In regard to the Greek philosophers from Thales to Plato, the ultimate source of these several doxographical works is almost certainly Theophrastus' lengthy survey of views or opinions, δόξαι, concerning nature.⁸⁸ Diogenes' catalogue lists this work as Φυσι-

⁸⁵ F. Sandbach, *Plutarch's Moralia* vol. 15 (Loeb vol. 429) p. 32.

⁸⁶ K. Ziegler (1949) col. 751, repr. (1964) col. 115.

⁸⁷ Sandbach p. 35.

⁸⁸ Fundamental is H. Diels, *Doxographi Graeci* (Berlin 1879, reprint Berlin: De Gruyter 1958) pp. 45–69. For a clear, concise overview, see Ziegler col. 241–242 and J. Mejer,

κῶν δοξῶν α'-ιζ' (5.48 = 1.238 = 137 no. 6a). In the text-translation volumes, we translated as follows: *The Opinions of Natural Philosophers* (or *Opinions concerning Natural Things*), 16 Books. The alternative translations are due to an ambiguity in the title as recorded in the catalogue. The second genitive, δοξῶν, depends on the book numbers α'-ιζ', 16 books of δόξαι. The first, φυσικῶν, elucidates the second, but it is unclear whether it is masculine referring to natural philosophers or feminine agreeing with δόξαι. Taurus ap. Philoponus gives the title of Theophrastus' work as Περί τῶν φυσικῶν δοξῶν (137 no. 6b = 241A.1). According to Jaap Mansfeld that "can only mean *On the Physical Tenets*."⁸⁹ With that judgment we agree, and now believe that we erred in our translation of the title as it appears in Diogenes' catalogue. The first alternative should be dropped, and the second should be removed from parentheses. But whatever the Theophrastean title may have been,⁹⁰ it is likely that the Theophrastean work focused on doctrines and not on individual natural philosophers. Moreover, the work is likely to have included the related opinions of medical writers along side those of natural philosophers.

Large portions of ps.-Plutarch's epitome were incorporated by Eusebius of Caesarea, c. 260–339 AD, in Books 14–15 of his *Preparation for the Gospel*,⁹¹ and an Arabic translation dating to c. 900 AD is extant.⁹² In addition, Stobaeus preserves portions of a doxographical work that is closely related to that of ps.-Plutarch. Frequent agreement in wording makes clear that the material found in Stobaeus and ps.-Plutarch goes back to a common source: namely, Aëtius. And where there is agreement in wording, we can say with some confidence that we have more or less what Aëtius wrote.⁹³ For our purposes, however, agreement in wording is of little help, for the text that interests us, 479, is found only in

"Aëtius," in *Encyclopedia of Classical Philosophy*, ed. D. Zeyl (Westport CT: Greenwood 1997) pp. 16–17 and "Doxography," *ibid.* pp. 199–201.

⁸⁹ "Physikai doxai and *Problemata physika* from Aristotle to Aëtius (and Beyond)" in *Theophrastus: His Psychological, Doxographical and Scientific Writings*, ed. W. Fortenbaugh and D. Gutas = Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities, vol. 5 p. 65.

⁹⁰ Whether Theophrastus himself assigned titles remains a matter of scholarly discussion. See the introduction to Section III, "Titles of Books," with note 8.

⁹¹ The portions are not always incorporated into Eusebius work in the order in which they appear in ps.-Plutarch. See the edition of E. Gifford (Oxford 1903), in which his outlines of chapters 14 and 15 (vol. 2 pp. 326, 411–412) together with marginalia to the Greek text make clear where Eusebius has introduced material from ps.-Plutarch.

⁹² See H. Daiber, *Aëtius Arabus. Die Vorsokratiker in arabischer Überlieferung* (Wiesbaden: Steiner 1980).

⁹³ See, Diels (above, note 88) pp. 273–444, where ps.-Plutarch and the relevant portions of Stobaeus are printed across from each other in parallel columns.

ps.-Plutarch. Moreover, it comes in the introduction to the first book and so might be the work of ps.-Plutarch and not of Aëtius. Nevertheless, I am inclined to believe that even here we have material drawn from Aëtius, for the material is awkwardly joined together in a way that suggests the work of an epitomist. Indeed, the awkwardness forces one to ask how much can be attributed specifically to Theophrastus as against the Peripatetics in general.⁹⁴ See the commentary on 479.

14 ps.-Plutarch, the author of 502] 2nd–3rd cent. AD.

The work *On the Life and Poetry of Homer* divides into two distinct parts.⁹⁵ The first is a short essay. Biographical material has pride of place, after which come remarks on the judgment of Paris, a summary of the story of Troy and reflections on the fact that the *Iliad* begins in the ninth year of the war. The second part is longer. At the outset it announces the educational benefits of reading Homer, and in what follows the poet is presented as a comprehensive source for both theoretical and practical knowledge. Moreover, Homer is viewed not as a mere conveyer of traditional knowledge but as an originator on whom later and sometimes competing traditions draw. To take an ethical example, both the Stoic ideal of freedom from emotion and the Peripatetic doctrine of moderate emotional response are found to be Homeric. Six passages are cited in regard to the Stoics and an equal number in regard to the Peripatetics (2.134–135).⁹⁶

The two parts of *On the Life and Poetry of Homer* have different authors, and neither part is the work of Plutarch of Chaeronea.⁹⁷ The first

⁹⁴ After naming Aristotle and Theophrastus, ps.-Plutarch continues *καὶ σχεδὸν πάντες οἱ Περιπατητικοί* (479.1–2).

⁹⁵ An outline of the work will be found in Keaney and Lamberton pp. 45–53. In what follows, I follow closely their introduction pp. 1–31. See also Ziegler col. 237–239.

⁹⁶ In the case of the Stoics, the author is clear that Homer is not simply a predecessor who in several verses may be said to have anticipated Stoic doctrine. Rather we are told that the Stoics put forth their doctrine of virtue following those verses in which Homer removes all emotional response. (2.135).

⁹⁷ Plutarch himself wrote on Homer. The so-called Lamprias catalogue, which may date from the fourth century AD, refers to *Homeric Studies* in four books (no. 42). Fragments from that work may be found in volume 15 of the Loeb *Moralia* pp. 238–243 (no. 122–127 Sandbach). But *Homeric Studies* is not the work that concerns us, and its relationship to the two parts of *On the Life and Poetry of Homer* is quite uncertain. See F. Buffière, *Les mythes d'Homère et la pensée grecque* (Paris: Les Belles Lettres 1956) 75–77.

part is almost certainly the later of the two, being Byzantine in origin.⁹⁸ The second part—which is our special concern, for it contains text 502—is more problematic. There are passages that relate closely to what we read in the genuine works of Plutarch. Apparently the author was acquainted with these works, but there are also passages that seem to contradict what Plutarch says.⁹⁹ In addition, the second part exhibits similarities to a work of which only fragments survive in a London papyrus dating from the third century.¹⁰⁰ And there are affinities with the *Homeric Allegories* of Heraclitus, with material preserved in Stobaeus and with the Homeric scholia.¹⁰¹ Sorting all this out (determining lines of dependence and/or the use of common sources) seems daunting, if not impossible. I am, therefore, inclined to follow John Keaney and Robert Lamberton, who hold that the second part may date from the time of Plutarch (c. 45–120 AD), but a somewhat later date, the end of the second or beginning of the third century, is more probable. As Richard Volkmann observes, the rhetorical definitions found in the second part suggest such a date, as does the use of the term πολιτικὸς λόγος, which points to the school of Hermogenes.¹⁰²

Happily, the text that the concerns us, 502, is relatively straightforward. Theophrastus is mentioned together with Plato and Aristotle, and the relevant Platonic and Aristotelian texts survive for inspection. See the commentary on 502.

15 Aspasius] 1st half of the 2nd cent. AD.

The exact dates of Aspasius' birth and death are not known, but we can say with certainty that he lived in the first half of the first century AD.¹⁰³ His

⁹⁸ R. Volkmann, *Leben, Schriften und Philosophie des Plutarch von Chaeronea* (Berlin: Calvary 1869) 1.2 p. 120.

⁹⁹ Keaney and Lamberton p. 7.

¹⁰⁰ Pap. Lond. 73.

¹⁰¹ For a general statement concerning these affinities see Keaney and Lamberton p. 2. For details see p. 20 n. 61 on the scholia and p. 165 n. 1 on Stobaeus. Most interesting may be p. 10, where a dissimilarity between Heraclitus and ps.-Plutarch is pointed out: Whereas Heraclitus attacks Plato for the Socratic rejection of Homer, ps.-Plutarch seems indifferent to the rejection.

¹⁰² Volkmann pp. 120–121.

¹⁰³ Aspasius, the Peripatetic philosopher, is to be distinguished from his contemporary Aspasius of Byblus (*Suda* s.v. Ἀσπάσιος [no. 4202, LG vol. 1 pars 1 p. 387.25–28 Adler]) as well as from Aspasius of Tyre (*Suda* s.v. Ἀσπασίσιος [no. 4203, LG vol. 1 pars 1 p. 387.29–31]).

Peripatetic allegiance should not be doubted. Galen refers to Aspasius as a Peripatetic and tells us that he studied under one of Aspasius' pupils.¹⁰⁴ We do not know the name of that pupil, but we do hear of a Eudemus and a Herminus, who are likely to have been Aspasius' pupils.¹⁰⁵ Certainty is elusive.

Aspasius wrote commentaries on Aristotle's *Categories*, *De Interpretatione*, *Physics*, *On the Heavens*, *On Sense and Sensibilia*, *Metaphysics* and *Nicomachean Ethics*. Most of commentaries have been lost; only his comments on Books 1–4, part of 7 and most of 8 of the *Ethics* survive.¹⁰⁶ Texts 545 and 555 are from his comments on Book 7, and text 533 is from his comments on Book 8.

Although Aspasius is a comparatively early source for uncovering Theophrastean ethical doctrine, we should keep in mind that he was separated from Theophrastus by some 450 years and that his commentaries exhibit Stoic influence, at least in regard to terminology. A pertinent example may be his emphasis on being in a natural state, ἔχειν κατὰ τὴν φύσιν, as a standard for virtue and friendship. Mercken labels this emphasis Stoic,¹⁰⁷ and indeed it is. But we should not simply assume that all references to being in a natural state are Stoic as against Peripatetic. See the commentary on 533 together with the commentary on 501 and 507.

The reference to Eudemus in 533 is not to a lost work by Eudemus but to the surviving *Eudemian Ethics* (7.4 1239a1–12). Apparently Aspasius not only knew the Eudemian discussion of friendship but also regarded it

¹⁰⁴ Moraux (1984) pp. 256–257, 265, 269 prefers to think of Aspasius as an outsider, who had Aristotelian sympathies. But most likely Galen is correct in labeling Aspasius a Peripatetic.

¹⁰⁵ We are sometimes told that Aspasius was a student of Herminus (J. De Filippo, "Aspasius" in Zeyl [1997] p. 99), but that is unfounded. For a cautious account, see Barnes (1999) pp. 1–5.

¹⁰⁶ *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca* vol. 19.1, ed. G. Heylbut. Although portions have been lost, it is fair to refer to Aspasius' commentary on the *Ethics* as the earliest extant commentary on an Aristotelian text. On the transmission of the surviving portions, see Moraux (1984) pp. 249–253, Mercken (1990) pp. 438–439, Barnes (1999) pp. 13–14 and Konstan (2001) p. 9. Here I call attention to one version of a composite Byzantine commentary on the *Ethics* (the earlier version = 12th cent.), in which Aspasius' contribution is limited to Book 8. In the same composite commentary, Book 5 is covered by anonymous scholia and comments by Michael of Ephesus. Some Theophrastean material is included. See 529A–B and 530.

¹⁰⁷ Mercken (1990) p. 439, citing R. Gauthier in R. Gauthier and J. Jolif, *L'Éthique à Nicomaque*² (Louvain 1970) vol. 1.1 p. 100.

as the work of the Rhodian.¹⁰⁸ Moreover, mentioning Eudemus together with Theophrastus fits well with what we know from other texts. In certain areas and on certain problems (e.g. hypothetical syllogisms) the two worked together or at least shared similar interests (111A–E).¹⁰⁹ And if Aspasius is correct in attributing the *Eudemian Ethics* to Eudemus,¹¹⁰ then we may want to cite 449A, which exhibits important similarities to the *Eudemian Ethics*.

Familiarity with the *Eudemian Ethics* can be of considerable assistance in interpreting difficult passages in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, but only as long as one keeps clearly in mind that the *Eudemian* and *Nicomachean Ethics* may differ in significant ways. (See the commentary on 449A.) Failure to do so, can result in serious error. For an example of error, I cite Aspasius' comments on the relationship between friendship based on virtue and friendships based on pleasure and utility. Aspasius tells that the last two are related to the first in the way that a medical book, a medical instrument and whatever else is called medical are related to medicine (p. 164.3–8 H). Although he does not cite Eudemus at this point in his commentary, Aspasius has the example from the *Eudemian Ethics*, where a general explanation of this mode of analysis is offered: the definition of the primary item (e.g., medicine) occurs in the definitions of all the other things (e.g., medical instrument and the rest). This relation, we are to believe, also holds for the three kinds of friendship (7.2 1236a16–32). But it does not and is not mentioned in the *Nicomachean* analysis of friendship. There Aristotle works with analogy and similarity. Aspasius has rather mindlessly introduced a faulty analysis that he found in the *Eudemian Ethics*. He does not attempt to apply it to friendship and goes on to speak of similarity (164.10 H).¹¹¹ See the introduction to the section on “Friendship.”

The preceding is not intended to destroy Aspasius' credibility as a commentator, but it may serve as a reminder that in dealing with sources, it is well to consider each text critically and apart from any general view of the author's reliability.

¹⁰⁸ Moraux (1984) pp. 258–261; Gottschalk (1987) p. 1158.

¹⁰⁹ See, e.g., L. Repici, *La logica di Teofrasto* (Bologna: Mulino 1977) pp. 41–42 and P. Huby in *Commentary* vol. 2 on logic p. 53.

¹¹⁰ While I have no strong view on the matter, respect for the wisdom of Harold Cherniss prompts me to note that many years ago in private conversation he argued for taking Eudemus as the author of the *Eudemian Ethics*.

¹¹¹ Fortenbaugh (1975b) pp. 57–58, repr. (2006) pp. 217–218.

16 Marcus Aurelius] 121–180 AD.

Marcus was born in Rome, studied rhetoric under Fronto, held various minor offices and succeeded Antonius Pius as Emperor in 161 AD. During his rule, the Roman Empire enjoyed unusual stability. Death came in 180, while Marcus was fighting rebellious German tribes.

Our interest in Marcus concerns a work that was unpublished at the death of Marcus and most likely was never intended for publication. It is often referred to as *Meditations*, but the manuscripts carry the heading Εἰς ἑαυτὸν, *To Himself*. Whether that is a title or a descriptive phrase, it does capture the fact that much of Marcus' work is a kind of notebook in which personal reflections are jotted down.¹¹² The whole is written in Greek and exhibits a clear commitment to Stoic philosophy. It was composed late in Marcus' life while he was on campaign in Germany.¹¹³

The *Meditations* is divided into twelve books, each containing a series of chapters. The first book may have been the last to be written. Marcus reports what he has learned from others including relatives and teachers of grammar, rhetoric and philosophy. Special attention is paid to what is owed to Antonius Pius and to the gods (1.16–17). The books that follow are not unified wholes: the several chapters vary in topic and length. Given Marcus' Stoic leanings, we are not surprised to find references to Chrysippus, to Epictetus, whose brand of Stoicism seems to have appealed to Marcus,¹¹⁴ and even to Heraclitus, whom the Stoics took seriously. More interesting are favorable references to Epicurus, whose central doctrines were rejected by the Stoics (7.65, 9.41). Similarly, we find Marcus referring favorably to Theophrastus concerning a matter that

¹¹² On the death of Marcus, someone must have set aside the book for safekeeping. It apparently attracted little or no attention for a considerable time, for there is no reference to the work until the middle of the fourth century, when Themistius refers to the παραγγέλματα, precepts, of Marcus (*Oration* 6.81C). R. Rutherford in Hornblower et al. p. 221 cautions that the reference in question is "not a certain allusion" to the *Meditations*. Much later in the *Suda* (end 10th cent.), we are told that Marcus wrote an ἀγωγή, a directing, of his own life in twelve books (*LG* vol. 1 part 3 p. 328.24 s.v. Μάρκος).

¹¹³ As a heading to the second book of the *Meditations* (in which Theophrastus is cited [441.1]), one reads, "Written among the Quadi on the (river) Gran." R.B. Rutherford in his notes to Farquharson's translation (Oxford: University Press 1989) pp. 151–152 suggests that the heading is authentic.

¹¹⁴ C. Haines in the introduction to the Loeb edition (1916) p. xiii comments, "Epictetus the Phrygian slave was his (Marcus') true spiritual father, but we do not find in the Emperor the somewhat rigid didacticism and spiritual dogmatism of his predecessor."

divided the Stoics and the Peripatetics (see the commentary on 441). It appears that Marcus was not a hard line Stoic. He was able and willing to appreciate the views of opposing schools.

17 Aulus Gellius] c. 130–180 AD.

Neither the dates of Gellius' life nor the place of his birth can be securely established. Nevertheless, we can say that he was a student in Rome toward the end of the first half of the second century AD, and during that period he studied literature with Sulpicius Apollinaris. In addition, he studied in Athens, where he heard the lectures of Calvenus Taurus. His work *Attic Nights* offers glimpses of Gellius student days in Athens.

Attic Nights is a collection of essays that vary in length and topic.¹¹⁵ In the preface, Gellius acknowledges that his collection is one more addition to an established genre: he lists thirty titles, both Greek and Latin,¹¹⁶ of exiting collections, whose titles are said to be more lively than *Attic Nights* (pr. 4–9). Gellius tells us that he began collecting material during his stay in Athens (pr. 4) and that he assembled a portion of the material in book form only later in life for the entertainment and education of his children (pr. 23–24). In regard to collecting material, he says that he did so in a random manner, jotting down whatever appealed to him. He goes on to say that the material was stored away as an aid to his memory, in order that when he had forgotten something, he might easily find what he needed (pref. 2). The latter assertion (the adverb *facile*, “easily”) suggests that his method of preserving the material was not as random as the process of collection. Be that as it may, Gellius acknowledges that the order in which the material is presented within *Attic Nights* is haphazard (2–3), but he insists that his work is not a mindless mix of everything that he has read or heard. Rather, he distances himself from his predecessors, especially the Greeks, who aimed at quantity and claims to offer a selection of what is likely to arouse in the alert reader a desire for honorable and useful learning or at very least save busy people from a shameful and boorish ignorance (11–12).¹¹⁷

¹¹⁵ The topics include grammar, poetry, logic, geometry, law and ethics. Gellius refers to such topics as the liberal arts, *ingenuae artes* (pr. 13).

¹¹⁶ 19 Greek titles and 11 Latin.

¹¹⁷ We may compare Aelian, who admits that he has not arranged his material in a systematic order, but who, unlike Gellius, defends lack of arrangement on the grounds that variation will prevent boredom. See below, this chapter, no. 21 on Aelian.

Gellius arranged his material in twenty books.¹¹⁸ The beginning of the preface is lost as is the end of the twentieth book. The whole of the eighth book is lost except for the brief summaries that were written for all chapters throughout the work.¹¹⁹ That affects this commentary, for two of the chapters in which Theophrastus was mentioned occurred in the eighth book, and one of these chapters, 8.6 = 543, contained ethical material.¹²⁰ We do, however, have intact two chapters, 1.3 = 534 and 6.8 = 568B, which name Theophrastus and are ethical in their content. All three chapters are discussed below, in their proper place among “The Texts,” i.e., in IV.13 and IV.16.

Gellius acknowledges that some of the material that he presents is likely to appear trite and commonplace (14–15). He also suggests that his readers will find something new or obscure and asks that they not indulge in useless criticism but rather allow the material to inspire study (17). But if the readers think that certain material ought to be criticized, Gellius tells them that they should direct their displeasure at the source from which the material in question has been drawn. And if the readers know of differing views expressed by others, he advises the readers to consider both the reasons for the views in question and the value of the authorities that he (Gellius) and his critical readers are following (18). In other words, if Gellius cites, e.g., Aristotle, then the criticism is to be directed at Aristotle, who is to be compared with the authorities, whom the critical readers embrace. And same holds whenever Gellius cites Theophrastus. All that seems reasonable enough. Gellius claims to be presenting material that will stimulate study, so that there is nothing wrong with presenting controversial material. But none of that tells us whether Gellius is a reliable reporter of his own sources, and in particular, whether Gellius draws directly on the authorities whom he cites? In regard to his contemporaries, especially his teachers Taurus and Favorinus,¹²¹ there is little reason to question the accuracy of

¹¹⁸ In the preface 22–24, Gellius tells us that he has written twenty books, and if he continues to live and has leisure time, then he will write more. That seems not to have happened.

¹¹⁹ At the end of the preface, Gellius tells us that the summaries will follow immediately on the preface (*hic*) in order to make clear the contents of each book (25).

¹²⁰ The other chapter in the eighth book that named Theophrastus contained material concerning Theophrastus’ life. The summary of this chapter, 8.9 = app. 32A, is referred to under the heading “Leisure and Political Affairs.”

¹²¹ Both were teachers of Gellius. See Holford-Strevens pp. 66–92.

what Gellius reports.¹²² But when Gellius names earlier authorities like Aristotle and Theophrastus, we may wonder whether he is drawing on his own reading or on some intermediary, e.g., one of those thirty collections that he lists early in the preface, or on both.

In the case of Aristotle, we can be certain that Gellius read, either on his own or together with his teachers Taurus and Favorinus, at least some of the works included in the *corpus Aristotelicum*. That is especially clear in regard to the pseudo-Aristotelian *Problems*, which Gellius claims to have excerpted for himself (2.30.11). The excerpts that Gellius actually includes in his work can be quite short (e.g., 19.4.6) and of considerable length (e.g., 19.2.5). But there are difficulties. On one occasion, Gellius tells us that (ps.-)Aristotle used the word ψυχροποιός (19.4.4), but the word is never used by Aristotle, or more cautiously, it does not occur in the *corpus Aristotelicum*. And on another occasion, Gellius promises to consult Aristotle's work *On Animals* and to report in Aristotle's own words what is written there about a lion's litter. But Gellius fails to do so (13.7.6).¹²³ Regarding the former difficulty, it seems reasonable to follow Holford-Strevens and to hold that Gellius is drawing on a version of the *Problems* that in various places and various ways differs from the version that has come down to us.¹²⁴ And in regard to the latter, we may have an example of Gellius' failure to edit carefully his work. One of the chapters in which Theophrastus is named (1.3) provides three examples of just such a failure. See the commentary on 534, below in IV.13.

Turning now to Theophrastus, we can say that three of Gellius' reports do not concern what Theophrastus said or wrote. We are told that Aristotle picked out Theophrastus as his successor by likening him to Lesbian wine (13.5.1–12 = 8.13–25), that Theophrastus had a philosophic slave (2.18.8 = app. 1.7), and that Theophrastus fell silent when he was about to address the people of Athens (8.9 *capitulum* = app. 32A). The remaining five reports are concerned with what Theophrastus said or wrote. Two concern animals. Theophrastus, we are told, said that all the partridges in Paphlagonia have a double heart (16.15.1 = app. 356.1–2). He

¹²² I do not want to deny that the oral utterances, as against the written words, of a teacher are easily distorted, but generally and in the absence of strong evidence to the contrary, Gellius' remarks concerning his teachers' views, whether expressed orally or in writing, merit credence. Cf. Holford-Strevens pp. 80–81.

¹²³ The missing Aristotelian passage, *History of Animals* 6.31 579a31–b11, is added in the *vulgata*.

¹²⁴ Holford-Strevens p. 200 n. 31: Gellius "knew the *Problems* in a different editorial disposition from ours."

also reported that at Naupactus dolphins afire with passionate love were perceived with certainty. And this passion was directed toward young boys. (6.8.15 = 568B.4–8). In both cases, Gellius may be dependent on a secondary source, but that is not certain.¹²⁵ And given the brevity of what Gellius offers, we may wonder whether Theophrastus expressed some doubt or qualified in some way what we read.¹²⁶ A third report concerns music and human physiology: we are told that according to Theophrastus, the piper who plays gently over the pains of sciatica diminishes them (4.13.1–2 = 726C.1–3). There is no reason to doubt Gellius' assertion, "I found this quite recently in a book of Theophrastus." The book in question is *On (Types of) Inspiration* (328 no. 9a–b); the title is given in the parallel texts 726A.1–2 and B.1–2. Gellius says "quite recently," *nuperime*, in order to indicate that what he reports is not something that he noted down years earlier when he was gathering material in Athens, but rather something that he came upon while putting together the material that makes up *Attic Nights*. The reference to diminished pains, *minui dolores*, is of interest, for it is a weaker claim than what we read in the parallel texts: namely, that the music of a pipe, the aulos, cures, ἰᾶται, sciatica (726A.4 and B.1). And it may well be a more accurate reflection of the benefit that Gellius claimed for aulos music, i.e., the lesser benefit of relief rather than the greater benefit of a cure. Either way, the text under consideration is good evidence that Gellius could and did consult a Theophrastean work directly and was not always dependent on secondary sources. Finally there are two reports concerning friendship. One is a summary of a discussion once found in the lost eighth book of *Attic Nights*. The discussion will have pointed out that mutual complaints are not helpful when reconciliation is underway. A discourse of Taurus on the subject was set forth as were words, i.e., a quotation drawn from a book of Theophrastus. In addition, what Cicero thought about the affection of friendship was added with Cicero's own words (8.6.capitulum = 543.1–3). It is not inconceivable that Gellius has everything from Taurus, but even if Taurus did call Gellius' attention to Theophrastean and Ciceronian material, it is more likely that Gellius studied this material with some care and quoted the authors directly from their works. That is

¹²⁵ Concerning the partridge, Wellmann and Kroll think that Gellius is dependent on Favorinus. See Sharples, *Commentary* 5 (1995) p. 59. Concerning the dolphins, Holford-Strevens p. 200 thinks that Gellius has drawn on Apion.

¹²⁶ On the final lines of 568B, which are attributable to Gellius, see below, the commentary on 568B.

supported by the remaining report, which is substantial. Gellius refers to the first book of Theophrastus' work *On Friendship* (436 no. 23b) and tells us that certain portions of the work were drawn on by Cicero in his like-named work. At one point, Gellius quotes Theophrastus in Greek (1.3.26 = 534.59–64), and when he reports in Latin what Theophrastus said (1.3.10–25, 28–29 = 534.15–64, 70–75), Gellius is careful to acknowledge that his report is not a word for word translation.¹²⁷ There is nothing to suggest that Gellius is blindly working from an intermediary, or that his reading of Theophrastus is hasty and hence likely to be misleading. That is not to say that Gellius gives a full survey of the Theophrastean work *On Friendship*—did Theophrastus discuss reconciliation in this work, and if so, did he do so in the first book or in a later book?—but what Gellius does give us is significant. See the commentary on 534.

18 Anonymous on *Nicomachean Ethics* 2–5] end 2nd cent. AD.

The Anonymous in question is the compiler of a collection of scholia on Books 2–5 of the *Nicomachean Ethics*.¹²⁸ The collection has come down to us as part of a composite Byzantine commentary that belongs to the 12th century and covers all 10 books of the *Ethics*.¹²⁹ The scholia on Books 2–5 are of much earlier origin, going back, it seems, to the end of the second century AD.¹³⁰ The latest persons referred to are the satirist Lucian, who lived c. 120–180 AD, and the Middle Platonist Atticus, who was active under the Emperor Marcus Aurelius, whose rule ran from 161 to 180 AD (CAG vol. 20 p. 156.13 and 248.26 Heylbut).¹³¹ It follows that the Anonymous postdates Aspasius, who commented on the *Nicomachean*

¹²⁷ The phrases *ad hunc ferme modum* and *ad hanc ferme sententiam* (534.43 and 69) alert the reader that what follows is not a word for word translation. For an example of Gellius introducing his own style, compare the use of polysyndeton in 1.3.28 = 534.70–75 with that in, e.g., pr. 17 and 6.3.13. Not surprisingly, Gellius' diction is often Roman and Ciceronian. Examples are *turpitude* and *officium* in 1.3.23 and 28 = 534.44 and 71. The use of *turpitude* may have been suggested by Cicero's use of the word in *On Friendship* 61, quoted earlier by Gellius in 1.3.13 = 534.33.

¹²⁸ The work divides into four parts, each dealing with a separate book of the *NE*. The heading to each part refers explicitly to *σχόλια*.

¹²⁹ On this composite commentary, which takes two forms, see Mercken (1973) p. 3*–4*, (1990) p. 407 and Barnes (1999) pp. 13–14.

¹³⁰ In the text-translation volumes, vol. 2 p. 635, the Anonymous is assigned to the 12th century. That is a mistake. The correct date is the end of the 2nd century. The error seems to have occurred through confusing the Anonymous with the 12th century composite commentary in which the scholia of the Anonymous were included.

¹³¹ Moraux (1984) pp. 325–327 and Mercken (1990) p. 420.

Ethics during the first half of the second century. Material common to both authors will have come to the Anonymous either from Aspasius or from a common source.¹³²

Although the scholia brought together by the Anonymous were taken from a variety of sources, it seems certain that one important source was Adrastus of Aphrodisias, a Peripatetic philosopher who lived in the first half of the second century.¹³³ He composed an important commentary on Plato's *Timaeus* as well as several works on the writings of Aristotle, including *On the Order of Aristotle's Works*. In *The Sophists at Dinner* 15.15, Athenaeus tells us that Adrastus "published five books *On Questions of History and Style in the On Dispositions of Theophrastus* (Περὶ τῶν παρὰ Θεοφράστῳ ἐν τοῖς Περὶ ἡθῶν κατ' ἱστορίαν καὶ λέξιν ζητουμένων)¹³⁴ and a sixth *On the* (same matters) *in the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle*; and he added an abundance of thoughts on the (character) Plexippus in the tragic poet Antiphon, and he said a great deal also on Antiphon himself" (437.2–7). Paul Moraux has called attention to the high quality of the philological, literary and historical scholia in the collection of the Anonymous and argued convincingly that these scholia—as against those that are philosophic in orientation—are attributable to Adrastus.¹³⁵ His argument has gained the support of Paul Mercken and seems to be generally accepted.¹³⁶

Our concern is with scholia that involve Theophrastean material. Three name Theophrastus and may be said to exhibit Adrastus' interests. In 516 we are told that Theophrastus called the lyric poet Simonides "fond of money." Reference is made to *On Dispositions*, concerning which Adrastus is reported to have written five books.¹³⁷ Reference is also made to *On Wealth*. Most likely the Anonymous adds the second title, because

¹³² Mercken (1973) p. 15*, (1990) p. 420.

¹³³ Kenny (1978) p. 37 n. 3 wanted to identify Adrastus with the Anonymous, but given the references to Lucian and Atticus that is chronologically impossible. Mercken (1990) p. 421 suggests that Adrastus was the younger contemporary of Aspasius. Barnes (1999) p. 16 finds it impossible to decide who was the younger of the two.

¹³⁴ Caveat: Scholars sometimes speak of "Adrastus' five books on Theophrastus' *Characters*" (so Mercken p. 421 and cf., e.g., Barker in the *OCD* [ed. Hornblower 1996] p. 14). That can be misleading: Adrastus wrote five books on the Περὶ ἡθῶν (436 no. 1) and not on the Ἠθικαὶ χαρακτῆρες (436 no. 4).

¹³⁵ Moraux (1984) pp. 323–329.

¹³⁶ Mercken (1990) p. 422. One might object that the name "Adrastus" is an emendation in the text of Athenaeus (437.2), so that any argument based on that text is suspect. The objection seems to me overly skeptical. See the commentary on 437.

¹³⁷ Adrastus is not mentioned in 516. As stated in the preceding paragraph, the report concerning him is found in Athenaeus 5.15 673E = 437.

Adrastus made mention of the work, but it is possible that he has added it from another source. In 529A we have a scholium on the proverb, “In justice every virtue is brought together.” It is referred to the poet Theognis and there is reference to Book 1 of Theophrastus’ *On Dispositions*. In 530, the focus is on Aristotle’s and Theophrastus’ understanding of ἀτυχήματα, “misfortunes.” This time no Theophrastean work is named. That could be significant, for while the scholium can be viewed as lexical (Aristotle and presumably Theophrastus use ἀτυχήματα ambiguously, ὁμωνύμως) and therefore might well go back to Adrastus’ work on Theophrastus’ *On Dispositions*, the scholium can also be understood as primarily philosophic, exhibiting an interest in the analysis of two ethical terms: ἀτύχημα and ἀδίκημα. And if that way of viewing the scholium is adopted, the scholium might derive from a source other than Adrastus. See the commentary on 530.

19 Alexander of Aphrodisias] fl. 200 AD.

Alexander’s floruit is determined by the dedication of his work *On Fate* to the emperors Septimius Severus and Caracalla, who had appointed him to a chair in Aristotelian philosophy (1 p. 164.3–15 Bruns). It is probable that his appointment was to the chair in Athens, which had been established by Marcus Aurelius, but there were similar positions elsewhere.

Alexander was a productive author. He wrote commentaries on Aristotle’s school treatises and was considered “the commentator” by later generations.¹³⁸ He was the last of the Peripatetic commentators on Aristotle; those who followed were Neoplatonists. Alexander also wrote systematic treatises in which he set forth his own views. I mention *On the Soul*, *On Fate* and *Ethical Problems*, for they relate most directly to the study of Theophrastean ethics. In addition, there survive under his name shorter essays that have come down to us as the second book of *On the Soul*. This collection of essays was renamed *Mantissa* = *Supplement* (to the Book *On the Soul*) by Freundenthal. The title was accepted by Bruns in his edition of 1887 (*Suppl. Arist.* Vol. 2.1) and is widely used today.¹³⁹ Our special concern is with two of the essays contained in the *Supplement*, both of which refer to Theophrastus by name.

¹³⁸ Simplicius, *On Aristotle’s Physics* p. 707.33, 1170.2, 1176.32 Diels and Philoponus, *On Aristotle’s Prior Analytics* p. 136.20 Wallies.

¹³⁹ On the *Supplement*, see Sharple’s introduction to his translation of the Greek text (1990) pp. 1–7.

One of these essays carries the heading “Ὅτι ἀντακολουθοῦσιν αἱ ἀρεταί,” “That the Virtues Follow Each Other” or “That the Virtues are Implied by One Another.”¹⁴⁰ According to Robert Sharples, the essay relates to Aristotelian exegesis—to “live debate”—within the Peripatetic School.¹⁴¹ For our purposes, the important point is that the concluding sections, 10 and 11, of the essay are based on Aristotle’s *Ethics* (NE 6.12–13). The mutual implication of moral virtue and practical wisdom is argued for (p. 156.6–25 Bruns), after which Alexander concludes the essay by referring to Theophrastus (p. 156.25–27). The reference is clearly meant to support the preceding argument. It will be discussed in the commentary to 460. Here I note only that a somewhat condensed version of the argument recurs in Alexander’s *Ethical Problems* 22 (p. 142.23–143.8 Bruns). There are some differences: the *Problems* refers explicitly to Aristotle (p. 142.29–30), and following the *Ethics* (NE 6.13 1145a4, cf. 6.12 1144a20), mentions choice, προαίρεσις (p. 142.24, 24–25, 30). The essay does neither.¹⁴² And while the essay refers to Theophrastus (460.6), the *Problems* fails to do so. That may be deliberate economy, or it may reflect the state of the text.¹⁴³

The second essay that interests us carries the heading Περί εἰμαρμένης, “On Fate.” The heading invites comparison with the longer treatise *On Fate*, whose full title is *To the Emperors on Fate and Responsibility*. Most likely the longer treatise is the earlier of the two, and the shorter essay is Alexander’s own reworking of things said in the treatise.¹⁴⁴ And if that is correct, Alexander added details found in the shorter essay and not in the longer work: in particular, the examples of Socrates and Callias¹⁴⁵ and the emphasis on the individual (p. 185.11–33 Bruns), as well as the

¹⁴⁰ The second of the two versions is that of Sharples (2004) pp. 10 and 159.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.* p. 1.

¹⁴² In the essay, we find αἰρούμενον (p. 155.35, 36) and αἰρεῖσθαι (p. 156.1, 2).

¹⁴³ Chapter 22 of the *Supplement* appears to be a portion of a larger discussion. That is suggested by καί, “also,” in the first sentence (p. 142.23); see Sharples (2004) p. 56 n. 181. At the end of the chapter, Bruns places three asterisks indicating omission (p. 143.9); in the critical apparatus, he reports a marginal note occurring in ms G: δοκεῖ μοι ἑλλίπτεσ εἶναι.

¹⁴⁴ See J. Freudenthal, “Die durch Averroes erhaltenen Fragmente Alexanders zur Metaphysik des Aristoteles,” *Abhand.* Berlin (1884) phil.-hist. Kl. 1 pp. 14–16, J. Orelli, *Alexandri Aphrodisiensis de fato quae supersunt* (Zurich 1824) pp. 327–329, Sharples (1980) pp. 76–86, (2001) pp. 532, 582 and (2004) pp. 1–2. Sharples thinks that the discussion of responsibility in section 23 of the *Supplement* also draws on and develops what is said in the treatise *On Fate*.

¹⁴⁵ The examples of Socrates and Callias on p. 185.14 = 504.3–4.

quotations taken from Aristotle's *Meteorology* and *Physics*¹⁴⁶ and the references to Theophrastus and Polyzelus (p. 186.13–31).¹⁴⁷ The latter segment may be thought to replace the vague reference to “those from the Peripatos,” which occurs in the longer treatise (p. 171.17). It is reasonable to assume that Polyzelus was a Peripatetic, and since Alexander attributes a work *On Fate* to Polyzelus (p. 186.30–31 = 504.9–10), we have here evidence of Peripatetic interest in fate during the period between Theophrastus and Alexander. But that said, it is well to underline that we know nothing else concerning Polyzelus including his precise dates.¹⁴⁸ In regard to Theophrastus, we are told that he wrote a work entitled *Callisthenes*¹⁴⁹ and that in this work he showed most clearly that what is in accordance with fate is the same as what is in accordance with nature (p. 186.28–30 = 504.8–9).¹⁵⁰ A passage in Stobaeus (503) confirms what Alexander reports concerning the relationship of fate to nature. To be sure, the Stobaeian passage contains no reference to the *Callisthenes*, but that is no reason to doubt what Alexander tells us. See the commentary on 503–504.

20 Athenaeus] fl. c. 200 AD.

Born in Nauractis, Egypt, Athenaeus lived much of his life in Rome. He wrote several works, but only one has come down to us: namely, the dialogue entitled *The Sophists at Dinner*.¹⁵¹ The date of composition cannot be established with accuracy. A hostile reference to the Emperor Commodus (12.53 537F) suggests 193 AD as a date *post quem*. For 193 is the year in which Commodus died, and a hostile reference to him during his lifetime is unlikely. A date *ante quem* is more elusive. If the Syrian Ulpian, who is prominent in the dialogue and whose death is mentioned

¹⁴⁶ The Aristotelian passages are *Meteorology* 1.14 352a28–30 and *Physics* 5.6 230a31–32. According to G. Verbeke, “Aristotélisme et Stoïcisme dans le De fato d’Alexandre d’Aphrodise,” *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 50 (1968) p. 81 and R. Sharples, “Aristotelian and Stoic Conceptions of Necessity in the *De Fato* of Alexander of Aphrodisias,” *Phronesis* 20 (1975) p. 271, the second passage better supports the thesis under discussion. See also Sharples (1980) p. 79.

¹⁴⁷ The references to Theophrastus and Polyzelus are on p. 186.29–31 = 504.8–10.

¹⁴⁸ See below, Chapter III “Titles of Books” no. 15 n. 142.

¹⁴⁹ The reference to the *Callisthenes* is on p. 186.30 = 504.9. For discussion of the work, see the commentary on 436 no. 15.

¹⁵⁰ If I understand the text correctly, the same doctrine is attributed to Polyzelus (p. 186.30–31 = 504.9–10).

¹⁵¹ From *The Sophists at Dinner* 5.47 211A and 7.138 329C, we know that Athenaeus wrote *On the Syrian Kings* and *On Thracian Women*.

toward the end of the work (15.33 686C), is identified with the famous jurist Domitius Ulpianus, then Athenaeus will still have been at work in 228 AD, for that is the year in which the jurist died. But the identification is problematic and has been much discussed in the scholarly literature.¹⁵²

The Sophists at Dinner contains fifteen books. The idea that it originally ran for thirty books has been disproved.¹⁵³ The primary manuscript is the codex Marcianus from the late ninth or early tenth century. All other manuscripts are dependent on it. Books 1–2 and portions of Books 3, 11 and 15 are missing in the codex Marcianus and therefore in the dependent manuscripts. An epitome of the work survives and is important for filling omissions in the codex Marcianus and on occasion for confirming and correcting readings of the Marcianus. But caution is in order, for the epitome may introduce an error of its own. For example, at 4.25 144F–145A, the epitomist has Athenaeus twice refer to Theophrastus, whereas the codex Marcianus correctly refers to Theopompus.¹⁵⁴ The epitomist has confused two similar names, perhaps misled by a preceding reference to Theophrastus (144E = 603.1).

For the scholar doing research on authors whose works survive only in fragmentary form, Athenaeus can be of considerable importance, for he often cites the source of his reports: sometimes just the author and on other occasions both the author and his work.¹⁵⁵ We see that in the case of Theophrastus. In our collection of sources, 124 texts drawn from Athenaeus' *The Sophists at Dinner* are either printed or mentioned in

¹⁵² At the beginning of *The Sophists at Dinner*, Ulpian is said to hail from Tyre (1.2 1D). Toward the end of the work, he is said to have died happily or opportunely, εὐτυχῶς (15.33 686C). The characterization of Ulpian's death presents difficulties regarding the identification of Athenaeus' figure with the like-named jurist. For the latter, having been appointed praetorian prefect by Severus Alexander, died a violent death at the hands of his troops in 228 AD. See, e.g., Braund p. 17, who rejects the identification. In contrast, Mengis pp. 31–36 and J. Davidson, "Pleasure and Pedantry in Athenaeus," in *Athenaeus and His World: Reading Greek Culture in the Roman Empire*, ed. D. Braund and J. Wilkins (Exeter: University Press 2000) pp. 570–571 n. 5 are inclined to accept the identification. E. Bowie, "Athenaeus [3]," in *Brill's New Pauly* 2 (2003) col. 241 finds the murder of the jurist irrelevant to the death of the dialogue figure and therefore of no relevance to dating Athenaeus' work.

¹⁵³ See Arnott (2000) 42–43.

¹⁵⁴ S. Peppink, *Athenaei Dipnosophistarum* epitome, pars prima, libri III–VIII (Leiden: Brill 1937) pp. xxv, 24.

¹⁵⁵ Arnott (2000) p. 41, and see Davidson, *op. cit.* p. 295, who characterizes Athenaeus' use of citations as pedantic and heavy-handed, and suggests that this usage "reflects an anxiety for the culture of scholarship itself on the eve of the Anarchy, a memorial to conversations which could no longer be staged."

a list. The section on ethics contains 25 texts in which Theophrastus is named, and of these 18 give the title of a Theophrastean work. Of the 25 that name Theophrastus, one will be found under "Writings on Ethics,"¹⁵⁶ another under "Fortune,"¹⁵⁷ two under "Flattery,"¹⁵⁸ five under "Pleasure,"¹⁵⁹ six under "Eros"¹⁶⁰ and ten under "Wine."¹⁶¹ Of the 18 that give the title of a work, one refers to *On Dispositions*,¹⁶² two to *On Happiness*,¹⁶³ one to *On Flattery*,¹⁶⁴ four to *On Pleasure*,¹⁶⁵ three to the (*Dialogue*) *concerning Love*,¹⁶⁶ and seven to *On Drunkenness*.¹⁶⁷

Athenaeus occasionally tells us that the attribution of a work to Theophrastus is uncertain. In the case of the *Memoranda* (727 no. 6), Athenaeus states that the work is by Aristotle or Theophrastus (4.74 173E = 587.1, 14.69 654D = 373.1). That the work was actually of disputed authorship is confirmed by Diogenes Laertius, who acknowledges the twofold attribution in his catalogue of Theophrastean titles (5.48 = 1.237). On occasion, Athenaeus alone alerts us to disputed authorship. *To Casander on Kingship* (589 no. 12) is listed by Diogenes Laertius without qualification as a Theophrastean work (5.47 = 1.207), but Athenaeus tells us that many persons attributed the work to Sosibius (4.25 144E = 603.2). Similarly a work *On Pleasure* (436 no. 27) is assigned by Diogenes to Theophrastus (5.44 = 1.117), but Athenaeus twice says that a work *On Pleasure* is attributable to either Theophrastus or Chamaeleon (6.105 273C = 550.5–6 and 8.39 347E = 553.2). All that is encouraging. Athenaeus appears to be a careful reporter, who is willing to record contested attribution.

There are, however, problems. Take the work *On Pleasure*, to which I have just referred. Although the two references to disputed attribution are straightforward, on two other occasions Athenaeus cites *On Pleasure* as the work of Theophrastus. No other author is mentioned (12.3 511C

¹⁵⁶ 437.

¹⁵⁷ 489.

¹⁵⁸ 547, 548.

¹⁵⁹ 549, 550, 551, 552B, 553.

¹⁶⁰ 559, 561, 562, 563, 564, 567A.

¹⁶¹ 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 578.

¹⁶² 437.

¹⁶³ 489, 552B.

¹⁶⁴ 547.

¹⁶⁵ 549, 550, 551, 553.

¹⁶⁶ 539, 561, 567A.

¹⁶⁷ 569, 570, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576.

= 551.3 and 12.31 526D = 549.1).¹⁶⁸ It may be that the omission is deliberate. The two references to disputed attribution come first, and Athenaeus may have thought that sufficient. But the two references to disputed attribution are at considerable distance from the other two passages (Books 6 and 8 as against Book 12), so that Athenaeus would be assuming a reader who read continuously and had good memory. Perhaps, then, the omission is an oversight. But it is also possible that there were two different works to which Athenaeus refers. In the one case, he believes that the attribution is uncertain, and in the other, uncontested attribution is deemed correct. We are left guessing.

More important may be keeping in mind that Athenaeus' reports are often drawn from secondary sources and therefore only as good as his sources. Those of us who are keen on Peripatetic philosophy are likely to assume that Athenaeus shared our enthusiasm and read with care the works of Aristotle, but that seems not to be the case. At least Düring asserts that Athenaeus "himself never unrolled an original work of Aristotle," and Jacob points out that "Aristotle's zoological quotations in the *Deipnosophistae* are drawn mainly from Pamphilus and Alexander of Myndus, who were themselves middlemen transmitting Hellenistic materials."¹⁶⁹ That Athenaeus' knowledge of Theophrastus is any less dependent on secondary sources is not clear. To be sure, Athenaeus will have had access to the many books by ancient Greek authors that were housed in the library of his patron P. Livius Larensis (1.4 3A).¹⁷⁰ Moreover, there are not a few citations of Theophrastus' works *On Pleasure* and *On Drunkenness*, and that may suggest autopsy, but it is equally possible and in my judgment more likely that Athenaeus worked with later collections and treatises that cite Theophrastus.¹⁷¹ Indeed, on one occasion, Athenaeus says explicitly that he has drawn

¹⁶⁸ Text 549 concludes a segment on luxury among the Ionians. The text is marred by a lacuna, but this does not affect the reference to Theophrastus and his work *On Pleasure*. At the beginning of the segment (12.28 524F), Athenaeus shows himself alert to disputed authorship: he tells us that either Callias or Diocles wrote the *Cyclopes* (fr. 5 vol. 1. p. 695 Kock).

¹⁶⁹ Düring (1950) p. 41 and Jacob p. 551 n. 178.

¹⁷⁰ Larensis is the host of the dinner that Athenaeus records. He is not a fictional character. He was a pontifex minor (*CIL* VI 2126 = *ILS* 2932), a man of substance and a collector of books. His library is said to have surpassed the famous libraries of Polycrates and others including Aristotle, Theophrastus and Neleus (1.4 3A–B = 40). See Mengis pp. 29–31 and Braund pp. 3–22.

¹⁷¹ See the commentary on 579A–B.

Theophrastus' report concerning drink, Alexander and sexual impotence from the *Epistles* of Hieronymus (10.45 435A = 578).¹⁷²

There are occasions when what we read in another author provides reason to question what Athenaeus or his epitomist reports. An example, is found in the second book, where we read that "Aristotle or Theophrastus records that a certain Philinus never consumed any food or drink other than just milk throughout the whole of his life" (2.21 44B–C = 340). As written, the report is clear enough, but it seems to be based on Plutarch's *Table Talk* 4.1 660E, where Philinus is a character in the dialogue. A pupil of his is likened to a certain Sosastrus (the name is probably corrupt), who is said to have lived on milk alone throughout his life. It appears that Athenaeus has misunderstood his source and erroneously added the names of Aristotle and Theophrastus. Alternatively, an epitomist may have tampered with what Athenaeus actually wrote and in doing so introduced the names of Aristotle and Theophrastus into a passage where they do not belong.¹⁷³

Finally, a word should be added about Athenaeus' manner of attribution. I am thinking of those cases in which he cites both author and work. Quite often these citations take the form "A(uthor) says in T(itle) that" Such a formula encourages the reader to assume that what follows in the that-clause is attributable to A: i.e., the words that depend on the verb of saying are the actual words of A or a report of what he said or at least of his beliefs. But much of the time the words that depend on the verb of saying are not attributable to A, except in the weak sense that A quotes or reports them. And the potential for confusion is increased if T refers to a dialogue. For then the reader may assume (wrongly) that A played a role in dialogue T and spoke the words in question. As an example I refer to 2.7 38D, where Athenaeus writes, "Plato in *Laws* 2 says that the use of wine is for the sake of health." The reference to *Laws* 2 is correct, but Plato is not a speaker in the dialogue. The words are put in the mouth

¹⁷² See Dalby p. 580 n. 17. Indeed, it may be that Athenaeus has Hieronymus through a later collection or treatise, so that he has Theophrastus not at second hand but at third hand. Certainty is elusive.

¹⁷³ For further details including the earlier literature on this text, see Sharples' *Commentary* vol. 5 (on biology) pp. 18–20. For another example from Book 2, see 413 no. 5–6 = 2.59–60 61F–62A with R. Sharples and D. Minter, "Theophrastus on fungi, inaccurate citations in Athenaeus," *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 103 (1983) pp. 154–156 and D. Gourevitch, "Hicesius' Fish and Chips" in *Athenaeus and His World* (Exeter: University Press 2000) pp. 484–485.

of the Athenian Stranger (674B).¹⁷⁴ The same may be true of texts in which Theophrastus is named, and one of his dialogues is cited. Nevertheless, I do not want to suggest that anytime there is reference to a Theophrastean dialogue, the words that follow will have been spoken by someone other than Theophrastus. On my reading of the fragments, Theophrastus was a speaker in at least some of his dialogues, and on occasion Athenaeus may be citing passages in which Theophrastus is the speaker. Indeed, I think that 576 is such a case. But each fragment must be considered on its own merits. For further discussion, see the commentary on 489, 559 and 576.

21 Aelian] c. 170–235 AD.

Claudius Aelianus was born some two-thirds into the second century AD in Praeneste, east of Rome. He studied rhetoric in Rome under Pausanias of Caesarea and became a successful declaimer and master of Greek style. He seems to have lived much of his life in Rome, where he enjoyed imperial patronage. According to Philostratus, Aelian “used to say that he never ventured anywhere beyond the borders of Italy,”¹⁷⁵ but that report appears to be contradicted by Aelian himself when he says “I saw (ἑθαεσάμην) a sacred ox with five feet in the city of Alexandria.”¹⁷⁶ Either Aelian failed to change a verb in the first person that occurred in the source he was following, or Philostratus is in error. Scholars are of different minds.¹⁷⁷

He is best known for two popular compilations. One is entitled *On the Nature (Peculiarities) of Animals*. It runs seventeen books and is filled with miscellaneous facts that are not arranged systematically. In the epilogue to the work, he defends this lack of order, arguing that frequent changes in subject matter maintain interest while fighting boredom (p. 435.4–18 Hercher). The paradoxical or miraculous is well rep-

¹⁷⁴ I do not want to deny that a speaker may serve as spokesman for an author, and that one can make such a case for the Athenian Stranger. But allowing that, it remains true that what depends on the verb of saying cannot be simply assumed to be the words of A or a statement of his doctrine. A spokesman may occasionally say things that are not in harmony with the views of A, and he may be made to say things that later will be criticized and rejected.

¹⁷⁵ *The Lives of the Sophists* 2.31.3: ἔφασκε δὲ ὁ ἀνὴρ οὗτος (sc. Αἰλιανὸς) μηδ’ ἀποδεδημηγμένοι ποι τῆς γῆς ὑπὲρ τὴν Ἰταλῶν χώραν.

¹⁷⁶ *On the Nature of Animals* 11.40.

¹⁷⁷ See M. Wellmann, “Claudius Aelianus (11),” in *Paulys Realencyclopädie* vol. 1.1 (1893) col. 486, who is criticized by N. Wilson in the introduction to the Loeb edition (1997) p. 5.

resented and there is a tendency to moralize. Both may be illustrated by what Aelian reports concerning storks. In their old age these birds are said to migrate to the islands of Ocean, where they are transformed into human shape as a reward for their piety toward their parents (3.23). Much of the material collected by Aelian is taken from summaries and collections of excerpts. That is true in regard to Aristotle. His work on zoology makes him an obvious source, and Aelian cites him over fifty times. But it appears that Aelian knows Aristotle only through Aristophanes of Byzantium.¹⁷⁸ His knowledge of Theophrastus will also have been at secondhand.

A second compilation carries the title *Miscellaneous History* and runs for fourteen books.¹⁷⁹ It has come down to us in abridged form.¹⁸⁰ At the outset, there is material on inanimate nature, but the work as a whole serves up anecdotes that focus on well-known political and literary figures. Here too there is a deliberate avoidance of systematic arrangement.¹⁸¹ Also surviving are twenty *Rustic Epistles* and fragments of other works including *On Providence* and *On Manifestations*.¹⁸²

In the text translation-volumes, eighteen passages from works of Aelian are either printed or mentioned in a list. Thirteen are from the *Nature of Animals* and five from *Miscellaneous Histories*. Four are printed within the section on "Ethics." Of these four, one, 567B, comes from the *Nature of Animals*; it appears under the rubric "Eros." The other three, 513, 552A and 579A, are taken from the *Miscellaneous History* and appear under "Wealth," "Pleasure" and "Wine." Of the four texts, three have an A or B after their number. That means that they are parallel to one or more texts,¹⁸³ and in all three cases, Athenaeus provides a parallel, which is shorter than the corresponding text in Aelian but essentially

¹⁷⁸ On Aelian's knowledge of Aristotle and for an excellent introductory survey of Aelian's various sources (based on articles by M. Wellmann and R. Keydell published in *Hermes* between 1891 and 1937), see A. Schofield, *Aelian, On the Characteristics of Animals*, Loeb edition (Cambridge MA 1958) vol. 1 pp. xv–xxiv.

¹⁷⁹ The fragments are collected at the end of Hercher's edition, Leipzig: Teubner 1866.

¹⁸⁰ Regarding ὅτι *qua* mark of epitomisation, see Chapter IV, Section 9 "Wealth" on 513.

¹⁸¹ For an example, see below, the commentary on 579A–B *ad init.*, where the lack of any close connection between 2.37–38 and the surrounding sections 2.36 and 2.39 is briefly discussed.

¹⁸² The *Epistles* and fragments of other works will be found in *Claudius Aelianus, Epistulae et Fragmenta*, ed. D. Domingo-Forasté, Stuttgart: Teubner 1994. E. Bowie, "Aelianus [2]," in Brill's New Pauly 1 (2002) col. 2000 suggests that *On Providence* and *On Divine Manifestations* may be the same work.

¹⁸³ Two texts are parallel to 567B.

the same in content. Both Aelian and Athenaeus are almost certainly following the same intermediate source, and in one case the existence of Aelian's fuller text allows us to say with some certainty that a portion of the material assigned by Wimmer to Theophrastus should not have been so assigned. See the commentary on 579A–B.¹⁸⁴

Although Aelian's fuller text may provide help with interpreting a parallel text in Athenaeus, Aelian may fall short of Athenaeus in failing to cite a particular work of Theophrastus. In our collection of ethical texts that is true of 552A–B and 567A–B. In both cases, only Athenaeus gives the title of the Theophrastean work that stands behind the report.¹⁸⁵ It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that Aelian is quite sloppy in his handling of sources. Looking forward to the commentary on 567B = *On the Nature of Animals* 5.29, I call attention to Aelian's repeated use of ἀκούω, "I hear," and ὡς ἀκούω, "as I hear." To be sure the use of the verb ἀκούειν in regard to a source is vague, and sometimes one wonders whether it is stylistic rather than a reference to oral communication.¹⁸⁶ But that said, as Aelian uses the verb it can and often does alert the reader to a change in source. A clear example is provided by a passage that occurs only two sections before 567B. I am referring to 5.27, where Aelian mentions the diverse natures of eight or nine different animals,¹⁸⁷ and in all but one case, he names a source. That case concerns goats. After citing Alexander of Myndus for a brief report concerning the unusual behavior of goats on Mimas, Aelian adds a remark about the goats of Illyria. He says that their hoof is solid not cloven, and instead of naming a source he says ἀκούω, "I hear." Apparently the mention of goats on Mimas prompts Aelian to add a remark concerning Illyria, and he makes use of ἀκούω in order to indicate that he has changed sources, i.e., Alexander of Myndus is no longer in play (5.27). The comparison with

¹⁸⁴ G. Wentzel, "Athenaios (22)," in *Paulys Realencyclopädie* 2.2 (1896) col. 2027 tells us that Aelian knew and used the work of Athenaeus. That may be, but in the case of 552A–B, 567A–B, 579A–B, Aelian is not drawing on Athenaeus. The two are drawing on a common source. For further discussion, see Wilson in the Loeb edition pp. 10–11 with n. 10, in which Wilson refers to previous literature.

¹⁸⁵ In 579A–B neither author gives a title.

¹⁸⁶ On occasion Aelian may be using ἀκούω, with or without ὡς, where ἀναγινώσκω would be more precise: i.e., when he is reporting, perhaps from memory, what he read somewhere. In such a case, we might take a hint from Aristotle's *Poetics* 21 1457b8–9, 13 and speak of metaphor from species to species. For ἀκούειν used of reading, see LSJ s.v. I.4 citing Polybius, *Histories* 1.13.6.

¹⁸⁷ There are eight different animals if one does not distinguish between the goats on Mimas and those of Illyria; there are nine if one counts the two separately.

567B should be obvious. In both cases, one report suggests another: goats on Mimas suggest goats in Illyria (5.27), and an affectionate goose in Aegium suggests an affectionate ram and goose in Chios (5.29 = 567B). And in both cases there is change in source that is marked by ἀκούω, without ὥς in the earlier passage and with ὥς in the later.

Regarding ὥς ἀκούω, I cite a passage toward the end of Book 4, where Aelian focuses on the rock-dove, οἰνάζ. He first says that it is a bird and not a vine, after which he cites Aristotle regarding the comparative sizes of the rock-dove, the ring-dove and the common pigeon. Finally he adds that in Sparta there are persons called rock-dove-catchers (4.58). In making this addition, he says ὥς ἀκούω, thereby indicating that he is no longer drawing on Aristotle. In my judgment, a similar use of ὥς ἀκούω is found in 567B.5, but that is not the only feature of interest in Aelian's remarks concerning the rock-dove. I am thinking of the fact that the relevant Aristotelian passage is found in the *History of Animals* 5.13, where the rock-dove is compared with the ring-dove and the pigeon (544b1–7), but the order of magnitude is not the same as that reported by Aelian. Both authors have the rock-dove in the middle, but while Aristotle declares the pigeon larger than the rock-dove and therefore the largest of the three birds, Aelian has it the other way around: now the ring-dove is the largest of the three. Whether Aelian has nodded or his source, this report by Aelian should remind us that in general it is prudent to scrutinize what Aelian says not only concerning Aristotle but also concerning Theophrastus and other members of the early Peripatos.

22 Diogenes Laertius] early 3rd c. AD.

Our knowledge of Diogenes himself is entirely derived from his name and what we read in his work on the Greek philosophers. The epithet Laertius suggests that Diogenes may have been born in Laerte in Caria or Cilicia, but the epithet may be part of a nickname that derives from Homer, who refers to Odysseus as διογενής Λαερτιάδης (*Iliad* 2.173, 4.358).¹⁸⁸ A different possibility, based on παρ' ἡμῶν at 9.109 of Diogenes' work, is that he hailed from Nicaea in Bithynia.¹⁸⁹ Diogenes' date of birth or death is nowhere reported, but his floruit may be placed in the first half of the third century, probably early, for the latest person

¹⁸⁸ Odysseus is Zeus-born, διογενής, and the son of Laertius, υἱὸς Λαέρτεω See, e.g., *Odyssey* 2.352, 366 and 4.555.

¹⁸⁹ D. Runia, "Diogenes [17] Laertius" in *Brill's New Pauly*, vol. 4 (Leiden 2004) col. 452.

mentioned in his work is a Saturninus, who was a pupil of Sextus Empiricus (9.116),¹⁹⁰ and no knowledge of Neoplatonism is exhibited anywhere in the work.¹⁹¹

Diogenes' work is regularly referred to as the *Lives of the Philosophers*, but the manuscripts offer longer titles: e.g., *Compendium of the Lives and Opinions of the Philosophers in Ten Books* and *Lives and Maxims of the Persons Most Renowned in Philosophy and of the Doctrines of Each School in Ten Books*. These longer titles not only make explicit that the work runs for ten books or rolls, but also that it offers more than the basic facts concerning a string of philosophers: maxims and more generally sayings and anecdotes are included as are the doctrines of the several schools. Book 1 covers the so-called Seven Sages including Thales. The other nine books are divided between two main lines of succession: Books 2–7 brings together philosophers representing the Ionian or eastern line and Books 8–10 present the Italian or western line. Our concern is with the Peripatetic philosophers, who are grouped together in Book 5, after Plato and his successors in Books 3–4 and before the Cynics in Book 6. The life of Aristotle, *qua* founder of the Peripatetic School comes first, after which Diogenes discusses Theophrastus, Strato of Lampsacus, Lyco of Troas, Demetrius of Phalerum and Heraclides of Pontus. Diogenes reports the origin (place of birth), the physical appearance and/or personal qualities, and death of all six Peripatetics. The education of five of the six Peripatetics is noted (in the case of Strato no information is given), and lists of students are given for three of the Peripatetics (Aristotle, Theophrastus and Strato). Lists of writings are given for five of the Peripatetics (a list is missing in the case of Lyco), a doxography is given as part of the life Aristotle ("What he wishes to say in his writings" 1.28–34), and wills are recorded for four of the Peripatetics (wills for Demetrius and Heraclides are not recorded). More details concerning the content of the Peripatetic Lives can be found in Sollenberger's 1992 article pp. 3800–3879 as well as in his dissertation (1984) pp. 11–38, References to earlier literature will be found in these places.

In this commentary on the ethical sources, our special concern is with Diogenes' catalogue of Theophrastean writings, two anecdotes, three sayings, remarks from the deathbed and a two-word characterization of beauty. I have already discussed the catalogue of writings in *Commentary*

¹⁹⁰ Sextus' dates are c. 160–210 AD.

¹⁹¹ Saturninus, mentioned in 9.116, was a pupil of Sextus Empiricus (fl. second half of second century AD); Neoplatonism begins with Plotinus (204–c. 269 AD).

8 (2005c) on rhetoric and poetics (pp. 49–53), and in the present commentary, I take up the topic in the introduction to Chapter III on “Titles of Books.” Discussion of individual titles follows. See also Sollenberger (1984) pp. 25–35 and (1992) pp. 3849–3855.

In regard to anecdotes, I cite the report that Aristotle changed the name of his pupil from Tyrtamus to Theophrastus on account of the divine manner in which he expressed himself (διὰ τὸ τῆς φράσεως θεσπέσιον 5.38 = 1.30–31). The story is not credible, but it does harmonize both with Cicero’s repeated assertion that Theophrastus expressed himself in an attractive manner (50–54, 482) and with the report that Adrastus wrote five books on questions of history and style (λέξις) in Theophrastus’ work *On Dispositions* (437.2–4). A second anecdote concerns the comparison Aristotle drew between Theophrastus and Callisthenes: the former was said to be in need of a bridle and the latter of a goad (5.39 = 1.33–38). That Aristotle ever drew the comparison as reported is doubtful (the comparison is movable, being applied by Plato to Aristotle and Xenocrates and by Isocrates to Ephorus and Theopompus [see the apparatus to 1.34–38]), but it is suggestive in regard to what Theophrastus may have said concerning the death of Callisthenes in the work entitled *Callisthenes or On Grief* (493, 504–505).¹⁹²

Diogenes says that useful sayings (ἀποφθέγματα) of Theophrastus are in circulation and then reports three.¹⁹³ The first runs: θᾶπτον πιστεύειν δεῖν ἴππῳ ἀχαλίνῳ ἢ λόγῳ ἀσυντάκτῳ, “One ought sooner to trust in an unbridled horse than in disorganized speech” (5.39 = 1.41–42). The concluding phrases exhibit a certain attention to style: each phrase is two words long, and each word is in the dative case ending in omega iota-subscript; the first word of each phrase has the same number of syllables as does the second word; and the second word in each phrase begins with an alpha-privative. The saying has special application to an oration whose length demands organization so that the listener does not become confused and finally stop listening. But the saying can also be applied to speeches and talks of all kinds including moral exhortation.¹⁹⁴

The second saying is given context. Being present at a symposium and observing a man who remains completely silent, Theophrastus says to

¹⁹² See the commentary on 504 *ad fin.* with notes 553–554.

¹⁹³ The number of sayings, i.e., three, falls well short of the number reported for Aristotle, i.e., twenty-seven. In both cases, Diogenes will have drawn on existing collections. Regarding Aristotle, see Searby pp. 43–46.

¹⁹⁴ See *Commentary* 8 (2005c) on rhetoric and poetics p. 27.

the man: εἰ μὲν ἀμαθὴς εἶ, φρονίμως ποιεῖς, εἰ δὲ πεπαιδευσαι, ἀφρόνως, “If you lack learning, you are behaving sensibly, but if you are educated, senselessly” (5.40 = 1.42–44). Here too there is a certain artfulness to the saying: we have two adverbs that share the same root, φρονίμως and ἀφρόνως, and alpha-privatives come early and last, ἀμαθὴς and ἀφρόνως. The saying is a comment on appropriate participation in the dialogue that takes place during a symposium. It might go back to Theophrastus’ work *On Drunkenness* (436 no. 31), but there are other possibilities¹⁹⁵ including attribution based solely or largely on Theophrastus’ known interest in symposia.¹⁹⁶ Indeed, the saying is movable from one well-known person to another and variable in diction. See Plutarch, *Table Talk*, preface 645F, where we are told that Simonides addressed a person who remained silent at a symposium, saying εἰ μὲν ἡλίθιος εἶ, σοφὸν πράγμα ποιεῖς· εἰ δὲ σοφός, ἡλίθιον.

The third saying lacks context and is quite short: πολυτελὲς ἀνάλωμα εἶναι τὸν χρόνον “Time is a costly expenditure” (5.40 = 1.44–45). Theophrastus is said to have made constant use of the saying. That may be overstatement, but a philosopher, whose ethics was intended to be practical, could not ignore the difference between time wasted and time well spent. Indeed, the man of practical wisdom, the φρόνιμος, will consider in his deliberations whether the cost in time is too high.

Theophrastus’ remarks from the deathbed are presented by Diogenes as a response by the philosopher to his students, who are seeking direction. Here is the Greek text (1.40–41 = 1.53–59):

φασὶ δ’ αὐτὸν ἐρωτηθέντα ὑπὸ τῶν μαθητῶν εἶ τι ἐπισκῆπτει, εἰπεῖν ἐπισκῆπτειν μὲν ἔχειν οὐδέν, πλὴν ὅτι “πολλὰ τῶν ἡδέων ὁ βίος διὰ τὴν δόξαν καταλαζονεύεται· ἡμεῖς γὰρ ὁπότε ἀρχόμεθα ζῆν, τότε ἀποθνήσκομεν. οὐδὲν οὖν ἀλυσιτελέστερόν ἐστι φιλοδοξίας. ἀλλ’ εὐχεῖτε, καὶ ἦτοι τὸν λόγον ἄφετε, πολὺς γὰρ ὁ πόνος, ἢ καλῶς αὐτοῦ πρόστητε, μεγάλη γὰρ ἡ δόξα. τὸ δὲ κενὸν τοῦ βίου πλέον τοῦ συμφέροντος. ἀλλ’ ἐμοὶ μὲν οὐκέτ’ ἐκποιεῖ βουεῦσθαι τί πρακτέον, ὑμεῖς δ’ ἐπισκέψασθε τί ποιητέον.” ταῦτα, φασίν, εἰπὼν ἀπέπνευσε.

The following translation is a corrected version of that found in the text-translation volumes:

¹⁹⁵ The Ὀμιλητικός, (*Dialogue*) concerning *Social Interaction* (436 no. 32), is a possibility.

¹⁹⁶ Theophrastus is reported to have left money for symposia. See below, the commentary on the title *On Drunkenness* (436 no. 31) ad fin.

They say that when he was asked by his students if he had any command, he said that he could command nothing, except that “Life greatly exaggerates many of the pleasures resulting from glory, for no sooner do we begin to live than we die. Nothing, therefore, is more profitless than love of glory. But farewell, and either forsake my teaching—for there is much labor—or champion it well—for the glory is great. The empty part of life is more than the advantageous. But I am no longer allowed to determine what must be done. You consider what must be undertaken.” Saying this, they say, he expired.

The correction involves the Greek words *πολλὰ τῶν ἡδέων ὁ βίος διὰ τὴν δόξαν καταλαζονεύεται*. In the text-translation volumes we translated “Life greatly depreciates many pleasures on account of glory (and does so wrongly).” The need to add the words in brackets suggests that the translation may be wrong, and translating *καταλαζονεύεται* with “greatly depreciates” is problematic. To be sure, LSJ s.v. 3 gives the translation “depreciate invidiously,” but the only passage cited in support of the translation is that which concerns us. As I now understand the sentence, ὁ βίος is personified and said to “boast greatly,” and the preposition *διὰ* refers not to a final cause (depreciating pleasures “for the sake of” glory) but rather to an efficient cause (pleasures “caused by” or “resulting from” glory). The personification is bold¹⁹⁷ and might be tempered by translating “greatly exaggerates” instead of “boasts greatly.” (That is the suggestion of Sollenberger [1984] p. 213, whose comments I find persuasive.) But whichever translation we prefer, Diogenes’ text presents a succinct but intelligible argument in three steps: 1) the pleasures of glory are greatly exaggerated, 2) for life is short, i.e., we are apt to be dead before we can enjoy the pleasures that flow from glory, 3) so that pursuing glory tends to be profitless. Each of the parts can be viewed as an independent saying and the overall affect is aphoristic.

What follows is a response to the students’ question, but it is not a simple command. Rather, alternatives are presented (*ἢτοι ... ἢ*) together with considerations that support one or the other of the alternatives (*γὰρ ... γάρ*). The balanced construction is noticeable and perhaps helpful given the brevity of expression. After that comes another saying, “the empty part of life is more than the advantageous,” which serves to dampen the immediately preceding consideration, “the glory is great.” Finally

¹⁹⁷ But not without parallel. See 584.27–28, where we are told that life (ὁ βίος), having shifted to cultivated food and offerings of fruit, said (*ἔφη*) “Enough of the oak.” I am indebted to Stefan Schorn for this parallel.

Theophrastus is made to say that he is no longer in charge, so that the students must decide. Taken as a whole we have a compact series of reflections that are presented with a certain attention to style. Moreover, they speak to concerns that Theophrastus addressed in some of his writings. The value of glory or honor will almost certainly have been discussed in his work *On Ambition* (436 no. 21) and in his *Ethics* (436 no. 2). And the value of leading a life devoted to philosophy will have been discussed in *On Lives* (436 no. 16) and *On Happiness* (436 no. 12). What Diogenes' text may be said to contribute is clear recognition that the philosophic life involves labor, πόνος. The contemplation of eternal truths may be of unsurpassed pleasure, but getting there takes hard work.

Clearly Diogenes' report of Theophrastus' dying words cannot be taken as a verbatim quotation. It may well be true that Theophrastus died surrounded by several of his students, and they may even have requested a final directive, but we should not imagine that some especially gifted student remembered with accuracy what was said. Indeed, Diogenes does not claim historical accuracy. Rather, he claims to report what "they (men or people generally) say." Perhaps he is thinking of an oral tradition, but it is equally possible that he is thinking of a report that circulated in one or more collections of sayings including those from the deathbed.¹⁹⁸ Moreover, we should keep in mind that a different version of Theophrastus' dying words was recorded by Cicero in his *Tusculan Disputations* 3.69 = 34A. There is some connection with the report of Diogenes—both take note of the shortness of life—but there are also clear differences. Cicero has Theophrastus contrast the shortness of human life with the longevity of stags and crows. Moreover, in Cicero the emphasis is on learning and not on pleasure: if men had been given a longer life, all arts would have been perfected and the life of men would be polished by all learning (34A.4–6). Of special interest is the fact that a similar observation (nature grants a longer life to animals than to men, who are capable of many great achievements) is attributed by Seneca to Aristotle. We may choose to say that Seneca has nodded and revealed his unreliability,¹⁹⁹ but equally we may say that both Seneca and Cicero are reporting what "is said" (*dicitur* in Cicero). They are reproducing attention-getting words that could be moved from one well-known figure to another and on occasion turned into the final remarks of a dying

¹⁹⁸ The two possibilities are not exclusive.

¹⁹⁹ Rose (1863) p. 111.

man.²⁰⁰ Much the same can be said of what Diogenes reports, though the argument in three parts is, I believe, nowhere else attested.

I have been discussing a text of Diogenes in which a general reference is made to what men say. Elsewhere there are references to particular sources. Indeed, the very first sentence of the *Life of Theophrastus* mentions Athenodorus for information concerning Theophrastus' father. For a general survey of Diogenes' sources, I refer to Sollenberger (1984) pp. 20–21, who focuses on Book 5 and concludes that “we can distinguish no single or even main source for the lives of the Peripatetics as a whole.” Here I add only that when a particular source is identified, it is possible that more than one source stands behind whatever is reported. And when that is the case, dependence may be involved. For example, when Diogenes reports the fact that in his old age Theophrastus was carried about in a litter, Diogenes cites Favorinus, who is said to report what was said by Hermippus, who is reporting what Arcesilaus narrated in his remarks to Lacydes of Cyrene. Put simply, Diogenes is dependent on Favorinus, who is dependent on Hermippus, who is dependent on Arcesilaus (5.41 = 1).

Finally, Theophrastus' two-word characterization of beauty is found in the *Life of Aristotle*, where it is embedded within a list of “most attractive sayings” (5.19). See the commentary on 566 in Chapter IV, Section 16 “Eros.”

23 Censorinus] 2nd quarter of the 3rd cent. AD.

We know little concerning the life of Censorinus. Assuming that he is related to L. Marcus Censorinus, who was consul in 149 BC, he will have been born into an old and respected Roman family.²⁰¹ Two passages in Censorinus' work *About the Day of Birth* make clear that the work was written in 238 AD (chap. 18.12 and 21.6). Hence his floruit belongs to the first half of the 3rd century. Priscian cites a different, lost work of Censorinus, namely, *On Accents* (*Grammatical Foundations* 14.1.6 [GL vol. 3 p. 27.25–26 Keil]) and describes him as *doctissimus artis grammaticae*, “most learned in the art of grammar” (1.4.17 [GL vol. 2 p. 13.19–20]).²⁰²

²⁰⁰ Seneca counters the Aristotelian complaint by saying that the problem is not the shortness of life but the way that man wastes time (1.3–4).

²⁰¹ Holt Parker, *The Birthday Book: Censorinus*, (Chicago: University Press 2007) p. xi. Censorinus mentions the consul in *About the Day of Birth* 17.11.

²⁰² See G. Wissowa, “Censorinus 7” in *Paulys Realencyclopädie* 3.2 (1899) col. 1908–1910 and K. Sallmann, “Censorinus 4” in *Brill's New Pauly* 3 (2003) col. 105.

In *About the Day of Birth*, Censorinus draws on various sources, most notably Varro and Suetonius, but there are others including Theophrastus, who is cited twice, almost certainly through an intermediary. In Chapter 4.3 = 185, Censorinus refers to the Pythagoreans, Academics and the Peripatetics, names people who belong to each group and tells us that they hold the human race to be eternal. Among the persons named are Plato, Aristotle and Theophrastus. Censorinus is correct to name them. Regarding Plato, see *Laws* 6.22 781E–782A, and on Aristotle see *Generation of Animals* 2.1 731b35–732a1. Theophrastus will have agreed concerning eternity of the human race. There is, however, one striking error: Dicaearchus is listed among the Academics.²⁰³

In Chapter 12.1 = 721B, Censorinus tells us that according to Socrates music is only in the voice; according to Aristoxenus it is in voice and bodily motion; and according to Theophrastus it is in both of these plus the motion of the soul. The list, with its well-known names and progression by addition and temporal sequence, most likely goes back to a doxographer who liked to organize his reports in an orderly manner. In the text-translation volumes, the mention of Socrates is explained by citing *Republic* 530D. In the notes to his translation, Holt Parker cites *Symposium* 215C and *Philebus* 17B.²⁰⁴ Both texts are certainly relevant, but the latter gives me pause. For after connecting the musician and his art with voice (17B–C), Socrates is made to extend the art to bodily movement (17D), which invites comparison with Aristoxenus in our passage from Censorinus. And that agrees with *Laws* 2.1 653D–654A, 2.2 655A, 2.9 664E–665A, where, however, Socrates has been replaced by the Athenian Stranger.²⁰⁵ Be that as it may, I have no reason to doubt what Censorinus reports concerning Theophrastus: a full account of music will mention not only voice and bodily motion but also movement of the soul. See 716.7–9, 130–132; also the commentary on 719A–B and 721B in Chapter IV, Section 2 “Emotions” and Section 4 “Education, Exhortation and Censure.”

²⁰³ See Sharples in *Commentary* 3.1 on physics pp. 142–143.

²⁰⁴ Parker, *op. cit.* p. 80.

²⁰⁵ On occasion, the issue seems to be one of terminology and context: see e.g., *Laws* 2.2 655A where postures and tunes are said to be in music, ἐν μουσικῇ, which deals with rhythm and harmony, and 2.9 665A, where rhythm and harmony in combination are referred to as choristry, χορεία.

24 Porphyry] 232/3–c. 305 AD.

Porphyry hailed from Tyre on the Phoenician coast. He studied with Longinus in Athens and at the age of 30 moved to Rome, where he attached himself to Plotinus. He remained in Rome for five years and then in 268 AD moved to Sicily. He was there when Plotinus died in 270. It is not certain when Porphyry returned to Rome, but he married there the wife of a former fellow student of Plotinus and was alive during the reign of Diocletian, who abdicated in 305 AD.²⁰⁶

Porphyry is perhaps best known for editing the writings of Plotinus. He divided some of the works in order to increase their number to fifty-four, which is the product of the perfect number six and the number of totality, nine. The material was then organized into six sets, each containing nine treatises. The sets represent the six stages in the ascent of the soul, while the number of treatises in each set is reflected in the title, *Enneads*.²⁰⁷ In the *Life of Plotinus*, which serves as a preface to the *Enneads*, Porphyry claims to be imitating Apollodorus and Andronicus. The former is said to have collected the writings of the comic poet Epicharmus into ten volumes, and the latter to have divided the works of Aristotle and Theophrastus into treatises, bringing together related subjects into the same work (39).

Porphyry's interests were wide-ranging and his writings numerous, many of which are lost. Of the surviving works, I have already mentioned the *Life of Plotinus*. Here I add his influential *Isagoge* (*Introduction to Aristotle's Categories*), *Life of Pythagoras* and *On Abstinence from Eating Animals*. The last is our special concern, for in Book 2 there are lengthy excerpts from Theophrastus' work *On Piety* (584A–D).²⁰⁸ In Book 3 there is a comparatively short excerpt (531), most likely from the same work, and in Book 4 there are two still shorter notices, whose provenance is less certain (440C, app. 512A). In the text-translation volumes, the excerpts found in Book 2 are printed together under the rubric "Religion." Since I have discussed them in two earlier works ([1984] pp. 125–128, 262–274 and [2003b] pp. 173–192) and since they will be discussed by Stefan Schorn in *Commentary* volume 6.2, I limit myself to brief remarks.

²⁰⁶ Clark pp. 4–5.

²⁰⁷ D. O'Meara, "Plotinus," in Zeyl (1997) p. 421.

²⁰⁸ Nowhere does Porphyry give the title of the Theophrastean work on which he is drawing, but a consideration of content, a scholion on Aristophanes *Birds* 1354 and an entry in Photius' *Lexicon* s.v. κύρβεις (app. 584A ad 177) establish that the work in question is *On Piety*. See my *Quellen* (1984) p. 126.

In 1866 Jacob Bernays published *Theophrastos' Schrift über Frömmigkeit*. He subjected Porphyry's *On Abstinence* to close scrutiny and was able to identify with extraordinary accuracy the excerpts that Porphyry took over from Theophrastus. In addition, Bernays studied Porphyry's use of source material by considering the excerpts drawn from Josephus' *On the Jewish Wars*. He concluded that on the whole Porphyry remained faithful to the original text from which he was excerpting. Subsequent scholarship has found little to fault in Bernays' identification of Theophrastean material. Dümmler, Wilamowitz, Regenbogen, Gortemen, Pötscher and Bouffartigue have suggested adding to the material picked out by Bernays, but their suggestions have not led to a major reconsideration of Bernays' method and judgment.²⁰⁹ On the suggested additions and for a schematic overview of the excerpts recognized by Bernays, Pötscher and Bouffartigue, see *Quellen* (1984) pp. 263–264.

Texts 584B–D aside, the excerpts from Theophrastus in Book 2 of *On Abstinence* are brought together in 584A. Theophrastus is named at the beginning (line 2), at the end (line 383) and four times along the way (lines 58, 93, 169, 262). Clearly Porphyry is not hiding his use of Theophrastean material, in part because Theophrastus is a respected philosopher, whose agreement lends authority to Porphyry's argument. For our purposes, the most important reference to Theophrastus is that with which 584A concludes. Here Porphyry not only signals an end to the extended use of excerpts but also tells that he has omitted, added and shortened certain passages. The omissions are said to be interspersed myths (lines 381–382). They will have been appropriate in *On Piety*, which was an exoteric work (written for a general readership), but they would be less at home in Porphyry's treatise *On Abstinence*. The omissions will also have included repetitions and material extraneous to Porphyry's argument. In addition, excerpting material from what was likely to have been a dialogue and incorporating it in a treatise will have necessitated omitting or at least altering phrases, sentences and exchanges that would betray the dialogue format of Porphyry's source.²¹⁰ The additions

²⁰⁹ Most ambitious is Pötscher (1964), whose suggestions are interesting but for the most part not to be embraced. See H. Gottschalk's highly critical reviews of Pötscher in the *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 88 (1968) p. 169 and *Gnomon* 41 (1969) pp. 338–344.

²¹⁰ I agree with Gorteman p. 96, Wehrli (1963) p. 223 and Gottschalk (1969) p. 344, against Pötscher (1964) p. 13, that the work *On Piety* was probably a dialogue. Stefan Schorn has recently called my attention to 584A.211, where ὁμολογῶμεν, "we have agreed," occurs. According to Schorn, such an expression is intelligible only in a dialogue

may have been largely intended to integrate the Theophrastean material into the flow of Porphyry's argument. But we cannot rule out occasional additions and omissions that were intended to bring a Theophrastean text into line with Porphyry's own position.

Turning now to Book 3, in which text 531 occurs, we again find Porphyry making use of excerpts. Of especial interest is the lengthy excerpt (3.20.7–24.6) from Plutarch's dialogue *Whether Land or Sea Animals are Cleverer* (2 959E–6 963F). As Pötscher has shown,²¹¹ Porphyry takes over the material with minimal changes. Since the Plutarchan work is a dialogue, Porphyry is occasionally forced to make changes that suit his own format. For example, at 3.21.1 he alters a passage in which one interlocutor addresses another by name (3 960C). He may also add a sentence when he wants to highlight his own position and omit material that might weaken his case. An instance of the former occurs at 3.20.7, where Porphyry asks rhetorically, "How did they (the Pythagoreans) not do more to build up justice (by practicing justice toward animals) than those who say that as a result of these (practices) habitual justice (i.e., what most men regard as justice) is destroyed?" An instance of the latter occurs later at 3.21.9. Porphyry is drawing on a passage in which Plutarch sets forth a two-part argument in order to demonstrate that perceiving does not occur without thinking (3 961A–B). First, there is an argument involving inattention or absentmindedness. It is attributed to Strato, the third head of the Peripatetic School. Second, we are offered an example concerning the Spartan King Cleomenes III.²¹² Plutarch then concludes with the following if-then hypothetical: ἀνάγκη πᾶσιν, οἷς τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι, καὶ τὸ νοεῖν ὑπάρχειν, εἰ τῷ νοεῖν αἰσθάνεσθαι πεφύκαμεν, "it is necessary that in all creatures that are perceiving, thinking is also occurring, if by nature we perceive through thinking." The protasis (the if-clause) comes last, and in excerpting the passage, Porphyry omits it. Perhaps he found the protasis unnecessary or too wordy, but more likely he omits it, because the if-clause weakens the immediately preceding apodosis,²¹³

format. In a treatise we would expect an expression like "as has been shown above." Here Porphyry will have nodded and failed to alter his source.

²¹¹ Pötscher (1964) pp. 5–12.

²¹² Cleomenes III was King of Sparta from 236 to 222 BC. On chronological grounds, we can say that the example is not taken from Strato, who died in c. 268 BC. See Wehrli (1967–1978) vol. 5 pp. 74–75.

²¹³ Or more cautiously, the protasis may be thought to weaken the apodosis. See Pötscher (1964) p. 7. In any case, Porphyry's text concludes the argument with an unqualified assertion of what necessarily follows from the preceding two-part argument.

which is taken over verbatim from Plutarch. Omitting the protasis may not misrepresent the view of Strato,²¹⁴ but we should take seriously the possibility that on occasion Porphyry is prepared to omit and to add in order to strengthen and/or emphasize his own position.²¹⁵ See the commentary on 531, in which I consider Dierauer's claim that Theophrastus did not attribute calculation, λογισμοί, to animals. Rather, the attribution is an addition by Porphyry to what is otherwise a Theophrastean fragment.

In Book 4 of *On Abstinence*, Theophrastus is mentioned twice. The first (app. 512A) occurs within an excerpt from Plutarch's *Life of Lycurgus* (Porph. 4.2–5.1 = Plut. 8.4–12.4). The excerpt involves several omissions (including the whole of Plutarch's Chapter 11),²¹⁶ but the portion of text containing the name of Theophrastus is reported without omission and verbatim. In the text-translation volumes, the text is assigned to Plutarch. Porphyry is named in the apparatus of parallel texts. See the commentary on 512A–B. The second mention of Theophrastus occurs toward the end of the book (4.20.14 = 440C.4). Porphyry is arguing that the consumption not only of meat but also of crops contaminates the soul and contributes to our mortality (4.20.11–13). In making this argument, he draws without acknowledgement on Plutarch's *Dinner of the Seven Wise Men* (Porph. 4.20.13 = Plut. 16 160A–B),²¹⁷ and then cites Theophrastus without revealing his source: namely, Plutarch's *Recommendations on Preserving Health* (Porph. 4.20.14 = Plut. 24 135E).²¹⁸ See the commentary on 440A–C.

²¹⁴ In fact, it is all but certain that Strato's view is not misrepresented by omitting the if-clause. See the commentary on 531.

²¹⁵ E.g., in arguing that justice ought to be extended to animals, Porphyry cites Aristotle's *Research on Animals* 8–9, in which Aristotle speaks in ways that encourage the humanization of animals. What Porphyry does not do is acknowledge that Aristotle expresses himself with caution and qualification, and that in other works Aristotle recognizes a fundamental difference between animals and human beings (Fortenbaugh [2010b] pp. 398–400).

²¹⁶ The omissions are noted by Clark p. 181. The omission of Chapter 11 is a good example of Porphyry cutting out irrelevant material. His primary concern in *On Abstinence* is persuading Castricius to return to a vegetarian diet. In Chapter 11 Plutarch is focused on the character of Lycurgus and in particular his measured response to an attack that left him blind in one eye.

²¹⁷ Clark p. 192.

²¹⁸ The phrase "as Theophrastus says somewhere" (που 440C.4) reflects the fact that Plutarch fails to refer to a particular work of Theophrastus.

25 Aphthonius] probably 1st half of the 4th cent. AD.

Little is known concerning Aelius Festus Aphthonius. On the basis of style, he has been thought to be African by birth,²¹⁹ but that has been denied as unfounded.²²⁰ Even his name is problematic. In particular, the cognomen Aphthonius is uncertain: it may be a corruption of Asmonius, though the reverse has also been asserted.²²¹ Be that as it may, Aphthonius wrote a grammar dedicated to Constantinus II; it has been lost (Priscian, *Grammatical Foundations* 10.4.24 in *GL* vol. 2 p. 516.15–16 Keil). He also wrote a work on metrics in four books. The beginning is lost; what we have today was combined with Marius Victorinus' *Art of Grammar* (*GL* vol. 6 p. 31.17–173.32).²²² That will have occurred in the course of the fifth century.²²³ The joining of work by Aphthonius to that of Victorinus has been explained in two ways. Either Victorinus himself joined the material making numerous changes to the work of Aphthonius,²²⁴ or the joining is the result of an accident: namely, the loss of pages between the two works.²²⁵ The latter seems preferable. A third possibility, that the entire work is attributable to Aphthonius,²²⁶ can be rejected.

Our special concern is a brief passage in which Aphthonius names Theophrastus and speaks of emotion being an impulse to song (*GL* vol. 6 p. 159.8–16 = 719B). The passage is closely related to what we read in Plutarch's *Table Talk* 1.5.2 (719A). Dirlmeier claims to identify additional Theophrastean material in what precedes.²²⁷ See below, the commentary on 719A–B.

²¹⁹ Th. Bergk, attributes an African birth to Aphthonius ("Kritische Analekten," *Philologus* 16 [1860] p. 646).

²²⁰ The idea is rejected by Goetz, "Aphthonius 2," *Paulys Realencyclopädie* 1.2 (1894) col. 2800.

²²¹ Bergk rejects the name Asmonius as strange and unable to be explained. He thinks the name a scribal error (p. 645). P.L. Schmidt is of the opposite opinion (*Brill's New Pauly* vol. 2 [2003] col. 163).

²²² Keil, *GL* vol. 6 pp. xiv–xviii.

²²³ Aphthonius may also be the author of supplements to Horatian metrics and of metrical definitions; see Bergk p. 640 and Schmidt col. 164.

²²⁴ Keil vol. 6 p. xvii, Goetz col. 2800.

²²⁵ Wessner, "Marius (Victorinus) 70" *Paulys Real Encyclopädie* 14.2 (1930) col. 1839–1840.

²²⁶ Bergk p. 639.

²²⁷ Dirlmeier (1937) pp. 98–100.

26 Libanius] 314–394 AD.

Born in Antioch to parents of considerable standing within the city, Libanius retained the social and political values of his family throughout his life. However, he did not enter politics but preferred to become a sophist or teacher of rhetoric. He initially studied in Antioch under Ulpian of Ascalon and Zenobius of Elusa. In 336 he went to Athens, where he studied under Diophantus. In 340 he departed Athens and began teaching, first in Constantinople and later in Nicea, where he accepted the official chair in sophistry. Subsequently he moved to Nicomedia, where he received a more important chair, which he held until 348. After that he taught again in Constantinople, and finally in 354 he returned to Antioch, where he was appointed official sophist of the city. His *Antiochicus* (*Oration* 11), written in 360 for the local Olympic games, is an expression of devotion to his native city.²²⁸

Libanius was a committed pagan, who embraced the Hellenic ideal of education, which was based on rhetoric and the study of classical literature. He rejected and ignored things Roman and refused to learn Latin even though it was the language of administration within the Roman Empire.²²⁹ In regard to diction, he admired Aelius Aristides (2nd cent. AD), and in his teaching, he emphasized the classical Greek authors including Homer and Hesiod, Herodotus and Thucydides, Lysias and Demosthenes.²³⁰ The study of philosophy was less important to Libanius. He exhibits interest in Pythagoras, Plato, Socrates and Xenophon, but his interest in them is more literary and philological than philosophical. The corpus of Libanius' writings includes 51 declamations, 96 *progymnasmata* or preliminary exercises, 64 orations, the *Hypotheses* to the orations of Demosthenes, and some 1600 letters.²³¹

Our collection of Theophrastean texts includes a single text of Libanius. It is a preliminary exercise based on a *chria* or memorable response

²²⁸ For a translation of *Orations* 11 together with an introduction and commentary, see G. Downey, "Libanius' Oration in Praise of Antioch," in the *Transactions of the American Philosophical Society* 103 (1959) pp. 652–686. On the life of Libanius, see his autobiography, *Orations* 1: text, translation and commentary by A. Norman, *Libanius' Autobiography: Oration I*, Oxford: University Press 1965.

²²⁹ On the threat of Latin and Roman law to Greek rhetorical education, see *Orations* 1.154, 214, 234; 40.5; 43.5. Also J. Liebeschuetz, *Antioch: City and Imperial Administration in the Later Roman Empire*. (Oxford: Clarendon 1972) pp. 242–255.

²³⁰ Grant p. 251 and G. Kennedy, *Greek Rhetoric under Christian Emperors* (Princeton: University Press 1983) p. 163, citing *Letters* 1036.

²³¹ Kennedy, op. cit. p. 151, and cf. P. Kroh p. 364.

that Theophrastus is alleged to have made in answer to the question “What is eros?”²³² It would be nice to think that Libanius’ interest in classical literature had prompted him to study the works of Theophrastus, in this case the (*Dialogue*) *on Love*,²³³ that the response attributed to Theophrastus is genuine, and that the development of this response in the rest of the exercise contains at least some Theophrastean material. But we must be careful. More than likely, Libanius has the Theophrastean response from an existing collection of *chriae*, in which the various attributions cannot be automatically accepted as genuine. Indeed many of the attributions are likely to have been fanciful.²³⁴ And what we are offered in the rest of the exercise is not intended to conform to historical standards; rather, it is intended to satisfy the guidelines of the rhetorical schools. I.e., after the *chria* has been stated, the exercise proceeds through eight steps: 1) praise of the person to whom the *chria* is attributed, 2) a paraphrase of the *chria*, 3) its rationale, 4) an argument from the opposite, 5) corroboration through analogy, 6) historical examples, 7) testimony of the ancients, 8) and an epilogue.²³⁵ All this is meant to give the student practice in rhetorical invention as well as an opportunity to develop good style. The truth concerning a long dead philosopher like Theophrastus plays little or no role. That may be discouraging to those of us who are interested in Theophrastus’ ethics in its historical context, but it does exhibit one way in which Theophrastus’ name was kept alive during the late Roman Empire.

27 Julian] 331–363 AD.

Flavius Claudius Julianus was born in Constantinople. He was the nephew of the Emperor Constantine, whose death in 337 led to bloodshed (Julian’s father Julius Constantius, his uncle Flavius Dalmatius and two cousins were killed) and thereupon a precarious childhood for Julian. Nevertheless, Julian not only survived but also received a good education in Greek literature, rhetoric and philosophy. The earliest stage was supervised by the bishop Eusebius of Nicomedia. Instruction in Homer

²³² Libanius, *Preliminary Exercises* 3 (*Chriae*) 4 = 558. Strictly speaking a *chria* need not be a verbal response. It may be an action or a combination of the two. See, e.g., Aphthonius, *Preliminary Exercises* 3 (*RhGr* vol. 2 p. 23.4–5 Spengel).

²³³ 436 no. 29.

²³⁴ On the historical reliability of *chriae* or lack thereof, see R. Hock, the “General Introduction” in *The Chreia in Ancient Rhetoric*, ed. R. Hock and E. O’Neil, vol. 1 (Atlanta: Scholars Press 1986) pp. 42–47.

²³⁵ See, e.g., Aphthonius, *loc. cit.* (p. 23.14–17 Spengel).

and Hesiod was provided by the eunuch Mardonius, who had a significant and lasting influence on his pupil. In 342 Julian was sent by his cousin, the Emperor Constantius II, to Macellum, an imperial estate in Cappadocia, where he lived for six years. The reasons for and the details of this period are hazy, but at a minimum Julian seems to have received training in Christianity and become familiar with the library of George of Cappadocia, who is likely to have taken over responsibility for Julian's education. Subsequent to this period, Julian studied rhetoric with the pagan Nicocles and the Christian Hecebolius. Directly or indirectly he had access to the lectures of the rhetorician Libanius. In addition he received training in philosophy from several Neoplatonists: Eusebius of Myndus, Chrysanthius of Sardis and Maximus of Ephesus. He also received instruction from Themistius, who admired and lectured on Plato, but remained remote from contemporary Neoplatonism. In 355 the Emperor Constantius II, who had no heir, elevated Julian to the Caesarship and sent him to Gaul, where he commanded an army with considerable success. In 359 Constantius ordered Julian to send certain select legions to assist him in the East. Julian's soldiers balked and proclaimed him Emperor. In 361 Julian began to march East with his troops. A struggle would have ensued had Constantius not fallen sick and died. Julian became Emperor and ruled for 16 months. He was killed while campaigning against the Persians.²³⁶

Julian converted from Christianity to paganism when he was twenty (in 351) and today is well-known for reestablishing paganism as the official religion of the empire. That earned him the epithet "Apostate." His work *Against the Christians*, surviving only in fragments, explained his apostasy. Other works include the *Beard-Hater*, a satire on the luxury of the citizens of Antioch, and *The Convivium* or *Caesars*, also a satire in which earlier Emperors are shown trying to enter heaven. In addition, there are orations and letters.

In the text-translation volumes, there are three texts drawn from Julian. One is taken from the *Beard-Hater*, in which Theophrastus is named together with Plato, Socrates and Aristotle. All four are said to be

²³⁶ For summaries of the life of Julian, see Grant pp. 240–241, W. Wright's introduction to vol. 1 of the Loeb edition pp. vii–xii and K. Rosen, "Fl. Claudius I." in *Brill's New Pauly* 6 (2005) col. 1046–1049. A fuller account of the education of Julian can be found in R. Smith, *Julian's Gods: Religion and Philosophy in the Thought and Action of Julian the Apostate* (London: Routledge 1995) pp. 23–36. See also Shaun Tougher, *Julian the Apostate* (Edinburgh: University Press 2007) pp. 14–16, 23–30. Tougher has a lengthy bibliography on pp. 187–194.

frequently ridiculed in comedy (64). A second is taken from the eighth oration, in which Julian cites the Peripatetic Xenarchus (1st century BC), who criticized Theophrastus for investigating the fifth bodily substance. (158).²³⁷ The third is our particular concern. It is from the sixth oration. Julian's subject is the Cynics of his day, who are criticized for failing to maintain the style of life that characterized Diogenes, the sect's founder (483). In line with his training in Greek literature and rhetorical style, Julian mixes in allusions to classical authors and on occasion prefers circumlocution to the use of proper names. A striking example of avoiding the use of names occurs immediately after 483, in which Pythagoras, Theophrastus and Aristotle have been named. Instead of continuing in such a straightforward manner, Julian turns to the Stoics, says that in fairness he ought to mention their name (ὧν τε ἐν δίκῃ νῦν εἴπομαι ἂν τοῦνομα) and then avoids doing so. He speaks of the companions of the man from Citium (τοὺς τοῦ Κιτιέως ὁμιλητὰς λέγω 185C).

In text 483, Pythagoras, Theophrastus and Aristotle are mentioned in that order. There may be nothing extraordinary in the combination. Certainly Julian's interest in the Neoplatonists, especially Iamblichus, is sufficient to explain a reference to Pythagoras,²³⁸ and if a special influence is needed to explain a mention of Aristotle, then Themistius will do.²³⁹ Similarly the mention of Theophrastus may be explained by reference to one of these authors or simply to Julian's early education.²⁴⁰ But it may be worth asking whether Theophrastus himself referred to Pythagoras in regard to the injunction under consideration: liken oneself as far as possible to god (185A = 483.2–4). See the commentary on 483.

28 Ambrose] c. 340–397 AD.

Saint Ambrose was born in Trier and grew up in Rome. He became governor of Emilia-Liguria in 370 and bishop of Milan in 347. His selection as Bishop was extraordinary: he was a compromise candidate, who went from unbaptized layman to bishop in eight days. His new position suited him well, so that he became a dominant force in the religious, political and cultural life of his time. He played an important

²³⁷ On 158, see Sharples in *Commentary* vol. 3.1 on physics pp. 94–96.

²³⁸ Iamblichus (c. 250–330) wrote several works on Pythagoreanism including *On the Pythagorean Life*. In Julian's sixth oration, Iamblichus is referred to by name at 188B.

²³⁹ Themistius wrote paraphrase commentaries on Aristotelian treatises. Extant in Greek are those on the *Posterior Analytics*, *Physics* and *On Soul*.

²⁴⁰ Our collection of Theophrastean fragments includes twelve from Themistius.

role in establishing Nicene orthodoxy and defended the church's moral and spiritual authority in relation to the state. Indeed, his authority was such that he was able to rebuke the emperor Theodosius and to impose public penance on him. In addition, Ambrose was responsible for Augustine's conversion to Christianity, and through his sermons and other writings he provided his age with a model of Latin prose. He also wrote hymns that influenced the liturgy of the church.²⁴¹

Our collection of Theophrastean fragments contains a single text taken from Ambrose's work *On the Duties of Ministers*. The work is modeled on Cicero's *On Duties* and contains material drawn from *On Ends*. In particular, text 480B draws directly on what Cicero has Piso say in *On Ends* 5.73 (lines 1–3). For our purposes, the interesting part of the text is found in what follows (lines 4–7). For there Ambrose departs from what Piso is made to say in an earlier passage: namely, that it is the goods of mind and body—as against external goods—by which the ultimate good is filled (5.68). In contrast, Ambrose, following Aristotle and Theophrastus, tells us that happiness is made full by both bodily and external goods. See the commentary on 480B.

29 Jerome] c. 347–420 AD.

Perhaps in 347 AD,²⁴² Saint Jerome (Eusebius Hieronymus) was born into a Christian family of means at Stridon in Dalmatia.²⁴³ He was educated first in Stridon and then in Rome, where he was taught by the grammarian Aelius Donatus and an unidentified rhetorician. Under these teachers, he will have been well-instructed in Latin literature, both poetry and prose. To what extent Jerome became acquainted with Greek literature during this early period is uncertain.²⁴⁴ In 367 or 368, he went to Trier and subsequently to Dalmatia. During this period he became

²⁴¹ For a general introduction to the life and writings of Ambrose, see, e.g., R. Crouter, "Ambrose" in the *Encyclopedia of Religion, Second Edition*, ed. by L. Jones (Detroit: Thomson Gale 2005) vol. 1 pp. 287–288 and W. Buchwald et al., "Ambrosius," in the *Tusculum Lexicon griechischer und lateinischer Autoren des Altertums und des Mittelalters* (Munich: Artemis 1982) pp. 45–46.

²⁴² Currently a date in the late 340s seems to be preferred (347 AD is given in the OCD), but see J. Kelly, *Jerome: His Life, Writings and Controversies* (New York: Harper & Row 1975) p. 1, who argues for 331.

²⁴³ According to Kelly op. cit. p. 3, Stridon may have been destroyed by the Goths in 379. No trace of the town remains.

²⁴⁴ W. McDermott, "Saint Jerome and Pagan Greek Literature," *Vigiliae Christianae* 36 (1982) p. 372 suggests that Jerome may have acquired a reading knowledge without being fluent in speaking.

attracted to monasticism. In 373 AD he traveled to the East, and beginning in 375, he lived for two years as a hermit in the desert. In 378 he was ordained on the understanding that his monastic inclinations would be respected. He returned to Rome in 382, where he was secretary to Pope Damasus and revised the Old Latin translation of the Gospels and the Latin Psalter. In addition, he promoted the ascetic life, holding classes for monastic-minded widows and virgins, while attacking the view that virginity and marriage are of equal merit. In 385 he returned to the East and soon settled in Bethlehem, where he remained with only minor interruptions until his death. He became the director of a monastery and worked extensively on the Bible, revising portions of the Old Latin translation of the Septuagint and producing commentaries concerning the minor and major prophets.

The above is a highly selective biography that is intended to make clear not only Jerome's extensive learning but also his preference for an ascetic life and his prejudice against marriage. The latter is fully exhibited in the work *Against Jovinian*, which was written in 393 and contains a lengthy segment, at the beginning and end of which Jerome cites Theophrastus as his source (486.7, 79). Much is problematic. Jerome makes explicit reference to a so-called little golden book *On Marriage* (486.7), which is mentioned neither in Diogenes' catalogue of Theophrastean writings nor anywhere else except in authors dependent, directly or indirectly, upon Jerome. See the commentary on 436 no. 17. What is said about women and marriage within the segment attributed to Theophrastus is so harsh and out of line with other Theophrastean texts that it cannot be accepted as Theophrastus' considered view. See the commentary on 486.

In general Jerome's knowledge of the classical Greek philosophers was acquired through intermediate sources.²⁴⁵ Theophrastus was no exception: that Jerome had first-hand knowledge of a Theophrastean work entitled *On Marriage*, Περὶ γάμου, is not to be believed.²⁴⁶ What is open for discussion is the identity of Jerome's source. The most likely candidate is Seneca. For not long after the presentation of Theophrastean material (i.e., at the beginning of chapter 49), Jerome writes: *scripserunt Aristoteles et Plutarchus et noster Seneca de matrimonio libros, ex quibus et superiora nonnulla sunt et ista quae subieciimus*, "Aristotle and Plutarch and

²⁴⁵ Instructive is *Against Rufinus*, for here Hieronymus states that his knowledge of Pythagoras, Plato and Empedocles is based on Cicero, Brutus and Seneca.

²⁴⁶ See, e.g., Lubeck pp. 6–7, Grossgerge pp. 16–17, Courcelle p. 60, transl. p. 70–71, Hagendahl p. 153 and Gaiser p. 68.

our Seneca wrote books on marriage, from which I have taken some of the preceding material and that which follows" (1.49 p. 392 Bickel). Since Aristotle and Plutarch can be eliminated, most scholars have concluded that Seneca is Jerome's source for Theophrastus: e.g., Haase pp. 428–430,²⁴⁷ Wageningen pp. 427–429, Arnim (1892) p. 127, Luebeck pp. 93, 205–206, Grossgerge pp. 17–18,²⁴⁸ Wilamowitz vol. 2 p. 285 n. 1, Regenbogen col. 1487, Gaiser p. 68. A different view has been put forward by Bock p. 11, who maintains that Jerome did not make direct use of Seneca. Rather, he will have drawn on Tertullian, whose lost work *De nuptiarum angustiiis* contained much material taken from classical authors. This view has been adequately refuted by Grossgerge pp. 15–18 and therefore can be ignored. A more interesting possibility has been advanced by Bickel pp. 17–20, 213–214, who suggests Porphyrius as Jerome's source. Porphyrius will have written a work, now lost, that may have carried the title Περὶ ἀγνοῦ βίου. Although Bickel's suggestion has been embraced by Courcelle pp. 60–61, transl. 71–72, Delhay 68–69 and with some hesitation by Hagendahl pp. 153, 324, the scepticism of Regenbogen col. 1487 seems to me justified. I leave the issue undecided, for a firm decision between the competing possibilities demands more than a casual familiarity not only with the style of Seneca but also with that of Jerome.

What we can say with certainty is that the Theophrastean segment is not a word for word translation of the original. An example is the argument against marrying for the sake of children in order that one's name not perish: "For when we depart this world, what does it matter to us, if another is not called by our name? A son does not assume the name of his father straightway and there are innumerable persons called by the same name." The words *quid enim ad nos pertinet recedentes e mundo* (486.69–70) are addressed to Jerome's Christian readers, and the words *filius non statim patris vocabulum referat* (486.70–71) obscure what Theophrastus is likely to have stated more clearly: a son does not take the name of his father; that is left to the grandson.²⁴⁹ In addition, there are lines that seem

²⁴⁷ F. Haase includes Jerome's text in his edition of the fragments of Seneca, Leipzig 1872, vol. 3 fr. XIII 47–59, pp. 428–430.

²⁴⁸ The fact that Seneca attaches *noster*, "our," to Seneca's name is striking. According to Grossgerge p. 15, it indicates that Jerome counted Seneca among Christians. That may be too strong, but it certainly enhances Seneca's candidacy as Jerome's source for Theophrastus.

²⁴⁹ See Bloch p. 441 n. 29, with whom Bickel pp. 16–17 n. 1 agrees. Citing Terence, *Phormio* 790, Bickel goes on to suggest that Jerome may be using *statim* in the sense of *in perpetuum*. Disregard my comment in *Quellen* (1984) p. 208.

to contain reminiscences of Latin texts: e.g. *nec posse quemquam libris et uxori pariter inservire*, “No man can be devoted to books and wife equally” (486.12–13), agrees closely with words subsequently attributed to Cicero: *non posse se et uxori et philosophiae pariter operam dare* (1.48 p. 390.22–23 Bickel). And the sentence *numquam minus solus erit quam cum solus erit*, “(The wise man) will never be less alone than when he is alone” (486.66), recalls Cicero, *On Duties* 3.1: *numquam se minus otiosum esse quam cum otiosus nec minus solum quam cum solus esset*, and *Republic* 1.27: *numquam minus solum esse quam cum solus esset*. So too the words: *difficile custoditur quod plures amant*, “It is difficult to guard what many love” (486.46), recall the verse of Publius Syrus: *maximo periculo custoditur quod multis placet* (826 Orelli = 326 Meyer). And the phrase *rara avis*, “rare bird” (486.61), is found in both Juvenal (6.165) and Persius (1.46).²⁵⁰ On the basis of these parallels and the fact that the insertion of extraneous material suits Jerome’s practice, it seems reasonable to say that 486 is not a simple rendering of Theophrastean material. Nevertheless, two caveats are in order. First, since Jerome is not drawing directly on Theophrastus, we cannot entirely exclude the possibility that the lines in question were already present in Jerome’s source. Second, some of the lines may reflect sayings that were already commonplaces in Theophrastus’ day, so that it would be wrong to think of them as being peculiarly Theophrastean. But even if that is the case, the lines in question are likely to have been influenced in either diction or style or both by the Latin equivalents, either those cited above or those that will have occurred elsewhere.

Nevertheless, it does not follow that text 486 is so contaminated that it offers no clues as to what Theophrastus may have written in some lost work. Moreover, I think Grossgerge p. 18 is wrong to compare Jerome’s use of excerpts from Plutarch’s *Conjugal Precepts* with what Jerome presents as Theophrastean material. To be sure the Plutarchan excerpts follow closely on the Theophrastean material (they occur in chapters 48–49), but the differences are significant. Whereas the Theophrastean material is comparatively long and continuous, the excerpts from Plutarch are short, do not form a continuous series and (in chapter 48) are presented by Jerome in an inverted order.²⁵¹ Moreover, the Theophrastean material is introduced and concluded with a reference to

²⁵⁰ See Bickel 10–11 and Hagendahl 155–156.

²⁵¹ In 1.48, Jerome’s order is *Conj. Prec.* 43, 40, 35, 22, 10, 7. See Hagendahl p. 152 with note 4. In 1.49, Jerome draws on *Conj. Prec.* 48.

Theophrastus. In contrast, Jerome uses the Plutarchan excerpts without referring to his source (save the general reference to Aristotle, Plutarch and Seneca at the beginning of chapter 49). For further discussion of the content of 486, see below, Chapter IV, Section 6 “The Wise Man and Marriage.”

Two other texts in which Jerome refers to Theophrastus have been included among the ethical texts. Both relate to friendship and both almost certainly depend on an intermediate source. One is 532, in which Jerome, like Diogenes Laertius (5.45 = 1.65), reports that *On Friendship* was three books in length. In addition we are told that Theophrastus preferred *amicitia* to all *caritas* and witnessed to the rarity of friendship in human affairs. The other text is 541, in which a saying concerning the blindness of love is attributed to Theophrastus. We are also given Cicero’s translation, but no surviving Ciceronian text has what Jerome reports.

No. 30 Fulgentius] late 5th and early 6th cent. AD.

Fabius Planciades Fulgentius was a Christian, who hailed from North Africa, where he seems to have been a teacher of grammar and letters. In regard to faith and African descent, he may be compared with St. Augustine (354–430 AD), but he did not share Augustine’s hostility to the classical education offered in the schools of North Africa during the 4th and 5th centuries. Similarly Fulgentius shared faith and descent with a younger contemporary who was also named Fulgentius (467–533 AD), but the two differed markedly in career. The younger Fulgentius became bishop of Ruspe in modern Tunisia, opposed Arianism and Pelagianism, and wrote theological tracts and letters.²⁵²

The Fulgentius who concerns us wrote several works. Three are *Mythologies*, *Exposition of the Content of Virgil* and *Explanation of Obsolete Words*. A fourth work called *On the Ages of the World and of Man* is mostly likely his. Unlikely is *On the Thebaid*. Our special concern is the *Mythologies*. The work divides into three books, in which a total of fifty legends are interpreted allegorically with attention to morality and etymology. The only mention of Theophrastus occurs in the first

²⁵² See Leslie Whitehead, *Fulgentius the Mythographer* (Ohio State University Press 1971) pp. 3–11, who offers not only a lucid introduction to his translation of Fulgentius’ writings but also a full bibliography of earlier scholarship.

chapter of the second book, in which the judgment of Paris—preferring the beauty of Venus to that of Minerva and Juno—is interpreted in terms of three modes of life. Venus is associated with the life of pleasure, Minerva with that of contemplation and Juno with that of acquisition. In the case of Juno, Fulgentius begins with the etymology of her name and then explains²⁵³ what is said about her by reference to power and riches. In particular, Fulgentius explains that the peacock is put under Juno's protection, because the acquisitive life is always seeking to adorn its appearance and the peacock embellishes its visage by spreading its tail while disgracefully baring its rear-end. That prompts a reference to Theophrastus and to Solomon, i.e., the book of *Ecclesiastes*. We may credit Fulgentius with a display of learning, but we may also deem the display tiresome. Be that as it may, Fulgentius does not say where he found the Theophrastean citation (it is only three words long: τὰ λοιπὰ γνῶθι), but that is not a concern of his. An anthology is the likely source. See the commentary on 468.

31 Damascius] c. 460–530 AD.

Damascius, as indicated by his name, hailed from the town of Damascus in Syria. Initially he studied and taught rhetoric in Alexandria and Athens, where he attended Neoplatonic Schools. Later he turned to philosophy and in time became head of the Academy in Athens. He is credited with revitalizing the school. However, in 529 the Academy was closed by the Emperor Justinian. Damascius went into exile in Persia, but in 532, he returned to Athens. When and where he died is uncertain.²⁵⁴

Many of Damascius' writings are lost, but we do have numerous fragments of his *Life of Isidore*, under whom Damascius studied. There are also fragments of and references to commentaries on Platonic and Aristotelian works. Surviving are his commentary on Plato's *Parmenides* and a treatise *On [First] Principles*. In addition, his lectures on the *Phaedo* and the *Philebus* have come down to us in the form of notes, which appear to have been originally taken down by students while Damascius delivered his lectures.²⁵⁵ From these notes, we have two texts in which Theophrastus is named: 262 is from the notes on the *Phaedo* and mentions

²⁵³ The conjunction *quod*, "because," occurs six times.

²⁵⁴ D. Omeara, "Damascius" in Zeyl (1997) pp. 166–167.

²⁵⁵ Westerink p. xv.

Theophrastus in connection with providence; 556 is from the notes on the *Philebus* and concerns false pleasure, a topic on which Theophrastus wrote a monograph (436 no. 28).

According to Westerink and Van Riel,²⁵⁶ Damascius' lectures on the *Philebus* were largely organized around an existing commentary by Proclus. A portion of Platonic text was first read or referred to (not recorded as a lemma in the surviving lecture notes), after which Damascius introduced an interpretation drawn for the most part from a commentary (now lost) of Proclus (he is normally not identified in the notes).²⁵⁷ This interpretation was then subjected to criticism by Damascius. As a metaphysician, Damascius took little interest in documentation and relied heavily on what Proclus reported. That is relevant to 556, where the text divides into two segments, each of which begins with a brief report concerning Theophrastus and concludes with critical remarks. Presumably the opening reports derive from Proclus, and the subsequent criticisms are Damascius' own. See the commentary on 556.

32 Simplicius] c. 490–560 AD.

Simplicius was born in Cilicia, Asia Minor toward the end of the fifth century AD. He was a pupil of Ammonius in Alexandria and of Damascius in Athens. In 529 when Justinian enforced legislation against the pagans, he left Athens and went to Persia along with Damascius and other philosophers. What happened after that is problematic. According to Ilsetraut Hadot, it is a near certainty that Damascius, Simplicius and his fellow students were welcomed into a pre-existing Neoplatonic school in Carrae, modern Harran, where they continued to live, teach and write.²⁵⁸ But the view has met with serious criticism.²⁵⁹

²⁵⁶ Westerink pp. xv–xxii and G. van Riel, *Pleasure and the Good Life* (Leiden: Brill 2000) pp. 136–139.

²⁵⁷ I express myself cautiously, for two reasons. First, Proclus is occasionally referred to in the lecture notes as we have them. In his index, Westerink p. 122 lists eleven places where Proclus is named. Second, there is no reason why Damascius could not on occasion begin from a different source including his own memory. See, e.g., section 134, where Porphyry is cited and subjected to criticism before Proclus is introduced. In beginning with Porphyry, Damascius may be following Proclus, but as a Neoplatonist he will have been familiar with Porphyry through his own reading.

²⁵⁸ I. Hadot, "The Life and Work of Simplicius in Greek and Arabic Sources" in *Aristotle Transformed*, ed. R. Sorabji (London: Duckworth 1990) p. 289.

²⁵⁹ P. Foulkes, "Where was Simplicius?" *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 112 (1992) p. 143; H. Blumenthal, *Aristotle and Neoplatonism in Late Antiquity* (Ithaca: Cornell 1996) pp. 44–46.

Surviving are Simplicius' commentaries on Epictetus' *Handbook* and on Aristotle's *Categories*, *On the Heavens*, *On Soul* and the *Physics*.²⁶⁰ Lost are his commentaries on Plato's *Phaedo*, Aristotle's *Meteorology* and *Metaphysics*, on the first book of Euclid's *Elements* and Iamblicus' writings on the Pythagoreans. Also lost is a work entitled *Summary of Theophrastus' Physics* (279.10–11), but as Bob Sharples points out both the title and author are uncertain.²⁶¹ All of the surviving commentaries on Aristotle mention Theophrastus. The commentary *On Soul* has the least and that on the *Physics* the most (see the index in the text-translation vol. 2 pp. 695–696). In commenting on Aristotle, Simplicius assumes that Aristotle is in fundamental agreement with Plato, though the latter is recognized as superior. The commentaries are part of a progressive course of instruction in philosophy. That on the *Categories* comes at the beginning and aims at beginners. The other three are written for more advanced students.²⁶²

In a commentary on the ethical fragments of Theophrastus, our special concern is with Simplicius' commentaries on the *Categories* and the *Physics*. The former contains two texts that we have printed in the text-translation volumes under the heading "Ethics." They are 438 on emotions and 462 on virtue. The latter contains one text that we have printed in the section on "Psychology" but have referred to from the section on "Ethics." It is 271 on kinds of motion with special reference to desires, appetites and feelings of anger. The Theophrastean material contained in these texts varies in length. Quite brief is 462: in less than one line, Simplicius tells us that Theophrastus offered a sufficient argument against the idea that virtue cannot be lost. Longer is 271: there we have an excerpt on bodily and psychic motions that appears to run for six lines.²⁶³ Puzzling is 438: in regard to emotions that differ in degree, Theophrastus might be cited for a single example that runs for only two lines, but it is also possible (and in my judgment, more likely) that the examples are several

²⁶⁰ The attribution of the *Commentary on Aristotle's On Soul* to Simplicius has been challenged, but at this time it seems sensible to accept the attribution. See Hadot pp. 290–291.

²⁶¹ R. Sharples in *Commentary* vol. 3.1 p. 13 on 137 no. 7.

²⁶² I. Hadot, "Simplicius" in Zeyl (1997) p. 491.

²⁶³ As printed in the text-translation volumes, there is a break in the Theophrastean material in line 7 of 271: all but the last two words in the line are attributed to Simplicius. But as Huby observes in *Commentary* vol. 4 on psychology p. 28, it is not clear how lines 6–9 should be divided between Theophrastus and Simplicius.

and run for six or seven lines. Fuller discussion of these three texts will be found later in the present commentary.²⁶⁴ Here I want to call attention to text 683 and the discussion of this text in *Commentary* vol. 8 on rhetoric and poetics pp. 38, 244–250. 683 is taken from Simplicius' work on Aristotle's *Categories*. The text is problematic in several ways: e.g., it is not certain whether the text mentions by title a Theophrastean work, and it is unlikely that the text has been properly placed among those dealing with rhetoric and poetics. As I now see it, 683 should be located among the logical texts. For our purposes, however, the interesting point is that what Simplicius reports comes to him through an intermediary. He is drawing on either Porphyry or Iamblichus and almost certainly doing the same in 438 and 462. However, text 271 may be different. The text is taken from Simplicius' commentary on Aristotle's *Physics*. Simplicius wishes to reject a thesis of Alexander and finds it useful to cite Book 1 of Theophrastus' work *On Motion* (137 no. 2). No intermediary is named, and in my judgment there is no strong reason for positing one. I do not want to overlook the fact that elsewhere in the commentary on the *Physics*, Simplicius does cite Theophrastus through an intermediary. An example is 234, in which Simplicius cites Theophrastus through Alexander.²⁶⁵ That is grounds for pause, but it does not justify assuming that whenever Simplicius cites Theophrastus he is dependent on an intermediary.²⁶⁶

33 John of Lydia] c. 490–560 AD.

John was born in Philadelphia (Lydia) toward the end of fifth century. At the age of 21, he removed to Constantinople, where he studied with the Neoplatonist Agapius and began a career in the Praetorian Prefecture. About 543, he acquired a teaching position in the imperial school, and in 551 or 552 AD, after forty years of service, he retired from the Prefecture.²⁶⁷ John was, therefore, active in public service in 526, when

²⁶⁴ 438 and 271 are discussed in Chapter IV, Section 2 "Emotions" and 462 in Section 3 "Virtue and Vice."

²⁶⁵ I am grateful to Pamela Huby for calling the example to my attention.

²⁶⁶ See R. Sharples, "Eudemos' *Physics*: Change, Place and Time," in *Eudemus of Rhodes*, ed. I. Bodnar and W. Fortenbaugh = RUSCH 11 (New Brunswick: Transaction 2002) 114–115.

²⁶⁷ M. Maas, *John Lydus and the Roman Past* (London: Routledge 1992) p. 28; F. Tinnfeld, "Iohannes L." in *Brill's New Pauly* 8 (2006) col. 14. Kroh p. 313 has John retiring in 532 (apparently a typo).

Justinian I became Emperor in 526, During this service and afterwards in retirement, John experienced Justinian's efforts to bring culture into line with Christianity.

John himself was almost certainly a Christian, but his three surviving works do not reflect the fact.²⁶⁸ The earliest is that *On the Months*, after which he wrote *On Celestial Signs* and *On the Magistracies of the Roman State*. Our special concern is with the earliest, which exhibits a keen antiquarian interest. The work is divided into four books, of which the first does not survive intact. Missing is a formal statement of John's purpose in composing the work. What we do have includes Romulus' establishment of a ten month calendar beginning in March (1.14) and Numa's introduction of a twelve month year (1.17). The second book carries the heading "On Days." It focuses on the seven days of the week beginning with Sunday. Here John is adopting the Christian order of days without explicitly acknowledging as much. That may seem odd given the alternatives and John's antiquarian interests, but it suits John's own Christian persuasion while maintaining his general silence concerning Christian issues.²⁶⁹ The third book has as its heading "On the Month." The Roman months are discussed from various points of view including length, name, numerology and festivals. The fourth book treats each of the twelve months beginning with January (4.1–24) and ending with December (4.153–162). It is by far the longest book and rich in antiquarian material. Within the discussion of January, Theophrastus is cited together with Aristotle (4.7 = 490), and later within the discussion of June, he is cited alone (4.100 = app. 490). The information conveyed by the two texts is all but identical and almost certainly drawn from the same secondary source. Unfortunately the information as reported is at best an exaggeration or simply erroneous. In all probability, that is attributable to John's source, which could be based on a still earlier secondary source. There is no certainty here.

²⁶⁸ Photius, *Library* 180 125b24–28 (CB vol. 2 p. 188.26–30 Henry) notes that John's writings do not make it easy to decide whether he was a convinced Christian. Tinnefeld col. 15 puts it this way: "L. is almost completely silent about anything Christian and suggests only through the abstention from open pro-pagan propaganda that he was at least officially not a pagan." Interesting is John's account of the Brumalia (a festival in honor of Dionysus that was still celebrated), for there he does break silence about Christian concerns. He comments that the church turns away or dissociates itself (ἀποτρέπεται), because people call the Brumalia the festival of Cronus (4.158 p. 174 W). See Maas pp. 64–65.

²⁶⁹ Maas *op. cit.* pp. 57–58.

34 Michael of Ephesus] 12th cent. AD.

Michael was born in Ephesus²⁷⁰ and moved to Byzantium, where he may have practiced medicine. He came into contact with Anna Comnena (born in 1083, she lived until some time after 1148), who was interested in Aristotle and has been credited with a significant revival of Aristotelian scholarship.²⁷¹ Under her patronage, Michael produced a wide range of exegetical works extending over Aristotle's logical, biological, metaphysical, ethical and political writings. In George Tornikès' funeral oration on Anna Comnena, we read that Michael blamed Anna for his blindness, attributing it to the many nights he worked on his commentaries at her command.²⁷² Michael's wide range was not matched by his originality. He was given to reading existing works of exegesis, extracting and editing what he found.²⁷³

Michael produced commentaries or scholia on Books 5, 9 and 10 of the Nicomachean Ethics.²⁷⁴ Our special concern is the commentary on Book 5, for in it he cites Theophrastus. Throughout he draws heavily on an anonymous commentary or compilation of scholia that dates from the end of the second century AD. The author of the compilation—he is regularly referred to as the Anonymous²⁷⁵—cites Theophrastus twice. The first occasion concerns complete virtue and a verse of Theognis that Aristotle cites as a proverb. In the text-translation volumes, we have printed both the comment of the Anonymous and that of Michael. The latter, including the reference to Theophrastus, is clearly dependent on that of the Anonymous. See below, the commentary on 529A–B.

The second passage in which the Anonymous cites Theophrastus is concerned with different kinds of βλάβη, harm or injury (530). This time

²⁷⁰ The fact that Michael calls Heraclitus a fellow citizen tells us that he was born in Ephesus (*On NE* 10.5 1176a3, *CAG* vol. 20 p. 570.20–21 Heylbut).

²⁷¹ For some cautious remarks, see Mercken (1990) pp. 436–437.

²⁷² For the passage in translation, see R. Browning, "An Unpublished Funeral Oration on Anna Comnena" in *Aristotle Transformed*, ed. R. Sorabji (London: Duckworth 1990) p. 406.

²⁷³ Mercken (1990) pp. 432, 434 and S. Ebbsen, "Philoponus: 'Alexander' and the Origins of Medieval Logic" in *Aristotle Transformed*, ed. R. Sorabji (London: Duckworth 1990) p. 451.

²⁷⁴ The commentary on Book 5 will be found in *CAG* vol. 22.3 (Hayduck), and the commentary on Books 9 and 10 will be found in *CAG* vol. 20 (Heylbut). The commentaries on Books 5 and 9 are introduced as (carry the title) Ἐξηγήσεις ... εἰς τὸ πέμπτου/ἐνάτου τῶν Ἡθικῶν.

²⁷⁵ On the Anonymous, see above, no. 18.

Michael does not cite Theophrastus, and we have not printed Michael's text, for it is obviously dependent on the Anonymous. A striking example of that dependence is the general discussion of the several ways in which a person can harm another in ignorance. Aristotle lists four ways: ὅν, ὅ, ὅ, οὗ ἔνεκα, i.e., the agent may be in ignorance concerning the person affected, what he (the agent) is actually doing, the instrument he is using, and the outcome (5.8 1135b13). The Anonymous erroneously says that Aristotle lists five ways: he adds ὡς, manner (p. 238.11–17), and Michael follows him (54.4).²⁷⁶ In fairness to Michael, it should be added that he does show some independence in rearranging material. In the Anonymous, the five ways of injuring another in ignorance are listed after particular examples of ignorance and after a reference to Theophrastus, who is said not to have classified misfortune as an unjust act (p. 238.9). Michael rearranges the material, so that the five ways of injuring another in ignorance come later, after he has discussed unjust acts that are done in full knowledge and manifest an unjust character (p. 53.35). The postponement itself may not be an improvement (following particular examples of ignorance [p. 238.3–9] with a general list seems logical [p. 238.11–17]), but it does improve the flow of the discussion of injuries inflicted in ignorance. For the reference to Theophrastus and unjust acts that involve full knowledge comes awkwardly and breaks up the discussion.²⁷⁷

35 Albert the Great] 1193–1280 AD.

Toward the end of twelfth century, Albert the Great, known as *doctor universalis* for his breadth of knowledge, was born in Lauingen, Swabia (Germany). He studied the *artes liberales* in Padua, where he joined the Dominican order in 1223. Some eleven years later, he was sent to Paris for further education in the *studium generale*. There Albert began to lecture on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard, and in 1249 he published these lectures in Cologne, to which he had removed. Between 1250

²⁷⁶ Earlier in the same chapter of the *NE*, Aristotle lists three items: ὅν, ὅ, οὗ ἔνεκα, the person affected, the instrument, and the outcome (5.8 1135a25–26). There is no indication that ὡς—a reference to manner—has fallen out, unless one thinks that the subsequent mention of the whole action (περὶ τὴν προᾶξιν ὅλην 1135a31) implies a full description of the action including the manner. Later in the following chapter, ὡς does occur twice (5.9 1136a32, b4). Perhaps these occurrences prompted the Anonymous to add ὡς when discussing the earlier passage (5.8 1135b13), but it is quite clear that Michael has ὡς from the Anonymous.

²⁷⁷ See the commentary on 530, below, Chapter IV, Section 11 “Justice.”

and 1252, he composed a commentary known as the *Super Ethica* on the complete *Nicomachean Ethics* of Aristotle. In 1262 he published a second, shorter commentary, the *Ethica*, on the same work. His interest in Aristotle went well beyond ethics to include psychology, botany and zoology. He also mentions Theophrastus on numerous occasions. Given Albert's keen interest in Aristotle and his recognition of Theophrastus as the most excellent of Aristotle's pupils (377.37–38), we might expect Albert to be a valuable source for our knowledge of Theophrastus. But Albert's reliability is very much in question. To make the point, I refer to Pamela Huby's *Commentary* vol. 4 on psychology and Bob Sharples' *Commentary* vol. 5 on biology. In the former, fourteen texts are declared dubious: 270, 303, 304, 305, 305B (a new text that is not printed in the text-translation volumes), 309C–D, 310A–B, 313, 314A–B, 315, 322A. In the latter, seven texts are marked as dubious: 376A–C, 377, 378, 379, 416.

In regard to ethics, two texts are of special interest. One is 354. It comes from Albert's work *On Animals* and has been printed among the texts on "Living Creatures." Citing Theophrastus, Albert reports that some animals are more perfect than others both in body and soul. No Theophrastean work is mentioned nor is any intermediary that might be Albert's source. But the information conveyed concerning differences in body and soul agrees with what we read in Porphyry's work on *Abstinence from Eating Animals*, where Theophrastus is cited for recognizing kinship between men and animals. In regard to body and soul the principles are said to be naturally the same, though there are differences in degree of finish (531.12–21). Here human beings are brought into the comparison, but as regards animal body and soul Porphyry and Albert agree regarding the view of Theophrastus. That hardly proves that Albert is drawing on Porphyry, but it does show that Albert can be correct in what he reports concerning Theophrastus.²⁷⁸

Very different is 439, which is taken from Albert's work *On the Fifteen Problems*. There Theophrastus is joined to a pseudo-philosopher, who is said to eliminate moral strength and the entire seventh book of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. That is worse than dubious. See the commentary on 439.

²⁷⁸ The comparison is between lines 2–4 of 354 and lines 21–21 of 531. Sharples, *Commentary* vol. 5 p. 50 is careful not to commit himself regarding the extent of the material that Albert attributes to Theophrastus. It may stop at line 4.

36 Bartholomew of Bruges] c. 1286–1356 AD.

Concerning Bartholomew's early years we know next to nothing. We can, however, say that as a young man, perhaps twenty or twenty-one, he had become a master of Arts in Paris. There he held lectures in which he commented on the writings of Aristotle. In 1307–1308 he concerned himself with the *Physics*. Perhaps in 1306 he discussed *On Soul*. During this period he also concerned himself with the *Meteorology*, Averroes' paraphrases of the *Poetics* and two pseudo-Aristotelian works, *On the Flooding of the Nile* and the *Economics* (*Oeconomica*). That he also dealt with *On Generation and Corruption* during this period is a reasonable assumption.²⁷⁹ This concentration on Aristotle is not unusual. In the course of the 13th century, members of the Arts Faculty in Paris had turned away from the seven liberal arts and began to think of themselves as philosophers. That meant lecturing on Aristotle and writing commentaries that were to a greater or lesser extent used in giving lectures.²⁸⁰

There is no evidence of later activity by Bartholomew *qua* philosopher and Aristotelian commentator. Apparently he soon (already in 1309 or 1310) turned to medicine, obtained a doctorate and by 1315 was a fellow at the Sorbonne. In 1328 he is known to have been a professor of medicine at the university in Montpellier. Such a career change from philosopher to doctor seems not to have been unusual in the early 14th century. Moreover, Bartholomew did not abandon his interest in writing. On the contrary, he wrote on medical subjects, producing commentaries on Avicenna, Galen and Hippocrates.²⁸¹

Our special concern is the commentary on the pseudo-Aristotelian *Economics*. At the beginning of the 14th century, the *Economics* was not widely known and apparently not part of the normal course of lectures within the Arts Faculty. It is possible that Bartholomew wrote a commentary on the work without lecturing on it. But it is more likely

²⁷⁹ See C. Lohr, "Medieval Latin Aristotle Commentaries," *Traditio* 23 (1967) pp. 375–377.

²⁸⁰ During this period, Bartholomew also composed sophisms in which he expressed his views on contemporary controversies concerning logical, natural and metaphysical issues. According to C. O'Boyle, *Manuscripta* 40 (1996) pp. 70–74, the sophisms show Bartholomew to have been a staunch defender of orthodox Aristotelianism, and those that focus on metaphysical issues suggest that Bartholomew wrote a commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics* in addition to those named above.

²⁸¹ For fuller accounts of Bartholomew's life and works see O'Boyle pp. 68–78 and Pavel Blazek, *Die mittelalterliche Rezeption der aristotelischen Philosophie der Ehe* (Leiden: Brill 2007) pp. 199–206.

that the existing commentary represents a corrected/improved version of his lectures. Be that as it may, the commentary is dated to 1309.

The commentary on the *Economics* has three parts: at the outset, there is a substantial prologue; second comes an expository section that elucidates the text while following it closely; finally thirty²⁸² questions are addressed that in one way or another relate to the text. The idea of including in a commentary a series of questions developed in the 13th century in such a way that by the time of Bartholomew the questions could be regarded as an independent work, complementary but separable from the expository section. It is, therefore, not surprising that certain manuscripts contain only the questions, while others have the exposition without questions.²⁸³

Addressing the question whether a man should have intercourse with more than one woman, Bartholomew twice refers to Theophrastus for a negative remark concerning polygamy: having several wives causes division within a household. That would be of interest, were the report correct, but it is almost certainly erroneous. See the commentary on 486.5.

37 Barlaam of Seminara] c. 1290–1350

Barlaam was born in Seminara, Calabria, Italy. He was educated in the Byzantine monasteries of southern Italy and later moved to Constantinople. He taught there and in Thessalonica. He seems to have had a penchant for dispute and did not shy away from insult. E.g., he accused the Hesychastic monks on Mt. Athos of illuminism and a crude form of Messalianism, he made fun of their posture during contemplative prayer and referred to them as, ὀμφαλοψυχοί, “men with their souls in their navels.”²⁸⁴ In addition, he was active in discussions concerning the unification of the eastern and western church, taught Greek to Petrarch, converted to Roman Catholicism and became bishop of Gerace in Calabria, where he died in 1350.

Barlaam composed in Greek scholarly works many of which have not been edited. The majority concern religious issues. Exceptional are a *Reasoned Arithmetic*, a commentary on the second of Euclid and a

²⁸² Blazek p. 309 reports thirty, while O’Boyle says twenty-eight.

²⁸³ See Blazek pp. 206–207.

²⁸⁴ See H. Hunter, “Barlaam of Calabria,” in the *New Catholic Encyclopedia* (Farmington Hills MI: Gale 2003) p. 99, who points out that Barlaam was later compelled to retract his attack on the Hesychasts.

compendium of Stoic ethics. A Latin translation of the compendium—it carries the title *Ethica secundum Stoicus*, *Ethics according to the Stoics*—has survived and is our special concern. It divides into two parts. The first focuses on happiness, which is said to depend only on virtue. The second considers the soul and the difference between *constantia*, “steadiness,” which is an equable state of mind, and *perturbatio*, “a disturbance” of the mind.²⁸⁵ In the course of the second part, Theophrastus’ view of emotional response is criticized from a Stoic point of view (447).

38 Denis the Carthusian] 1402–1471 A.D

Denis was born in 1402 at Rijkel in Limburg (Belgium) and was educated at Zwolle and the university in Cologne. In 1425 he joined the Carthusian order. He wrote on dogmatic, ascetical and mystical theology as well as composed commentaries on Scripture and a handbook of philosophy. He died in 1471.²⁸⁶ Denis is an exception to our general policy of excluding authors whose *floruit* belongs to the middle of the fifteenth century or later. The grounds for including him are that in his writings he remained firmly attached to the late Middle Ages, and that his writings contain testimonies concerning Theophrastus that are not found in earlier sources.²⁸⁷

In our collection of Theophrastean sources, Denis is referred to sixteen times in the apparatus of parallel texts, and excerpts from his writings are printed ten times. Of the latter, one will be found in the section on physics (140); four in the section on theology (255, 257A–B, 260); four in the section on psychology (300, 322B, 323A–B) and one in the section on Living Creatures (353).

In text 140, Denis writes *multos legi auctores*, “I have read many authors,” and in what follows he names Theophrastus in an open ended list of thirteen natural philosophers: “Plato, Proclus, Aristotle, Avicenna, Ghazali, Anaxagoras, Averroes, Alexander, Farabi, Abubather, Avempace, Theophrastus, Themistius and others.” The list is a mixed bag and troubling in that it treats Abubather and Avempace as two persons. Arabists today are in agreement that the two are one and the same person.

²⁸⁵ For a brief account of the work, see M. Spanneut, *Permanence du Stoïcisme* (Grenoble 1973) p. 187.

²⁸⁶ For more details concerning the life and times of Denis, see J. Huizinga, *The Waning of the Middle Ages* (London: Arnold 1924) pp. 124–125, 170–174, 190–191, 195–205, 245–248.

²⁸⁷ See volume 1 p. 5 of FHS&G and Huby, *Commentary* 4 (1999) pp. 4–5.

The confusion is not unique to Denis. Many medieval writers, including Albert the Great, treated the two as separate authors.²⁸⁸ Nevertheless, there is no reason to doubt that Denis was a voracious reader; only it would be a mistake to think that Denis read at first hand all the authors named in 140. Most likely Denis knows the views of Anaxagoras through quotations in later sources²⁸⁹ and much the same may be said of Theophrastus: Denis will have known of him through intermediate sources and more generally through the tradition.²⁹⁰ That is not necessarily bad, and according to Pamela Huby, when we can compare Denis with his source, he is shown to be reliable.²⁹¹ A different issue, however, is whether Denis' sources concerning Theophrastus are reliable. That may not be much of an issue in regard to 140, but elsewhere it is of some importance. I am thinking especially of two closely related texts, 323A and B, which are printed in the section on psychology but are relevant to ethics. In 323A, Denis mentions Theophrastus together with three Arabic authors and relates intellect to happiness in a way that recalls Cicero's *Tusculan Disputations* 1.44–45. In 323B Denis deals with the same topic but more briefly. Here as in 140, Denis errs in treating Abubather and Avempace as two distinct persons. See the commentary on these two texts, below, Chapter IV "The Texts," section 4 on "Happiness".

2. Greek, Latin and Italian²⁹² Anthologies, Gnomologies and Other Collections

The collections listed here are arranged as follows: First come collections that are regularly attributed to a particular author, i.e., compiler. Second come collections that lack the name of an author and are most often referred to by a title, either one found in a manuscript or one assigned by an editor. Third come collections that have no title and are commonly referred to by the codex or codices or papyrus in which they occur. That corresponds to the mode of reference adopted in the text-translation volumes.

²⁸⁸ See note 1 to the translation of 140 in FHS&G together with Sharples, *Commentary* 3.1 (1998) p. 34 on 140 and Huby (1999) p. 165 on 314B.

²⁸⁹ Sharples (1998) p. 34.

²⁹⁰ See 255.13–14, where Denis, after reporting what philosophers say concerning the heavens, adds: *quam (sc. opinionem) constat fuisse de mente Aristotelis, Avicennae, Algazelis, Averrois, Alphorabii, Theophrasti*, "which (opinion) is known to have been held by Aristotle, Avicenna, Algazel, Averroes, Farabi, Theophrastus." Here Denis tells us that his report agrees with established opinion.

²⁹¹ *Commenatary* 4 pp. 4–5. Huby cites 259 and 326A.

²⁹² There is a single Italian entry, no. 45.

39 Stobaeus] early 5th cent. AD.

Stobaeus or John of Stobi (in Macedonia) is the author of an anthology, in which a large number of excerpts are brought together from earlier poets and writers of prose. The collection was in the first instance intended for the edification of Stobaeus' son Septimius.²⁹³ It is divided into four books, of which the first focuses on metaphysics and physics.²⁹⁴ The second and third books are primarily concerned with ethics,²⁹⁵ and the fourth brings together material that is closely related to ethics: e.g., politics and household management. In each of the four books, the material is organized under headings, and under each heading excerpts from the poets typically precede those taken from prose writers. Over 500 different authors including Theophrastus are represented. In our text-translation volumes, we have printed or cited 26 passages in which Theophrastus is named. Of these passages, 14 have been printed under "Ethics" (443, 444, 445, 449A, 465, 469, 503, 517, 521, 523, 526, 539, 557, 565). Two others are mentioned in the apparatus of parallel texts (538F, 558).²⁹⁶ Some of these excerpts are quite short and of lesser importance,²⁹⁷ but others are longer and of considerable interest. I think of 449A, which tells us much concerning Theophrastus' understanding of moral virtue, and 523, which strongly suggests that we should not think of Theophrastus as a reclusive scholar who wanted nothing to do with women, children and fellow citizens.

²⁹³ Photius, *Library* 167 112a14–24 (CB vol. 2 p. 149.13–23 Henry).

²⁹⁴ Halm (1990) p. 2939 offers a fuller description of the contents of the first book: "the schools of philosophy, geometry, music, arithmetic, theology and physical philosophy." Halm's overview of the "editorial practices of Stobaeus and the gnomological tradition" constitutes an excellent, concise introduction to the anthology as we have it today (pp. 2938–2943).

²⁹⁵ The first six chapters of Book 2 deal with a variety of topics: epistemology, dialectic, rhetoric, language and grammar, poetry, and the character of the ancients (vol. 2 p. 3.1–p. 37.13 W). These chapters illustrate the abridgment that Stobaeus' Anthology underwent in transmission. For Chapters 2–5, the headings must be supplied from Photius, and Chapter 6 has been reduced to a single entry. With Chapter 7, ethics becomes the focus of Book 2. Text 449A is found in Chapter 7.

²⁹⁶ If we add the four passages printed in the section on "Politics" (628, 650, 661 and 662) and one that is listed as "Miscellaneous" (738 referring to the proverb "Know yourself"), then 19 of the 26 named passages in Stobaeus may be said to be concerned with individual and communal life within the *polis*, i.e., that sphere to which Aristotle refers inclusively as politics (NE 1.2 1094a27, b11).

²⁹⁷ "Lesser importance" need not imply "of no interest." See, e.g., 565, in which the rhetorical style of a saying attributed to Theophrastus is interesting in itself. Moreover, there is an Ovidian parallel, which encourages construing the saying in such a way that Theophrastus is endorsing a negative view of women. But in the absence of context, we must treat the text with considerable caution.

There is no doubt that Stobaeus drew heavily on the collections of earlier compilers.²⁹⁸ One of these is Arius Didymus (the “Warlike Twin”²⁹⁹), who is widely believed to be the source of the long segment on ethics in Book 2, Chapter 7. In the past, this Arius has been repeatedly identified with the Stoic philosopher Arius of Alexandria, who was a close associate of the Emperor Caesar Augustus. This identification can no longer be accepted as certain, for as Tryggve Göransson has observed, direct references to Stobaeus’ source never omit “Didymus,” while the associate of Augustus is never referred to by that name.³⁰⁰ As a result, we are left with no firmly fixed date for Stobaeus’ source except that he must have lived between the mid-first century B.C and the time of Eusebius, who died in 339/40 AD.³⁰¹

Book 2, Chapter 7 contains no explicit reference to Arius Didymus.³⁰² Instead, a portion of this chapter, section 17, recurs in Book 4, where it is assigned to Didymus (4.39.28 p. 918.15–919.6 H).³⁰³ Since 2.7 includes an introduction (2.7.1–4), a survey of Stoic ethics (2.7.5–12) and one dealing with the Peripatos (2.7.13–26), and since section 17 falls within the survey of Peripatetic ethics, it is reasonable to assume that Didymus is Stobaeus’ source for the Peripatetic survey. That leaves open the question whether Didymus can be assumed to be the source of Chapter 7 in its entirety. An answer in the affirmative is tempting and finds support in the scholarly literature.³⁰⁴ There are, however, reasons for hesitation. The material is heterogeneous and occasionally seems contradictory. And

²⁹⁸ See Searby (1998) pp. 47–48, who points out that there are *lemmata* in Stobaeus’ *Anthology* that “explicitly mention certain collections of sayings and anecdotes as sources, although we usually do not know whether these were sources Stobaeus had direct access to or were already included as excerpts in his (hypothetical) source anthology.”

²⁹⁹ The translation is that of C. Kahn, “Arius as a Doxographer,” in *On Stoic and Peripatetic Ethics: The Work of Arius Didymus*, ed. W. Fortenbaugh = Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities 1 (1983, repr. 2002) p. 3.

³⁰⁰ T. Göransson, *Albinus, Alcinous, Arius Didymus* = *Studia Graeca et Latina Gothoburgensia* 61 (Göteborg 1995) 182–226.

³⁰¹ Runia p. 364. The best and fullest modern discussions of Arius Didymus are those of Moraux (1973) pp. 259–443 and Halm (1990) pp. 2935–3055.

³⁰² At the beginning of 2.7 (p. 37.16), Wachmuth supplies the words Ἐκ τῆς Διδύμου ἐπιτομῆς, “From the epitome of Didymus,” In the *apparatus*, he tells us that the supplement is based on the “ingenious conjecture” of Meineke.

³⁰³ It is possible that at 4.39.28 p. 918.15 Stobaeus cites Didymus through an intermediary. See Searby, *loc. cit.* But in regard to 4.39.28, I am inclined to follow Halm p. 2978, who argues that Stobaeus cites the work he has in hand, i.e., the *Epitome* of Didymus.

³⁰⁴ See Halm (1990). On the earlier contributions of van Heeren, Meineke and Diels see Halm pp. 2936, 2975–2978.

while the author speaks in the first person in the introduction and in the section on Stoic ethics, the section on Peripatetic ethics avoids the first person.³⁰⁵ The issue awaits further discussion.

Halm has argued that Stobaeus usually reproduced his sources as he found them: verbatim or with only minimal changes.³⁰⁶ I have no reason to question Halm's judgement, but from time to time one is pushed to explain a striking awkwardness. For a small but interesting example, I cite 2.7.20, in which a passage, whose focus is Theophrastus (p. 140.7–142.13), is interrupted by the introduction of Aristotle's definition of moral virtue (p. 140.12–14 = 449A.5–6). To be sure, Theophrastus almost certainly accepted Aristotle's definition, but one wonders whether this is a place where different sources have been combined in an awkward manner. Perhaps Stobaeus himself is responsible for the interruption, or perhaps he is reproducing Arius Didymus, who for some reason chose to interrupt the Theophrastean material. See the commentary on 449A.

One other text may be picked out for special mention. It is 503, which is included by Stobaeus in a chapter entitled "On Fortune or Chance." The text is quite short being only three sentences long, but each sentence presents a problem of its own. The first speaks of Theophrastus adding choice to the causes. That implies a context that is left unclear.³⁰⁷ The second sentence connects individual nature with fate, but the subject of the sentence is disputed. The third sentence refers to four causes but lists only three and is clearly corrupt. And if that is not enough, there are two ways (not necessarily mutually exclusive) to supply a context that might assist in understanding what we read in Stobaeus. One way is to relate 503 to earlier material in the same chapter and to argue that this material and 503 derive from the physical doxography of Arius Didymus. The other way is to recognize a close relationship between 503 and 504. The latter text is taken from Alexander of Aphrodisias, who cites an ethical work of Theophrastus: namely, the *Callisthenes* or *On Grief* (436 no. 15). For further discussion, see the commentary on 503–504.

Photius] c. 810–895 AD; see below no. 57

³⁰⁵ Kahn p. 4.

³⁰⁶ See Halm (1990) pp. 2940–2943.

³⁰⁷ We may be disappointed that the context has been left unclear, but what we do have suggests that Stobaeus has copied his source verbatim. And that can be viewed as positive in dealing with an anthologist.

40 ps.-Maximus Confessor] 10th–11th cent. AD.

41 Antonius Melissa] perhaps 11th cent. AD.

In the text-translation-volumes we have either referred to or printed six texts, each of which is attributed to the Byzantine monk Maximus Confessor (580–662 AD).³⁰⁸ We cite the work *Common Places*, and refer to the edition that is found in the *Patrologia Graeca*, volume 91 (1860). That turns out to be an error. Scholars have made clear that the collection of sayings that was traditionally attributed to the Maximus Confessor is not his. And that was already made clear prior to the publication of our two volumes. What we do have is a collection of Christian and pagan sayings that exists in a shorter and longer version, was compiled in c. the 10th and 11th centuries, and is dependent upon already existing collections. The Christian sayings are derived primarily from the *Sacra Parallela* of John of Damascus,³⁰⁹ and the pagan sayings derive largely from a collection known as the *Corpus Parisinum*.³¹⁰ The latter was compiled perhaps a century before the collection of ps.-Maximus, and like that collection, it contains both Christian and pagan sayings. But the *Corpus Parisinum* differs in an interesting way. It keeps the Christian and pagan sayings separate (the former come first), while the collection of ps.-Maximus is organized by topic with Christian and pagan sources appearing in the appropriate chapter.³¹¹ That involves considerable rearrangement, which opens the door to error.

The case of Antonius Melissa differs little. In the text-translation volumes, we refer to or print two texts that carry his name *qua* anthologist.³¹² The name is a fiction and charming—we are to think of a bee, μέλισσα, that engages in flower-gathering, ἀνθολογία, but that the name refers to a real person is hard to believe. Perhaps “Melissa” was originally the title of a collection of sayings, but that does little to bring Antonius alive.³¹³ Be that as it may, the collection in question was two books long; the second

³⁰⁸ Five are referred to in the apparatus of parallel texts: 20 = app. 1.42–44, 26 = app. 557, 40 = app. 469, 54 = app. 444, 58 = app. 628. One is printed: 46 = 519 = 39.20 p. 724 lhm ed. 2001.

³⁰⁹ PG vol. 95 col. 1040–1588 and vol. 96 col. 9–442.

³¹⁰ The name *Corpus Parisinum* refers especially to codex Parisinus Graecus 1168, but the collection is also found in Codex Digby 6 D. On these codices, see Searby (2007) vol. 1 pp. 9–17.

³¹¹ That is a simplification. Searby (1998) p. 60 speaks of “each chapter offering texts from first biblical, then patristic, then Jewish (Philo) and finally pagan sources, normally cited in something approaching a settled order.”

³¹² Referred to is text 1.73 = app. 1.42–44, and printed is 2.71 = 470.

³¹³ One might add “ps.-” before “Antonius,” but the case seems to be different from that

book survives only in fragments. The compiler drew on ps.-Maximus, which means that the *Corpus Parisinum* stands behind much of what passes under the name of Antonius. The edition found in *Patrologia Graeca*, volume 136 (1865) is deemed a philological horror.³¹⁴

42 Engelbert of Admont] c. 1250–1331 AD.

Engelbert was Abbot of the Benedictine Cloister at Admont (Styria, Austria) and author of numerous works on a variety of subjects: theology, philosophy, politics, history, natural science and music. He also compiled a Latin anthology entitled *Sententiae morales*. It is arranged by topic and includes both Greek and Latin authors. The former are recorded in translation. Theophrastus appears twice. In a chapter that carries the heading “On Wisdom and the Wise Man” (p. 253.44–254.3 Fowler), there is an excerpt from Jerome’s work *Against Jovinian* 1.47 = 486.62–66. The excerpt is quite accurate, exhibiting only minor variation in wording. In a different chapter entitled “On Enemies,” there are four excerpts (p. 278.8–15) that have been printed together as a B-text alongside four sayings found in codices Parisini Latini 2772, 4718, 4887 (sent. 27–30 = 527A). Although only the first saying is the same in both texts, all the sayings are closely related in that each is concerned with taking revenge and harming an enemy.

43 Thomas of Ireland] c. 1265 – before 1338 AD³¹⁵

As indicated by his name, Thomas was most likely born in Ireland, where he received his early education. He subsequently removed to Paris where he became a fellow of the Sorbonne and achieved the rank of bachelor in theology. There he compiled the work most often referred to as *Manipulus Florum* or in translation *Handful of Flowers*. It was intended

of ps.-Maximus Confessor. “Antonius Melissa” may be the pen-name of the compiler or more likely a fictitious name, whose sole purpose is to give the collection an author. No historical figure is being recalled.

³¹⁴ My remarks on ps.-Maximus and Antonius add nothing to what can be found in the fuller and authoritative remarks of Gutas pp. 25–28, Searby (1998) pp. 59–61 and Ihm pp. I–IV.

³¹⁵ In the text-translation volumes, Thomas’ dates are given as c. 1250–1315 (vol. 2 p. 703). The dates given above are taken from R. and M. Rouse, *Preachers, Florilegia and Sermons: Studies of the Manipulus florum of Thomas of Ireland* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute 1979) pp. 94–96. I am grateful to Denis Searby for calling this book to my attention.

to provide preachers with material for use in their sermons. One family of manuscripts reports that the compilation was begun by John of Wales (fl. 1260–1285 AD). That is often recorded in the scholarly literature, but the report is most likely erroneous.³¹⁶ The material is organized by topic, and the topics are presented in alphabetical order. The topics number 266³¹⁷ and vary in length. The longest are “Amicitia” and “Mors,” having 95 and 99 entries, respectively. The printed edition that we have used (Cologne 1616) does not carry the title *Manipulus Florum*. Instead, the title runs *Flores doctorum pene omnium*, or in translation *Flowers of Almost All Learned Men*.³¹⁸

There are six different entries that are assigned to Theophrastus. One is found in the section on “Mulier.” It refers to the work *On Marriage* (436 no. 17c) and includes an excerpt from that work (app. 486). Five others are found in the section on “Amicitia.” Four occur in other collections as well; in the text-translation volumes, they are mentioned in the apparatus of parallel texts (app. 538C and 546). One is attributed to Theophrastus only in Thomas’ collection (536). It would be nice to value this text as uniquely preserving a genuine saying of Theophrastus, but elsewhere the saying is attributed to Menefranes and Demosthenes. See the commentary on 536.

44 Walter Burley] 1275-after 1343 AD.

Burley, a student of Duns Scotus, taught in Oxford, Paris and Toulouse. He was highly regarded as a philosopher, writing works on various topics including logic, psychology and ethics. He also wrote commentaries on Aristotle and Porphyry. Our special concern is with Burley’s work *On the Life and Character of Philosophers*, in which we find a chapter on Theophrastus (ch. 68 p. 282.15–290.24 Knust). It begins with the statement that Theophrastus was the student and successor of Aristotle (282.15).

³¹⁶ For the report, see, e.g., A. Little, *The Grey Friars in Oxford* (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1892) p. 148, and for criticism of the report, see R. and M. Rouse (1979) pp. 106–110.

³¹⁷ In an earlier article by R. Rouse, “The List of Authorities Appended to the *Manipulus Florum*,” *Archives d’Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Âge* 40 (1965) p. 244, the *Manipulus* is described as a collection of extracts “grouped according to eighty-five topics alphabetically arranged.” In the later work of R. and M. Rouse (1979) p. 117 we read that the extracts are “classified according to 266 alphabetically arranged topics.”

³¹⁸ In private correspondence, Dennis Searby has reported to me that an earlier edition (Antwerp 1576), housed in the Royal Library of Stockholm, carries the title *Flores doctorum insignium, tam graecorum quam latinorum qui in Theologia ac Philosophia claruerunt*.

After that comes a reference to Aulus Gellius and an abbreviated version of his account of the succession (p. 282.16–25 = app. 8). There follows a list of sayings and a remark concerning the work *On Friendship* (p. 282.26–284.12 = app. 538C, 546, app. 527A, app. 541). That is followed by Theophrastus' last words. Burley is drawing on Cicero but fails to cite him (p. 284.13–286.2 = app. 34A). Next comes the statement that Theophrastus wrote a work *On Wealth* (p. 286.3 = 436 no. 19b), after which we are treated to Jerome's account of Theophrastus' remarks concerning marriage. Jerome is cited by name and the Theophrastean title *On Marriage* is reported (p. 286.3–290.16 = 436 no. 17c, app. 486). Finally, we read that Theophrastus recommended education over wealth as a defense against bad fortune. The recommendation is an excerpt from Vitruvius, who is not cited (290.17–24 = app. 491).

On the whole the excerpts are accurate, though there is considerable variation in wording and some abbreviation. I limit myself to five observations, all of which concern Jerome and Theophrastus' work *On Marriage*. 1) Whereas Jerome says that a man might marry *si ipse sanus et dives*, "if he himself is healthy and rich" (486.9), Burley has *si ipsa sana, si dives*, "if she herself is healthy, if rich" (p. 286.6–7). That is possible, but I prefer the text of Jerome, for only a few lines later in both Burley and Jerome, we read that a rich wife is a torment to endure" (p. 286.21 = 486.23). 2) In Jerome's text, the list of persons whom a husband must honor concludes by mentioning the castrated eunuch who is useful for long and safe acts of lust (486.34–36). Burley omits the eunuch (too much for him?), which is regrettable, for coming last the eunuch concludes the list with punch. 3) In Jerome's text, the truly virtuous wife is one who was permitted to sin if she so wished, *si voluit*, but does not do so (486.44–45). Burley tells us that she was permitted to sin but did not wish to do so, *sed noluit* (p. 288.7). Not wanting to be unfaithful to her husband may be more the mark of a truly chaste wife than simply not being unfaithful, but my guess is that we should follow Jerome. Women are subject to lust,³¹⁹ so that on occasion moral strength is the best that can be hoped for. 4) According to Jerome, friends and slaves are better able to sit beside, *adsidere*, a husband when he is sick (486.55–56). Jerome replaces "to sit beside" with "to assist," *assistere* (288.19). The replacement is general and loses the visual effect of *adsidere*. 5) In the text of Jerome, we read that a good and sweet wife is a *rara avis* (486.60–61). According to Burley's text,

³¹⁹ Hence the importance of honoring temperance in a woman (564).

such a wife occurs rarely or scarcely, *raro aut vix* (p. 288.25). I find the phrase “rare bird” trite, but it seems preferable to the repetition involved in *raro aut vix*. Be that as it may, Burley is not thinking for himself. He has either nodded or worked from a faulty text.

The following collections, lacking a known author, are listed alphabetically by title

- 45 *Choice Sayings and Lives of Philosophers and of Other Wise Men and of Rulers*] 13th cent AD.

The English title is our translation of the Italian *Fiori e vita di filosofi e d'altri savi e d'imperadori*. The Italian title is that of Alfonso D'Agostino, who follows Hermann Varnhagen with only the slightest modification.³²⁰ According to Varnhagen, the *Fiori e vita* is a “volgarizzamento,” i.e. a translation of portions of the *Speculum historiale* of Vincent of Beauvais. In places where the text diverges significantly from that of Vincent, the translator is following a manuscript that differs from those on which our knowledge of Vincent is based. That view has been opposed by D'Agostino who argues that the translator is not working directly with the text of Vincent, but rather with that of Adam of Clermont, whose *Flores historiarum* is a compendium of the *Speculum historiale* together with excerpts from other authors.³²¹ The translator can be assigned to the 13th century, but he remains anonymous.³²²

Our concern is with chapter 12, in which we find *vita* material (Theophrastus is said to have been a pupil of Aristotle; his selection as successor to Aristotle is related, p. 134.2–8 = app. 8), followed by the statement that Theophrastus wrote numerous books (135.9). Finally we are offered five sayings (p. 135.10–16). Of these five, the first four are known from elsewhere, so that the *Fiori e vita* is referred to in the apparatus of parallel texts (p. 135.10 = app. 538C, 11–12, 13 = app. 527A, 14 = app. 541). The last saying is, I believe, nowhere else attributed to Theophrastus (p. 135.15 = 455). The uniqueness of the attribution raises suspicions but hardly disproves the attribution. See the commentary on 455.

³²⁰ The title adopted by Varnhagen runs *Fiori e vita di filosofi ed altri savii ed imperadori*; see D'Agostino p. 94.

³²¹ D'Agostino pp. 26–29.

³²² D'Agostino pp. 29–40 dates the translation to the years between 1270 and 1275.

46 *Florilegium: Best and First Lesson*]

We have here a collection that was compiled some time before the 10th century. It has come down to us in not fewer than ten codices that have been divided into three groups by Schenkl. The codices range from the 11th to the 16th century.³²³ The collection has 161 entries, which are arranged alphabetically according to the first letter of the first word. The title by which the collection is known is not that of the manuscripts.³²⁴ Rather, it is that of Schenkl, who bases it on the first entry: ἄριστον καὶ πρῶτον μάθημά ἐστιν ἐν ἀνθρώποις πράττειν τὰ χρηστά, ἀπομαθεῖν δὲ τὰ κακά. According to Overwien, who divides the collections of this period into two traditions, the Wiener Apophthegmensammlungen Tradition and the Gnomologium Vaticanum Tradition, the *Florilegium: Best and First Lesson* belongs to the former together with the *Florilegium Monacense* (see below).³²⁵ A single saying is attributed to Theophrastus, no. 64 = 451.

47 *Florilegium Monacense*]

This collection, which predates the 10th century, is found in the 16th century codex Monacensis Graecus 8. It was first published by Walz as an appendix to his edition of the *Violetum* of Arsenius (1832) pp. 494–512 and then later by Meineke at the end of the fourth volume of his edition of Stobaeus' *Anthology* (1857) pp. 267–290. In both publications, the collection carries the title *Maxims Selected from Democritus, Epictetus and Other Philosophers, Poets and Rhetors*. The entries were assigned numbers by Meineke, and his numbers are regularly used to refer to the entries.³²⁶ The collection falls into three parts, the first of which (no. 1–101) contains the Democritus, Isocrates, Epictetus gnomologium, which was later published by Wachsmuth as *Gnomologium Byzantinum* (1882, repr. 1971). The second part (no. 102–154) consists of poetry drawn from an anthology of Orion,³²⁷ and the third (no. 155–270) is a short version of a postu-

³²³ H. Schenkl, "Das Florilegium Ἄριστον καὶ πρῶτον μάθημα," *Wiener Studien* 11 (1889) pp. 1–4; Searby (2007) vol. 1 pp. 22–24.

³²⁴ With some variation, the manuscripts offer Γνώμαι σοφῶν κατ' ἐκλογὴν καὶ κατὰ στοιχεῖον.

³²⁵ Overwien pp. 114–120.

³²⁶ Aside from the addition of numbers, Meineke's edition is essentially a reprint of Walz's edition. See Overwien p. 129.

³²⁷ Orion, an Egyptian grammarian of the 5th century AD compiled an anthology of which only a small segment has come down to us. See Gutas (1975) pp. 18, 28–29 and Ihm pp. XII, XV.

lated archetype, the so-called *Apophthegmata Philosophorum*.³²⁸ A study of the third part has led Overwien to conclude that the *Florilegium Monacense* belongs among those collections that make up the “Wiener Apophthegmensammlung Tradition.” Put negatively, it does not belong to the “*Gnomologium Vaticanum* Tradition.”³²⁹ Searby disagrees: he holds that the third part is related to the *Gnomologium Vaticanum* tradition.³³⁰

Within the third part, there are two sayings attributed to Theophrastus: in the text-translation volumes, one will be found in the section on “Politics” (no. 201 = p. 506 W = 621) and the other in the section on “Ethics” (no. 202 = p. 506 W = 510). Neither of these sayings is attributed to Theophrastus in the *Gnomologium Vaticanum*. The former is attributed to Epaminondas (GV no. 281) and the latter to Aristippus (GV no. 29).³³¹

48 *Gnomologium Vaticanum*]

This collection is found in codex Vaticanus Graecus 743, which dates to 14th century. It was first published by Leo Sternbach in three volumes of *Weiner Studien* 9–11 (1887–1889). The entire collection was brought between two covers in 1963. It contains 563 sayings that are alphabetically arranged according to the names of the philosophers and generally famous persons to whom the sayings are attributed. There follows a much shorter list of 14 sayings attributed to women, most of whom are not referred to by a proper name. The sayings attributed to Theophrastus number 15 (no. 322–336). Theophrastus is also mentioned in a saying attributed to Aristotle, who is reported to have taken note of a difference in character between Theophrastus and Callisthenes (no. 52).³³² Of the fifteen sayings attributed to Theophrastus, nine are printed in the section on ethics (323 = 471, 324 = 524, 325 = 522, 326 = 538E, 327 = 453, 328 = 525, 329 = 473, 331 = 452, 336 = 472); four are mentioned in the apparatus of parallel texts (322 = 1, 332 = 444, 333 = 517, 334 = 558); a single

³²⁸ Concerning the *Apophthegmata Philosophorum*, see below on the *Gnomologium Vaticanum*.

³²⁹ Overwien pp. 115–116, 128.

³³⁰ Searby (2007) vol. 1 p. 31.

³³¹ On the *Florilegium Leidense*, the “kleine Schwester” of the *Florilegium Monacense*, see Overwien p. 113.

³³² The saying as found in the *Gnomologium Vaticanum* is reported in the appendix of parallel passages to 1.34–38. For discussion of the difference between Theophrastus and Callisthenes, see the commentary on text 504.

saying is printed among the political texts (335 = 610): and still another is printed in the section on "Private Affairs" (330 = 21).

A glance at the apparatus of parallel passages makes clear that the sayings of Theophrastus are not uniquely transmitted in the *Gnomogium Vaticanum*. On the contrary, there are not a few collections that overlap on each other to greater and lesser degree, and that is true not only in regard to Theophrastus but also to many other famous people. That may give the impression that the sayings conveyed in the *Gnomologium Vaticanum* and in the other collections are well-attested and can be accepted as genuine. But that would be a hasty conclusion. For the collections form a family and in some cases can be said with considerable certainty to share a single source or archetype, which Gutas calls *Apophthegmata Philosophorum*.³³³ Hence, multiple attributions to Theophrastus are not to be confused with multiple independent sources whose cumulative weight is impressive. For further discussion, I refer to the studies of Gutas and Searby, who assign the archetype to the Hellenistic period.³³⁴ In addition, we should remember that sayings are remarkably movable. They can be and were moved from one famous person to another,³³⁵ so that attribution must always be viewed with a critical eye. And that too holds not only for the *Gnomologium Vaticanum* but also for the other collections contained in the codices listed above.

49 *Light of the Soul*

The *Lumen animae*, or in English the *Light of the Soul*, is not the single work of one compiler. Rather, it is three works, albeit related, by different compilers. Each of the works is a compilation of *exempla* (illustrative material) drawn from natural history and intended for use in Christian sermons.³³⁶ The earliest, *Lumen A*, is the work of Berengar of Landorra in Spain. He was a Dominican friar, who became Archbishop of Compostella in 1317 and remained in that post until his death in 1330.

³³³ Gutas (1975) p. 10.

³³⁴ Gutas (1975) pp. 23–25 and Searby (1998) pp. 48–53. See also Chadwick col. 1137.

³³⁵ An example is no. 52, which is attributed to Aristotle (see above). Diogenes Laertius knows the same attribution (5.39) but he also reports that it was said by Plato in regard to Aristotle and Xenocrates (4.6). Cicero assigns the saying to Isocrates, who used it in regard to Theopompus and Ephorus (*Brutus* 204, *On Oratory* 3.36 etc.).

³³⁶ Throughout these brief remarks on the *Lumen animae*, I am drawing heavily on M. & R. Rouse, "The Texts Called *Lumen Anime*," *Archivium Fratrum Praedicatorum* 41 (1971) pp. 5–113. See also Schmidt (1971b) p. 266, Sharples (1984) pp. 187–189 and Huby in *Commentary* vol. 4 on psychology (1999) p. 5.

According to the introduction, Berengar received encouragement from Pope John XXII, who even provided him with three unnamed assistants who were able to translate from Greek into Latin. Exactly when Berengar finished his work cannot be determined with precision. We can, however, say that a copy of his work was available in Austria before or soon after his death. For the compiler of *Lumen B*, a man named Godfrey, who served as canon of the Augustinian house in Vorau, made use of it. The earliest surviving manuscript of *Lumen B* dates from 1332, two years after the death of Berengar. *Lumen C* also seems to have been compiled in Austria. Its author is unknown, but he cannot have been much younger than Godfrey, for the earliest known manuscript of *C* dates from 1357, i.e., twenty-five years after the earliest manuscript of *B*.

Our special interest is with *Lumen B*, for this is the source of the twenty-seven entries that appear in the text-translation volumes. From the preface to *Lumen B*, we learn that the compiler Godfrey was an unabashed self-promoter. Like Berengar before him, he mentions the Pope, but this time the Pope is said to have seen an unfinished draft and ordered Godfrey to finish the work. The Pope is also said to have provided him with three translators, who now are given names: Leo, Amundus and Severinus.³³⁷ But subsequently, as if to burnish his own credentials, Godfrey tells us that he has made his own translations from Greek into Latin. Be that as it may, *Lumen B* contains material not found in *A* and is considerably larger. Of especial interest is the fact that Godfrey cites sources that are commonly cited by Berengar and yet avoids repeating Berengar's *exempla*. It would be nice to think that Godfrey's knowledge of the sources was extensive and that in assigning different *exempla* to the sources, he did so with a view to getting things right. But there is little reason to adopt such a view. On the contrary, it appears that Godfrey has seen fit to take names and titles from his predecessor and to apply them freely to different *exempla*, whatever their real source may be. That is a way to achieve originality, but it also diminishes the value of *Lumen B* as a source for the history of Greek philosophy.

This free association of source and *exemplum* is, I fear, well illustrated in the case of Theophrastus. The collection of ethical texts contains two

³³⁷ Rouse & Rouse p. 27 suggest that Godfrey has fabricated the papal letter that he purports to quote, and that Leo, Amundus and Severinus are paragons. On p. 29 R & R suggest construing the unfinished draft to which Godfrey refers as Berengar's *Lumen A*, which Godfrey wishes to diminish.

from *Lumen B*, 448 and 506, both of which are attributed to Theophrastus and both of which are most likely Stoic in origin. See the commentary on these two texts.

The following collections, lacking both a known author and a title, are listed here according to the codex, codices or papyrus in which they are found. The list is arranged alphabetically

50 Cod. Neapolitanus II D 22

This codex, which dates from the 14th century, was published by Francesco Sbordone in 1935 and reprinted in 1971. It contains 128 sayings of which 15 are without attribution.³³⁸ A grammarian has added comments to each of the sayings. Part of the collection exhibits an imperfect alphabetic arrangement (no. 33–78 and 101–112). As a whole, the collection belongs to the *Gnomologium Vaticanum* Tradition.³³⁹ Apparently the source on which the compiler drew was faulty. Overwien cites *inter alia* sayings no. 16 and 17, which are attributed to Aristotle. In the *Gnomologium Vaticanum*, they are attributed to Theophrastus (no. 331 and 332 = 452 and app. 558).³⁴⁰ The two sayings that follow immediately in the codex Neapolitanus, i.e., no. 18 and 19 are attributed to Theophrastus (476 and 477). They do not occur in the *Gnomologium Vaticanum*, but as Sbordone³⁴¹ has pointed out, the first of the two sayings is closely related to a Theophrastean excerpt found in Stobaeus' *Anthology* (465.8–10).³⁴² Since the second saying is related to the first—both are concerned with the difficulties involved in living a good life—Sbordone is confident that the attribution of both sayings to Theophrastus is correct. But we must remember that Stobaeus takes us back only to the 5th century AD. Almost certainly a selection of Theophrastean sayings appeared in one or more of the Hellenistic collections. During the centuries that followed, the selection will have been added to, sometimes fancifully, so that spurious sayings became mixed with genuine ones.³⁴³

³³⁸ No. 104, 108, 111, 114–116, 118–127. See Sbordone, repr. p. 179.

³³⁹ Sbordone, repr. 179 thinks that the anonymous sayings belong to a different tradition. Cf. Searby (2007) vol. 1 p. 37.

³⁴⁰ Overwien p. 122.

³⁴¹ Sbordone, repr. p. 171.

³⁴² The first saying, 476, is also attributed to Theophrastus in cod. Vat. Gr. 1144, and the first part of the saying is attributed to him in cod. Par. Gr. 2571.

³⁴³ I note that Diogenes Laertius (3rd cent. AD) 5.39–40 = 1.41–45 reports only three sayings of Theophrastus, but I draw no conclusion from the small number.

51 Codices Parisini Latini 2772, 4718, 4887

These three codices transmit a collection that E. Woelfflin wished to identify with a work *De nugis philosophorum*, *On the Trifles of Philosophers*, which he attributed to Caecilius Balbus.³⁴⁴ This identification was given up by Woelfflin himself and finds today no support among scholars. Who actually put together the collection remains unknown; it is, however, certain that the collection came into being no later than the ninth century AD.³⁴⁵ Codex 2772 dates to the first half of the ninth century; the other two belong to the thirteenth century.³⁴⁶

Five sayings are attributed to Theophrastus one after the other. All are printed in the text-translation volumes: one will be found in the section on “Friendship” (26 = 538C), and four will be found in the section on “Kindness, Honor and Vengeance” (27–30 = 527A).

52 Codex Vaticanus Gr. 1144

This codex, which dates to the 15th century, contains a short list of sayings (thirty in all) that was published by Elter in 1892,³⁴⁷ Elter argued convincingly that the list goes back to Stobaeus’ *Anthology* or perhaps to an earlier anthology, on which Stobaeus (5th cent.) drew when compiling his own work. Be that as it may, ten of the sayings form a unit whose focus is friendship (no. 17–25; one saying is divided into two, 20 and 20a, so that the total number becomes ten). The last two sayings are attributed to Theophrastus (no. 24 = 540 and no. 25 = 538A) and appear in the text-translation volumes within the section on “Friendship.”

53 Papyrus Pack² 1574

This papyrus was acquired for the Egypt Exploration Society in 1914 at Medinet-el-Faiyûm. It is kept in the Ashmolean Museum in Oxford and has been published in *Classical Quarterly* by John Barns, who assigns it to the 2nd century BC.³⁴⁸ The papyrus contains the fragmentary remains of a school anthology in verse and prose. All the entries concern τύχη or fortune. One is attributed to Theophrastus or Anaximenes (col. 3 v. 25–

³⁴⁴ *Caecilii Balbi De nugis philosophorum quae supersunt*, Basel 1855.

³⁴⁵ G. Wissowa, “Caecilius Balbus” in *Paulys Realencyclopädie* 3 (1899) col. 1196–1198.

³⁴⁶ I am grateful to Tiziano Dorandi for assistance in finding the dates of these codices.

³⁴⁷ A. Elter, “Neue Bruchstücke des Ioannes Stobaeus,” *Rheinisches Museum* 47 (1892) pp. 130–137.

³⁴⁸ *Classical Quarterly* 44 (1950) pp. 126–137 and 45 (1951) pp. 1–19.

28 = 487). It is a clear example not only of Theophrastus being cited in a Hellenistic anthology but also of an attribution that was disputed already in the Hellenistic period.

3. *Lexicographers*

An interest in words, phrases and generally how one expresses oneself comes naturally to man as a creature marked by the use of language. Not surprisingly the fifth century Sophists took up the subject³⁴⁹ as did rhetoricians and philosophers in the fourth century.³⁵⁰ Interest continued throughout the Hellenistic period and into that of the Roman Empire.³⁵¹ Partly driven by the rise of Atticism,³⁵² extensive glossaries were written, which were drawn on by later lexicographers, thereby creating a chain of dependency. I have made a separate unit out of the lexicographers for their work is interrelated and special in that it focuses on diction and generally treats context lightly if at all.³⁵³

54 Anonymous author of the *Antiatticista*] 2nd half of the 2nd cent. AD.

55 Phrynichus of Bithynia] 2nd half of the 2nd cent. AD.

I have grouped together two authors, not only because they are both concerned with Atticism as it developed in the second century AD³⁵⁴ but also because a close relation between the two is obvious. One is Phrynichus,

³⁴⁹ In the Plato's *Phaedrus* 267B–C, mention is made of Protagoras' *Correct Diction*, Polus' *Muse's Treasury of Phrases* and Licymnius' *Treasury of Words*.

³⁵⁰ The work of Aristotle and Theophrastus hardly needs to be mentioned. Both took a keen interest in λέξις, both narrowly construed as diction (words that are ordinary or foreign, or artificial or used metaphorically) and also widely construed as expression. On Theophrastus, see *inter alia* 684–697 with *Commentary* 8 (2005c).

³⁵¹ In the middle of second century, Adrastus, himself a Peripatetic, wrote about the λέξις of Theophrastus (473.3).

³⁵² Atticism was a literary movement that reacted negatively to stylistic developments that occurred during the Hellenistic period: especially Asianism and the spread of *koinê* Greek. To counter these developments, the proponents of Atticism pushed a form of archaism, i.e., a return to the diction and composition that mark selected (favored) authors of the fifth and fourth centuries BC. The movement reached a highpoint during the second century AD and was perpetuated in later antiquity and the Byzantine period through the teaching of grammarians and rhetoricians. See, e.g., G. Kennedy, *The Art of Rhetoric in the Roman World* (Princeton: University Press 1972) pp. 553–554 and *Greek Rhetoric under the Christian Emperors* (Princeton: University Press 1983) pp. 45–48.

³⁵³ On the whole, writers of lexica are not concerned with doctrine, so that the evidence they provide for a philosopher's ethical teachings is quite limited. They may confirm the occurrence of a word and list the work in which it is found (that is true of 494A–B). In addition, they may quote one or more sentences in which the word is used. Little else can be expected.

³⁵⁴ Dickey pp. 9, 96–98.

who was among the strictest Atticists of his day. He composed a lengthy lexicon entitled Σοφιστική προπαρασκευή, *Sophistic Preparation*. It was thirty-seven books long, but what survives is an epitome as well as a collection of fragments. Another work entitled Ἐκλογή Ἀττικῶν ῥημάτων καὶ ὀνομάτων, *A Selection of Attic Phrases and Words*, is shorter. What survives is thought to be more or less the complete work. It runs two books and provides an example of Phrynichus' rigor: namely, text 494B, in which Theophrastus' use of κεφαλοτομεῖν is rejected, and καρατομεῖν is recommended.

Less rigorous is the anonymous compiler of the so-called Ἀντιαττικιστής, *Antiatticist*. The title of the work suggests that the compiler is a full-blown opponent of Atticism, but that is not correct. In fact, he is more generous than Phrynichus. Text 494A may be cited. Instead of being rejected, κεφαλοτομεῖν is accepted and reference is made to Theophrastus' work *On Happiness*.³⁵⁵ The *Antiatticist*, at least in its original form (what we have is an abridged version), is now regarded as earlier than the work of Phrynichus.³⁵⁶ In 494B, Phrynichus is reacting to what he reads in the *Antiatticist* and recommends καρατομεῖν in place of κεφαλοτομεῖν. It is not impossible that he found καρατομεῖν in the original version of the *Antiatticist*. The verb may have been cited as an approved alternative to κεφαλοτομεῖν.³⁵⁷

56 Hesychius of Alexandria] 5th or 6th cent. AD.

Scholarship on pagan authors had flourished in Alexandria during the Hellenistic period, but in the early centuries of the Christian era, it lost prominence. That changed in the course of the fourth century, when a revival occurred. Theon's commentary on the Handy Tables appended to Ptolemy's *Almagest* and Theodosius' *Cannons* belong to this period. Hesychius—whom most scholars assign to the fifth century, but the sixth century remains a candidate—is a representative of the revival. We know him through a lexicon that survives in a single manuscript. In the dedicatory letter that precedes the work, Hesychius refers to early lexicographers who compiled narrowly focused lexica on the Homeric epics, comedies and tragedies. He also names Diogenianus, who is said to have made use of the lexica already mentioned and to have put together

³⁵⁵ Latte pp. 378, 383, 391.

³⁵⁶ See W.G. Arnott, "A note on the Antiatticist" *Hermes* 117 (1989) p. 374, referring to Latte pp. 377–394.

³⁵⁷ See Latte pp. 374–378.

an inclusive work that covered not only Homer and the writers of comedy and tragedy, but also lyric poets, orators, medical writers and historians. In addition, proverbs were included. Hesychius praises Diogenianus but regrets that the proverbs were reported without hypotheses, statements or explanations concerning the subject, and that the lexical entries lacked reference to the persons who used the words in question and the works in which the words were to be found (vol. 1 p. 1.1–24 Schmidt = vol. 1 p. 1.1–26 Latte). Hesychius claims to have corrected these deficiencies. He names as sources Aristarchus, Appion, Heliodorus, Diogenianus and Herodian, after which he says that he has added many entries on his own. Moreover, he says that he has supplied hypotheses for the proverbs and supplied the names of authors and their works (vol. 1 p. 2.1–13 S = vol. 1 p. 1.29–2.42 L).

The lexicon as it has come down to us—it survives in a single manuscript—differs significantly from what Hesychius actually wrote. For the original has been both abridged and interpolated.³⁵⁸ Abridgement has often removed the sources to which Hesychius referred. In regard to Theophrastus, the result is mixed. Theophrastus may be named and a work cited, or he may be named with no work cited, or he may not be named and no work cited (e.g., 199, 349, 413 no. 22, respectively). Our special interest is in the entry *σαλακωνίσαι*, (449B) which relates closely to an important text concerning the moral virtues (449A). Reference is made to Theophrastus, but no work is mentioned. That is regrettable, for had a work been named we could identify with considerable certainty the Theophrastean work that stands behind 449A. See the commentary on 449B.

57 Photius] c. 810–895 AD.

Photius of Constantinople was born into a family of some standing and presumably enjoyed a good education. He began his career as a professor of philosophy at the Imperial Academy, after which he became director of the imperial chancellery and a senator. Famously, he was twice Patriarch of Constantinople. The first period began in 858 and ended in 867, when Photius was deposed and sent into exile. Subsequently he was absolved and served again as Patriarch from 877 until 886. He supported

³⁵⁸ See N. Wilson, *Scholars of Byzantium* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 1983) p. 43; R. Browning et al., “Hesychius,” *Oxford Classical Dictionary* (1996) pp. 701–702; Dickey pp. 88–90.

the traditions of the Eastern Church against Rome and is credited with widening the breach between East and West. He wrote copiously on theological issues and brought Bulgaria, Moravia and Russia within the sphere of his church.

Photius was also an accomplished classical scholar. Indeed, he has been called “the most important figure in the history of classical studies in Byzantium.”³⁵⁹ Best known is his Βιβλιοθήκη, *Library*, which is divided into 280 units that vary considerably in length. Its contents include prose authors of the classical period, later antiquity and Byzantium. There are résumés of individual works, notices concerning the authors and comments on style. The works included do not represent everything Photius had read. Notably absent are Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics and Epicureans. For scholars interested in Theophrastus, the special value of the *Library* is unit 278 (525a30–529b23), which draws on nine of Theophrastus’ scientific *opuscula* including *On Dizziness*, *On Fatigue*, *On Sweat* (328 no. 1a–b, no. 2 and 12).³⁶⁰ For some discussion of excerpts from *On Creatures Said to be Grudging* and *On Creatures that Change Color* (350 no. 7b and 9b), see the commentary on text 531.

Less appreciated but not without value is an earlier work known as Photius’ *Lexicon*, which may have been written between 830 and 840. It is a compilation of lexicographical sources. The immediate sources are late compilations like glossaries attributed to Cryil, Timaeus’ Platonic lexicon and the so-called *Synagoge*. Through intermediaries, the *Lexicon* goes back to earlier sources like Aelius Dionysius, Pausanias, Phrynichus and Diogenianus.³⁶¹ Photius is primarily concerned with words and phrases that he deems especially appropriate for use by orators and prose authors,³⁶² but poetic usage is not entirely ignored, especially words found in Old Comedy. An example, is our text 464, which explains the compound adjective τυμβογέρων.

³⁵⁹ Wilson, *op. cit.* p. 89.

³⁶⁰ The three named works have recently been made available with introduction, translation and notes in *Theophrastus, On Sweat, On Dizziness, On Fatigue*, ed. W. Fortenbaugh, R. Sharples, M. Sollenberger. Leiden: Brill 2003.

³⁶¹ N. Wilson, *op. cit.* p. 91 and cf. “Photius” in the *Oxford Classical Dictionary*, 3rd ed. (1996) p. 1175, as well as I. Vassis, “Photius 2” in *Brill’s New Pauly* 11 (2007) col. 186 and Dickey pp. 101–102.

³⁶² So the dedication to Photius’ pupil Thomas: (λέξεις) αἱ μᾶλλον τῶν ἄλλων ῥήτορσι καὶ λογογράφοις ἀνήκουσιν εἰς χρεάν. Cf. the announcement of the prologue, which follows immediately upon the dedication: πρόλογος τοῦ λεξικοῦ· δ’ ὧν ῥητόρων τε πόνοι καὶ συγγραφέων ἐξωραΐζονται μάλιστα.

4. *Scholia*

Scholia, as understood here, are marginal notes that comment in one way or another on the body of text that they surround. The writers of such notes may be recording their own thought(s) on a particular word or words or segment within the text, but more importantly they may be reporting material drawn from earlier commentaries, dictionaries, grammars and the like. E.g., a ninth century manuscript containing Platonic dialogues may exhibit scholia based on a lost writing of Proclus, the Neoplatonist who lived in the fifth century (see below). That means that while the date of a given manuscript is important in dealing with scholia, it alone does not determine the value of the scholia. Hence, scholia must be used with care, for notes from different periods and of varying worth may be mixed together. Moreover, they may be abbreviated, miscopied and misplaced.³⁶³ For a misplaced scholium concerning Theophrastus, see 84 together with my article “Theophrastus, no. 84: Nothing New Here!”³⁶⁴

58 Euripidean Scholia]

The scholia on Euripides are limited to nine plays and may be divided into old scholia and Byzantine scholia. The former are of special interest, for they are thought to have their beginnings in the notes and lectures of Aristophanes of Byzantium, who was the fourth head of the library in Alexandria (c. 195–80 BC). Other Alexandrians will have written proper commentaries on the plays of Euripides, and at the end of the first century BC Didymus Chalcenterus will have used this material to produce composite commentaries. Additions to the old scholia seem to cease around the middle of the third century. Their value lies *inter alia* in the correct readings that they preserve, in the information they record concerning the production and staging of plays, in lexicographical remarks, in citations from earlier authors and much more.³⁶⁵

In collecting material for our two volumes of sources, we failed to search adequately the old scholia and therefore missed an entry in which Theophrastus is named. It is included in Schwartz' edition, vol. 2 (1891) p. 39 and concerns the proverb μηδὲν ἄγαν, which occurs in the *Hippolytus*. Schwartz cites four manuscripts of which two have the entire entry and two do not: the latter omit the opening attribution of the

³⁶³ Dickey pp. 11–15 offers an excellent, succinct introduction to scholia.

³⁶⁴ *The Passionate Intellect: Essays on the Transformation of Classical Traditions* = Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities 7, ed. L. Ayres (1995) pp. 161–176, reprinted in *Theophrastean Studies* = Philosophie der Antike 17 (2003) pp. 22–34.

³⁶⁵ Dickey pp. 31–34, W. Barrett, *Euripides, Hippolytus* (Oxford: Clarendon 1964) pp. 78–81.

proverb to Chilo, perhaps because it was widely known and therefore less interesting. Be that as it may, the omission is not a sign of independence. What both pairs share is all but identical, so that a common source seems certain. For further discussion, see the commentary on NEW 738.5 below, Section IV on “Virtue and Vice”.

59 Platonic Scholia]

The scholia on Plato’s dialogues divide into two groups: the *scholia Arethae* and the *scholia vetera*. The former are found in codex B = Bodleianus, Clarkianus 39, which was written in 895 AD for the use Arethas who would later become Archbishop of Caesarea in Cappadocia. Arethas himself corrected the manuscript and added the scholia that are referred to by his name. They are largely exegetical and derive from lost Neoplatonic commentaries. The latter, i.e., the *scholia vetera* are represented in codex B and in other codices. In Greene’s edition of the *Scholia Platonica* (1938), they are codex Venetus, Marcianus Gr. 542 = T (11th–12th cent.); codex Vindobonensis, suppl. Gr. 7 olim 54 = W (10th cent.); Parisinus Graecus 1807 = A (9th cent.); Vaticanus Graecus 1 olim 796 = O (late 9th or early 10th cent.).³⁶⁶

The text-translation volumes print or mention five Platonic scholia: two on the *Laws*, two on the *Republic* and one on the *Timaeus*.³⁶⁷ Our special concern is the scholium on *Laws* 1.6 631C = 507. It occurs in codices A and O, whose scholia generally correspond,³⁶⁸ and that is true of 507. The scholium concerns wealth, and according to Greene, it is likely to derive from a lost work of Proclus.³⁶⁹

60 Aristotelian Scholia]

The scholia on Aristotle that are found in the margins of Aristotelian manuscripts are numerous and often based on existing commentaries. That diminishes their importance, so that they are for the most part

³⁶⁶ According to Greene, “The Platonic Scholia,” *Transactions of the American Philological Association* 68 (1937) pp. 186–187, it has been shown by L. Post, *The Vatican Plato and Its Relations*, Philological Monographs of the American Philological Association (Middletown CT 1934) pp. 10–14 that codex O was copied from A beginning at Book 5.15 746B, but not the earlier portion.

³⁶⁷ Three are printed: 507, 602, 637; one is mentioned a list 413 no. 99; one is mentioned in the apparatus of parallel texts 211A.

³⁶⁸ See Greene in the introduction to his edition (1938) p. xli.

³⁶⁹ Greene in the apparatus to his edition (1938) p. 303.

unpublished. That is reasonable, for not only is duplication wasteful, but also the scholia are frequently abridged and generally less informative than the existing commentaries.

Scholia that are marginal notes but cannot be traced to an existing commentary are necessarily problematic, but not necessarily false or misleading. An example in our collection of Theophrastean texts is 461, which is found in the margin of two manuscripts that contain Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*.³⁷⁰ One is codex Vindobonensis Graecus philosophus 315 and the other is 151. In Wartelle's inventory of Aristotelian manuscripts, the former is given an approximate date: 13th–15th century. The latter is assigned to the year 1427.³⁷¹ According to Heylbut, the scholium in 151 is copied from 315. Regarding content, especially the relationship between the scholium and the *Magna Moralia*, see the commentary on 461.

Different from scholia that occur as marginal notes are those that have been brought together to form a collection that gives the appearance of a continuous single commentary without being one. An example is the anonymous collection of scholia on *Nicomachean Ethics* 2–5. It has come down to us as part of a Byzantine commentary on all ten books of the *NE*, but the scholia on Books 2–5 are of much older origin (see above, this chapter, source no. 18). Texts 516, 529A and 530 are part of the collection.

61 Theocritean Scholia]

The scholia on the poet Theocritus (c. 305–255 BC) divide into ancient and Byzantine scholia. The latter are of little importance except as they are evidence for Byzantine scholarship. The former are much earlier and of considerable interest. They appear to derive from a composite commentary that was based largely on two earlier works: one belonging to the Augustan period and another to the second century AD. The standard edition of the ancient scholia is that of Wendel,³⁷² who omitted the Byzantine scholia.³⁷³ A thorough discussion of the ancient scholia will be found in a separate publication by Wendel.³⁷⁴ Briefer but quite useful

³⁷⁰ The scholium is a comment on *Nicomachean Ethics* 6.13 1145a10–11.

³⁷¹ A. Wartelle, *Inventaire des Manuscrits Grecs d'Aristote et de ses Commentateurs* (Paris: Les Belles Lettres 1963) p. 168.

³⁷² C. Wendel, *Scholia in Theocritum vetera*, Leipzig 1914.

³⁷³ For the Byzantine scholia, see H. Ahrens, *Bucolicorum graecorum Theocriti Bionis Moschi*, Leipzig 1859.

³⁷⁴ C. Wendel, *Überlieferung und Entstehung der Theokrit-Scholien*, Berlin 1920.

remarks will be found in the introduction to Gow's edition of Theocritus' poems vol. 1 pp. lxxx–lxxxii³⁷⁵ and in Dickey pp. 63–65.

Four times in our collection of sources, we have printed Theocritean scholia (218C, 362E, 370B, 567C), and five times we have referred to scholia without printing them (413 no, 9, 23, 36, 83, app. 557). Among the ethical texts, a single scholium has been printed: namely 567C, in which we are told on the authority of Theophrastus that a ram fell in love with a citharode named Glaucā.³⁷⁶ A second witness, Aelian, who wrote a work on animals, tells us that Glaucā attracted not only a ram but also a goose (567B). Since Aelian is normally placed at the end of the second and beginning of the third century (fl. 200 AD), and since the scholion belongs to the ancient scholia, which have roots in the first and second centuries, the scholion might be viewed as the earlier and more reliable witness. But caution is in order, for the ancient scholia underwent abridgment in transmission, so that the omission of a particular detail (a goose) need not be significant. Moreover, the issue is complicated by Aelian's use of the phrase "as I hear" and especially by the scholiast's reference to Ptolemy Philadelphus. That introduces a chronological difficulty, which seems to rule out Theophrastus as the scholiast's source. See the commentary on these texts.

5. Catalogue of Books

62 Papyrus Petersburgiensis Gr. 13] 2nd quarter of the 3rd cent. AD.

The papyrus Petersburgiensis Gr. 13 (no. 155 Mitteis and Wilcken = Pack² 2089) is now referred to as P^{RossGeorg} I 22.³⁷⁷ Haeblerlin dates the papyrus to 235–238 AD.³⁷⁸ Linguisti is not very different: he suggests 222–238.³⁷⁹ The papyrus, which was found in the catacombs of Sakkarah near Alexandria in Egypt, lists authors and the titles of their books. The occurrence of the letters ἐνοίχια in line 2 of column 1 prompted the suggestion that the papyrus contains a mixed list in which books

³⁷⁵ A. Gow, *Theocritus*, Cambridge: University Press 1965.

³⁷⁶ In the "Index of Theophrastean Texts," vol. 2 p. 694 line 8 FHS&G, "app. 567C" is a mistake. The text is printed and not merely mentioned in the apparatus of parallel texts.

³⁷⁷ *Papyri Russischer und Georgischer Sammlungen [P.Ross-Georg.]* 1, ed. Gregor Zere-teli (Tiflis 1925, reprint Amsterdam: Hakkert 1966) pp. 153–158.

³⁷⁸ C. Haeblerlin, *Griechische Papyri* (Leipzig: Harrassowitz 1897) p. 91.

³⁷⁹ A. Linguisti, "Elenco di opere filosofiche e letterarie" *Corpus dei papiri filosofici greci e latini* 1.1 (Firenze 1989) p. 86.

occur together with business documents: ἐνοίκια is read and taken as a reference to receipts for rent.³⁸⁰ But that seems to be a mistaken idea, for the word ἐνοίκια would refer to rent money as against documents that might be stored along with books and appear together in a catalogue.³⁸¹ Hence, the reading ἐν οἰκίᾳ seems preferable.³⁸² We should think of a private library, whose holdings were stored in various locations. The phrase ἐν οἰκίᾳ indicates where one group of books was to be found.

In column 1 of the papyrus, we find a string of titles: the author is listed first and the title comes second. The left hand side of the column is damaged but only slightly, so that in most cases it is immediately clear who is being cited as the author of any given work. For example in line 7, στοτέλους is preserved at the beginning. That is easily emended to read [᾽Αρι]στοτέλους. The title Περί Ἀρετῆς completes the line. Similarly in line 12, τοτέλους is easily recognized as [᾽Αριω]τοτέλους. The title Ἀθηναίων πολιτείας follows. In line 22, we have Ἀ[ρ]ιστοτέλους followed by the title Πολιτεία Νεαπολιτῶν. Our special concern is line 10, in which the title Περί σωφροσύνης occurs. It is preceded by οφραστου, which is easily emended to read [Θε]οφράστου. Theophrastus is here cited as the author of a work entitled *On Temperance*. That is the third of the three alternatives occurring together in the title Περί παιδείας ἢ περὶ ἀρετῶν ἢ περὶ σωφροσύνης, *On Education*, or *On Virtues*, or *On Temperance*, which occurs in Diogenes' catalogue of Theophrastean works (1.283). See the commentary on 436 no. 9a–c.

In column 2, the right hand portion of the column is badly damaged. The titles are lost and often the name of the author is too. In line 10, we read Θεοφρ. Here we can emend the text to read Θεοφρ[άστου]. In line 22, we have Ἀριστο. One is tempted to read Ἀριστο[τέλους], but that is not certain. In both cases, guessing at a title would be reckless.

Perhaps we can conclude with Zereteli and Wilcken that the Papyrus Petersburgensis Gr. 13 reports a (small) portion of the holdings of a private library. It reflects the fact that in Egypt during the 3rd century

³⁸⁰ E. Kurtz, *Byzantinische Zeitschrift* 11 (1902) p. 219 thinks that the catalogue in question is not a true book list. It contains an inventory of business papers as well as literary works including those by philosophers.

³⁸¹ See LSJ s.v. ἐνοίκιος II.1 and U. Wilcken, *Gründzüge und Chrestomathie der Papyruskunde* 1 (Hildesheim: Olms 1963) pp. 182–183.

³⁸² Haeberlin, *op. cit.* pp. 90–91 reports that the papyrus lacks accents, breathings, punctuation and iota adscripts; cf. Zereteli, *op. cit.* pp. 154–155.

there was a significant demand for books and that the works of Peripatetic authors like Aristotle and Theophrastus were represented in the libraries of private individuals.³⁸³

6. Arabic Sources

63 Ḥunayn ibn-Ishāq] 808–873 AD.

Ḥunayn, the most renowned Christian Arab physician, scholar, and translator into Syriac and Arabic during the Graeco-Arabic translation movement in Baghdad, was also the compiler of a gnomologium entitled *The Anecdotes* (or *Apophthegms*) *of the Philosophers* (Nawādir [or *Ādāb*] *al-falāsifa*). It survives not in its original form but in a 12th century recension (apparently also interpolated), in medieval Hebrew and Spanish translations, and in scattered fragments in later compilations; a thorough investigation that will study all the available evidence has yet to be conducted. His sources were quite disparate, and at this stage it seems clear that he used both pre-existing translations of Greek gnomonic material and his own versions of a wide range of material to which he had access. The one saying attributed to Theophrastus (520) is found among the fragments of his work cited in a 16th or 17th century MS (Istanbul Köprülü 1608). We have no information about the provenance of this saying, and the attribution to Theophrastus is far from certain even in the MS itself; the form of the name as written in Arabic may plausibly also be read as Theocritus. For Ḥunayn in general see G. Strohmaier, 'Ḥunayn b. Ishāq,' in *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2nd ed., vol. 3 pp. 578–581, and for the gnomologium see Gutas (1975) pp. 38–39.

64 al-Fārābī] d. 950–951 AD.

The great philosopher al-Fārābī is a source for our purposes in this volume only inadvertently, due to a scribal error. He compiled a brief essay on the *Prolegomena to the Study of Aristotle's Philosophy* in which he essentially presented the material that was used in late antiquity in the philosophical curriculum that was taught in Alexandria. One of the subjects treated was the subject with which to begin the study of philosophy, and al-Fārābī, following the late antique discussions, mentioned that Adrastus—the most plausible reading of the garbled form of the name in

³⁸³ Zereteli, *op. cit.* p. 155 and Wilcken, *op. cit.* p. 183.

Arabic—said that one should start with ethics (466A). In the transmission of the manuscripts, the name of Adrastus in Arabic transliteration was misread as Theophrastus, the more familiar name.

65 Ibn-an-Nadīm] *fl.* 987 AD.

The invaluable Baghdad bookseller, scribe, and bibliographer Ibn-an-Nadīm, to whose diligence we owe our knowledge of a good number of medieval Arabic books that have not survived, compiled his *Index* (*Al-Fihrist*) in 987. He was friends with fellow scribe Yaḥyā ibn-ʿAdī, the leader of the Baghdad Aristotelian philosophers, from whom he received a good part of his information about philosophical books and translations. On the basis of this information and his own knowledge of the market of manuscripts, he compiled the list of Theophrastus' works that we have (3A).

66 *Depository of Wisdom Literature*] c. 1000 AD.

The Arabic gnomologium entitled *Depository of Wisdom Literature* (*Šiwān al-ḥikma*) was compiled by an unknown but philosophically literate scholar from Iran or further to the East. It brings together in a systematic fashion gnostic and biographical material from and about ancient philosophers that had been translated from Greek into Arabic in the immediately preceding centuries; it is a valuable and reliable collection, whose riches have yet to be fully tapped. The original recension is lost, but the work survives in a number of later abridgments and extracts, on the basis of which it has been possible to reconstruct the contents of the section on Theophrastus (Gutas 1985). It preserves the largest number of sayings attributed to Theophrastus in Arabic, and the majority of the Arabic sayings on ethics. For the work and its transmission see Gutas (1985) pp. 68–69, and D. Gutas, “The *Šiwān al-Ḥikma* Cycle of Texts,” *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 102 (1982) pp. 645–650.

67 Mubaššir ibn-Fātik] *fl.* 1048–1049 AD.

The sole surviving work by the Cairene philosopher and bibliophile al-Mubaššir ibn-Fātik is his extensive gnomology *Choicest Maxims and Best Sayings* (*Muḥtār al-ḥikam wa-maḥāsin al-kalim*), compiled in 1048–1049. It was a work that gained immense popularity both in Arabic and, in medieval translations into Spanish, Latin, and other vernacular languages, throughout Europe. Like the compiler of the *Depository of*

Wisdom Literature, al-Mubaššir also drew on the extensive Arabic translations of Greek gnomic material from the preceding two centuries. The three ethical sayings by Theophrastus he reports (454, 544–545) are found in the general section of his book devoted to minor philosophers of whom not enough was known to fill an independent chapter. For al-Mubaššir and his work see Franz Rosenthal, “Al-Mubashshir ibn Fātik. Prolegomena to an Abortive Edition,” *Oriens* 13/14 (1960/61) pp. 132–158, and the same author’s entry in the *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2nd ed., vol. 7 pp. 282–283;³⁸⁴ for the sayings attributed to Theophrastus, see Gutas (1985) pp. 69–70.

68 Abū-l-Farağ ibn-aṭ-Ṭayyib] d. 1043 AD.

The Nestorian theologian and churchman, Baghdad hospital physician, and philosopher Abū-l-Farağ was one of the last representatives of the Baghdad Aristotelians. He was a prolific author of a traditional mold on all the subjects of his professional concerns and wrote much that preserves Greek material both from late antiquity and early Arabic translations. His monumental commentary on the *Categories* presents an Arabic summation of the exegetical work by the late antique Alexandrian philosophers. His one contribution to Theophrastus in this volume, though, much like that by al-Fārābī, is due to the scribal error that was reported above. For this commentary, see the work by Ferrari referred to at the beginning of the comment on 466B.

69 az-Zawzanī] fl. 1249 AD.

The extensive biographical dictionary of philosophers and physicians by the scholar and administrator in Aleppo Ibn-l-Qiftī (d. 1248) survives in the abridgment by a certain az-Zawzanī, compiled in 1249. Ibn-al-Qiftī drew mainly on the previous work by Ibn-an-Nadīm, supplemented by whatever other information he could find in the literature. His entry on Theophrastus (3B) brings little new to what we have from Ibn-an-Nadīm.

³⁸⁴ “An anecdote, which is undoubtedly apocryphal, brings to life for us the type of individual he appears to have been: when he died, his wife had all his books, for which he had always neglected her, thrown into the pool in the courtyard of their house” (p. 282b).

CHAPTER THREE

TITLES OF BOOKS

Our list of ethical titles, 436 no. 1–33, derives for the most part from Diogenes Laertius' catalogue of Theophrastean works (5.42–50 = 1.68–291). The catalogue contains five lists plus two addenda.¹ The first, second, fourth and fifth lists (1.68–176, 177–242, 270–284, 285–289) are arranged alphabetically according to the most important word.² The first list, which is the longest, contains 17 ethical titles. The second list contains 9, the third 2 and the fourth 4. That gives 32 titles, of which two are duplicates. *Ethical Characters* (436 no. 4), with the words reversed, occurs twice in the second list (1.202 and 241), and *Exhortation* (or *Protrepticus* 436 no. 33) occurs in the third and fourth lists (1.262 and 284). If we remove the duplicates, we are left with 30 ethical titles. And if we add 3 titles that are not found in Diogenes' catalogue, *On Dispositions*, *Ethics* and *On Marriage* (436 no. 1, 2 and 17), then our list of ethical titles expands to 33. There are, of course, other titles that are closely related to ethics. Two of these, *On Injustices* and *Political, Natural, Erotic, Ethical Problems* (666 no. 10 and 727 no. 4) are referred to within the list of ethical titles printed in the text-translation volumes. The two will be discussed below.³ The first has its primary location among the rhetorical titles; the second has been placed among the miscellaneous titles. Similarly, some of the ethical titles are closely related to other areas. For example, *Ethical Characters* and *On Kindness* (or *Grace*) (436 no. 4 and 24) are related to rhetoric, and for that reason they are referred

¹ Sollenberger (1984) pp. 25–26, 375 and (1992) p. 3852.

² The occurrence of five distinct lists, four of which are alphabetically arranged, clearly distinguishes the Theophrastean catalogue from the Aristotelian catalogues that are based primarily on content and literary form (see, e.g., Moraux [1951] p. 12). For an adequate interpretation of individual Theophrastean titles, related titles within the Aristotelian catalogues can be quite helpful, but concerning the Theophrastean catalogue as a whole, its divisions and their arrangement, the Aristotelian catalogues are so different that any comparison between the two must be treated with caution.

³ In accordance with the position of the references in the text-translation volumes (to be precise, vol. 2 pp. 260–263), 666 no. 10 will be discussed immediately after 436 no. 22 and 727 no. 4 will be discussed after 436 no. 30a–b.

to within the list of rhetorical titles. It is clear that assigning titles to one area as against another is not always a simple matter.

Diogenes' catalogue probably derives from Hermippus of Smyrna, who was a follower of Callimachus⁴ and active in Alexandria during the second half of the third century BC. Hermippus wrote a work *On Theophrastus*⁵ and most likely included the catalogue in that work. The fact that five lists can be distinguished within the catalogue may reflect five separate purchases by the library in Alexandria. That would explain the existence of duplicates. The ethical title *Exhortation* may serve as an example. It is found in the third and fourth lists (5.49 = 1.262 and 5.50 = 1.284). The work may have been acquired in a first purchase, say, that which is represented by the third list. Later it will have been acquired as part of a second purchase, which is represented by the fourth list. Or the fourth list may represent the earlier purchase, and the third the later.⁶ Either way, we have an easy answer to the question, why purchase a work twice. Purchasing a duplicate would be considered unimportant compared to acquiring the new works that made up the bulk of the later purchase. A slightly different case is that of *Ethical Characters*. This title is found twice in the same (i.e., the second) list. Here there would be only a single purchase, but once again acquiring a duplicate will have seemed unimportant compared with acquiring the other books that belonged to the purchase. There is, however, another possibility. It may be that the two copies of *Ethical Characters* were not exact duplicates. One copy contained only some of Theophrastus' character sketches; the other copy contained a different selection. There may have been overlap, but purchasing both copies was necessary, if the library was going to possess all or most of the Theophrastean sketches.⁷

Although Diogenes' catalogue is likely to derive from Hermippus, there is reason to believe that the catalogue has been contaminated. One

⁴ Athenaeus calls Hermippus ὁ Καλλιμάχειος, "the Callimachean" (*The Sophists at Dinner* 5.52 213F and 15.52 696F = fr. 21 and 48 Wehrli).

⁵ Diogenes Laertius 2.55 = Hermippus fr. 52 Wehrli.

⁶ We might guess that the order of the lists reflects the order of the purchases by the library, so that the copy mentioned in the third list was purchased before that found in the fourth list. But that is risky speculation. I allow for both possibilities.

⁷ Although I am inclined to believe that the lists that make up Diogenes' catalogue reflect separate purchases by the Alexandrian library, I should acknowledge that the idea of library purchases is itself a matter of scholarly controversy. See R. Blum, *Kallimachos und die Literaturverzeichnis bei den Griechen* (Frankfurt am Main: Buchhändler-Vereinigung 1977) col. 317–319, White (2002) p. 19 and my responses in *Commentary* vol. 8 (2005) p. 50 n. 7.

possible way is through the introduction of collective titles that may reflect the work of Andronicus of Rhodes (second half of the first century BC). He is said to have divided the works of Aristotle and Theophrastus into treatises, bringing together related subjects (Porphyry, *Life of Plotinus* 24 = 39.7–8). In other words, he will have combined smaller *monobiblia* into larger works and assigned the larger, collective works their own titles. As an example, scholars have often pointed to Περί ζώων α'-ζ', *On Living Creatures*, 7 books (5.44 = 1.115 = 350 no. 1). It is found in the first list of Diogenes' catalogue, which is alphabetical, under ζ and preceded by seven titles, each of which announces a special subject concerning animal life in one book. Two of the seven titles include the word ζῶων, so that they seem properly positioned within the list. But five lack that word or any other word beginning with ζ, and as a result they seem wrongly placed among the titles beginning with ζ. On reflection, however, it seems possible that the seven *monobiblia* belong together as works on ζῶα, and that they form the seven books that made up the work Περί ζώων. On this interpretation, their position in the first list may be initially confusing, but it is not wrong.⁸ That said, I want to acknowledge that the issue is not simple and is still a matter of scholarly discussion (see Sharples [1995] pp. 41–42). Whether any of the ethical titles can be identified as collective works is not immediately clear. *On Dispositions* (436 no. 1) and *Ethics* (436 no. 2) are candidates. They do not occur in Diogenes' catalogue, but that does not rule them out and indeed might be thought to strengthen their candidacy. For if the catalogue largely derives from Hermippus, and if the titles *On Dispositions* and *Ethics* reflect the work of Andronicus, then their absence from the catalogue is hardly surprising. The titles were created two centuries after Hermippus' catalogue was put together, and for whatever reason the titles never found their way into the catalogue.

A different kind of contamination would be the inclusion of works not written by Theophrastus. Certainly the large number of titles contained in the catalogue and the existence of five lists plus two addenda encourage the idea that the catalogue contains non-Theophrastean titles. Moreover, the first and second lists are alphabetical and contain works that seem genuinely Theophrastean. What follows is different. The third list does not exhibit alphabetical order and the fourth and fifth lists are noticeably shorter, not to mention the two addenda. Beginning with the third list

⁸ See Usener (1858) p. 14, Regenbogen (1940) col. 1364, 7 and Sollenberger (1984) pp. 30–35.

and running through the others, contamination by non-Theophrastean titles has been suspected. Among the several candidates, three stand out. One occurs in the third list: Ἱστορικῶν γεωμετρικῶν α'β'γ'δ', *Geometrical Researches*, 4 books ($5.48 = 1.245 = 264$ no. 3); two are found in the fourth list: Ἀστρολογικῆς ἱστορίας α'β'γ'δ'ε'ζ', *Astronomical Research*, 6 books ($5.50 = 1.271 = 137$ no. 43) and Ἀριθμητικῶν ἱστοριῶν περὶ αὐξήσεως α', *Arithmetical Researches concerning Increase*, 1 book ($5.50 = 1.272 = 264$ no. 2). The first two titles are elsewhere attributed to Eudemos,⁹ whose interest in the subject matter is well attested. The third is more problematic, for the title taken in its entirety—i.e., including the phrase περὶ αὐξήσεως—is not assigned to Eudemos. Some editors have chosen to split the third title into two titles—Ἀριθμητικῶν ἱστοριῶν α' and Περὶ αὐξήσεως α'—with the result that the first of the two titles corresponds to a title attributed to Eudemos (fr. 142 Wehrli). But the emendation is bad philology. It is based on a single secondary manuscript in which only a Greek semi-colon divides the titles.¹⁰ All three primary manuscripts have the longer title undivided. Moreover, in the relevant Eudemian fragment (and there is only one) reference is made to “the first book,” which suggests that the Eudemian work was longer than one book. In Diogenes' catalogue, the Theophrastean work is assigned one book (1.272). Hence, I am inclined to follow Wehrli, who expresses caution concerning the attribution of all three works to Eudemos.¹¹

But even if we accept without reservation the attribution to Eudemos and allow that the contamination is likely to be greater than three titles, we should observe restraint in looking for non-Theophrastean titles. If one asks how the third, fourth and fifth lists came to be included in Diogenes' catalogue, one possible answer is that most of the titles do refer to Theophrastean works and were known to do so, or were reasonably believed to do so. As examples, I cite the political titles *On Kingship* (1.249 = 589 no. 10), *Notes on How Cities May be Best Governed* (1.263 = 589 no. 8), *On Crises* (1.279 = 589 no. 5), *Political Dialogue* (1.288 = 589 no. 2), the rhetorical titles *On Slander* (1.252, 275 = 666 no. 13), *On Judicial Speeches* (1.274 = 666 no. 9) and the religious title *On Piety*

⁹ There are, of course, insignificant variations: e.g. singular for plural and vice versa. For the passages in which the titles are attributed to Eudemos see 137 no. 43 and 264 no. 3.

¹⁰ The book number α' after Ἀριθμητικῶν ἱστοριῶν is supplied by Meurs without any basis in the manuscript tradition.

¹¹ Wehrli (1967–1978) vol. 8 p. 114.

(1.277 = 580 no. 3).¹² In regard to ethics, several titles are especially interesting: *On the Divine Happiness in Response to the Academics* (1.261 = 436 no. 13), *Exhortation* (1.262, 284 = 436 no. 33), *On Bringing Up Children*, another work with different treatment, and *On Education, or On Virtues, or On Temperance* (1.281–283 = 436 no. 10, 11, 9a). For discussion of these titles, I refer to the commentary on individual titles that follows this introduction.

A zoological title *On the Intelligence and Habits of Living Creatures* merits special consideration. It has been placed in the section on “Living Creatures” (1.254 = 350 no. 11) and receives its primary treatment in *Commentary* vol. 5. I do, however, want to signal my disagreement with Stephan White, who suggests and seems to believe that the title should be assigned to Eudemus.¹³ To be sure the title is cited only in Diogenes’ catalogue, and there is no way to rule out Eudemus. He did discuss animal behavior, and we have preserved not a few fragments that relate to the topic (fr. 125–132 Wehrli). But there are other Peripatetics who come to mind. One is Clearchus, for whom fewer fragments survive, but in what we do have, there is reference both to the so-called out-lying fish that protects itself against birds (fr. 101 W) and to the octopus that is said to be quite deficient in regard to intelligence (λίαν ἀνόητος fr. 102 W). Another Peripatetic is, of course, Theophrastus, whose interest in zoology is amply documented. He is credited with a variety of titles including *On Living Creatures* in seven books (see above). Thanks to Photius and others, we know much about two *opuscula*, *On Creatures That are Said to be Grudging* (362A–I) and *On Creatures That Change Color* (365A–D). Both relate directly to questions of behavior and intelligence. In addition, fragments preserved by Porphyry present a close relationship between animals and human beings, and it is tempting to assign one of these fragments (531) to *On the Intelligence and Habits of Living Creatures*, but equally it can derive from *On Piety*. Be that as it may, it is clear that Theophrastus was every bit as interested in animals as Eudemus. He

¹² On the rhetorical titles, see *Commentary* vol. 8 on the rhetorical and poetic fragments, and on the religious title see *Quellen* (1984) pp. 125–128. Concerning the political titles, we await *Commentary* vol. 7. The very last item in the catalogue (the last of the two addenda) *On Living Creatures* (1.291 = 350 no. 1) is a zoological title and may be a duplicate of the work that carries the same title in the first list (the work in seven books discussed above). But there is little point in running through all the titles. The possibilities are too many and too speculative.

¹³ White (2002) pp. 216, 226, 236. My disagreement (or uneasiness) in no way diminishes my admiration for White’s interesting and useful article on Eudemus.

shared with his contemporaries an interest in *mirabilia*, but he also took a scientific interest in animal behavior. Hence, I prefer to take my cue from Diogenes—he announces a catalogue of Theophrastean writings—and to attribute *On the Intelligence and Habits of Living Creatures* to Theophrastus. But certainty is beyond our reach.¹⁴

A special concern is whether the titles are genuine in the sense that they that were assigned to a particular work by Theophrastus himself. I am inclined to believe that many if not most of the titles are of Theophrastean origin. The practice of assigning titles appears to have developed during the fourth century in conjunction with the increase in the number of scholarly works that were written for readers. Theophrastus lived into the third century and will have contributed to this development. Moreover, Theophrastus inherited Aristotle's library and wrote extensively himself. Assigning titles and marking book rolls with tags (including the rolls of Aristotle) would have made it easier for Theophrastus and his pupils to find individual works as needed. There are, however, reasons for hesitation. In particular, the references that we find in the surviving treatises of Theophrastus can be quite vague: e.g., ἐν ἄλλοις, "elsewhere."¹⁵ If Theophrastus had assigned fixed titles, we might expect a clear reference to a specific work. Perhaps, then, the titles that have come down to us postdate Theophrastus. But even if they do, it does not follow that Theophrastus would disapprove. Indeed, the titles may be based on the incipit and adequately reflect the subjects of the works in question. I say "adequately," for in general it is unreasonable to demand that a title perfectly match the content of any given work. *On Sweat* (328 no. 12) is a good example. The title is too broad, in that the treatise does not discuss sweat from every possible angle—Theophrastus makes that clear at the very outset¹⁶—but the title is certainly adequate for conveying a rough idea of the subject under consideration. Rather different is the ethical title *Callisthenes* (436 no. 15). It is found in two versions. Cicero and Alexander use the shorter form *Callisthenes* (493.18 and 504.9), while Diogenes' list exhibits a longer form *Callisthenes* or *On Grief* (1.123). The title may refer to a dialogue, and the shorter version may focus on Callisthenes, whose story (fate) took pride of place, after which the dia-

¹⁴ For fuller discussion of this title see, e.g., Regenbogen col. 1370, 1407, 1432–1434, Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 128–129, Sharples (1995) pp. 45–47 and the additional literature cited in these places.

¹⁵ See my comments (2003) pp. 62–63 on *On Sweat* 1.4 and other passages in which the phrase ἐν ἄλλοις occurs.

¹⁶ *On Sweat* 1.2–4.

logue cited other famous people while developing the subject of grief. We may compare Plato's *Gorgias*. The great sophist appears early on, but then takes a back seat to Polus and Callicles. Hence, the fuller title *Gorgias* or *On Rhetoric* might be preferred in that it suggests a subject larger than *Gorgias*. So too with the *Callisthenes*: the longer title might be preferred as more informative concerning the work as a whole, but the shorter version is not thereby faulty or unworthy of Theophrastus. It may well reflect the way (or one way) in which Theophrastus referred to the work.¹⁷

It is common knowledge that the writings of Theophrastus, like those of Aristotle, took different forms. In particular there were exoteric and esoteric writings. From our collection of Theophrastean texts, I cite Cicero, *On Ends* 5.12. Exoteric writings are said to exhibit a popular style; esoteric writings (here spoken of as commentaries) are described as more refined (498.1–3). Applied to Aristotle, we can say that his dialogues were written in a popular style for a general, albeit educated, public. In contrast, the treatises that have come down to us (those that make up our *corpus Aristotelicum*) were intended for use within the school. We can think of them as detailed notes that Aristotle used when lecturing to students who aspired to do philosophy.¹⁸ Similarly in regard to Theophrastus, we can think of him composing works that exhibited quite different styles. There were exoteric works written for a wider audience and esoteric works that were used when teaching students within the Peripatos. This division of writings is useful when discussing the Theophrastean titles listed by Diogenes or cited elsewhere. But caution is necessary and for several reasons. Here are four.

First and most important, as I have presented it, the division is too simple.¹⁹ In addition to dialogues that were written for a general audience and treatises that were composed for lecture within the Peripatos, there were collections that might be referred to during lecture. Best known are Aristotle's collection of constitutions (Diogenes Laertius 5.27) and Theophrastus' collection of laws (D.L. 5.44 = 589 no. 17), but there were also collections of problems (D.L. 5.23, 26 and 5.47–48 = 727 no. 3–4) and theses (D.L. 5.24 and 5.44, 49 = 68 no. 34, 35). In addition, there were *Memoranda* (D.L. 5.23 and 5.48 = 727 no. 6, cf. no. 7) and works

¹⁷ While the longer titles may be preferred as more informative, the sub-titles *On Rhetoric* and *On Grief* may be deemed inadequate to the works in question. See below, the commentary on title no. 15.

¹⁸ In *EE* 1.8 1217b22, the esoteric writings are spoken of as λόγοι κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν.

¹⁹ See, e.g., Moraux (1957) pp. 16–22, Gauthier and Jolif vol. 2 p. 93, Düring (1966) pp. 556–557, Dirlmeier (1964) pp. 274–275 and Fortenbaugh (1984) p. 138.

that were referred to as *Divisions* (D.L. 5.22, 23 and 5.46 = 68 no. 15). Further, there were essays and addresses that were written for a general public but were not dialogues in form. The *Exhortation* of Aristotle and that of Theophrastus are examples (D.L. 5.22 and 5.49, 50 = 436 no. 33).²⁰

Second, some works will have been “dualizers.” They were written primarily for persons outside the Peripatos, but they will have had a secondary role in lecture within the school. Again the *Exhortation* may be cited. It was an exoteric work that was written with a larger public in mind, but in all probability it was not a dialogue. In addition, it may have been referred to (even quoted from) during lecture, in order to avoid a lengthy restatement of material that was already familiar to students within the school.²¹ A different case is the *Characters* (D.L. 5.47, 48 = 436 no. 4), which can be considered an exoteric writing. Its undeniable wittiness seems intended for readers outside the school, but it is not written in dialogue form, and it may have played a role within the school. When lecturing on character traits like loquacity and insensitivity, Theophrastus may have called on it in order to enliven his presentation. In addition and perhaps more important, he may have used the work as a source book for illustrating traits that are not goal directed.²² If that is correct, the *Characters* could be and may well have been used in different ways that qualify it as both exoteric and esoteric.

Third, some titles strongly encourage classification as either an exoteric or an esoteric work. For example, the title Ἐρωτικός, *Concerning Love* (436 no. 29), invites the supplement λόγος and was most likely an exoteric writing: in this case, a dialogue in which the discussion focused on passionate love. Another example is Ὀμιλητικός (436 no. 32). In the text-translation volumes, we have preferred the translation (*Dialogue*) *concerning Social Interaction*. In contrast, titles that begin with περί seem especially appropriate to esoteric writings.²³ An example is Περί ἀρετῆς (436 no. 8). Most likely it was an esoteric treatise that agreed in large mea-

²⁰ In regard to Aristotle, I agree with Düring (1961) pp. 29–32.

²¹ Cf. NE 1.13 1102a26–28, where Aristotle refers to the ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι for discussion of the bipartite soul. Following Gauthier and Jolif vol. 1 p. 93, I think that Aristotle is most likely referring to his own *Exhortation* (see fr. B 23 and 60–61 Düring), but I leave open the possibility that Aristotle is referring to *On Justice* (see Moraux [1957] pp. 55–57, 62, 156). Indeed, the reference in the NE (ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτεριοῖς λόγοις) is general enough to be directed at both the *Exhortation* and *On Justice*.

²² See below, the commentary on 436 no. 4.

²³ On περί in rhetorical titles, see *Commentary* vol. 8 on rhetoric and poetics pp. 50–52.

sure with Aristotle's treatment of virtue in his ethical treatises.²⁴ The same is true of *Περὶ ἡδονῆς ὡς Ἀριστοτέλης* (436 no. 26). Here the addition of "like (that of) Aristotle" suggests that the Theophrastean work was in important ways similar to Aristotle's treatment of pleasure in the ethical treatises. It may also remind us that Aristotle often uses *περὶ* in the incipit to a new topic or section within a larger treatise (e.g., *περὶ δὲ ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης θεωρῆσαι τοῦ τὴν πολιτικὴν φιλοσοφοῦντος* *NE* 7.11 1152b1).²⁵ In my view, many of the Theophrastean titles refer to relatively short treatises that will have been used within a lecture series. The incipit to some or many of these short treatises will have announced the subject to be discussed with a *περὶ*-clause, which became the basis of a title, whether the title was assigned by Theophrastus or at a later date. That said, it would be a mistake to think that all titles with *περὶ* are esoteric. I cite the double title *Καλλισθένης ἢ περὶ πένθους* (436 no. 15a). Despite the subtitle, *On Grief*, the work was almost certainly intended for a general audience. So too *Περὶ εὐσεβείας*, *On Piety* (580 no. 3)—a title that we have placed in the section on religion—was in all probability an exoteric work. The subject is, of course, important, and the surviving fragments suggest a serious treatment of the topic, but *On Piety* is regularly and correctly classified as an exoteric work. It may have been a dialogue, but here scholars disagree.²⁶

Fourth, if our sources relating to Theophrastus' ethics were more numerous and of greater length, one might be tempted to draw up a list of criteria that are deemed sufficient for assigning any given work to one category or the other. But the temptation is to be resisted. For the overwhelming majority of our sources are quite short,²⁷ and there is no obvious list of criteria that would be sufficient for assigning all works to

²⁴ The phrase "in large measure" is intended to leave open the possibility of certain departures from what we read in the two Aristotelian *Ethics*. One possibility is a longer and more sophisticated discussion of mean-dispositions in social intercourse, *ὁμιλία*. See below, on 436 no. 8, no. 32 and 449A.

²⁵ Aristotle's use of *περὶ* to announce a topic needs little documentation. See, e.g., his repeated use of *περὶ* in the *NE*, when introducing a new moral virtue for discussion: courage 1115a6, temperance 3.10 1117b23, liberality or generosity 4.1 1119b22, magnificence 4.2 1122a18, greatness of soul or high-mindedness 4.3 1123a34. And cf. *Rhet.* 1.15 1375a22 with 666 no. 8 and 3.15 1416a4 with 666 no. 13, discussed in *Commentary* vol. 8 on rhetoric and poetics pp. 92–96 and 108–111.

²⁶ See, e.g., Gottschalk (1969) p. 344 and Fortenbaugh, *Quellen* (1984) p. 127.

²⁷ An exception is the long excerpt from *On Marriage* (486). Among the sources for religion, we have an exception in the excerpts from *On Piety* found in Porphyry's *On Abstinence* (584A).

one category or the other. One criterion already advanced in the literature strikes me as especially problematic. I am thinking of Grossgerge, who suggests paying attention to the number of books attributed to a given work. When the number of books is limited to one or two, then with few exceptions the work in question is to be regarded as exoteric.²⁸ That may hold for cases like the *Callisthenes* and *Concerning Social Interaction* (436 no. 15 and 32), but I have doubts about, e.g., *On the Voluntary* (436 no. 6). Grossgerge classifies the work as exoteric, but I am inclined to think of an esoteric treatise or portion thereof. We may compare Book 3 of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. Aristotle first tells that an analysis of voluntary and involuntary action is essential to an investigation of moral virtue and then proceeds to devote a whole chapter to the topic (3.1 1109b30–1111b3). That is not to deny that certain features like anecdotes, polemical remarks and in general memorable passages are especially appropriate in exoteric writings. It would, however, be a mistake to think that such passages are restricted to writings intended for readers outside the Peripatos. Theophrastus is reported to have been a popular teacher, and there is no good reason to deny the report.²⁹ Nor is there any reason to think that his popularity as a lecturer depended entirely on tightly knit argumentation. Especially in ethics, he will have enriched his lectures with well-known examples and forcefully condemned wrong-headed views concerning, e.g., the happy life.³⁰

In the following discussion of individual titles, I shall occasionally refer to the esoteric-exoteric distinction, and in certain cases I shall not hesitate to assign a work to one category or the other. But in view of the above considerations, I shall not attempt to pigeonhole all the works of which we know the titles. Some have already been declared “dualizers,” and others are best left undecided.

- no. 1 *On Dispositions*] Anonymous, *On Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics* 4.2 1121a7 (CAG vol. 20 p. 180.17) = 516. 2–3 and 5.3 1129b29–30 (*QETHs* p. 52) = 529A.6; Athenaeus, *Sophists at Dinner* 15.15 673E = 437.3;

²⁸ Grossgerge pp. 58–63.

²⁹ Diogenes Laertius tells us that 2,000 students came to Theophrastus' school (5.37 = 1.16). The number is clearly a round number and does not refer to the number of students that were present at any one time. But with those qualifications, the report still testifies to Theophrastus' popularity.

³⁰ Wehrli (1983) p. 509, Wehrli-Wöhrle p. 546, and see below, this chapter on title no. 12 *On Happiness*.

Michael, *On Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics* 5.3 1129b29–30 (CAG vol. 22.3 p. 8.12) = 529B.3; scholium on Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* 1121a7 (vol. 1 p. 194.26 Cramer) = app. 516

Literature: Usener (1858) pp. 22–23; Zeller (1879) pp. 854–855 n. 3; Heylbut (1888) pp. 196–198; Walzer (1929) pp. 80–81, 271; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1479–1489, 1507; Wehrli (1983) p. 509; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 91–93; Wehrli-Wöhrle (2004) pp. 528–529

The title Περί ἡθῶν, *On Dispositions*, does not occur in Diogenes Laertius' catalogue of Theophrastean writings.³¹ It is, however, cited by Athenaeus in his *Sophists at Dinner* and by two commentators³² and a scholiast on Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*.³³ The Athenaeus passage is of considerable interest, for there we read that Adrastus “published five books *On Questions of History and Style in the On Dispositions of Theophrastus* and a sixth *On the (same matters) in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics*” (437.2–5). On the basis of this text, we can say with considerable certainty that the Theophrastean work will have contained much material of historical and lexical interest. To be sure, explicit references to *On Dispositions* in the surviving fragments are few (in addition to 437, there are 516 and 529A–B), but other fragments strongly suggest that in many of his writings Theophrastus frequently introduced historical material and expressed himself in ways that would attract the attention not only of lexicographers but also philosophers (e.g., Adrastus) who took an interest in matters of diction and composition. See the commentary on 437.

The fact that Adrastus is said to have devoted five books to *On Dispositions* and a sixth to the *Nicomachean Ethics* might suggest that the former was longer than the latter.³⁴ That is, however, no more than a suggestion and in my judgment unlikely. Moreover, we cannot say to what extent the two works discussed the same topics, and when they did discuss the same topics, which work offered the fuller treatment. For example, *On Dispositions* may have offered a much fuller discussion of social dispositions like dignity and friendliness, but that cannot be demonstrated. We can, however, say that the title *On Dispositions* is quite general, and as such it is

³¹ Meurs conjectured reading Περί ἡθῶν instead of Περί εἰδῶν at Diogenes Laertius 5.43 = 1.91 = 246 no. 4. The conjecture is to be resisted.

³² One of the two commentators, the Anonymous, is in fact the compiler of a collection of scholia. See Chapter II “The Sources” no. 18.

³³ The scholiast is not an independent witness to the title *On Dispositions*. Rather, he depends on the Anonymous. See the commentary on 516.

³⁴ Cf. Zeller 855 n. 3.

appropriate to a work that discussed more than the central cases of moral virtue and vice like courage and cowardice. It may well have devoted space not only to social dispositions but also to different temperaments like impetuosity and lethargy and to natural virtues like innate ambition and love of learning, which are manifested in quite young children.³⁵

Assuming that *On Dispositions* did discuss traits of character like dignity, friendliness, truthfulness, wittiness and garrulity, *On Dispositions* is likely to have shared much in common with the Ὀμιλητικός, (*Dialogue*) concerning *Social Interaction* (436 no. 32). But no text other than Diogenes' catalogue of Theophrastean titles refers to the work, so that our knowledge is quite limited and our assertions must be guarded. That is not true of the *Ethical Characters* (436 no. 4). We have the work or a goodly portion of it and can say with confidence that on the above assumption, *On Dispositions* will have exhibited a close relationship to the *Characters*. That does not mean that the *Ethical Characters* are excerpts from *On Dispositions*.³⁶ The idea strikes me as quite unlikely. And it is certainly false that the alleged excerption occurred in the second or third century AD.³⁷

Since both *On Dispositions* and the excerpt from Arius Didymus preserved in Book 2 of Stobaeus' *Anthology* (449A) are concerned with dispositions that manifest themselves in behavior, there is no reason to doubt some sort of relationship between the two. Indeed, the fact that the excerpt from Arius not only discusses moral virtues and vices but also takes notice of the mean in conversation (saying neither too much nor too little but only what is necessary), the likelihood of a significant relationship seems strong. It would, however, be hasty to believe that Arius' excerpt is drawn from *On Dispositions*. There are other possibilities, of which *On Education* or *On Virtues* or *On Temperance* (436 no. 9a) seems especially attractive.

The preceding remarks have proceeded on the assumption that *On Dispositions* is a work concerning human beings. That is most likely correct. Certainly no text tells against the idea, and those texts that do refer to *On Dispositions* are focused on human beings (Simonides is fond of money, 516.1–2; the idea that justice brings together every virtue is said to be a proverb 529A.4–6, and also referred to Theognis 529B.1–3). But it remains possible that animals played a role either by way of compari-

³⁵ See Chapter IV, the introduction to Section 3 on "Virtue and Vice."

³⁶ Petersen p. 90.

³⁷ Regenbogen col. 1507.

son with human beings or as a topic of independent interest. Cf. the title Περί ζώων φρονήσεως καὶ ἡθους, *On the Intelligence and Character of Animals* (350 no. 11). Moreover, even if *On Dispositions* was narrowly focused on human beings, we should allow that *On Dispositions* may not have been limited to ethics as we know it from the Aristotelian treatises. Rather, *On Dispositions* may have extended to politics (the dispositions looked for in the citizens and their rulers) and to rhetoric (the character of the persuasive orator, his audience and the persons who are the subject of deliberative, judicial and epideictic speeches). And while a discussion of dispositions is apt to be organized in accordance with the several emotions and the virtues that guarantee correct emotional response, there are other perspectives that may determine how a discussion proceeds. I cite Aristotle's *Rhetoric* 2.12–17 1388b31–1391b6, where Aristotle first says that he has already discussed dispositions in relation to emotions and virtues, and then goes on to discuss dispositions according to age (youth, old age, the prime of life) and fortune (good birth, wealth and power).

no. 2a *Ethics*] Anonymous, *On Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics* 5.3 1129b29–30 (QEThs p. 52) = 529A.6; Aspasius, *On Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics* 7.15 1154b7–15 (CAG vol. 19.1 p. 156.17) = 555.7; Michael, *On Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics* 5.3 1129b29–30 (CAG vol. 22.3 p. 8.13) = 529B.4; Plutarch, *Pericles* 38.2 = 463.5

b *Ethics*] Fulgentius, *Mythologies* 2.1 (p. 39.2 Helm) = 468.6

Literature: Usener (1858) pp. 22–23; Brandis (1860) p. 348; Zeller (1879) 854–855 n. 3; Heylbut (1888) pp. 196–198; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1479–1480, 1493; Wehrli (1973) pp. 491–494, (1983) p. 492; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 91–93; Wehrli-Wöhrle (2004) pp. 528–529

Like the title *On Dispositions*, the title Ἠθικά, *Ethics*, does not occur in Diogenes' catalogue of Theophrastean writings, but like *On Dispositions* it does occur in other authors: namely, Plutarch (463.5) and three commentators on Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*: namely, Aspasius (555.7), the Anonymous (529A.6) and Michael (529B.4).³⁸ The Latin equivalent, *Moralia*, is found in Fulgentius (468.6). Since the Anonymous and Michael tell us that Theophrastus made mention of the same proverb concerning justice, "In justice every virtue is brought together," both in the first book of *On Dispositions* and in the first book of the *Ethics*, it

³⁸ The Anonymous (end 2nd cent. AD) is in fact the compiler of a collection of scholia. Michael (12 cent.) draws heavily on the Anonymous and is doing so in 529B.

seems clear that the two Theophrastean works are not to be identified and that both works contained more than one book. But a simple reference to the first book does not tell us whether there were two books or three or more. Indeed, one of the works could have been two books in length and the other considerably longer. The fact that both works mention the same proverb in the first book prompted Regenbogen col. 1480 to assert with confidence (*zweifellos*) that the two first books were closely related in content. That is possible, but the evidence is hardly strong enough to justify Regenbogen's confidence. The *Ethics* may have been a lengthy esoteric work, whose first book was a general introduction to a variety of topics that would be taken up one by one in later books. If so, the proverb may have been mentioned in anticipation of a later discussion of justice *qua* complete virtue. *On Dispositions* may have been a shorter work in which justice was discussed in the first book. Moreover, it is possible that *On Dispositions* was an exoteric work and that the proverb was mentioned in the first book, because it was well-known and might warm the reader to what would follow. The possibilities are numerous.

When one thinks of Plutarch's Ἠθικά, *Moralia*, it is tempting to believe that the Theophrastean title Ἠθικά refers to a collection of individual essays, in which different topics within the field of ethics were discussed.³⁹ Diogenes' catalogue of Theophrastean works seems to contain collective titles (e.g., Περί ζώων α'-ζ' [1.115 = 350 no. 1]),⁴⁰ and it is quite possible that Andronicus, who is said to have divided the works of Aristotle and Theophrastus into treatises, bringing together related subjects into the same work (39.7–8), gave the title Ἠθικά to a collection of essays on ethics. The idea is attractive and compatible with the fact that the title does not occur in Diogenes' catalogue.⁴¹ It is, however, possible that such a collection was first put together after Andronicus.⁴²

Wehrli (1973) pp. 491–494 suggests identifying the *Ethics* with Theophrastus lectures on ethics within the Peripatos.⁴³ He sees an analogy

³⁹ Regenbogen col. 1480. 1493.

⁴⁰ In *Quellen* p. 91, I mentioned not only Περί ζώων α'-ζ' but also Περί τεχνῶν ῥητορικῶν εἶδη ξα'/ιζ' (1.235 = 666 no. 2a). In doing so I was following Usener and Regenbogen. But their argument is flawed and there are other possibilities. I discuss the matter in *Commentary* vol. 8 on rhetoric and poetics pp. 57–64.

⁴¹ The bulk of the catalogue probably goes back to Hermippus. Andronicus was at work two centuries later. See the introduction to this Chapter on the "Titles of Books."

⁴² Regenbogen col. 1378.

⁴³ Cf. Walzer (1929) p. 271.

in the titles of the *Nicomachean* and *Eudemian Ethics*, discusses texts 463, 529A–B, 554 and 555 (the *Ethics* is not explicitly mentioned in 554), shows that the texts exhibit a close relationship to the *NE* and concludes that the *Ethics* was an esoteric treatise used in lecturing and especially well suited for use in interpreting the *NE*. Wehrli admits that the organization of the material in the *Ethics* was not identical to that in the *NE*, for the proverb concerning justice as complete virtue occurs in the fifth book of the *NE* (5.3 1129b29–30) and not in the first book as in the *Ethics* of Theophrastus (529A.6, B.3–4). Wehrli deems this difference relatively unimportant, for in the case of Peripatetic school treatises (lecture series), one must allow that their final or definitive arrangement may have been established at a later time. That is correct, but it does not address the problem, which texts a later editor may have collected and arranged under the title Ἠθικά. Moreover, it is hardly surprising that the texts discussed by Wehrli are closely related to the *NE* (or to the books that are common to the *NE* and *EE*), for four of the five are found in Aristotelian commentators (the exception is 463) and all five concern problems that were of interest to Aristotle and Theophrastus. We need further evidence, without which it remains at least possible that a variegated collection of texts—including *Divisions*,⁴⁴ *Theses*,⁴⁵ *Problems*⁴⁶ and even dialogues—were brought together by an editor and subsequently circulated under the title Ἠθικά.

no. 3 *Ethical Lectures*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, Lives 5.47 = 1.200

Literature: Usener (1858) p. 22; Brandis (1860) p. 348; Zeller (1879) 854 n. 3; Wehrli (1983) p. 491; Fortenbaugh (1984) p. 93; Sollenberger (1984) p. 313; Wehrli-Wöhrle (2004) pp. 528–529

The title Ἠθικαὶ σχολαί, *Ethical Lectures*, is found only in the second list of Diogenes catalogue of Theophrastean titles. It occurs in the genitive case and is followed by a book number: Ἠθικῶν σχολῶν α', 1 book of *Ethical Lectures*. In its primary use, the noun σχολή refers to leisure. By

⁴⁴ 1.186 = 68 no. 15. On division as a way of treating the emotions, see the commentary on the title *On Emotions*, below, this chapter no. 5.

⁴⁵ 1.118 = 68 no. 34, 1.248 = 68 no. 35, 1.176 = 68 no. 36. The last, i.e., a *Thesis on the Soul* could have been or included a discussion of the bipartite soul, which is fundamental to the distinction between moral virtue and practical wisdom.

⁴⁶ 1.224 = 727 no. 4 is a collection entitled *Political, Natural, Erotic and Ethical Problems*.

extension it is used of leisured activity including discussion and lecture. See LSJ s.v. II and cf. the use of the Latin *schola* in the plural in 493.18.⁴⁷

The Theophrastean title is in the plural: Ἡθικαὶ σχολαί. That suggests a collective work, but a collection of what? Brandis p. 348 regards with skepticism the idea that the ethical lectures of Theophrastus were contained in the collection. For were that the case, the work should be longer than one book. As it is, the work could only be an introduction to ethics or an outline of the subject.⁴⁸ Zeller p. 854 n. 3 says that the *Ethical Lectures* could be identical with either *On Dispositions* or the *Ethics* (436 no. 1 or 2), both of which are missing from Diogenes' catalogue. But in that case, the *Ethical Lectures* cannot have been one book in length, for both *On Dispositions* and the *Ethics* were longer than one book. Usener (1858) p. 22 and Regenbogen col. 1480 suggest a student's notes of limited length on the lectures of Theophrastus. This suggestion has a certain attraction, but without further evidence it cannot be demonstrated. My own view is that we may have here a quite general title or description that was attached to a collection of ethical texts simply to give a rough indication of what the collection contained. I compare Diogenes Laertius, who gives a brief account of the Stoic Persaeus. We are told that he was a pupil of Zeno, an anecdote involving Antigonus is related, and a book list is provided. The list includes eleven books, of which several are clearly ethical (7.36). Earlier while discussing the death of Zeno, Diogenes reports that Zeno died at the age of 98, after which he adds what Persaeus said in his ethical lectures, ἐν ταῖς ἠθικαῖς σχολαῖς: namely, that Zeno died at the age of 72 (7.28). In Arnim's *Stoicorum veterum fragmenta* vol. 1 p. 102 fr. 458, ἠθικαῖς is printed without a capital eta. In the Loeb and OCT editions of Diogenes, a capital is printed. I much prefer Arnim's choice, for almost certainly Diogenes or his source has used a descriptive phrase that is conveniently inclusive. It covers Persaeus' writings on ethics and is not intended to pick out a particular work let alone report Persaeus' own title. What we have in Diogenes' catalogue of Theophrastean writ-

⁴⁷ Although a translation like *Ethical Schools* is possible (LSJ s.v. σχολή II.2), it is properly rejected by Sollenberger (1984) p. 313.

⁴⁸ It might be suggested that the work did in fact extend beyond one book. In Diogenes' catalogue, the number of books of a particular work is often given by a string of numerals (α', β', γ' and so on), so that one can imagine the numerals that once followed α' being lost through careless copying. But in regard to the title that concerns us, altering the book numbers would be a bold conjecture, to which I do not subscribe. Comparable boldness is exhibited by Usener pp. 9, 20, who wanted to change the number of books attributed to *On Style* (666 no. 17a) from 1 to 4. For discussion, see *Commentary* 8 on rhetoric and poetics (2005c) pp. 61–62.

ings is, I think, similar. Within the catalogue, the phrase Ἠθικῶν σχολῶν α' may be said to provide a quasi-title, but strictly speaking what we have is an initial phrase that describes in general terms the content of a single book or roll. Most probably the initial phrase does not go back to Theophrastus. It may have originated soon after his death, when a younger member of the Peripatos put together a diverse collection of short ethical texts. Or it may have been added by a bookseller, or by someone working in the library in Alexandria, perhaps by Hermippus himself. Or at a later date, Andronicus may have gathered certain ethical writings into a single book, which subsequently intruded itself into Diogenes' catalogue under the label Ἠθικῶν σχολῶν α'. As often, the possibilities are many. See the introduction to the present section on "Titles of Books."

- no. 4a *Ethical Characters*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.47 = 1.201, and with the words reversed, Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.48 = 1.241
 b *Characters concerned with Peculiarities*] cod. Barberinus Gr. 374 f. 1^v, cod. Leidensis 107 f. 301^r, cod. Rhedigeranus 22 f. 29^v
 c *Characters*] most codices including Parisinus Gr. 1983 f. 290^v and Parisinus Gr. 2977 f. 333^r; Tzetzes, *Histories* 9.934, and cf. Eustathius *Commentaries on the Iliad* 13.276, where however the title of the Theophrastean book is not found

Literature: Usener (1858) p. 21; Brandis (1860) pp. 357–360; Zeller (1879) p. 855 n. 3; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1500–1511; Steinmetz (1959) pp. 209–246; (1960a) pp. 185–191; (1960b) vol. 1–2; Fortenbaugh (1975) pp. 62–82, (1981b) pp. 245–260, (1984) pp. 93–96, 133, (1994) pp. 15–35, (1996b) pp. 453–456, (2005b) pp. 213–220; Sollenberger (1984) pp. 313–314; Wehrli (1983) pp. 476, 492; Stein (1992) pp. 1–293; Rusten (2003) pp. 5–23; Diggle (2004) pp. 1–57⁴⁹

The title Ἠθικοὶ χαρακτῆρες, *Ethical Characters*, is found twice in Diogenes' catalogue of Theophrastean writings. Both times it occurs in the second of Diogenes' five lists. In its first occurrence (1.201), it is listed under *êta* and follows Ἠθικαὶ σχολαί, *Ethical Lectures* (436 no. 3). In the second occurrence (1.241), the words of the title are reversed, so that

⁴⁹ The literature listed above is only a fraction of what has been written on the *Characters* and is still growing. Here I add three annotated editions and commentaries that cover the entire work and are commonly available in university libraries: R. Jebb-J. Sandys, *The Characters of Theophrastus* (London 1909); O. Navarre, *Caractères de Théophraste* (Paris 1924); R. Ussher, *The Characters of Theophrastus* (London 1960).

Χαρακτῆρες comes first. It is listed under *chi* and follows Περί χάριτος, *On Kindness* (436 no. 24). In the first occurrence, the number of books follows the title: α' or one book. In the second occurrence, no number follows, so that one might be tempted to join the title to that which follows, Περί ψεύδους καὶ ἀληθοῦς α', *On False and True*, 1 book, thereby creating a single title out of two plus one book number. But that would be a mistake. The second title is quite unconnected with that which precedes and has been listed by itself in the section on "Metaphysics" (246 no. 5).⁵⁰

The shortened form of the title, Χαρακτῆρες, which is found in most manuscripts, is explained by Steinmetz (1959) pp. 224–226 as follows. Theophrastus used the substantive χαρακτήρ in an unusual, metaphorical way and for that reason added the adjective ἠθικός, in order to make clear that the work concerns "stamps" or "impressions" in the soul. The shortening of the title occurred centuries later, when the work was incorporated within a collection of rhetorical writings (see below), for the adjective ἠθικός might give the impression that the work was ethical in orientation and therefore out of place in a rhetorical collection. I find Steinmetz's explanation quite plausible; indeed, I accept it, but two comments may be in order. First, it is possible that the title Ἡθικοὶ χαρακτῆρες is the original title, but that it does not go back to Theophrastus. At the time of his death, the collection of sketches may have lacked a title. Subsequently, a title may have been assigned by the executors of Theophrastus' estate or by one or more of his pupils, who organized his papers and wished to indicate clearly that the work in question focused on stamps or impressions in the soul. Second, a century after Theophrastus, another Peripatetic, Satyrus of Callatis, wrote a work that apparently carried the title Περί χαρακτῆρων (Athenaeus, *The Sophists at Dinner* 4.66 168C = fr. 27 Schorn). Like the Theophrastean *Characters*, this work seems to have focused on the behavior of certain types of people, but the title lacks the qualifier "ethical" or an equivalent. That makes one pause and wonder whether Theophrastus or his editor felt the need to qualify χαρακτῆρες.

As it has come down to us, the *Characters* has a clear ethical orientation. It begins with a preface, which speaks of improving young people by

⁵⁰ The fact that Ἡθικοὶ χαρακτῆρες and Χαρακτῆρες ἠθικοί occur in the same list within Diogenes catalogue might prompt one to believe that the titles refer to two different works, but that is almost certainly wrong. See above, the introduction to this chapter on the "Titles of Books."

providing them with practical examples. There follow thirty sketches of unattractive behavior, each of which is introduced by a definition, while some end with a moralizing epilogue. The preface and epilogues have long been recognized as Byzantine additions, but they are not entirely off the mark in giving the work a moral focus. More recently the definitions have come under strong criticism, so that they too are now widely considered spurious.⁵¹ Nevertheless, for persons interested in conceptual issues, the definitions are of some interest. For together with the sketches that follow, they tend to focus on superficial behavioral regularities apart from the motives and beliefs that underlie and explain the regularities. To be sure, the sketch of *κολακεία*, “flattery,” begins with a definition that mentions a motive, advantage or profit (2.1), and that of *ἀπιστία*, “distrust,” mentions an underlying belief, a judgment of injustice against everyone (18.1). But these definitions are exceptional. In contrast, the majority of the definitions fit well with the sketch that follows at least in so far as they ignore deeper lying explanations. See below on comedy.

Regarding an ethical orientation, we may compare two later Peripatetics, who composed character sketches. One is Lyco of Troas (c. 300–225 BC), whose sketch of the drunk has come down to us in Latin translation (Rutilius Lupus, *On Figures* 2.7 = fr. 12 SFOD). It is more elegant than the average Theophrastean sketch, but it clearly belongs to the tradition of the *Characters*. The first sentence suggests an ethical orientation: “What remnant of good hope should I think remaining in the man who conducts the whole span of his life with one and the most desperate habit?” Brink suggests that the sketch was written for a lost work entitled *On Drunkenness*.⁵² The suggestion is not foolish, and given Lyco’s reputation for partying (fr. 8.3–41), it may be based on personal experience. But here some caution is in order. The opening sentence may be no more than a rhetorical question intended to capture attention at the beginning

⁵¹ Most important is the Stein’s 1992 book *Definition und Schilderung in Theophrasts Charakteren*. Diggle p. 17 treats the matter as closed. On their view, the definitions are spurious, being later than Theophrastus and earlier than Philodemus. (On Philodemus, see Chapter IV, Section 3 on 450 no. 1.) Rusten is more cautious. He holds that some of the definitions are spurious but others need not be. Two arguments are advanced against attributing the definitions as a group: the Theophrastean imitations by the Peripatetic Aristo of Ceus begin with definitions, and three of the definitions were known to Philodemus. For my part, I have expressed some misgivings concerning Stein’s treatment of the definitions in my review (1996b) of his book in *Gnomon* 68 pp. 453–456.

⁵² Brink (1940) p. 933.

of a display piece. Perhaps Lyco read the sketch aloud while teaching rhetoric or composed it for entertainment at a symposium.⁵³

The second later Peripatetic who composed character sketches is Aristo of Ceus (fl. 225–200 BC). A comparatively large selection of his work has come down to us through Philodemus' *On Vices* (fr. 21 SFOD). In certain aspects, the sketches resemble closely those of Theophrastus: they portray only unattractive traits, both Aristo and Theophrastus deal with arrogance, irony and self-will; the same grammatical forms are found in both authors (τοιούτος ... οἷος plus infinitive; frequent use of the conjunction καί); there is a shared focus on social dispositions; typical expressions are listed.⁵⁴ There are, of course, differences: Aristo's sketches are closely connected, and they are accompanied by instructive remarks. But the differences do not undo the fact that the sketches of Aristo and Theophrastus are closely related. And the ethical orientation of Aristo's work encourages treating Theophrastus' *Characters* as similarly oriented.⁵⁵

Given the history of character portrayal within the Peripatos and Theophrastus' interest in character traits that are discussed by Aristotle in the *Nicomachean* and/or *Eudemian Ethics* (εἰρωνεία, irony; κολακεία, flattery; ἀγροικία, boorishness; ἀρέσκεια, obsequiousness/complaisance; ἀναισχυντία, shamelessness; αὐθάδεια self-will; ἀνελευθερία, stinginess; ἀλαζονεία, boastfulness; δειλία, cowardice; αἰσχροκέρδεια, profiteering),⁵⁶ it is hardly surprising that scholars have not only viewed the *Characters* as an ethical work but also made specific suggestions concerning its origin and purpose. Here are some: the *Characters* presents material excerpted from a larger ethical work like *On Dispositions* or the *Ethics*; the sketches are preliminary studies for a planned ethical treatise; they were originally an illustrative appendix, or a collec-

⁵³ Wehrli (1967–1978) vol. 6 p. 26; Fortenbaugh (2004) pp. 438–439.

⁵⁴ Wehrli (1967–1978) vol. 6 p. 59.

⁵⁵ For more on the treatment of character by Aristo and his Peripatetic predecessors, see Knögel 17–40, Regenbogen col. 1507–1510 and Sabine Vogt, "Characters in Aristo" in *Aristo of Ceos: Text, Translation and Comment*, ed. W. Fortenbaugh and S. White = Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities 13 (New Brunswick NJ: Transaction 2006) pp. 261–278.

⁵⁶ In listing these traits, I do not want to imply that they are always understood in the same way. Nor do I want to imply that Aristotle focuses on them equally. Indeed, αὐθάδεια, which the *EE* groups together with σεμνότης and ἀρέσκεια (3.7 1233b34–35), is missing in the *NE*.

tion of educational and therapeutic materials.⁵⁷ Such suggestions are not foolish, and one or the other may be correct. Nevertheless, certainty is unattainable; it is possible that the *Characters* was not written exclusively or even primarily for an ethical purpose. Rhetoric, comedy and entertainment come to mind.

That the *Characters* relates to rhetoric is immediately clear from the manuscript tradition. Byzantine scholars of the 8th or 9th century incorporated the work within a collection of rhetorical writings whose principal authors are Hermogenes and Aphthonius.⁵⁸ Moreover, the sketches are instructive in regard to rhetorical narration, διήγησις. I cite Aristotle's treatment of the subject in Book 3 of the *Rhetoric*, for there we are told that walking while talking reveals rashness and boorishness (3.16 1417a22–24). That calls to mind both Theophrastus' sketch of boorish behavior (4) and his sketch of arrogance, in which mention is made of walking while settling a dispute (24.4). Moreover, the sketch of the fabricator (8) can be viewed as a model for classroom study. It focuses on a single scene and could have been written by Theophrastus in order to illustrate how a character trait can be presented in the narrative portion of a speech.⁵⁹ We must, however, observe caution, for Lyco's sketch of the drunk may have been written for ethical instruction and subsequently taken over by Rutilius Lupus in order to illustrate the rhetorical figure of *χαλακτηρισμός* (2.7). Indeed, if we adopt Steinmetz' suggestion concerning the Theophrastean title ("Ethical" was dropped when the sketches were taken over by rhetoricians), then we would have two examples of sketches that were originally viewed as ethical and later taken over by rhetoricians for their own purposes.

A close relation to comedy is also clear, so that one may wonder whether the *Characters* was written in conjunction with Theophrastus' work *On (the Art of) Poetry* (666 no. 20) and especially his work *On Comedy* (666 no. 22).⁶⁰ It is certainly possible that the comic poet Menander, who was a pupil of Theophrastus (18 no. 12), learned something about

⁵⁷ See Jebb-Sandys (*op. cit.*) pp. 7–16, Regenbogen col. 1503, 1507–1510, Steinmetz (1959) p. 209, Ussher (*op. cit.*) pp. 3–9.

⁵⁸ The 8th century seems most likely. See O. Immisch in the Teubner edition (1897) p. xxxvi, and cf. Regenbogen col. 1502 and Steinmetz (1960b) vol. 1 pp. 54–56.

⁵⁹ See Immisch p. 203, who describes the sketch of the fabricator as a rhetorical composition with cheeky humor. G. Gordon, "Theophrastus and his Imitators" in *English Literature and the Classics*, ed. Gordon (Oxford 1912) pp. 54–55 opines that the *Characters* was written in order to enliven rhetorical instruction.

⁶⁰ See Ueberweg, F-Praechter, K. *Die Philosophie des Altertums* (Berlin 1926) p. 404 and Ussher's edition (1960) pp. 4–6.

character from his teacher's sketches as well as from the two works just cited. Theophrastus sketched the distrustful man (18), and Menander wrote the *Grouch* in which Knemon is presented as a suspicious individual who thinks that all others lack goodwill (720–721). More importantly, both Theophrastus and Menander shared an interest in behavioral regularities that are not tied to particular underlying beliefs. In regard to Theophrastus, I have discussed the matter on several previous occasions and will return to it later in this commentary.⁶¹ Here I mention only the sketch of ἀδολεσχία, garrulity (3). Theophrastus presents a person who talks incessantly: someone who is always ready to begin a conversation and never ready to end one. The behavior is annoying at best, but Theophrastus offers no motive or underlying belief that explains the behavior. Indeed, the sketch is funny in part because we are never made to confront whatever fear, unpleasant belief or physiological disorder is driving the garrulous individual.⁶² Menander understands the comic possibilities of such behavioral regularities, and in the *Woman Who is Shorn*, he exploits the possibilities with considerable skill. He brings forward a soldier named Polemon, who is characterized as a σφοδρός, a vehement/impetuous individual (127 OCT). The play is set in motion by an impetuous act (suddenly enraged by a misperception, Polemon cuts off his mistress' hair) and brought to an end with an absurdly impetuous promise (Polemon promises never to act in haste again [1018–1020 OCT]). The alert spectator will smile knowingly (most likely Polemon has an excitable temperament; it is innate, so that he will continue to act impulsively), but within the play no explanation is offered. For further discussion, see *Commentary* volume 8 on rhetoric and poetics, pp. 88–90, 139–141, 371–374.

Finally, there is the possibility that in writing the *Characters* Theophrastus was having fun. He may have had entertainment as his primary goal, leaving open the possibility of using the *Characters* in class in order to entertain his students while confronting serious issues in ethics, rhetoric and poetics. At the end of the 19th century, members of the Philologische Gesellschaft in Leipzig were so impressed by the humorous side of the *Characters* that they produced in imitation a sketch of the

⁶¹ Earlier articles are listed above by date: see "Literature." For discussion later in this commentary, see below, the remarks on κολακεία, flattery, and ἀρέσκεια, obsequiousness in this chapter no. 25 and in Chapter IV, Section 14 on text 547.

⁶² For further discussion of ἀδολεσχία, garrulity, and λαλία, loquacity, see below, the Chapter IV, Section 3 on texts 449A (lines 1–3) and 452.

Philologist. The Greek text together with a German translation is available in *Klassische Parodien*, edited by Klaus Bartels (Zürich 1968) pp. 26–29. The Greek text together with an English translation and brief commentary will be found in my article “The Thirty-first Character Sketch,” *Classical World* 71 (1978) pp. 333–339. The members of the Leipzig Gesellschaft were making fun of themselves, but what they wrote remains just as pointed today. Philologists (we say Classicists) are an odd lot: sometimes absent minded, occasionally pompous, and even prickly, so that they (we) would all benefit from reading the thirty-first sketch, much as the Greeks of Theophrastus’ day may have learned a thing or two from the original thirty sketches.

- no. 5 *On Emotions*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.45 = 1.155; Simplicius, *On Aristotle’s Categories* 8 8b26–27 (CAG vol. 8 p. 236.9) = 438.7

Literature: Zeller (1879) p. 854 n. 3; Arnim (1926) pp. 72–75, 83; Walzer (1929) p. 168; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1485; Bourguery (1942) pp. xvii–xviii; Wehrli (1983) pp. 495, 509; Fillion-Lahille (1984) pp. 26–27; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 96–98; Sollenberger (1984) p. 286; Wehrli-Wöhrle (2004) pp. 530–531, 547

The title *Περὶ παθῶν*, *On Emotions*, is found in the first list of Diogenes’ catalogue (1.155).⁶³ Since the list is arranged alphabetically, the position of the title in the list (determined by the initial pi in *παθῶν*) tells us nothing about the work’s content. The only other occurrence of the title is in Simplicius’ *Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories*. There we are told that Theophrastus, in his work *Περὶ παθῶν*, analyzed faultfinding, anger and rage in terms of the more and less (438.6–8). That is of considerable interest, but it does not tell us what else Theophrastus may have discussed in *Περὶ παθῶν*. Indeed, it leaves quite open whether Theophrastus was primarily concerned with conceptual issues (classifying different kinds of *πάθη*, while making clear *inter alia* that certain closely related *πάθη* are marked off by difference in degree), or ethical issues (*πάθη* like anger and rage play a major role in the Peripatetic analysis of moral virtue), or rhetorical issues (emotional appeal is a form of persuasion), or poetic issues (*πάθη* can be fundamental to a dramatic plot and also important to the spectator as he achieves catharsis through his own emotional responses to the drama), or all of these and more. In saying this, I do

⁶³ Zeller p. 854 n. 3 knows the title from Simplicius 438.7 but mistakenly asserts that it is missing in Diogenes.

not want to overlook the fact that in Diogenes' catalogue *Περὶ παθῶν* is said to be one book or roll in length. That might be thought to rule out multiple topics, but in fact one book makes room for considerable, albeit concise, discussion from a variety of perspectives.⁶⁴

In Diogenes' catalogue of Aristotelian writings, there are two titles, *Περὶ παθῶν ὀργῆς* and *Πάθη* (5.23 and 24), which invite comparison with Theophrastus' *Περὶ παθῶν*. Both occur among the logical titles, and both refer to lost works. The latter title, *Πάθη*, may have contained *διαίρέσεις*, divisions. At least, Moraux (1951) pp. 92, 191 suggests that the title has been mistakenly detached from what immediately follows, *Διαιρετικόν α'*. Originally there was only one title: *διαιρετικόν* referring to the form or type of work, and *πάθη* referring to the subject matter. A scribe will have erred in construing *διαιρετικόν* as a separate work and in adding a book number, *α'*, after *πάθη* and before *διαιρετικόν*. Moraux is speculating, but he may well be correct.⁶⁵ I add only that if he is, we need not think of a schematic division, a kind of "family tree," which begins from a single genus and then branches out (is divided) into species and subspecies without discussion. We might also think of Aristotle's treatment of emotion in *Rhetoric* 2. There Aristotle announces that it is necessary to divide or analyze, *διαίρειν* (2.1 1378a22), the emotions, after which he offers a discussion that does divide the emotions but does so with considerable comment. I return to the *Rhetoric* below.

The former title, *Περὶ παθῶν ὀργῆς*, is equally problematic. Rose (1863) p. 111 suggests that either the title is corrupt, or the plural *παθῶν* refers to different kinds of ὀργή, anger. In Rose's collection of fragments, the following conjecture is printed: *Περὶ παθῶν <ἢ περι> ὀργῆς* (Rose³ [1886] p. 4).⁶⁶ Moraux (1951) pp. 74, 186–190 suggests that the word

⁶⁴ The position of *Περὶ παθῶν* among the ethical titles in FHS&G can be misleading. It might suggest certainty that the work was primarily or even exclusively ethical. That was not our intention in assigning the title to its present position, and in my judgment a cross-reference to the title should have been placed in the list of rhetorical and poetic titles. That said, emotions are fundamental to Peripatetic ethics, and quite a few of the ethical texts refer to emotion (not just those brought together under the heading "Emotion"), so that the present position is appropriate.

⁶⁵ As a similar case, Moraux pp. 86, 92, 191 cites the title *Περὶ κινήσεως α'*, which is immediately followed by *Προτάσεις α'* (Diog. Laert. 5.23). The latter is said to indicate the genre or type of work, while the former gives the subject matter: hence, a collection of propositions concerning motion. See below, the comments on 436 no. 6 and 8, in which I discuss briefly Moraux's treatment of the Aristotelian titles *Περὶ ἐκουσίου* (it is preceded by *προτάσεις* 5.24) and *Προτάσεις περὶ ἀρετῆς* (5.23).

⁶⁶ For ἢ *περί* used to link alternative titles, see 436 no. 9a, where ἢ *περί* occurs twice.

ὁργῆς is a gloss that indicates the primary focus of the work. The original title will have been *Περὶ παθῶν*. The discussion of ὁργή will have been preceded by an introduction that discussed the emotions in general. Presumably the incipit contained the phrase *περὶ παθῶν*. Moraux also notes that the logical portion of Diogenes' catalogue is disturbed by the misplacement of ethical titles: not only *Περὶ παθῶν ὁργῆς* but also the work *Ἡθικά* in five books, which follows immediately on *Περὶ παθῶν ὁργῆς*. Kenny (1978) pp. 39–43 is also of the opinion that *Περὶ παθῶν ὁργῆς* is out of place among the logical titles. However, he wants to read ὁρμῆς instead of ὁργῆς and to refer the title *Περὶ παθῶν ὁρμῆς* to the sixth book of the *Eudemian Ethics* (= NE 7). These suggestions are of interest in regard to Aristotle, but how they might be applied to Theophrastus is not clear. Moreover, it seems to me wrongheaded to posit a Theophrastean work *Περὶ ὁργῆς* (Bourgery p. xviii) and to hold that such a work was a part of the *Περὶ παθῶν* to which Diogenes attests (Regenbogen col. 1485). We should keep clearly in mind that Diogenes' catalogue of Theophrastean writings mentions no work entitled *Περὶ ὁργῆς*, and that no text tells us how Theophrastus' *Περὶ παθῶν* relates to Aristotle's *Περὶ παθῶν ὁργῆς*.⁶⁷

Aristotle's detailed discussion of *πάθη* is found in the *Rhetoric* 2.2–11. That the discussion was originally written for its present place is doubtful.⁶⁸ But whatever its original location and purpose, it represents a significant contribution by Aristotle to philosophical psychology. *Πάθη* like anger and fright are analyzed as cognitive phenomena (they are necessarily tied to thought; a belief is their efficient cause). In addition, a connection with feelings of pleasure and pain is clearly recognized, but the connection is not deemed necessary (hate is explicitly dissociated from pain). Further, certain *πάθη* are shown to be practical: they necessarily involve a goal and lead to action, while others do not (pity is a case in point). I have discussed this analysis in earlier publications⁶⁹ and will

⁶⁷ To be clear, I am not denying that portions or sections of Theophrastus' *Περὶ παθῶν* were devoted to ὁργή. What I am resisting is positing a work that carried the title *Περὶ ὁργῆς*. In addition, I am uneasy about positing a clearly marked off chapter devoted exclusively to anger as is found in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* 2.2. Perhaps the Theophrastean work was organized like the *Rhetoric*'s account of emotion, but that cannot be demonstrated and hence is better not assumed.

⁶⁸ See my article "On the Composition of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*" in *ΔΗΝΑΙΚΑ: Festschrift für Carl Werner Müller* (Leipzig: Teubner 1996) pp. 174–177, reprinted in *Aristotle's Practical Side* (Leiden: Brill 2006) pp. 398–401.

⁶⁹ "Aristotle and the Questionable Mean-Dispositions" (1968), "Aristotle and Moral Virtue" (1969), "Aristotle's *Rhetoric* on Emotions" (1970) and *Aristotle on Emotion* (1975,

return to the subject in the introduction to the section on “Emotion.”⁷⁰ Here I want to underline that in the text-translation volumes and in this commentary, πάθος is translated with “emotion,” whenever it is clear or likely that the reference is to emotional response like anger, hate, or pity. And that holds for most occurrences of πάθος including its occurrence in the title Περί παθῶν.⁷¹

In composing Περί παθῶν, *On Emotions*, Theophrastus is likely to have made use of what he learned from Aristotle and added ideas of his own. In saying that, I do not want to imply that Theophrastus expressed himself concerning emotions only in the work *On Emotions*. On the contrary, emotions like anger and fright are complex phenomena, so that Theophrastus will have had occasion to discuss them from various perspectives and in various works. Being in part bodily (the angry man becomes red, and the frightened man turns pale), emotions are properly discussed in physical and physiological works. Since emotions often manifest themselves in voice, countenance and gesture (the angry man raises his voice, knits his eyebrows and clenches his fists), they are central to discussions of oratorical and dramatic delivery. And because emotions involve value judgments (the angry man deems someone’s behavior insulting; the courageous man thinks death in the front line preferable to flight), they find an important place in ethical writings. So it is with Theophrastus. In Περί κινήσεως, *On Motion* (137 no. 2), he directed his attention to emotions as σωματικαὶ κινήσεις, bodily motions (271.3). In Περί ὑποκρίσεως, *On Delivery* (666 no. 24), he viewed emotions from the standpoint of an orator’s and an actor’s use of voice and ges-

repr. 2002) are the earliest publications. These publications remain fundamental and may be said to have sparked a lively interest in the topic. Indeed, the interest has resulted in such a flood of publications, that we may end up drowning in our own scholarship.

⁷⁰ I.e., in Chapter IV, the introduction to Section 2.

⁷¹ It is well known and often commented on that the noun πάθος is used widely and equivocally not only in Greek literature taken as a whole but also in philosophical writings like those of Aristotle and Theophrastus. See, e.g., Burnet (1900) p. 291, Hicks (1907) p. 198, Ricken (1976) pp. 49–50. In regard to emotion and psychology in general, two passages may be cited to illustrate inclusive and restricted usage. In Aristotle’s *On Soul* 1.1 πάθη is used broadly of properties or attributes some of which are proper to the soul itself, while others are said to belong to living creatures on account of the soul (402a9). For narrow usage, I cite *Categories* 8, where Aristotle distinguishes between durable qualities of the soul and affections, πάθη, that are of short duration (9b29, 10a6). Being irascible is a durable quality or disposition, whereas an episode of anger is an emotion, πάθος. Here emotions are characterized as easily dispersed and quick to subside (9b28 and 10a6). That serves to mark off emotions from long-term dispositions, but it does not constitute a full or adequate account of emotional response.

ture including facial expression (712-13). And in his ethical writings he treated emotions as the field of moral virtue (449A). Moreover, emotions are often attributed to animals (they are said to be angry, frightened and even envious), so that a discussion of animal πάθη in a zoological treatise like *Creatures that are said to be Grudging* (350 no. 7a-d) is only to be expected (362A-I). Whether the work *On Emotions* discussed or touched upon emotion from all these perspectives and therefore was a comparatively full treatment of the topic remains a matter of speculation.

Arnim (1926) pp. 72-75, 83 refers the section on emotion in Arius' ethical epitome (Stobaeus' *Anthology* 2.7.21 p. 142.14-26 W) to Theophrastus and seems to be thinking of the work *On Emotion*. Walzer p. 168 expresses the same idea more clearly. The idea is not foolish—Arnim p. 75 may be correct when he speaks of a Theophrastean theory of the μέσα πάθη—but the idea cannot be demonstrated. Moreover, Arius' immediate source seems to postdate Theophrastus. See Moraux (1973) pp. 396-400, who calls attention to Stoic elements and suggests that Arius' source is an inclusive late Peripatetic *Division* of the emotions.

no. 6 *On the Voluntary*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.43 = 1.106

Literature: Zeller (1879) pp. 854-855; Walzer (1929) p. 87; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1483; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 98, 139; Sollenberger (1984) pp. 246-247

The title Περί ἐκουσίου, *On the Voluntary*, occurs in the first list of Diogenes' catalogue of Theophrastean writings. Since the first list is arranged alphabetically, it occurs among works whose significant word begins with epsilon. Ἐνστάσεις, *Objections*, precedes, and Ἐπιτομή τῆς Πλάτωνος Πολιτείας, *Epitome of Plato's Republic*, follows. The former belongs among the logical works (68 no. 24), the latter among the political works (589 no. 9). Together the three titles illustrate how alphabetical arrangement ignores subject matter.⁷²

The voluntary is an important topic within Peripatetic ethics. It is discussed at length by Aristotle in both the *Nicomachean Ethics* 3.1 1109b30-1111b3 and in the *Eudemian Ethics* 2.7-9 1223a21-1225b18. It also receives lengthy treatment in the ps.-Aristotelian *Magna Moralia* 1.12-16 1187b31-1188b39. In the absence of any fragment or report that refers explicitly to the Theophrastean work, I am inclined to think

⁷² Exceptional are the seven titles that precede Περί ζώων. See, above, the introduction to this chapter on titles.

of Theophrastus discussing voluntary and involuntary action from various points of view. For example, he may have discussed the voluntary in relation to virtue and vice, the connection between justice and voluntary action, the difference between moral weakness and involuntary action, and whether voluntary action extends to children and animals.⁷³ These topics and others—Zeller suggests that Theophrastus' *Περὶ ἔκνουσίου* addressed the emerging Stoic commitment to determinism⁷⁴—could have been discussed in some detail and at some length (filling an entire papyrus roll) or succinctly, perhaps being included in the *Ethics* as a single chapter.

Diogenes' catalogue of Aristotelian writings lists a work *Περὶ ἔκνουσίου* (5.24). Walzer suggests that the Aristotelian and Theophrastean works *Περὶ ἔκνουσίου* were identical.⁷⁵ That is possible but nothing more. Concerning the Aristotelian work, Moraux thinks that it belongs to the general area of logic and more particularly to that of dialectic. He notes that the Aristotelian catalogue takes account of genre and that *Περὶ ἔκνουσίου* is followed by *προτάσεις*. He construes the latter as an indication of genre and concludes that Aristotle's *Περὶ ἔκνουσίου* dealt with dialectical propositions⁷⁶ and therefore belongs among his logical works.⁷⁷ If correct, that might encourage assigning the Theophrastean work to the category of logic, but I am not ready to do so. The fact that two logical titles, *Ἐπιχειρήματα*, *Dialectical Arguments*, and *Ἐνστάσεις*, *Objections* (1.104–105 = 68 no. 22 and 24), immediately precede *Περὶ ἔκνουσίου* in Diogenes' catalogue of Theophrastean works is irrelevant (as pointed out above, alphabetical order is determinant), and once one looks beyond ethics, other possibilities suggest themselves. For example, a work *On the Voluntary* could easily find a place in rhetorical instruction (cf. Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1.10 1368b6–9 and 1.13 1373b27–36). In the absence of new evidence we cannot hope to achieve certainty, but perhaps we can say two things with considerable confidence. First, given the importance of voluntary action in ethical theory, it is not unreasonable to think of the Theophrastean work as ethical in orientation. Second, assigning the work

⁷³ For completeness' sake, I add plants. In his work *On Piety*, Theophrastus considered and rejected the idea that when we take fruits from plants, we do so against their will, *παρὰ ἀκόντων* (584A.118). See Fortenbaugh (2003b) p. 180.

⁷⁴ Zeller (1879) p. 854.

⁷⁵ Walzer (1929) p. 87 n. 2.

⁷⁶ I.e., propositions that are useful for constructing persuasive arguments, *πιθανὰ ἐπιχειρήματα* (Diogenes Laertius 5.29).

⁷⁷ Moraux (1951) pp. 93–94.

to ethics need not rule out multiple use. A work on the voluntary, even one with a clear ethical orientation, could be used when training students of rhetoric in the depiction of character and in persuasion through character. In addition, a work on the voluntary could easily assist students who were being trained in dialectical argumentation and were required to defend, e.g., a woman who gave her lover a love-potion that proved fatal (*MM* 1.16 1188b32–39). We may add poetics: think of Euripides' play in which Alcmaeon kills his mother (*NE* 3.1 1110a28–29), and zoology: does the octopus change color deliberately? (365A–D).⁷⁸ I can think of no reason to doubt that Theophrastus wrote many of his treatises with multiple uses in mind.

no. 7 *Varieties of Virtue*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.42 = 1.84

no. 8 *On Virtue*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.42 = 1.180

Literature: Regenbogen (1940) col. 1480; Wehrli (1983) p. 509; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 98–99; Sollenberger (1984) pp. 234, 302

According to Regenbogen, the title Ἀρετῶν διαφοραί, *Varieties of Virtue* (no. 7),⁷⁹ is likely to refer to the same work as does the title Περὶ ἀρετῆς, *On Virtue* (no. 8). And both of these titles refer to the same work as Περὶ παιδείας ἢ περὶ ἀρετῶν ἢ περὶ σωφροσύνης, *On Education* or *On Virtues* or *On Temperance* (no. 9). That makes three titles referring to the same work. In my judgment that is unlikely, but it is certainly possible. Each of the titles occurs in a different list within Diogenes' catalogue of Theophrastean writings: *Varieties of Virtue* occurs in the first list, *On Virtue* in the second list and *On Education* or *On Virtue* or *On Temperance* in the third. The organizer of a combined catalogue could easily overlook the identity of three works carrying different titles. Moreover, it is certain that the catalogue does contain duplicates, and on the theory that the five lists represent five different purchases by the library in Alexandria, it is easy to imagine three copies of the same work being acquired through three separate purchases.⁸⁰ Nevertheless, I think it more likely that only the first two titles, *Varieties*

⁷⁸ See below, Chapter IV, Section 12 "Natural Relationship" on text 531.

⁷⁹ For διαφορά in the sense of variety or species, see Aristotle, *Politics* 3.14.2, 4.1.11 and Theophrastus, *Research on Plants* 6.4.5 (all cited in LSJ s.v. I.2 [though LSJ has 6.4.4 instead of 6.4.5]) as well as the passages cited below.

⁸⁰ We may compare the title *On Slander* (666 no. 13), which occurs three times in Diogenes' catalogue (5.46 = 1.189, 5.49 = 1.252, 5.50 = 1.275). Discussion will be found in the *Commentary* vol. 8 on rhetoric and poetics pp. 108–111.

of *Virtue* and *On Virtue*, are copies of the same work. Both titles suggest a theoretical-conceptual treatment of virtue much as we find in the Aristotelian ethical treatises. In contrast, the title *On Education or On Virtues or On Temperance* suggests a treatise with a strong practical orientation, i.e., an emphasis on the training or education of youth. But even if that is correct, it hardly proves that the titles *Varieties of Virtue* and *On Virtue* refer to duplicates. The two Aristotelian *Ethics* offer different albeit closely related treatments of the virtues, and there is no reason why Theophrastus cannot have done the same. And much as the Eudemian treatment of individual moral virtues is noticeably shorter than Nicomachean treatment (c. six Bekker pages as against c. fourteen pages), one of the Theophrastean works may have been shorter. Moreover, like the Aristotelian treatises, the Theophrastean works may have differed in their treatment of mean-dispositions like truthfulness and wittiness. Or one or both may have omitted them as significantly different from the moral virtues that are tied to choice, προαίρεσις. See the commentary on 436 no. 4 and no. 32 as well as 449A, 452 and 519.

In discussing the title *On the Voluntary* (436 no. 6), I called attention to the fact that Moraux understands the like-named work of Aristotle to be concerned with propositions that are useful in constructing dialectical arguments. The connection with such propositions is explicit in the Aristotelian title Προτάσεις περὶ ἀρετῆς (Diogenes Laertius 5.23). According to Moraux, the title that follows, Ἐνστάσεις, *Objections*, refers to a companion work which concerned itself with rejoinders to the propositions brought together in the preceding work. Hence, both works concern virtue and both are logical in their orientation. Should we then think of Theophrastus' work Περί ἀρετῆς as a dialectical work concerned with ethical material? I see no way to rule out the possibility, but equally I see no strong reason to embrace the idea that the work properly belongs among Theophrastus' logical works. What we can assert is that the titles are not identical (only the Aristotelian title refers explicitly to προτάσεις), and the works are of different length (the Aristotelian work is assigned two books, the Theophrastean one). In what follows, I shall continue to think of the Theophrastean work as primarily ethical, albeit capable of providing material for instruction and exercises in other areas such as dialectic and rhetoric.

Taken by themselves, the titles *Varieties of Virtue* and *On Virtue* do not tell us whether the word ἀρετή is being used in an inclusive sense, i.e., it is not restricted to the moral virtues but also includes the intellectual virtues. Perhaps the absence of a qualifying adjective suggests an inclu-

sive treatment. In any case, a full treatment of the moral virtues could not ignore φρόνησις, practical wisdom. See 460.5–7 where we read that “according to Theophrastus it is not easy to conceive of the different kinds of (moral) virtue in such a way that they have nothing in common,” i.e., practical wisdom.

The title Ἀρετῶν διαφοραί, suggests a comparison not only with 460.6, τῶν ἀρετῶν ... τὰς διαφοράς, but also with 438.4–8, where the discussion concerns things that differ in kind and nevertheless differ according to the more and less: κατ’ εἶδος διαφέροντα ... ἔχειν τὴν κατὰ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον διαφοράν. Theophrastus is said to have analyzed fault-finding, anger and rage in this way. Also relevant is *Research on Plants*, in which Theophrastus focuses on differences, διαφοραί, between various kinds of plants. He tells us that a plant is complex and difficult to describe in general terms (1.1.10) and that definitions are to be understood as stated roughly and on the whole (1.3.2). Here we should observe some caution, for botany is not ethics (each may be said to have its own mode of investigation; cf. οἰκεία θεωρία 1.1.4), but in regard to the passages cited, it seems clear that the ideas expressed therein can be applied to ethics and in particular to Theophrastus’ analysis of virtue and virtuous action.⁸¹

When discussing Peripatetic ethics, we are apt to focus on virtues like courage, good temper and temperance, each of which is distinct in that it has its own sphere: i.e., courage is manifested in danger and is related to fear; good temper is exhibited in provocative situations and is related anger; temperance is shown in presence of tempting pleasures and is related to lust *qua* bodily passion. Moreover, we are apt to follow Aristotle and to discuss these and other moral virtues seriatim, i.e., one after the other, regarding them as coordinate species of a single genus. That Theophrastus proceeded in this manner in *Varieties of Virtue* and *On Virtue*, whether they be one work or two works, seems to me quite likely. But Theophrastus may also have taken care to recognize that a full analysis of virtue will not ignore subordinate species. No text tells us that he made the point explicitly and developed it by example, but a passage in Arius’ summary of Peripatetic ethics is suggestive. For there we are told that some virtues are subordinate to others and examples are offered. The first example concerns justice, under which five subordinate species are listed: εὐσέβεια, δσιότης, χρησότης, εὐκοινωνία and εὐσυναλλαξία,

⁸¹ Regarding complexity and difficulty in stating a general (universal) guideline, see the commentary on 534.

“piety, holiness, helpfulness, correctness in fellowship and correctness in dealing/contracting” (Stobaeus, *Anthology* 27 p. 146.15–18, p. 147.1–12). Given Theophrastus’ interest in piety (580 no. 3, 584), holiness (523.1–3), circumspection in contracting (523.11–14) and generally in justice, I would not be surprised if on some occasion he listed and discussed the subordinate species of justice and did the same for other virtues like temperance and courage (cf. Stobaeus 2.7 p. 146.18–20, 147.12–21).

- no. 9a *On Education*, or *On Virtues*, or *On Temperance*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.50 = 1.283
- b *On Education*, 1 book] Ibn-an-Nadīm, *The Index* 7.1, chap. on Theophrastus (p. 252.8 Flügel) = 3A.6; Zawzanī, *Selections from Qiftī’s The History of Philosophers*, chap. on Theophrastus (p. 107.3 Lippert) = 3B.8
- c *On Temperance*] papyrus Petersburgensis Gr. 13 (no. 155 Mitteis and Wilcken = Pack² 2089) fr. 1 line 10 (the title together with the name of Theophrastus is found in a book list perhaps from a private library; in fr. 2 line 10 the name of Theophrastus occurs, but the title is missing)
- no. 10 *On Bringing up Children*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.50 = 1.281
- no. 11 another work (on the same topic) with a different treatment, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.50 = 1.282

Literature: Usener (1858) p. 21; Zundel (1866) pp. 431–437; Zeller (1879) p. 854 n. 3; Baumstark (1922) p. 231; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1480, Fortenbaugh (1983) p. 206, (1984) pp. 100, 133; Sollenberger (1984) pp. 372–374; Gutas (1985) p. 82; Linguisti (1989) pp. 85–87, 91; Wehrli-Wöhrle (2004) p. 550

In the fourth list of Diogenes’ catalogue of Theophrastean writings, there occurs a tripartite title, i.e., one which presents three alternative titles joined together by the conjunction “or.” The title runs *Περὶ παιδείας ἢ περὶ ἀρετῶν ἢ περὶ σωφροσύνης*, *On Education*, or *On Virtues*, or *On Temperance* (436 no. 9a). Regenbogen wished to identify the work to which the title refers with *Varieties of Virtue* and *On Virtue* (436 no. 7 and 8). In the immediately preceding comment, I have expressed disagreement.

In two Arabic sources (one of which, Zawzanī [3B], derives largely from the other, the *Fihrist* [3A], and both of which are lives with brief book lists) the title *Kitāb al-adab*, *On Education* occurs (no. 9b). That is the first alternative in the tripartite title *On Education*, or *On Virtues*, or *On Temperance* (no. 9a). The list of Theophrastus’ works in the *Fihrist*

was compiled by the author of the *Fihrist*: namely, the bookseller Ibn-an-Nadīm. He worked from manuscripts that he had personally seen or knew about. Most of the other titles mentioned by him are actual books by Theophrastus whose translation into Arabic is attested (cf. Gutas [1985] p. 80). It is, then, quite likely that Ibn-an-Nadīm had information about an Arabic translation entitled *Kitāb al-adab*. To be sure, he does not give the name of the translator, as he does in the case of some of the other books in his list, but that does not invalidate Ibn-an-Nadīm's information, for he also cites Theophrastus's *Meteorology*, of which the Arabic translation has survived. Here too Ibn-an-Nadīm fails to name a translator. Be that as it may, the Greek title of the work in question would have been *Περὶ παιδείας*. Baumstark's suggestion that the Arabic title refers to either the *Characters* (436 no. 4) or the *Ethics* (436 no. 2) is unfortunate and should not detain us. In the translation literature, the word *adab* almost invariably translates *παιδεία*,⁸² while *ἥθος*, especially as it occurs in the title *Ἠθικά*, was again almost always translated by *aḥlāq*,⁸³ not by *adab*.⁸⁴ The question, then, is whether the Greek manuscript from which the Arabic translation was made had the simple or the tripartite title, assuming that the two titles refer to the same work. If the latter, then the translator chose to ignore the alternative titles, or possibly the translator reported the alternatives and Ibn-an-Nadīm decided to simplify the title. We cannot know for certain, though on balance in such cases the translators and bibliographers can be trusted to have been accurate and precise. It is thus more likely than not that if a Greek manuscript containing this work survived until the 9th century, the work bore the simple title *Περὶ παιδείας*.

⁸² See the extensive references in Endress-Gutas vol. I, pp. 134–136.

⁸³ *Aḥlāq* is a plural form and a calque of the plural *ἠθικά*, formed from the singular *ἥθος*, which means exactly the same as *ἠθός*.

⁸⁴ There is no good reason for referring the Arabic title to the *Characters*. To be sure, the preface to the *Characters* does say that the sons of the author and the addressee will be better people if they possess such writings (3), but the preface is spurious. The possibility of referring the Arabic title to the *Ethics* might be defended by reference to the *Nicomachean Ethics*. At the end of that work, Aristotle is emphatic that becoming a good person depends upon a good upbringing (10.9 1179a33–1180b28), and Theophrastus may have done the same in his *Ethics*. Or if we think of the *Ethics* as a composite work made up of shorter works that once circulated separately, then we might imagine that the Arabic title refers to a short treatise that became part of the composite work. But that is speculation. Moreover and most importantly, the Arabic title refers to education and not to ethics, so that it is reasonable to make a connection with the work *On Education* or *On Virtue* or *On Temperance*.

The papyrus Petersburgiensis Gr. 13, now referred to as PRossGeorg I 22, dates from the third century AD and contains a portion of a book list⁸⁵ that was found in the catacombs of Sakkarah, Egypt. The portion is damaged but the title Περί σωφροσύνης, *On Temperance* (no. 9c), preceded by Theophrastus' name is certain.⁸⁶ That is the third alternative in the tripartite title. Most likely the titles refer to the same work, so that, neither the Arabic sources nor the St. Petersburg papyrus refer to an otherwise unknown work. Rather, we have one work that was known under at least three titles and referred to in Arabic as well as Greek sources.

The titles Περί παίδων ἀγωγῆς, *On Bringing up Children* (436 no. 10) and ἄλλο διάφορον, "another (work on the same subject) with a different treatment" (no. 11) are found in Diogenes' fourth list one after the other. They are immediately preceded by *On Education*, or *On Virtues*, or *On Temperance* (no. 9a). The proximity is appropriate, since all three concern education, but the primary reason for proximity is the alphabetical arrangement of the fourth list: παιδείας and παίδων are the governing words in the first two titles (no. 9a and 10), while παίδων or possibly παιδείας (preceded by περί) is understood in the third title (no. 11). Using ἄλλο to refer to another work on the same subject also occurs in the first list, where Περί ἡδονῆς ὡς Ἀριστοτέλης is followed by Περί ἡδονῆς ἄλλο (5.44 = 1.116–117 = 436 no. 26 and 27a). Here the phrase ὡς Ἀριστοτέλης occurs only in the first title and serves to mark off the two works whose subject matter is the same. In the works that concern us here, i.e., no. 10 and 11, there is no second title (we have a description), so that we may be dealing with two works that carried the same title, but were nevertheless different. Hence, the addition of διάφορον, which leaves us guessing in what ways the two works differed. That said, I should acknowledge the absence of a second title hardly proves that the two works shared the same title. It might be that the second work carried a different title or even no title and that the compiler of the list chose to indicate the subject matter by position and the use of ἄλλο.

The tripartite title *On Education*, or *On Virtues*, or *On Temperance* (no. 9a) proceeds in a logical manner. We first hear of education, which is then specified by reference to virtue (moral education), and finally temperance is picked out as a virtue meriting special mention. That is

⁸⁵ It has been suggested that the list contains not only books but also business documents. See above, Chapter II "The Sources" no. 62 on the Papyrus Petersburgiensis Gr. 13.

⁸⁶ Only the first two letters of Theophrastus' name, Θε, are lost.

immediately intelligible, for young people are especially susceptible to bodily desires, be it food, drink or sex. Theophrastus will have recognized this fact about young people and dealt with it by discussing temperance before the other moral virtues. This priority can easily have given rise to the third title *On Temperance*. We may compare the Aristotelian title Περί παθῶν <ἢ περι> ὀργῆς, *On the Emotions* (or *On*) *Anger* (Diogenes Laertius 5.23; cf. Moraux [1951] pp. 74, 76). Anger was recognized as a paradigm emotion and treated first.⁸⁷

The priority of temperance in Arius' summary of Theophrastus' treatment of the virtues (494A.9, 14–19) is relevant. It seems quite possible that Arius has based his summary on Theophrastus' work *On Education*, or *On Virtues*, or *On Temperance*. And if temperance was treated first in that work, then Arius has maintained the order of treatment, which differs from what we find in the Aristotelian treatises, where courage takes precedence (*NE* 3.6–9, *EE* 3.1).⁸⁸

Another work on education is found in the first list of Diogenes' catalogue of Theophrastean works. It is Περί παιδείας βασιλέως *On the Education of a King* (1.86 = 589 no. 13). It is listed immediately after Περί βασιλείας, *On Kingship* (1.85 = 589 no. 11) and like that work was one book long.⁸⁹ It is possible that Περί παιδείας βασιλέως was a part of the Περί βασιλείας, which was two books long and is found in Diogenes' fourth list (1.249 = 589 no. 10). Be that as it may, Περί παιδείας βασιλέως will have taken account of the special demands of kingship. That the education of a monarch was of interest in the early Hellenistic period is immediately clear from Xenophon's *Education of Cyrus*.⁹⁰ The fate of

⁸⁷ Aristotle wrote a work entitled Περί παιδείας, *On Education*. It is no. 19 in Diogenes Laertius' catalogue of Aristotelian writings (5.22). Had the work survived, it might have contributed to our understanding of the Theophrastean work *On Education*, or *On Virtues*, or *On Temperance*. As it is, we have only a single report found in Diogenes' *Life of Protagoras*: in the work *On Education*, Aristotle is said to have credited Protagoras with inventing a shoulder-pad for use in carrying heavy objects (9.53). Most likely the report was a quasi-footnote intended to document Protagoras' cleverness in practical matters. It will not have been central to the educational issues discussed by Aristotle in *On Education*. See Moraux (1951) p. 39.

⁸⁸ Another fragment that might derive from *On Education*, or *On Virtues*, or *On Temperance* is 465.

⁸⁹ As in the case of titles 436 no. 9a, 10 and 11, alphabetical order and not subject matter is the determining factor, though subject matter may play a role in placing Περί παιδείας βασιλέως next to and after Περί βασιλέως (first the general title, then the more specific). Another β-title, Περί βίων (436 no. 16), follows.

⁹⁰ Although Xenophon recognizes the noble ancestry and innate qualities of Cyrus, he is also clear that good stock needs good education. In the case of Cyrus, this was

Callisthenes' at the hands of Alexander the Great—despite the fact that Alexander had been the pupil of Aristotle—will have intensified this interest among the early Peripatetics including Theophrastus.

- no. 12a *On Happiness*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.43 = 1.99; *Antiatticist*, on *kephalotomein* (*Anecdota Graeca* vol. 1 p. 104.31 Bekker) = 494A.1; Athenaeus, *The Sophists at Dinner* 12.62 543F = 552B.8; 13.21 567A = 489.2
- b *On the Happy Life*] Cicero, *On Ends* 5.12 = 498.9; 585 = 496.1; Cf. *Tusculan Disputations* 5.24 = 493.9–10, where the words “on the happy life” occur, but apparently not as a title

Literature: Usener (1858) p. 23; Rose (1863) pp. 608–609, Regenbogen (1940) col. 1481–1483; Wehrli (1967–1976) vol. 4 p. 58, (1983) pp. 493–494; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 100–101; Sollenberger (1984) p. 242; Annas (1993) p. 385; Wehrli-Wöhrle (2004) pp. 529–531

The title Περί εὐδαιμονίας, *On Happiness*, is found in the first list of Diogenes' catalogue of Theophrastean writings. It also occurs twice in Athenaeus' *Sophists at Dinner* and once in a grammatical lexicon commonly called *Antiatticist*. The Latin version *De beata vita* is found twice in Cicero. The Latin phrase also occurs in a third Ciceronian text, where it seems to be descriptive rather than a title. But that may be a quibble; what is conveyed in the first half of the Ciceronian text (493.1–17) can be safely attributed to Theophrastus' *On Happiness*.

According to the third Ciceronian passage, when Theophrastus had determined that beatings, torments and the like make life miserable, he did not dare to express himself in a lofty and splendid manner (*non ... elate et ample* 493.4). He did, however, advance many arguments (*multa disputat*), why a man on the rack cannot be happy (493.10–11).⁹¹ To be sure, Theophrastus never said that happiness does not ascend on to the wheel, but what Theophrastus did say has the same force (493.11–14). While I have reservations concerning Cicero as a source for fragmentary authors,⁹² I see no reason to doubt what he says here concerning the work *On Happiness*. Theophrastus did recognize the importance of for-

provided in accordance with Persian law. For further discussion of Cyrus and generally of the relation between innate character and education, see Fortenbaugh (2009) pp. 121–129.

⁹¹ With *multa disputat* 493.10, cf. *multa ... dicente* 492.6.

⁹² See above, Chapter II, “The Sources” no. 4 on Cicero.

tune (cf. 498.10), and he was widely criticized in the Hellenistic period for holding that bodily and external evils are incompatible with happiness (cf. 496.8–9). That he advanced a similar view in the *Callisthenes* (436 no. 15) and was likewise criticized is also to be accepted (493.17–20). The *Callisthenes* was an exoteric work (one intended for circulation outside the school) and as such was written in a popular style that welcomed provocative remarks. Theophrastus felt free to praise the maxim “Fortune rules life, not wisdom” (493.19). What then should we say about *On Happiness*? Since Theophrastus is said to have provoked criticism by arguing that a man being tortured cannot be happy, should we conclude that *On Happiness*, too, was an exoteric writing?⁹³ I am inclined to believe that it was: that it took the form of a dialogue in which Theophrastus played a leading role. Nevertheless, there are grounds for caution. According to Cicero, Theophrastus never said, “Happiness does not ascend on to the wheel.” Moreover, and more important, being an esoteric work (one intended for lecture within the Peripatos) need not exclude provocative remarks. I cite *Nicomachean Ethics* 7.13, where Aristotle refers to certain people who speak of the man on the wheel as happy, providing he be good. According to Aristotle, such people are talking nonsense: οὐδὲν λέγουσιν (7.13 1153b21). That is certainly provocative, but no one wants to say that the *Nicomachean Ethics* is an exoteric writing.

Athenaeus cites the work *On Happiness* twice. Both passages have been described as anecdotal and said to tell in favor of classifying *On Happiness* as an exoteric writing.⁹⁴ I tend to agree, but again caution is called for. In one of the passages, the amount of Theophrastean material is quite small: “In *On Happiness*, Theophrastus said that he (Theomander of Cyrene) went around professing to teach good fortune” (489.2–3). There is no reason why such a report would be out of place in an esoteric work. In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle tells us that some people identified happiness with good fortune (*NE* 7.13/*EE* 6.13 1153b22). Theophrastus will have acknowledged that, and in such a context he might refer to Theomander. The other passage is more interesting. It concerns a painter named Parrhasius. We are told that he lost a contest with considerable grace, that he dressed in a luxurious manner, and that he worked with

⁹³ In *On Ends* 5.12 = 498.1–3, Cicero distinguishes between exoteric works that are written in a popular style and commentaries that are more refined. The latter are esoteric writings. In what follows, Cicero discusses Theophrastus’ *On Happiness*, but he does not tell us to which category *On Happiness* belongs.

⁹⁴ Wehrli-Wöhrlé p. 531.

ease while singing, as Theophrastus reports in *On Happiness* (552B.1–8). If this text stood alone, it would be easy to assign the report to an esoteric writing, for the Theophrastean material might be limited to what is said concerning the ease with which Parrhasius worked. Theophrastus, we might argue, cited Parrhasius in order to elucidate a doctrine that Aristotle discusses in the *Nicomachean Ethics*: namely, that happiness involves pleasure in that it involves unimpeded activity (*NE* 7.12/*EE* 6.12 1153a15, 7.13/6.13 1153b9–19).⁹⁵ However the same material is recorded by Aelian (522A.1–14), who concludes his report by telling us: λέγει δὲ ταῦτα Θεόφραστος, “Theophrastus says these things” (552A.1–14). The pronoun ταῦτα almost certainly includes everything that precedes, so that the Theophrastean material is not limited to a remark concerning the ease with which Parrhasius worked. That speaks for classification as an exoteric writing, but once again we should be cautious. Here are three considerations.

First, assuming that the entire passage from Aelian records material occurring in *On Happiness*, Theophrastus will have cited several sources: other witnesses, inscriptions, men in general (552A.2, 11). Nothing prevents an exoteric work from mentioning sources, but if the citations were more detailed than Aelian reports (who were the “other witnesses?”), then *On Happiness* will have exhibited a certain care that might be more at home in an esoteric work.

Second, reporting an incident in which Parrhasius exhibited a graceful manner need not be out of place in an esoteric writing. In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle often cites historical or mythological persons to elucidate some point under discussion. For example, to make clear that happiness requires a complete lifetime, reference is made to the disaster that befell Priam at the end of his life (1.9 1100a8, 1.10 1101a8). To illustrate pardonable cases of weakness (failure to restrain oneself), mention is made of Philoctetes, the eponymous hero of Theodectes’ tragedy,⁹⁶ Cercyon in Carcinus’ *Alope*,⁹⁷ and the musician Xenophantes, who tried to suppress a laugh but ultimately let out a large guffaw (7.7 1150b10–12). Similarly in regard to brutishness, multiple examples are given: the

⁹⁵ *NE* 7.13/*EE* 6.13 1153b9–19 is immediately followed by Aristotle’s polemical dismissal of persons who say that the man on the wheel, if he is good, can be happy (1153b19–21).

⁹⁶ Philoctetes was bitten by a snake and tried to endure the pain. When he could no longer do so, he exclaimed “Cut off my hand!”

⁹⁷ When Cercyon learned with whom his daughter had committed adultery, he was so overcome that he renounced living.

woman who is said to tear open pregnant women in order to devour their infants, certain savage tribes around the Black Sea that devour raw meat, and the tyrant Phalaris whose brutality was legendary (7.5 1148b19–24, 1149a13–15). Perhaps the issue is one of degree. Aristotle's examples tend to be stated succinctly.⁹⁸ In contrast, the example of Parrhasius seems to have been developed in some detail, and that may be more suitable in an exoteric writing. But that said, we should not assume that Theophrastus imitated his teacher in every way. We are told that he was a popular lecturer, and one reason for his popularity may have been a propensity to enliven his lectures with illustrative material of various kinds and varying length.⁹⁹

Third, reference to Parrhasius' luxurious style of dress may appear gratuitous and foreign to an esoteric writing, but Theophrastus was clearly interested in such stylistic matters and even exhibited this interest in the way he dressed—"splendid and all decked out"—when lecturing within the Peripatos (Athenaeus 1.38 21A = 12.2). He may even have called attention to his own dress in order to evoke a smile when making reference to Parrhasius.¹⁰⁰

Works entitled *On Happiness* occur in the catalogues of writings reported by Diogenes Laertius for Heraclides of Pontus and Strato of Lampascus. That has been seen as another reason for classifying Theophrastus' *On Happiness* as an exoteric writing.¹⁰¹ I am not convinced. It is, of course, true that in the transmitted text Diogenes introduces the book list of Heraclides by characterizing his writings as beautiful and excellent, after which he speaks of ethical dialogues and presents a list that includes *On Happiness* (5.86). But the transmitted text is almost certainly corrupt. The word *διάλογοι* occurs awkwardly between *κάλλιστά τε καὶ ἄριστα* and *ὃν ἡθικὰ μὲν*: i.e., a masculine plural breaks up a string of neuter plurals.¹⁰² And in the list that follows various titles seem out of place: e.g., *On Lives* appears under physics as against ethics, and *Expositions of Heraclitus* and *Expositions in Reply to Democritus* appear under music and

⁹⁸ E.g., in the case of Priam (1100a8, 1101a8), we are given little more than his name. His tragic ending is so famous that descriptive remarks are unnecessary.

⁹⁹ See above, the introduction to this section on "Ethical Titles" *ad fin.*

¹⁰⁰ Mixing humor into his lectures may have been characteristic of Theophrastus. According to Hermippus, during lecture Theophrastus refrained from no movement nor any gesture. On one occasion, he imitated a gourmet by sticking out his tongue and licking his lips (Hermippus fr. 51 Wehrli = Athenaeus, *Sophists at Dinner* 1.38 21B = 12.3–4). The audience will have responded by smiling and probably by laughing as well.

¹⁰¹ Wehrli-Wöhrlé p. 531.

¹⁰² *διάλογοι* appears to be an interpolation; I would print it in square brackets.

not physics. Moreover, Heraclides—*pace* Sotion *ap.* Diogenes (5.86)—was not a Peripatetic in any strong sense. In fact, his Academic credentials were such that he could be a serious candidate for head of the Academy.¹⁰³ In the Platonic tradition, he undoubtedly wrote dialogues and did so with a flare, but that does not mean that all his works (including *On Happiness*¹⁰⁴) were dialogues.¹⁰⁵ Still less does it tell us what Theophrastus was doing in the Peripatos.¹⁰⁶ The fact that Strato, too, wrote a work *On Happiness* is also unhelpful. The work is mentioned only in the catalogue preserved by Diogenes (5.59); no fragment survives. It would be reckless to draw a conclusion concerning the like-named work of Theophrastus.

In the introduction to this section on “Titles,” I have discussed the preposition *περί* and concluded that while titles beginning with *περί*, “on,” seem especially appropriate to esoteric writings, the mere occurrence of *περί* at the beginning of a title is not sufficient to establish a work’s proper classification. The title *On Piety* begins with *περί*, but the work in question was almost certainly exoteric. I am, therefore, unwilling to declare *On Happiness* an esoteric writing simply on the grounds that the title begins with *περί*. Nevertheless, we should keep in mind that titles beginning with *περί* may refer to relatively brief treatises that served Theophrastus as the basis of his lectures within the Peripatos. Here I want to call attention to *Nicomachean Ethics* 10.6, where Aristotle leaves the subject of pleasure and turns to happiness. He says that it remains for him to offer in outline remarks on happiness, *περὶ εὐδαιμονίας* (1176a31). What follows is a discussion of happiness that runs for three chapters (10.6–8). Were these chapters separated from the rest of Book 10, they could be tagged and on the basis of the incipit given the title *Περὶ εὐδαιμονίας*.¹⁰⁷ Indeed, they may have existed first as a separate lecture on happiness and only subsequently been incorporated into the *Nico-*

¹⁰³ Fr. 9 W = fr. 10 Sch. See below, n. 150.

¹⁰⁴ No fragment of Heraclides refers to the work *On Happiness*. Wehrli assigns a doxographical report concerning Pythagoras to *On Happiness* (fr. 44 W = fr. 25 Sch), but the assignation is not certain (the fragment might be assigned to *On the Pythagoreans* [Diogenes 5.88]), and the report reveals nothing about Heraclides’ presentation.

¹⁰⁵ See Mejer (2007) p. 31 n. 11, who takes “a rather restrictive view of the number of Heraclides’ dialogues.”

¹⁰⁶ For completeness’ sake, I mention another member of the Academy: namely, Xenocrates, who was elected head of the School over Heraclides. According to Diogenes Laertius 4.12, Xenocrates, too, wrote a work *On Happiness*, but that tells us no more about the work of Theophrastus than the fact that Heraclides wrote a like-named work.

¹⁰⁷ For brief remarks on tags, σίλλυβοι, see Fortenbaugh (1998) p. 185 with note 8, reprinted in *Theophrastean Studies* (2003) p. 198.

machean Ethics as we know it today. Similarly with Theophrastus' Περὶ εὐδαιμονίας. Originally it may have been an independent treatise that Theophrastus used when lecturing on happiness. At a later date, it may have been incorporated into a composite work (39.7–8). If one asks what composite work, Ἠθικά comes to mind (436 no. 2a).¹⁰⁸

Up to this point, I have been expressing caution concerning the classification of *On Happiness*. There is, however, one text that has been largely ignored and that may speak strongly for classifying *On Happiness* as an exoteric work. I am thinking of 475, which is regularly printed with an emendation. The words *ut ait Theophrastus* are transposed so that they accompany an assertion concerning the importance of philosophy. If the words are read as they occur in the manuscript tradition, then we seem to have a reminiscence of (or play on) a memorable passage in a Theophrastean dialogue. Since Cicero has made reference to *On Happiness* in the immediately preceding section, the reminiscence would almost certainly be to that work. See the commentary on 475. But whatever the proper interpretation of 475 may be, I am inclined, albeit with caution, to classify *On Happiness* as an exoteric work.

In addition to the texts that explicitly refer to *On Happiness* (489, 494A, 496, 498, 552B) and the first half of a text that may or may not refer to *On Happiness* (493), the following texts may be said to offer reports and material appropriate to *On Happiness*: 475–485 (i.e., the whole section on “Happiness”), 487–488, 490–492, 495, 497, 499–501 (i.e., all the texts in the section “Fortune and Goods and Evils outside the Soul” that mention no specific work). However, a complete and certain list is not possible, for works like *On the Divine Happiness in Response to the Academics* (436 no. 13) and *On Good Fortune* (436 no. 14) will have discussed much of the same material, so that assignation to one or the other or both of these works cannot be ruled out.

no. 13 *On the Divine Happiness in Response to the Academics*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.49 = 1.261

Literature: Dirlmeier (1937) p. 38; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1483; Bignone² (1973, repr. 2007) pp. 172, 200; Wehrli (1983) pp. 493–494; Fortenbaugh (1984) p. 101; Sollenberger (1984) pp. 359, 456; Wehrli-Wöhrle (2004) pp. 529, 531; Tsouni (2010) p. 441 n. 678

¹⁰⁸ See Usener (1858) p. 23. This is, of course, speculation. Concerning *Ethics* as a composite work, see the commentary on 436 no. 2a.

The title *Περὶ τῆς θείας εὐδαιμονίας πρὸς τοὺς ἐξ Ἀκαδημείας*, *On the Divine Happiness in Response to the Academics*, is found in the third list of Diogenes catalogue. Several editors including Hicks (Loeb 1950) and Long (Oxford Classical Text 1964) have divided the title, so that two titles are listed: *Περὶ τῆς θείας εὐδαιμονίας α'* and *Πρὸς τοὺς ἐξ Ἀκαδημείας α'*. In my edition of ethical texts (1984), Sollenberger's edition of the *Life of Theophrastus* (Diss. 1984) and our text-translation volume (1992), we recognize a single title. When I looked at photographs of the three primary manuscripts, BFP, and several derivative manuscripts as well, I saw no evidence of a division into two titles: neither a book number nor a semi-colon after *εὐδαιμονίας*. The same holds for Sollenberger.¹⁰⁹ More recently Marcovich (Teubner 1999) has printed two titles. He reports that the first hand in B did divide the titles with a book number and that the number was deleted by a second hand.¹¹⁰ Now Tiziano Dorandi, who is preparing a new edition for the Budé series, assures me that B offers no grounds for printing two titles: Marcovich has erred, and the title printed in the text-translation volumes is correct.¹¹¹

In support of two titles, it might be argued that *πρὸς τοὺς ἐξ Ἀκαδημείας* follows oddly on *Περὶ τῆς θείας εὐδαιμονίας* and that *πρὸς* is a suitable preposition with which to begin a title. The latter assertion concerning *πρὸς* is correct. Cf. *Πρὸς Ἀναξαγόραν* (1.75) and *Πρὸς Ἀισχύλον α'* (1.270). But there need be no oddity in a work on divine happiness that is in one way or another a reply to members of the Academy. Bignone has suggested that Theophrastus discussed the Academic doctrine according to which pleasure is not part of the happiness that the gods enjoy. He cites Plato's *Philebus*, in which Socrates explains pleasure and pain in terms of depletion and replenishment (thirst is painful for the body is suffering depletion, and drinking is pleasurable because the body is being replenished), after which Protarchus says that it is unlikely that the gods feel either joy or the opposite: οὐκ οὐν εὐχόμενος γε οὔτε χαίρειν θεοὺς οὔτε τὸ ἐναντίον. Socrates agrees emphatically, saying that it is very unlikely: πάνυ μὲν οὖν οὐκ εὐχόμενος (33B). He adds that it would be unseemly, after which discussion is postponed for a later time. On one level, the reference to postponement is stylistic, i.e., a convenient way to

¹⁰⁹ See Sollenberger (1984) p. 456 n. 60.

¹¹⁰ In the *apparatus criticus* on p. 343, Marcovich states explicitly that he is disagreeing with Sollenberger.

¹¹¹ Even if Marcovich were correct (and I do not think that he is), two of the principle manuscripts speak for a single title, and the alleged deletion in B might be an intelligent correction.

be rid of a side-issue and get on with whatever is deemed more relevant to the moment. But the idea of postponement can also be taken seriously, for the topic in question was and would continue to be under discussion in the Academy.¹¹² Bignone cites Heraclides of Pontus, who is reported to have deprived the god of sensation and wanted his form to be unchangeable (Cicero, *On the Nature of the Gods* 1.34 = Heraclides fr. 72 Sch.).¹¹³ Bignone also cites the pseudo-Platonic *Epinomis*, in which the Athenian Stranger is made to say that god exists apart from feelings of pain and pleasure (985A).¹¹⁴

A different view is set forth by Aristotle in his *Nicomachean Ethics*. He assumes that the gods are happy in the highest degree (10.8 1178b9–10)¹¹⁵ and speaks of god always enjoying one single and simple pleasure: ὁ θεὸς αἰεὶ μίαν καὶ ἀπλὴν χαίρει ἡδονήν (NE 7.14 1154b26). Not being a composite creature like man, god is free of change *qua* depletion and replenishment. Rather, he enjoys continuous contemplation, θεωρία (10.8 1178b21–22, 25–26), which being unimpeded activity is always pleasant. To the extent that man is able to live such a life, he enjoys a most pleasant life (10.7 1177a23, 1178a6), but since his nature is composite, he is subject to change and pain.¹¹⁶

¹¹² For another example of postponing discussion within the *Philebus*, see 50D8–E1, where Socrates promises to discuss tomorrow the relation between cognition and emotional response. See *Aristotle on Emotion* (1975a) p. 11.

¹¹³ Caveat: *On the Nature of the Gods* 1.34 does not quite say that Heraclides withheld pleasure from god. It says only that Heraclides deprives god of sensation. But in context it is clear that lacking sensation is incompatible with experiencing pleasure (cf. 1.30 on Plato). Moreover, we are dealing with a dialogue in which the report concerning Heraclides is put in the mouth of Velleius, an Epicurean who is running through a string of philosophers, bent on showing that their views are inconsistent. Accurate, nuanced reporting is not to be expected.

¹¹⁴ Bignone pp. 171–172. The idea that god or gods do not experience pleasure predates the Academy. I cite the tragedian Thespis (6th cent.) who speaks of Zeus not knowing pleasure (*TrGF* vol. 1 p. 65 fr. 3 Snell-Kannicht). In contrast, the lyric poet Simonides (late 6th, early 5th cent.) seems to find it unintelligible that the gods might not experience pleasure. He first asks what human life is desirable without pleasure and then says that without pleasure even the life of the gods is not enviable (*PMG* p. 300 fr. 584 Page).

¹¹⁵ Cf. NE 1.12, where Aristotle distinguishes between praise and honor and finds it ridiculous to praise the gods. They merit something greater and better, for we call the gods blessed and happy: τοὺς τε γὰρ θεοὺς μακαρίζομεν καὶ εὐδαιμονίζομεν (1101b23–24).

¹¹⁶ Cf. Arius' summary on Peripatetic ethics in Stobaeus, *Anthology* 2.7.18 pp. 132.18–133.2 W. After being told that happiness is most pleasant and noble, we learn that the happiness of god and man is not the same, for the virtue of good men is not unlosable. It can be removed by many and great evils. The Greek text is printed in the commentary on 462.

In the work *On Divine Happiness in Response to the Academics*, Theophrastus may well have embraced his teacher's view and replied to those members of the Academy who held that god does not experience pleasure. We need not think of a lengthy treatise that discussed Academic views from multiple perspectives. Some Theophrastean works in one book were quite short, and the work in question might have been one of these, i.e., narrowly focused on an Academic claim, to which Theophrastus objected.¹¹⁷ But equally we must keep in mind that a work in one book can make room for a variety of topics, or it can address one topic from various points of view. In this regard, the title is suggestive. For it does not refer to the happiness of god, θεοῦ (cf. *EE* 1.7 1217a23–24); rather it refers to happiness that is divine, θεία. The latter is inclusive in that it can be used of human happiness. For there is within human beings a divine element, which is intellect (cf. *NE* 10.7 1177a15–16, b28; *EE* 1.7 1217a28; Theophr. 271.6). And when a man lives in accordance with intellect, in particular when he leads a life of contemplation, he is engaged in an activity that is most akin, συγγενεστάτη, to that of the divinity (*NE* 10.8 1178b21–27).¹¹⁸ It can be spoken of as divine.¹¹⁹

The passages just cited make clear that the phrase Περί τῆς θείας εὐδαιμονίας might refer to human happiness as well as to that of the divinity. But they do not constitute a demonstration, and θεῖον in the Theophrastean title Τῶν περὶ τὸ θεῖον ἱστορίας α'–ζ', *Research on the Divine*, 6 books, most likely refers to the gods (1.243 = 251 no. 1). In the absence of additional Theophrastean texts that speak to the issue, I leave the matter open and turn to the work *On Piety* (580 no. 3), of which large fragments have been incorporated into Porphyry's *On Abstinence from Killing Animals*. On even the most casual reading of these fragments, it is clear that Theophrastus was on occasion prepared to speak of divinity in terms that reflect civic and popular religion as practiced in the fourth century. Animal sacrifice is discussed at length and forcefully rejected in favor of sacrificing vegetative matter. We are told that human beings should honor the gods with relatively inexpensive and frequent sacrifices. These are dear to the gods, θεοφιλεῖς (584A.155; cf. φίλον 152); in them

¹¹⁷ On titles referring to quite short works, perhaps no longer than a chapter within a book, see Fortenbaugh (1998) pp. 186–188, (reprint 2003) pp. 199–202. See also *Commentary* 8 (2005c) on the rhetorical and poetic fragments pp. 50–52.

¹¹⁸ At *NE* 10.8 1178b27, the relationship is described as one of similarity. Cf. 482.2–3, 483.3.

¹¹⁹ Drawing on *EE* 1.4 1215b12–13, we can say that the person who leads such a life participates in divine contemplation, θεωρία θεία.

the gods take delight, χαίρουσι (145). Moreover, we hear of the gods punishing and rewarding human beings: the Thoës were destroyed by Zeus for failure to sacrifice (65–76), and seeking a benefit is said to be a reason why one ought to sacrifice (217). We are also told that the divinity looks more to the character, ἦθος, of the person performing a sacrifice (152–153) and takes delight, χαίρειν, in what is most divine within us, i.e. the soul, ψυχή, when it is in a cleansed condition. For it is by nature akin, συγγενής, to god (158–161). There is here a clear difference in emphasis from what we read in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*. The focus is on ordinary men and on moral goodness as against intellect and contemplation. But the difference should not be exaggerated. In speaking of the Jews, Theophrastus is reported to have called them a race of philosophers, who fasted during sacrifice, talked with each other about the divine, περὶ τοῦ θείου, and at night observed the stars, τῶν ἀστρον ποιοῦνται τὴν θεωρίαν (268–269).¹²⁰ Moreover, in the *Ethics* Aristotle softens his emphasis on contemplation. His concluding remarks concerning happiness allow that the gods are concerned with human affairs: they are said to requite with good, ἀντευποιεῖν, those who honor intellect and act rightly and nobly as well, καὶ ὀρθῶς τε καὶ καλῶς πράττοντας (10.8 1179a29). The addition concerning noble action is brief, but its significance is not. Aristotle recognizes that a man *qua* human being ought not to neglect the human virtues, and that the gods, too, take notice when rewarding a man's behavior. Theophrastus would agree.¹²¹

In conclusion, I note that the work *On the Divine Happiness in Response to the Academics* is likely to have exhibited overlap, at least to some extent, with *On Happiness* (436 no. 12). Texts like 482 and 483 might be assigned to either of the two works. In addition, some points in common with *Encomia of Gods* (580 no. 1) are likely. For discussion of *Encomia of Gods* from a rhetorical perspective, see *Commentary* vol. 8 (2005c) on rhetoric and poetics pp. 106–108.

no. 14 *On Good Fortune*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.47 = 1.197

Literature: Usener (1858) p. 9; Petersen (1859) pp. 67–68; Zeller (1879) p. 855 n. 3, 860 n. 1; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1483; Steinmetz (1960) vol. 2

¹²⁰ Cf. 484.11–15.

¹²¹ I have expressed myself without qualification, but I should at least note that *On Piety* was most probably an exoteric dialogue, which opens the door to exaggeration and other forms of imprecision. In addition, Porphyry has excerpted material that suits his interests. We can only guess what has been omitted.

pp. 150–151; Donini (1965) p. p. 86 n. 12; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 101–102; Sollenberger (1984) pp. 311–312; Wehrli-Wöhrle (2004) p. 529

The title *Περὶ εὐτυχίας*, *On Good Fortune*, occurs in the second list of Diogenes' catalogue and nowhere else. In Stobaeus, *Anthology* 2.7.20 p. 140.8 Wachsmuth = 449A.1–2, Heeren wished to change the phrase *ἐν ταῖς ἐντυχίαις* to *ἐν τοῖς περὶ εὐτυχίας*, thereby creating a second reference to *On Good Fortune*. But the received text is quite intelligible and the change not insignificant (in the text as transmitted there is no hint of *περὶ*).¹²² Today the change finds no support among scholars and has not been mentioned in the *apparatus criticus*.¹²³

In the work *On Happiness* (436 no. 12a), Theophrastus said that Theomander of Cyrene went about professing to teach good fortune (489.1–3). That Theomander identified good fortune with happiness is a likely guess. In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle says that to certain people (τισι) good fortune seems to be the same as happiness (7.13 1153b22) and in the *Eudemian Ethics* he says that many people (οἱ πολλοί) identify the two (1.1 1214a25). We may compare the ps.-Aristotelian *Magna Moralia*, in which the many (οἱ πολλοί) are said to think that the happy life is the life of good fortune or at least not without the good fortune (2.8 1206b32–33). Nevertheless, Aristotle himself is clear that good fortune, however important it may be for living well, is not to be identified with happiness (*Pol.* 7.1 1323b26–27). In fact, excessive good fortune is an impediment to happiness (*NE* 7.13 1153b22–23). In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, we can assume that Theophrastus followed his teacher.

A close relationship between the two works *On Good Fortune* and *On Happiness* is certain. Details are less so. Since the two works are mentioned in different lists within Diogenes' catalogue (*On Happiness* occurs in the first list), it might be suggested that the two works are in fact identical, each having a different title and each being part of a different purchase by the library in Alexandria. That is possible, but more imaginative than plausible. It is also possible that *On Good Fortune* was a short treatise, chapter length, which was originally part of *On Happiness*, or together with *On Happiness* became part of the collective work called *Ethics* (436 no. 2), which is not referred to in Diogenes' catalogue.

¹²² In the apparatus of parallel passages to his edition of Diogenes' catalogue, Usener cites Stobaeus and gives the text as Θ. ἐν ταῖς εὐτυχίαις.

¹²³ See Petersen pp. 67–68 and Regenbogen col. 1483.

A different problem is whether the title *On Good Fortune* adequately reflects the content of the work. In particular, we may wonder whether the work was narrowly focused on good fortune or also dealt with bad fortune. Originally the title may have included a reference to bad fortune, and what we find in Diogenes is a truncated version. In regard to a truncated or abbreviated title, we may compare *On Affirmation* (68 no. 3c), which is almost certainly an abbreviation of *On Affirmation and Denial* (68 no. 3a).¹²⁴ But I leave aside as unimportant the issue of the original title (if there ever was a true Theophrastean title) and suggest that whatever the title, the work could have discussed bad fortune, perhaps quite briefly and as the opposite of good fortune. As a case of extreme brevity, I cite Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, in which a discussion of shame and shamelessness is announced (2.6 1383b11–12), but after discussing the former at length, Aristotle satisfies himself by saying that in regard to the latter we shall be adequately supplied from the opposites (1385a14–15). Having said that, I want to call attention to both the *Eudemian Ethics* and the *Magna Moralia*, each of which contains a chapter that focuses narrowly on good fortune. To be sure, the *Eudemian Ethics* does mention the unfortunate individual, ὁ ἀτυχής, in the first sentence (8.2 1247a2–3), but in what follows there are only a few references to bad luck,¹²⁵ and when Aristotle concludes his discussion he declares it obvious that there are two kinds of good fortune (1248b3); bad fortune is not mentioned. The corresponding chapter in the *Magna Moralia* is briefer and contains no explicit reference to the unfortunate individual or to bad fortune, ὁ ἀτυχής or ἀτυχία. The opening sentence contains the phrase περὶ εὐτυχίας, “on good fortune” (2.8 1206b32) as does the concluding statement (2.9 1207b19), and in between εὐτυχία is mentioned by name fifteen times. The focus is narrow throughout and were the chapter separated from its place in the *Magna Moralia*, the phrase περὶ εὐτυχίας, occurring as it does in the opening sentence, might become its title.¹²⁶

Good fortune, εὐτυχία, comes in more than one form. We may think of the person who is surprised by some event about which he had not been thinking, let alone deliberating (by luck a person stumbles upon

¹²⁴ A better example might be *On Praise* (666 no. 12), for it occurs in Diogenes' catalogue (1.190) and may well be an abbreviation for *On Praise and Censure*. See *Commentary* vol. 8 on rhetoric and poetics (2005) pp. 103–104.

¹²⁵ *EE* 8.2 1247a13, 36, b4, 13, 38.

¹²⁶ Regenbogen col. 1483 and Steinmetz, P. (1960b) vol. 2 p. 151 see a connection between Theophrastus and *Magna Moralia* 2.8. Donini (1965) p. 86 n. 12 is more cautious.

a treasure¹²⁷). Or we may think of a person reaching some goal despite bad planning (a man, who is looking for his lost wallet, finds it in a place that he had not even considered¹²⁸). Or a person might escape disaster through outside intervention or distraction (a man who is distracted and fails to go where he usually goes at a given time, escapes being killed¹²⁹). In such cases the outcome is welcome and may have long or short-term consequences (finding a treasure may have a long term effect, whereas recovering one's wallet is likely to have no long term benefit). That Theophrastus distinguished between such cases in the work *On Good Fortune* is in my judgment quite likely.

Rather different are inherited attributes like intelligence and good-looks. For Theophrastus and other Peripatetics, the former is a good of the soul and the latter a good of the body. A person who is innately intelligent or good-looking is apt to be called lucky, because being born with a keen mind or shapely body is not something an individual chooses or strives for. For the most part he is fortunate to have had intelligent or good-looking parents or both, whose attributes he has inherited.¹³⁰ And if the parents are mentally slow or ugly, we may say that the person is doubly lucky. For his innate good qualities are not his doing, and he has inexplicably escaped inheriting the attributes of his parents.¹³¹ I am prepared to believe that Theophrastus discussed these cases in *On Good Fortune*, perhaps taking note of inherited wealth. This is neither a good of the soul nor a good of the body; for a Peripatetic it is an external good and as such it is not transferred from parents to child biologically. But it can be transferred—we say inherited—and when the transference results from a decision by the parents (or by the courts), we are apt to call the child fortunate. He has acquired an external good over which he had no control.

¹²⁷ Cf. Aristotle, *NE* 3.3 1112a27.

¹²⁸ Cf. *EE* 8.2 1247b28–32, where Aristotle first asks whether the word εὐτυχία is used in more than one way, after which he considers different cases, saying that we speak of people having good fortune, κατετυχῆσαι, when they deliberate badly and yet succeed. Cf. also *MM* 2.8 1207a27–35, where the author recognizes different senses of εὐτυχία and εὐτυχής.

¹²⁹ Cf. Aristotle, *Rhet.* 1.5 1362a10–11.

¹³⁰ Cf. *Magna Moralia* 2.8, where we are told that good fortune occurs in things over which we have no control, and we say that the man of good birth, εὐγενής, is fortunate (1207a19–26). The author goes on to say that this is not the proper or strict use of “good fortune” (1207a27).

¹³¹ A related example is found in Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1.5 1362a7–8, where we read of the person whose brothers are ugly, but is himself handsome.

A further kind of innate attribute should be mentioned. I am thinking of the temperament—e.g., vehemence and lethargy—with which a person is born and persists through his adult life. The person who is by nature excessively intense or excessively lazy impedes his own happiness by overreacting or failing to act. In contrast, the person who is of moderate temperament is fortunate in that he is well disposed to virtue and virtuous action, which are prerequisites for leading a happy life. Theophrastus may have taken account of moderate temperament in *On Good Fortune* and *On Happiness*. And in the work entitled *Callisthenes* or *On Grief* (436 no. 15), he may have called attention to immoderate temperament in order to explain Callisthenes' fateful quarrel with Alexander the Great.¹³²

It might be thought that innate attributes like vehemence and intelligence and good-looks are oddly referred to fortune or luck, for good or bad luck is often thought of as something that does not repeat itself or very rarely. Yet these attributes do manifest themselves repeatedly. The dilemma here is only apparent, for it is not a string of occurrences that is due to fortune. It is the inheritance of an attribute, and that is a one-time event that is not under the control of the recipient.¹³³

Finally we may wonder whether Theophrastus' work *On Good Fortune* included discussion of the divine and if so whether the divine was associated with one kind of good fortune or another. That Theophrastus simply ignored the divine is, I think, unlikely. Both Aristotle in the *Eudemian Ethics* and the author of the *Magna Moralia* take note of the divine, as does Aristoxenus, Theophrastus' contemporary and fellow Peripatetic, in his work *Pythagorean Sayings*. Previously the doctrines set forth by Aristoxenus in this work have been viewed as Aristoxenus' own creation based on Platonic and Aristotelian material. That view has now been opposed (correctly in my judgment) by Carl Huffman, who argues that the doctrines are indeed Pythagorean teachings.¹³⁴ Be that as it may, Theophrastus will have known the work and the doctrine that there are two kinds of luck: that which is inborn and that which is imposed

¹³² See the commentary on 504, below pp. 472–473.

¹³³ I note that attributes need not be assigned a single cause. Take loquacity, *λαλιά*, of which Theophrastus provides a sketch in *Characters* 7. It may be assigned to excessive black bile, which can be an inherited condition, but a need to exhibit one's own importance may play a role as may the fear of being left alone. See Fortenbaugh (1981) pp. 246–247, (repr. 2003) p. 296.

¹³⁴ Huffman pp. 104–119. On Stobaeus, *Anthology* 1.6.18 (mentioned in what follows) see pp. 116–119.

from outside (σύμφυτον and ἐπείσασκτον). According to Aristoxenus, the Pythagoreans associated the divine with the latter and offered as an example men who succeed without proper planning (Stobaeus, Anthology 1.6.18 [p. 89.8–23 Wachsmuth] = fr. 41 Wehrli). Such men are indeed lucky, so that their good fortune might be attributed to divine intervention from without. But Aristotle is of a different mind. In the *Eudemian Ethics*, he rejects this attribution, arguing that it is absurd to think that the divine, acting as an external navigator, might favor a person who is foolish and not one who is exceptionally good and prudent (8.2 1247a23–29). What follows in the *Eudemian Ethics* is not always perspicuous, but if I understand correctly, Aristotle concludes that divine good fortune is not something that comes from outside, but something within that belongs to a man's nature and provides an impulse to do what brings success (1248a24–b7). What we read in the *Magna Moralia* is similar. The idea that good fortune involves care or attention on the part of the gods is rejected on the grounds that the gods would then be responsible for good fortune befalling persons who are bad as well as good (2.8 1207a7–18). Good fortune is said to be an irrational nature that is implanted in the soul and impels a person toward good things (1207a36–b5). It is tempting to say that Theophrastus adopted a similar position, but no text tells us that.¹³⁵

- no. 15a *Callisthenes or On Grief*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.44 = 1.123
 b *Callisthenes*] Alexander, *Supplement to the Book On the Soul* 25 (*Suppl. Arist.* vol. 2.1 p. 186.30) = 504.9
 c *Callisthenes*] Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations* 5.25 = 493.18

Literature: Dümmler (1889) pp. 211–212; Hirzel (1895) p. 317; Stroux (1933) pp. 229–230; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1484–1485; Baldry (1965) p. 142; Gigon (1951) pp. 508, 561; Dihle (1979) p. 130 n. 21; Wehrli (1983) p. 494; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 102–104; Sollenberger (1984) pp. 259–260; Wehrli-Wöhrle (2004) pp. 529, 531; White (2007) pp. 211–230

In the first list of Diogenes' catalogue of Theophrastean writings, we find the double title: Καλλισθένης ἢ περὶ πένθους, *Callisthenes or On Grief*. In contrast, Cicero and Alexander of Aphrodisias refer to the work by the single title *Callisthenes*. Double titles are not uncommon, and in

¹³⁵ Regenbogen col. 1483 and Steinmetz (1960b) vol. 2 p. 151 believe that the account of εὐτυχία in the *Magna Moralia* is influenced by Theophrastus.

the introduction to this chapter I have referred to Plato's *Gorgias*, which in certain manuscripts has the double title *Gorgias or On Rhetoric*.¹³⁶ Here I add three Aristotelian titles: *On Rhetoric or Gryllus*, *Eudemus or On Soul* and *Alexander or On Settlements*.¹³⁷ Each of these titles names a particular individual, but none was a biography. As the full titles and surviving fragments indicate, the *Gryllus* focused *inter alia* on the question whether rhetoric is an art (fr. 69 Rose³), the *Eudemus* concerned itself with the soul, immortality and memory (fr. 39–41) and the *Alexander* discussed how to establish colonies and to deal with people of different ethnicity (fr. 648, 658). The same is almost certainly true of Theophrastus' *Callisthenes or On Grief*. The mention of Callisthenes tells us that in one way or another he figured prominently in the work. At the very least his conflict with Alexander the Great and the resulting execution will have been highlighted, perhaps at the very outset,¹³⁸ but the overall subject of the work will have been wider than the fate of a single individual. Indeed, the second half of the title suggests that the death of Callisthenes may have functioned as a peculiarly striking example, which introduced *inter alia* the theme of grief and enabled Theophrastus to discuss human character from various points of view.

Theophrastus' *Callisthenes* has been referred to the genre of consolation literature. That is suggested by the sub-title and finds some support in Cicero's *Tusculan Disputations*, where we read that Theophrastus deplored the death of his companion Callisthenes (3.21 = 505.3). No reference is made to the work *Callisthenes*, but almost certainly Cicero's report is based on that work. We should, however, take note of what Cicero goes on to say. He tells us that Theophrastus was troubled by

¹³⁶ See above, p. 126.

¹³⁷ A difference between the titles is noticeable: in *On Rhetoric or Gryllus* (Diog. Laert. 5.22) the proper name occupies the second position; in *Eudemus or On Soul* (fr. 37–48 R³ [ἐν τῷ Εὐδήμῳ τῷ περὶ ψυχῆς fr. 46]) and *Alexander or On Settlements* (Diog. Laert. 5.22) the proper name enjoys pride of place. There is nothing unusual here. In the title that concerns us, *Callisthenes or On Grief*, the proper name comes first, but in two titles of works by Heraclides Ponticus, *Concerning Love or Clinias* and *On Public Speaking or Protagoras*, the proper name comes second (Diogenes Laertius 5.88 = fr. 17 no. 12 and 49 S). For our purposes, the variation is of no importance. In all these cases, the proper name refers to someone important in the work, while the other half of the title focuses on the subject matter.

¹³⁸ Callisthenes, the historian, accompanied Alexander the Great on his expedition to the East. He refused to make obeisance to Alexander, was accused of participating in a plot organized by Hermolaus and was executed (Plutarch, *Life of Alexander* 54.2–55.5). Callisthenes' tie to the Peripatetic school was extremely close: he was Aristotle's grandnephew and a fellow pupil of Theophrastus.

the success of Alexander the Great, and that Callisthenes “fell in with a man of supreme power and supreme fortune, but ignorant of how one ought to handle prosperity” (505.4–6). That suggests to me that in the *Callisthenes* Theophrastus not only focused on the terrible death of Callisthenes and the grief that it provoked, but also considered the character of Alexander and the way in which his character contributed to the death of Callisthenes. In this connection, a text of Alexander of Aphrodisias and another found in Stobaeus are informative. According to the former, Theophrastus in the *Callisthenes* demonstrated that “what is in accordance with fate is the same as what is in accordance with nature” (504.8–9). And from the latter, we learn that the nature in question is the nature of the individual (τὴν ἐκάστου φύσιν 503.2).¹³⁹ If I understand correctly, we should think not only of the nature of Alexander but also that of Callisthenes. Together they determined the fate of Callisthenes, i.e., his death at the hands of Alexander. (See the commentary on 503–504.) In saying this, I do not want to suggest that the sub-title *On Grief* is altogether mistaken. Grief will have received attention, but grief may have been only one theme among two or more. Again I refer to the Plato’s *Gorgias*, whose sub-title *On Rhetoric* does not do justice to the work taken as a whole. For the *Gorgias* is as much about ethics as it is about rhetoric, or more so. Similarly, the Theophrastean sub-title *On Grief* may be inadequate or misleading in that the *Callisthenes* may have covered much more than grief. In particular, it may have been equally or more concerned with the role that character plays in determining how a man lives and dies.

That the *Callisthenes* may have exhibited such a concern should not surprise us, for both philosophy and popular thought provided sufficient inducement for an inclusive discussion of individual character and its role in determining how a man lives. Well-known is the statement of Heraclitus: ἦθος ἀνθρώπῳ δαίμων (fr. 22 B 119 D–K), which Alexander cites as follows: ἦθος γὰρ ἀνθρώπων κατὰ τὸν Ἡράκλειτον δαίμων, τουτέστι φύσις “For men’s character is, according to Heraclitus, their daemon,¹⁴⁰ i.e., their nature” (*Suppl.* p. 185.23–24). For an example from the time of Theophrastus, I cite Menander’s *Arbitrants* (1092–1099 OCT = 734–741 BT), in which Onesimus is made to say:

¹³⁹ On φύσις, “nature,” referring to innate and acquired character, see the commentary on 503–504.

¹⁴⁰ Or “guardian spirit,” as Sharples (1983) p. 113 translates δαίμων.

You will say, Do not the gods care for us? For they have joined to each of us character (τρόπος) as commandant. Being within . . . , he ruins the person who seems to use him badly, but saves another. He is for us god and the cause of each of us doing well or badly. Propitiate him by doing nothing out of place or foolish, in order that you may fare well.

Concerning these lines, Konrad Gaiser writes: “The central theme of Onesimus’ speech refers to a philosophic source, according to which τρόπος, which can be good or bad, decides our fate. This idea is likely to have been alive in the philosophic schools during Menander’s lifetime, although the supporting evidence is not strong. . . . One may suppose that Theophrastus too, the author of the *Characters*, attributed special importance to the τρόπος of man, even if explicit proof has not been handed down to us.”¹⁴¹ Gaiser’s caution is not open to criticism; I want, however, to suggest that in the *Callisthenes* Theophrastus discussed the τρόπος, i.e., the φύσις of the individual in some detail. It may be significant, that in 504 Alexander mentions Theophrastus together with Polyzelus as someone who in a work *On Fate* connected nature with fate (lines 8–10). It would be rash to assume that the work of Polyzelus agreed with the *Callisthenes* in every detail. In particular, we do not know whether Polyzelus’ work was an exoteric or esoteric work and certainly do not know whether it took the form of a dialogue as Theophrastus’ work is likely to have done.¹⁴² Nevertheless, it seems to me quite likely that both authors discussed in detail the role of nature in determining the fate of an individual, and for that reason Alexander felt justified in naming Polyzelus together with Theophrastus and describing their remarks as exceptionally clear, φανερώτατα (line 8).¹⁴³

From what we read in Cicero—“Theophrastus is abused in both the books and the lectures of all philosophers, because in his *Callisthenes* he praised the maxim ‘Fortune rules life, not wisdom’” (493.17–19)—it appears that the *Callisthenes* attracted considerable attention through its emphasis on the power that fortune has over men’s lives. In particular, it influenced the Hellenistic debate concerning τύχη and provoked

¹⁴¹ Gaiser p. 29.

¹⁴² The only place in which this Polyzelus (= no. 6 in *Paulys Realencyclopädie*, Halbband 21.2 [1952] col. 1865) is mentioned is our text 504. That gives us a date *ante quem*, c. 200 AD, but in which century he lived seems unknowable.

¹⁴³ As the text reads, I think it natural to take φανερώτατα not only with Theophrastus but also with Polyzelus. But if others disagree, then I would argue that at very least Alexander is saying that the two authors are alike in holding that what is in accordance with fate is the same as what is in accordance with nature.

criticism of Alexander the Great for ordering the execution of Callisthenes.¹⁴⁴ Most likely the work was a dialogue, in which Theophrastus took the lead role and expressed a strong negative reaction to Alexander's treatment of Callisthenes.¹⁴⁵ Concerning the date of composition, only the date *post quem* is certain: it was written after the death of Callisthenes in 327 BC. Its date *ante quem* is, however, uncertain. It may have been written soon after the death of Callisthenes while Alexander was still alive,¹⁴⁶ or it may have been written at a later date, when Theophrastus wanted to discuss the way in which τύχη affects individual lives.¹⁴⁷ We may compare Plato's *Phaedo*, which was written more than twenty years after the death of Socrates, and the Aristotelian *Eudemus*, which need not have been written immediately after the death of Eudemus.¹⁴⁸

no. 16 *On Lives*, 3 books] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.42 = 1.87

Literature: Zeller (1879) p. 854; Leo (1901) pp. 95–101; Bickel (1915) pp. 213–220; Arnim (1926) pp. 83–95; Walzer (1929) pp. 189–193; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1481, 1487; Joly (1956) pp. 104–157; Wehrli (1967–1978) vol. 3 pp. 58–59, vol. 7 p. 72, vol. 10 pp. 115–120, (1983) p. 512; Dihle (1970) pp. 69–87; Momigliano (1971) pp. 65–89; Moraux (1973) pp. 403–418; Repici (1977) pp. 215–243; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 104–106, (2007a) p. 46; Sollenberger (1984) pp. 236–237; Wehrli-Wöhrle (2004) pp. 529, 550–551

The title Περί βίων, *On Lives*, is found in the first list of Diogenes' catalogue of Theophrastean writings (5.42 = 1.87). It is listed as three books or roles in length.

¹⁴⁴ See, e.g., Dümmler 211–216, Knögel p. 24, Stroux pp. 229–234, Regenbogen col. 1484–1485, Gigon p. 508 and Baldry p. 142.

¹⁴⁵ Hirzel p. 317 thinks that Callisthenes had a speaking part in the dialogue. Perhaps so, but if the execution of Callisthenes was a central topic, it is hard to imagine how he, the victim, played a speaking role, unless there was a dialogue within the dialogue, i.e., unless one of the speakers reported a dialogue which took place prior to the execution and had Callisthenes present as a speaker.

¹⁴⁶ Stroux p. 229 tells us that while Aristotle kept quiet, Theophrastus spoke out. That suggests a date soon after the death of Callisthenes. Cf. Regenbogen col. 1484.

¹⁴⁷ Hirzel p. 317 n. 2 favors a later date. He cites 505, which he assigns to the *Callisthenes*, and argues that the criticism of Alexander would not have been expressed while Alexander was still alive. That is reasonable, but it leaves open how long after the death of Alexander the *Callisthenes* was composed.

¹⁴⁸ Wehrli (1961) p. 322.

Although the word βίος came to be used as a quasi-*terminus technicus* for biography—e.g., Diogenes Laertius refers to Aristoxenus' biography of Plato with the words Πλάτωνος βίος (5.35 = Aristoxenus fr. 66 Wehrli)—it is not clear that members of the early Peripatos used βίος in this way.¹⁴⁹ Be that as it may, it is certain that the Theophrastean work *On Lives* was neither a collection of biographies nor a treatise on biography conceived of as a genre distinct from history and epideictic oratory (encomium and censure). Rather, the work was an investigation of different modes or ways of living with a view to determining which mode is the best. Two other members of the Aristotelian Peripatos are said to have written works entitled *On Lives*.¹⁵⁰ One is Dicaearchus (fr. 33–52 Mirhady), whose work was at least two books long. Almost certainly it championed the life of activity over the life of contemplation. The other Peripatetic is Clearchus (fr. 37–62 Wehrli), whose work ran at least eight books. Most of the fragments come from Athenaeus, who frequently refers to the work by the shorter title *Lives*. That might suggest a series of biographies, but Zenobius always refers to the work by the longer title *On Lives*. In any case, the surviving fragments suggest a comparison of life styles with an emphasis on the negative consequences of a life devoted to pleasure and luxury.¹⁵¹ Only one member of the Aristotelian Peripatos

¹⁴⁹ Concerning the use of βίος, see the cautionary words of R. Lewis, reviewing Momigliano in *The Classical Review* 24 (1974) p. 62. The Greek noun βιογραφία occurs only late in surviving Greek literature. In fact, it is found first in the fragments of Damascius' *Life of Isidorus* (5th–6th century AD) that are preserved by Photius (9th century AD), *Library* 242.8 335b14 (CB vol. 6 p. 9 Henry).

¹⁵⁰ Although I shall soon have occasion to mention Heraclides Ponticus (referring to fr. 88W = 87 Sch), I pass over him here. To be sure, Heraclides is said by Diogenes Laertius, on the authority of Sotion, to have been a pupil of Aristotle (*Lives* 5.86), and a work *On Lives* in two books is recorded in Diogenes' catalogue of Heraclides' writings (5.87). Nevertheless, Heraclides' credentials as a Peripatetic are quite weak, and in my judgment, he is best regarded as a respected member of the Academy. During Plato's third trip to Sicily, Heraclides functioned as acting head of the School, and on the death of Speusippus, he was a candidate to take over the headship of the school (Heraclides, fr. 2 and 9 W = 3 and 10 Sch; see, e.g., U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, *Antigonos von Karystos* = *Philologische Untersuchungen* 4 [1881] pp. 280–281 n. 12, E. Schwartz, "Die Zeit des Ephorus," *Hermes* 44 [1909] pp. 481–482 n. 1, Wehrli [1967–1978] pp. 59–61, and Mejer [2009] pp. 27–28). Be that as it may, it would be a mistake to think that the title *On Lives* is peculiarly Peripatetic. Xenocrates, who was a contemporary of Heraclides and became head of the Academy on the death of Speusippus, wrote a work *On Lives* in one book (D.L. 4.12).

¹⁵¹ Caveat: the fact that the surviving fragments focus on luxury and its unwanted consequences may reflect the interests of Athenaeus and not do justice to Clearchus, who may have devoted considerable space to virtuous living. See fr. 62 on Gorgias. On the basis of this fragment, which comes from the eighth book, Joly p. 138 suggests that

can be said to have written biographies. He is Aristoxenus, who wrote *Lives* of Pythagoras and Archytas, and Socrates and Plato (fr. 11–25, 47–50, 51–60, 61–68 Wehrli). Nevertheless, Aristoxenus appears never to have discussed biography as a genre. And the same is true of Dicaearchus and Clearchus.

Although Aristotle did not write a separate work entitled *On Lives*, he did discuss different modes of life in both the *Nicomachean Ethics* 1.5 1095b14–1096a10, 10.6–8 1176a30–1179a32 and the *Eudemian Ethics* 1.4 1215a26–21.5 1216a29. The focus is on three lives: the political, the philosophic and that of enjoyment (bodily pleasure). The life of material gain is mentioned only to be dismissed.¹⁵² Of the three serious candidates, the philosophic life receives the highest rating. If we begin from these Aristotelian texts, it is tempting to see in the three books that composed Theophrastus' work *On Lives* an indication of the content. Each book will have considered one of the three life styles discussed by Aristotle, and like Aristotle, Theophrastus will have rated the philosophic life highest. That may be the case, but certainty is elusive, for the three lives focused on by Aristotle were not so well canonized that other combinations were impossible. I cite Heraclides Ponticus and his famous comparison with the Olympic games. Here the life directed toward material gain appears alongside that which aims at glory and that spent in contemplation (fr. 88 W = 87 Sch.). Not surprisingly, context and purpose are often determinant, so that in Aristotle's *Politics* the pursuit of wealth is found alongside the life of the tyrant and that of virtue (7.2 1324a8–13). Furthermore, Theophrastus may have addressed other topics in conjunction with or in relative independence from the lives of politics, philosophy and enjoyment. For example, he may have discussed the three lives in the first book and then in the remaining two books discussed topics like marriage and old age.

While *On Lives* was not a collection of biographies, it is likely to have made room for a goodly number of historical examples.¹⁵³ In the *Nico-*

Clearchus, after a review of other modes of life, presented at the end of *On Lives* (i.e., in Book 8) his view of the best life: one lived in accordance with temperance, σωφρόνως (fr. 62.2–3). The idea is interesting: Clearchus' work may have ended with Book 8, but as Joly acknowledges, his suggestion is not a certainty.

¹⁵² NE 1.5 1096a5–7, EE 1.4 1215a25–32.

¹⁵³ Cf. 437.3. I have written historical examples, for history (actual fact) is most persuasive. But Theophrastus may have included mythical examples as well. Cf. Aristotle, NE 10.8 1178b19, who mentions Endymion in order to make clear that a divine life is incompatible with total inactivity. (Endymion, being quite beautiful, was put into a

machean Ethics, in his brief remarks concerning the life of enjoyment, Aristotle refers to Sardanapallus, i.e., the Assyrian king Ashurbanipal (1.5 1095b22). In the *Eudemian Ethics*, he mentions Smindyrides of Sybaris as well (1.5 1216a16–17). Theophrastus could have presented these examples in greater detail and added others for emphasis. See 550, on the self-indulgence that characterized the life of Smindyrides. It is, however, unlikely that Theophrastus shared Clearchus' enthusiasm for the titillating,¹⁵⁴ but see 578. According to Bickel pp. 217–220, Theophrastus' *On Lives* is the source of both the eight historical examples of the ἀγνὸς βίος and the story of Niceratus' wife that are found in Jerome's work *Against Jovinian* 307D–309B, 310C. That is a possibility that can be neither proven nor disproven.

Another possibility is that Theophrastus discussed the views of earlier thinkers. We may compare Aristotle, who cites Anacharsis, Solon and Anaxagoras (*NE* 10.6 1176b33, 10.8 1179a9, 1179a13; *EE* 1.4 1215b17). Theophrastus may have not only cited these and other predecessors for their views but also explained and when necessary criticized their views at length.

Of considerable interest is the section on different modes of living that is found in Arius Didymus' epitome of Peripatetic ethics. It is preserved in Stobaeus' *Anthology* 2.7.24 (p. 143.24–145.10 Wachsmuth). According to Arnim, the section in question is not only a coherent whole but also reports the position taken by Theophrastus in *On Lives*. Arnim's view has been criticized by a string of scholars, who assign the section a comparatively late date: not earlier than the time of Critolaus (the mid-second century BC) and possibly as late as Andronicus (mid-first century BC).¹⁵⁵ I single out Moraux, whose treatment of the passage is detailed and convincing in distinguishing various segments that have been awkwardly combined to create a single section. For our purposes, the most important result of Moraux's investigation concerns the relationship between the life of contemplation and the life of political activity. Although contemplation receives a higher rating than political activity, man's capacity

perpetual sleep by the goddess Moon, who descended and embraced him each night.) For the same point in regard to human life but without an example, see 1.5 1095b31–1096a3.

¹⁵⁴ Here I am assuming that the fragments preserved by Athenaeus do not misrepresent Clearchus' interests. See above, note 151.

¹⁵⁵ See Arnim (1926) 83–95, Walzer pp. 191–192, Joly pp. 149–157 and Moraux (1973) p. 413.

(natural desire) for community, τὸ κοινωνικόν, is explicitly recognized. The morally good man, we are told, will assign greater honor to the life of contemplation and still strive to be active politically (p. 144.7–8); he will assign precedence to the life of contemplation, but he will also as a matter of principle engage in politics (p. 144.18–20). He will lead a σύνθετος βίος (p. 144.16–17). Put differently, however desirable the philosophic life may be, human beings cannot be expected and should not try to live their lives like a disembodied god.¹⁵⁶ They should marry, beget children, experience love in a temperate manner and even on occasion, though not as a matter principle, become drunk (p. 144.8–11). At first reading, such a view may seem out of line with both Theophrastus' preference for the life of contemplation (481) and his remarks on marriage as reported by Jerome (486). But on reflection, we may see in the epitome of Arius a reflection of Theophrastus' considered view. Theophrastus will have defended the life of contemplation against the criticisms of Dicaearchus (481) and at the same time given due recognition to man's innate capacity for community. Moreover, it is unlikely that Theophrastus was as hostile to marriage as we might think, were our reading confined to the words of Jerome (486). We should take note of a fragment preserved in Stobaeus' *Anthology* that attributes to Theophrastus a benevolent interest in family: parents, wife and children (523). In my judgment, this fragment is a better reflection of Theophrastus' considered view. Jerome may be drawing on a dialectical or rhetorical thesis, in which marriage was both attacked and defended.¹⁵⁷ But whatever the truth concerning Jerome's source, I doubt that the work *On Lives* presented marriage as an unqualified evil for the person who would lead a philosophic life. See the immediately following commentary on the work *On Marriage* (436 no. 17).

- no. 17a little-golden book *On Marriage*, or *Little-Golden Book on Marriage*] Jerome, *Against Jovinian* 1.47 (p. 388.11 Bickel) = 486.7, *et al.*
 b *Little-Golden (Book)*, or little golden book] Walter Map, *Of Courtiers' Trifles* 4.4 (310.22 James, Brooke and Mynors), *et al.*
 c *On Marriage*] Peter Blois, *Epistles* 79 (*PL* vol. 207 col. 244A) = app. 486.7–76, *et al.*

¹⁵⁶ Cf. Joly p. 154: un péripatécien sait bien que la vie contemplative pure n'appartient qu'à Dieu.

¹⁵⁷ See my commentary on the rhetorical and poetic fragments of Theophrastus: *Commentary* vol. 8 pp. 83–87.

Literature: Usener (1858) p. 22; Zeller (1879) pp. 858–859; Bock (1898) pp. 40–50, 60–64; Grossgerge (1911) pp. 55–63; Bickel (1915) pp. 213–220; Buddenhagen (1919) pp. 158–172; Walzer (1929) pp. 189–193; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1481, 1487; Joly (1956) pp. 104–157; Wehrli (1967–1978) vol. 4 p. 60, (1983) p. 512; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 106–108, (1994) pp. 24–25; Wehrli-Wöhrlé (2004) p. 551

The earliest occurrence of the title *De nuptiis, On Marriage*, is in Jerome's work *Against Jovinian* (486.7). An equivalent Greek form, e.g., Περί γάμου is not found in Diogenes' catalogue of Theophrastean works, and to the best of my knowledge, it is not found in any other classical or medieval author in connection with Theophrastus. The descriptive adjective *aureolus*, "little-golden," in combination with *liber* is not Theophrastean. In the context of Jerome's treatise, it has an evaluative sense. The Church father is pleased to find an attack on marriage that is attributed to a respected philosopher. But that does not mean that Jerome was the first to apply the adjective to the Theophrastean work. Jerome may have found the adjective in his source.¹⁵⁸ Moreover, the application to a book is not without parallel. See Cicero, *Lucullus* 135 on Crantor's work *On Grief* and the commentary on text 486.

From the above, it is clear that the title *On Marriage* is poorly attested, so that one may doubt that Theophrastus ever wrote an independent work on marriage.¹⁵⁹ The title reported by Jerome may refer to part of a larger treatise like the *Ethics* (436 no. 2a–b), *On Happiness* (no. 12a–b), *On Lives* (16) or *On Friendship* (23a–b). Here we need to distinguish between two questions. 1) In which of his works is Theophrastus likely to have discussed marriage? And 2) from which Theophrastean work is 486 likely to derive? Clearly an inclusive answer to the first question will name numerous works (more than those already named) and throw little light on Jerome's text. The second question is more limited and less speculative in that it takes its start from an existing text. Here are two different answers to the second question.

¹⁵⁸ That Jerome's knowledge of the Theophrastean work is through an intermediary is not to be doubted. See above, "The Sources" no. 29 on Jerome. If Jerome has the particular phrase *aureolus liber* from a source, we cannot assume that the source shared Jerome's reason for using the phrase. In the source, the positive evaluation implied by "golden" might refer to literary features: diction, arrangement, etc.

¹⁵⁹ The fact that no title in Diogenes' catalogue refers to a work on marriage is significant but hardly decisive. The *Metaphysics* (extent) is not included in the catalogue; *On Dispositions* and the *Ethics* (not extent) are also missing from the catalogue.

The first answer is that Jerome's text is drawn from a collection of theses.¹⁶⁰ Diogenes' catalogue of Theophrastean writings includes *Theses* in 24 books (1.118) and *Theses* in three books (1.248). The collections are likely to have been used in the classroom and some at least will have been written in a forceful manner that enlivened instruction. 486 begins by announcing a thesis "Should the wise man marry?" and may well have been included in one of the collections mentioned by Diogenes.¹⁶¹ We know that in later times marriage was a common theme in the rhetorical schools (Quintilian, *Rhetorical Education* 2.4.25; cf. the *Preliminary Exercises* of Aphthonius and Theon 2.50 and 120 Spengel), and the polemical style of 486 and the self-contained argument suggest that Jerome's text goes back to a collection of rhetorical theses. In that case, Seneca, either directly or indirectly, might be Jerome's source.¹⁶² Only this suggestion leaves unexplained why Jerome speaks of a book, and it is not clear that parallels from a later period offer strong support.

The second answer is that Jerome's text derives from Theophrastus' work *On Lives* (436 no. 17).¹⁶³ According to Diogenes' catalogue, that work contained three books. The work will have discussed the lives of contemplation, political activity and pleasure. It might have discussed the wise man and marriage as part of the discussion of contemplation, or it might have discussed the topic separately along with other addenda toward the end of the work. This answer receives some support from a fragment of Philo of Larissa that is preserved in Stobaeus' *Anthology* 2.7.2. Discussion concerning lives is said to take two forms. One is specific and the other general. The latter deals with problems that concern all men. The former focuses on questions that concern specific categories of men, including the question whether the wise man should marry: διττὸς δὲ καὶ ὁ περὶ βίων λόγος, ὁ μὲν ἴδιος, ὁ δὲ κοινός· ὢν τὸν μὲν ἴδιον ἐπισκοπεῖν δέον ἐστὶ τὰ πρὸς ἕκαστον, οἷον εἰ τῷ νοῦν ἔχοντι πολιτευτέον ἢ τοῖς ἡγεμονικοῖς συμβιωτέον ἢ γαμητέον τῷ σοφῷ (vol. 2 p. 41.7–11 Wachsmuth).

Neither of these answers seems to me foolish; forced to choose, I would opt for the first. But that said, I do not want to rule out the possibility that

¹⁶⁰ See Bock pp. 41–44 (drawing on the work of O. Immisch, "Über Theophrasts Charaktere," *Philologus* 57 [1898] 193–212) and Fortenbaugh (1994b) pp. 24–25, reprint 232–234.

¹⁶¹ For fuller remarks on theses see *Commentary* volume 8 (2005c) on rhetoric and poetics pp. 83–87.

¹⁶² See Chapter 2 "The Sources" no. 29 on Jerome.

¹⁶³ Usener p. 22.

On Marriage was a self-contained monograph. Apart from titles that are associated with the name of Aristotle,¹⁶⁴ we should note that Demetrius of Phalerum is reported to have written a work *On Marriage* (Diogenes Laertius 5.81 = fr. 1.93 SOD). Also noteworthy is Dicaearchus' complaint concerning alleged philosophers who investigate whether it is necessary to marry (fr. 36. Mirhady). For the complaint suggests that the topic of marriage was under discussion in the Peripatos.¹⁶⁵ If Theophrastus' *On Marriage* was a monograph, the description "a little golden book" might be thought to rule out a lengthy treatment of the topic. But it is uncertain how much weight can be attached to the description. And even if the book was not particularly long, I would like to think that Theophrastus was able not only to reject with force the negative view set forth in 486,¹⁶⁶ but also to touch upon important topics like the different roles of husband and wife and the affection felt toward each other. But what one "would like to think" often falls short of reality.

no. 18 *On Old Age*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.43 = 1. 88

Literature] Hense (1909) p. cviii; Wilhelm (1911) p. 19; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1481; Fortenbaugh (1948) pp. 108–109; Sollenberger (1984) p. 237; Wehrli-Wöhrlé (2004) pp. 531–532

The title *On Old Age*, Περί γήρως, occurs in Diogenes' catalogue of Theophrastean writings. More precisely it occurs in the first list, which is arranged alphabetically. Περί βίων, *On Lives*, precedes and Περί τῆς Δημοκρίτου ἀστρολογίας, *On the Astronomy of Democritus*, follows. The title is nowhere else attested for Theophrastus, but that is not good reason to doubt what Diogenes' reports. Discussions of old age were common in philosophical literature and not least in the writings of the early Peripatetics. Aristotle devotes a chapter of his *Rhetoric* to the character of old men (2.13 1389b13–1390a27), and not only Theophrastus but also Demetrius of Phalerum wrote a separate work *On Old Age* (Diog. Laert. 2.13, 5.81, 9.20 = fr. 85.7–8, 1.106, 8.1 SOD). In addition, Aristo of Ceus may have done the same (Cicero, *Cato the Elder* 1.3 = Aristo fr. 18 SFOD).

¹⁶⁴ See Rose (1873) pp. 180–182, Bock pp. 17–40, and especially Moraux (1951) pp. 255–257.

¹⁶⁵ Wehrli (1967–1978) vol. 4 p. 60. See below, the commentary on 486.

¹⁶⁶ For a positive view of marriage, see 523.7–11. Moreover, Aristotle's will states that Theophrastus is "to be with" his daughter, should anything happen to Nicanor (Diogenes Laertius 5.13 = 19.15–16 FHS&G). That would be an odd provision were Theophrastus known to be a misogynist.

Also worth mentioning is Bion of Borysthenes, who attended lectures by Theophrastus (Diog. Laert. 4.52) and is reported to have been admired by Aristo of Ceus (Strabo, *Geography* 10.5.6).¹⁶⁷ Bion's sayings on old age are collected by Kindstrand, fr. 62–65.

Wilhelm p. 19 conjectured that the works of Theophrastus and Aristo of Ceus were drawn upon by Cicero when he wrote *Cato the Elder on Old Age*.¹⁶⁸ The idea finds some support in Cicero's own words: *qui (Cato) si eruditius videbitur disputare quam consuevit ipse in suis libris, attribuito litteris Graecis, quarum constat eum perstudiosum fuisse in senectute*; "If he (Cato) seems to argue more eruditely than is his custom in his own books, you shall attribute it to Greek writings, of which he is agreed to have been a keen student in his old age" (3). If the plural *litteris Graecis* can be pressed, Cato will have drawn on several sources among which may have been Theophrastus' *On Old Age*. Moreover, if we keep in mind that Cicero's work *On Friendship* was written shortly after *Cato the Elder* and that that work contained Theophrastean material, then it is reasonable to ask whether Cicero during this period made use of Theophrastean writings more often than he acknowledges.

Since we possess no fragment that is explicitly referred to *On Old Age*—464 on τυμβογέροντες may derive from *On Old Age*, but there are other possibilities (see the commentary on 464)—and no report concerning the form and content of the work has come down to us from a later author, we can make only general observations which may or may not be correct. The work may have been a dialogue, in which Theophrastus presented himself as the primary interlocutor. A mythological figure (like Tithonos in the work of Aristo) is unlikely. It is tempting to believe that Theophrastus composed the work during his old age in order to investigate and to defend his own condition. But that is little more than a guess. Since old age was a common theme, Theophrastus may have addressed it at nearly any point in his career, even when he was a student under Aristotle. Most likely he enumerated the usual complaints (e.g., fewer accomplishments, weakened body, diminished pleasures and approaching death; cf. *Cato the Elder* 5.15), set forth opposing

¹⁶⁷ According to Kindstrand pp. 79–82, Strabo is in error. It was the Stoic Aristo of Chios and not the Peripatetic from Ceus, who sought to emulate Bion of Borysthenes.

¹⁶⁸ In the letter *To Atticus* 14.21.3, Cicero refers to the work as *Cato Maior* and in *On Divination* 2.3 as *De senectute*. Philippson concludes that the work had a double title for which Cicero is responsible ("M. Tullius Cicero," in *Paulys Realencyclopädie* 7A1 (1939) col. 1163).

arguments and emphasized an increase in leisure and wisdom.¹⁶⁹ Perhaps he discussed γηροτροφία, “caring for the aged,” pointing out that children who have been well treated will return the kindness at a later time.¹⁷⁰ That does not mean that Theophrastus will have taken lightly the disadvantages and vulnerability that comes with old age. Aristotle had not only recognized εὐγηρία, “a good old age,” as part of happiness (*Rhet.* 1.5 1360b19–21) but also made clear its dependence upon bodily health and good fortune (1361b27–31). Theophrastus will have done the same. Perhaps he took note of Priam and other mythological/historical figures, who in old age suffered misfortune and died miserably (cf. *NE* 1.9 1100a5–9). Theophrastus’ complaint concerning the brevity of human life—men die before achieving perfection in arts and learning—may have been expressed in *On Old Age*, and from there been transformed into Theophrastus’ dying words (Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations* 3.69 = 34A),¹⁷¹ but that is pure speculation.

In Athenaeus 11.8 463C = 569, we are told that in the work *On Drunkenness* Theophrastus spoke of wine relieving the despondency of old age. That Theophrastus did the same in *On Old Age* is possible but cannot be demonstrated. On Hense’s suggestion that Stobaeus 4.11.16 be attributed to Theophrastus’ work *On Old Age*, see the commentary to 539.

- no. 19a *On Wealth*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.47 = 1.222; Anonymous, *On Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics* 4.2 1121a7 (CAG vol. 20 p. 180.17 Heylbut) = 516.3
- b *On Riches*] Cicero, *On Duties* 2.56 = 514.9, on whom John of Salisbury, *Statesman* 8.2 (p. 234.23 Webb) = app. 514.3–12 depends; Walter Burley, *On the Life and Character of the Philosophers* 68 (p. 286.3 Knust)

¹⁶⁹ Cf. Plato’s *Republic* 1.2–5 328B–331D, where Cephalus records the usual complaints against old age, but also makes clear that the diminution of physical pleasure is accompanied by a greater desire for and enjoyment of rational discourse. In addition, he argues that good character and wealth make old age sufficiently tolerable.

¹⁷⁰ See 523.7–8, where the focus is on the father, who treats well both his children and his wife. In the first book of the pseudo-Aristotelian *Οἰκονομικά*, *Matters of Household Management*, it is stated as a matter of fact that children will repay the benefits that they have received from their parents (1.3 1343b20–23).

¹⁷¹ I am not suggesting that Cicero invented the dying words that he reports. Most likely they were already in the tradition. Eventually they made their way into Arabic literature: see 34B. For two sayings that concern the brevity of life, see 477 and 478.

Literature: Rose (1863) pp. 101–103; Hirzel (1895) pp. 311–312 n. 2; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1487, 1541; Wehrli (1983) p. 494; Fortenbaugh (1984) p. 109; Sollenberger (1984) pp. 328–329; Wehrli-Wöhrle (2004) pp. 529, 532

The title *Περὶ πλούτου*, *On Wealth*, is found in the second list of Diogenes' catalogue. The fact that Aristotle wrote a like-named work, which was almost certainly a dialogue,¹⁷² suggests that the Theophrastean work was also a dialogue. Issues concerning wealth were discussed in other works as well. The value of the life devoted to material gain will have been discussed in *On Lives*, which was three books in length (436 no. 16). Character in relation to material gain was also discussed in *On Dispositions*, which ran more than one book (436 no. 1, 516.2–3). Concerning wealth and character, it should be mentioned that in the *Rhetoric* Aristotle discusses the relation between the two as part of a larger discussion of different types of character. The remarks on wealth and character are quite brief running less than a page in Bekker's edition (2.16 1390b32–1391a19).¹⁷³ It is not impossible that the Theophrastean title refers to a similarly short discussion within a larger work, but the idea is not to be pressed. Both the Aristotelian parallel and the fact that Cicero refers to a book *On Riches*, *liber De divitiis*, in which Theophrastus said many fine things (514.8–9) strongly suggest that Theophrastus' *On Wealth* was an independent work of some length. To be sure, Cicero's report is problematic. He may be dependent on Panaetius, and his criticism of Theophrastus is off the mark (514.9–13). Nevertheless, Cicero is almost certainly correct in referring to a book in which many things were stated in a splendid manner, *multa praeclare*. See the commentary on 514. The relation of *On Wealth* to the *Megarian (Dialogue)* is problematic. See the immediately following commentary on 436 no. 20.

Few details concerning the content of *On Wealth* are reported. According to the Anonymous commentator/scholiast on Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, Theophrastus, in *On Wealth*, referred to Simonides as someone fond of money, φιλάργυρος (516.2). Cicero refers to *On Wealth*, when he criticizes Theophrastus for praising large expenditures on public spectacles (514.9–13), and it is likely that Cicero's report concerning how

¹⁷² Moraux (1951) pp. 27–28, 33.

¹⁷³ The discussion of types of character, ἥθη, runs from 2.12 1388b31 to 2.17 1391b6. The discussion is divided into characters corresponding to differences in age and fortune, καθ' ἡλικίαν καὶ τύχην (2.12–14 and 2.15–17). The discussion of wealth and character occurs under fortune (2.16).

Cimon treated the people of his own district goes back directly or indirectly to *On Wealth* (515.9–13). Cicero's criticism of Theophrastus' praise of lavish outlays on public spectacles is quite wrongheaded, so that one is moved to ask whether Cicero himself ever read *On Wealth*. If he did on some occasion have *On Wealth* in his hands, it seems likely that he read portions in haste and was careless in reporting what he read (See the commentary on 514–515).

The general idea of wealth as an instrument or means for engaging in virtuous action will have been set forth in *On Wealth*. In text 507, which does not refer to any particular Theophrastean work, we find wealth referred to as a tool, ὄργανον, which virtuous men know how to use.¹⁷⁴ Most likely *On Wealth* stands behind 507, but it remains unclear to what extent Theophrastus developed this idea in *On Wealth*. Perhaps the Athenian Cimon was mentioned in order to illustrate how generosity can be combined with self-interest: Cimon both benefited the members of his district and gained goodwill for himself (515.7–10).¹⁷⁵ And assuming that Cicero is correct and Theophrastus did say in *On Wealth* that the capacity for outlays, *sumptuum facultas*, is the fruit of wealth (514.11), we may want to say that Theophrastus classified wealth as a δύναμις, a capacity or power. He may even have developed this idea by marking off δυνάμεις like wealth and political office, from ὠφέλιμα, things that produce and protect δυνάμεις (cf. Stobaeus, *Anthology* 2.7.19 p. 134 Wachsmuth; Alexander, *On Aristotle's Topics* 242.1–9 = Aristotle, fr. 113 Rose; ps. Aristotle, *Magna Moralia* 1183b19–37). But this is guessing, and we may wonder whether a dialogue was the best place to draw such fine distinctions. I say “the best place,” for Plato had made clear that the dialogue format is compatible with careful analysis. But that said, it seems fair to ask whether such distinctions might be more at home in, e.g., the Ἠθικά, *Ethics* (436 no. 2), or the Διαίρεσεις, *Divisions* (68 no. 15).

On the possible identification of *On Wealth* with the *Megarian (Dialogue)*, see the commentary on the latter title (436 no. 20).

¹⁷⁴ Cf. Aristotle, *NE* 1.7 1097a26–27, where wealth and *auloi* are classified as ὄργανα.

¹⁷⁵ The idea that Cimon was motivated both by a desire to benefit others and to acquire a good reputation makes him a useful example of the complexity of human motivation (see the commentary on 514–515). But Cimon's generous side is sometimes passed over in silence. I cite Plutarch's *Life of Cimon* 10.5. There Plutarch reports what Gorgias said about Cimon: τὸν Κίμωνα τὰ χρήματα πᾶσθαι μὲν ὡς χρῶτο, χρῆσθαι δὲ ὡς τιμῶτο, “he acquired money in order that he might use it, and he used money in order that he might be honored.” Here there is no mention of beneficence. Even if others did benefit, Cimon is characterized as having a single goal: namely, to be honored.

no. 20 *Megarian (Dialogue)*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.44 = 1.129 and 6.22 = 511.2

Literature: Hirzel (1895) pp. 311–312 n. 2, 317; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1487, 1541; Huby (1976) p. 267, (2007) p. 12; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 129–130; Sollenberger (1984) pp. 263–264; Döring (1998) p. 280

The title Μεγαρικὸς, *Megarian (Dialogue)*, is found in the first list of Diogenes Laertius' catalogue of Theophrastean writings. Hirzel identifies the work with Περὶ πλούτου, *On Wealth* (436 no. 19). He treats it as a dialogue that takes place in Megara and has Diogenes the Cynic as its leading figure. That is speculation, but by no means foolish. Here are four considerations, which taken together support Hirzel's position. 1) The *Megarian (Dialogue)* and the work *On Wealth* occur in different lists within Diogenes' catalogue: the former in the first and the latter in the second. We know that Diogenes' catalogue contains duplicates that have the same title and occur in different lists (666 no. 13), and it is quite possible that the catalogue also contains duplicates whose titles differ in choice of words. *Varieties of Virtue* and *On Virtue* are two such titles that occur in different lists (436 no. 7 and 8). The *Megarian (Dialogue)* and *On Wealth*, which occur in different lists, have no word in common, but in itself that does not rule out their being duplicates. 2) One title begins with Περί and the other does not. At first blush, that might seem to tell against identifying the two works, but on reflection it is entirely compatible with identity. We may compare Καλλισθένης ἡ περὶ πένθους, which is sometimes referred to in shortened form as Καλλισθένης (15a, b). It is possible that the shorter form predates the fuller form. Περί πένθους will have been added to make clear the subject matter. Similarly in the case of the *Megarian (Dialogue)*, Περὶ πλούτου will have come into use in order to make clear the content, but it never became part of a double title.¹⁷⁶ 3) A work that focuses on wealth would suit the Megarians. Aristotle refers to their misuse of wealth in the production of comedies: the chorus was brought on stage dressed in purple (NE 4.2 1123a23–24). 4) Diogenes the Cynic, to whom Hirzel assigns the lead role, is said to have been in Megara, where he saw sheep covered with leather while the children went naked. He ridiculed the φιλαργυρία and μικρολογία, “love of money” and “meanness” of the Megarians as well as their ἀμαθία and ἀπαιδευσία, “lack of learning” and “lack of education.” See Diogenes

¹⁷⁶ For further discussion of titles beginning with Περί, see the introduction to this chapter on “Titles of Books.”

Laertius 6.41, Plutarch, *On Love of Wealth* 7 526C, Aelian, *Miscellaneous History* 12.56, Stobaeus, *Anthology* 3.321 and Tertullian, *Apologeticum* 39.14. Hirzel suggests that the remarks of Diogenes that are found in these passages occurred in the Theophrastean dialogue. The suggestion cannot be demonstrated with certainty, but it is no wild guess. We can cite Diogenes Laertius, who tells us that in the *Megarian (Dialogue)* Theophrastus recorded an anecdote concerning Diogenes the Cynic. He is said to have discovered how to deal with circumstances by watching a mouse running about “neither seeking a bed nor avoiding darkness or desiring any of the things considered enjoyable” (511). The anecdote is not a direct criticism of the Megarians, but it is compatible with and even an opening for criticism directed at the Megarians’ love of money and lack of good judgment.

Nevertheless, we should not forget that during the time of Theophrastus Megara was associated with a philosophical school that on occasion hit heads with the Peripatos. From Diogenes Laertius, we learn that Eucleides and Stilpo hailed from Megara (2.106, 113), and that the latter wrote a dialogue entitled *Aristotle* (2.120) and took students from Theophrastus (2.113). Eubulides is said to have belonged to the school of Euclides and to have engaged in controversy with Aristotle, saying much to discredit him (2.109). It is possible that this rivalry between schools found a place in the *Megarian (Dialogue)* and that the subjects discussed were varied. Dialectic comes immediately to mind, for Eubulides is generally credited with originating the liar’s paradox (Diog. Laert. 2.108). Aristotle takes note of the paradox in the *Sophistical Refutations* (1.25 180b2–7),¹⁷⁷ and Theophrastus wrote a work about it that ran for three books (68 no. 33).¹⁷⁸ Metaphysics also comes to mind. The Megarians reduced potentiality to actuality, and Aristotle responded critically (*Metaph.* 9.3 1046b29–32). Other possible topics include politics, with which Stilpo was especially identified (he was called πολιτικώτατος, Diog. Laert. 2.114) and comedy, which the Megarians claimed to have invented (Arist. *Poet.* 3 1448a31). It would, however, be a mistake to treat as unimportant the observations presented above concerning the possible identification of the *Megarian (Dialogue)* with *On Wealth*. And we

¹⁷⁷ Döring pp. 215–216 comments that the temporal relationship between Eubulides’ and Aristotle’s treatment of the liar paradox is unclear, and that interest in such paradoxes hardly began with Eubulides and Aristotle.

¹⁷⁸ See Huby (1976) p. 267: the *Megarian (Dialogue)* has “some claim to consideration as a logical title,” and (2007) p. 12: “It is possible that Theophrastus touched on the logical aspect of their (the Megarians’) work.”

should keep in mind that only one text mentions by title the *Megarian* (*Dialogue*), and that text is ethical in orientation. Perhaps, then, the dialogue was primarily but not exclusively concerned with ethical issues. As all too often, there is no certainty here.

- 21 *On Ambition*, 2 books] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.46 = 1.166; Cicero, *To Atticus* 2.3.4

Literature: Heylbut (1876) pp. 10–11, (1884) p. 158; Tyrrell and Purser (1904) vol. 1 p. 256; F. Steinmetz (1967) p. 130; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1486; Fortenbaugh (1984) p. 110; Sollenberger (1984) 292–293

The title *Περὶ φιλοτιμίας*, *On Ambition*, is found in the first list of Diogenes' catalogue of Theophrastus' writings. The list is arranged alphabetically: *Περὶ φιλοτιμίας* follows an ethical title *Περὶ φιλίας*, *On Friendship* (436 no. 23a) and precedes a string of physical titles (on nature and botany), the first of which is *Περὶ φύσεως*, *On Nature* (137 no. 3).

The title *Περὶ φιλοτιμίας* is also found (after emendation) at the end of Cicero's letter *To Atticus* 2.3.¹⁷⁹ In what precedes, Cicero discusses a variety of matters: Hortensius' successful defense of Valerius (sec. 1), windows that are deemed too narrow (sec. 2), agrarian legislation that might be opposed, supported or simply allowed to proceed (sec. 3–4), and domestic arrangements (sec. 4). After that the letter concludes with these words: Θεοφράστου Περὶ †φιλοτιμίας† *adfer mihi de libris Quinti fratris*, "Bring me Theophrastus' †Love of ...† from brother Quintus' books."¹⁸⁰ Here the title of the Theophrastean work is corrupt. The generally accepted emendation,¹⁸¹ *Περὶ φιλοτιμίας*, *Love of Honor* or *On Ambition*, which has been printed in the text-translation volumes, is first found in the margin of the *editio Cratandrina* (1528).¹⁸² In *Quellen*, I defended the emendation, stating that Cicero is requesting the volume at a time when he must make a political decision that will bring strife and praise or peace and leisure, *dimicatio* and *laus* or *pax* and *otium* (sec. 3). Apparently Cicero believed that the Theophrastean work would in some

¹⁷⁹ The letter was written in December 60 BC.

¹⁸⁰ The sentence is not printed later as a separate entry among the ethical texts, e.g., within the section on "Kindness, Honor and Vengeance." It is printed only as part of 436 no. 21.

¹⁸¹ An exception is Heylbut (1876) pp. 10–11.

¹⁸² See the *apparatus criticus* in Watt's edition (1965) together with pp. xii and xxii.

way help in reaching a decision ([1984] p. 110).¹⁸³ That may be correct, but the closing sentence does not follow immediately on the remarks concerning *dimicatio* and *pax*. Domestic matters intervene. Moreover, one can imagine other titles that could be connected with Cicero's political activities. An example is *Περὶ φιλονεικίας*, *On Love of Victory/Rivalry*, which occurs in the margin of a codex Mediceus.¹⁸⁴ In his *Politics*, Aristotle recognizes the danger that *φιλονεικία* poses to stability within a political community (5.6 1305b23, 5.8 1308a31). The dangers of *φιλονεικία* were also recognized by Theophrastus. We have two texts that make the point in regard to private life (526.3, 577B.6), and we can imagine Theophrastus composing a work entitled *Περὶ φιλονικείας*, in which he discussed the dangers of contentiousness in public life as well as private. But aside from this exercise in fantasy, there is no reason to think that a Theophrastean work ever carried this title. That is not true of *Περὶ φιλοτιμίας*. That title is found in Diogenes' catalogue and no other obvious candidate beginning with *Περὶ φιλο*—(or *φιλο*—without *περὶ*) is present in the catalogue. It seems reasonable, therefore, to accept the emendation *Περὶ φιλοτιμίας*, providing we keep in mind that the primary evidence for the Theophrastean title is Diogenes' catalogue and not the Ciceronian letter.¹⁸⁵

The importance of *τίμη*, honor, for the Greeks including the Peripatetics is well known. I cite Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, in which we are told that honor is desirable in itself (7.4 1147b29–30), or not only for itself but also for the sake of happiness, for men assume that honor contributes to happiness (1.7 1097b2–5). Moreover, honor is important for the maintenance of the city-state. Honor is said to motivate citizens to act courageously in defense of the state (3.8 1116a28–29) and to be recompense for the just ruler, whose efforts are intended to benefit other people (5.6 1134b2–7). That does not mean that honor is never troublesome. Being honored is pleasant, so that some people become excessive

¹⁸³ Tyrell and Purser (1904) vol. 1 p. 256 comment that Quintus probably used Theophrastus' work *Περὶ φιλοτιμίας* when in 64 BC he wrote the *Handbook of Electioneering* for Cicero who was a candidate for the consulship. The trouble here is that the authenticity of the work is highly suspect. That is, however, no reason to doubt that Quintus did have the work in his possession and that Atticus did bring the book to Cicero.

¹⁸⁴ See the editions of Orellius (1831) p. 39 and Tyrell (1885) vol. 1 p. 428.

¹⁸⁵ Dirlmeier (1937) p. 63 says that Cicero had a certain knowledge of the original works of Theophrastus and that Cicero's request that Atticus bring him Quintus' copy of *On Ambition* shows that Cicero will have read the book. Assuming that Atticus did bring the book, we may still want to ask how well Cicero will have read the work. See "The Sources" no. 4 as well as the commentary on 436 no. 19b, 493, 497, 498.

in the pursuit of honor. They become, as it were, morally weak in regard to honor (7.4 1147b31–34), or they pursue it hoping for some further benefit. They seek to be honored by persons of power, thinking that they will receive whatever they need from such persons (8.8 1159a17–21).

Aristotle recognizes that a person may or may not be properly disposed toward honor. And in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, he introduces two sets of three coordinate dispositions, of which both sets are concerned with honor: one set deals with great honors and the other with lesser honors. The former is composed of μικροψυχία, μεγαλοψυχία and χαννότης, smallness of soul, greatness of soul or high mindedness and vanity. The latter is composed of ἀφιλοτιμία, ἀνώννυμος and φιλοτιμία, lack of love of honor or lack of ambition, an unnamed mean-disposition and love of honor or ambition (2.7 1107b21–1108a1, 4.3–4 1123a34–1125b25). In the *Eudemian Ethics*, Aristotle focuses on a single set of coordinates, i.e., that set of coordinates which is concerned with great honors: μικροψυχία, μεγαλοψυχία and χαννότης. He does, however, recognize a fourth member,¹⁸⁶ which is concerned with small honors: the person, who is worthy of small honors and lays claim to such, is not marked by greatness of soul, but neither is he blameworthy. And his nature is said to be the same as the man who is characterized by greatness of soul:¹⁸⁷ both lay claim to things of which they are worthy (2.3 1221a10, 3.5 1233a19–25).

There is no reason to doubt that Theophrastus followed Aristotle in broad outline. In regard to the importance of honor, I cite 517 in which we read that honor, in combination with good works and vengeance, holds together the life of men.¹⁸⁸ For the dangers involved in an excessive pursuit of honor, see 467.7–10. And concerning coordinate dispositions, I refer to 449A.11–12, 26–28, in which the three coordinates μικροψυχία, μεγαλοψυχία and χαννότης are listed and the self-assessment of the μεγαλοψυχός is described. That Theophrastus was especially influenced by the *Eudemian Ethics* is suggested not only by the use of the phrase “for the sake of example(s)” to introduce the list of coordinate dispo-

¹⁸⁶ For “fourth” see *EE* 3.5 1233a17, where the adjective is applied to the man of lesser worth who lays claim only to what he is worth.

¹⁸⁷ *EE* 3.5 1233a22–23: καὶ ὁ αὐτός ἐστι τῇ φύσει τῷ μεγαλοψύχῳ. Here φύσις refers to an acquired disposition like that of μεγαλοψυχία. That does rule out an innate component that has been shaped through moral training. See below.

¹⁸⁸ It might be objected that 517 reports a Theophrastean saying in question and answer form, which is so general that it is moveable and might have been attributed to Theophrastus in order to fill a gap in some collection of his sayings. That is, of course, possible but the saying seems not to have been attributed to other persons, and its correctness and generality seem to ensure that Theophrastus would embrace it.

sitions in both the *Eudemian Ethics* 2.3 1120b36 and in 449A.¹⁸⁹ but also by the omission of a set of coordinates concerning lesser honors in both texts. There are, however, grounds for caution, not least that 449A is marred by lacunae and is an abbreviated summary. Moreover, even if abbreviation is emphasized, 449A is not comparable to the treatment of virtues and vices that Aristotle offers in *NE* 3.6–4.5 and in *EE* 3.1–6. Perhaps Theophrastus's *Περὶ φιλοτιμίας* contained a thorough discussion of good and bad dispositions in regard to both large and small honors—the work is reported to have been two books long—but we are not told that, and there may have been other topics that interested Theophrastus more. We may wonder whether *Περὶ φιλοτιμίας* discussed the importance of *φιλοτιμία* as an innate virtue,¹⁹⁰ the role of honor in educating young people¹⁹¹ and appropriate honors for women,¹⁹² all combined with historical examples¹⁹³ and strongly paraenetic passages. But again we are not told.

Finally, I call attention to the fact that the *Characters* contains a sketch of *μικροφιλοτιμία*, petty ambition. The noun and the cognate adjective *μικροφιλότιμος*, are not found elsewhere.¹⁹⁴ The behavior that Theophrastus sketches is quite laughable. E.g., the *μικροφιλότιμος* strives to sit next to his host at a dinner party, takes his son to Delphi for the ceremonial cutting of his hair¹⁹⁵ and sees to it that his attendant is Ethiopian (21.2–4). It is clear that his desire for recognition finds expression in matters of no great importance. He is, therefore, not to be confused with Aristotle's *χαῦνος*, the vain individual, who like the *μεγαλόψυχος*, the highminded or great-souled individual, is concerned with matters of considerable importance (2.7 1107b26, 4.3 1123b8–9).¹⁹⁶ But it is equally clear that the *μικροφιλότιμος* is not to be confused with Aristotle's *ἀφιλότιμος*, who desires honor less than he should (4.4 1125b8).¹⁹⁷ By

¹⁸⁹ The *EE* has *παραδείγματος χάριν* and 449A has *παραδειγμάτων χάριν*. The variation in number (singular vs plural) is unimportant.

¹⁹⁰ See Xenophon, *Education of Cyrus* 1.2.1, mentioned in Chapter IV in the introduction to Section 3 on “Virtue and Vice.”

¹⁹¹ See 467. 3–4.

¹⁹² See 564.

¹⁹³ See 437.3 and the commentary on that text.

¹⁹⁴ LSJ s.v.; Rusten p. 176; Diggle p. 405.

¹⁹⁵ Taking the son to a local temple would suffice.

¹⁹⁶ Here I am siding with Diggle p. 405 against Rusten p. 177.

¹⁹⁷ The Greek noun *ἀφιλοτιμία* suggests a negative disposition, i.e., one that is conceived of in terms of absence. The *ἀφιλότιμος* is marked by an absence of desire for honor. That leaves open what in fact motivates him. We might say that he does not choose to be

presenting a string of acts typifying the μικροφιλότιμος, Theophrastus lets us know that his desire for recognition is not lacking. On the contrary, his desire manifests itself frequently in many different situations, but it is all too often misdirected. In other words, the μικροφιλότιμος fails to understand what brings recognition and what invites laughter. For his dead dog, he builds a monument on which he inscribes “Scion of Malta” (21.9), and when he is a member of the executive committee of the Council, he takes it upon himself to report favorable sacrifices and he does so wearing a white robe and a garland. And that is not enough. When he returns home he tells his wife that he has had an extremely successful day (22.11). Here we have a clever ending that brings the sketch to an end on a delightful note. The ending is not unique. E.g., the sketch of loquacity ends on a similar or even funnier note (7.8).¹⁹⁸ I would like to think that the work *On Ambition* was enlivened by such clever endings, and that in lecture Theophrastus used them not only to amuse his students but also to hold their attention.

no. 22 *On Retribution*, 2 books] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.45 = 1.160

Literature: Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 110–111; Sollenberger (1984) 288; Wehrli-Wöhrle (2004) p. 529

The title Περί τιμωρίας, *On Retribution*, is found in the first list of Diogenes' catalogue. The list is arranged alphabetically: Περί τιμωρίας is preceded by the title Τοπικά, which belongs among the logical titles (68 no. 17) and followed by Περί τριχῶν, which has been assigned to “Human Physiology” (328 no. 13).

No text preserves a fragment/quotation that is explicitly referred to Περί τιμωρίας, and no text offers a report concerning the contents of the work. Since the work is said to have been two books in length, it

honored even for noble accomplishments (cf. *NE* 4.4 1125b10–11) and understand that he has a dispositional aversion to honor. But there are other reasons why a person may lack ambition. He may, for example, be overly concerned with the expense involved in many, if not most, ambitious undertakings. Cf. Theophrastus' sketch of the ἀνελεύθερος, the man who lacks generosity. He wins the tragic competition and then marks his victory by dedicating to Dionysius a mere piece of wood with only his name written on it (22.2). Apparently the expense has deterred him from erecting an impressive monument. Cf. the (spurious) definition, ἡ δὲ ἀνελευθερία ἐστὶν ἀπουσία τις φιλοτιμίας δαπάνην ἐχούσης, “Lack of generosity is an absence of ambition when expense is involved” (7.1).

¹⁹⁸ The children of a loquacious father ask him to talk to them in order that they may fall asleep (7.8). On the clever ending see Fortenbaugh (1994) pp. 19, 25, repr. (2003) pp. 228, 233.

is reasonable to think of an inclusive treatment that discussed the subject from various points of view. In all likelihood, Theophrastus will have considered the interests of both the individual and the larger community, of the city state and the citizen. In regard to the state, he will have pointed out that τιμωρία is important for the maintenance of community life (517) and gone on to recognize that punishment can be imposed for a variety of reasons including deterrence and reformation (see Plato, *Gorgias* 525B–C and *Laws* 908A–909A).¹⁹⁹ Punishing a wrongdoer has the effect of deterring the citizen body in general from engaging in crime and reforming the wrongdoer will ultimately benefit the other citizens, should the wrongdoer be returned to society. Moreover, Theophrastus will have defended capital punishment, deeming it appropriate to especially heinous crimes and to perpetrators who are thoroughly evil (see 584A.195–198, where Theophrastus speaks of a relationship, οἰκειότης, between men and still deems it necessary to destroy those who are driven by their nature and wickedness to do evil). But equally Theophrastus will have emphasized that the principle of appropriate punishment is important in a different way: it restrains a society from imposing spectacular punishments for minor offenses, which may be common and annoying but cannot justify extreme punishment.

In the preceding paragraph, I have focused on τιμωρία *qua* punishment imposed by a community or state on offending individuals. Here I want to underline that individuals themselves often seek revenge and that Theophrastus may well have developed the idea in relation to the emotion of anger. That might be expected, for Aristotle had defined anger as a desire for revenge, τιμωρία (*Rhetoric* 2.2 1378a30, *Nicomachean Ethics* 4.5 1126a22), and recognized that men have an innate capacity for anger (2.5 1105b19–1106a13, 5.8 1135b21). This capacity is not something awful that is best extirpated. Rather, it needs to be so trained that a man becomes angry on the right occasions and in the right way (4.5 1125b31–32), so that he desires revenge that is just and noble (*Rhet.* 1.9 1367a21–22). If Theophrastus did proceed this way in Περί τιμωρίας, he may have added certain practical remarks concerning how best to take revenge. E.g., he may have cautioned against seeking immediate revenge, for when one's anger is fresh and intense, one is likely to do oneself harm. And it is beneficial to conceal one's anger, for revenge is likely to be lost if one's anger is manifest (526, 527A–B). But if Theophrastus did give such

¹⁹⁹ See G. Morrow, *Plato's Cretan City* (Princeton: University Press 1960) pp. 490–491.

advice, I imagine that he was also careful not to overrate revenge. He will have included discussion of situations in which revenge is not to be sought and also stated clearly that it is better to remember those persons who have done one a good turn as against those persons by whom one has been ill-treated. For expressing thanks belongs to a better character than taking revenge (525).

666 no. 10 *On Injustices*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.46 = 1.188

Literature: Regenbogen (1940) col. 1541; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 124–125, (2005b) pp. 98–99; Sollenberger (1984) pp. 305–307; Wehrli-Wöhrle (2004) p. 547

The title Περί τῶν ἀδικημάτων, *On Injustices*, is found in the second list of Diogenes' catalogue. The second list is arranged alphabetically and Περί ἀδικημάτων appears under delta and not under alpha. That might be due to scribal error, but most likely the position in the list is based on the stem of the word ἀδικημάτων, i.e., on the initial delta in δικ-. We may compare the position of Περί παρانونτων, *On Illegalities* (589 no. 20) It, too, occurs in the second list, where it appears to be out of place. It is listed under nu and not pi. But the fact that it occurs immediately after Περί νόμων, *On Laws*, makes clear that its position has been determined by its stem, i.e., by νομ-. An alternative explanation is suggested by Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, in which Chapter 13 of Book 1 begins with these words: τὰ δ' ἀδικήματα πάντα καὶ τὰ δικαιώματα διέλωμεν, "Let us classify all the unjust and just acts" (1373b1). Perhaps the Theophrastean title originally contained a reference to δικαιώματα. If the title ran Περί τῶν δικαιωμάτων καὶ τῶν ἀδικημάτων, we can imagine the eye of a scribe passing from the first τῶν to the second, so that the words δικαιωμάτων καὶ τῶν were omitted. But this explanation, while possible, seems unnecessarily complicated, and even if it were correct, its position in the catalogue would be determined by the stem δικ-, albeit now the initial element in the significant word.

We have listed Περί ἀδικημάτων among the rhetorical titles for several reasons: the second list of Diogenes' catalogue contains all but one of the rhetorical titles; focusing on ἀδικήματα suggests judicial oratory; *Rhetoric* 1.13 not only refers to ἀδικήματα in the opening sentence but also goes on to consider a variety of topics that might well have received fuller explanation in a rhetorical monograph of book/roll length. Nevertheless, a work entitled *On Injustices* is likely to have contained material relevant not only to rhetoric but also to ethics, religion and politics. In this

regard, *Rhetoric* 1.13 is suggestive. Aristotle characterizes doing injustice as voluntary, ἐκούσιον (1373b29), and recognizes that persons who do an unjust act may be acting from choice or passion, προαίρεσις or πάθος, (1373b36) and if from choice then from wickedness (1374a11). Theophrastus is likely to have done the same in *On Injustices*. And like Aristotle, Theophrastus will have seen a connection between being treated unjustly and suffering harm against one's will, ἀκουσίως (1373b30).²⁰⁰ Indeed, in the work *On Piety*, when arguing that it is unjust to sacrifice animals that do no harm (584A.201–202),²⁰¹ Theophrastus approves the sacrifice of fruits, pointing out that when we take fruits from plants it is not against their will, παρὰ ἀκόντων (584A.118). And just as Aristotle introduces natural law and cites Empedocles' injunction against killing animals (1373b14–17), Theophrastus may have done the same (cf. 584A.178–190), albeit within limits and not as part of an argument in favor of vegetarianism.

Also suggestive are Aristotle's remarks on the importance of equity, τὸ ἐπιεικές (1374a18–b23). We are told that written law is necessarily inadequate: it cannot cover all possible cases, so that there are occasions when a violation of the law is not to be treated as a punishable offense. Moreover, mistakes and misfortunes call for sympathy. And when a man does wrong, we should take account of what sort of character he has exhibited in the past and remember the benefits that he has bestowed. None of this escaped the notice of Theophrastus (on written law see 629–630; on mistakes and misfortunes 530; on remembering benefits 525), and we can imagine him discussing them in the work *On Injustice* as well as in other works like *On Laws* (589 no. 19), *On the Voluntary* (436 no. 6) and *On Retribution* (436 no. 22).²⁰²

²⁰⁰ In reading ἀκουσίως, I am accepting the emendation of Richards. If one reads ἐκούσιως, then one must understand it as a reference to the agent who inflicts harm and in doing so acts unjustly. It would be absurd to say that the person who suffers injustice must, ἀνάγκη (1373b29), suffer voluntarily.

²⁰¹ Cf. 584A.223–227. There are serious issues here. In particular, is Theophrastus departing from Aristotle, who held that justice requires having something in common and that there is no justice between men and animals? See my article "Theophrastus: Piety, Justice and Animals" (2003b) pp. 183–186, in which I suggest that Theophrastus need not have laid great weight on a shared capacity to calculate. Rather, he emphasized that animals, like men, experience sensation (531.18–19), and much as it is unjust to cause men pain without good reason, so it is unjust to cause pain to animals that do no harm (584A.201–202).

²⁰² Regenbogen col. 1541 lists *On Injustices* among works that are not to be assigned to a particular area (nichteinzuordnende Schriften). He hazards nothing further. Wehrli-Wöhrlé p. 547 view *On Injustices* as one of several *Stoffsammlungen*, collections of

- no. 23a *On Friendship*, 3 books] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.45 = 1.165
 b *On Friendship*] Gellius, *Attic Nights* 1.3.10 = 534.18 (“in the first book”);
 cf. 8.6 = 543.3, where however the title of the book does not occur;
 Jerome, *On Micah* 2.7 (CCSL vol. 76 p. 509.193) = 532.1; on Jerome
 depend Vincent of Beauvais, *Looking-Glass of History* 5.2 (p. 138 col. 1.5
 ed. Douai 1624) = app. 532.1–3; Walter Burley, *On the Life and Character
 of the Philosophers* 68 (p. 284. 11 Knust) = app. 532.1–3; Francesco de
 Barberino, *The Documents of Love* 7 (vol. 3 p. 194.23–25 Egidi) = app.
 532.1–3

Literature: Heylbut (1876) pp. 1–41; Zeller (1879) pp. 862–863; Regenbo-
 gen (1940) col. 1485–1486; Hommel (1955) pp. 319–323; F.-A. Steinmetz
 (1967) pp. 62–66, 105–108; Wehrli (1983) pp. 491, 494–495; Forten-
 baugh (1984) pp. 111–113; Sollenberger (1984) 291–292; MacKendrick
 (1989) p. 222; Wehrli-Wöhrle (2004) pp. 529, 532

The title Περὶ φιλίας, *On Friendship*, is found in the first list of Diogenes’
 catalogue, where it is described as three books in length (1.165). Jerome,
 too, reports the title and the number books. He adds that Theophrastus
 preferred friendship to all other forms of affection and witnessed to its
 rarity in human affairs (532). Gellius tells us that in the first book of *On
 Friendship* Theophrastus discussed whether one ought ever to do wrong
 for the advantage of friends (534). There are other reports concerning
 Theophrastus’ doctrine of friendship, but none refers explicitly to the
 work *On Friendship*. That is regrettable, for we would like to know what
 this comparatively long work contained and how it related to other
 Theophrastean writings (it has been suggested that *On Kindness* and *On
 Flattery* were parts of *On Friendship*)²⁰³ and to Aristotle’s several writings
 on friendship: the work entitled *On Friendship* (Diogenes Laertius 5.22),
 the relevant books of the *Nicomachean* and *Eudemean Ethics* (NE 8–9 and
 EE 7) and the two books of theses concerning friendship (Diog. Laert.
 5.24). If Morraux is correct that Aristotle’s work *On Friendship* was a
 dialogue,²⁰⁴ it is tempting to say that Theophrastus’ writing was a dialogue

material, which exhibit an interest in the empirical, i.e., in individual cases. That may
 be correct, but such a characterization of the work strikes me as risky, for we have no text
 that quotes from the work or offers a report concerning its contents. In addition, there
 is no reason why a collection cannot be well organized according to content and make
 room for general conclusions based on the collected material.

²⁰³ See the commentary on 436 no. 24 and 25.

²⁰⁴ Moraux (1951) pp. 43–44 thinks it probable that the Aristotelian work *On Friend-
 ship* was a dialogue identical with the *Menexenus*, which is mentioned earlier in Diogenes’

inspired by the work of his teacher. The fact that the Theophrastean work is reported to have contained three books is not a serious objection. As we know from Plato, dialogues could be long as well as short. But given the importance and space that Aristotle assigned to the topic (it is discussed at length in both the NE and EE), I am inclined to believe that the Theophrastean work was an inclusive treatise, which drew distinctions between different kinds of friendships (533), took notice of other forms of affection like kindness (532), and addressed issues that could be regarded as theses, e.g., whether a man should act contrary to the law for the sake of a friend (532). Other topics will have been discussed, some in depth and some in passing, but to establish with certainty a list that approaches completeness, we need more texts that refer explicitly to *On Friendship*.

In order to develop a better idea of what Theophrastus' work *On Friendship* contained, Heylbut adopted the following principle: material found in both Cicero's *Laelius* (*De amicitia*) and Plutarch's *Moralia* is attributable to Theophrastus. This principle made it possible for Heylbut to collect much interesting material, but it did not enable him to rise above the level of speculation. Moreover, Heylbut felt obliged to concede that it is not only possible but also probable that Cicero himself did not read the Theophrastean work but was familiar with it through an intermediate source (pp. 36–39). In this regard, two facts should be underlined. First, nowhere in the *Laelius* does Cicero refer to Theophrastus. That is, however, quite in line with Cicero's desire to present the dialogue's leading figure, i.e., Laelius as someone not given to studying the writings of Greek philosophers.²⁰⁵ Second, in *Attic Nights*, Gellius does not say that Cicero read the Theophrastean work. Rather, he says, *eum librum M. Cicero videtur legisse, cum ipse quoque librum de amicitia componeret*. "Marcus Cicero seems to have read this book, when he himself was likewise composing a book *On Friendship*" (1.3.11 = 534.18–19). I do not want to overlook the fact that Gellius goes on to say, *et cetera quidem, quae sumenda a Theophrasto existimavit ... sumpsit et transposuit commodissime aptissimeque*. "And indeed other material that he thought

Catalogue (5.22). The work had a double title, *Menexenus* or *On Friendship*. Originally Diogenes' list will have mentioned only the *Menexenus*. The alternative title entered the catalogue in two steps: it was first a marginal note and subsequently made its way into the catalogue in the wrong place. The *Menexenus* referred to in the title will have been the friend of Lysis, for whom the Platonic dialogue is named.

²⁰⁵ We may compare the case of Empedocles. Instead of naming him, Laelius is made to speak vaguely of "a certain learned man from Agrigentum" (24).

ought to be taken from Theophrastus ... he took and translated in a most pleasing and apt manner" (534.20–22). This additional observation omits a qualifying "seems," but that is not to be pressed. For the omission is only an example of what writers all too often do: they first express themselves in a qualified manner, and then in what follows they omit any qualification and speak as if there can be no doubt or hesitation. Moreover, it is possible and perhaps likely that Gellius knew the Theophrastean work only through excerpts and therefore was in no position to assert with confidence that Cicero had direct knowledge of that work.²⁰⁶ That is not to deny that there were points of contact between the Ciceronian and the Theophrastean works and that these points of contact prompted the remarks of Gellius. But that is entirely compatible with Cicero's use of an intermediate source.

Modern scholars have already devoted considerable energy to identifying Cicero's source, and they may be expected to continue their efforts. Here I limit myself to stating briefly a theory that I find economical and plausible: namely, that when Cicero wrote the *Laelius*, he worked only or at least primarily with Panaetius' Πεὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος, *On the Appropriate*. The words of this Stoic would be especially fitting in the mouth of Cicero's leading figure, for Panaetius was the teacher and friend of Laelius. In addition, the appearance of Theophrastean material in the *Laelius* would be easy to explain, for Panaetius is said to have spoken continuously of other philosophers including Theophrastus (Cicero, *On Ends* 4.79 = fr. 55 v. Straaten).²⁰⁷

In his book *Die Freundschaftslehre des Panaitios*, F.-A. Steinmetz has advanced this theory in its strongest form: Panaetius is Cicero's sole source. I shall not attempt to report, let alone to analyze, everything asserted by Steinmetz. Instead, I want to call attention to Steinmetz's view that Cicero took Theophrastean material that Panaetius had included in his own work and presented it in two places as the reflections of Scipio.²⁰⁸ In the first of these places (*Laelius* 33–35), we read, *haec ita multa quasi fata impendere amicitii, ut omnia subterfugere non modo sapientiae, sed etiam felicitates diceret sibi videri*. "So many (dangers) of this kind, he would say, hang like (evil) fates over friendships" (35). A connection with 493.18–19 is obvious: *quod in Callisthene suo laudavit illam senten-*

²⁰⁶ See F.-A. Steinmetz pp. 112–114.

²⁰⁷ *On Ends* 4.79: *semperque habuit in ore Platonem, Aristotelem, Xenocratem, Theophrastum, Dicaearchum, ut ipsius scripta declarant*.

²⁰⁸ Steinmetz pp. 62–66, 105–108.

tiam, “*vitam regit fortuna, non sapientia*.” “Because in his Callisthenes he (sc. Theophrastus) praised the maxim ‘Fortune rules life, not wisdom.’”²⁰⁹ Also noteworthy is the following: *mutari etiam mores hominum saepe dicebat, alias adversis rebus, alias aetate ingravescente*. “He used to say that frequently, too, the dispositions of men are changed, sometimes by adverse occurrences and sometimes by the increasing burdens of age” (33). We may compare 462.6, where we are told that Theophrastus adequately demonstrated that virtue can be lost, and 463.5–6, where we learn that Theophrastus responded in the affirmative to the question, εἰ πρὸς τὰ τύχης τρέπεται τὰ ἥθη καὶ κινούμενα τοῖς τῶν σωμάτων πάθεσιν ἐξίσταται τῆς ἀρετῆς, “whether character traits shift in response to fortunes, and being changed by bodily affections they cease to be virtuous.” In the second of the two places (*Laelius* 59–60), we find Scipio endorsing *diligentiam in amicitii comparandis*, “diligence in forming friendships” (60). That agrees with Theophrastus’ statement: *prudētis officiū amicitiam probatam appetere*. “It is the role of a prudent man to strive for a friendship that has been tested” (538D.1–2). Also of interest is the sentence: *quin etiam si minus felices in diligendo fuissetem, ferendum id Scipio potius quam inimicitiarum tempus cogitandum putabit*. “Indeed, even if we had been unfortunate in selecting (a friend), Scipio was of the opinion that we should endure rather than think of an opportunity for breaching the friendship” (60). While no exact parallel is attributed to Theophrastus, we do have texts that consider the possibility of reconciliation instead of rupture (538F.4–5, 543.1–3). In any case, it is, I think, certain that Theophrastus rejected the saying that is attributed to Bias, *ita amare oportere, ut si aliquando esset osurus*, “one ought to love as if at some time one is going to hate” (59).²¹⁰ Only Theophrastus’ rejection will have avoided Scipio’s exaggerated assertion: *necesse erit cupere et optare ut quam saepissime peccet amicus, quo pluris det sibi tamquam ansas ad reprehendendum*, “it will be necessary that he desire and hope that the friend do wrong as often as possible and in doing so give him, as it were, more handles to grab hold of” (59).

Here two caveats are in order. First, in focusing on passages in which reference is made to Scipio and in relating these passages to certain Theophrastean texts, I do not want to give the impression that Cicero regards Scipio as a spokesman for Theophrastus. That is not the case. Indeed, Cicero can mention Scipio for a variety of reasons. For example,

²⁰⁹ See Dirlmeier (1935) p. 89 n. 1.

²¹⁰ Despite 546.4.

the brief reference to Scipio in section 62 may be intended *inter alia* to bind together two different parts of the dialogue and to assign a special importance to the new material. But that does not mean that the content of 62 is unrelated to Theophrastus. The complaint that men are careless in selecting friends, *in amicis eligendis neglegentis esse*, is obviously related to 538A–F.²¹¹ Second, much of the material presented in the preceding paragraph is an expression of everyday experience. Steinmetz may be correct that Cicero draws heavily on Panaetius and through him on Theophrastus. But often Cicero may be drawing on his own experience without paying attention to what his predecessors may have said or not said.²¹² Decisions concerning individual cases are all too often guesses whose probability varies from case to case.

no. 24 *On Kindness (or Grace)*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.48 = 1.240

Literature: Regenbogen (1940) col. 1486; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 114–115, (2005c) pp. 126–130; Sollenberger (1984) pp. 344–345; Wehrli-Wöhrle (2004) p. 529

The title Περὶ χάριτος, *On Kindness (or Grace)*, is found in the second list of Diogenes' catalogue of Theophrastean writings. Whether the title refers to a rhetorical work or to an ethical work has been a matter of scholarly debate. We have preferred the latter possibility but there are reasons to prefer the former, so that we have placed a reference in the list of rhetorical-poetic titles (immediately after 666 no. 17a–b) to Περὶ χάριτος in its present position. In addition, I have discussed the title in the *Commentary* on rhetoric and poetics.²¹³ The reader interested in rhetorical issues can consult that discussion. Here I limit myself to two observations. First, although the position of the title within the second list is of little importance—the list is organized alphabetically according to the important word, so that Περὶ χάριτος appears toward the end immediately before Χαρακτῆρες ἠθικοί, *Ethical Characters* (436 no. 4a)—occurring in the list is of some significance, for all but one of the rhetorical titles are found in the second list.²¹⁴ That at least prompts one to ask whether the title Περὶ χάριτος refers to a rhetorical work.

²¹¹ See F.-A. Steinmetz 115–119.

²¹² Cf. MacKendrick p. 220.

²¹³ *Commentary* vol. 8 (2005c) pp. 126–130.

²¹⁴ *Ibid.* p. 49.

Second, connecting χάρις with rhetoric did not begin with Theophrastus and did not stop with him. Well known is Plato's *Gorgias* 462C, where Socrates is made to characterize rhetoric as a knack or skill in producing gratification and pleasure: χάριτός τινος καὶ ἡδονῆς ἀπεργασίας (ἐμπειρία). And Aristotle discusses χάρις in the *Rhetoric* as an emotion important to persuasion through the hearer, i.e., as important to emotional appeal *qua* oratorical means of winning the favor of one's audience (2.7 1385a16–b10). Moreover, after Theophrastus writers on rhetoric continued to discuss χάρις. Especially relevant is the fact that χάρις found a place within Peripatetic discussions of style. The treatise *Περὶ ἑρμηνείας*, which the manuscripts falsely attribute to Demetrius of Phalerum, contains a long discussion of χάρις (128–162), whose roots go back to the early Peripatos.²¹⁵ It also contains Theophrastus' definition of κάλλος ὀνόματος, beauty in a word (687.2–3), which in context is regarded as producing a charming style: ποιεῖ εὖχαριν τὴν ἑρμηνείαν (173). In Diogenes' catalogue of writings by Demetrius of Phalerum, a work *Περὶ χάριτος* is listed. It occurs between *Περὶ πίστεως* and *Περὶ τύχης* (5.81). Wehrli thinks the position important, for he holds that both of the surrounding works are ethical.²¹⁶ That has been doubted by Grube, who thinks that both *Περὶ πίστεως* and *Περὶ χάριτος* can have a rhetorical orientation.²¹⁷ I agree with Grube that *Περὶ πίστεως* can be rhetorical (πίστις is fundamental to rhetoric),²¹⁸ but *Περὶ τύχης* is almost certainly ethical.²¹⁹ In any case, I hesitate to put much weight on a particular position within a book list, for random placement or misplacement either by the composer of a list or by a scribe is common.

Regenbogen col. 1486 regards *Περὶ χάριτος* as an ethical title and suggests that it refers to a part of the work *Περὶ φιλίας*, *On Friendship*, which Diogenes records as being three books in length (436 no. 23a). The suggestion is hardly foolish. Aristotle lists χάρις among the causes of friendship (*Rhet.* 2.4 1381b35), and within the Nicomachean discussion

²¹⁵ F. Solmsen, Demetrios ΠΕΡΙ ΕΡΜΗΝΕΙΑΣ und sein peripatetisches Quellenmaterial, *Hermes* 66 (1931) pp. 262–263; Regenbogen col. 1524; G. Grube, *A Greek Critic: Demetrius on Style* (Toronto 1961) pp. 30–32.

²¹⁶ Wehrli (1967–1978) vol. 4 pp. 61–62.

²¹⁷ Grube, *op. cit.* p. 52.

²¹⁸ Aristotle draws a fundamental distinction between ἐντεχνοὶ and ἄτεχνοι πίστεις and divides the latter into three kinds (*Rhet.* 1.2 1355b35–1356a20). According to Diogenes Laertius, Theophrastus wrote a work *Περὶ τῶν ἀτέχνων πίστειν* (5.46 = 1.177 = 666 no. 8).

²¹⁹ In his edition of the fragments of Demetrius of Phalerum (2000) pp. 145–146, David Mirhady treats both *Περὶ τύχης* and *Περὶ χάριτος* as ethical (fr. 81 no. 1 and 10).

of friendship, he takes notice of χάρις conceived of as gratitude in return for a good deed (9.7 1167b24). In addition, it seems significant that in Arius' summary of Peripatetic ethics, χάρις is discussed immediately after friendship (Stobaeus 2.7.23 p. 143.18–23 Wachsmuth). Among our Theophrastean texts, Gellius' discussion of doing wrong in order to assist a friend is especially relevant, for it tells us that Theophrastus discussed the topic in the first book of *On Friendship* (534.15–18). Assisting a friend contrary to justice would be an act of favor or kindness (cf. Favorinus' definition of χάρις [534.15–18]), but we cannot conclude on the basis of what Gellius tells us that the title reported by Diogenes, i.e., Πεὶ χάριτος refers to a part of *On Friendship*, let alone to the first book of that work.

In the absence of additional evidence, I am inclined to believe that Πεὶ χάριτος was an independent monograph, in which χάρις was discussed not only in relation to friendship but also in relation to justice and other aspects of human community. We may compare *Nicomachean Ethics* 5.5, where Aristotle says that the permanence of community depends upon reciprocal exchange and then adds that men erect a sanctuary of the Graces, Χαρίτων ἱερόν, in a prominent place in order to promote reciprocity, which is a special characteristic of χάρις (1132b33–1133a5). That Theophrastus concerned himself not only with χάρις as doing favors or kindnesses but also as essential to the maintenance of human community is attested (517.1–2, 518.2–14), and in my judgment Theophrastus is likely to have discussed such topics at length in Πεὶ χάριτος. Hence, the translation *On Kindness*. That need not exclude some discussion of χάρις from other points of view: e.g., as a graceful or pleasing manner that makes one popular and may have an adverse affect on the assignation of honors or offices (519.1–2), or as a graceful or charming use of words that pleases the listener or reader and at the same time can make a person uncritical in regard to content.²²⁰ As often observed, one book or roll provides room for a variety of topics succinctly discussed.

I have mentioned above that in the *Rhetoric* Aristotle discusses χάρις as an emotion important to persuasion through the hearer. One interesting feature of the discussion is that Aristotle defines χάρις as assistance or service, ὑπουργία, rendered to someone in need, not in return for anything and not in order that the man rendering assistance gain something

²²⁰ Cf. Plato's *Laws*, in which the Athenian stranger explains χάρις in terms of pleasure and argues that χάρις should function as a standard only in cases that do not involve issues of correctness and utility (2.10 667B–E).

but that the person being assisted gain something (2.7 1385a17–19). Neither in the definition nor in the subsequent discussion is there mention of pleasure or pain, ἡδονή or λύπη, on the part of the person rendering assistance. To be sure, Aristotle does mention the pain felt by the person in need of assistance (1385a22, 25, 32), but that is different from the pain or pleasure that a person rendering assistance might be thought to experience. Here silence may be a virtue, for it is not clear that a person rendering service need feel anything at all. He might simply recognize need and respond in a helpful manner. If that is a real possibility (and I think it is), we might say that χάρις is a practical emotion. That does not preclude the occurrence of pleasurable and painful feelings, but such feelings are not essential to χάρις any more than feeling pain is essential to μῖσος, hate. On practical emotions, see Chapter IV, the introduction to Section 2 on “Emotion.”

We should not forget that χάρις begets χάρις (Sophocles, *Ajax* 522). One good turn deserves another. The beneficiary of an act of kindness is likely to be kindly disposed toward his benefactor and to make a return (1.13 1374a23–24). As already stated above, reciprocity is important for holding together human community. It is also a card in the orator’s bag of tricks. Defending a client, he portrays the defendant as a benefactor. The jury is moved and responds favorably. Such a jury may well experience pleasure in remembering past benefits, feel pained by the defendant’s predicament and take pleasure in acquitting the defendant. Similarly, everyday citizens probably feel some level of discomfort when a benefactor is in distress. They are also apt to remember with some pleasure past benefits and to feel good about rendering assistance. But here it may be appropriate to add “for the most part” (*EE* 2.2 1220b12–14). See the introduction to the section on “Emotions,” below, p. 248.

Given what has already been said, I do not think it odd to analyze χάρις as a practical emotion—or more cautiously, to analyze χάρις *primarily* in terms of action. That is what Aristotle does in his account of the emotions in *Rhetoric* 2.7, and Peripatetics after him seem to have continued to offer such an analysis. I cite Arius’ summary of Peripatetic ethics, in which three definitions of χάρις are given: χάριν δὲ λέγεσθαι τριχῶς, τὴν μὲν ὑπουργίαν ὠφελίμου αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου ἔνεκα, τὴν δ’ ἄμειψιν ὑπουργίας ὠφελίμου, τὴν δὲ μνήμην ὑπουργίας τοιαύτης. “χάρις is used in three ways: providing useful assistance (to another) for the sake of that person himself, returning useful assistance, remembering such assistance” (Stobaeus, *Anthology* 2.7.23, p. 143.18–20 Wachsmuth). Arnim comments that only the last of these definitions is tied to πάθος. The

first two define πράξεις.²²¹ Arnim's comment is intelligible. The first two definitions mention actions, ὑπουργία, ἄμειψις ὑπουργίας, that are only loosely (if at all) tied to pleasant and painful feelings in the sense of passive affections or sensations. The third definition mentions remembering (being mindful of) beneficial assistance, and as noted above, memory of past assistance is likely to be pleasant. If sensations are deemed essential to πάθος, then a definition in terms of action without explicit mention of pleasure or pain (like the first two definitions) would be faulty through omission. And since the *Rhetoric* and the *Nicomachean Ethics* offer definitions of πάθος that include pleasure and pain, Arnim might seem to be on solid ground. But I do not think so. The definition found in the *Rhetoric* is clearly slanted toward rhetoric (it focuses on altering the judgment of the audience) and is not intended as a general definition. The definition in the *Nicomachean Ethics* is not in full agreement with that found in the *Eudemian Ethics*, where the qualifier "for the most part" is added. And neither can be said to capture the essence of emotional response (both are little more than lists, with no mention of the beliefs that are the efficient cause of emotional response).

To what extent Theophrastus addressed these issues in Περὶ χάριτος cannot be ascertained. According to 518.8–10, he held that χάρις is not to be regretted: it brings praise from those who have been well-treated. As stated, that may well go back to Περὶ χάριτος. But no text tells us how or even whether Theophrastus explained the connection between χάρις and pleasure and pain. So too no text explicitly relates χάρις to a particular moral virtue. A connection with justice comes to mind, but it is best not to speculate further.

- no. 25 *On Flattery*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.47 = 1.206; Athenaeus, *The Sophists at Dinner* 6.65 254D = 547.1

Literature: Petersen (1854) p. 77; Ribbeck (1884) pp. 17, 32, 83; Heylbut (1888) pp. 27–33; Kayser (1910) pp. 347–358; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1486; P. Steinmetz (1960b) vol. 2 p. 45; Gargiulo (1981) p. 124; Wehrli (1983) p. 495; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 115–118. (2005b) pp. 126–130; Sollenberger (1984) pp. 316–317; Gallo-Pettine (1988) pp. 20, 181, 189; Wehrli-Wöhrle (2004) p. 532²²²

²²¹ Arnim (1926) p. 76; cf. Moraux 1972 p. 402.

²²² On flattery and the flatterer in general, see (in addition to Ribbeck cited above under "Literature") W. Kroll, "Kolax" in *Paulys Realencyclopädie* 11.1 (1922) col. 1069–1070, E. Wüst, "Parasitos" in *Paulys Realencyclopädie* 18.4 (1949) col. 1381–1397; N. Fischer,

The title *Περὶ κολακείας*, *On Flattery*, is found in the second list of Diogenes' catalogue of Theophrastean writings (1.206). It is reported to have been one book in length. The title occurs in only one other place: text 547, which is quite brief (just over five lines long). Another text, 548, which is even shorter (four lines), mentions flatterers, but it cannot be assigned to *On Flattery* with certainty. (See the commentary on this text.) It is, therefore, difficult to state what the work *On Flattery* contained, not only because the evidence is meager but also because the topic can be discussed from various points of view. Ethical issues may well have been paramount, but it is not only possible but also likely that *On Flattery* included material that is primarily political in orientation: cf. Aristotle's *Politics* 4.4 1292a4–28, where demagogues in democracies are compared with flatterers in tyrannies. Along with political material, some mention of rhetoric might be expected: cf. Plato's *Gorgias*, in which rhetoric is presented as a subdivision of flattery, which aims at providing pleasure without considering what is best (463A–C, 464E–465A). The Theophrastean work may have also made room for lexicographical and historical matters: cf. the *Gergithius* of Clearchus of Soli, a Peripatetic and Theophrastus' contemporary, who discussed the origin of the name "flatterer" and reported the practices of "aristocratic flatters" on Cyprus (ap. Athenaeus 6.67 255C–6.70 257C, 6.72 258A–B = fr. 19, 20 Wherli). Finally, it is easy to imagine Theophrastus making reference to comedy: flatterers appeared frequently on the comic stage²²³ and Menander, Theophrastus' pupil, wrote a work entitled the *Flatterer*, which seems to have been produced soon after 315 BC during Theophrastus' headship of the Peripatetic School.²²⁴ What I hesitate to attribute to Theophrastus is an interest in titillating details. Wehrli mentions Clearchus' interest in such details (ap. Athenaeus 256F–257C = fr. 19),²²⁵ but I know of no text that justifies attributing a similar interest to Theophrastus.

Below in the introduction to the section on "Flattery," I call attention to the fact that Aristotle differs in his treatment of flattery in the *Nicomachean* and *Eudemian Ethics*. In the former, flattery is explicitly tied to a specific goal: advantage or gain. In the latter, no specific goal is

"The Bad Boy, The Flatterer and the Sykophant: Related Forms of the *Kakos* in Democratic Athens" in *Kakos*, ed. I. Sluiter and R. Rosen (Leiden: Brill 2008) pp. 185–209.

²²³ Ribbeck pp. 30–31 counts some seventy-five comedies, in which flatterers or parasites appeared.

²²⁴ See A. Gomme and F. Sandbach, *Menander: A Commentary* (Oxford 1973) p. 422.

²²⁵ Wehrli (1967–1978) vol. 3 p. 52.

mentioned. That may be significant, when one takes account of Theophrastus' sketch of the flatterer in the *Characters*. For if we ignore the definition (reject it as spurious), what we have is a string of typical acts: e.g., the flatterer accompanies another person and compliments him (2.2), he removes a speck of wool from someone's coat (2.3) and laughs at frigid jokes. Why the flatterer acts in these ways is not stated, so that it is difficult to draw a sharp distinction between the flatterer, κόλαξ, and the person who is obsequious or complaisant, ἄρεσκος. Both kiss the children of their host (2.6, 5.5), and both regularly act in ways that are pleasing. We might say that each is marked by a manner that is manifested throughout his behavior without being tied to some one goal or motive. (See the commentary on 547.) In regard to flattery, Aristotle's *Politics* 5.9 1313b41–1314a1 is suggestive. For here interacting humbly, ταπεινῶς ὁμιλεῖν, is said to be the function of flattery, ἔργον κολακείας. That suggests construing flattery as a stylistic trait, i.e., a superficial behavioral regularity that occurs independently of a single motive or deeper lying belief.

The work *On Flattery* will have been related in various ways to other works of Theophrastus. Heylbut suggests that *On Flattery* was part of *Περὶ φιλίας*, *On Friendship*, which was three books in length (436 no. 23). While that cannot be proven, we can say that both works are likely to have not only distinguished between flattery and friendship, but also to have expressed disapproval of the former and approval of the latter. The distinction between flattery and friendship may also have found a place in the Ἐρωτικός, *Concerning Eros* (436 no. 21). We may compare Clearchus, who in the first book of his *Erotica* said that no flatterer suffices for friendship, for time exposes his false pretences (ap. Athenaeus 6.66 255B = fr. 21 Wehrli). Since flattery can be viewed as a mode of interaction (ὁμιλεῖν),²²⁶ *On Flattery* and the Ὀμιλητικός, *Concerning Social Interaction* (436 no. 32), may have overlapped at least to some extent. Finally, I mention Kayser's thesis that the work *Περὶ ὑποκρίσεως*, *On Delivery* (666 no. 24) was an ethical treatise similar in content similar to *On Flattery*. Comparison with Eustathius' *Περὶ ὑποκρίσεως* can add some support to Kayser's thesis, but ultimately it must be rejected.²²⁷ It is, I think, quite certain that the Theophrastean work was primarily concerned with oratorical and stage delivery. See *Commentary* 8 (2005c) on rhetoric and poetics pp. 145–150.

²²⁶ See ps.-Plato, *Definitions* 415E9–10, Arist. *NE* 4.6 1126b11–1127a12 and *Politics* 5.9 1313b41–1314a1 cited above.

²²⁷ See Regenbogen col. 1527 and Fortenbaugh (1985a) p. 281.

- no. 26 *On Pleasure*, like that of Aristotle, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.44 = 1.116
- no. 27a *On Pleasure*, another (work), 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.44 = 1.117
- b *On Pleasure*] Athenaeus, *The Sophists at Dinner* 6.105 273C = 550.5; 8.39 347E = 553.2; 12.3 511C = 551.3; 12.31 526D = 549.1

Literature: Koepke (1856) pp. 42–47; Usener (1858) p. 18; Rose (1863) pp. 87–88; Scorza (1934) pp. 41–43; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1483–1484; Moraux (1951) pp. 36–37; Bignone² (1973, repr. 2007) pp. 256, 264–265; Giordano (1977) pp. 106–107; Wehrli (1983) pp. 511–512; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 118–119, (2005c) p. 134; Sollenberger (1984) 252–253; Wehrli-Wöhrle (2004) p. 550

The titles Περί ἡδονῆς ὡς Ἀριστοτέλης, *On Pleasure* like that of Aristotle, and Περί ἡδονῆς ἄλλο, *On Pleasure*, another (work), are found next to each other in the first list of Diogenes' catalogue. The fact that the second title is marked by "other" underlines the fact that the compiler of the list²²⁸ viewed the titles as referring to two different works.²²⁹ The unqualified title Περί ἡδονῆς, *On Pleasure*, does not occur in Diogenes' catalogue. Rather it is found four times in Athenaeus' *The Sophists at Dinner*.

We can compare the title Περί ἡδονῆς ὡς Ἀριστοτέλης with the title Πολιτικῆς ἀκροάσεως ὡς ἡ Θεοφράστου α'-ή, which occurs in Diogenes' catalogue of Aristotelian works (5.24). Since this political work is said to have contained 8 books, it is tempting to follow Usener p. 16 and Regenbogen col. 1365 and to identify the work with the existing Aristotelian *Politics* (it contains 8 books) and to posit a relationship to two Theophrastean works, Πολιτικῶν α'-ζ' (6 six books) and—on one reading—Πολιτικῶν α'-β' (2 books), both of which are found in Diogenes' catalogue (5.45 and 50 = 589 no. 1 and 2). Similar form and content might be supposed,²³⁰ but the identification involves a reading that goes against the evidence of the better manuscripts. Πολιτικοῦ α'-β' is to be preferred in 5.50,²³¹ and the title is to be understood as referring to a dialogue and not to an esoteric treatise like the Aristotelian *Politics* in

²²⁸ Presumably Hermippus, who will have had access to the holdings of the library in Alexandria. See the introduction to this chapter, above p. 122.

²²⁹ Cf. ἄλλο διάφορον α' in Diogenes' catalogue at 5.50 = 1.282.

²³⁰ See Rose pp. 87–88.

²³¹ See the *apparatus criticus* to 1.288 together with Sollenberger (1984) p. 378.

8 books. We may compare Diogenes 5.22, where a work *Περὶ πολιτικοῦ α'-β'* is listed among Aristotle's exoteric works.²³² Both the Aristotelian and the Theophrastean works will have been dialogues that in one way or another focused on the statesman.

Diogenes' list of Aristotelian exoteric works also mentions a *Περὶ ἡδονῆς α'* (5.22). This may be the work to which the Theophrastean title *Περὶ ἡδονῆς ὥς Ἀριστοτέλης* refers. If so, both works will have been dialogues that focused on pleasure. In the one, Aristotle may have been the lead figure; in the other, Theophrastus. There may have been other similarities, but I am reluctant to believe that the Theophrastean work is best described as an imitation of the Aristotelian work.²³³ At very least, it will have developed certain points and introduced new material.²³⁴

There is, however, a different possibility that cannot be excluded. The title *Περὶ ἡδονῆς ὥς Ἀριστοτέλης* may refer to an esoteric writing that was similar to one of the two discussions of pleasure that are found today in the *Nicomachean Ethics*: one in Book 7 and the other in Book 10. The second of these discussions is announced as *περὶ ἡδονῆς* (10.1 1172a19). Theophrastus may have composed a treatise or lecture on pleasure that resembled the second discussion and for that reason was referred to as "like that of Aristotle." Or Theophrastus may have had his eye on the first of the two discussions and composed an esoteric work that resembled that discussion. To be sure, the first discussion begins with the phrase *περὶ ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης* (7.11 1152b1), which is fuller than *περὶ ἡδονῆς*. But there is no reason why the Theophrastean title must mention pain (as the opposite of pleasure, it is understood), and the phrase *καὶ λύπης* could have fallen out through homoeoteleuton. If one of these alternatives is correct, then the second title appearing in Diogenes' catalogue of Theophrastean writings, i.e., *Περὶ ἡδονῆς ἄλλο* is likely to have been a dialogue, having the same title as the Aristotelian dialogue that Diogenes lists among the exoteric writings (5.22).

²³² The first nineteen titles in Diogenes' catalogue of Aristotelian works form a unit: all are exoteric works that are ordered according to length. The first work contains four books; then come works of three books, two books and one (5.22). See Moraux (1951) pp. 27–28.

²³³ Moraux (1951) p. 37.

²³⁴ Diogenes' catalogue of Aristotelian writings lists a second work entitled *Περὶ ἡδονῆς* (5.24). As Moraux (1951) pp. 36, 93–94 has convincingly argued, this work was a collection of dialectical propositions (*προτάσεις*) as were the two works *Περὶ ἐκουσίου* and *Περὶ καλοῦ*, both which follow *Περὶ ἡδονῆς* in Diogenes' catalogue. Düring (1957) p. 45 follows Moraux in his edition of the catalogue.

In the preceding sentence, I wrote “is likely,” for it seems to me at least possible that Theophrastus composed two esoteric treatises: one that takes its start from Book 10 of the *Nicomachean Ethics* and the other from Book 7. In that case, ἄλλο in Περί ἡδονῆς ἄλλο would refer not only to Περί ἡδονῆς in the preceding title but also to ὡς Ἀριστοτέλης. But this possibility is, I think, quite remote, for were it in fact true, then Diogenes’ catalogue of Theophrastean writings would not include a dialogue Περί ἡδονῆς. And that would be a surprising omission not only because the catalogue of Aristotelian writings includes such a dialogue, but also because the texts in Athenaeus that refer to Περί ἡδονῆς contain largely anecdotal material that would be most at home in a dialogue.

On four occasions, Athenaeus mentions Theophrastus together with a work entitled Περί ἡδονῆς, but on two of these occasions, Athenaeus expresses uncertainty concerning the authorship of the work: it is attributed to either Theophrastus or Chamaeleon (6.105 273C = 550.5–6 and 8.39 347E = 553.2). Should we assume that the uncertainty applies to all four cases in which Athenaeus refers to Περί ἡδονῆς? Or is Athenaeus drawing on two distinct sources that refer to two different works: one that is attributable to Theophrastus without hesitation and another that is problematic? And should we prefer Chamaeleon to Theophrastus on the grounds that he is less prominent and therefore less likely to have had his name erroneously attached to a work on pleasure? However we decide these issues, we shall still be hesitant concerning the relationship between the work or works to which Athenaeus refers and the works listed in Diogenes’ catalogue. That a work of disputed authorship may appear in the catalogue is made clear by the occurrence of the title Ὑπομνημάτων Ἀριστοτελικῶν ἢ Θεοφραστείων, *Aristotelian or Theophrastean Memoranda* (5.48 = 1.237). Cf. Athenaeus 4.74 173E = 587.1 and 14.69 654D = 373.1, where the disputed authorship of the work is also mentioned. Moreover, a work may be mentioned in Diogenes’ catalogue without reference to its disputed authorship. That is clear from the title Πρὸς Κασάνδρον περὶ Βασιλείας, *To Cassander On Kingship* (5.47 = 1.207), for Athenaeus reports that many persons attribute the work to Sosibius (4.25 144E).²³⁵ The same may be true of Περί ἡδονῆς ὡς Ἀριστοτέλης or Περί ἡδονῆς ἄλλο: in regard to one of these titles (the second is the stronger candidate) Diogenes’ catalogue may have omitted a reference to the disputed authorship that is found in Athenaeus.²³⁶ But these considerations,

²³⁵ For discussion, see Mirhady pp. 89–90.

²³⁶ See Usener p. 18.

however interesting, still leave us guessing. All that we can say with any certainty is that Theophrastus wrote at least two works on pleasure. (I ignore for the moment *On False Pleasure*, 436 no. 28). One was almost certainly an exoteric work, presumably a dialogue. The other is likely to have been an esoteric treatise that Theophrastus used when lecturing on ethics within the Peripatos. It may have been incorporated into the *Ethics* (436 no. 2) or into the *Ethical Lectures* (436 no. 3). But equally it may have circulated as an independent treatise that found mention in Diogenes' catalogue.

no. 28 *On False Pleasure*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.46 = 1.175

Literature: Rose (1863) pp. 87–88; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1483–1484; Fortenbaugh (1984) p. 119; Sollenberger (1984) p. 299; Wehrli-Wöhrle (2004) p. 550

In his catalogue of Theophrastean writings, Diogenes Laertius lists not only *On Pleasure*, like (that of) Aristotle and *On Pleasure*, another (work), but also a third work on pleasure. I refer to Περὶ ψευδοῦς ἡδονῆς, *On False Pleasure*, which is found at the end of the first list under ψ (psi). It is, therefore, removed from the other two works on pleasure, which are also found in the first list, but earlier under η (eta). The separation is largely mechanical. The compiler of the list focused on the initial letter of the word ψευδοῦς (it comes immediately after Περὶ) and placed the third title under ψ. Moreover, we should not assume that discussion of false pleasure was confined to the work *On False Pleasure*. One or both of the two works *On Pleasure* may have touched upon the topic. Nor should we assume that the work *On False Pleasure* discussed no other topic. To be sure, false pleasure may have had pride of place and been the most discussed topic, but false pain is likely to have received some attention, and other less closely related topics may have received more than a passing remark.²³⁷

In the *Philebus*, Plato considers false pleasure at some length: in particular, whether there are false pleasures, and if so, in what way they are false. If it is true that Theophrastus heard Plato teach (Diogenes Laertius 5.36 = 1.4), he will have arrived in the Academy when the topic of false pleasure was or had recently been under discussion. For the *Philebus* is a

²³⁷ Some titles may suggest a wider topic than was actually discussed (e.g. *On Sweat* [328 no. 12]; see the introduction to this chapter), while others suggest one that is narrower. *On False Pleasure* might belong to the latter group.

late work of Plato, perhaps his penultimate work and last to be finished.²³⁸ But whatever the truth concerning Theophrastus' arrival in the Academy, his association with Aristotle will have brought the topic to his attention. For Aristotle was keenly interested in and influenced by the Academic discussion of pleasures and pains and their relationship to opinions or beliefs, δόξαι, which by common agreement are true or false.²³⁹

Aside from Diogenes' catalogue, we have no text that refers explicitly to Theophrastus' work *On False Pleasure*. There is, however, a single text, 556, in which Theophrastus is said to have opposed Plato and to have rejected the notion of false pleasure. Apparently Theophrastus offered a conceptual analysis of false pleasure, in which ordinary usage featured largely. We are told that "false" is used in three ways—of feigned character, of a statement and of some existing thing—and in none of these ways is pleasure false (556.9–12). We should not, however, conclude that Theophrastus' work *On False Pleasure* was a dry linguistic analysis from beginning to end. In the *Philebus*, Plato had opened the door to a light touch when he called attention to the pleasures of persons who are dreaming or insane (36E) and then went on to present a vivid picture of opining: first as writing in one's soul and then as painting a picture that has no basis in reality. One imagines, e.g., acquiring a huge amount of gold and being greatly pleased with oneself (38E–40A). Heraclides of Pontus, who studied under Plato, appears to have seen the potential here, and in his work *On Pleasure* related the story of Thrasyllus, who was afflicted with insanity and believed that all the ships entering the Piraeus were his. He experienced the pleasure of someone who accumulates great wealth and continued to do so, until his brother Crito took him to a doctor, who effected a cure. Returned to his senses, Thrasyllus said repeatedly that he had never experienced greater pleasure than when he was insane. Not a single pain had befallen him and the pleasure was overwhelming (Athenaeus, *Sophists at Dinner* 12.81 554E–F = Heraclides fr. 40 Sch.). The story is good fun and well illustrates the pleasures experienced by persons who have lost their grip on reality. In addition, it raises a serious psychological and ethical question. What is wrong with pleasures that have no basis in reality, especially when they are intense

²³⁸ The *Laws* is Plato's last work, but it was not entirely finished. On the date of the *Philebus*, see L. Brandwood, *The Chronology of Plato's Dialogues* (Cambridge 1990) pp. 183–184, 206 and Fortenbaugh (1996) p. 173.

²³⁹ See, e.g., *Philebus* 37B5–C2, E12–38A2.

and enduring?²⁴⁰ Plato said that the gods protect good men from false pleasures, but the minds of evil men are full of such pleasures (*Phil.* 40B–C). But is that true?

Whatever the truth concerning the gods, we can say that Theophrastus had good precedent for introducing entertaining examples into his work *On False Pleasure*. Assuming that Theophrastus did in fact study under Plato (1.4), he will have met Heraclides in the Academy. And even if Theophrastus never was a student of Plato, we may be sure that he read Heraclides' dialogue *On Pleasure* and appreciated the charming way in which Heraclides narrated the story of Thrasyllus.²⁴¹ To be sure, an example like that of Thrasyllus is anecdotal and perhaps more at home in an exoteric dialogue than in an esoteric discussion of false pleasure. But a dialogue can be serious, and no text tells us that *On False Pleasure* was not a dialogue. Plato's *Philebus* is a dialogue and its discussion of false pleasure is certainly serious as well as attractive. But whatever the form of the Theophrastean work (an esoteric treatise for use in lecture is perhaps more likely than an exoteric dialogue²⁴²), I would not be surprised if it contained illustrative material that is at once both anecdotal and instructive.

no. 29 (*Dialogue*) concerning Love, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.43 = 1.97; Athenaeus, *The Sophists at Dinner* 13.14 562E = 559.1; 13.21 567B = 561.2; 13.85 606C = 567A.2

no. 30a another (work) *On Love*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.43 = 1.98
b *On Love*] Strabo, *Geography* 10.4.12 = 560

Literature: Swoboda (1891) pp. 163–166; Walzer (1929) pp. 241–242, (1939) p. 58; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1481; Lasserre (1944) p. 170.172; Wehrli (1961) pp. 331–332, (1967–1978) vol. 3 p. 54; (1983) pp. 495–496; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 119–121, (2011a) Chapter 2.2; Sollenberger (1984) pp. 240–242; Wehrli-Wöhrle (2004) pp. 532–533

²⁴⁰ The qualifier “enduring” is important, for intense but brief periods of pleasure do not constitute a happy, blessed life. Rather, happiness demands continuous as well as pleasant activity (Aristotle, *NE* 10.7 1177a21–27).

²⁴¹ Heraclides is said to have narrated the story of Thrasyllus “not unpleasantly,” οὐκ ἀηδῶς (fr. 40.1 Sch.).

²⁴² The fact that the title of the Theophrastean work begins with Περὶ may suggest an esoteric work, but dialogues may also begin with Περὶ. Heraclides work *On Pleasure* is an example. On Theophrastean titles beginning with Περὶ, see above, the introduction to this chapter.

The title Ἐρωτικός, (*Dialogue*) *concerning Love*, is found in the first list of Diogenes' catalogue of Theophrastean writings. The title Περί ἔρωτος, *On Love*, follows immediately in the same list. It is preceded by ἄλλο, "another work." What form the two writings took, and how they did or did not relate to each other is problematic.

Works that focused on love, *eros*, were composed not only by Theophrastus but also by several other Peripatetics. Aristotle wrote an Ἐρωτικός, (*Dialogue*) *concerning Love* (XV.95–99 R³) and Θέσεις ἐρωτικάι, *Theses concerning Love* (Diogenes Laertius 5.24). In addition, Clearchus wrote Ἐρωτικά, (*Matters*) *concerning Love* (fr. 21–35 W.), Demetrios of Phalerum: Ἐρωτικός, (*Dialogue*) *concerning Love* (81 no. 7 SOD) and Aristo of Ceus: Ὅμοια ἐρωτικά, *Erotic Examples* (fr. 7 no. 1 SFOD). I add Heraclides of Ponticus, who is best regarded as a member of the Academy, but nevertheless had close ties with members of the Peripatos. His work carried the title Ἐρωτικός ἢ Κλεινίας, (*Dialogue*) *concerning Love or Clinias* (17 no. 12 S).

Aristotle's Ἐρωτικός was almost certainly a dialogue; it occurs early in Diogenes' catalogue of Aristotelian writings among works, most of which were dialogues.²⁴³ His Θέσεις ἐρωτικάι will have been a collection of general questions that were argued both *pro* and *contra*. Their primary use may have been in rhetorical instruction, though they will have been relevant to theoretical and practical ethics.²⁴⁴ Heraclides' Ἐρωτικός ἢ Κλεινίας is listed by Diogenes among the ethical texts (5.87), which appear to be characterized as dialogues (5.86). But the text is corrupt, and the most recent editor, Eckart Schütrumpf, has placed διάλογοι between daggers. Nevertheless, the addition of the subtitle ἢ Κλεινίας, "or *Clinias*," strongly suggests a dialogue in which Clinias played an important role or perhaps enjoyed pride of place or both.²⁴⁵ That the Ἐρωτικός of Theophrastus and that of Demetrius were also dialogues is, I think, a reasonable assumption.²⁴⁶

The works of Clearchus and Aristo are different. In the case of Clearchus, we can say that the surviving fragments do not suggest a dialogue.

²⁴³ See Moraux (1951) p. 27.

²⁴⁴ See *Commentary* vol. 8 on the rhetorical and poetic fragments, p. 86 on 68 no. 34–36.

²⁴⁵ Regarding the proper name occurring second, cf. the Aristotelian title *On Rhetoric* or *Grylus* (Diogenes Laertius 5.22 = X.68–69 R³).

²⁴⁶ On Theophrastus, see Walzer (1939) p. 58, Swoboda 165 and the commentary on 559. In their edition of Demetrius, Peter Stork *et al.* (SOD) translate (*Dialogue*) *concerning Love* (RUSCH vol. 9 [2000] p. 147).

Two of the fragments are formulated as problems in the style that we know from the pseudo-Aristotelian *Problems*: the question διὰ τί is followed by possible explanations introduced by πότερον ὅτι, ἢ ὅτι or simply ἢ (fr. 24–25 W). That might encourage interpreting the title Ἐρωτικά by adding προβλήματα,²⁴⁷ but there is no compelling reason to think that the entire work was a collection of problems and explanations. And even if it was such a collection, it does not follow that Clearchus made use of διὰ τί in order to introduce each problem. In this regard, Plutarch's *Table Talk* is suggestive. For in the preface, Plutarch refers to his work as a collection of προβλήματα (612E), and as the work proceeds, each new topic or question carries the heading πρόβλημα. To be sure, the phrase διὰ τί is used frequently to introduce a particular problem, but many problems are introduced in a different way.²⁴⁸ I do not press the comparison with Plutarch (he was not a Peripatetic and lived long after Clearchus), but I am impressed by the fact that Clearchus' work was at least two books long.²⁴⁹ That will have provided Clearchus with numerous opportunities to vary the format, if he chose to do so.²⁵⁰

Aristo's work Ὅμοια ἔρωτικά was also two books long or longer (fr. 10, 11, 13A SFOD) and is equally problematic. If the adjective ὅμοια is used in its everyday sense, "similar" or "alike," then it would seem to indicate a collection of similar cases or likenesses or examples of things erotic: presumably erotic behavior and the like.²⁵¹ And these cases or examples may have served not only to depict one kind of behavior but also to mark off that kind of behavior from other kinds that are normally spoken of as erotic: e.g. the physiological drive to reproduce, which is not chosen and differs from acts of lust that have been learned and involve deliberate choice.²⁵² Such an analysis may have been carried out at

²⁴⁷ Cf. the Theophrastean title Προβλήματα πολιτικά, φυσικά, ἔρωτικά, ἠθικά, *Political, Natural, Erotic, Ethical Problems* (727 no. 4), which is discussed in the immediately following comment.

²⁴⁸ Book 1 of *Table Talk* contains ten questions. In five (3, 7–10), διὰ τί is used to introduce the question, while the other five use different expressions and without repetition.

²⁴⁹ Fr. 33 W = Athenaeus 14.43 639A refers to the second book of the Ἐρωτικά. The work may have been complete in two books, but that cannot be determined.

²⁵⁰ Cf. Wehrli (1967–1978) vol. 3 p. 54.

²⁵¹ Cf. Wehrli, "Ariston von Iulis auf Keos," in *Paulys Realencyclopädie* Suppl. Bd. 11 (1968) col. 158.

²⁵² On the drive to reproduce that is shared with animals and is not a matter of choice, see Aristotle, *Politics* 1.2 1252a27–30. Knögel points out that apart from Aristo's work, a special book concerning likenesses in erotic matters is unknown. He also refers to Aristo's *On Relieving Arrogance* to establish Aristo's interest in traits of character (pp. 83–

considerable length, but it may not have exhausted the contents of Aristo's work, which was at least two books long. Indeed, among the surviving fragments, there are two that are of special interest not least because they focus on excessive drinking: one tells us that the ancients bound their heads to relieve the headaches that result from drinking wine (fr. 10 SFOD), and the other concerns drinking with an eye to the morning after (fr. 11). Wehrli²⁵³ comments: "As the banquet in life and literature leads to discussions of erotic matters,²⁵⁴ so *vice versa* sympotic issues attach themselves to these" (i.e., to discussions of erotic matters).²⁵⁵

While I am inclined to view Theophrastus' Ἐρωτικός as a dialogue, it should be underlined that we need not understand διάλογος with Ἐρωτικός. It is also possible to understand λόγος, and λόγος may be understood quite generally to mean "discourse" or more specifically as "speech" or "address."²⁵⁶ In this regard, a brief look at Plato's *Symposium* and *Phaedrus* may be helpful. Both works are dialogues, but both contain speeches or addresses that are referred to as λόγοι ἐρωτικοί. At the very beginning of the *Symposium*, an interlocutor asks Apollodorus about speeches

84). It is worth noting that among the many recommendations for relieving arrogance, Aristo is careful to distinguish between arrogance and greatness of soul. There is a clear similarity between the two: both involve a tendency to make negative judgments; but there is also a difference: the man marked by greatness of soul despises the gifts of fortune, while the arrogant man looks down on other people because he is inflated by possessions (fr. 21f.22–33 SFOD). So too in regard to eros, Aristo may have been careful to distinguish between similar types, e.g., those mentioned above: both the physiological drive to reproduce and learned lust share a common goal, intercourse, but they differ in that the former does not involve choice, while the latter does. Note also the use of the verb γαυριᾶν (21f.13–14). It is used properly of a horse that prances (LSJ s.v.) and here is applied to the behavior of the arrogant individual. Whether Aristo introduced comparison with animals into his work on eros is not thereby shown, but Aristotle's characterization of the desire to reproduce (cited above, this note) strengthens the possibility.

²⁵³ Wehrli (1967–1978) vol. 6 p. 63.

²⁵⁴ That drinking, either real or in literature, lends itself to talk of love is, I think, obvious, but see Athenaeus 13.86 607A–B, where we read that Persaeus of Citium in his *Sympotic Memoranda* says that "it is fitting for a man drinking wine to make mention of sexual matters, for we are prone to this when we tittle."

²⁵⁵ For completeness' sake, I refer to Diogenes Laertius' life of the Stoic philosopher Aristo of Chios. There we find a catalogue of books in which the title Ἐρωτικά διατριβαί, *Dissertations concerning Love*, occurs. At the end of the list, Diogenes adds that Panaetius and Sosicrates deem only the *Letters* (mentioned last in the catalogue) to be genuine. All the other works are by Aristo the Peripatetic (7.163 = Aristo of Ceus, fr. 8 SFOD). If Panaetius and Sosicrates are correct, then there is a second work on eros by Aristo of Ceus. But no other text makes a similar claim on behalf of the Peripatetic, and the surviving fragments do not illuminate the issue.

²⁵⁶ Lasserre pp. 171–172.

concerning love, περὶ τῶν ἐρωτικῶν λόγων, that were delivered by Socrates, Alcibiades and others at a dinner hosted by Agathon (172A–B), and in what follows we are treated to six speeches that are characterized as speeches of praise or encomia (177D–E). Should we, then, say that Theophrastus' Ἐρωτικός was a speech of praise, perhaps one in which Eros is recognized as a god?²⁵⁷ The possibility cannot be ruled out, though I think that a dialogue in which various people spoke concerning love is more probable. Most likely Theophrastus was one of several speakers who discussed eros from different points of view. Theophrastus may have spoken at considerable length in praise of eros much as Socrates does in the *Symposium*. But there is no compelling reason to think that a negative view of eros found no place in the Theophrastean work. See 557–559.

In the *Phaedrus*, the eponymous interlocutor reads to Socrates a writing allegedly by Lysias, which is called a λόγος ἐρωτικός (227C).²⁵⁸ Since Lysias wrote speeches of which we have a sizeable corpus, it is natural to translate λόγος with “speech,” but what we have presented to us in the *Phaedrus* is not an oration that was or was imagined to have been delivered before an assembly or court of law. Rather, it is a persuasive address to a single person. And instead of praising eros, the speaker seeks to dissuade the addressee from giving himself to a person who is driven by erotic desire. Rather, he should give himself to the speaker who is not dominated by erotic passion but nevertheless sexually interested. The speaker does not define eros, and his arguments are strung together in a haphazard manner. The composition may be an indication that the address is the creation of Plato, who wishes to oppose a poorly conceived address to the speeches of Socrates that follow in the dialogue. Be that as it may, what we are offered might play a role in rhetorical instruction: it might be viewed as an exercise in inventing arguments and as such might be viewed as an open-ended string of notes to which additional arguments can be added as they occur to the teacher or student.²⁵⁹ That Theophrastus' Ἐρωτικός was of this character seems to me unlikely—the fragments do not support the idea—but it is certainly possible that the

²⁵⁷ Cf. *Symposium* 177A. Theophrastus wrote a work entitled *Encomia of Gods* (580 no. 1), but it would be rash to develop in any detail a connection between the *Encomia of Gods* and the *Eroticos*. On the *Encomia of Gods* in relation to rhetoric, see *Commentary* 8 (2005c) on rhetoric and poetics pp. 106–108.

²⁵⁸ Later at 263D, Lysias' work is referred to by the adjective ἐρωτικός, but it is clear that λόγος is understood.

²⁵⁹ For fuller discussion, see Fortenbaugh (1994b) pp. 19–22, reprint (2003) pp. 228–231.

Theophrastean work was intended in some way for rhetorical instruction. Moreover, it would be a mistake to assume that a work will have been written with a single purpose in mind. It is quite conceivable that the Ἐρωτικός was a well written dialogue complete with anecdotes, and that Theophrastus intended it to be not only instructive in ethical and rhetorical matters but also entertaining: a work that might appeal to a wide audience, many of whom had little interest in ethics and rhetoric *qua* classroom subjects.

Whatever the truth concerning the Ἐρωτικός, it is likely to have differed markedly from ἄλλο Περί ἔρωτος. To be sure, in some context ἄλλο might be placed before a title in order to indicate another copy of the same work. Diogenes' catalogue does contain duplicate copies: *On Slander* occurs in three lists, the second, third and fourth, with no variation in title (666 no. 13), and *Ethical Characters* occurs twice in the second list with only a variation in word order (436 no. 4a). In addition, it is possible that two works with different titles in different lists may be identical: e.g., *Varieties of Virtue* and *On Virtue*, which occur in the first and second lists (436 no. 7 and 8).²⁶⁰ And had the compiler of Diogenes' catalogue or of the first list within the catalogue used ἄλλο to indicate a different work and not just another copy of the same work, he might have added διάφορον as is done in the fourth list in regard to two different works on bringing up children (436 no. 10 and 11). Taken together these considerations have some weight, but not enough to cast serious doubt on recognizing two different works on *eros*. Indeed, when quite different titles occur next to each other in the same list, it is, I think, improbable that the two titles refer to the same work. And in the case before us, the addition of ἄλλο to the second title almost certainly marks a significant difference in form or content or both and not just two copies of the same work.²⁶¹

If the Ἐρωτικός was a dialogue and if it is unlikely that Theophrastus wrote two dialogues on the same subject, then it seems reasonable to believe that Περί ἔρωτος was a treatise. In my earlier work (1984) p. 120, I suggested that the title itself speaks against a dialogue, because in the case of dialogues a title beginning with περί usually comes second as a kind of subtitle. As statistical claim the argument is, I think, correct, and we

²⁶⁰ I assert only the possibility. See the commentary on titles no. 7 and no. 8.

²⁶¹ More problematic might be the title *On Pleasure*, another (work), which follows immediately on an identical title, i.e., *On Pleasure* (Diogenes Laertius 5.44 = 1.117). But even here it is, I think, all but certain that "another" (ἄλλο) refers to a different work on the same topic. See above, the commentary on 436 no. 26–27.

might add that a title beginning with περί seems well suited to a treatise intended for teaching within the Peripatos. But that said, we should keep in mind that the title Περί ἔρωτος is not peculiar to Peripatetic writings. Diogenes Laertius tells us that two associates of Socrates, Euclides of Megara and Simias of Thebes, wrote works entitled Περί ἔρωτος, and that these works were dialogues (2.108, 124). Moreover, we can be certain that not all Theophrastean titles beginning with περί were treatises. An example among the ethical works is Περί εὐδαιμονίας, *On Happiness* (436 no. 12). That work is important for our knowledge of Theophrastus' views on happiness, but it was a dialogue, which may have contributed to the impact it had both in and outside the school.

There remains one more puzzle that may be the most worrisome. It is whether we even have a genuine title. In the introduction to this section on "Titles of Books," I called attention to the fact that some scholars are hesitant or quite unwilling to say that the titles that have come down to us were actually assigned by Theophrastus. I am less skeptical, but in the case before us, I think that doubt is quite understandable. For what we find in Diogenes' first list can be read as a notation by the person who compiled the list. The preposition περί may never have been intended to be the first word of a title. It should be printed with a small pi and understood to introduce the content of the work and nothing more. The compiler of the list may have had a roll that lacked a tag on which a title was written. Perhaps he unrolled the papyrus enough to see that no title appeared above text. but he did read enough to ascertain that the topic was *eros*. He may even have spotted the phrase περί ἔρωτος in the opening sentence (the incipit), which prompted him to enter the work in his list as ἄλλο περί ἔρωτος. But this, like so much, is speculation. I leave the matter undecided.

727 no. 4 *Political, Natural, Erotic, Ethical Problems*, one book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.47 = 1.224

Literature: Flashar (1962) pp. 321–322; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 134–135, (2011a) Chapter 2.2; Sollenberger (1984) pp. 329–330

Within Diogenes' catalogue of Theophrastean writings, the title Προβλήματα πολιτικά, φυσικά, ἐρωτικά, ἠθικά, *Political, Natural, Erotic, Ethical Problems* is one of five titles that make explicit reference to problems.

- 1) *Collection of Problems* (5.45 = 1.147): it occurs in the first of the five lists and is said to have been five books long.

- 2) *Political, Natural, Erotic, Ethical Problems* (5.47 = 1.224): second list and one book long.
- 3) *Collection of Problems* (5.47 = 1.226): second list and one book long.
- 4) *On the Problems concerning Nature* (5.48 = 1.227): second list and one book long.
- 5) *On Problems concerning Nature* (5.49 = 1.266): third list and one book long.

The first of the titles refers to a multi-book work, which may have been quite independent of the other four. But it is also possible that it contained one or more of the four (they all are listed as one book in length), or perhaps it overlapped on one or more to some degree. The case for inclusion is strongest in regard to the third title, for this title is identical to the first, but it is equally possible to regard the third title as referring to a collection of problems that were different from and supplemented those found in the longer work. Certainty is elusive. Titles 4 and 5 are identical even in the number of books. Since they occur in different lists, it is possible that the titles refer to duplicates that were acquired by the library in Alexandria: i.e., they were parts of two larger packages that were purchased most likely at different times and despite the presence of duplication.²⁶² But again there is no certainty.²⁶³

The second title, that which concerns us (727 no. 4), is like the fourth and fifth titles in that reference is made to subject matter, but it differs in that it refers to four different kinds of subject matter—the political, natural or physical, erotic and ethical—and not one kind of subject matter—nature—as in the fourth and fifth titles. Erotic and ethical problems are, of course, closely related, and if “political” (πολιτικά) is understood inclusively so that it covers ethical issues, then three of the four kinds of problems are closely related. But it is harder to see a close relationship with natural problems. To be sure, “natural” (φυσικά) can cover physiological phenomena that affect behavior and therefore relate

²⁶² Cf. the rhetorical title *On Slander* (666 no. 13). It occurs three times in Diogenes’ catalogue: not only in the second and third lists like titles 4 and 5 above, but also in the fourth list (5.46 = 1.189, 5.49 = 1.252, 5.50 = 1.275). In the *Commentary* vol. 8 pp. 108–109, I suggest that the three occurrences of *On Slander* refer to the same work, which was acquired three times in separate purchases by the library in Alexandria.

²⁶³ I omit references in Arabic authors to a Theophrastean work entitled *Problems* with and without *concerning Nature*. See the report of Dimitri Gutas in the *Commentary* vol. 3.1 on physics p. 26.

closely to ethics.²⁶⁴ And a person's innate nature may be viewed in terms of eugenics and as such it is a matter of concern to the politician *qua* statesman and lawgiver.²⁶⁵ But "natural" covers much more: it extends to the physical world around us, which is marked by movement and change including, e.g., the movements of the heavens, the changes of seasons and the flow of rivers and the flooding and ebbing of tidal waters. Such phenomena present numerous problems that are remote from politics and ethics and erotic behavior, but they are of interest to the philosopher and may well have been addressed in Theophrastus' work *Political, Natural, Erotic, Ethical Problems*. If they were (and most likely some were), then we are dealing with a heterogeneous work that cannot be pigeon-holed, at least within the framework that we have adopted for organizing our collection of sources. Hence, the title has been placed in the section devoted to "Miscellaneous Items" (727 no. 4) and referred to from within the lists of titles assigned to physics, ethics and politics (137, 436 and 589).

A variant reading merits brief mention. In codex Q, the adjective ποιητικά, "poetic" occurs in place of πολιτικά, "political." If we adopt ποιητικά, we get a different mix of subject matter, which strikes me as even more heterogenous. For a collection of poetic problems is likely to include discussion of, e.g., artful errors, the presentation of stage figures, introducing the impossible, the use of unusual words and metaphors. The fact that such matters are discussed by Aristotle in Chapter 25 of the *Poetics* may encourage us to read "poetic." For this chapter is said at the outset (in the incipit) to be concerned with problems and solutions, περὶ προβλημάτων καὶ λύσεων (1460b6). Nevertheless, the reading of codex Q is not to be accepted, for this codex is dependent upon codex P, which along with B and F is one of the three primary codices. And like B and F, P reads πολιτικά. The mistake is probably due to the occurrence of the title Περί ποιητικῆς in the immediately preceding line. A scribe, having written ποιητικῆς (1.223), lapsed and wrote ποιητικά instead of πολιτικά in the immediately following line (1.224).²⁶⁶

²⁶⁴ See the commentary on 557 regarding Plato, *Republic* 439D–E, *Timaeus* 86C–E, Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1.11 1370a18–27 and pseudo-Aristotle, *Problems* 30.1 953b32–34, 954a32.

²⁶⁵ On innate character and eugenics, see Plato, *Statesman* 307B–311A and *Laws* 772E–773E with Fortenbaugh (1975d) pp. 283–305 and (2007a) p. 52.

²⁶⁶ Sollenberger (1984) p. 329 reports that the order in which the four areas are mentioned varies in the manuscripts. He deems the variation insignificant. That is certainly correct. A careless scribe could easily mix up the order by omitting what

Strictly speaking, *Poetics* 25 is not a collection of problems. Rather, it is a preliminary discussion that considers the kinds of criticisms, ἐπιτιμήματα,²⁶⁷ that are brought against poetic texts, and the different ways in which these criticisms can be met. Nevertheless, Aristotle's remarks concerning one kind of criticism are especially relevant to a commentary on ethics. This criticism concerns actions that out of context seem to be either good or bad but in truth are the opposite. We are told to consider the matter by looking not only at what was done or said, whether it was good or bad, but also at the agent and the person toward whom the deed or word was directed, or the time or the means or the intended result (1461a4–9). The advice is sound and could well have been given by Theophrastus, whose interest in timing and circumstances is well attested.²⁶⁸ Taking a cue from text 534, we can easily imagine Theophrastus setting forth the problem “Why” or “For what reason ought a person to break the law in order to assist a friend?” and then responding in terms of the friend's character and the particular circumstances: he is on trial for a capital crime.

When we think of Peripatetic works that featured problems, we cannot ignore the pseudo-Aristotelian Φυσικά προβλήματα, *Physical* or *Natural Problems*, which dates from the third century BC,²⁶⁹ contains Theophrastean material and exhibits a question and answer format. A problem is introduced by διὰ τί, “why” or “on account of what,” and one or more explanations follow that are typically introduced by πότερον ὅτι, ἢ ὅτι or ἢ. That Theophrastus' *Political, Natural, Erotic, Ethical Problems* exhibited the same format is a reasonable guess. In support, I offer three considerations. First, although the title of the pseudo-Aristotelian work refers only to physical problems, what we are actually offered includes material that is also political, erotic and ethical (especially chapters 27–30).²⁷⁰ That makes clear that the διὰ τί format was

precedes and then adding it out of order. I add only that the variation in the manuscript tradition may mirror—albeit accidentally—the origin of the Theophrastean collection. For that collection may be (is likely to be) a combination of four smaller collections that were not conceived of as parts of a whole and might have been joined together in several different ways.

²⁶⁷ For ἐπιτιμήματα and cognate words, see *Poetics* 25 1460b21, 33 and 1461b19, 22.

²⁶⁸ See, e.g., 534.44–75 and the commentary on that passage; also 628, 629 and 630 (printed among the political texts) together with Fortenbaugh (1993) pp. 447–455.

²⁶⁹ Flashar p. 326.

²⁷⁰ The headings to chapters 27–30 make the connection with ethics obvious. Regarding politics, I cite the heading to chapter 29: “Problems concerning Justice and Injustice.” Justice figures prominently in ethics, but it does so too in politics. See sections 12–13 and

applied to more than purely physical topics and therefore would not be out of place in the Theophrastean work. Second, the surviving fragments of Clearchus of Soli include two that concern eros and make use of the διὰ τί formula (fr. 24–25 W). Perhaps, then, Theophrastus' treatment of erotic problems was formulated in the same way. Third, the fact that the five Theophrastean titles listed above make explicit reference to problems is likely to reflect the fact that the works in question all shared a format that was common within the Peripatos, i.e., the διὰ τί format. And that can be true whether or not Theophrastus himself assigned the titles. There are, however, grounds for caution. Here are three. First, it is not certain that Clearchus used the formula whenever he discussed an erotic problem (see the preceding comment on titles no. 29–30a–b). Second, Aristotle's chapter on problems and solutions in *Poetics* 25 is admittedly not a collection of problems; rather, it is a programmatic statement on dealing with criticisms aimed at poetry. Nevertheless, there is nothing in this chapter suggesting that the διὰ τί format is always to be preferred. Third, in certain contexts, an author may want to be clear at the outset what sort of cause or explanation is being sought. If he is looking, e.g., for a final cause, a person's intended goal, then he may prefer to formulate the problem by using the phrase οὐ ἔνεκα. But that said, in a collection of problems where the kind of cause being sought may vary from problem to problem, he might embrace διὰ τί precisely because it can be used inclusively.²⁷¹

- no. 31 *On Drunkenness*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.44 = 1.135; Athenaeus, *The Sophists at Dinner* 10.22 423F = 574.1; 10.24 424E = 576.5, 10.30 427D = 570.2; 11.8 463C = 569.1; 11.13 465B = 573.1; 11.97 497E = 575.1; 15.48 693C = 572.1

Literature: Koepke (1856) p. 39; Rose (1863) p. 116; Hirzel (1895) vol. 1 p. 361 n. 2; Scorza (1934) p. 37; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1485; Gigon (1959) p. 73; Wehrli (1961) p. 333; (1983) p. 495; Flashar (1962) p. 437; Bignone (1973, repr. 2007) p. 860 n. 1, 867–868; Giordano (1977) pp. 109–112; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 121–123; Sollenberger (1984) pp. 269–270; Wehrli-Wöhrlé (2004) p. 533

15, which focus on the courts of law, an institution of special importance to the *polis*. Regarding eros, see chapter 30, in which an erotic disposition is explained in terms of black bile (954a32).

²⁷¹ See Aristotle, *Physics* 2.3 194b19, where διὰ τί is used in introducing the four kinds of cause. In the Loeb edition vol. 1 p. 129, Wicksteed-Cornford capture the inclusiveness by translating διὰ τί with “how and why.” For διὰ τί replacing οὐ ἔνεκα, see 194b33.

The title *Περὶ μέθης*, *On Drunkenness*, is found in the first list within Diogenes' catalogue of Theophrastean writings. The list is alphabetical, so that the title occurs together with other titles whose significant word begins with mu. The title also occurs seven times in Athenaeus' *The Sophists at Dinner*. That the Theophrastean work was a dialogue, in which Theophrastus played a role, most likely the lead role, is strongly suggested by 576.5 (see the commentary on that text).

Our collection of texts makes clear that the topics discussed were various. In those texts that give the title *On Drunkenness*, we read of wine as a relief for old age (569), toasts, libations and the kottabus (570), the controlled use of unmixed wine (572), nymphs and wine stock (573), the meaning of the adjective ζωρός (574), the drinking vessel called rhyton (575), boys who pour wine, Euripides and the so-called Dancers (576). In texts that do not give the title of a work but can be plausibly assigned to *On Drunkenness*, we read of the ancient way of mixing wine with water (571) barbershops and chatter (577A–B), Alexander's lack of sexual desire (578) and laws regarding women (579A–B).²⁷² Clearly drunkenness or intoxication was a central theme, but we can also recognize an interest in human physiology, symposiac rituals and games, lexical issues, conversation and legislation.

Among the early Peripatetics, not only Theophrastus but also Aristotle, Hieronymus and Chamaeleon are reported to have written a work *On Drunkenness*. The case of Aristotle is complicated by the fact that Diogenes' catalogue of Aristotelian writings does not mention *On Drunkenness*. Instead, we find the title *Symposium* listed among the dialogues (5.22). That Aristotle's *On Drunkenness*, cited seven times by Athenaeus, is the same work as the *Symposium*, albeit under a different title, is likely. And if that is the case, Theophrastus will have followed his master in composing a dialogue *On Drunkenness*, in which intoxication and other topics were discussed.²⁷³ Presumably the Aristotelian title *Symposium* derives from the fact that the discussion was imagined to take place at a symposium. That the discussion in Theophrastus' *On Drunkenness* was also imagined to take place during a symposium is a reasonable assumption.

²⁷² The parallel texts 579A–B are sometimes assigned to a political work, e.g., *Laws*, in alphabetical order (589 no. 17a). See the commentary on these texts (below, pp. 734–737). Here I want only to underline that nothing will have prevented Theophrastus from discussing legislation concerning wine and women in both an ethical treatise like *On Drunkenness* and a political treatise like the *Laws*.

²⁷³ See below, the introduction to Chapter IV, Section 17 on "Wine."

In this regard, we should take note of a passage in Plutarch's work *That a Life in Conformity with Epicurus Cannot be Pleasant* 13 1095E–1096A = 715. There we read:

What do you say, Epicurus? You go to the theater early in the morning to hear those who play the cithara and the aulos, but at the banquet when Theophrastus gives a discourse on concords and Aristoxenus on modulations and Aristotle on Homer, you cover your ears with your hands in disgust and loathing? And so don't they (the Epicureans) make the Scythian Ateas appear more musical—he who, when the *aulos*-player Ismenias was taken prisoner and played at a drinking party, swore that he listened with greater pleasure to the whinnying of his horse? ...

The anecdote concerning Ateas occurs in other writings of Plutarch: *Sayings of Kings and Commanders* 174F and *On the Fortune and Virtue of Alexander the Great* 334B. It was not invented by Plutarch, but that is not a reason to refer the anecdote to Theophrastus. To do so would be pure speculation.²⁷⁴ More important is the phrase “at the banquet” or “in the symposium,” ἐν συμποσίῳ, for the phrase suggests that Theophrastus is mentioned because of what he said in a sympotic work.²⁷⁵ That work may have carried the title *Symposium* and been identical with *On Drunkenness*. In support we might cite Aristotle, for whom both titles are attested and are likely to refer to one and the same dialogue. Nevertheless, I am reluctant to add a new Theophrastean title, *Symposium*, even if doing so does not introduce a new work. The phrase ἐν συμποσίῳ does not give a title and need not be based on one. Rather, it speaks for a sympotic context, and that suits *On Drunkenness*. Moreover a segment devoted to a musical theme, i.e., concords would fit well in a sympotic context. We may compare the reference to Aristoxenus. He, too, is mentioned in connection with a musical theme, modulations, and the phrase ἐν συμποσίῳ is not grounds for saying that he wrote a work entitled *Symposium*. Instead we should think of Aristoxenus' *Sympotic Miscellany*.²⁷⁶

A second Plutarchan passage calls for brief comment. It is found in *Table Talk* 1.intr. 612D. Plutarch has chosen to compose a work in which discussion takes place over drinks. Accordingly he wants to establish that recording such a discussion is worthwhile, and toward that end he offers a list of well-known philosophers who have written similar works: “Plato,

²⁷⁴ See Rose (1863) p. 121.

²⁷⁵ Hirzel p. 361 n. 2.

²⁷⁶ See Wehrli (1967–1978) vol. 2 pp. 84–85 on fr. 127 W.

Xenophon, Aristotle, Speusippus, Epicurus, Prytanis, Hieronymus and the Academic Dio, all of whom deemed the recording of conversation over drinks a task worthy of some effort.” The fact that Theophrastus is not named in this passage is of little importance. Plutarch is offering a list that is illustrative. He makes no claim to completeness—Chamaeleon is also missing—and need not do so.

Both Hieronymus and Chamaeleon are credited with having written works entitled *On Drunkenness*. That their works were dialogues set in the context of a symposium may be assumed. Indeed, the Plutarchan passage just discussed is evidence that Hieronymus made use of a sympotic setting, and no text speaks against a similar setting in the case of Chamaeleon. Here I want to call attention to the fact that the fragments of Hieronymus and Chamaeleon exhibit interests in common with those of Theophrastus. Hieronymus fr. 28 Wh agrees with Theophrastus 576 in that both are concerned with young boys serving wine, Euripides and the Dancers.²⁷⁷ Chamaeleon fr. 10 M makes mention of the rhyton as does Theophrastus 575, and fr. 14 agrees with Theophrastus 579A–B in that both exhibit an interest in legislation.²⁷⁸ If we add an interest in lexical matters—Hieronymus on σκυθίζειν (fr. 29), Chamaeleon on ἐπισκυθίζειν (fr. 11), Theophrastus on ζωρός (574) and Aristotle on μεθύειν (fr. 102 R³)—it is clear that the several Peripatetics who wrote works *On Drunkenness* shared common interests and were not especially concerned to avoid overlap. To what extent they put their own stamp on shared material is difficult to assess. We need more and longer fragments.

As mentioned above, our Theophrastean texts exhibit an interest in human physiology: wine relieves the despondency of old age (569), and Alexander suffered diminished sex drive (578). The same may be said in regard to Aristotle. In his work *On Drunkenness*, we read that the heat of the body plays a role in the susceptibility of old men and the very young to drunkenness (fr. 107), and while men are most susceptible to drunkenness, women are least susceptible (fr. 108).²⁷⁹ The latter passage is of some importance, for it offers a caveat. We are first told that Aristotle failed to

²⁷⁷ Wh = White's edition of the fragments of Hieronymus in Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities vol. 12 (2004).

²⁷⁸ M = Martano's edition of the fragments of Chamaeleon forthcoming in Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities.

²⁷⁹ We may add the use of Rhodian pots and spices to make wine less intoxicating (fr. 110, 11). Presumably these measures have an effect on the body, which becomes more resistant to drunkenness.

work out the explanation, even though he was accustomed to omit nothing of this kind. After that, an explanation is supplied: whereas women are moist, gulp down their drinks and have many passages throughout their bodies, men have bodies that are dry and rough, and even when sober they exhibit the characteristics of drunkenness. At first reading, we may see a contradiction here: the latter passage (fr. 108) tells that Aristotle failed to explain the susceptibility of old men to drunkenness, while the former passage offered one (fr. 107). To be sure, the former passage offers an explanation that is different from the explanation subsequently supplied in the latter (lack of heat is the cause as against dryness and roughness), but an explanation is given. There is, however, a different and more satisfactory way to view the matter: Aristotle's failure to offer an explanation concerns only women. In other words, Aristotle fell short of giving a full explanation.²⁸⁰ Put more generally, we may say that in their works *On Drunkenness* Aristotle and Theophrastus and probably Hieronymus and Chamaeleon introduced material that invites physiological explanation, but we cannot assume that the early Peripatetics always offered detailed explanations in works that carried the title *On Drunkenness*. Instead, a scientific work (an esoteric work as against an exoteric dialogue), whose primary focus was physiological may have been deemed more appropriate to fully developed explanations. In this regard, we should notice that the third book of the ps-Aristotelian *Problems* carries the title "Whatever Concerns the Drinking of Wine and Drunkenness" (871a1) The book may contain Theophrastean material,²⁸¹ but whether it does, and if so which sections, cannot be decided apart from speculation.

Finally, it should be mentioned that according to Athenaeus, Theophrastus left money for symposia (κατέλιπε χορήματα 5.2 186A = 36.5–6). In the case of a man who not only wrote on wine and related topics but also took part in symposia, such a bequest would hardly be surprising. There is, however, no mention of a bequest for symposia in the will of Theophrastus as recorded by Diogenes Laertius (5.51–57 = 1.295–365). Gottschalk has suggested that Athenaeus is in error. He should have reported a gift that Theophrastus made during his lifetime.²⁸²

²⁸⁰ Rose (1863) p. 119.

²⁸¹ That the *Problems* contains Theophrastean material is not in doubt. An example is sweat. See the introduction to my edition of *On Sweat* (Leiden: Brill 2003) pp. 12–15.

²⁸² Gottschalk (1972) pp. 316–317.

no. 32 (*Dialogue*) concerning *Social Interaction*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.47 = 1.219

Literature: Dirlmeier (1937) p. 7; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1541; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 132–133, (2005b) pp. 131, 394, 397, 419; Sollenberger (1984) pp. 326–327

The title Ὀμιλητικός, (*Dialogue*) concerning *Social Interaction* is found only in the second list of Diogenes' catalogue of Theophrastean writings. We have added "Dialogue" in parentheses to our translation of the title. That is in line with our translation of the title Μεγαρικός, *Megarian (Dialogue)*, but it should be acknowledged that our translation of Μεγαρικός is not certain. To be sure, Hirzel considered the Μεγαρικός a dialogue, and there are reasonable arguments that support his view (see above the commentary on 436 no. 20). But Hicks is not making a foolish mistake when he translates *Megarian Treatise* (Loeb ed. p. 492). Much the same can be said regarding the title Ἐρωτικός. We have translated (*Dialogue*) concerning *Love*, while Hicks prefers *Concerning Love* (Loeb ed. p. 491). Here Hicks' translation adds nothing to the Greek title and in that way avoids the issue of genre. That may be commendable caution, for with all three titles, Ὀμιλητικός, Μεγαρικός and Ἐρωτικός, we can understand λόγος, which can be used of a treatise or a speech as well as a dialogue (see LSJ s.v. VI.3 and above, the commentary on 436 no. 29).

Aside from Diogenes' catalogue, no text refers to the Ὀμιλητικός. That leaves us guessing concerning the particular topics discussed within the work. Regenbogen mentions the work among those that cannot be placed (col. 1541) and says nothing about content. The restraint is understandable but perhaps excessive. We know that Aristotle discussed character traits that manifest themselves ἐν ταῖς ὁμιλίαις καὶ τῷ συζῆν καὶ λόγων καὶ πραγμάτων κοινωνεῖν, "in social relations and living together and sharing words and actions" (*NE* 4.6 1126b11–12). We know also that Theophrastus took an interest in such traits. His *Ethical Characters* is primarily a description of different forms of inappropriate and laughable behavior in human society. And a passage in Stobaeus informs us that he illustrated the mean relative to us (behavior that is appropriate to a given individual in a particular situation) by reference to talking: i.e., saying what is necessary and so laying hold of due measure (449A.3). These texts suggest that the Ὀμιλητικός focused on character traits that are manifested in every day interaction, ὁμιλία.²⁸³ We can

²⁸³ Here I have connected ὁμιλία with "everyday interaction," and above I have followed

imagine that Theophrastus followed Aristotle who in the *Nicomachean Ethics* discussed three sets of coordinate dispositions: friendliness, complaisance and grouchiness (4.6 1126b11), truthfulness, boastfulness and self-deprecation (4.7 1127b13–32) and wittiness, buffoonery and boorishness (4.8 1127b33–1128a3). Perhaps Theophrastus added other traits, e.g., those exhibited in conversation (449A.1–3), and explained how these traits differ from central cases of moral virtue and vice like courage, cowardice and boldness.

There is, however, a complication in that the *Nicomachean* and the *Eudemian Ethics* differ in their treatment of social dispositions. In the *NE*, the mean dispositions are associated with nobility and choice, τὸ καλὸν and προαίρεσις (4.6 1126b28–33); they are spoken of as virtues, ἀρεταί (4.7 1127a16–17, b1). In addition, they are separated from shame, αἰδώς, which is discussed afterwards and said not to be a virtue but more like an emotion (4.9 1128b10–15). What we find in the *EE* is very different. The three sets of coordinate dispositions discussed in the *NE* are now part of a larger discussion (six sets of coordinate dispositions). It begins with an entirely new set of coordinates: righteous indignation, envy and *Schadenfreude* (3.7 1233b16–26). Shame, shamelessness and bashfulness come second (1233b26–29), and dignity, self-will and complaisance are discussed fourth (1233b34–38). Moreover and more importantly, the several mean dispositions are said not to be virtues and the extremes are said not to be vices, for they lack choice, ἄνευ προαιρέσεως (1234a23–25).²⁸⁴ That is striking, but perhaps understandable in that the *EE* mixes

Ostwald and translated the plural at *NE* 1126b11 with “social relations.” That seems to me quite acceptable, but I want to underline that ὁμιλία and cognate forms are not always used of social or private interaction. They can also be used of business and political interaction, which can be public as well as private. See, e.g., Plato, *Gorgias* 484D.2–5 and 519.

²⁸⁴ Much turns on the meaning of προαίρεσις. Is Aristotle referring to *per se* προαίρεσις, choosing something for its own sake? And are we to understand that not only the moral virtues but also the coordinate vices are dispositions to choose actions for their own sake? That Aristotle does make *per se* προαίρεσις a defining mark of moral virtue is not in doubt (*NE* 2.4 1105a32, *NE/EE* 6/5.12 1144a19–20). He viewed the moral virtues as the product of early training in values, i.e., as learned dispositions on account of which a person sees certain actions as noble and chooses these actions for their own sake. Less clear, however, is Aristotle’s understanding of vice. On the one hand, we are told that the ἀκόλαστος, the intemperate individual, chooses pleasure, because he is convinced that he must always take the immediate pleasure (*NE/EE* 1146b22–23). On the other, we are told that the βάνανσος, the vulgar individual spends large sums, not because it is noble to do so, but because he believes that he will gain admiration by showing off his wealth (*NE* 4.2 1123a24–26). It appears that the intemperate individual makes a *per se* choice,

in shame, which the *NE* associated with emotion and dissociated from virtue. And the *EE* begins with a set of coordinates, righteous indignation, envy and *Schadenfreude*, which can be construed as emotions.²⁸⁵ Moreover, the fourth set of coordinates, dignity, self-will and complaisance, can be viewed as manners, i.e., superficial traits that cut across a person's behavior. Theophrastus sketched self-will and complaisance in the *Characters* (15 and 5, respectively) and did so as behavioral regularities that are compatible with a variety of motives.²⁸⁶ I would like to believe that somewhere in his ethical writings Theophrastus was prompted by his interest in behavioral regularities to pick apart the Eudemian discussion. For example, he might have grouped together righteous indignation and shame and their coordinate extremes as dispositions closely tied to emotional response. Dignity and friendliness and their coordinate extremes might have been grouped separately as stylistic dispositions, i.e., manners that are not closely tied to emotion. At the same time, Theophrastus might have approved of the *EE* for withholding choice from a mean disposition like friendliness. I mean *per se* choice, for manners, albeit important to smooth social interaction, are not on the same level as, e.g., courage. The courageous man defends his country, because it is noble to do so, but it seems odd to speak of a simple act of friendliness, an accommodation, as noble.²⁸⁷ We can imagine other ways in which Theophrastus might have sorted out the disagreement between the *NE* and *EE*, but if he did so, the author of the *Magna Moralia* either was unaware

but the vulgar individual does not. At first reading, that seems like confusion, but on reflection it seems clear that an adequate treatment of vices should make room both for those involving *per se* choice and for those that do not. Indeed, some vices are best conceived of negatively. Indeed, the names of some vices involve negation: e.g. ἀφιλοτιμία and ἀνελευθερία. See Fortenbaugh (1975c) pp. 63–71; repr. (2003) pp. 132–137.

²⁸⁵ See Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 2.9–10 1386b8–1388a30.

²⁸⁶ See Fortenbaugh (1975c) pp. 71–76; repr. (2003) pp. 137–141. On the difference between Aristotle's treatment of complaisance, ἀρεσκέα, in the *NE* and Theophrastus' sketch in the *Characters*, see pp. 71–73 and repr. pp. 137–139. Put succinctly, in the *NE* the complaisant individual does everything with a view to pleasing another, πάντα πρὸς ἡδονήν; he thinks it necessary, δεῖν, not to be a pain to those whom he meets (4.6 1126b12–14); he has no further goal in mind and therefore is quite different from the flatterer who has a further goal in mind, i.e., his own advantage (1127a8–10). In *Characters* 5, the complaisant individual is presented in terms of a behavioral regularity: he does whatever he does in a pleasing manner. No single goal is suggested; on occasion his behavior is superficially the same as that of the flatterer, e.g. kissing someone else's children (2.6, 5.5).

²⁸⁷ When one person accommodates another, he may think of his accommodation as a means and not a goal.

of what he did or simply choose to ignore it. For at the conclusion of his own discussion (which is closer to the *EE* than to the *NE*), the author of the *MM* leaves open whether the mean dispositions should be regarded as virtues. He refers vaguely to another discussion and satisfies himself by saying that those who live according to the mean dispositions receive praise (1.32 1193a37–39).

The Ὀμιλητικός may have contained not only theoretical and descriptive material but also a paraenetic element. Dirlmeier (1937) p. 7 refers to (pseudo?) Isocrates' address *To Demonicus* (*Or.* 1) 30: γίγνου πρὸς τοὺς πλησιάζοντας ὀμιλητικὸς ἀλλὰ μὴ σεμνός· τὸν μὲν γὰρ τῶν ὑπεροπτικῶν ὄγκον μόλις ἂν οἱ δοῦλοι καρτερήσειαν, τὸν δὲ τῶν ὀμιλητικῶν τρόπον ἅπαντες ἡδέως ὑποφέρουσιν, "Be affable to those who approach but not haughty, for slaves would hardly endure the weight of the contemptuous, but all bear with pleasure the manner of the affable."²⁸⁸ We can easily imagine that Theophrastus' work contained similar advice. The reader or listener may have been told to pay attention to the particular situation, τὸ γὰρ ἄκαιρον πανταχοῦ λυπηρόν, "for the unseasonable is always unpleasant" (*Dem.* 31). He may have been urged to adopt an agreeable ἔξις ὀμιλητική without becoming a flatterer whose pleasant way exceeds due measure (cf. the Platonic *Definitions* 415E).²⁸⁹

²⁸⁸ In the passage quoted above (from section 30), Isocrates addresses Demonicus in the second person singular imperative, γίγνου. That is appropriate to advice directed toward an individual and common in the paraenetic portion of the address *To Demonicus* (13–43). The addition of an explanation introduced by γὰρ is also common. What follows (section 31 not printed above) is of interest, for Isocrates continues to speak about affable behavior, but he does so in a notably different way. Instead of using an imperative construction, he uses the second person singular future of the verb "to be," ἔσει, together with participles. In addition, he offers more specific advice, and for the most part this advice is expressed negatively: after μὴ there are nine occurrences of μηδέ. Wefelmeier p. 49 comments that the strong rhetorical style would suit a preparatory exercise, προγύμνασμα, in a grammatical or rhetorical school. For further discussion of *To Demonicus*, see the immediately following note and below, Chapter IV on text 523 and 538 *ad fin.*

²⁸⁹ The directive, "Be affable to those who approach" (*Dem.* 30, printed above) may be compared with an earlier passage in which Demonicus is instructed to be courteous in his manner and cordial in address: τῷ μὲν τρόπῳ γίγνου φιλοπροσήγορος, τῷ δὲ λόγῳ εὐπροσήγορος. Isocrates explains that the former involves greeting those whom one meets, while the latter involves speaking in a familiar or friendly manner (*Dem.* 20). Clearly such behavior can be overdone, and when carried to extremes it becomes quite laughable. Of this Theophrastus is well aware, and in the *Characters* he sketches a humorous example (*Characters* 5.2). Isocrates, too, is aware that friendly greetings can be overdone, and in what follows he adds a new directive, "Be pleasant to all, and cultivate the best," ἡδέως μὲν ἔχε πρὸς ἅπαντας, χρῶ δὲ τοῖς βελτίστοις (*Dem.* 20). Recognizing two groups of persons may be applied to how one greets people and therefore can be seen

We know that Theophrastus valued correct speech at a symposium (1.42–44, 577A–B) and can at least ask ourselves whether the Ὀμιλητικός had something to say on the subject. Cf. Plutarch, *Table Talk* 2.1 629F, where an important part of the Ὀμιλητική (τέχνη) is said to be the knowledge and maintenance of propriety in putting questions and being playful during a symposium. Cf. also Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.88–89, where the focus is on the several styles of writing employed by Heraclides of Ponticus. In composing dialogue between philosophers, generals and statesmen, Heraclides is said to have used an intermediate style of conversation: μεσότης τις Ὀμιλητική (5.89 = fr. 1.64–72 Sch). We cannot conclude from this brief passage concerning Heraclides that Theophrastus, in the Ὀμιλητικός, discussed the style appropriate to conversation between philosophers, generals and statesmen. But we do know that Theophrastus had a keen interest in style (he wrote a work *Περὶ λέξεως*, 666 no. 17a), and we can at least imagine him discussing λέξεις from various points of view. Moreover, we know that Theophrastus' own style was much appreciated.²⁹⁰ If the Ὀμιλητικός was a dialogue, it is not unreasonable to believe that Theophrastus made use of a μεσότης Ὀμιλητική perhaps not unlike that of his contemporary Heraclides.

For ὁμιλία and χάρις in opposition to προᾶξεις, see 519.

no. 33 *Exhortation*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.49 and 5.50 = 1.262 and 284

Literature: Koepke (1856) pp. 36–37; Fortenbaugh (1984) p. 123–124; Sollenberger (1984) pp. 359–360

The title Προτρεπτικός, *Exhortation*, occurs twice in Diogenes' catalogue of Theophrastean writings. It is found in the third list, which is not arranged alphabetically, after *Περὶ τῆς θείας εὐδαιμονίας πρὸς τοὺς ἐξ Ἀκαδημείας* (436 no. 13) and before *Πῶς ἄριστ' ἂν πόλεις οἰκοῖντο ὑπομνήματα* (589 no. 8). It recurs in the fourth list, which is alphabetical, after *Περὶ παιδείας ἢ περὶ ἀρετῶν ἢ περὶ σωφροσύνης* (436 no. 9a) and before *Περὶ ἀριθμῶν* (264 no. 1), which begins the fifth list. The

as a welcome qualifier. But the reference to “all” people seems overly inclusive, so that we might welcome an additional qualifier. Nevertheless, in the context of paraenetic address, we would be expecting too much. Paraenesis, as we meet it in *To Demonicus*, is typically brief and not intended to cover all possible exceptions.

²⁹⁰ Cicero is especially complimentary. For passages, see below, Chapter IV, Section 1 “Writings on Ethics” n. 20.

recurrence does not indicate a second work that was referred to by the same title as the first. Rather, we should think of two copies of the same work. Most likely these copies were part of two separate purchases by the library in Alexandria. Each purchase was recorded on a separate list and these lists are combined in Diogenes' catalogue.²⁹¹

Προτρεπτικός is a generic title. It refers to a work that has a hortatory function: cf. Stobaeus, *Anthology* 2.7.2, ἔστι γὰρ ὁ προτρεπτικός (*sc.* λόγος) ὁ παρορμῶν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν, "the protreptic (address) is one urging (the addressee) to virtue" (vol. 2 p. 40.6–7 W). In line with that function, we have translated the title with *Exhortation*, but the transliteration *Protreptikos* or the Latinized form *Protrepticus* might have been preferred. For those renderings are common when referring to Aristotle's Προτρεπτικός.

The Aristotelian title appears among the 19 exoteric works with which Diogenes' catalogue of Aristotelian writings begins (5.22). Whereas the majority of these works were dialogues, three were παραινήσεις, i.e., addresses giving advice or counsel.²⁹² The *Protrepticus* or *Exhortation* is one of these.²⁹³ It is lost, but a philologically sound collection of fragments is available in Ingemar Düring's book *Aristotle's Protrepticus: An Attempt at Reconstruction*.²⁹⁴ On the basis of this collection, it is clear that Aristotle composed a fictitious address to Prince Themison of Cyprus (B 1 Düring), in which he advanced an extended argument in favor of living a philosophic life. Man, we are told, comes into being by nature, διὰ φύσιν, and in accordance with nature, κατὰ φύσιν, and

²⁹¹ H.G. Hübner, the editor of the Leipzig edition (1828–1831), deletes the second mention of the Προτρεπτικός. That is an error: the second mention is not a scribal error; rather, it refers to a second copy. Accordingly, the error has not been recorded in the *apparatus criticus* to 1.284.

²⁹² I am following Moraux (1951) p. 27, who refers to three works that were παραινήσεις. Here I add only that paraenetic works take more than one form. They can be continuous addresses in which individual topics are treated at some length, and they can also offer strings of recommendations that are quite short. An example of the latter is ps.-Isocrates, *To Demonicus*, in which the body of the text is a series of directives that can be as short as one or two lines. The *Protrepticus* of Aristotle belonged to the former category, and my guess is that the Theophrastean work did too.

²⁹³ The other two were *Alexander* or *On (On behalf of?) Colonies* and *On Kingship*. See Moraux (1951) 27–28, 36–37. There have been scholars, who thought that the *Protrepticus* was a dialogue (e.g., J. Bernays, *Die Dialoge des Aristoteles in ihrem Verhältnis an seinen übrigen Werken* [Berlin 1863] pp. 131–132 and H. Diels, "Zu Aristoteles' *Protreptikos* und Ciceros *Hortensius*," *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 1 [1888] pp. 483–492), but today their view finds little or no support.

²⁹⁴ In Düring's book (1961), the fragments will be found on pp. 46–93.

therefore has an end for which he exists (B 11, 13). Having intellect, νοῦς, as his superior part (B 23–24), man finds his end in acts of philosophic contemplation, ἐν ταῖς κατὰ σοφίαν θεωρίαις (B 27, cf. B 6), through which he becomes like god, ὁμοιοῦται θεῷ (B 28). He contemplates the universe (B 44), attains truth (B 65) and experiences delight, χαίρειν, in an activity that is the most pleasant, ἡδίστη, of all (B 87, 95). That Aristotle presented these thoughts forcefully and fulsomely is not to be doubted, but we should not ignore what is almost a footnote in the surviving fragments. I am thinking of the passage in which we are enjoined to honor supremely and revere, τιμᾶν ὑπερβαλλόντως καὶ σέβεσθαι, our fathers and mothers as the cause of our greatest goods, of our thinking and seeing (B 102). However much Aristotle enjoyed and praised the philosophic life, he seems not to have forgotten that men are part of a community that begins with parents and extends beyond.

Most likely Theophrastus followed his teacher in that his like-named work was not a dialogue. Rather, it was an address, which emphasized the value of the contemplative life. We can imagine Theophrastus beginning his exhortation by calling attention to the different kinds of life men lead (Theophrastus wrote a Περὶ βίων 436 no. 16) and underlining the importance of acquiring correct goals at an early age. Perhaps he introduced an extended metaphor like that of the traveler who takes the wrong road and has difficulty turning back (465.11–18).²⁹⁵ To do so would not only add clarity and force to his message but also delight the reader and keep his attention. In addition, we can imagine Theophrastus identifying what is good for man with what is according to nature, κατὰ φύσιν, (507.3–5), focusing on man's intellect, νοῦς, as superior and more divine (271.6), characterizing god in terms of intellect and urging his reader to liken himself to god, ὁμοιοῦσθαι θεῷ, at least as far as he can (483.3). In this context, he may have described the beauty of the heavens, credited it with awakening philosophy among earlier generations and spoken of a fuller knowledge of the heavens, which will be possible once the soul is free of bodily cares (484.9–15). But we can also imagine him returning to earth and ending on a sobering note: to be admired for one's relationship to the divinity requires more than likening oneself to god through periods of intellectual activity. It also calls for attention to parents, family and fellow citizens (523.3–13).

²⁹⁵ The metaphor that presents life as a road is, of course, common and appropriate to a paraenetic work. See, e.g., ps.-Isocrates, *To Demonicus* 5.

The preceding musings may be reasonable, but they must remain musings. The hard reality is that aside from Diogenes' catalogue, no text refers explicitly to Theophrastus' Προτρεπτικός, let alone describes its content.

In addition to Aristotle and Theophrastus, both Demetrius of Phalerum and Chamaeleon of Heraclea wrote works entitled Προτρεπτικός. The work of the former is mentioned only in Diogenes' catalogue of Demetrius' writings (5.81 = fr. 81 no. 11 SOD). The work of the latter is mentioned only in Athenaeus' *The Sophists at Dinner*, where Alceides of Alexandria (one of the dinners) cites Chamaeleon and reports that the Spartans, Thebans and Heracleots learned to play the *aulos*, as did the most prominent Athenians (4.84 184D = fr. 4 Martano). It would be rash to draw any conclusion concerning the content of Theophrastus' Προτρεπτικός.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE TEXTS

1. *Writings on Ethics*

A single text, 437, has been printed under the heading “Writings on Ethics.” It concerns historical matter and style or mode of expression and is discussed below. Four additional texts, 436 no. 21, 482, 498 and 590, which are not printed under the heading “Writings on Ethics,” are nevertheless referred to in the text-translation volumes immediately after 437.

437 Athenaeus, *The Sophists at Dinner* 15.15 673E–F (BT vol. 3 p. 488.22–489.7 Kaibel)

Literature: Petersen (1854) pp. 65–66; Usener (1858) p. 22; Brandis (1860) pp. 348, 359–360; Zeller (1879) p. 855 n. 3; Heylbut (1888) p. 196; von der Mühl (1909) p. 27 n. 2; Walzer (1929) pp. 80–81; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1480; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 140–142; Moraux (1984) pp. 295, 323–332; Mercken (1990) pp. 421–422; Barnes (1999) pp. 14–16; Braund (2000) p. 18

Text 437 is found in the fifteenth book of Athenaeus’ *The Sophists at Dinner*. The topic under discussion is wreaths. Within the framework of the dinner, the discussion is prompted by the arrival of slaves bringing wreaths and perfumes for the diners (15.8 669C). Cynulcus¹ asks why broken wreaths are taken as a sign that the people wearing them are in love (669C); a lengthy answer is provided by Democritus,² who cites Clearchus’ (*Matters*) *concerning Love* (15.9 669F–670F).³ Democritus

¹ “Cynulcus” is the nickname of the Cynic philosopher Theodorus. See 1.2 1D and 15.9 669E with Mengis pp. 36–37.

² This Democritus, who is introduced in 1.1 1D as a philosopher from Nicomedia, is not to be confused with the well-known atomist who hailed from Abdera in Thrace and was born c. 460 BC.

³ The Clearchus text is fr. 24 W.

then discusses a problematic passage in Plato's *Laws* (15.10 670F–671B)⁴ and after a short interruption takes up two questions posed by Cynulcus. What is the wreath of Naucratis? And why are some people wreathed with withes? (15.11 671E).⁵ Democritus begins with the second question and claims to have found the answer in a little treatise of Mendotus of Samos (15.12 672A–15.15 673E). After that Democritus says that he showed to many people what he found in Mendotus' treatise and asserts that Hephaestion⁶ took the answer from him and published it as his own in a treatise entitled *On the Wreath of Withes in Anacreon*. To this assertion, Democritus adds the further claim that Hephaestion behaved similarly in regard to the noble Adrastus. That is the beginning of 437.

We read that Adrastus wrote five books *On Questions of History and Style in the (work) On Dispositions of Theophrastus* and a sixth (book) *On the (same matters) in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics*; he added abundant thoughts on the (character, i.e., stage figure) Plexippus in the tragedian Antiphon and said a great deal about Antiphon himself. Hephaestion took this too as his own and wrote a book *On Antiphon in the Memorabilia of Xenophon*. He added nothing of his own, just as in the (work) *On the Wreath of Withes* (lines 1–9).⁷ The final sentence makes clear that these remarks concerning Adrastus have been added by Democritus in order to support the preceding claim that Hephaestion took as his own what he (Democritus) had discovered in a treatise of Mendotus of Samos. In the context of Democritus' remarks, the addition is needed, for Democritus does not claim to have written a work from which Hephaestion stole (i.e., a work that could be consulted by anyone who might doubt Democritus' assertion of theft). Rather, Democritus says that he had shown to many others what he had found: (15.15 673E–F). We are to

⁴ The Platonic passage is *Laws* 7.21 819B: as a lesson in computation, children are taught to divide up apples and wreaths, so that in larger or smaller groups each recipient has an equal number of apples or wreaths.

⁵ Both questions relate to verses of Anacreon: PMG no. 89 and 7 Page.

⁶ According to Fabricius, this Hephaestion is not to be confused with the grammarian from Alexandria who lived in the middle second century AD and wrote a work *On Meters* in forty-eight books (Bibl. Gr. vol. 8 p. 18). Schweighaeuser cautions that neither the fatherland, nor the profession nor the age of the grammarian constitutes a serious objection to the identification (vol. 8 pp. 61–62). Moraux (1984) p. 295 puts forward three possibilities: the grammarian, the father of Ptolemaeus Chennus and the author of the *Encheiridion* περί μέτρων.

⁷ The phrase "of Withes" translates the adjective λυγίνου in the title of Hephaestion's work (line 9, cf. 673E, where the title occurs for the first time). In the text-translation volumes we preferred the Latin *Agnus castus*, which now seems to me overly scholarly and less familiar than "withes."

believe that Hephaestion became aware of the discovery, perhaps through a series of oral communications, and subsequently published it as his own. The result is a “my word, his word” conflict, which Democritus attempts to counter by referring to a second case of theft. In rhetorical terms, Democritus advances an argument by example.⁸ In what follows, no more attention is given to Adrastus and his books on Theophrastus and Aristotle. Rather, Democritus attempts to gain further credibility by showing himself to be a fair person: he acknowledges that Hephaestion did add something on his own: namely that the historian Phylarchus knows the story of the withe but not the verses of Anacreon (15.15 673F).⁹

Our text is not without textual difficulties. First, the words ὁ Ἡφαιστίων συγγράφει καὶ (line 1) have been placed in brackets, because in the context of what precedes (not printed as part of 437) and of what follows an explicit reference to Hephaestion is unnecessary and is likely to have been added to the text from a marginal notation.¹⁰ Second, Ἀδραστον (line 2) is Casaubon’s correction of ἄδραντον. The change is slight and almost certainly correct. Adrastus was a Peripatetic philosopher, who lived in the middle of the second century AD. He may have taught Athenaeus, and as a Peripatetic he might be expected to have written at length on Theophrastus and Aristotle.¹¹ Third, the report concerning the work of Adrastus has two parts that may appear somewhat awkwardly joined. In the first part, we read that Adrastus wrote about Theophrastus’ *On Dispositions* and Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics*. Five books were devoted to Theophrastus and a sixth to Aristotle (lines 2–5).¹² In

⁸ See Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* 1.2 and 2.20, and my *Commentary* 8 (2005c) on the rhetorical and poetic texts pp. 73–77; on direct comparison between two similar cases, see pp. 75–76.

⁹ To keep things simple, I have omitted references to the poet Nicaenetus: 15.14 673B–D, 15.15 674A.

¹⁰ See Schweighauser vol. 8 p. 62, who is following Casaubon, and in his edition places the words in brackets.

¹¹ Barnes (1999) p. 15 strikes me as playful and overly skeptical, when he characterizes Casaubon’s conjecture as “genial” (we think first of a jovial, agreeable conjecture, and then of genius and the ingenious), says that there are other possibilities (but gives none) and suggests that the adjective καλός, “noble,” does not suit an “obscure” Peripatetic. Even if Adrastus never taught Athenaeus and even if he is not well known to us, writers of the late second century will not have deemed him unimportant. He wrote *inter alia* a commentary on Plato’s *Timaeus*, a work on the order of Aristotle’s writings and commentaries on Aristotle’s *Categories* and *Physics* (see Mercken [1990] p. 421). Moreover, the work of six books mentioned in 437 will have had a special appeal for the author of *The Sophists at Dinner*, because it focused on historical and lexical material.

¹² However tempting it may be, we should resist emending ἕκτον to ἕξ, “sixth” to “six,” in line 4. To be sure, reading ἕξ would give Adrastus a lengthy commentary on

the second part, we read that Adrastus added thoughts, ἐννοίας, about Plexippus and Antiphon (lines 5–7). The conjecture of Schweighaeuser, ἐν οἷς for ἐννοίας, is at first glance attractive. The change is not great, and it makes clear that the remarks of Adrastus concerning Plexippus and Antiphon were to be found in the works cited in the first part. Nevertheless, the suggested emendation is not necessary, and it introduces a new problem: after the phrase ἐν οἷς one expects a finite verb and not the participles παραθεμένου and εἰπόντος (lines 5 and 7). Be that as it may, neither Plexippus nor Antiphon is mentioned in the *Nicomachean Ethics*.¹³ That encourages the conclusion that the two were mentioned in Theophrastus' work *On Dispositions*. But it should be acknowledged that if the conjecture ἐν οἷς is not accepted, then all that we are told is that Adrastus added thoughts about Plexippus and said a great deal about Antiphon. Perhaps these additions were prompted by explicit references to Plexippus and Antiphon in Theophrastus' *On Dispositions* (a reasonable guess), but they may have been prompted by related material or simply added by Adrastus as a kind of excursus dealing with questions of history and style.

In the text-translation volumes, we translated ἱστορία with "history" (line 3). That is not entirely wrong, but it can be misleading, for it might suggest construing ἱστορία narrowly, so that it covers only history as written by, e.g., Herodotus and Thucydides. In fact, ἱστορία often refers generally to investigation. A Theophrastean example is the botanical title Περί φυτῶν ἱστορία which we translate *Research on Plants* (384 no. 1a). In text 437, ἱστορία is used widely in regard to questions of fact that invite investigation. That does not exclude political and military history, but it makes room for issues concerning a stage figure like Plexippus, a tragedian like Antiphon and a great deal more (lines 5–7).

Walzer tells us that in ethics Theophrastus made greater use of historical material (to be construed widely) than Aristotle. In support of this assertion, he refers to Plutarch, *Pericles* 38, in which Theophrastus is said to have asked whether character is affected by bodily changes and to have answered the question by citing Pericles who began to wear an amulet when afflicted by the plague (463). Walzer also refers to our text, in which Athenaeus reports that Adrastus was able to write five books dealing with

the *Nicomachean Ethics*, and that might satisfy a wish, but it is bad philology. For that reason, our apparatus criticus ignores the possibility of emending to ἔξ.

¹³ In the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle introduces Plexippus to illustrate anger toward friends (2.2 1379b15).

historical and lexical questions in Theophrastus' work *On Dispositions* and only one in regard to Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* (437).¹⁴ The surviving evidence concerning *On Dispositions* is woefully meager, and in what we do have, only Simonides and Theognis are named (516, 529A–B). Reports concerning other writings are more numerous and do exhibit an interest in historical material. See texts 550 and 551, which tell us that Theophrastus cited Smindyrides and Sardanapalus as part of a discussion of living well. In 559 and 561, we read that in the (*Dialogue*) *concerning Love* Theophrastus cited Chaeremon, Euripides and Amasis the Elian. And in 560, we are told that Theophrastus related the story of Leucocomas and Euxynthetus in the work *On Love*. In 563–564, there are remarks concerning beauty contests among Greeks and barbarians that most likely derive from one or the other of the works on love. On the basis of 570 and 571,¹⁵ we can say that in *On Drunkenness* Theophrastus discussed the sympotic practices of an earlier time, and from 576, we learn that in the same work Theophrastus not only spoke of dances that used to be performed around the temple of Delian Apollo but also made explicit reference to a document or painting preserved in the temple of the Laurel Bearer. Also relevant is 584A, which contains excerpts from the work *On Piety*. These excerpts are taken from Porphyry's work *On Abstinence from Eating Animals* and have been grouped together with texts that focus on religion. But the excerpts show clearly Theophrastus' concern with historical detail, and not only in regard to the Athenians (2.7.1, 2.9.1–2, 2.29.1–30.5 = 584A.46–51, 84–92, 321–365) but also the Egyptians (2.5.1, 2.26.5 = 584A.1–8, 272–275) and the Jews (2.26.1–4 = 584A.261–275). Not to be ignored is a passage in which Porphyrius tells us that Theophrastus referred to τὰ πάτρια, "the ancestral traditions," in order to show that in early times sacrifices were of fruit (2.20.2 = 584A.169–171).

Four caveats are in order. First, by itself text 437 is not clear proof of the claim that Theophrastus made noticeably greater use of historical material in his ethical writings than Aristotle did in his writings on ethics. For 437 does not explain why Adrastus wrote only one book on the *Nicomachean Ethics*. The fact that he wrote five books on Theophrastus' *On Dispositions* might depend on Adrastus' own special interests and not on the quantity of historical and lexical material contained in the work. Second, the wording of our texts suggests that what Adrastus said about

¹⁴ Walzer p. 81.

¹⁵ Text 570 makes explicit reference to *On Drunkenness*; 571 does not, but it can be assigned to *On Drunkenness* with all but complete certainty.

On Dispositions and the *Nicomachean Ethics* constituted a single work by Adrastus (the sixth book belongs together with the first five books in a work that was divided into six scrolls¹⁶), and that in turn might suggest that the Theophrastean work was similar in kind to that of Aristotle, i.e., both were esoteric works for use within the Peripatetic school. But that is not stated explicitly, and in regard to *On Dispositions* our meager evidence does not allow a firm decision (see the commentary on 436 no. 1). Third, the texts that present material found in the (*Dialogue*) *concerning Love*, *On Drunkenness* and *On Piety* may be misleading, for these works are likely to have been exoteric works intended for a wide readership. In such works, a goodly number of historical examples that enliven the theme would be more at home than in an esoteric school treatise like the *Nicomachean Ethics*. Fourth, Aulus Gellius reports that in discussing conflicts between allegiance to a friend and obedience to the law, Theophrastus failed to consider individual deeds and made no use of the certain evidence of examples. (534.41–42). The report is striking, for a few well-chosen examples would help to elucidate the issue. However, the report itself must be used with some caution, for it is possible, though in my judgment unlikely, that Gellius knew the relevant Theophrastean work, *On Friendship*, only through an intermediary that offered excerpts.¹⁷

Although no lexical peculiarity is specifically cited in regard to *On Dispositions*, lexical interest in regard to the ethical writings of Theophrastus is attested. See 449B, 494A–B and Eustathius' Commentary on Homer's *Odyssey* 11.224 (vol. 1 p. 409.24–26 Stallbaum), where Theophrastus is cited to document the use of γύν(ν)ις to describe a man who is unable to have intercourse with a woman (cited in the apparatus to 578.3–8).¹⁸ Moreover, phrases like ἄζηλος καὶ ἄπλουτος (512A.1–2 and 512B.3–4) and ἀκατάσκευος καὶ καθάπερ ἀνεύρετος (551.7–8)—alliteration achieved through the repetition of the alpha-primitive—seem to call out for comment. The same is true of the repeated use of words having the same root: φιλ- and φρον- (523.12–14). So too the first two of three sayings attributed to Theophrastus by Diogenes Laertius (5.39–40 = 1.41–44): we find balanced phrases as well as repetition of the alpha primitive

¹⁶ I should say “six or more scrolls,” for it is possible (the wording of 437 does not exclude the possibility) that the addition concerning Plexippus and Antiphanes made up a seventh scroll.

¹⁷ See above, Chapter II “The Sources” no. 17 on Gellius and below, Section 13 on 534.

¹⁸ In the Theophrastean passage, the man is Alexander the Great.

and the same root.¹⁹ To be sure, sayings are special in that they may be entered in a collection because of their stylistic features or even altered in order that they exhibit a more striking style. There is also metaphor, which Theophrastus not only discussed in *On Style* (666 no. 17a) but also used to good effect (e.g., 465). When Cicero compliments Theophrastus for writing in an attractive manner,²⁰ he may be thinking primarily of the exoteric writings, especially dialogues, in which attention to style may be expected. The work *On Dispositions* may have been different. It may have been an esoteric writing like the *Nicomachean Ethics*, but that is not certain, and more importantly nothing prevents an esoteric writing from exhibiting a measure of elevation in expression. Indeed, the *Nicomachean Ethics* is not written throughout in a forbidding style. In addition, obscurities call for comment, and Adrastus may have been interested in *termini technici* and generally in philosophic expression. No text either confirms or rules out such an interest.²¹

In conclusion, I call attention to the fact that λέξις has a variety of meanings (see LSJ s.v.). It may refer to style or expression (refined, flat, atrocious), but it may also refer (more objectively) to a word or phrase. And if that is how λέξις is being used in line 3, then we might construe the phrase κατὰ λέξιν as a reference to a phrase-by-phrase commentary. Adrastus' commentary will then have been concerned with history or facts and proceeded phrase by phrase. That is possible,²² but the idea seems to me more clever than convincing. Here are two reasons. First, it requires taking κατὰ in two ways: with ἱστορία, it is used of subject matter: "concerning history or fact," and with λέξις, it is used distributively: "phrase by phrase." Second, when paired with ἱστορία, λέξις is readily understood as a reference to style. Adrastus' commentary was distinguished for its philological exegesis, and this made it an attractive source

¹⁹ See the commentary on Diogenes Laertius, above, Chapter II, "The Sources" no. 22.

²⁰ See 5B.2, 50.1, 51.2–4, 52A.2–3 52B.5, 53.4, 54.2 and 497.1.

²¹ Theophrastus' own interest in lexical matters is clear in 584A (2.5.3, 2.30.5) and 574. Concerning his work *On Style* (666 no. 17a), see *Commentary* vol. 8 on rhetoric and poetics pp. 120–124 together with the section on "Expression" pp. 227–335.

²² Already in the 1st century AD, Boethus, a student of Andronicus, had written a commentary on the *Categories*, which is reported to have proceeded καθ' ἑκάστην λέξιν: "one word after the other" or "phrase by phrase." The report and with it the phrase comes from Simplicius, who lived in the 6th century (*On Aristotle's Categories*, CAG vol. 8 p. 30.2–3 Kalbfleisch; in the translation of M. Chase [2003] p. 44, the phrase is rendered by "word for word"), but there is no reason why Boethus and after him Adrastus could not have used κατὰ λέξιν in the sense described. See Sorabji (2007) pp. 20–21 and Sharples (2007) pp. 511–512.

for the Anonymous scholiast on the *Nicomachean Ethics*.²³ In saying that, I do not want to overlook the fact that Adrastus was an accomplished philosopher within the Peripatetic tradition, but it does not follow that all his writings were narrowly philosophical. In commenting on Theophrastus' work *On Dispositions*, he may well have indulged his interest in matters of fact and style.

436 no. 21 Cicero, *Letters to Atticus* 2.3.4²⁴

482 Cicero, *On Ends* 5.11 (BT p. 161.1–5 Schiche)

498 Cicero, *On Ends* 5.12 (BT p. 161.6–27 Schiche)

590 Cicero, *On Ends* 5.11 (BT p. 160.26–161.1 Schiche)

Literature: on 436 no. 21 see the literature cited in Chapter III; on 482 see below, Section 5; on 498 see below, in Section 7; on 590, which has been printed first among the political texts and which will find its primary discussion in *Commentary* 7, see Düring (1957) pp. 426–428, Fortenbaugh (1948) pp. 204–205; Runia (1989) pp. 23–38; Mirhady (1992) pp. 96–98

The four texts listed above all have their primary discussion elsewhere. They have been mentioned here because they are in various ways relevant to our understanding of the content, genre and style of Theophrastus' writings as well as the availability of his writings at the end of the Hellenistic period.

Texts 482, 498 and 590 are three segments of a single continuous text found in Cicero, *On Ends* 5.11–12. Text 590 comes first followed by 482 and 498. In 590 Cicero is largely focused on the political writings of Aristotle and Theophrastus; he does, however, recognize that rules for living well are concerned with private life as well as public affairs. That reflects the fact that both Aristotle and Theophrastus wrote not only separate works entitled *Ethics* and *Politics* but also works whose titles refer to specific topics within the two areas of ethics and politics. Of especial interest is Cicero's assertion that Theophrastus wrote more fully (than Aristotle) on changes in the circumstances of a state and on dealing with critical moments: *hoc amplius Theophrastus: quae essent in re publica*

²³ On the Anonymous, see above, Chapter II, "The Sources" no. 18.

²⁴ I am ignoring the fact that 436 no. 21 refers not only to Cicero, *Letters to Atticus* 2.3.4 but also to the title *On Ambition* which is listed in Diogene's catalogue of Theophrastean writings 5.46 = 1.166.

rerum inclinationes et momenta temporum quibus esset moderandum utcumque res postularet. We can be certain that Theophrastus was equally focused on the particular situation and the critical moment in private life (see the commentary on, e.g., 449A.1–4, and 534.44–64, 69–81).

In 482 Cicero tells us that Aristotle and Theophrastus expressed special approval of a quiet and contemplative life, likening it to the life of the gods and doing so in a brilliant and illustrious manner. That is correct: Theophrastus did join Aristotle in giving the highest rating to the philosophic life (481, 483), and his discourse could rise above the ordinary when dealing with this topic (483–485).²⁵ In 498 the focus is still on the best life, now referred to as the highest good. Cicero tells us that the subject was discussed in two kinds of books: ones that are written in a popular style and called exoteric, and ones that are more refined and called commentaries. And that is why Aristotle and Theophrastus do not always appear to say the same thing. The distinction between two kinds of writings—popular works intended for circulation outside the classroom, hence exoteric, and commentaries intended for use in teaching and research, hence esoteric—is important for the evaluation of our sources. I have discussed the distinction in the introduction to Chapter II on “Titles of Books.” Here I offer only a caveat: while an exoteric work, especially a dialogue, makes room for extraordinary statements that appear, especially when taken out of context, inconsistent with statements made elsewhere, other factors may be equally important. I cite Cicero’s assertion that in regard to happiness the greatest cause of apparent inconsistency is Theophrastus’ work *On Happiness*, in which considerable importance is assigned to fortune. Cicero comments that if this were the case, i.e., if misfortunes/adverse circumstances were able to snatch away happiness, then wisdom and virtue would not be able to guarantee happiness (498.9–12). Here Cicero is not misrepresenting Theophrastus (he does believe that misfortunes can remove happiness), but Cicero errs in thinking that Theophrastus’ view is out of line with Aristotelian doctrine. In fact, both Peripatetics recognized that

²⁵ Caveat: in 484 only the phrase “of fathers and grandfathers” is explicitly attributed to Theophrastus. Moreover, Cicero’s knowledge of Theophrastus’ style may be based largely on the exoteric works and not on the esoteric works. In some respects that may be unimportant, but we should not assume that Theophrastus regularly wrote in a lucid, pleasing style (try reading one of the surviving *opuscula*, e.g., *On Sweat!*), and we should not assume that acquaintance with style is a sign of accurate knowledge concerning content. See above, Chapter II “The Sources” no. 4 on Cicero and *Commentary* 8 (2005c) on rhetoric and poetics pp. 10–11 n. 22.

misfortunes can spoil human happiness (see the commentary on 498), only in *On Happiness* Theophrastus may have greatly emphasized, even exaggerated, the power of adverse circumstances. And if he did, he may have been moved to do so by what the Stoics were claiming: namely, that the wise man remains happy even in extreme misfortune. Aristotle was dead before Zeno founded the Stoa. It fell to Theophrastus to oppose the Stoic claim, and we can imagine him doing so by stating strongly the fragility of human happiness.

In 436 no. 21, i.e., in *To Atticus* 2.3, Cicero asks Atticus to fetch Theophrastus' work *On Ambition* from the library of Cicero's brother Quintus: Θεοφράστου Περί φιλοτιμίας *adfer mihi de libris Quinti fratris*. The letter dates to 60 BC. That is of some interest, for Strabo tells us that upon the death of Theophrastus (287–286 BC) Neleus acquired the library of Theophrastus along with that of Aristotle. He removed the books from the School and gave them to his heirs who stored the books carelessly so that they suffered damage. That, we are told, left the Peripatetics no books except for a few exoteric works. The treatises or commentaries remained unavailable until early in the first century, when they were acquired by Apellicon of Teos, who purchased them from the heirs of Neleus, took them to Athens and published copies that were full of errors (37.1–23).²⁶ Subsequently Sulla, who conquered Athens in 86 BC, brought them to Rome, where the grammarian Tyrannion worked on them and the Rhodian Andronicus eventually published them (37.24–28, Plutarch 38.1–8). If *On Ambition* was an esoteric work, Cicero's request might be our earliest evidence of Tyrannion's work and the emerging availability of Theophrastus' commentaries. If *On Ambition* was an exoteric writing, then Cicero's request seems less interesting, for as stated above Strabo qualifies his story concerning the removal of Aristotle's and Theophrastus' books, saying that some exoteric works were left behind (37.19–20). Indeed, the exoteric writings, being aimed at a wider audience than the esoteric writings will have existed in multiple copies and found their way to various centers of learning in the Hellenistic world. That the esoteric writings were less available during the Hellenistic period is likely to be true, but that they were quite unavailable is not to be believed. If Diogenes' catalogue of Theophrastean writings reflects the work of Hermippus and the holdings of the library in Alexandria in the second half

²⁶ Apellicon was the Athenian mint master in 89/88 BC and famous for his collection of books (H. Gottschalk, "Apellikon," in *Der Neue Pauly* vol. 1 p. 830). According to Strabo, he was more of a bibliophile than a philosopher (37.15).

of the third century BC, then there were copies outside the School, which Neleus did not get his hands on. Moreover, it seems likely that Eudemus took works with him when he left Athens for Rhodes, where the rhetoricians will have been interested in acquiring the rhetorical treatises of Aristotle and Theophrastus. And *pace* Strabo, the story of Apellicon purchasing the works of Aristotle and Theophrastus from Neleus' heirs is likely to be a fiction. The story may have been invented by Apellicon to create interest in and enhance the value of the copies that he published. It would, however, be rash to assume that the Hellenistic authors who cite Theophrastus always had direct access to his works and were not dependent on intermediaries. Perhaps Demetrius Rhetor did practice autopsy, but we should be skeptical concerning, e.g., the paradoxographer Apollonius. He may be drawing on earlier collections of *Mirabilia* like that of Bolus.²⁷

2. *Emotions*

Most people, almost all, would agree that the emotions are central to our lives. Perhaps we do not want to attribute emotions to babies. When they cry, we say they are hungry or thirsty or have soiled themselves; we do not say that they are angry or frightened. However, quite young children, still in diapers, are said to be frightened by a sudden noise or a strange face, and by the time a child reaches kindergarten his emotional responses are subject to criticism. We speak negatively of the "cry baby" and reprove the child that repeatedly exhibits anger whenever he fails to get his way. In adolescents we expect greater self-control: we might say that it is time for reason to take control of the emotions, in order that unacceptable behavior does not occur. And yet we also recognize that the bodily changes occurring during adolescence are often intense and seemingly determinant of behavior. We may not want to call adolescents victims of their bodies, but we are often prepared to cut them slack and to say that steadier behavior is only a year or two away. Indeed, maturity does bring a noticeable settling down, but reflective adults will hardly claim to be free of emotions. They will not claim to be guided in their actions solely by reason. Even the mildest of individuals will respond emotionally on certain occasions and will even feel badly if he fails to

²⁷ On Demetrius, see *Commentary* 8 (2005c) on rhetoric and poetics pp. 6–8; on Apollonius, see above, Chapter II "The Sources" no. 2.

do so. The loss of a spouse or child, for example, occasions grief, and if it does not do so, we are apt to attribute the lack of response to bad character. There are also times when a physiological state like sickness or sleep deprivation makes an otherwise controlled adult liable to outbursts that are unwanted and regretted. Finally old age brings new changes that not only affect a person's body but also occasion emotional response. Failing health, for example, not only produces physical deterioration but also tends to excite fear, envy and other emotions that may become unattractive and unworthy of a life well-lived.

What then are these emotions that are so prominent in our lives? And how do central cases like anger and fright differ from hunger and thirst, which are not normally described as emotional responses? These are questions, which were much discussed by members of the late Platonic Academy. The discussion finds expression not only in Plato's *Philebus*, his penultimate work, but also in Aristotle's *Topics*, which belongs in part to the period of his residence in the Academy. For details I refer to "Aristotle's *Rhetoric* on Emotions" (1970) pp. 56–58, repr. (2006) pp. 23–26 and *Aristotle on Emotion* (1975a, 2nd ed. 2002) pp. 9–12.²⁸ Here I limit myself to a six-part summary of Aristotle's response to the Academic discussion.

1) Confronted with the question, how thought relates to emotions like anger and fright, Aristotle determined that thought or belief is the efficient cause that is mentioned in the essential definition of these emotions. Anger is necessarily caused by apparent outrage and fear by the thought of imminent danger (*Rhet.* 2.2 1378a30–32, 2.5 1382a21–22). This means that a man who does not think himself outraged is not angry, and the man who does not think that danger threatens is not frightened. That marks an important difference between emotions and bodily drives like hunger and thirst: the latter are caused by physiological changes and not by certain thoughts. To be sure, there are times when we can turn our thoughts to a topic of such interest that we no longer notice the pangs of hunger and thirst. But we would not want to say that we are no longer hungry. The cause is still there and the pangs will return.

²⁸ Book 8 of the *Topics* in which anger receives an unambiguous causal definition (it is said to be a desire for revenge on account of apparent insult [8.1 156a32–33]) is likely to be later, belonging to the period of Aristotle's residence in Macedonia. See "On the Composition of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*" (1996a) pp. 173–175, (repr. 2006) pp. 396–398.

2) Including thought or belief in the essential definition of an emotion like anger and fright makes clear why an angry individual is always angry at some person or persons, and the frightened individual is always frightened of some impending danger (*Rhet.* 2.2 1378a33, 2.5 1382a27–32, 1382b30–34). Put generally, beliefs have objects, and since beliefs are necessary ingredients in emotional responses, these responses have objects. A man is said to be angry at a particular person because he holds a belief about that person. And a man is frightened of a person, because he believes that the other person threatens him.

3) Central cases of emotion like anger and fright are defined not only in terms of their efficient cause but also in terms of their final cause. Part of being angry is having revenge as one's goal, and part of being frightened is having safety as a goal (*On Soul* 1.1 403a30–31, *Rhet.* 2.2 1378a30, 2.5 1383a5–6). If revenge is seen to be impossible, so that the offended individual no longer aims to achieve revenge, then that person is no longer angry. And if safety is seen to be unattainable, so that the threatened individual no longer deliberates concerning safety, he is no longer frightened (*Rhet.* 1.11 1370b13, 2.5 1383a5–8, 1382b29–34). A different emotion may be present, but it will not be anger or fright. I call these emotions “practical” in that they are tied to goal-directed action, and in this way can be distinguished from “non-practical” emotions like pity and shame. These emotions can be and often are experienced apart from goal-directed action. Indeed, pity and shame are likely to be felt more intensely, when there is nothing that can be done, i.e., when it is clear that no remedial action is possible.²⁹

4) In addition to the efficient and final causes, a full account of emotional response will include the material cause. Aristotle is explicit that all emotions involve the body as well as the soul. They are *ἐνυλῶι*, “enmattered,” so that a full definition of, e.g., anger will mention not only a desire to return pain on account of apparent outrage but also a boiling of the blood or warm substance around the heart (*On Soul* 1.1 403a16–b1). On occasion, a bodily disturbance of this kind may occur by itself, i.e., apart from a desire for revenge on account of outrage (403a21–24). But that would not be anger in the strict sense. Anger is a complex phenomenon, such that any occurrence involves three causes: efficient, final and material.

²⁹ Fortenbaugh (1975a, 2nd ed. 2002) pp. 79–83.

5) According to Aristotle, emotions are accompanied by pleasure and pain (*NE* 2.5 1105b23, *Rhet.* 2.1 1378a20–21). That seems unobjectionable, for we not only speak of “feeling” anger and fright and pity etc., but also say that, e.g., an insult causes pain and the thought of revenge is pleasant. Moreover, given Aristotle’s commitment to a material cause involving bodily change, it is natural to think of pleasant and painful sensations, some of which are quite distinct and located in a particular part of the body, while others are diffuse and vague. The matter is, however, complicated by the fact that Aristotle’s remarks on the pleasure and pain that accompany emotion are not of a piece. I.e., he recognizes cases where such feelings are absent. On one occasion, he says that perceptible pleasure and pain accompany the emotions “for the most part,” ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ (*EE* 2.2 1220b12–14),³⁰ and in the case of hate, he dissociates the emotion from pain (*Rhet.* 2.4 1382a13). That prompts the question: If the sensations of pleasure and pain that accompany emotion are the result of the bodily changes that are part of emotional response, why are sensations of pleasure and pain absent in some cases? Three answers come to mind. One is that sometimes the bodily changes are minor and therefore fail to reach the level required for sensation. This might be true of most, if not all, episodes of hate. Second, a person might react immediately to a provocative situation like sudden danger and never notice anything that might be called bodily sensation. Third, a person who is totally absorbed in deliberating how best to achieve a goal, e.g. safety or revenge, might be too occupied to notice sensations caused by changes within his body.³¹

6) People are said not only to experience emotional response but also to be predisposed to emotional response. Two ways in which people are predisposed should be distinguished. First, people are predisposed to emotion on account of their bodily condition. Aristotle makes this clear when he discusses the characters of young and old men. The former are warmer by nature and therefore more apt to become angry and to confront danger boldly. In contrast, the bodies of old men have cooled down, so that they exhibit a feeble anger and a readiness to become frightened, which Aristotle describes as a kind of cooling (*Rhet.* 2.13 1389b29–32, 1390a11).

³⁰ The author of the *Magna Moralia* may be influenced by the *Eudemian Ethics*, when he says that pain and pleasure “are accustomed,” εἰωθέν, to accompany emotional response (1.7 1186a13). That wording seems to open the door to exceptions.

³¹ See Fortenbaugh (2002, epilogue in the 2nd ed. of the 1975a ed.) pp. 111–114 and (2006a) pp. 97–99, repr. (2008) pp. 40–41, and the commentary on 438.

Second, the values a person holds including his sense of personal worth affect his emotional responses. Someone who sees no value in life including his own may fail to be frightened when normal people would be, and a person who thinks himself quite unworthy of respect may fail to become angry when others would. Conversely, the person who overvalues life and has an exaggerated opinion of himself is prone or predisposed to fright and anger. Aristotle makes a similar point when he tells us that young people are quick tempered: being lovers of honor and superiority, they cannot endure being slighted; they become indignant and think themselves unjustly treated (2.12 1389a10–11). Valuing honor is not in itself a bad thing (*NE* 1.7 1097b2–5). But it can be excessive. Sometimes the experience that comes with aging is sufficient to moderate a young person's enthusiasm for honor, but education *qua* instruction in values should not be forgotten.

For completeness' sake, I add that predisposition in regard to emotional response can be fleeting as well as enduring. By the latter I am thinking of the two kinds of predisposition just described. The warmth of a young body lasts for years and the cooling may occur so slowly that it is unnoticed. Similarly, the values that stand behind our emotional responses may be of longstanding, and in the case of moral virtues that is desirable. Nevertheless, we should keep in mind that temporary situations can and do predispose a person to emotional response. A normally placid person who is suffering from acute hunger is apt to overreact, should someone fail to respond quickly to his need. Assuming the slow response could not be avoided or was at least reasonable, we are apt to say that the hungry person acted out of character. He was a momentary victim of his body and could be expected to act differently in the future.

438 Simplicius, *On Aristotle's Categories* 8 8b26–27 (CAG vol. 8 p. 235.3–13 Kalbfleisch)

Literature: Regenbogen (1940) col. 1485; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 145–150; (1985) pp. 212–215, repr. (2003) pp. 74–79; (2006a) pp. 97–99, repr. (2008) pp. 40–41; Schroeder (1997) p. 46; Wehrli-Wöhrle (2004) pp. 530–531

The text 438 is taken from Simplicius' commentary *On Aristotle's Categories*. In particular, it is taken from his discussion of the category of quality, of which Aristotle recognizes four kinds: 1) states and conditions, 2) natural capacity or incapacity, 3) affective qualities and affections, 4)

shape or external form.³² 438 is concerned with the first kind, which covers states and conditions: ἔξεις and διαθήσεις. A state is said to differ from a condition in that it is of long duration and difficult to change. In contrast, a condition is of shorter duration and easier to change (8 8b26–9a10).³³

Text 438 tells us that some people might object to making one class of state and condition (“habit and disposition” in our translation). The objection charges Aristotle with basing his classification on the fact that a state is intensified and a condition slackened, while maintaining the same specific character (lines 2–4). Calling attention to difference in degree is in itself unobjectionable, but it is not a sufficient basis for making one class of state and condition. For nothing prevents things that differ in kind from differing in degree (lines 4–6). Examples then follow, of which the first is explicitly attributed to Theophrastus. In his work *On Emotion*, he said that faultfinding, anger and rage differ in respect to the more and less and are not identical in kind. Three more examples are given: friendship and goodwill, savagery and bestiality in relation to anger, and appetite and lust. The more shameful of the emotions are said to change into another kind when intensified (lines 6–12). It is not clear whether the Theophrastean material is limited to the example of faultfinding, anger and rage, or the subsequent examples are Theophrastean as well. My guess is that they are. I offer three reasons. First, the subsequent examples follow on faultfinding, anger and rage without any noticeable interruption. Second, the inclusion of appetite and lust, ἐπιθυμία and ἔρως, in the list invites comparison with another Theophrastean text, in which lust is described as an excess or irrational appetite: it comes quickly and departs slowly (557). Third, difference in degree is not only compatible with difference in kind but also determinant of difference in kind. That is clear at the end of 438, where we read, “the more shameful of the emotions, when intensified, change into another kind” (lines 11–12). The idea is Theophrastean. I cite the introduction to *Research on Plants*, in

³² The translations are those of J. Ackrill, *Aristotle's Categories and De Interpretatione* (Oxford: Clarendon 1963) pp. 24–27. Aristotle does not claim that there are only four types of quality, let alone argue for such a claim. And we may wonder how distinct the four types really are. These matters, albeit interesting in themselves, will be passed over in this comment on the Theophrastean material found in text 438.

³³ Later, we are told that a ἔξις is a διάθεσις, but a διάθεσις is not necessarily a ἔξις (9a10–13). That should cause no confusion. Having used διάθεσις in a narrow sense that contrasts with ἔξις, Aristotle goes on to recognize an inclusive sense such that διάθεσις can be used of both long-term states and short-term conditions.

which Theophrastus makes special mention of the more and less (1.1.6). Later in the discussion of related kinds of plants, e.g., the date palm and the doum palm, he uses difference in degree in order to distinguish between different kinds (2.6.6–11). That Theophrastus failed to make use of the more and less to distinguish between closely related emotions like appetite and lust is unlikely. If there is a difficulty in the list of examples, it is that ὀργή, anger, is mentioned twice (lines 6 and 10). That might be thought to speak for a change of source, but in my judgment the repetition of anger is neither otiose nor contradictory. We first meet anger together with two common emotions that are all too human: faultfinding and rage (lines 6–7). Later anger is combined with two emotions that are uncommon and border on being inhuman: savagery and bestiality (line 10). Both combinations might occur in an inclusive treatment of emotions such as Theophrastus is likely to have offered in *On Emotions*.

In the preceding paragraph, I made mention of Theophrastus' *Research on Plants*. I now want to take a closer look at the opening chapter, in which Theophrastus lists three ways in which plants differ in regard to their parts. 1) Particular parts occur in certain kinds of plants and are absent in others. 2) The same parts occur, but their particular qualities differ in terms of the more and less. 3) The same parts are arranged differently (1.1.5–6). What interests me here is that in classifying plants Theophrastus recognizes that an adequate analysis is not limited to difference in degree. It also considers the presence and absence of particular parts.³⁴ Almost certainly Theophrastus held a similar view concerning an adequate analysis of the emotions. In addition to the more and less, it also takes account of what is found in one kind of emotion and not in another. The example of friendship and goodwill, φιλία and εὖνοια (line 9 of our text) is instructive, for certain features that are essential to the occurrence of friendship are absent in goodwill. I cite Aristotle, who tells us that goodwill can only be the beginning of friendship, for the object of goodwill can be a person with whom one is unacquainted:

³⁴ In his zoology, Aristotle too made use not only of the more and less but also of presence and absence. See, e.g., *Parts of Animals* 1.4 644a17–21, b11–15 and *Research on Animals* 1.1 486a20–b17. For discussion, see D.M. Balme, "Γένος and Εἶδος in Aristotle's Biology," *Classical Quarterly* 56 (1962) pp. 87–89 and Aristotle's *De partibus animalium I* and *De generatione Animalium I* (Oxford: Clarendon 1972) pp. 103, 120. An example from Aristotle's ethical writings is provided by the *Nicomachean Ethics*. In distinguishing between generosity and magnificence, ἐλευθερία and μεγαλοπρεπεία, Aristotle tells us not only that the generous individual deals with lesser sums, but also that the generous man alone is concerned with the acquisition of money (4.2 1122a18–29).

someone who is unaware of the feelings of goodwill and from whom one cannot expect assistance in achieving one's own goals (*NE* 8.2 1155b32–1156a5, 9.5 1166b30–1167a21). That Theophrastus followed his teacher and offered a similar analysis of goodwill is not to be doubted. And that he proceeded in the same way in dealing with other emotions seems to me equally certain. As in *Research on Plants*, so in *On Emotions* he will have called attention not only to differences in degree but also to features that are necessarily present in one kind of emotion and not in another.

The mention of μέμψις, faultfinding (line 6), is interesting, for here we have an emotion that Aristotle largely ignores. From a passage in *Nicomachean Ethics* 8.13 it is clear that Aristotle identifies faultfinding with (or at least ties it to) complaining, ἐγκλήματα, ἐγκαλεῖν (1162b5, 25, 35), and in *Research on Animals* 9.1 we are told that a woman is more of a complainer than a man (608b10). That statement may reflect male prejudice, but it is important as a clear recognition that people are disposed in different ways to emotions. In the case of faultfinding, Aristotle is almost certainly thinking of an innate, physiologically determined disposition that admits of the more and less. That is one application of difference in degree, but our special concern is how an episode of faultfinding relates to anger and rage. In this regard, our Theophrastean text is helpful. Since difference in degree is mentioned (lines 7–8), it seems reasonable to say that faultfinding is caused by a wrong of no great magnitude, i.e., it is caused by the belief that a relatively small injustice has occurred. In addition, it involves a comparatively weak desire for revenge, results in little bodily disturbance and produces minimal pain or discomfort. But we may wonder whether all these features are present during an episode of faultfinding. Is complaining always tied to a desire for revenge, and are not some episodes quite painless? Indeed, faultfinding seems to be more a matter of complaining, i.e., making critical remarks, than of suffering bodily change and experiencing unpleasant sensations. In this regard the definition of faultfinding in Theophrastus' *Characters* is of interest: ἐπιτίμησις παρὰ τὸ προσήκον τῶν δεδομένων, "inappropriate criticism of what one has been given" (17.1). The definition may be a spurious addition to the sketch, but it is significant in that the focus is entirely on doing something, i.e., making critical remarks. Moreover, the sketch goes on to illustrate faultfinding with eight negative remarks, i.e., eight verbal acts that are not associated with any change in color or temperature or unpleasant sensations resulting from bodily changes. That suggests to me that an adequate analysis of faultfinding must take account of absences. Perhaps we should resist saying that an absence of painful sensations is

essential to faultfinding, but we might want to say that painful sensations occur only “for the most part.”³⁵ Individual episodes can take place without discomfort and perhaps without any desire to get revenge by hurting another person. My guess is that Theophrastus would agree, but what he actually said in *On Emotions* remains an open question.³⁶

271 Simplicius, *On Aristotle's Physics* 6.4 234b10–20 (CAG vol. 10 p. 964.29–965.6 Diels)

Literature: Brandis (1860) p. 283; Zeller (1879) p. 846; Hicks (1907) p. 594; Regenbogen col. 1396; Barbotin (1954) p. 272; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 150–152; Repici (1988) pp. 33–37; Huby (1999) pp. 25–30; Leonhardt (1999) pp. 145–146; Barker (2003) pp. 136–137

Text 271 belongs primarily among the physical-psychological texts. In the text-translation volumes, it appears under the heading “Psychology,” and Pamela Huby has discussed the text in her commentary on the psychological texts (*Commentary* vol. 4 pp. 25–30). Nevertheless, we have placed a reference to 271 among the ethical texts under the heading “Emotions,” not only because the text mentions ὀρέξεις, ἐπιθυμῖαι and ὀργαί, desires, appetites and feelings of anger (line 3), but also and especially because it could be read in a way that contradicts Theophrastus’ view of emotional response. Since ὀρέξεις, ἐπιθυμῖαι and ὀργαί are described as σωματικαὶ κινήσεις, bodily motions or changes, and since they are distinguished from κρίσεις and θεωρίαι, decisions and speculations, which have their starting-point, activity and completion in the soul (lines 3–6), it might be thought that the emotions are purely bodily, lacking an essential tie to judgment. Moreover, since emotions are the field of moral virtue, it might be thought that moral virtue has nothing to do with the values and beliefs that guide human behavior, and that moral education is little more than a training in the management of pleasant and unpleasant sensations. That would be an error, which would render nonsense Theophrastus’ doctrine of virtue and moral education. In what follows, I offer three considerations that should help clear up the matter.

First, there are ὀργαί (line 3). If we think only of bodily turbulence (ὅταν ὀργᾷ τὸ σῶμα, *On Soul* 1.1 403a21–22), then we have a neat contrast with κρίσεις καὶ θεωρίαι (line 4). But that may not be the correct

³⁵ See above, the introduction to this section on “Emotions,” item no. 5.

³⁶ For a different emotion to which action seems central and sensation marginal, see the discussion of χάρις, “kindness,” in Chapter II “Titles of Books” no. 24 *On Kindness*.

way to read the text. For if we think of ὀργαί as episodes of anger, i.e., as responses to perceived slights that are more intense than episodes of faultfinding and less intense than episodes of rage (438.6–8), then we shall not construe the phrase σωματικαὶ κινήσεις in such a way that it excludes all thought. Rather, we shall think of ὀργή as a phenomenon that has both a bodily component (its material cause) and a cognitive component (its efficient cause).³⁷

Second, the words καὶ ἀπὸ τούτου τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχουσιν, “and from this they have their starting-point” (lines 3–4) are problematic. If the word τούτου is understood to refer to the body (σώματος), then Theophrastus attributes a bodily origin to anger. That would not be entirely wrong. For emotions like anger do require a particular bodily condition if they are to occur,³⁸ but such a bodily condition is not enough for the occurrence of anger. For a man to become angry (as against merely experiencing bodily disturbance; cf. Aristotle, *On Soul* 1.1 403a16–19), he must also think that he has been slighted. The efficient cause of anger is the person who brings the slight (cf. *NE* 1135b26–27) or more accurately, the thought that someone has committed a slight.

Third, since one of the manuscripts reads τούτων instead of τούτου (line 4; see the *apparatus criticus*), we might be tempted to call into question the reliability of what we read in 271. But the deviating manuscript is not first class,³⁹ and there is, I think, a better way to resolve the issue: namely by considering the context in which 271 occurs. Simplicius is concerned to refute Alexander’s thesis that a soul that is ἀσώματος and ἀμερής cannot move and therefore is ἀχωριστός (p. 964.14–18, 23–24). Toward that end, Simplicius draws a distinction between bodily movement and that which is appropriate to the soul (964.24–26). Here Simplicius finds it useful to refer to Theophrastus, for in addition to desires and appetites and feelings of anger which are said to have their starting point in the body, Theophrastus recognized a second kind of motion,⁴⁰ which has its starting point, activity and completion in the soul (lines 4–6). Simplicius has no further interest in Theophrastus, so that he does not go on to elucidate the Theophrastean distinction. It is, however, reasonable to suppose that Theophrastus, like Simplicius, was concerned with two

³⁷ See above, the introduction to this section on “Emotion,” items no. 1 and no. 4.

³⁸ See the introduction to this section on “Emotion,” item no. 6.

³⁹ See the *praefatio* of Diels p. viii.

⁴⁰ With ὅσαι (line 4) understand κινήσεις.

kinds of κίνησις,⁴¹ one of which he characterized as bodily and illustrated by citing desires, appetites and feelings of anger. They involve noticeable bodily changes and have a bodily ἀρχή conceived of as an original state or condition, τὸ ἐξ οὗ.⁴² In 721 nothing is said concerning what actually causes the bodily motion or change that occurs during emotional response. That cause (the efficient cause) would be a motion in the soul, i.e., a judgment that triggers a response. In the case of anger that would be the belief that an insult has occurred. It causes both the bodily change and the desire for revenge which are essential ingredients in an episode of anger. Cf. Theophrastus' *Metaphysics* 9 5b9–10: ἡ (κίνησις) τῆς διανοίας, ἀφ' ἧς καὶ ἡ ὀρεξις.⁴³

The idea that νοῦς, intellect, is κρεῖττον τι καὶ θειότερον, something better and more divine (line 6), recalls Aristotle, *On Soul* 1.4 408b29 and *NE* 10.7 1177a12–18, 1177b26–1178a2. In our collection of Theophrastean texts, see 584A.160.⁴⁴ On the divine character of θεωρία, see 482–483. Regarding νοῦς as ἔξωθεν ἐπεισιών (line 7), see Aristotle, *Generation of Animals* 2.3 736b27–28 and 307A.1–8.

439 Albert the Great, *On the Fifteen Problems* 9 (*Op. omn.* vol. 17.1 p. 41.11–14 and 42–50 Geyer)

Literature: none

Text 439 is taken from Albert's work *On the Fifteen Problems*. More precisely, it comes from the discussion of the ninth problem, in which Albert rejects the assertion that free choice, *liberum arbitrium*, is a passive capacity, not an active one, and therefore is moved necessarily by the object of desire itself: *et ideo de necessitate moveri ab ipso appetibili* (lines 1–3). Albert calls that altogether absurd and contrary to the principles of the ethical philosophers. He then proceeds to advance a bipartite argument against the position. The first part is longer and has been

⁴¹ Cf. p. 860.27–28.

⁴² For clarity's sake, I emphasize that the ἀρχή in line 4 (ἀπὸ τούτου [sc. σώματος] τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχουσιν) refers to a bodily condition that is suitable to experiencing anger. It does not refer to the bodily changes that begin to occur when one first becomes angry on account of an apparent insult.

⁴³ Concerning the contrast between body and soul, see 439. Also of interest is 531, for here in a different context, ἐπιθυμία and ὁργή are referred not to the body but to the soul.

⁴⁴ At 584A.160 it is soul that is called the most divine thing in us. Although the soul does include more than νοῦς, it is certainly νοῦς that gives special value to the soul. See Barbotin p. 236 n. 3.

omitted in 439 (line 4). Fundamental is the idea that actual desire depends upon judgment, which involves a capacity that is active and not simply passive. The second and shorter part is the remainder of 439. Albert labels his opponent a pseudo-philosopher and accuses him of destroying moral strength, *continentia* (rendering the Greek ἐγκράτεια) and the whole of Book 7 of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. For although the man of moral strength is moved by vile passion he is not led astray. Rather, he resists through free choice. The pseudo-philosopher is said to be affected by the same error as Theophrastus, in that the passions of the soul are measured against physical passions, although they are quite dissimilar, as is clear to all who are well acquainted with ethical philosophy (lines 4–10).

Theophrastus is being treated unfairly. Following Aristotle, he would insist on recognizing important differences between the passions of the soul and physical motions. Anger and fright are passions of the soul, which involve judgment and therefore have an act of intellect as their efficient cause. That need not be the case with physical/bodily motions. Moreover, Theophrastus would want to qualify the assertion that the passions of the soul have no similarity to the passions of the body. He would add that passions like anger and fright involve bodily motions that can be quite turbulent. In addition, bodily turbulence similar to that which occurs during episodes of anger and fright can occur in the absence of any belief in outrage or imminent danger.⁴⁵

In regard to Theophrastus, Albert is at best a problematic source. In their commentaries on the psychological and biological fragments of Theophrastus, Pamela Huby and Bob Sharples have repeatedly labeled reports by Albert “dubious.”⁴⁶ Text 439 is no different, so that one wonders what basis Albert had for his report. Further research may disclose an intermediary (perhaps one that is quite misleading or wildly wrong), but it is worth noting that Albert can misspeak even when a simple check of the relevant material would have avoided an error. I am thinking of the statement, “the pseudo-philosopher destroys moral strength and the entire seventh book of the *Nicomachean Ethics*” (lines 4–5). Albert should have said the first half or part of the seventh book. The error may be minor, but it is still telling. Albert knew Grosseteste’s translation of the *Ethics* and had lectured on it. Perhaps Albert was writing too quickly or having a memory lapse. Either way, he erred.

⁴⁵ See the introduction to this section on “Emotion,” item no. 4.

⁴⁶ See Chapter II “The Sources” no. 35 on Albert.

- 440A pseudo-Plutarch, *On Desire and Grief* 2 (BT vol. 6.3 p. 52.10–53.4 Ziegler)
- 440B Plutarch, *Recommendations on Preserving Health* 24 135D–E (BT vol. 1 p. 278.28–279.14 Paton, Wegehaupt and Gärtner)
- 440C Porphyrius, *On Abstinence from Eating Meat* 4.20 (BT p. 265.22–266.4 Nauck² = CB vol. 3 pp. 36–37 Patillon et al.)

Literature: Brandis (1860) p. 347; Cobet (1873) p. 359; Kranz (1955) p. 277; Milobenski (1964) p. 93; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 152–154; Clark (2000) pp. 14, 117, 193

We have here three texts, 440A–C, that have been grouped together, because all refer to the same remark of Theophrastus: the soul inhabits the body at great cost to itself. We have placed the texts in the section on “Emotion” because 440A makes explicit reference to individual emotions, and we have placed the texts after 271 and 439, because they agree with these two texts in distinguishing between soul and what is bodily or physical. There are, of course, differences between the three texts, but the differences do not obscure the fact that Theophrastus spoke metaphorically of the soul paying a high rent to the body.

We might have placed the three texts in the section on “Happiness,” for in 440B, i.e., Plutarch’s *Recommendations on Preserving Health* 24, the focus is on the fruitless and debilitating rivalries of an active political life (lines 1–8, 10–12). That recalls the controversy between Theophrastus and Dicaearchus concerning the relative merits of the contemplative and active lives and therefore suggests placing the three texts next to or in the vicinity of 481, which reports the controversy between the two Peripatetics concerning the better way of life. Indeed, only a page earlier in *Recommendations on Preserving Health*, we find Theophrastus contrasted with Demetrius of Phalerum. We are told that inactivity is not the way to achieve health and that Theophrastus was not in better health than Demetrius (24 135B–C = 26). The idea is clear enough. The life devoted entirely to contemplation and void of humane activities, φιλόανθρωποι πρῶξις, can be unhealthy idleness. Fairly or unfairly, Theophrastus is cited as an example and contrasted with Demetrius, who was not only a student of Theophrastus but also an active political force in Athens. That does not mean, however, that Plutarch has his eye on a particular Theophrastean text. Rather he is drawing on Theophrastus’ well-known preference for the life devoted to study (481) and contrasting the leader of the Peripatos with one of his own pupils. Moreover, in the passage that concerns us, i.e. in 440B, the focus has shifted. There the damage done

to health by envy, unrestrained ambition and the like is under consideration. That may not be a reliable guide to the original Theophrastean context. For in 440B Theophrastus is mentioned only in passing (lines 8–10). In the lines that immediately precede, Plutarch cites Democritus for a memorable remark: “Were the body to bring suit against the soul for ill-treatment, the soul would not be acquitted” (lines 7–8 = FVS 68 B 159 D–K). The remark supports the thesis under discussion: i.e., political activity is all too often motivated by excessive ambition: it is misdirected, causes exhaustion and produces no worthwhile result. Plutarch then cites an equally memorable remark by Theophrastus: “The soul pays the body a high rent” (lines 9–10). It adds contrast and charm (Plutarch calls attention to the use of metaphor, line 9), but nothing more. And in the very next sentence, Plutarch returns to the damage done to the body by the soul (signaled by “nevertheless,” μέντοι, line 10). He says that the passions and struggles of the soul cause the body to be neglected. It remains, of course, possible that the original Theophrastean context was like that in 440B, but the brevity of the remark and its opposition to the quotation from Democritus suggest that Plutarch may have cited Theophrastus for no other reason than to offer the reader a charming contrast and without regard to the original context.⁴⁷

I have discussed the authorship of *On Desire and Grief* and therefore of 440A briefly in Chapter II on “The Sources” no. 12. Here I want to call attention to the relationship between 440A and B. The coupling of Democritus and Theophrastus in both texts (A.2, 9; B.7, 8–9) as well as a similar choice of words (ἀφειδῶς, ἐνοικεῖν A.8, 9 and ἐνοίκιον, ἀφειδεῖ B.9, 12) speaks for a connection that goes beyond chance. Pseudo-Plutarch, i.e., 440A seems to offer more Theophrastean material (lines 9–14), which might suggest that *On Desire and Grief* predates *Recommendations on Preserving Health*, but caution is in order. For in the relevant portion of *On Desire and Grief*, the author is primarily concerned with writing an attractive introduction.⁴⁸ Accurately reproducing a parti-

⁴⁷ The idea that the soul harms the body through neglect is also found in 723 (an Arabic text found in the *Depository of Wisdom Literature*), but there neglect is attributed to music, which is said to distract the soul from attending to the welfare to the body. No mention is made of envy and rivalry.

⁴⁸ I call attention to the use of metaphor in the sentence immediately preceding the reference to Theophrastus. There the body is likened to a tool, ὄργανον, of which the soul has been a careless user (440A.7–8). The metaphor is softened by the use of ὥσπερ, “as it

cular source is of minor importance. Possibly the author is drawing on the Plutarchan text and varying it to suit his literary taste. Cf. τῷ σώματι πολλοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐνοικεῖν A.9 with πολὺ τῷ σώματι τελεῖν ἐνοίκιον τὴν ψυχὴν B.9–10, and the way in which τὸν χρώμενον ἀφειδῶς A.8 precedes the Theophrastean quotation in A.8, whereas χρωμένης ... ἀφειδεῖ B.11–12 comes after the quotation. But one can also ask whether the Plutarchan text is clear/suggestive enough to occasion the expansion of psychological details found in pseudo-Plutarch. Perhaps pseudo-Plutarch knew another text that contained more Theophrastean material. Or perhaps the author belonged to the circle of Plutarch and after the death of Plutarch had access to his collection of quotations and anecdotes. There he may have found the Democritean and Theophrastean passages, which he paraphrased more fully than Plutarch had done before him.⁴⁹

Text 440C is taken from the fourth book of Porphyry's work *On Abstinence*. There Porphyry is concerned with refuting the idea that eating meat is advantageous and that no people have ever abstained from meat. In Chapter 2 within a discussion of Lycurgus' reforms and the common meals that he established in Sparta, Theophrastus is mentioned (app. 512A). He is mentioned again toward the end of the book in Chapter 20, where Porphyry argues that eating dead flesh stains the soul. Indeed, he adopts a strongly ascetic position, holding that it would be better, were it possible, for men to abstain not only from meat but also from vegetables. In support of this position, Homer is cited (4.20.13),⁵⁰ after which Theophrastus is mentioned. That is our text 440C, which is dependent on 440B.⁵¹ But there is a difference. Whereas 440B opposes Theophrastus to Democritus and to the idea that the soul causes the body to suffer, 440C makes no mention of Democritus and the words of Theophrastus are introduced to strengthen Porphyry's own ascetic stance. Indeed, Theophrastus is faulted for not taking a stronger position.

were." See 689A–B on the apologetic metaphor. See, too, 507.3, where wealth is called a tool. But here the use of ὄργανον, is less striking, so that an apologetic word like ὥσπερ would be an affectation.

⁴⁹ Cf. F. Sandbach in the introduction to the Loeb edition (*Moralia* vol. 15) p. 35.

⁵⁰ Porphyry refers to *Iliad* 5.341–342, which is cited by Plutarch in the *Dinner of the Seven Wise Men* 16 160A–B. In introducing this reference to Homer, Porphyry has his eye on the *Dinner of the Seven Wise Men*. His immediately following comment matches that of Plutarch.

⁵¹ Like 440B.9, 440C.4 has ἐνοίκιον, but τελεῖν is replaced by διδούσης. 440A.9 has ἐνοικεῖν with the genitive of price.

Instead of saying that the soul pays the body a high price, he should have said that the soul “hands over its entire self” (line 5).⁵²

In the relevant portion of *On Abstinence*, Porphyry does not concern himself with emotions like fright and envy.⁵³ Rather, his concern is with the need for nourishment, which is obviously dependent on the body. That prompts the question whether Theophrastus, in using the metaphor of high rent, considered bodily drives like hunger and thirst. Certainty here is elusive. We can, however, say that an inclusive interpretation (one that makes room for not only emotional responses but also bodily drives) creates no difficulty. The metaphor is equally applicable to troubles caused by hunger and thirst and those caused by unreasonable emotions.

For the idea of paying a high price, see Aristotle, *Eudemian Ethics* 2.7, where Heraclitus is quoted to document the strength of rage: χαλεπὸν γὰρ θυμῷ μάχεσθαι, ψυχῆς γὰρ ὠνεῖται, “For it is hard to fight against rage, for it buys (revenge, victory) at the cost of life” (2.7 1223b23–24; similarly *Pol.* 5.11 1315a30–31). Plutarch has the quotation in slightly fuller form: ὁ γὰρ ἂν θέλῃ precedes ψυχῆς ὠνεῖται, rage “buys whatever it wants at the cost of life” (*Life of Coriolanus* 22 = FVS 22 B 85 D–K). There is an obvious relationship between this remark of Heraclitus and that attributed to Theophrastus, but we should not conclude that the Theophrastean remark is unoriginal. On the contrary, the metaphor of the soul paying rent, τελεῖν ἐνοίκιον τὴν ψυχὴν (440B.9–10), seems to be Theophrastus’ own,⁵⁴ and it well illustrates why later writers found Theophrastus’ style attractive and worthy of comment. See above on 437.

⁵² Cobet p. 359 thinks that the Theophrastean material in *On Abstinence* 4.20 extends beyond p. 266.4 Nauck, i.e. beyond our text 440C, to include p. 266.5–7. That is wrong. In what immediately precedes our text, Porphyry has his eye on Plutarch’s *Dinner of the Seven Wise Men* 160A–B, and in what follows his eye returns to the same work. The reference to the hunger-suppressant and thirst-suppressant on p. 266.5 picks up Plutarch 157D, F. See Clark p. 193 n. 677.

⁵³ In contrast with 440A10–11, B5–6.

⁵⁴ To avoid confusion, I note that the judicial metaphor of bringing a suit (δίκην λαχόντος 440A.3, διζάσαιτο B.7) is Democritean. The metaphor of paying rent is another matter. Even if Kranz p. 277 is correct when he suggests that Theophrastus was replying to Democritus, paying rent is almost certainly Theophrastus’ own metaphor. That Theophrastus knew not only the Democritean passage but also that of Heraclitus is not to be doubted, but without more context or additional evidence, I hesitate to say that Theophrastus was consciously replying to Democritus. As suggested, he may have been focused on Dicaearchus, who promoted an active life of civic involvement.

441 Marcus Aurelius, *Meditations* 2.10 (vol. 1 p. 24.19–25 and 26.1–4 Farquharson)

Literature: Ménage (1830–1833) p. 637; Brandis (1860) pp. 350–351; Zeller (1879) vol. 2.2 p. 862; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1485; Farquharson (1944) p. 288; Theiler (1951) p. 309; Graeser (1975) p. 160; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 154–155

Text 441 is found in the second book of the *Meditations* of Marcus Aurelius. It is preceded by brief reflections on the need to focus on what is occurring in one's own soul as against that of another (2.8) and on what is the nature of the universe as well as one's own nature with a view to acting always according to nature (2.9). 441 is followed by a noticeably longer reflection on dying, which is presented as nothing to fear, neither good nor bad (2.11). Our text 441 is shorter than the latter and longer than former; it is also independent in that its focus is on Theophrastus and his assessment of faults attributable to rage and those attributable to appetite. The latter are deemed more serious: βαρύτερα εἶναι τὰ κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν (lines 2–3). In introducing this comparison, Marcus is careful to add the qualifier: ὥς ἂν τις κοινότερον τὰ τοιαῦτα συγκρίνει, “as one generally compares such things” (lines 1–2), for as a Stoic, Marcus is inclined to treat faults due to rage and faults due to appetite as equally bad.⁵⁵ That said, it should be underlined that in regard to Theophrastus, Marcus is complimentary. He tells us that Theophrastus presented the comparison φιλοσόφως, “philosophically” (line 1), and later he repeats the positive assessment telling us that Theophrastus spoke ὀρθῶς καὶ φιλοσοφίας ἁξίως, “correctly and worthily of philosophy” (lines 6–7).

Since Marcus is a Stoic author and since the word συστολή (line 4) is a *terminus technicus* among Stoics (*SVF* 3.386, 391, 394; cf. 1.209), the use of this word by Theophrastus is doubtful. It may have been introduced by Marcus.⁵⁶ Similarly, the phrase τὸν λόγον ἀποστρεφόμενος (line 4–5) has a Stoic ring (*SVF* 3.389, 390, 462, 475). Nevertheless, it cannot be excluded that Theophrastus anticipated Zeno and subsequent Stoics. In particular, it is possible that both Theophrastus and the Stoics were influenced by a medical use of συστολή.⁵⁷ It would, however, be unwise to claim a Theophrastean use on the grounds that Theophrastus wrote a work entitled Σύγκρισις τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων, *Comparison of Mistakes*,

⁵⁵ See Farquharson p. 288.

⁵⁶ Theiler p. 309.

⁵⁷ See Aëtius, *Placita* 4.22.3 (Diels, *Doxographi Graeci* p. 413.11).

which is cited by Marcus as his source.⁵⁸ A Theophrastean work with this title is not attested elsewhere, and in my judgment there is no compelling reason to see a book title in the phrase ἐν τῇ συγκρίσει τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων (line 1). The context in Marcus offers no help, for the Theophrastean passage has been removed from its original context.⁵⁹ Moreover, Marcus cites a comparison involving two different faults, those attributable to rage and those attributable to appetite, without indicating whether he is drawing on a detailed discussion of these faults, e.g. a more or less independent section within a larger work, or drawing on briefer remarks like those within Aristotle's analysis of ἀκρασία, moral weakness (NE 7.6 1149a24–b26).⁶⁰

Regarding the relationship between 441 and Aristotle's analysis of moral weakness, it should be noted that both texts exhibit the same difference in assessment, and both speak of θυμός, rage, instead of ὀργή, anger (the occurrence of ὀργή in NE 1149b20 is an exception). Furthermore, neither text observes the distinction between ἀδικήματα and ἁμαρτήματα, injustices and mistakes, which is advanced in NE 5.8 1135a15–1136a5. According to this distinction, mistakes due to rage and appetite should be referred to as ἀδικήματα. See the commentary to 526 and 530.⁶¹

In his collection of Theophrastean fragments, Wimmer does not print all of 441. He omits the second half (lines 6–11), beginning with ὁ-
θῶς οὖν καὶ φιλοσοφίας ἀξίως ἔφη ..., “Therefore, he (Theophrastus) stated correctly and worthily of philosophy ...”. It is clear that Wimmer thinks that the omitted lines are a remark by Marcus. That is correct (see above), but the remark contains nothing to which Theophrastus would object. Marcus goes on to describe the person who acts in rage as διὰ λύπης ἠναγκασμένῳ, “compelled by pain” (line 9), but he does not say or even suggest that the enraged person is overcome in such a way that

⁵⁸ Graeser p. 160 n. 13.

⁵⁹ Farquharson p. 288.

⁶⁰ Ménage p. 637 suggests that the Theophrastean discussion may have formed a part of *On Dispositions* (436 no. 1).

⁶¹ In 441 we read that when a man becomes enraged he manifestly abandons reason: φαίνεται τὸν λόγον ἀποστρεφόμενος (lines 4–5). That might seem to contradict NE 7.6 1149a25–26, where we are told that rage seems to listen in a way to reason: ἀκούειν τι τοῦ λόγου. There is, however, no contradiction. 441 is not saying that an enraged man fails to assess the particular situation. Rather, it is saying that an initial assessment of outrage closes the mind to further reasoning about the situation or an appropriate response. And that is what Aristotle is saying in the NE passage. On the initial assessment of a situation and the involvement of *logos* therein, see *Aristotle on Emotion* (repr. 2002) pp. 100–103.

he is no longer responsible from his actions. And in the case of the person who acts on account of appetite, there is nothing foreign to Theophrastus in the words πρὸς τὸ ἀδικεῖν ὥρμηται, “he was driven/rushed to do wrong,” and φερόμενος ἐπὶ τὸ προᾶξαι τι κατ’ ἐπιθυμίαν, “being swept/borne along by appetite to do something” (lines 11). We may compare 584A.196–197, 199–200, where Theophrastus speaks of evil men ὑπό τινος πνοῆς <τῆς> ἰδίας φύσεως καὶ μοχθηρίας φερομένους πρὸς τὸ βλάπτειν, “being borne along by a stormy wind of their own nature and wickedness to do harm,” and of evil animals πρὸς τὸ βλάπτειν ὥρμημένα τῇ φύσει, “driven by their nature to do harm.” In 584A the metaphor of being borne along is enhanced by the mention of a stormy wind,⁶² but the image is fundamentally the same.

526 Stobaeus, Anthology 3.19.12 (vol. 3 p. 532.1–13 Hense)

Literature: See below, Section 10, the commentary on 526.

442 *Depository of Wisdom Literature*, chap. on Theophrastus, saying no. 2

Literature: Gutas (1985, repr. 2000) p. 85

Text 442 is found in the chapter on Theophrastus in the *Depository of Wisdom Literature* as reconstructed by Dimitri Gutas. In translation the text runs: “When he (Theophrastus) was told that control of anger is difficult, he said, ‘Control of desire is also difficult; this is because nothing that is good is easy’” (or “none of the good things is easy”). It is possible that this text reports an actual occurrence: Theophrastus was addressed by another person and responded to him. Nevertheless, I think it more likely that the context—being told that anger is difficult to control—is the creation of a Greek anthologist, who, in adherence to the typology of sayings known as *chreiai*,⁶³ liked to fabricate anecdotes by giving context to the words of a well-known person. That context might take the form of a question (cf. *Depository* no. 16 = 509) or an assertion (as in 442) or an event (cf. *Depository* no. 25 = app. 1.42–44). In the case of 442, we can imagine a Theophrastean text in which the Peripatetic first asserted that

⁶² The use of καθάπερ at 584A.196 acknowledges and softens the metaphor of being carried along by a blast of air or stormy wind. See 690 with *Commentary* 8 (2005c) on rhetoric and poetics pp. 286–292.

⁶³ See the extensive discussion of the subject, with reference to Graeco-Arabic gnomologia, by O. Overwien, *Die Sprüche des Kynikers Diogenes in der griechischen und arabischen Überlieferung* = Hermes Einzelschriften 92 (2005) p. 27 ff.

anger is difficult to control and then added that control of desire is too. A later Greek anthologist will have converted the initial assertion into a statement addressed to Theophrastus and in this way enlivened what was otherwise a flat statement with two parts. But that is speculation.

The ethical content of 442 is straightforward. That both anger and desire are difficult to control is a matter of everyday experience. Aristotle takes up the matter within his discussion of moral weakness in *NE* 7.6 1149a24–1150a8, and Theophrastus does the same in 441 (and presumably at greater length in some lost work). What is missing in 442 is any indication that failure to control appetite is the more offensive failure. That is stated explicitly in *NE* 1149b18, 24 (more unjust and more disgraceful) and 441.2, 6 (more serious and more effeminate). Nevertheless, the omission of such a comparative evaluation in 442 is not to be faulted. An anecdote in an anthology should not be expected to say everything. Brevity and punch are more important. But if that is correct, one may question the value of the final clause, “this is because nothing that is good is easy.” It comes across as a separate gnomic saying that adds little. The idea that controlling anger and appetite is good has not been stated explicitly in what precedes, but it need not be. And to refer to what is not easy is simply a variation on what is difficult. In all likelihood we see here the work of a Greek anthologist who could not resist an addition of his own, or of the Arabic compiler who felt the need to make the translated point more explicit. But again I am speculating.

443 Stobaeus, *Anthology* 3.38.43 (vol. 3 p. 717.14–18 Hense)

Literature: Molobenski (1964) p. 92; Kindstrand (1974) pp. 255–257; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 155–156; Millett (2007) p. 152 n. 265

In the text-translation volumes, texts 443–445 have been grouped together and reference has been made to 362A–I and 610, because all these texts are concerned in one way or another with φθόνος, envy.

Text 443 is taken from the third book of Stobaeus’ *Anthology*. It occurs in Chapter 38, which carries the heading Περί φθόνου, “On Envy” (p. 708.2 Hense). As usual, the chapter begins with a string of excerpts taken from various poets (1–29). The prose authors follow, beginning with an excerpt from Theophrastus (30 = 444). Text 443, occurs toward the middle of the prose selections and focuses on the twofold misery of envious people, φθονεῖς, i.e. persons who are disposed to experience envy. They are said to be pained not only by their own misfortunes but also by the successes of other people (lines 3–4). Despite the fact that 443

follows 444 in Stobaeus (twelve texts intervene), we have printed it first, because it makes explicit mention of φθόνος. 444 does not.

In Stobaeus' Anthology, 443 is immediately preceded by an excerpt from Isocrates' *Evagoras*: "The cause of this (that a man of superior virtue is deemed unworthy of praise) is envy, which is only good in that it is the greatest evil for those who possess it" (6). 443 is followed by an excerpt from Anaximenes: "Those who judge with envy award first prize to the worst, not to the best" (*FGrH* vol. 2A 72 F 32). Although the immediately surrounding excerpts in Stobaeus are not necessarily reliable guides concerning the meaning of any given excerpt, the preceding excerpt from Isocrates does relate to 443 in that both concern the misery of an envious man. In a striking and elliptical manner, Isocrates speaks of something good about envy (i.e., in feeling pain the envious man gets what he deserves).⁶⁴ Theophrastus does not speak of something good in envy, but he is clear that the envious man is pained at the successes of other people.

Theophrastus says nothing that contradicts Aristotle's conception of envy. The idea that envious people feel pain, ἐπὶ τοῖς τῶν ἄλλων ἀγαθοῖς, "at the successes of other men" (line 3), may be compared with *Rhetoric* 2.9 1386b18–19 and 2.10 1387b23: λύπη ἐπὶ εὐπραγίᾳ, "pain at prosperity" (see also *EE* 1221a38–40). Nevertheless an Aristotelian might find Theophrastus' reference to other people, τῶν ἄλλων, imprecise. For to speak simply of being pained at the good things or successes of other men fails to distinguish between the pain of envy and the pain of indignation, νέμεσις. The latter is directed toward persons whose prosperity is unmerited. To feel it is a mark of good character, for it shows a loathing of injustice (*Rhet.* 2.9 1386b8–15). The former, envy, is not based on unmerited success and is not a mark of good character. Rather, it is a mark of bad character (see *Rhet.* 2.11 1388a35–36, where Aristotle characterizes feeling envy as a bad emotion felt by people who are bad: φθονεῖν φαῦλον καὶ φαύλων⁶⁵) and directed toward like persons, i.e., people who are similar in various ways including birth, relationship, age, dispositions, reputation and wealth (2.10 1387b26–28).⁶⁶ Envy is essentially

⁶⁴ In the original context, i.e., in *Evagoras* 6, the meaning is clear (though I had to pause and reflect), so that elliptical may not be an altogether correct description. But as the excerpt appears in Stobaeus, the description is apt.

⁶⁵ Cf. *NE* 2.6 1107a9–11.

⁶⁶ While both Aristotle and Theophrastus treat φθόνος as a bad emotion, the word φθόνος does not always carry a negative connotation. See below, this section, the commentary on 610; also Konstan (2006b) pp. 111–128, to which Kristjánsson (2008) p. 10 n. 5 refers. We might wish that the two Peripatetics had acknowledged a positive use of

comparative: envious people think themselves inferior to other persons like themselves and for that reason experience pain (cf. 1388a5). These distinctions are Aristotelian and they are missing in 443, but their absence from 443 does not signal any divergence on the part of Theophrastus from the view of his teacher. Theophrastus' focus is limited: he wishes to underline the misery of envious individuals, and toward that end, he opposes envious individuals to other men (δυστυχέστεροι τῶν ἄλλων, "more unfortunate than other men" [lines 1–2]). The opposition is striking because it is unqualified, and it remains in force when Theophrastus writes ἐπὶ τοῖς τῶν ἄλλων ἀγαθοῖς (line 3).

The formulation of 443 is typical of gnomic sayings. Cf. the *Gnomologium Byzantinum* 219 Wachsmuth: φθονερούς ἄνδρας οὐχ οὕτως τὰ οἰκεία κακὰ ὥς τὰ τῶν πέλας ἀγαθὰ λυπεῖ, "their own evils (failures) do not so much pain envious men as the goods (successes) of their neighbors,"⁶⁷ and Boissonade, *Anecdota Graeca* vol. 3 p. 468: τὶς σοφὸς ἰδὼν φθονερόν λυπούμενον ἔφη· τούτῳ ἢ μέγα τι κακὸν συμβέβηκεν, ἢ ἄλλῳ μέγα ἀγαθόν, "A certain wise man, seeing an envious person in pain, said 'Either some great evil has befallen this person, or a great good (has happened) to another.'" The latter saying is attributed to Bion of Borysthenes (e.g. Stobaeus 3.38.50 = fr. 47A Kindstrand, cf. fr. 47B–F). It is clear that 443 is a commonplace that is easily attributed to various authors. Cf. *Gnomologium Vaticanum* 19 Sternbach, where similar words are attributed to Anacharsis: ὁ αὐτὸς (sc. Ἀνάχαρσις) ἐρωτηθεὶς ὑπὸ τινος, διὰ τί οἱ φθονεροὶ ἄνθρωποι αἰὲν λυποῦνται, ἔφη· ὅτι οὐ μόνον τὰ ἑαυτῶν αὐτοὺς κακὰ δάκνει, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ τῶν πέλας ἀγαθὰ λυπεῖ, "The same man, when asked by someone, why envious people are always in pain, said, 'Because not only do their own bad things bite them, but also the good things of their neighbors cause them pain.'"⁶⁸ Nevertheless,

φθόνος, but their failure to do so (assuming that Theophrastus did not do so in some lost work), is hardly troubling. They will not have thought that all uses of φθόνος are identical, and in a restricted ethical context their narrow usage causes no confusion. Similarly, when Plato has Timaeus say that no φθόνος concerning anything is ever present in what is good (*Tim.* 29E1–2), context makes clear that Plato is using φθόνος to refer to a negative emotion that is foreign to the creator. We will not conclude that Plato was unaware that φθόνος can be and was used positively to refer to a legitimate emotion.

⁶⁷ The phrase τῶν πέλας may be viewed as a variation for τῶν ἄλλων (line 3). Cf. Plato's *Philebus* 48B11, where the phrase also occurs. In Arist. *Rhet.* we find τὸν πλησίον (2.11 1388a37). Moreover, neighbors are likely to be similar not only in belonging to the same community but also in status, income and other respects (2.10 1387b26–28).

⁶⁸ See the note of Sternbach p. 12 to no. 19; also Kindstrand pp. 255–257 and Milobenski p. 92 n. 88.

it does not follow that 443 is mistakenly attributed to Theophrastus. The vocabulary and style are appropriate to Theophrastus; the text may have been excerpted from one of his works.

In regard to ethics, it is important that Theophrastus follows Aristotle and grounds the pain of envy on the apparent successes or good things of someone else.⁶⁹ In other words, for a man to feel envy he must assess as good the condition of another person. This assessment can be false. It might be that the other person only appears (is thought) to be successful (cf. *Rhetoric* 1387b33). More important, this judgment is in principle open to correction. Calling attention of particular features of a given situation may result in a change of judgment. And a proper moral education will do much to prevent false assessments.

444 Stobaeus, *Anthology* 3.38.30 (vol. 3 p. 714.7–10 Hense)

Literature: Brandis (1860) p. 363; Milobenski (1964) p. 92; Fortenbaugh (1948) pp. 156–157; Millett (2007) p. 30; Searby (2007) p. 726

Like 443, text 444 is found in Book 3, Chapter 38 of Stobaeus' *Anthology* under the heading Περί φθόνου, *On Envy*. It comes first among the prose selections. Verses of Menander (fr. 538 Koerte-Thierfelder) precede and a prose selection from Plutarch's work Περί τοῦ διαβάλλειν, *On Slandering*, follows (fr. 154 Sandbach).⁷⁰ I shall return to the Plutarchan text in my comment on 445.

According to 444, "Theophrastus said that wicked men are not so pleased with their own good things as with the evils afflicting others": Θεόφραστος ἔφη τοὺς μοχθηροὺς τῶν ἀνθρώπων οὐχ οὕτως ἡδεσθαι ἐπὶ τοῖς ἰδίοις ἀγαθοῖς ὥς ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις κακοῖς. Unlike 443.1, text 444 does not refer to envious men, φθονεροί. Rather it mentions men who are wicked, μοχθηροί (line 1). In addition there is no reference to being pained at the good things or successes of other people as in 443.3–4. Instead, mention is made of being pleased with the evils afflicting others (line 2). Hence, we may want to say that 444 is poorly placed

⁶⁹ See, e.g., φαίνεται and οἶονται in *Rhet.* 2.10 1387b18–30. On φαίνεται and cognate forms meaning "appears" to be the case, i.e., "is thought/believed that" something is the case. See the epilogue to *Aristotle on Emotion* (2002 = 2nd ed. of 1975a) pp. 94–103.

⁷⁰ The title *On Slandering*, Περί τοῦ διαβάλλειν, does not occur in the Lamprias catalogue. The variant Περί διαβολῆς is found in Stobaeus 3.20 (the chapter Περί ὀργῆς) no. 59 (vol. 3 p. 551.16 Hense). Diogenes' catalogue of Theophrastean titles lists Περί διαβολῆς (666 no. 13) three times. See *Commentary* vol. 8 on rhetoric and poetics pp. 108–111.

in a chapter concerning envy, for the text is really about *Schadenfreude*, taking delight in the troubles of others. But there is reason for pause. In codex Ottoboniensis Gr. 192 the saying in question is attributed to Theophrastus but with a difference: φθονερούς is read instead of μοχθηρούς. And in the *Commonplaces* of ps.-Antonius Melissa,⁷¹ where the saying is attributed to Agathon, φθονερούς again occurs instead of μοχθηρούς. The variation need not be a sign of confusion. 444 is not about a particular emotion narrowly understood. Rather, the text is about wicked people, μοχθηροί, who *inter alia* delight in the troubles of others.⁷² Such people may (perhaps often) combine *Schadenfreude* with envy. And if that is true, such people will be delighted when others suffer misfortune and do so without any reference to themselves. That would be *Schadenfreude*. But they may also be envious, i.e., they may be pained at the success of other people like themselves and therefore apt to feel relief and even pleasure if one or more of these other people fall on hard times.⁷³ See *Rhetoric* 2.10, where Aristotle says that the conditions under which people feel the pain of envy are those under which they will feel pleasure in things that are contrary (1388a26–27). In other words, when people enjoying good fortune suffer a reversal so that their good fortune is lost, envious people are apt to be pleased. That 444 is intended to cover such cases seems likely.

Like Aristotle, Theophrastus will have realized that in certain cases wicked people not only feel the pain of envy but also find themselves quite unable to remove the pain. For example, older people are envious of younger people, for younger people possess what older people once possessed (*Rhet.* 2.10 1388a22). The situation cannot be reversed, so that the pain of envy is likely to persist.⁷⁴ But again like Aristotle, Theophrastus will have realized that not all cases of envy are equally hopeless. Indeed,

⁷¹ The name “Antonius Melissa” is a fiction. See Chapter II “The Sources” no. 41.

⁷² To be clear, I want to underline that Theophrastus is not challenging the definition of φθόνος put forward by Aristotle in *Rhetoric* 2.10: a certain pain felt at the apparent success of persons like ourselves, not with a view to acquiring something good for ourselves, but because others have it (1387b23–25). Rather, in 444 the focus is on vicious individuals and the complexity of their feelings. Cf. M. Mills, “ΦΘΟΝΟΣ and its related ΠΑΘΗ in Plato and Aristotle,” *Phronesis* 30 (1985) pp. 4–5.

⁷³ See Kristjánsson (2008) p. 10, who points out that envy is a strongly comparative emotion (the envious man sees another possessing what he lacks and would like to have). In contrast, *Schadenfreude* need not be comparative (cf. the indignant man who may be pained at another’s good fortune without reference to his own standing).

⁷⁴ Envy is a non-practical emotion like pity. Sometimes there is no possible remedy, so that the emotion is compatible with inaction.

experience teaches that envious people may take steps to prevent their neighbors from having good things (2.11 1388a36–37). And when such steps fail, it is still possible that τύχη comes to the rescue. The person possessing good things falls on hard times, so that the pain of envy is replaced by pleasure.

In the *Philebus*, Plato introduces envy in order to illustrate the mixture of pleasure and pain, both of which are said to belong to the soul (48A8–50B6). And in doing so, he associates envy with injustice (49D1, 7), which Aristotle does in the *Eudemian Ethics* 3.7 1234a30–31: ὁ μὲν οὖν φθόνος εἰς ἀδικίαν συμβάλλεται (πρὸς ἄλλον γὰρ αἱ πράξεις αἱ ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ), “envy contributes to injustice (for the actions that derive from it are related to/affect another person).” 444 agrees with these texts in that it makes explicit reference to wicked men, μοχθηροί (line 1). That is a matter of some interest, for Theophrastus, like Aristotle, treats emotion as the special field of moral virtue. The virtuous man, e.g., the man of good temper experiences anger in moderation, whereas the vicious individual is apt to experience too much or too little anger. But envy seems to be different. At least Aristotle and, as far as we can tell, Theophrastus treat envy as a mark of bad character. We may compare Arius’ summary of Peripatetic ethics as preserved in Stobaeus’ *Anthology*. In a section that is sometimes attributed to Theophrastus, envy is listed alongside *Schadenfreude* and *hybris* as bad emotions (2.7.21 p. 142.17–18 Wachsmuth).⁷⁵ The idea that envy is simply bad (a moderate response does not occur) and therefore would be best eradicated⁷⁶ has been the subject of recent discussion. For example, Kristján Kristjánsson has suggested that Aristotle should have recognized a general emotion, which is characterized by “pain at another’s superior position with respect to oneself where justified envy is the mean and invidious envy the excess.”⁷⁷

445 Stobaeus, *Anthology* 3.12.17 (vol. 3 p. 446.13–15 Hense)

Literature: Milobenski (1964) p. 92; Fortenbaugh (1984) p. 157

Text 445 occurs earlier than 443 and 444 in the third book of Stobaeus’ *Anthology*. It is found in Chapter 12, which carries the heading Περὶ ψευδοῦς, *On Falsehood*. The frequent arrangement according to

⁷⁵ See Chapter III “Titles of Books” no. 5 *On Emotions*.

⁷⁶ We may add *Schadenfreude* and shamelessness which are said to be like envy in that they are always base (*NE* 2.6 1107a10–11).

⁷⁷ Kristjánsson (2008) p. 11.

which excerpts in verse precede those in prose is imperfectly maintained in Chapter 12: the prose excerpts are interrupted by an excerpt from Chaeremon and another from Theognis. 444 follows the latter and in turn is followed by a prose piece attributed to Demetrius. The identity of this Demetrius is not specified.⁷⁸ We are told only that when asked what bad consequence follows liars, Demetrius said that “even if they say what is true, they will not be believed/trusted” (3.12.18 p. 446.17–447.2 Hense).

445 is quite short: Θεοφράστου· ἐκ διαβολῆς καὶ φθόνου ψεῦδος ἐπ’ ὀλίγον ἰσχύσαν ἀπεμαράνθη, “Theophrastus: As a result of slander and envy, falsehood prevailed for a short while (and then lost) its force.” It seems clear that slander and envy are viewed negatively. Little else is clear. In particular, it seems impossible to decide whether the excerpt originated in an ethical, political or rhetorical context. And the use of the aorist (ἀπεμαράνθη, line 2) can be explained in two ways. On the one hand, Theophrastus may have referred to a historical event in which slander and envy combined to support a lie for a short period. On the other hand, we may have a gnomic aorist that expresses a general truth based on experience. I prefer the first interpretation but acknowledge that the style and brevity of 445 suggest a gnomic aorist. We may compare the aorist ἔλαβεν in 449A.3.

In my comment on 444 = Stobaeus 3.38.30, I called attention to the immediately following selection in Stobaeus, i.e., no. 31. It is from Plutarch’s work Περί τοῦ διαβάλλειν, *On Slandering*, and runs as follows: τὸν φθόνον ἔνιοι τῷ καπνῷ εἰκάζουσι· πολὺς γάρ ἐν τοῖς ἀρχομένοις ὢν, ὅταν ἐκλάμψωσιν, ἀφανίζεται. ἥκιστα γοῦν τοῖς πρεσβυτέροις φθονοῦσιν,⁷⁹ “Some liken envy to smoke. For in the case of beginners there is much, but it disappears when their light shines forth. Certainly very little envy is felt toward older men” (fr. 154 Sandbach). The mention of envy in a work entitled *On Slandering* relates to 445, in which envy and slander are said to support falsehood for a short while. The selection

⁷⁸ In the most recent collection of fragments attributed to Demetrius of Phalerum (ed. P. Stork, in RUSCH 9 [2000] p. 260), the excerpt is listed as “uncertain.” If that Demetrius, who was a pupil of Theophrastus (18 no. 5) as well as a politician, is not the intended person, then we might think of Demetrius the Cynic (see Wehrli [1967–1978] vol. 4 p. 87) or Demetrius Rhetor.

⁷⁹ The title *On Slandering*, Περί τοῦ διαβάλλειν, does not occur in the Lamprias catalogue. The variant Περί διαβολῆς is found in Stobaeus 3.20 (the chapter Περί ὁργῆς) no. 59 (vol. 3 p. 551.16 Hense). Diogenes catalogue of Theophrastean titles lists Περί διαβολῆς (666 no. 13) three times. See *Commentary* vol. 8 (2005c) on rhetoric and poetics pp. 108–111.

also relates to Chapter 7 in Plutarch's work *Whether an Old Man Should Engage in Politics*. There the focus is on envy in public life. We are told that some liken envy to smoke, for when men begin their political career, envy pours out in great volume, but when their light shines forth, it disappears. And in old age they attain respect (787C–D).⁸⁰ Here there is no explicit mention of slander, but the mention of envy and the idea that it disappears as one begins to shine fits well with 445. Theophrastus, like Aristotle, recognized that envious people take steps to remove the good things that others possess (cf. *Rhet.* 2.11 1388a37–38). In political life, envious people deal in slander and generally in falsehood, which is said to have a limited life. A depressing observation about human nature is countered by the hopeful observation that merit will in time (sooner rather than later) win the day.

In Book 2, Chapter 23, Stobaeus collected material that dealt with πολυπραγμονεῖν as the cause of envy and slander. The heading is preserved, ὅτι οὐ χρὴ πολυπραγμονεῖν, φθόνου γὰρ καὶ διαβολῆς αἴτιον γίνεται τὸ τοιοῦτον, “One ought not to be meddlesome, for such behavior is the cause of envy and slander” (p. 198.7–8 = Photius, *Library* 113a25–27). Unfortunately the excerpts that were collected under the heading have been lost. That prevents us from determining whether this chapter contained one or more excerpts from Theophrastus.

In Polybius' account of the cyclical transformation of constitutions, διαβολή and φθόνος occur together (*Histories* 6.7.5). Regenbogen col. 1519 suggests that the account reflects Theophrastean doctrine.⁸¹ That Theophrastus did discuss the succession of constitutions seems to me likely, and in this context he may have taken note of envy and slander. See the commentary on 610 (below, this section). See also Cicero, *To Atticus* 2.9.1–2, where *invidia* is Latin for φθόνος: *festive, mihi crede, et minore sonitu quam putaram orbis hic in re publica est conversus; citius omnino quam potuit. ... video iam quo invidia transeat et ubi sit habitatura*, “It is amusing, believe me, (how) with even less sound than I had expected this wheel in the state has turned; more quickly certainly than might have been. ... Already I see in what direction unpopularity/envy is shifting and where it will settle” (593.1–3). A general connection with 445 is clear, but to flesh out the details would be highly speculative.

⁸⁰ Sandbach (Loeb p. 281 n. c) cites Patzig for the argument that fr. 154 derives from *Whether an Old Man Should Engage in Politics* 7 787C.

⁸¹ Cf. Mirhady pp. 101–102.

362A–I Photius, *Library* 278 528a40–b27 *et al.*

Literature: see below, Section 12 “Natural Relationship” on 531

610 *Gnomologium Vaticanum*, no. 335 Sternbach (WSt vol. 10 [1888] p. 260)

Literature: Milobenski (1964) p. 93; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 157–159; Mirhady (1992) pp. 133–135

Text 610 is found in the *Gnomologium Vaticanum*, where it follows 444 (see the apparatus of parallel texts to 444). 610 is quiet short: ὁ αὐτὸς (sc. Θεόφραστος) ἐρωτηθεὶς, τίνα προκοπὴν ἔχει πολιτεία, ἔφη· φθόνον. “The same man (Theophrastus), when asked what gain there is in government, said, ‘Envy.’” The reference to πολιτεία has determined the placing of 610 among the political texts. The mention of envy and an apparent relation to 445 has prompted a reference to 610 from within the section on ethics.

Whether the text is a reliable report concerning the historical Theophrastus is unclear. Three considerations raise doubts. First, the word προκοπή has a Stoic ring (e.g., SVF 3.127, 135, 136, 217).⁸² Second, the words ὁ αὐτὸς ἐρωτηθεὶς are formulaic (cf. *Gnom. Vatic.* 19, which is quoted in the commentary to 443, and 332, which is referred to in the apparatus to 558). Third, the answer φθόνος, “envy,” seems too paradoxical. From the student and successor of Aristotle, we might expect ζῆλος, “emulation/rivalry.” Cf. *Rhetoric* 2.11 1388a35–39, where ζῆλος is contrasted with φθόνος and described as ἐπιεικές, a “good” emotion.

Nevertheless, 610 should be taken seriously. Although the surviving botanical writings and the scientific opuscula together with the fragments and reports collected in FHS&G give us a fair idea of Theophrastus’ vocabulary and style, we cannot be certain that the word προκοπή was never used by Theophrastus (or in a question put to Theophrastus), and a witty answer seems quite possible from the author of the *Characters*. Moreover, we may compare 445 and two Plutarchan texts cited above in the commentary on 445: envy is a given when one begins a political career, but in time it dissipates as competence and virtue are

⁸² Although the Stoics held that a man is either virtuous (wise) or vicious, they did recognize that a man who has not attained virtue can be making progress, προκοπή, in that direction. The cognate verb προκόπτειν is attested for Zeno SVF 1.234 = Plutarch, *How a Man May Become Aware of His Progress in Virtue* 12 82F.

demonstrated.⁸³ That gives us a background for Theophrastus' witty reply. He picks out envy as a necessary first step in a distinguished political career.

A related way of viewing 610 was communicated to me in private correspondence by Hans Gottschalk, who suggested that in our text προκοπή is used in the sense of "success" or "prosperity" (LSJ s.v. 2b) and πολιτεία in the sense of "tenure of public office" (LSJ s.v. II.2). In that case, the question becomes what gain is brought by participation in public life, and the answer "envy" is a witty reminder that envy precedes acceptance.

Another approach would be to relate 610 to Theophrastus' disagreement with Dicaearchus, who rated the active life of political involvement higher than the leisured life of contemplation. Theophrastus embraced the latter, and according to Cicero, found himself embroiled in a "controversy" with his fellow Peripatetic (481.1). It is not inconceivable that 610 was in one way or another a poke at Dicaearchus.

The preceding interpretations take φθόνος negatively. It is an illegitimate emotion. Here I want to acknowledge that φθόνος can have a positive connotation.⁸⁴ I think, e.g., of Hesiod (c. 700 BC), who in his *Works and Days*, recognizes two kinds of ἔρις, strife. One causes fighting and is hateful. The other is good for men: it stirs up a healthy rivalry, so that neighbor vies, ζηλοῖ, with neighbor, and beggar envies, φθονέει, beggar; even the lazy want to work (11–26). Jumping forward in time, we find Hippias of Elis (flor. end 5th cent.) recognizing that φθόνος takes two forms. One form is just; it is directed at bad men who receive honors. The other is unjust, being directed at good men (86 B 17 D–K = Stobaeus 3.38.32 p. 715.4–8 H). And Demosthenes, an older contemporary of Theophrastus, asserts that φθόνος is properly directed against Meidias (*Or.* 21.196).⁸⁵ Despite these and other positive uses of φθόνος, a positive use in 610 seems to me unlikely: the answer would no longer be amusing; it would lack the punch that one expects in a one-word reply.

⁸³ Plutarch fr. 154 Sandbach and *Whether an Old Man Should Engage in Politics* 7 787C.

⁸⁴ See above, note 66 to 443.

⁸⁵ In *Quellen* (1984) p. 158 I cited Polybius' account of the cycle of constitutions (see the commentary on 445), in which φθόνος is used for an emotion that is justified and drives the cycle of constitutions (*Histories* 6.7.8, 6.9.1). In addition, reference was also made to Cicero's *Tusculan Disputations* 4.46, 56, where we read that certain Peripatetics defended *aemulatio* and *obtrectatio* as beneficial emotions. In this context, there is no mention of *invidia/invidentia* = φθόνος, but a similar defence of φθόνος that goes back to the early Peripatos cannot be ruled out.

Above, I noted parenthetically that προκοπή occurs in a question put to Theophrastus. That is I think significant, for the question and answer format is common in anthologies. In many cases, it will have been imposed upon a saying that an anthologist wished to present as an anecdote: an interaction between two persons. In my judgment, that is likely to be the case in 610. Although I am unwilling to rule out a Theophrastean use of προκοπή, my guess is that the question including the use of προκοπή is by a later anthologist (or someone who wished to create an anecdote out of a saying). What goes back to Theophrastus is only the reply “envy.” That might be thought to diminish the value of 610, but it does not remove all interest. For we still have an example of how a later generation/century viewed Theophrastus and played with his name. See the general remarks of Otto Luschkat in the preface to the reprint of the *Gnomologium Vaticanum* (Berlin: De Gruyter 1963) vii.

- 446 Seneca, *On Anger* 1.12.3 and 14.1 (*BT* vol. 1.1 p. 59.12–18 and 61.7–10 Hermes)

Literature: Brandis (1860) p. 356; Zeller (1879) vol. 2.2 p. 862; Bickel (1915) p. 13; Ueberweg-Praechter (1926) p. 122; Theiler (1934) p. 379; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1485; Bourgery (1942) pp. xvii–xviii, 15; Moraux (1951) p. 79; Fillion-Lahille (1984) pp. 26–27; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 161–164; Wehrli-Wöhrle (2004) pp. 530–531; Millett (2007) p. 30

Text 446 is from the first book of Seneca’s work *On Anger*. In what immediately precedes, i.e., in Chapter 11, Seneca has focused on nations and argued that anger is not necessary in war. Indeed, in dealing with an enemy it has disastrous consequences. The Cimbrians, Teutons and Germans are cited as examples. Discipline and reason are preferable. Roman successes under Fabius Cunctator, Scipio Africanus Maior and Minor are cited. In Chapter 12, Seneca turns his attention to personal matters. The question is put, *quid ergo? inquit, vir bonus non irascitur si caedi patrem suum viderit, si rapi matrem?* “What, then? he says, Is a good man not angered, if he sees his own father killed, if he sees his mother raped?” Seneca responds in accordance with his Stoic beliefs: a good man will not become angry, but he will avenge and protect them. A second question follows, *quid ergo? cum videat secari patrem suum filiumque, vir bonus non flebit nec linquetur animo?* “What, then? Will not a good man weep or faint, when he sees his father or son being sliced (with a knife)?” Seneca again responds as a Stoic, saying that such behavior is womanly. A good man will remain undisturbed and unafraid; he will take revenge,

not because he is grieved but because taking revenge in such a situation is what a good man ought to do (1.12.1–2).⁸⁶ At this point, 446 begins. Seneca introduces Theophrastus, who is made to say, *irascuntur boni viri pro suorum iniuriis*, “Good men are angered on account of wrongs done to their own (close friends and relatives).” Seneca responds by saying that Theophrastus is seeking to arouse prejudice against more manly precepts (i.e. Stoic precepts); he has left the judge and is approaching the gallery, appealing to people who deem their own emotions just (lines 1–5).

A textual problem should not be overlooked. The opening lines of 446 (1–5) reproduce the text of Hermes (Teubner 1905), and that text involves an emendation. In the manuscripts the words *irascuntur boni viri pro suorum iniuriis* occur at the end of the segment under consideration, i.e., after *adgnoscat* (line 5) and not at the beginning (line 1). If the reading of the manuscripts is maintained (as in Bourgery’s text [Budé 1961]), then the words *cum hoc dicis, Theophraste* (lines 1–2) refer not to *irascuntur boni viri pro suorum iniuriis* but to what is said in sections 1–2. And if that is the case, then one can understand Theophrastus as the subject of *inquit* in section 1. Indeed, both questions to which Seneca responds are to be understood as Theophrastean (as Bourgery does [p. 15 n. 1 and 2]).⁸⁷ Conservative philology may speak for following the manuscripts and rejecting Hermes’ text, but there are reasons for following Hermes. Here are three. First, in the manuscripts the words *irascuntur boni viri pro suorum iniuriis* seem awkwardly placed (Bourgery seems to acknowledge that; he separates the words from what precedes and follows by introducing dashes). A smoother flow is achieved by placing the words at the beginning of the segment. Second, the use of *inquit* in section 1 does not need a specific subject. The verb is frequently used anonymously (in Book 1, see, 3.1, 3.2, 8.4, 10.4, 11.1, 13.3) and as such accords with the style of a diatribe.⁸⁸ Third, the second question hardly suits Theophrastus. The words, *vir bonus non flebit nec linquetur animo?* “Will not a good man weep or faint,” exhibit Stoic bias. At least, the idea of losing consciousness seems to play on the Stoic idea that an emotion is a *perturbatio animi*, “disturbance of the mind.” Moreover, not only a

⁸⁶ In *Quellen* (1984) pp. 19–20, this portion of text, i.e., 1.12.1–2, was printed as context material. It has been omitted in FHS&G, where 446 begins with 1.12.3.

⁸⁷ Strictly speaking the second question is introduced by Seneca (*aut dic eodem modo*, “or say in the same way”), but if the manuscript reading is maintained, then the phrase *cum hoc dicis, Theophraste* would cover the second question as well as the first.

⁸⁸ One might translate *inquit* with “it is said.” See Rosenbach, *L. Annaeus Seneca, Philosophische Schriften* Bd. 1 (Darmstadt 1969) pp. 123, 125.

Peripatetic but also an ordinary person might counter that tears are entirely appropriate when a relative is sliced up, and then add that in the imagined situation tears have nothing to do with anger. They would be a normal and acceptable sign of grief.

Wherever the words *irascuntur boni viri pro suorum iniuriis* properly belong, the phrase *pro suorum iniuriis*, “on account of wrongs done to their own,” recalls Aristotle’s definition of anger as a desire for revenge accompanied by pain on account of an apparent slight to oneself or one’s own: διὰ φαινομένην ὀλιγωρίαν εἰς αὐτὸν ἢ τῶν αὐτοῦ (*Rhet.* 2.2 1378a31 cf. a34). In both the Latin and the Greek, reference is made in the plural to “one’s own.” There can be little doubt that in some writing Theophrastus, too, made explicit reference to the fact that people become angry not only when they themselves are insulted or treated unjustly but also when their relatives and close friends suffer the same. In saying that, I do not want to claim that Seneca had a particular Theophrastean work in hand⁸⁹ when he wrote the passage in question. I am claiming only that Seneca has not misrepresented Theophrastus by introducing the words *irascuntur boni viri pro suorum iniuriis*.

In 446 the words *relicto iudice venis ad coronam*, “having left the judge you approach the gallery” (lines 2–3) are striking. They not only introduce a visual element that enlivens Seneca’s remarks but also denigrate Theophrastus. Like a lawyer who turns to common bystanders when he is doing poorly with the judge, Theophrastus is presented as someone whose position appeals to ordinary folk as against the wise man (the Stoic sage) or at least someone who is making progress toward wisdom (the Stoic προκόπων).

446 omits Seneca’s critical remarks in 1.12.4–13.5. They presuppose the Stoic view of emotion as a *perturbatio animi*. I call attention to the claim that anger is exceedingly eager to achieve revenge and for that reason is unsuited to obtain revenge. Being quick and mindless, it blocks its own progress (1.12.5). The argument is remarkable for everyone including Theophrastus would agree that anger can lead to hasty action that will be regretted. See 526, where Theophrastus warns against taking immediate revenge. Indeed, he expresses himself in Stoic fashion, when he says that the man of practical wisdom ought to do nothing at all in anger (526.1–2). From what follows, it seems clear that Theophrastus

⁸⁹ See above, Chapter II, “The Sources” no. 9 on Seneca.

is not condemning all anger. Rather he is targeting rage, i.e., extreme anger that exceeds the mean.⁹⁰ For further discussion of 1.12.4–13.5, see *Quellen* (1984) pp. 162–163.

446 continues with a second statement attributed to Theophrastus: *non potest fieri ut non vir bonus irascatur malis*, “It cannot happen that a good man is not angered by evil” (lines 6–7). Here too the focus is on the good man, *vir bonus* (the shift from plural [*viri*, line 1] to singular is of no significance). The criticism that follows would hardly impress a Peripatetic. When Seneca says, *isto modo quo melior quisque, hoc iracundior erit*, “That way, the better each person is, the more irascible he will be” (line 7), he ignores the Peripatetic doctrine of the mean. A virtuous man, or more specifically the *πρᾶος*, the gentle or good-tempered individual, experiences anger in moderation. An increase in angry behavior, such that it becomes excessive, would be a mark of vicious character. Put differently, virtue including *πραότης*, gentleness or good temper, is a perfection, and as such it is a limit that admits no increase. A virtuous man is disposed to become angry, but only up to a point. Were he to become *iracundior*, more irascible (line 7), he would no longer be a person of good-temper.⁹¹

The final sentence of 446 runs: *vide ne contra placidior solutusque affectibus et cui nemo odio sit*, “Careful lest on the contrary he (a good man) be calmer, free of passions and one who hates nobody” (line 8). Here, too, a Peripatetic would be unimpressed. He might agree that it is better to incline toward calmness than toward irascibility (cf. Arist., *NE* 4.5 1126a29–b9), but he would balk at the phrase *solutus affectibus*, “free of passions,” for emotions, as the Peripatetics conceive of them, are not only human but also a fundamental ingredient in virtuous behavior. Moreover, the idea that a good man hates no one would be rejected. For if *odium* is construed as *μῖσος*, then a Peripatetic would point out that it is free of pain (*Rhet.* 2.4 1382a13), more open to reasoned deliberation than anger (*Pol.* 5.10 1312b32–34; cf. 538E.2) and appropriate to courts of law, where an impartial juror may (even ought to) experience hate when voting to condemn a vicious criminal.⁹² Indeed, early moral education is a training in loves and hates,⁹³ so that the well-educated

⁹⁰ The shift from ὀργή in line 1 to θυμός in lines 2 and 6 of 526 is significant.

⁹¹ See 449A.10, 20–22. A similar disregard of the Peripatetic doctrine of the mean is behind the criticism in 1.13.1–2.

⁹² W. Fortenbaugh, “Aristotle’s Art of Rhetoric” in *A Companion to Greek Rhetoric*, ed. I. Worthington (Oxford: Blackwell 2007) p. 118.

⁹³ See the introduction to Section 4 “Education, Exhortation and Censure.”

person experiences hate not only when voting condemnation but also on numerous other occasions throughout his life.

In concluding this comment, I take brief notice of Moraux's claim that Theophrastus exhibits a more favorable attitude toward the passions than Aristotle does.⁹⁴ In support of this claim, Moraux cites 446 and contrasts this text with what Aristotle says in *NE* 3.8 1117a6–9 and 7.8 1151a20–25. Moraux's claim is curious, for nothing in 446 points to a departure from Aristotle. Good men are said to be angered when wrongs are done to their own (line 1) and to be angered by evil (lines 6–7). To be sure, Aristotle might call for some qualifications: anger must be limited or appropriate to the wrongs in question, and a distinction needs to be made between anger and hate. When the evil does not affect one's self or one's own, then good men respond with hate. But I know of no reason to think that Theophrastus would reject these qualifications. Moreover, the passages cited from the *NE* hardly speak to the issue. In 3.8 the focus is on θυμός conceived of as spirited temper. It is said to be most hasty or ready to encounter dangers, ἱππητικώτατον γὰρ ὁ θυμός πρὸς τοὺς κινδύνους (1116b26–27), and to support the action of courageous men, ὁ δὲ θυμός συνεργεῖ αὐτοῖς (1116b31). If I understand Aristotle correctly, he is not speaking of an emotion, i.e., extreme anger or rage, but of a temperament, i.e., vehemence or intensity, that cuts across a person's behavior and in the right situations contributes to courageous action. But whether θυμός be construed as a temperament or as an emotion, Aristotle is recognizing an occasion when θυμός is useful. Theophrastus would not object. In 7.8 Aristotle distinguishes between the self-indulgent individual and the morally weak individual. The latter is said to be overcome by passion and as result not to act in accordance with right reason. Since the contrast is with the self-indulgent person, the ἀκόλαστος, the morally weak man under discussion is one who is overcome by desire for bodily pleasures. Such a desire might be construed as a bodily drive different from an emotion like anger, but that makes little difference in regard to the issue before us. Both Aristotle and Theophrastus disapprove of the person who knows what he ought to do and yet fails to control his lust or anger. The passage does not support the claim that Theophrastus is more favorable to passion/emotion than Aristotle.

⁹⁴ Moraux (1951) pp. 78–79. Cf. Bourgery p. xviii. Fillione-Lahille p. 27 is rightly critical of Moraux and Bourgery.

447 Barlaam of Seminara, *Ethics according to the Stoics* 2.13–14 (PG vol. 151 col. 1362B–1363D Migne)

Literature: Brandis (1860) p. 356; Dirlmeier (1937) p. 12; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 164–166, (2005c) pp. 404, 413

Text 447 is taken from the Latin translation of Barlaam's compendium of Stoic ethics. The original was in Greek. The work divides into two books of which the first deals with happiness and its dependence upon virtue, while the second concerns *constantia*, "steadiness" and *perturbatio*, "disturbance." The former is explained as that condition of the soul, in which *aequabilitas mentis*, "an equable state of mind," is combined with *vera sententia*, "true opinion," and *benefica voluntas*, "beneficent desire" (1359B). The latter is said to be a condition of the soul, in which *aequabilitas mentis* is replaced by *obscuratio*, "obscuraton" of the mind. In combination with *falsa sententia*, "false opinion," and *malefica voluntas*, "pernicious desire," the resulting *perturbatio* is deemed extremely bad (1358A–B, 1360A–1361A). Nevertheless, Barlaam recognizes that *perturbatio*, albeit incompatible with virtue (1361C), can have consequences that are good (1356A, 1358A, 1359A, 1361A): *non penitus inutiles sunt perturbationes; aliarum enim rerum cupiditate, vel metu, laetitia, vel aegritudine commoti, multa bona in vita consequuntur, et mala evitant: sed ita dispositi simulacra virtutum, non ipsas veras virtutes aestimandi sunt habere*, "Disturbances are not entirely useless; men who are moved by desire for other things or by fear (or) pleasure or distress obtain many goods in life and avoid (many) evils. But being so disposed by a phantom of virtues, they are not to be deemed possessors of the true virtues" (1361D–1362A). We may recall Cicero's *Tusculan Disputations*, in which we are told that emotions can benefit persons other than the man who is steady and wise, *constans* and *sapiens* (4.55), and more generally the controversy between Stoics and Peripatetics, in which the latter emphasized the usefulness of emotion.⁹⁵

Shortly after the sentence quoted above (17 lines later in Migne), 447 begins. At first reading, the text seems to be a straightforward reply to what precedes and therefore evidence of an early Peripatetic polemic,

⁹⁵ Cf. also Seneca, *On Anger* 1.12.6–13.5, part of which was printed in *Quellen* (1984) text L12, and all of which has been omitted in 446. See the commentary in *Quellen* pp. 162–163.

beginning with Theophrastus, against the Stoa.⁹⁶ On reflection, however, I think that such a reading is too simplistic. To be sure, Theophrastus may well have stated his opposition to Zeno in some lost work,⁹⁷ but in 447 Barlaam is not drawing on such a work. Rather, Barlaam is following a Stoic source that reflects a later stage in the controversy between the Stoics and Peripatetics concerning emotional response. Theophrastus has become, as it were, a straw-man, whose view of emotion was characterized by the Stoics in ways favorable to their own position. That is, I think, clear in 447, when we read: *et in animo secundum infirmas eius partes contingit nonnunquam ex aliquo casu turbida commotio, nec a falsa opinione pendens, nec maleficam voluntatem excitans, nec menti obscuracionem inferens*, “also in the soul in accordance with its infirm parts, he (Theophrastus) says that there occurs occasionally as a result of some cause a turbid commotion, which does not depend upon false opinion, does not excite pernicious desire and does not obscure the mind” (lines 7–10). I offer three considerations, which taken together, support the claim that Barlaam is presenting a Stoic version of Theophrastus’ understanding of emotional response.

1) In itself the use of the adjective *infirmus* is suspicious, but the use of this adjective in the plural, i.e., in the phrase *infirmas partes* (line 8), is all the more suspicious. We might have expected a reference to the irrational part of the soul, i.e., to the *ἄλογον*.

2) The phrase *turbida commotio* (line 9) is a strengthened variation for the word *perturbatio*. It suggests with greater negative force the *turbidus motus* (1360A, cf. 1360D, 1362A), which upsets the *aequabilitas mentis*, the equable state of mind (1355B–C). Both *turbida commotio* and *perturbatio* could be used to render the Greek word *ταραχή*, which is used by Aristotle in the *Rhetoric* to define three kinds of emotional response: fear, shame and envy (2. 1382a21, 1383b13, 1386b18, 23). Nevertheless, I find it unlikely that either Aristotle or Theophrastus would use *ταραχή* in a passage that characterizes emotions in general, for *ταραχή* seems poorly suited to, e.g., *χάρις*, “favor,” which Aristotle

⁹⁶ See the interesting questions put by W. Theiler, “Die Grosse Ethik und die Ethiken des Aristoteles,” *Hermes* 69 (1934) p. 379.

⁹⁷ Born c. 335 BC, Zeno studied in Athens and began teaching there around 300. It is, therefore, quite possible that Theophrastus responded to Zeno in one or more of his later works.

defines as a ὑπουργία and not as a disturbance (*Rhet.* 2.7 1385a18).⁹⁸ And the same holds for μῖσος, hate, which is said to be without pain (2.4 1382a13) and to be compatible with indifference: i.e., the man who hates does not care whether the person hated suffers; he simply wants him to cease to exist (1382a9, 15).⁹⁹ It is, I think, clear that the phrase *turbida commotio* as used in 447 is no more Theophrastean than, e.g., the phrase κίνησις πλεοναστική in Stobaeus 2.7.1 (πάθος δ' ἐστίν, ὥς μὲν Ἀριστοτέλης, ἄλογος ψυχῆς κίνησις πλεοναστική, p. 38.18–19 W) is Aristotelian. In both cases, we observe the influence of a later period.

3) The mention of *falsa opinio*, *malefica voluntas* and *mentis obscuratio* (lines 6, 9–10) is carried over from the preceding presentation of Stoic doctrine (beginning 1355A; see above) and is not a fair reflection of Theophrastean doctrine. To be sure, Theophrastus would agree that there are emotional responses that do not depend on false opinion, do not excite pernicious desire and do not obscure the mind: *nec a falso opinione dependens, nec maleficam voluntatem excitans, nec menti obscuracionem inferens* (lines 9–10). But he would object to the qualifier nonnunquam, “occasionally,”—“more often than not” would be more accurate—and he would insist that good men, those who have benefited from a sound moral education, will rarely experience a *turbida commotio*.

In what follows concerning facial signs of emotional response, Barlaam continues to use Stoic language, *commotio*, *perturbatio* and *constantia*, in order to trap Theophrastus in a contradiction: the facial signs are indicators of a *commotio*, which is a *perturbatio*, which is not in the least opposed to *constantia* (lines 10–12)! Theophrastus would object to replacing his understanding of emotional response with the Stoic notion of *perturbatio*. In addition, he would balk at the idea that emotional response is not in the least opposed to an equable state: *minime constantiae adversatur* (line 12). As an ordinary human being, he knew that emotions can be turbulent and therefore disruptive of composure. But he would insist that emotions need not be disruptive, and in the case of virtuous individuals they are rarely so. That said, it should be acknowledged that Theophrastus would agree that emotions find expression on the mouth, in the countenance and in the eyes: *in ore, in vultu, in oculis* (line 11). He would add that emotions are also expressed in gesture and in

⁹⁸ On χάρις see Chapter III “Titles of Books” no. 24 Περί χάριτος.

⁹⁹ In addition, hate is compatible with reasoning. See 538E.2 with Arist. *Pol.* 5.10 1312b32–34.

voice. That these external signs of emotional response were discussed not only in the work *On Emotions* (436 no. 5) but also in *On Delivery* (666 no. 24) is likely, but the extent of these discussions cannot be determined with any certainty. See texts 712 and 713 with *Commentary* 8 (2005c) on rhetoric and poetics pp. 145–150, 399–415.

Barlaam goes on to draw a distinction between his own conception of *perturbatio* and *perturbatio* as conceived of by Theophrastus. He holds that *perturbatio* is a disturbance that obscures the mind and therefore can be predicated of the mind. Theophrastus does not conceive of *perturbatio* in this way, so that it cannot be predicated of the mind. In other words *perturbatio* is an equivocal. Barlaam and Theophrastus are using one and the same word but in different senses (lines 13–34).¹⁰⁰ A captious Aristotelian might object that neither the mind nor the soul is the proper subject of emotional response. Rather, it is a man who feels anger or fright (*On Soul* 1.4 408b13–15). That may be correct, but it ignores what is at issue. For even if one concedes that emotions are properly attributed to man and not to mind, it still remains a question whether a man's capacity to think is regularly affected for the worse by the occurrence of emotional response. One might compare drunkenness and sickness (408b23–24) and argue that an emotion too is a disturbance and one that all too often obscures the mind. And as a counter-argument, one might cite the facial expressions that accompany emotional response (lines 10–12) and argue that they are often visible when a person is experiencing emotion and still thinking clearly. Even Barlaam (his Stoic source) recognizes a *primus gradus* of love, fright and the like, which are entirely compatible with an equable state of mind (1359D–1360A, 1361A–B). Only Barlaam resists using the word *perturbatio* in reference to this condition.

That Theophrastus compared emotions with hunger and thirst (line 3) is not to be doubted. Only he will have held that hunger and thirst are in essence physiological phenomena. They are caused by bodily changes, not by beliefs, and for that reason are involuntary drives that in themselves are neither virtuous nor vicious (lines 49–51; cf. Arist., *NE* 1.13 1102a32–b12 and *Rhet.* 1.11 1370a19–23). In contrast, emotions are not involuntary and not indifferent in regard to virtue and vice. That does not mean that Theophrastus compared emotions with hunger and thirst for no other reason than to draw a sharp distinction between emotions and bodily drives. On the contrary, he may also have made the compar-

¹⁰⁰ These remarks concerning equivocity are not unexpected, for earlier Barlaam had focused on equivocal usage (1359B–1361B).

ison in order to underline the fact that emotional response, like hunger and thirst, is natural.¹⁰¹ Aristotle had recognized the natural capacity of human beings for emotional response (*NE* 2.5 1106a6–10), and later Peripatetics combined what is natural with what is useful (Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations* 4.43). Theophrastus will have done the same.

448 *Light of the Soul B*, chapter 63, On Wisdom, E (ed. 1477² Farinator)

Literature: Sharples (1984) p. 189

The work entitled *Light of the Soul* is not a reliable source for Theophrastus.¹⁰² Text 506 is an example in that it attributes to Theophrastus a Stoic view: *proprium est sapientis in eius animum nullam posse incidere passionem*, “It is characteristic of the wise man that no passion can enter into his soul” (lines 1–2). From the preceding comments on 446 and 447, it should be clear that such a view is not only Stoic but also incompatible with Theophrastean doctrine. More puzzling is what follows: *corporalis namque passio omni quidem consilio sapientiaeque repugnant*, “For bodily passion is opposed to all judgment and wisdom” (lines 2–3). It is true that the Stoics are materialists, so that on their view passion can be spoken of as bodily,¹⁰³ but the Stoics are also prepared to distinguish between involuntary bodily disturbances like hunger and thirst (cf. 447.49) and those passions that are disturbances of the mind, are caused by false opinion, and involve pernicious desire. It is the latter, which are under consideration in 448 and which the Stoics opposed to sound judgment and wisdom, so that they cannot enter into the soul of the wise man (lines 1–2). But such passions are not what Theophrastus has in mind when he associates emotions with moral virtue and calls for moderation. Unless one is keen on the misinformation that circulated at the end of the thirteenth and the beginning of the fourteenth century, 448 is best put aside.

¹⁰¹ That is not explicitly stated in lines 3–10, where the comparison is limited to not depending upon false opinion, not exciting pernicious desire and not obscuring the mind (lines 5–6 and 9–10). But it is certainly compatible with what is said in lines 3–10, if we ignore the fact that Barlaam uses the label *perturbatio* when referring to Theophrastus’ notion of emotional response. Presumably Barlaam was attracted to the comparison of emotion with hunger and thirst, for the latter can be viewed as a disturbance that needs to be removed so that the body is able return to its natural state.

¹⁰² On *Light of the Soul*, see above, Chapter II, “The Sources” no. 49.

¹⁰³ The Stoics held that the soul is composed of πνεῦμα, breath. See, e.g., Arius’ summary of Stoic ethics in Stobaeus, *Anthology* 2.7.5b7 p. 64.21–23 Wachsmuth together with A. Long and D. Sedley, *The Hellenistic Philosophers* (Cambridge: University Press 1987) vol. 1 p. 320 on text 53G1–5.

719A Plutarch, *Table Talk* 1.5.2 623A (BT vol. 4 p. 26.20–26 Hubert)

719B Aelius Festus Aphthonius, *On Meters* 4.2 (GL vol. 6 p. 159.8–16 Keil)

Literature: Dirlmeier (1937) pp. 98–100; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1532; Neubecker (1956) p. 79; Anderson (1980) pp. 92–94; Kassel (1981) pp. 17, 26–27; Fortenbaugh (1984) p. 132; Theodorsson (1989–1996) vol. 1 pp. 112–113; Sicking (1998) p. 141; Barker (2005) pp. 133–135, (2007) pp. 433–434

In the text-translation volumes, 719A and B are found within the section on “Music.” The primary discussion of these texts will be found in *Commentary* 9 on music and miscellaneous items. Nevertheless, the two texts have been referred to from the section on “Emotions,” because they mention emotions/affections as sources of song.

719A is taken from Plutarch’s *Table Talk*. We are to imagine a banquet hosted by Sossius, Plutarch’s friend and the dedicatee of *Table Talk*.¹⁰⁴ Under discussion is the meaning of a verse of Euripides: ποιητὴν δ’ ἔρα Ἔρως διδάσκει, καὶν ἄμουσος ἢ τὸ πρὶν, “Eros, then, teaches the poet, even if he was previously songless” (fr. 663 Nauck). After some indication of what was said in discussion (622C–623A),¹⁰⁵ 719A begins. Plutarch has Sossius say that one would do well to start from what Theophrastus said: namely, that there are three sources of music: λύπη, ἡδονή and ἐνθουσιασμός, “pain, pleasure and inspiration,” for each of these turns aside the voice from its usual inflection (lines 1–6). As transmitted the text involves corruption, and the word παθῶν (line 4) is an emendation, which on one level is satisfactory, for pain, pleasure and inspiration are all affections: the person experiencing them can be said to be affected, πάσχειν.¹⁰⁶ But that does not tell us whether we should construe pain and pleasure widely to include more than central cases of emotional response (e.g., anger and pity) and exactly what Theophrastus may have meant by inspiration. Some help is provided by what follows. Plutarch is no longer drawing closely on Theophrastus, but what he offers would most likely be acceptable to the Peripatetic. Pain is illustrated by sorrowful lament,

¹⁰⁴ See the introduction to Book 1, in which Plutarch addresses Sossius, saying that he is sending three books, each containing ten problems or questions, and he will send the rest later (612C–E).

¹⁰⁵ Although Plutarch refers by name to his grandfather Lamprias (622E), he is not concerned with attributing what was said to individual diners. Instead, Plutarch twice writes ἐλέχθη, “it was said” (622C, D). That leaves ἐκείνους, “them” (623A = line 1 of 719A) vague, but not unintelligible.

¹⁰⁶ In addition, the occurrence of πάθος in 623C and D supports the emendation.

pleasure by intense joy, and inspiration by ecstasy such as occurs when people are inspired by the gods or in a frenzy of madness (623A–C).¹⁰⁷ Be that as it may, the application to eros is clear. It is said to contain all three sources of music: bitter pains, intense joys, and great ecstasies and derangements (623C–D).

Plutarch has Sossius recommend beginning from what Theophrastus said about music, *περὶ μουσικῆς* (line 2). After that Sossius is made to say that he recently read the book, *τὸ βιβλίον* (line 3). That prompts the question whether the phrase *περὶ μουσικῆς* should be construed as a title *On Music*. For titles beginning with *περὶ* are common, and Diogenes' catalogue of Theophrastean writings includes a *Περὶ μουσικῆς* in three books (5.47). In addition, Porphyry refers to the second book of Theophrastus' *Περὶ μουσικῆς* (*On Claudius Ptolemy's Harmonics* 1.3 = 716.4). In *Quellen* (1984) p. 132, I found it quite likely that the phrase *περὶ μουσικῆς* in 719A is a reference to the work *Περὶ μουσικῆς*,¹⁰⁸ but in the text-translation volumes a more cautious attitude was adopted. In fact, we suggest that a negative answer is correct. I note that both 719A and B refer to *ἐνθουσιασμός* (lines 4 and 8, respectively) and that Theophrastus wrote a work entitled *Περὶ ἐνθουσιασμοῦ*, *On Inspiration* (328 no. 9a = 726B.1–2)¹⁰⁹ or *Περὶ ἐνθουσιασμῶν*, *On (Types of) Inspiration* (328 no. 9b = 726A.1–2). One or the other may well have been the title of the book referred to in 719A. But whatever the truth concerning the phrase *περὶ μουσικῆς*, the fact that Plutarch has Sossius (his close friend) say, *τὸ βιβλίον ἀνέγνων*, “I read the book” is significant. The book in question must have been available to Sossius, and Plutarch is likely to have read it. And if that is the case, we can assume with some certainty that 719A is Theophrastean not only in substance but also in diction.

719B is from Aphthonius' work *On Meters*.¹¹⁰ Despite being in Latin, a close relationship to 719A is clear. Not only are *adfectiones*—which are explicitly equated with *πάθη*—said to provide an impulse to song (lines 2–7) but also mention is made of *voluptas*, *ira* and *enthusiasmos*, “pleasure, anger,” and “inspiration” (line 8). *Voluptas* and *enthusiasmos* are Latin for *ἡδονή* and *ἐνθουσιασμός* in 719A, and *ira* is a specific kind

¹⁰⁷ See Aristotle's *Politics* 8.7, where *ἐνθουσιασμός* occurs together with *ἔλεος* and *φόβος*, and all three are spoken of as *πάθη* (1342a1–15).

¹⁰⁸ Dirlmeier (1937) p. 98, Regenbogen col. 1532 and Anderson p. 92 are even more certain.

¹⁰⁹ Anderson p. 87 translates *On Divine Infilling*.

¹¹⁰ In *Grammatici Latini* vol. 6, Keil prints the text under the name of Marius Victorinus, *Ars Grammatica*. The name Aphthonius may be a corruption of Asmonius.

of λύπη. A detail may be briefly noted. In 719B there is mention of the heating that occurs during emotional response (line 5). In 719A there is no reference to heating, but in what precedes (less than a half page earlier) Plutarch does mention heat as a consequence of eros and as a contributing cause of song (622D). That emotions involve bodily change including heating and cooling is an observable fact that the Peripatetics did not ignore. More important is the fact that 719B not only tells us that the emotions provide an impulse to song but also says that song “induces pleasure, anger and inspiration” (line 8). In 719A these are the emotions that are said to be sources of music. Now in 719B song is said to induce the very same emotions. The text is quite condensed, but almost certainly we are being told that music arouses in the listener emotions similar to those that are said to be its sources. And if that is correct, the effect of these emotions in the listener is likely to be cathartic. I cite Prophyry, who concludes a long section on Theophrastus as follows: “The nature of music is one. It is the movement of the soul (κίνησις τῆς ψυχῆς)¹¹¹ that occurs in correspondence with/for the sake of its release from the evils due to the emotions (κατ’ ἀπόλυσιν ... τῶν διὰ τὰ πάθη κακῶν); and if it were not this, neither would it be the nature of music” (*On Claudius Ptolemy’s Harmonics* 1.3 = 716.130–132). The preceding translation offers two renderings of the preposition κατὰ: “in correspondence with” and “for the sake of.” The former is that found in the text-translation volumes, and the latter is that of Andrew Barker¹¹² The latter is the stronger in that release from the evils of emotion would be the function of song, essential to its very nature. The former recognizes the result without making the release a function essential to song. For our purposes, the important point is that song is conceived of as having a cathartic effect.¹¹³ That is not a permanent or long-term cure, but in providing short-term relief music can help prevent unwanted behavior. Regarding music working long-term cures as against those of short duration, see the immediately following commentary on 726A–C.

In lines preceding 719B, Aphthonius discusses the origin of a human being’s capacity for rhythm and song. It is said to occur naturally at birth together with sense perception; later it is subjected to and elevated by art and discipline (p. 158.8–159.7). Dirlmeier pp. 98–100 argues that

¹¹¹ Cf. 716.7: κίνημα μελωδικὸν περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν.

¹¹² Barker (2007) p. 433.

¹¹³ Fortenbaugh (1984) p. 132, Barker (2003) pp. 133–135.

this discussion too is Theophrastean. He calls attention to details that have a Peripatetic, Theophrastean ring (the use of examples [p. 158.23], the recognition that laughter is a property of human beings [p. 158.14] and reference to the critical moment [p. 158.32]), and he sees in the opening words of 719B a clear indication that what precedes contains Theophrastean doctrine: *his accedentem et consentaneam etiam Theophrasti opinionem eruditioribus litteris haud praetermiserim*, “I must not pass over the opinion of Theophrastus, agreeing and according as it does with these very learned writings” (lines 1–2). On my reading, these words assert no more than agreement. They certainly do not say that the same Theophrastean source stands behind the material that precedes 719B. That said, I want to acknowledge that the preceding material contains nothing that is incompatible with Theophrastean doctrine.¹¹⁴

726A Apollonius, *Amazing Stories* 49.1–3 (*Parad. Gr.* p. 140.262–142.275 Giannini)

Literature: Reinach (1901) pp. 48–49; Edelstein (1937) repr. pp. 233–234; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1534; Wehrli (1967–1978) vol. 2 p. 48; W. Anderson (1980) pp. 87, 93–94; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 125, 197; Sicking (1998) pp. 141–142; Barker (2005) pp. 135–141; Gibson (2005) pp. 119–120

Like 719A and B, text 726A finds its place in the text-translation volumes within the section on “Music.” The primary discussion of 726A will be found in *Commentary* volume 9 along with other texts whose focus is musical (714–726). We have referred to 726A from the section on “Emotions,” because it deals with certain affections, πάθη, of the body and the soul, and with the positive effect that the aulos is said to have on these affections.

726A is taken from Apollonius’ Ἱστορίαι θαυμασíaι, *Amazing Stories*, a collection of paradoxographical reports drawn from earlier writers. 726A is preceded by three selections (46–48) from Theophrastus’ botanical writings: one from *Plant Explanations* (384 no. 2b) and two from *Research on Plants* (384 no. 1g). It is followed by one (50) from *Research on Plants*. 726A has a quite different origin. It is drawn from Theophrastus’ work Περί ἐνθουσιασμῶν, *On (Types of) Inspiration* (328 no.

¹¹⁴ Regenbogen col. 1532 is impressed by Dirlmeier’s argument. He thinks it likely that the material preceding 719B is Theophrastean in origin.

9b).¹¹⁵ In this work, we are told, Theophrastus said things worthy of consideration. In particular, Theophrastus spoke of music curing many of the affections or ills of soul and body, e.g., fainting, episodes (or types) of fear, and prolonged disturbances of mind: πολλὰ τῶν ἐπὶ ψυχὴν καὶ τὸ σῶμα γιγνομένων παθῶν ἰατρεύειν, καθάπερ λιποθυμίαν, φόβους καὶ τὰς ἐπὶ μακρὸν γιγνομένας τῆς διανοίας ἐκστάσεις (lines 2–4). In what follows, we read that according to Theophrastus playing the aulos cures both sciatica and epilepsy: ἴαται γάρ, φησιν (sc. Θεόφραστος), ἡ καταύλησις καὶ ἰσχιάδα καὶ ἐπιληψίαν (lines 4–5).¹¹⁶ Next we are offered an example concerning Aristoxenus. Someone is said to have gone to the musician: καθάπερ πρὸς Ἀριστόξενον τὸν μουσικὸν ἐλθόντα (lines 5–6). The epithet “the musician” (line 6) makes clear that the Aristoxenus referred to is the Peripatetic and contemporary of Theophrastus.

The use of ὁ μουσικός in 726A is the earliest occurrence of ὁ μουσικός as an identifying epithet of Aristoxenus. Reinach p. 79 believes that it was present in the text of Theophrastus and taken over by Apollonius. That may well be the case. A good example of Theophrastus using a professional epithet to avoid confusing two like-named persons is found in *Plant Explanations*, where a person named Eudemus is identified as ὁ φαρμακοπώλης, the drug vendor, in order that he not be confused with the Chian Eudemus (9.17.2–3).¹¹⁷ Nevertheless, we cannot rule out that the use of ὁ μουσικός as an epithet for Aristoxenus postdates Theophrastus, and that its occurrence in 726A is an addition attributable to Apollonius. Either way, the epithet stuck and became a badge of honor.

What follows in 726A is seriously corrupt; attempts to emend the text are problematic at best. In particular, Reinach wants to transpose the better part of two lines (lines 5–7 to line 11) and to emend individual words.¹¹⁸ The result has its appeal, but it also rules out an example of curing bodily ills, such as might be expected, given that καθάπερ, “just

¹¹⁵ The addition of “Types of” in parentheses is meant to take account of the plural ἐνθουσιασμῶν. Another possible addition is “Cases of.” The difference need not be very great, for a series of types might be elucidated by a string of particular examples or cases.

¹¹⁶ The noun καταύλησις occurs in *Research on Plants* (384 no. 1) 4.11.5, which is part of a discussion of reeds from which auloi are made (4.11.2–9).

¹¹⁷ In *Amazing Stories* 50, Apollonius draws on *Plant Explanations* 9.17.2–3. He includes the epithet ὁ φαρμακοπώλης, but he does so in a garbled manner. See Chapter II “The Sources” no. 2 Apollonius.

¹¹⁸ In the critical apparatus to lines 10–11, we have recorded Reinach’s proposed transposition of lines 5–7, and in note 1 to the translation the sense given to the text by Reinach’s transposition will be found.

as,” follows the mention of sciatica and epilepsy (line 5).¹¹⁹ Perhaps, then, the text is lacunose, and were it whole, we would see that καθάπερ introduces an example of curing bodily ills: someone who was suffering from a disorder like sciatica or epilepsy, went to Aristoxenus for treatment and presumably came away in better physical condition. After that a second example will have been offered: one that dealt with psychic disturbance. In that case, I would not follow Gianinni and delete the words τὸν μουσικόν (line 7). They belong to the second example.¹²⁰ In the first, Aristoxenus is identified by means of the phrase “the musician.” In the second, he is referred to simply as “the musician,” who restored someone who had been driven mad in Thebes by the sound of the salpinx: λέγεται τὸν μουσικὸν καταστῆναι τινα ἐξιστάμενον ἐν Θήβαις ὑπὸ τὴν τῆς σάλπιγγος φωνήν (lines 7–8). That is, of course, speculation, but not wildly so. For toward the beginning of our text, we are told that Theophrastus spoke of music curing ills not only of the soul but also of the body (lines 2–3). On the suggested understanding of the text, we are given examples of both.

According to Apollonius, Theophrastus said that music cures fainting (line 3),¹²¹ and playing the aulos cures sciatica and epilepsy (line 5).¹²² If music does in fact cure physical maladies, that is wonderful news and quite appropriate to a work that reported *mirabilia*. Given our present day enthusiasm for “alternative medicine,” we may be not only intrigued by what Apollonius reports but also inclined to believe that Theophrastus himself was convinced that playing the aulos could cure bodily disorders. Indeed, we might cite Athenaeus, who tells us that in *On Inspiration* (328 no. 9a)¹²³ Theophrastus recorded that music cures diseases. In particular, Theophrastus reported that “persons suffering from sciatica

¹¹⁹ In saying that Reinach’s transposition rules out an example of curing bodily ills, I am focusing on 726A as printed in the text-translation volumes. In other words, I am ignoring section 4 of *Amazing Stories*, which is not printed as part of 726A. See below.

¹²⁰ Cf. Wehrli (1967–1978) p. 48.

¹²¹ Theophrastus wrote a work Περί λειποψυχίας, *On Fainting* (328 no. 2). The noun λειποψυχία is used as a synonym for λειποθυμία. Cf. the use of λειποθυμεῖν in 345.6, where it is a synonym for λειποψυχεῖν found elsewhere in the text (345.15, 20, 33). Whether Theophrastus wrote λειπ- or λιπ- is problematic. LSJ gives only λειποθυμία and under λειπανδρία comments that metrical evidence favors λιπ-. In 345, i.e., Photius’ excerpts from Theophrastus’ Περί λειποψυχίας, there is no mention of musical therapy.

¹²² The verb φησι(v) occurs twice (lines 2 and 4). There is no doubt that Theophrastus is the subject of the second occurrence as well as the first. The shift from ἰατρῆν (line 3) to ἰᾶσθαι (*re vera* ἰᾶται, line 4) is noticeable, but perhaps not to be pressed given the state of the text.

¹²³ The titles *On Inspiration*, Περί ἐνθουσιασμοῦ, and *On (Types of) Inspiration*, Περί ἐνθουσιασμῶν, do not refer to two separate works. We may compare, e.g. *On Sweat*, Περί

are permanently freed from the illness, ἀνόσους διατελεῖν, if someone played the aulos over the (affected) area in the Phrygian harmony” (726B). Nevertheless, we should not overlook Aulus Gellius. He tells us that he has recently consulted a work of Theophrastus, in which he found the following: “It is believed by many and has been put on record, that when the pains of sciatica are greatest, if a piper plays over them with gentle melodies, the pains are diminished” (726C). That is not evidence that Theophrastus actually believed in permanent cures accomplished by auloi and the like. On the contrary, we read of a lessening of pain, *minui dolores*, and more importantly, we are told that Theophrastus wrote, “It is believed by many,” *creditum hoc a plerisque esse*. Since Gellius’ claim to have read a Theophrastean work is not to be doubted,¹²⁴ I am inclined to follow Gulick and Anderson,¹²⁵ who hold that Theophrastus reported what many believe without making their belief his own.¹²⁶

Of greater relevance to ethics is the idea that music can cure ills of the soul including fear, φόβοι, and prolonged disturbances of the mind, τῆς διανοίας ἐκστάσεις (line 4). We are provided with an illustration: the man in Thebes who was driven out of his mind by the sound of the salpinx, a kind of trumpet that was used in war to give signals.¹²⁷ Whenever the Theban heard the salpinx, he shouted loudly and disgraced himself. And if someone sounded the salpinx in military mode, εἰ ... πολεμικὸν σαλπίζει τίς, he suffered much more, πολὺ χειρόν (line 10), becoming mad. He was cured by Aristoxenus, who introduced him little by little to the sound of the aulos and in this way made him able to endure even/also the sound of the salpinx, καὶ τῆς σάλπιγγος φωνὴν ὑπομένειν (line 12). The use of καὶ here may be emphatic. In the text-translation volumes, καὶ has been translated with “even.” That underlines

ἰδρώτος, and Περὶ ἰδρώτων, *On (Types) of Sweat*. Both titles are found in the manuscripts of Diogenes’ catalogue of Theophrastean writings. On the issue see, Fortenbaugh (2003a) pp. 53–55.

¹²⁴ See Chapter II “The Sources” no. 17 on Gellius.

¹²⁵ Gulick (1937) in the Loeb edition of Athenaeus vol. 6 (= 327) p. 364 n. a; Anderson p. 94. If Gulick and Anderson are correct as I think they are, then Soranus’ characterization of persons who believe that serious illness can be removed/cured by music and song—such persons are disturbed by an empty mind—does not apply to Theophrastus: *Sorani iudicio videntur hi mentis vanitate iactari qui modulis et cantilena passionis robur excludi posse crediderunt* (Caelius Aurelianus, *Chronic Diseases* 5.23).

¹²⁶ Confronted with a passage in which Theophrastus reports what others say, an excerptor may be tempted to omit single words or phrases that make clear whose view is being reported. For an example, see Chapter II “The Sources,” no. 2 on Apollonius, *Amazing Stories* 31 and the omission of “as some say.”

¹²⁷ See LSJ s.v. σάλπιγξ I together with ps. Aristotle, *On the Universe* 6 399b1–10.

what might be thought astonishing: repeated exposure to the sound of one instrument, the aulos, was able to change the way the Theban reacted to the sound of a different instrument, the salpinx.¹²⁸ But is such a change truly astonishing? For Aristotle, *Politics* 8.7 1342b1–3 compares the aulos with the Phrygian mode: both are said to be exciting and emotional, ὀργιαστικά καὶ παθητικά. Being a wind instrument like the salpinx and being able to affect the listener with considerable impact, it might be thought to have a kind of homoeopathic effect that extends to the sound of the salpinx.¹²⁹ And if that is correct, then a less emphatic translation of καί, “also,” might be preferable.

The preceding interpretation has a certain appeal, but it stands on wobbly legs. Our Apollonius text does not characterize the sound of the aulos as exciting and emotional (we are told only that Aristoxenus introduced the Theban to the aulos, τῷ αὐλῷ προσάγειν) and we would be making a mistake to think that the aulos was always used to excite the listener. It can be used to calm a person down,¹³⁰ and more importantly it is connected with an orderly approach to war. I am thinking of Polybius,

¹²⁸ Anderson p. 87 says that Apollonius’ story is “in one respect unusual: it combines a musical instrument with a non-musical one and even seems to postulate a link between their affective natures. The salpinx was a military signaling device, a battle-trumpet supposedly invented by the war-goddess Athena. The Greeks never considered it a musical instrument.”

¹²⁹ According to Wehrli (1967–1978) vol. 2 p. 48, the title of the Theophrastean work, i.e., *On (Types of) Inspiration* makes clear that the change in the Theban is effected by the enthusiastic character of the music. Wehrli also cites Book 7 of Plato’s *Laws*. At the beginning of this book, the Athenian Stranger is made to emphasize the importance of movement for the proper development of young bodies and souls. He first appeals to experience, pointing out that wakeful children are made to fall asleep through motion and music: their mothers move them about and sing to them as if piping them down, καταυλοῦσι. In much the same way, persons in a Bacchic frenzy are cured through dance and song. Both conditions are associated with fear and both are said to be caused by a bad state of soul, which is removed by imposing an external motion that overcomes the fearful and manic motions within (790C.5–791B.2). A relation to 726A is clear. Both texts mention fear (790E.8–791A.2; 726A.4), and both speak of playing the aulos (the use of καταυλοῦειν in 790E.2 invites comparison with καταύλησις in 726A.5). But there is difference. In the case of wakeful children (790D5–6) and persons suffering from a Corybantic or Bacchic frenzy (790D.4, E.2–3) the relief appears to be temporary. In contrast, the Theban treated by Aristoxenus seems to have received more than temporary relief: henceforth he will be able to endure the sound of the salpinx, τῆς σάλπιγγος φωνὴν ὑπομένειν (line 12). But I would be more confident in this understanding, were some word like διατελεῖν added to the text (cf. 726B.2 cited above).

¹³⁰ A clear example is provided by an anecdote concerning Pythagoras and a Tauromanian youth who had been partying heavily at night. The latter was greatly stimulated not only by wine but also by the Phrygian melody that an aulete was playing. The youth

Histories, in which we read that in war the ancient Cretans and Spartans replaced the salpinx with the aulos and rhythmic movement. And in Arcadia the young men practiced military parades with the aulos and orderly movement (4.20). Similarly, Plutarch in the *Life of Lyscurgus* tells us that when the Spartan king led his army into battle, the auletes played a hymn to Castor, and the soldiers marched rhythmically in time to the aulos without confusion or fear or rage in their souls (22.2–3). Should we think, then, of Aristoxenus introducing the Theban to orderly rhythms played on the aulos? The Theban understands that the rhythms are associated with war, but they produce composure and confidence, so that in time the Theban is no longer terrified when he hears the sound of the salpinx.¹³¹ I find this second interpretation preferable, but in the absence of further information concerning the music that Aristoxenus played on the aulos, an unqualified assertion would be hasty.

Up to this point I have been focused on the salpinx *qua* war trumpet and have assumed that the Theban experiences fright (line 4) whenever he hears the sound of the salpinx. That is, I think, correct, but it should be acknowledged that the use of the salpinx is not confined to war. I cite Aristotle who tells us that when men revel, ὅταν κωμάζωσιν, they make use of the salpinx, relaxing their breath in order to make a softer sound (*On Things Heard* 803a25–27).¹³² This use outside of war explains, I think, the Theban's different reactions to the sound of the salpinx. When he heard it being played softly outside a military context, he shouted and disgraced himself (line 9), but when he heard the salpinx giving a military signal he went mad (line 9–10). In the second case,¹³³ the Theban's reaction is clearly based on belief. As part of his early training or simply through experience, the Theban recognizes that the signal being sounded is one of war. Reasonably or unreasonably he believes himself in danger and is quite overcome with fear. The first case is stated succinctly. We are

wanted to set fire to the door of a rival in love, but he was stopped by Pythagoras who had the aulete change the melody to a spondaic one that had a calming effect (Iamblichus. *Life of Pythagoras* 112).

¹³¹ The phrase κατὰ μικρόν, “little by little” or “gradually” is important, because it makes clear that we are dealing with a process that builds on itself, i.e., a process of habituation that gradually changes the character of the Theban. In other words, we are not to think of catharsis as it is presented in Aristotle's *Poetics* 6. For there catharsis is a purgation that is accomplished during a single performance and that needs repeating (frequently, if one is naturally emotional).

¹³² Andrew Barker called my attention to this passage.

¹³³ That there are different reactions in different contexts is emphasized by the way in which the second case is introduced: εἰ δέ ποτε καί (line 9).

told only that the Theban disgraced himself by shouting when he heard the sound of the salpinx. We might suppose that the Theban heard the salpinx making a softer sound, which he nevertheless found unpleasant, even painful, and therefore difficult to tolerate. Such a response could be understood as a purely physiological reaction to painful sensation. But that seems to me an unlikely stretch. More probably, the Theban has come to associate the salpinx with war, so that whenever he hears it he experiences fright and disgraces himself. But when the sound is one of war, a military signal, his response is intensified to the point of madness.

In treating the Theban, Aristoxenus does not intend to mislead him into believing that the salpinx never signals danger. It does signal danger, and it is important to know when it does and to respond in a proper, orderly manner. What Aristoxenus intends—on the second interpretation—is to reduce the Theban's fear of war. And that is accomplished by introducing the Theban to the aulos in much the way that Polybius describes. As a result, the Theban acquires orderliness and confidence. He can tolerate the sound of the salpinx not only when it is played softly but also when it blasts the sound of war. But there may be more. The use of the aulos, albeit a pipe, need not exclude words as part of the Theban's training. I cite Polybius, who refers to young men singing to the accompaniment of auletes (4.20.9). Aristoxenus may have introduced something similar: i.e., he may have added words that celebrate courage and the nobility of death in battle. And none of that rules out using the aulos to play music that is exciting and emotional. That use might be infrequent, but it might provide a way of testing and strengthening the character of the Theban. But I am speculating.¹³⁴

¹³⁴ There are clear similarities between 726A and what Apollonius reports in *Amazing Stories* 40. Here, too, the paradoxographer refers to Aristoxenus, though this time he is not a figure in an anecdote. Rather, he is cited for what he says in his *Life of Telestes* about women in Locri and Rhegium. They had become quite excitable, so that at dinner when they heard someone calling, they jumped up, and becoming frantic they ran outside the city. When the people of Locri and Rhegium consulted the oracle concerning a release from this affliction, they were told to sing vernal paeans for sixty days (40.1–2). Connections with the story of the Theban are clear: There is an unwanted disposition that manifests itself in frantic behavior, an oracle is consulted, the recommended remedy is musical and requires time, in order that a cure be achieved. There are, however, differences. In *Amazing Stories* 40, there is no mention of a musical instrument. The oracle recommends singing vernal paeans, which rules out the aulos (unless one imagines two parties: singers and pipers). Moreover, the singing will not be simple humming. There will be words, so that the content of the paeans will have a remedial effect alongside the

In what precedes, I have ignored the fact that 726A omits the final two sections (4–5) of what we read in *Amazing Stories* 49. Wimmer (fr. 88) omits these sections and so does Wehrli (Aristoxenus fr. 6). There is good reason to omit the last section. It runs as follows: τὸ δὲ γιγνόμενον διὰ τῆς καταυλήσεως ἐπιχωριάζει καὶ ἀλλαχῇ, μάλιστα δὲ ἐν Θήβαις μέχρι τῶν νῦν χρόνων, “(cures) occurring through the playing of the aulos are customary elsewhere and especially in Thebes up to the present time” (5). The reference to Thebes harkens back to the earlier reference to Aristoxenus and the cure that he is said to have effected in Thebes (lines 7–8). The reference to the present time tells us that the kind of cure effected by Aristoxenus was still being practiced in Thebes. Since Theophrastus was a contemporary of Aristoxenus and since the phrase “up to the present time” implies that more than a few years have passed, it seems reasonable to say that the final section is not Theophrastean and is probably an addition by Apollonius, who belongs to the second century BC, and therefore will have been writing a full hundred years or more after Theophrastus.

That Apollonius did add material to his reports concerning earlier authors is clear. To make the point, I cite two reports that are said to be Theophrastean. One is found shortly before 726A: it is no. 46 = 417 no. 15. Apollonius announces that he is drawing on Book 5 of *Plant Explanations* (384 no. 2b) and proceeds to report that bean pods, when scattered on the roots of trees, dry out what is growing. With only minor variation in wording, the report is a fair rendering of what Theophrastus says at the end of *Plant Explanations* 5.15.1. What follows is another matter. Apollonius says that birds that eat these bean pods become sterile, and that the Pythagoreans prohibit the use of beans because they cause gas, impede digestion and produce turbulent dreams. That seems to be an exercise in free association. It is certainly not present in *Plant Explanations* 5.15.1.

The second report comes immediately after 726A: it is no. 50 = 413 no. 107.¹³⁵ Apollonius begins by referring to the end of the work *On Plants*, i.e., to Book 9 of *Research on Plants* (384 no. 1g). After that comes a somewhat garbled account of a Chian who was able to drink a large quantity of hellebore without being purged. Apollonius calls the

paeonic melody. Above, in regard to 726A, I did suggest that Aristoxenus could have added words to the treatment of the Theban, but that was speculation without any basis in the text.

¹³⁵ No. 50 has already been mentioned in Chapter II “The Sources” no. 2 on Apollonius.

Chian Eunomus (which differs from Theophrastus¹³⁶) and he reduces two persons to one (Theophrastus distinguishes between a drug vendor who was overcome by a single draft and a Chian who drank many cups; Apollonius has only a Chian drug vendor). That should give us pause regarding Apollonius as a source for Theophrastus, but what especially interests me is that once again, Apollonius adds material that is not in Theophrastus. Whereas Theophrastus reports that the Chian was able to drink much without being purged because he took an antidote of vinegar and pumice stone, Apollonius speaks of developing toleration by beginning with a few drinks and proceeding to a larger number. Perhaps Apollonius simply stopped reading and on his own added an explanation involving habituation. Or perhaps he had a lacunose text of *Research on Plants*.¹³⁷ But whatever the correct explanation, excerpts 46 and 50 give us good reason to question the ending of Apollonius' excerpts.

That includes not only the last section of 49 but also the next to last section, which also is not printed as part of 726A. It runs: θεραπεύει δὲ ἢ καταύλησις καὶ ἓν τι μέρος τοῦ σώματος ἐν ἀλγίματι ὑπάρχει· καταυλούμενου τοῦ σώματος καταύλησις γιγνέσθω ἡμέρας ε' ὡς ἐλάχιστα, καὶ εὐθέως τῇ πρώτῃ ἡμέρᾳ ἐλάττων ὁ πόνος γενήσεται καὶ τῇ δευτέρᾳ, "Playing the aulos also provides therapy if some part of the body is in pain. When the body is being treated with the playing of the aulos, let the playing occur for at least five days, and immediately on the first day the pain will be less and on the second (still less)" (4). Much as the last section takes us back to what has already been said (Thebes, which is mentioned in section 5, is referred to earlier in line 8), so the penultimate section seems to recall earlier material: the mention of "pain being in some part of the body" (sec. 4) recalls the mention of bodily ills (line 3) and in particular the specific mention of sciatica (line 5), which is a localized condition. If there was an earlier example of treating bodily pain (one which has fallen out of the text; see above), then the penultimate section might be drawing on that example while adding a detail like continuing treatment for five days.¹³⁸ And if there was no earlier example, then the

¹³⁶ The correct name of the Chian is problematic. Amigues argues for Eunomus. See Chapter II "The Sources" no. 2.

¹³⁷ Or perhaps he was drawing on an intermediary (e.g., Bolus), who had introduced the explanation in terms of habituation.

¹³⁸ The use of the imperative γιγνέσθω, "let (the playing) occur" suggests a practical directive to someone who might want to attempt a cure using the aulos. That might be evidence of a later addition, but there is no reason why Theophrastus could not have expressed himself in this manner. Or Apollonius could have altered a Theophrastean

penultimate section may have been added by Apollonius to supply an example, though neither sciatica nor any other bodily ill is referred to by name. Some support for this interpretation might be seen in the use of καί in the opening sentence. There we read that playing the aulos “also” provides therapy if some part of the body is in pain. That might suggest that the topic was not covered (or not covered adequately) in what precedes. Perhaps then the section in question is an addition by Apollonius, intended to add what is missing above. But that need not be the case. It may be that Theophrastus, after mentioning sciatica and epilepsy (line 5), put off discussion of these afflictions and turned immediately to mental derangement. Only later did he return to bodily afflictions offering what is reported in the penultimate section of Apollonius’ text. That possibility finds some support in 726B and C. In B Athenaeus explicitly refers to Theophrastus’ *On Inspiration* and speaks of someone playing the aulos over the place, εἰ καταυλήσῃ τις τοῦ τόπου (lines 2–3). That seems to echo καταυλούμενου τοῦ σώματος in Apollonius. And in C Gellius refers to a book of Theophrastus and speaks of pains being diminished, *minui dolores* (line 2–3). That seems to echo ἐλάττων ὁ πόνος γενήσεται in Apollonius.¹³⁹ I have already said that Gellius’ testimony is to be taken seriously, and Athenaeus may be drawing on a good source. Hence, I think we must allow the possibility that section 4 of Apollonius does report Theophrastean material albeit in abbreviated form: e.g., a reference to sciatica has been omitted.¹⁴⁰

report in declarative sentences by introducing an imperative, hoping thereby to engage the reader. Cf. *Amazing Stories* 29, in which Apollonius has changed the grammatical construction by introducing an imperative. See Chapter II “The Sources,” no. 2 on Apollonius, n. 15. Whatever the truth concerning the imperative construction, the phrase καταύλησις γιγνέσθω following immediately upon the words καταυλούμενου τοῦ σώματος strikes me as ugly prose and a sign of abbreviation.

¹³⁹ It also goes well with the use of θεραπεύειν at the beginning of the penultimate section. The verb and cognate noun θεραπεία are used widely of caring for and treating humans, animals and plants, without necessarily effecting a cure. For a striking example, see the Hippocratic *Aphorisms* 6.38, where we are told that it is better not to give treatment, θεραπεύειν, in the case of hidden cancer, for patients who receive treatment die quickly.

¹⁴⁰ The specific reference to five days, ἡμέρας ε΄, might be significant. In *Amazing Stories* 29, where Apollonius also focuses on therapy and adds a reference to time which is missing in Theophrastus, the reference is vague: let the uterus be bathed for several days, πλείονας ἡμέρας. In contrast, the reference to five days is quite specific, perhaps because it was present in Theophrastus. Alternatively five days may have been a widely accepted period of time, which Apollonius added on his own. I leave the issue undecided.

Up to this point I have resisted suggesting that sections 2 and 3 as well as 4 and 5 might not be Theophrastean. I.e., with the words *καθάπερ πρὸς Ἀριστόξενον τὸν μουσικὸν ἐλθόντα*, “just as (someone) going to Aristoxenus the musician” (lines 5–6), Apollonius begins to draw on a different source, perhaps Bolus and in any case someone later than Theophrastus. That author will have described Aristoxenus as “the musician” and gone on to relate the anecdote concerning the Theban. Moreover, the textual disturbance in section 2 may be more severe than is normally imagined. Were the text intact, we would see that the Theophrastean material stops at the end of the first section and that what follows was once a separate report drawn from a different source. Many of Apollonius’ reports are quite brief, so that the length of section 1 (just short of 5 lines) does not tell against seeing section 1 as a complete report, after which Apollonius changes sources and reports an anecdote concerning Aristoxenus. All that seems to me possible, but the mention of ills affecting soul and body in section 1 fits well with what follows in sections 2–4, and the mention of fear and derangement in section 1 seems to introduce the story of the Theban in sections 2–3. Such considerations suggest not separating section 1 from what follows. I despair of any firm conclusion and recommend printing all of *Amazing Stories* 49 (all five sections) in any future edition of the Theophrastean volumes. That would make it easier for the interested reader to assess the evidence and to make his own decision.

3. *Virtue and Vice*

It is generally recognized that there are virtuous individuals who act in ways that are good, and that there are vicious individuals who act in ways that are bad or evil. We may want to say that most people fall somewhere in between, but that does not obscure the fact that virtue and vice are not only human qualities but also the object of praise and blame. In addition, it is commonly held that virtuous individuals have been brought up properly: they have received a sound education not only in academic subjects (reading, writing, mathematics, etc.) but also in morals (a training in values that begins early in childhood and continues through adolescence and beyond). Moreover, most of us recognize that genetics plays a role, so that not all people are born equal. There are differences in academic intelligence (some persons find it easier to read and write, etc.), in temperament (some people are excitable while others are lethargic)

and in inclinations (some are naturally more social and helpful, while others have a stronger need to succeed and to be recognized).

None of the above escaped the notice of the ancient Greeks, who took a keen interest in both genetics and education. I cite Xenophon, who wrote a work on Cyrus the Elder, in which he took account of family origin, nature and education. Cyrus' Persian lineage is said to have included not only kings on both sides but also a connection with the demi-god Perseus on the paternal side. As a result, Cyrus was handsome and endowed with a strong love of mankind, learning and honor.¹⁴¹ In addition, these innate attributes were controlled and refined by an education that was in accordance with Persian law.¹⁴² I also cite Plato, who not only discussed moral education at length but also focused on temperament, recommending that excitable people marry those who are lethargic, so that their offspring are not handicapped by an extreme temperament, one way or the other.¹⁴³ Aristotle, too, recognized the importance of innate attributes. He speaks of virtue of family and tells us that good children are likely to be the offspring of good parents. But he also recognizes the importance of education, stating that the person who is well trained is apt to be a good person.¹⁴⁴ That Theophrastus was of a different mind is nowhere reported and most unlikely. On moral education, see below, Section 4, "Education, Exhortation and Censure" (esp. 465–466, 661–662 and 720–721).

The investigation of emotional response that occurred in the late Platonic Academy (see the introduction to the preceding section) had important consequences for understanding moral virtue in general and for distinguishing between different kinds of virtue. Once emotions like anger and fright had been analyzed in terms of thought and goal-directed behavior, virtues like gentleness/good temper and courage could be understood as proper dispositions to assess correctly the particular situation and to respond in an appropriate manner. The good-tempered individual is one whose angry responses befit the situation. He correctly observes and assesses a slight as unjustified and acts to take suitable revenge. And the courageous individual is one who feels fright on the right occasions.

¹⁴¹ Cyrus is said to have been εἶδος μὲν κάλλιστος, ψυχὴν δὲ φιλάνθρωπóτατος καὶ φιλομαθέστατος καὶ φιλοτιμóτατος.

¹⁴² Xenophon, *The Education of Cyrus* 1.1.6, 1.2.1–2.

¹⁴³ Plato, *Statesman* 307b5–308a9, *Laws* 6 773b1–2.

¹⁴⁴ Aristotle, *On Nobility of Birth* = fr. 92 p. 93.16 R³, *Rhetoric* 1.9 1367b31–32. For fuller remarks concerning Xenophon, Plato and Aristotle, see my article (2009) "Good, Stock, Natural Virtue and Aristotle."

He correctly observes and assesses an imminent danger and responds accordingly, either seeking safety or confronting the danger. As conceived of by Aristotle, the moral virtues are tied to action as are the emotions to which they relate. That is important, for it explains why an emotion like pity may be referred to good character but is not treated as a moral virtue. Another person's suffering does on occasion call for action, but there are times (e.g., an undeserved death has occurred) when pity is appropriate but nothing is done to remedy the situation, because there is nothing that can be done. Something similar can be said of shame. People often feel shame, when they have done something wrong that cannot be remedied. But shame is different from pity in that it cannot be referred to good character without significant qualification. For typically shame is occasioned by something that one should not have done, so that its occurrence involves a lack of virtue. To be sure, shame in young persons is good. They need time to become virtuous, so that shame can be viewed as a sign that they are moving toward virtue. They know right from wrong but still need to acquire and strengthen good habits. Regarding shame, see 453, 469, 470 and 473 with the commentary on these texts.

The virtue of temperance is puzzling, because it is concerned with appetites: hunger, thirst and sexual desire. On one level, these are bodily drives, involving physiological changes, which can be so intense that a person loses control over his behavior. In such cases, we may want to say that the person is not responsible for his actions: he deserves pity and not censure.¹⁴⁵ But the matter is not so simple, for moral education provides training in regard to appetites. Young people are taught that certain sorts of appetitive behavior are acceptable and other sorts are not. When the instruction is effective, young people acquire values that lead them to resist unseemly behavior. Moreover, repeated acts of self-discipline can teach a person to ignore bodily discomfort and may even effect a welcome bodily change, e.g., the stomach shrinks thereby eliminating or at least minimizing episodes of painful hunger. Finally, it is all too easy to overstate the importance of the body in arousing appetite. Thoughts (e.g. that a person is beautiful and worth having) may come first and arouse the body, so that in a particular case it may be difficult to decide which came first. In addition, a thorough moral education will train an individual to assess the beauty of another person primarily as a good

¹⁴⁵ A good example is provided by Plato's *Timaeus*, in which the eponymous interlocutor attributes sexual excess to fluidity of marrow and porosity of bone, which he characterizes as a disease that calls for treatment and not censure (86C3–E3).

(an external/bodily good), which is worthy of admiration. Unlike the intemperate individual, he will not see the other person as a source of pleasure that ought to be pursued, not only on the present occasion but also when any other source presents itself.¹⁴⁶

There are other dispositions that are of importance to society but differ significantly from those already mentioned. I am thinking of social dispositions like friendliness, truthfulness and wittiness. In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle groups them together as virtues concerned with human relations in speech and action (4.6–8 1126b11–1128b9). The friendly individual is presented as one who is disposed to do whatever he does in an agreeable manner quite apart from feelings or emotions of personal affection.¹⁴⁷ Similarly, the truthful man is marked not by a particular emotion but by a mode of interaction. He is neither boastful nor overly self-deprecating. Rather, he presents himself as he is.¹⁴⁸ The witty individual is more complicated. He is disposed to interact with charming versatility. He has a playful, dexterous manner that is exhibited in tactful pokes directed at other people. He also accepts tactful pokes directed at himself, and to the extent that he enjoys (laughs or smiles at) such pokes he cannot be easily dissociated from emotional response.¹⁴⁹ That Theophrastus followed Aristotle and took an interest (perhaps a greater interest) in dispositions concerned with social interaction is certain. See the commentary on the titles Ἠθικοὶ χαρακτῆρες, *Ethical Characters* (436 no. 4) and Ὀμιλητικός, (*Dialogue*) concerning Social Interaction (436 no. 32) as well as on 452–455.¹⁵⁰

Finally, for both Aristotle and Theophrastus moral virtue, ἡθικὴ ἀρετή, implies practical wisdom, φρόνησις, and vice versa (449A.32), so that being virtuous seems to be a perfection toward which a person can progress, but to which he cannot lay claim until he has acquired both

¹⁴⁶ Cf. Aristotle, *NE* 7.3 1146b22–23.

¹⁴⁷ At *NE* 4.6 1126b12, Aristotle tells us that the disposition of friendliness (which lacks its own name) is different from friendship in that it is without emotion, ἀνευ πάθους.

¹⁴⁸ In saying this, I do not want to deny that one could conceive of an emotion concerned with true and false assertions and then posit a disposition related to this emotion. But if such an emotion is logically possible, it is generally ignored and more importantly finds no place in Aristotle's remarks concerning truthfulness.

¹⁴⁹ On laughter as finding something funny, see *Aristotle on Emotion*, 2nd ed. 2002 pp. 120–126.

¹⁵⁰ To keep these introductory remarks brief, I have ignored the fact that the *Eudemian Ethics* differs from the *Nicomachean* in that it denies that dispositions like friendliness, truthfulness and wittiness are virtues (3.7 1234a23–24). See above, the commentary on the (*Dialogue*) concerning Social Interaction (436 no. 32).

the several moral virtues and practical wisdom not only in regard to means end deliberation but also in regard to understanding how the virtues relate to each other and why they are necessary for a happy life. So understood virtue is an all or nothing disposition. A person may progress towards it, be well along the way and still fall short. That may suggest Stoic doctrine, according to which the sage alone is truly virtuous. Other people may be making progress toward virtue. They are προκόπτοντες, but until they arrive (which is unlikely), they are stupid and depraved.¹⁵¹ The comparison is enticing, but there is a significant difference between Aristotle's view and that of the Stoics. Whereas Aristotle recognizes a middle ground between being virtuous and vicious, the Stoics do not: a person is either one or the other; there is nothing in the middle. Applying Aristotle's account of opposites in *Categories* 10, we can say that both he and the Stoics view virtue and vice as contraries, ἐναντία, but Aristotle thinks of virtue and vice as contraries that allow for something in the middle, τούτων ἔστι τι ἀνὰ μέσον (12a10–11). It is not necessary that a person be good or bad, σπουδαῖος or φαῦλος, just or unjust, δίκαιος or ἄδικος, any more than a person must be black or white. Only in the case of black or white, there are names for intermediaries, e.g. yellow and gray. In the case, of good and bad, just and unjust, there are no readily available names so that the intermediaries, middle conditions, are referred to by negative expressions: “neither good nor bad,” οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακόν, and “neither just nor unjust,” οὔτε δίκαιον οὔτε ἄδικον (12a13–25).¹⁵² In contrast, the Stoics view virtue and vice in the way that Aristotle views

¹⁵¹ Plutarch, *On Common Conceptions* 10 1036A = SVF vol. 2 pp. 143–144 no. 539.

¹⁵² Aristotle speaks of a person progressing toward being better, εἰς τὸ βελτίω εἶναι, and becoming more easily changed toward virtue, εὐκίνητοτερος πρὸς ἀρετήν. He is no longer worthless and given time he will be able to make a complete change from φαῦλος to σπουδαῖος (13a22–31). While on this journey, he is neither vicious nor virtuous, but somewhere in between. He may have acquired many good moral principles but lack others. He may need to improve his practical deliberation or on occasion he may exhibit moral weakness. But needing improvement is not to be construed as vicious or even less vicious. In the *Categories*, vicious and virtuous are distinguished from contraries like odd and even, which have no middle ground (12a6–8). Nor are they presented as an asymmetrical pair, in which one member is a limit, i.e., virtuous, while the other admits comparison, i.e., more or less vicious. Rather they are two polar opposites, between which there is an intermediate that lacks a name or names. Aristotle recommends speaking of what is neither good nor bad, οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακόν (12a24).—Caveat: in other contexts, Aristotle does not hold to his recommendation: he uses “good” to characterize persons who fall short of perfect virtue without being bad. An example is the discussion of friendship, in which Aristotle says that in friendships based on virtue, the parties may be equally good or one may be better than the other (8.13 1162a36–b1), and that good people become better through their interaction (9.12 1172a11–12). See the introduction

sickness and health. There is no middle ground so that a person must be one or other (12a5–6). And that holds even as a person progresses toward virtue. That Theophrastus aligned himself with Aristotle is not to be doubted.

449A Stobaeus, *Anthology* 2.7.20 (vol. 2 p. 140.7–142.13 Wachsmuth)

Literature: Petersen (1854) pp. 66–73; Brandis (1860) pp. 357–358; Diels (1879) p. 71; Zeller (1879) vol. 2.2 p. 860; Heylbut (1888) p. 196; von der Mühlh (1909) pp. 29–32; Strache (1909 pp. 57–60); Arnim (1924) pp. 124–141, (1926) pp. 63–69, (1929b) pp. 50–53; Kapp (1927) pp. 73–81; Walzer (1929) pp. 12, 124–125, 172, 211–215; Mansion (1931) pp. 80–86; Dirlmeier (1937) pp. 4–12; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1491–1492, 1499–1500; Moraux (1973) pp. 379–390; Donini (1975) p. 344; Kenny (1978) pp. 12–15; Fortenbaugh (1983) pp. 203–212, (1984) pp. 167–174; Wehrli (1983) pp. 492, 509; Halm (1983) p. 21, (1990) pp. 2937, 2981, 2992; Wehrli-Wöhrle (2004) p. 548; Millett (2007) p. 29; Tsouni (2010) p. 45

Text **449A** is found in Book 2, Chapter 7 of Stobaeus' *Anthology*. Chapter 7 carries the heading Περί τοῦ ἠθικοῦ εἵδους τῆς φιλοσοφίας, "On the Ethical Branch of Philosophy." It begins a series of excerpts that are focused on ethics and continue through the next book. The chapter divides into three parts that have been labeled A, B and C by David Halm (1990) p. 2945. Part A, which carries no heading, functions as a kind of theoretical introduction to the subject and its several topics (2.7.1–4 p. 37.18–57.12 W). Part B carries the heading "Zeno and the other Stoics" (2.7.5 p. 57.13–116.18), while Part C has as its heading "Aristotle and other Peripatetics" (2.7. 13–26 p. 116.19–152.25). We can be certain that a portion of Part C, i.e., 2.7.17 is drawn from Arius Didymus¹⁵³ and can assume with confidence that all or at least almost all of Part C goes back to Arius. That Parts A and B also go back to Arius is likely but not certain. Moreover, the identity of Arius, his provenance and dates are uncertain, though there are good reasons to place him in the middle of the first century BC. See above, "The Sources" no. 39 on Stobaeus.

to Section 13 on "Friendship." See also Aristotle's use of αὔξειν and αὔξησις at *NE* 2.2 1104a18, 27 together with Stobaeus, *Anthology* 2.7 p. 138.15–20 W. In these passages virtue is a disposition that admits increase. That agrees with ordinary language.

¹⁵³ We find 2.7.17 repeated in Book 4.39.28, where it is said to be taken from the *Epitome* of Didymus.

Our concern is with Part C and in particular with a segment that mentions Theophrastus, focuses on moral virtue, ἡθικὴ ἀρετή, as a mean disposition between two vicious dispositions and concludes with brief remarks on the reciprocal implication that exists between moral virtue and practical wisdom, φρόνησις (2.7.20 p. 140.7–142.13). Earlier in Part C, the subject of virtue has already received considerable attention. Toward the beginning, the division of the soul into logical and alogical parts, τὸ λογικόν and τὸ ἄλογον, is made the basis of a distinction between two kinds of virtue: one concerned with deliberation and reflection, the other with action and choice (2.7.13 p. 117.11–118.4). After that virtue is discussed in relation to οἰκείωσις, “appropriation” (p. 118.5–124.13).¹⁵⁴ Later virtue is said to be a symphony between reason and emotion, λόγος and πάθος (2.7.15 p. 128.17–19), between reason and the alogical, τὸ ἄλογον (p. 128.20–25). Still later the division of the soul into logical and alogical parts is revisited:¹⁵⁵ to the former are assigned *inter alia* practical wisdom and theoretical wisdom, φρόνησις and σοφία, and to the latter the moral virtues including temperance, justice and courage, σωφροσύνη, δικαιοσύνη and ἀνδρεία (2.7.20 p. 137.13–23).¹⁵⁶ In what follows, attention is focused on the moral virtues. They are said to be destroyed by deficiency and excess, and to be increased by moderation

¹⁵⁴ In adopting the translation “appropriation,” I am following Sharples (1996) p. 101, who comments that οἰκείωσις is “a term with no very natural English equivalent.” A different term οἰκειότης is not to be confused with οἰκείωσις. The former refers to natural relationships that are reciprocal. In our collection of Theophrastean texts, it is used of the relationship that exists between humans and animals (530.21). The latter is a developmental theory that is Stoic in origin. Its presence in Part C illustrates how Stoic notions had become part of Peripatetic thought in the course of the Hellenistic period. For an extensive and balanced treatment that takes account of earlier literature, see Moraux (1973) pp. 316–350.

¹⁵⁵ Here the soul is referred to as bipartite, διμερής, which is immediately qualified by the phrase πρὸς τὴν παροῦσαν θεωρίαν, “with regard to the present theoretical investigation” (p. 137.17). The qualification is important for it recognizes implicitly that in another context a different division is preferable: e.g., in biology Aristotle divides the soul into the faculties of nutrition, sensation and thought. Theophrastus was of like mind. For further discussion of Aristotle’s biological psychology in relation to his ethical dichotomy, i.e., the alogical and logical parts of the soul, see Aristotle on Emotion (1975a, repr. 2002) pp. 26–30.

¹⁵⁶ The fact that σωφροσύνη has pride of place (p. 137.22) should be noted, for it will again have pride of place in the Theophrastean text 449A.9 (p. 140.18). But in the earlier passage it is followed by δικαιοσύνη, while in the Theophrastean passage it is followed by προαίτις. And soon after the earlier passage and before we come to Theophrastus, σωφροσύνη again has pride of place, but this time it is followed by ἀνδρεία (p. 138.9). That discourages drawing any grand conclusion, but the repeated priority of σωφροσύνη suggests a shared interest with 436 no. 9a and c. See below, this comment.

(p. 137.24–138.20).¹⁵⁷ A necessary connection with pleasure and pain is asserted (p. 138.21–26). A distinction is drawn between emotions, capacities and dispositions, πάθη, δυνάμεις and ἕξεις, and the moral virtues are shown to be praiseworthy dispositions (p. 139.1–18). They constitute a mean between extreme dispositions (vicious dispositions), and a mean that is relative to us, τὸ μέσον τὸ πρὸς ἡμᾶς, (i.e., relative to the individual and his circumstances). It is said to be best, βέλτιστον, for it accords with what knowledge and reason enjoin, ὥς ἡ ἐπιστήμη κελεύει καὶ ὁ λόγος (p. 139.19–140.6).

449A follows. We are again told that the mean relative to us is best (ἄριστον [line 1] replaces βέλτιστον [p. 139.18–19]), after which Theophrastus is introduced in order to elucidate the matter. He is reported to have cited meetings, ἐντυχίαι (line 2), in which one person says much, another a little and a third only what is necessary. In this way the third lays hold upon due measure, which is the mean relative to us,¹⁵⁸ for it is determined by us by means of reason, αὕτη γὰρ ὑφ' ἡμῶν ὠρίζεται τῷ λόγῳ (lines 1–4). Here λόγος picks up the earlier reference to reason (p. 139.24), but it also looks forward to the next sentence in which the noun again occurs (line 6). In addition the verb ὀρίζεσθαι, “to be determined,” replaces κελεύειν (p. 139.24) and looks forward to next sentence in which it recurs (line 5). Left unsaid is the fact that the next sentence is word for word¹⁵⁹ Aristotle’s definition of moral virtue in *Nicomachean Ethics* 2.6: ἡ ἀρετὴ ἕξις προαιρετική, ἐν μεσότητι οὖσα τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ὠρισμένη λόγῳ καὶ ὥς ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος ὀρίσειεν, “Virtue is a disposition to choose, being in the mean which is relative to us, determined by reason and such as the practically wise man would determine it” (1106b36–1107a2). There is no reason to believe

¹⁵⁷ On increasing virtue, see above n. 7 ad fin. and below, the introduction to Section 13 on “Friendship”

¹⁵⁸ In the Greek manuscripts, this clause runs αὕτη (ἡ) μεσότης πρὸς ἡμᾶς (the beginning of line 4). In Wachsmuth’s edition, on the basis of conjectures by Usener and Meurer, the clause has been expanded so that it runs: αὕτη (ἡ) μεσότης πρὸς ἡμᾶς (ἄριστον). Moraux (1973) pp. 382–383 n. 211 has argued correctly that the additions are unnecessary and they have not been printed in 449A.

¹⁵⁹ “Word for word” might be deemed overstatement, for in line 6 of 449A we have printed καὶ ὥς ἂν, which is the reading of NE 1107a1, (the reading of the codices and not the OCT of Bywater), The Stobaeian codices F and P read δὲ ὥς ἂν. In regard to content, the difference is minor (a variation in conjunction), but from a grammatical point of view the reading of F and P is best rejected, for δὲ normally comes second in its clause. It might be suggested that the clause to which δὲ belongs begins with ὠρισμένη. The words ὠρισμένη λόγῳ are taken as a unit, so that δὲ is not misplaced. But that would be a stretch that is best ignored.

that Theophrastus found fault with Aristotle's definition. He undoubtedly accepted it, and in some context he may have made it his own. If he did, then the introduction of the definition need not signal a shift in Arius' source. But that cannot be demonstrated and there are other possibilities. Arius himself may have drawn on Aristotle and introduced the definition without naming his source. Or perhaps Aristotle's name disappeared through abridgment or careless copying. Or perhaps the definition began as a marginal note and was later introduced into the text. I leave the matter open.¹⁶⁰

As stated, Theophrastus is cited to elucidate the mean relative to us: one person talks too much, another too little and a third person says what is necessary (lines 2–3). That this interpretation of the text is correct seems to me certain, but it does depend upon an emendation. In line 3, we have followed Wachsmuth and read μόνα instead of μή. So emended, the text reads οὗτος δὲ αὐτὰ ἃ ἔδει μόνα τὸν καιρὸν ἔλαβεν, “but a third person (says) only what is necessary and so lays hold upon due measure.” Zeller pp. 860–861 n. 1 wanted to print the received text: μή instead of μόνα, i.e., μή τὸν καιρὸν ἔλαβεν, so that we are offered a third case of failing to achieve the mean relative to us. The words of Zeller's third person are indeed less than those of the first person and more than those of the second person, but they are not what the third person ought to have said given his special circumstances (p. 139.15–16, 25–140.1). Zeller is thinking of Aristotle's distinction between the mean κατὰ αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα and the mean πρὸς ἡμᾶς (NE 1106a26–32). The former is a point on a continuum equidistant from the two ends and the same for everyone. The latter is not a simple mid-point and not the same for everyone. This distinction is of importance for Peripatetic ethics, and in the Theophrastean example all three cases are concerned with the mean πρὸς ἡμᾶς. The man who says too much is not someone who fails to hit the mid-point between two fixed ends; rather, he is someone who in relation to his own situation engages in excess. We should think of the Theophrastean *Characters* and the sketch of the garrulous man, the ἀδολέσχης, who sits down beside someone whom he does not know and engages in unbroken chatter (3.2). In another situation, e.g., when

¹⁶⁰ Arnim (1924) p. 133 suggests that the definition came to Theophrastus from a collection of definitions. From there it made its way into a Theophrastean survey of ethics, which may have been known to Arius. That cannot be proven and strikes me as too complicated. If pushed, I am prepared to agree with Moraux (1973) 383, 388 that the definition is an interruption inserted by Arius.

sitting next to a friend, unbroken chatter might for some reason or other be comforting, but what Theophrastus describes in the *Characters* is an excess of the mean πρὸς ἡμᾶς. Similarly in 449A, the focus is on the mean πρὸς ἡμᾶς. The first two men fail to achieve the mean πρὸς ἡμᾶς. The third individual gets it right.

Arnim (1926) p. 65 recognizes that prior to 449A the mean relative to us has been introduced (p. 139.23–24) and that the Theophrastean example is intended to elucidate the mean relative to us. But he thinks that simply mentioning what is necessary, ἃ ἔδει, and due measure, ὁ καιρὸς (line 3), need to be clarified by means of an example like that of the famous wrestler Milo and the person who has only recently taken up the sport. A skilled trainer will not give each the same amount of food. Indeed a particular quantity of food that is too little for Milo may be too much for the beginner (Aristotle, *NE* 2.6 1106a36–b5). Theophrastus would agree, and he may have followed up his reference to what is necessary and due measure (line 3) with a suitable example. It may have been omitted by Arius or his source or through subsequent abridgment. But whether Theophrastus did or did not add an example, he could have done so. I cite 623, in which Plutarch, drawing on Theophrastus, tells how the general Philocles washed himself, put on a splendid robe, and going first, led his defeated soldiers to execution (*Lysander* 13.1–2). See also 622, in which Plutarch cites Theophrastus, who said that a general should die the death of a general and not that of an ordinary targeteer (*Sertorius* 13.6).

The occurrence of λαμβάνειν in the aorist tense, ἔλαβεν (line 3) is of some interest. It may be reporting a fact. But in the absence of any indication who might be the subject of ἔλαβεν, and given the reference to meetings in the plural, ἐν ταῖς ἐντυχίαις (lines 1–2), ἔλαβεν could be a gnomic aorist.¹⁶¹ Hence, we have used the present tense in our translation. At the time of writing *Quellen*, I found the latter possibility more likely, but I now believe the former more likely or at least no less likely. For the aorist could be the remainder of an actual example that Theophrastus used to elucidate the mean relative to us.

¹⁶¹ If the plural expression ἐν ταῖς ἐντυχίαις is understood to be generalizing and not referring to specific meetings, then a gnomic aorist seems quite possible. But if the example has been removed from its context (see below), then we have little reason to decide the issue one way or the other. For another possible occurrence of the gnomic aorist, see 445.2 and the commentary on that text, above Section 2.

The reference to meetings, ἐντυχίαι, could be to social intercourse, one-on-one meetings or larger gatherings that may or may not be informal in character. That is the understanding of Arnim (1924) p. 124 and Walzer p. 124.¹⁶² But we should compare, e.g., Plutarch, *How to Tell a Flatterer from a Friend* 26 67C: ὡς Πλάτων ἐν ταῖς πρὸς Διονύσιον ὑποψίαις καὶ διαφοραῖς ἡτήσατο καιρὸν ἐντυχίας, “As Plato, involved in suspicions and disagreements with Dionysius, requested a time for a meeting,” and Theophrastus, *Characters* 1.3: καὶ τοῖς ἐντυγχάνειν κατὰ σπουδὴν βουλομένοις προστάξει ἐπανελθεῖν, “and to those who wish urgently to meet he instructs (them) to come back later.” These texts make clear that ἐντυχία is not limited to meetings that are social and often casual. Rather, it may refer to earnest encounters involving serious business, which present an occasion for saying too much and too little. See Dirlmeier (1937) p. 6. The word ἐντυχία is not found in Aristotle. In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, ὁμιλία, occurs in the sense of social interaction (4.6 1126b11, 31, 4.8 1127b34, 1128b2, 9). In the *Magna Moralia*, ἔντευξις occurs (1.28 1192b31). Heeren found the text of Stobaeus so suspicious that he proposed the emendation ἐν ταῖς περὶ εὐτυχίας. Although Usener (1858) p. 9 followed Heeren and saw in the emended text a reference to the work *Περὶ εὐτυχίας* (436 no. 14), no one today accepts the emendation.

The initial Theophrastean material (lines 1–4) is followed by Aristotle’s definition of moral virtue, which is quoted verbatim (lines 5–6). The occurrence is puzzling and has been discussed above. Here I comment briefly on what comes next: εἶτα παραθέμενος τινὰς¹⁶³ συζυγίας ἀκολούθως τῷ ὑφηγητῇ, σκοπεῖν ἔπειτα καθ’ ἕκαστα ἐπάγων ἐπειράθη τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον· ἐλήφθησαν δὲ παραδειγμάτων χάριν αἶδε, “Then setting out several sets of coordinates in conformity with his teacher, next adducing individual cases, he tried to investigate (the matter) in

¹⁶² Arnim and Walzer speak of *gesellschaftlicher Verkehr* and *gesellschaftliche Unterhaltung*.

¹⁶³ Moraux (1973) p. 380 n. 204 chooses to print τινὰς as an enclitic without accent. That is not so much wrong as perhaps second best. An enclitic may keep its accent for emphasis (Goodwin and Gulick, *Greek Grammar* [1930] p. 35 no. 161), and in the case before us there is reason for emphasis. The list of coordinates that follows offers *some* coordinates, τινὰς συζυγίας, but not all. In particular, no social dispositions are represented despite the fact that talking too much, too little and getting it right has been mentioned only a few lines earlier (lines 2–3) and that the list of coordinates in the *NE* includes not only social dispositions but also those concerned with small honors (2.7 1107b25–30) and those involving indignation, envy and spite (1108a35–b6). See also the list of coordinates in the *EE* (2.3 1220b38–1221a12).

the following manner. For the sake of example the following were chosen” (lines 7–9). It is I think quite certain that the focus is again squarely on Theophrastus, who is said to have followed his teacher, ἀκολουθῶς τῷ ὑφηγητῇ, i.e., Aristotle. Spengel wanted to emend the first sentence (reading σκοπῶν instead of σκοπεῖν and ἐπάγειν instead of ἐπάγων); his conjectures are printed by Wachsmuth. But they are unnecessary, so that we have printed the received text. See Moraux (1973) p. 380 n. 204.

The second sentence, announces the list of coordinates that follows. The feminine plural αἶδε (line 9) picks up συζυγίας in the first sentence (line 7) and looks forward to the list. Of special interest is the similarity of the second sentence to *Eudemian Ethics* 2.3 1220b35: εἰλήφθω δὴ παραδείγματος χάριν. It is possible that Arius on his own introduced a reminiscence of the *EE*, but in my judgment it is more likely that Theophrastus expressed himself in a way similar to what we read in the *EE* and that Arius, who is focused on Theophrastus, is reporting what he found in some Theophrastean text. In other words, with ἐλήφθησαν we should understand ὑπὸ Θεοφράστου.¹⁶⁴ Soon I shall call attention to other details that suggest a close relationship between Theophrastus and the *EE*.

The list of coordinates (lines 9–11) is straightforward. In line with the Aristotelian definition of moral virtue, we are presented with seven mean dispositions. There is a lacuna after δικαιοσύνη (line 12); the other six are followed by two related dispositions, of which one is an excess and the other a deficiency. At the conclusion of the list, we read, “Of these dispositions, some are bad on account of excess or deficiency in regard to emotions; others are good, obviously on account of being mean dispositions” (lines 13–14). The words are not in indirect discourse. They may have been written by Theophrastus (Arnim [1924] pp. 134, 136), but more likely they were written by Arius or an intermediate source (Kapp p. 73).

¹⁶⁴ Arnim believes that the phrase τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον (end of the first sentence) introduces a quotation and that this quotation is drawn from a work of Theophrastus that is based on ethical lectures by Aristotle. Accordingly, Arnim (1924) p. 134 wants to understand a reference to Aristotle, ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους, with the verb ἐλήφθησαν. To my knowledge, Arnim’s view (which is more complicated than I have indicated) has found no supporters. See Kapp pp. 73–74 and Moraux pp. 388–390 with n. 236, in which Moraux agrees with Dirlmeier (1937) p. 5 that ὑπὸ Θεοφράστου is to be understood with ἐλήφθησαν. For further discussion, I refer the interested reader to Kapp, Moraux and my discussion in *Quellen* (1984) pp. 170–171.

There follows a discussion (lines 14–30) that focuses on the persons who exhibit the dispositions just listed. Four lacunae mar the discussion: one in the discussion of the gentle man (line 20), one in that of the courageous man (line 23) and two in that of the generous man (lines 25–26). They are not large and do not impeded our understanding of the discussion. It is clear that we are not dealing with a word-for-word excerpt. The discussion is presented in indirect discourse and is greatly abbreviated. Only the first part, the discussion of the temperate individual, reflects in some degree the details of the Theophrastean original. And even here the epitomator's formula οὔτε ... οὔτε occurs (line 15; cf. lines 20, 22–23, 24, 26, 27, 29).

In the list of coordinates, temperance is given pride of place (σωφροσύνη line 9), as is the temperate man in the discussion that follows (σώφρων line 14). That is of some interest, for it puts an emphasis on temperance that is not present in any of the three Aristotelian ethical treatises. When one considers that Diogenes' catalogue of Theophrastean writings lists a work entitled *On Education* or *On Virtues* or *On Temperance*, one is tempted to see a close connection between 449A and the work listed by Diogenes. See Chapter III "Titles of Books" no. 9a–c.

Also interesting is the fact that in 449A no vice is said to be nameless, ἀνόνομα. Since the *Nicomachean* and *Eudemian Ethics* expressly mention nameless vices (*NE* 2.7 1107b2, 1108a17; *EE* 2.3 1221a3, 40), but the *Magna Moralia* does not, one is tempted to see a close relationship between 449A and the *MM*. The matter is, however, complicated by the fact that only the list of coordinates in 449A gives names to all the vices as well as all the virtues. In the subsequent discussion of persons who exhibit the several dispositions, the focus is on virtuous individuals. Without Spengel's addition to the text (line 20), only the person marked by excessive appetite is named; he is the ἀκόλαστος (line 17). The person who is totally lacking in appetite seems to be described and not named by ἀνεπιθύμητος.¹⁶⁵ Be that as it may, it is clear that the discussion of persons is a brief summary of what was once a much fuller discussion. That

¹⁶⁵ At *NE* 2.7 1107b6–8 and 3.11 1119a10–11, Aristotle says that such persons hardly occur and for that reason lack a name. In the former passage, he allows that they might be called ἀναίσθητοι. At *EE* 2.3 1221a21 the deficient person is called ἀναίσθητος without comment. At 3.2 1230b13–15, we are told that people differ in how they refer to persons who are unmoved by pleasure. Some call such people ἀναίσθητοι, while others use different names of the same sort.

leaves open the possibility that in the original text Theophrastus allowed that not all the vices and vicious individuals have names.¹⁶⁶

In 449A, σαλακωνία, “extravagance,” is mentioned as the excess coordinate with μεγαλοπρέπεια, “magnificence” (line 12), and ἀναλγησία, “lack of feeling,” is mentioned as the deficiency coordinate with πραότης, “gentleness” (line 10). In both cases our text distances itself from the *Nicomachean Ethics*, in which σαλακωνία does not occur at all and ἀναλγησία does not occur in connection with πραότης.¹⁶⁷ In contrast, 449A is nearer to the *Eudemian Ethics*, in which the adjective σαλάκων is used of the extravagant person coordinate with the μικροπρεπής and the μεγαλοπρεπής (2.3 1221a35, 3.6 1233b1), and the noun ἀναλγησία and the adjective ἀνάλγητος are used in connection with πραότης and the πρᾶος (2.3 1220b38, 1221a16).¹⁶⁸ We should, however, take note of the fact that in the later expanded discussion of the moral virtues, the *EE* exhibits a certain uneasiness regarding the usage of σαλάκων (3.6 1233a38–b1; see the immediately following comment on 449B), and the earlier use of ἀνάλγητος seems to be forgotten, at least in regard to πραότης. It occurs in the discussion of temperance, where temperate people are said not to be ἀνάλγητοι, unfeeling or insensitive, in regard to pleasure (3.2 1231a33). That contrasts with the *Magna Moralia* which exhibits no caution in the use of ἀνάλγητος (1.22 1191b34) and σαλακωνεία and σαλάκων (1.26 1192a37, b2). How one interprets these facts is problematic, but it seems to me not implausible that the *NE* represents the earliest stage, the *EE* the middle and the *MM* the last in a continuous development. The use of σαλάκων and ἀναλγησία in the *EE* is not influenced by earlier usage in the *MM* (as Arnim [1924] p. 137 would have it; cf. Dirlmeier [1958] p. 296); it is rather a significant step in the direction of the *MM*. And if that is correct, our Theophrastean text finds an intelligible place between the *EE* and the *MM*.

Relevant to what has just been suggested is the fact that not only in 449A but also in the *Eudemian Ethics*, the insensitive man, ἀναίσθη-

¹⁶⁶ It should, however, be acknowledged that Theophrastus was under no obligation to address all the issues that interested Aristotle. On occasion he may have thought that Aristotle's remarks were adequate and therefore chose to say nothing, or he may have found an issue unimportant and passed over it without comment.

¹⁶⁷ The noun ἀναλγησία is mentioned in regard to enduring painful misfortune (*NE* 1.10 1100b32), and the adjective ἀνάλγητος occurs in the discussion of ἀνδρεία and the coordinate vices (3.7 1115b26). See Arnim (1924) p. 138.

¹⁶⁸ Caveat: in the Loeb edition, Rackham has altered the text, so that ἀναλγησία and ἀνάλγητος have been replaced by ἀσργησία and ἀόργητος.

τος, is compared with a stone (line 16 and 1221a23). In addition, in the *NE* φιλοτιμία and ἀφιλοτιμία are coordinate with an unnamed virtue (2.7 1107b24–1108a1, 4.4 1125b1–25), but in the *EE*, 449A and the *MM* they are ignored. Also, in the *EE* and 449A justice receives attention in both the list of coordinates and in the subsequent discussion (*EE* 2.3 1221a4, 23–24; lines 11, 23–25). There are, of course differences. First, the Eudemian list uses the word δίκαιον instead of δικαιοσύνη (1212a4). Second, the Eudemian discussion concentrates on the two vices, so that the virtue/virtuous person is not mentioned (1221a23–24). Third, the text of 449A has suffered corruption, so that the names of the vices coordinate with justice no longer appear (line 11). Fourth, 449A adds an explanation of ἴσον as proportional equality (lines 23–25). Finally in the later, fuller discussion of the individual virtues in the third book of the *EE*, justice is not found.¹⁶⁹ Nevertheless, I find the points of agreement between 449A and the *EE* significant. In both, justice is treated as mean between two vices (lines 11, 24; *EE* 2.4 122a4). In particular, both recognize a deficiency: the *EE* speaks of the ζημιώδης, who rarely seeks to make a profit: ὁ μηδαμόθεν, ἀλλ' ἢ ὀλιγαχόθεν (1221a23–24). 449A speaks of τὸν (ἑαυτῷ νέμοντα) τὸ ἔλαττον (line 24). Both have what the *NE* lacks: a coordinate vice, that shows itself in regularly in taking less than one's fair share.

Here it may be noted that the *EE* suggests a possible reason why the Theophrastean list of coordinate virtues and vices and the following discussion of persons who exhibit these dispositions (lines 9–30) makes no mention of social dispositions like truthfulness, wittiness and friendliness. In the *EE*, social dispositions are said to be praiseworthy, but they are explicitly said not to be virtues or vices (3.7 1234a24–25). We know that Theophrastus had a keen interest in dispositions of this kind (think of the *Characters* as well as the opening reference to garrulous behavior [line 2]) and can imagine that he was so impressed by the special status of these dispositions that he chose not to mention them in the list of coordinates and the subsequent discussion.

The final paragraph of 449A addresses the relationship between moral virtue, ἠθικὴ ἀρετή, and practical wisdom, φρόνησις (lines 31–37). Arnim (1926) p. 68 thinks that it reports Theophrastus' own words. He does not claim certainty, but he cites three considerations in support of

¹⁶⁹ Since the third book seems to ignore the fact that the word ἀνάληγτος has been used in the second book (2.3 1221a16 [see above]), one might question the unity of the *EE*.

his view. The first is the obvious connection in content with what precedes. The man of practical wisdom was mentioned in the Aristotelian definition of moral virtue (line 6), so that a discussion of practical wisdom in relation to moral virtue is expected.¹⁷⁰ The second ground is the formal connection through τοιοῦτο μὲν τὸ τῶν ἠθικῶν ἀρετῶν εἶδος, “Such is the form of the moral virtues” (line 31). The connection is undeniable, but it need not be what Theophrastus wrote. It could equally well be the work of Arius or an intermediate source. The third reason, which Arnim rates most highly, is the use of direct discourse. In my judgment, this use tells against Arnim. In what immediately precedes, Arius has reported Theophrastean material in indirect discourse. The shift to direct discourse is more likely to signal the end of Theophrastean material than an accurate report in Theophrastus’ own words. Furthermore, the words ἀντακολουθία and εἰδοποιεῖν are not Theophrastean; rather, they are Stoic in origin.¹⁷¹ Nevertheless, there is nothing in this final paragraph that contradicts the teaching of Theophrastus. The paragraph can be Theophrastean, even if it is not copied directly from some Theophrastean work.

Reciprocal implication, ἀντακολουθία, is said to exist between moral virtue and practical reason, but not in the same way, οὐχ ὁμοίως (lines 32–33). The idea is the following: Moral virtue is necessarily dependent on, i.e., conceptually tied to practical wisdom, so that practical wisdom is mentioned in the definition of moral virtue. Hence, Aristotle’s definition of moral virtue: a mean disposition that is determined through reason and practical wisdom (lines 5–6). In contrast, practical wisdom is not conceptually tied to moral virtue. It is only because practical wisdom is a ἕξις ἀληθῆς μετὰ λόγου πρακτικὴ περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπῳ ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακά, “a truthful disposition to act rationally regarding things good and evil for a man” (*NE* 6.5 1140b5–6, cf. b20–21); a ἕξις βουλευτικὴ καὶ πρακτικὴ ἀγαθῶν καὶ καλῶν ἢ (ἀγαθὰ καὶ) καλά, “a deliberative disposition productive of actions that are good and noble *qua* good and noble” (Stobaeus p. 145.19–21) and because men of moral virtue do

¹⁷⁰ Cf. Zeller p. 860 n. 1. At risk of being picky, I would prefer to say “might be expected,” for while the mention of the man of practical wisdom might prompt some discussion of practical wisdom, it is not the case that every word in a definition always calls for explanation. Moreover, the definition is that of Aristotle and may be a foreign element in the Theophrastean context, perhaps introduced by Arius. See above.

¹⁷¹ See H. Meurer, *Peripateticorum philosophia moralis secundum Stobaeum enarratur* (Weimar 1859) p. 15 n. 91 and Moraux (1937) p. 386.

what is good and noble (*NE* 2.3 1104b28; *Rhet.* 1.9 1366b11–12) that the man of practical wisdom is said to be a person of moral virtue.¹⁷²

449B Hesychius, *Lexicon*, on *salakônisai* (no. 100, vol. 4 p. 5.20–22 Schmidt, ed. 1862)

Literature: Heylbut (1888) p. 196; Walzer (1929) pp. 118, 125; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 174–175; Millett (2007) p. 120 n. 12

Text **449B** is taken from Hesychius' *Lexicon*, in which it is the third of three entries (no. 98–100) concerning cognate words. The first runs: σαλάκων· ὁ πτωχὸς ἀλαζών, "*salakôn*: the boastful beggar." The second runs: σαλακωνία· ἡ ἐν πενίᾳ ἀλαζωνεία, "*salakônia*: boasting in poverty." The third, which is longer, runs: σαλακωνίσαι· σαλακωνεῦσαι. ἔλεγον τοὺς διαθρυπτομένους σαλάκωνας· ἀπο τοῦ ἀβροῶς καὶ μετὰ θρύψεως βαδίζειν. ὁ δὲ Θεόφραστος σαλάκωνά φησιν εἶναι τὸν δαπανῶντα, ὅπου μὴ δεῖ, "*salakônisai*: *salakôneusai*. They used to call people who give themselves airs *salakônes* (pretentious), from stepping delicately and with daintiness. But Theophrastus says that the man who spends money where it is not right (to do so) is *salakôn* (extravagant)."¹⁷³

The first two entries concern nouns, of which the first characterizes a person in terms of his behavior, "the boastful beggar," while the second refers to the behavior that characterizes him, "boasting in poverty." The third entry, which is our special concern, is more interesting. It begins with the verb σαλακωνίζειν. Hesychius cites the verb in the aorist tense, σαλακωνίσαι, instead of in the present. That reflects Hesychius' practice of citing words in the form in which he finds them in his sources.¹⁷⁴ There follows the cognate verb σαλακωνεῦσαι, also in the aorist. Presumably we are to understand the two verbs as synonyms (line 1). After that we are told that people who give themselves airs are called *salakônes* from the way they walk, i.e., in a delicate and dainty manner. Here the noun refers to the person who exhibits a stylistic trait that manifests itself in a

¹⁷² See Arnim (1926) pp. 68–69, Moraux (1973) pp. 385–386 and text 460.

¹⁷³ In regard to these three entries, there is no significant difference between the edition of Schmidt (1862) and the recent edition of Hansen (2005). The differences in punctuation are unimportant.

¹⁷⁴ E. Dickey, *Ancient Geek Scholarship* (2007) p. 88 observes that the words listed by Hesychius "are often in inflected forms (as they appeared in the original texts from which Hesychius' predecessors extracted them) rather than the dictionary forms used today."

particular manner of walking (lines 1–2).¹⁷⁵ What comes next characterizes the *salakôn* in quite a different manner. No longer is he marked by delicate movement. Rather, he is the person who spends money where he ought not to (lines 2–3). I do not want to deny that people who spend money on the wrong things may in certain circumstances put on airs and walk about in a particular manner. But spending money foolishly and putting on airs need not go together. And the same is true of boasting. On occasion spending large sums on unimportant things may be a form of boasting, i.e., calling attention to one's wealth or in the case of a beggar, one's imaginary worth.¹⁷⁶ But again there are other reasons for wrongheaded spending that have nothing to do with boasting. We may wish that Photius had drawn these and other distinctions, but we should not forget that Photius' *Lexicon* has come to us in an abridged form. In its original, fuller form, the third entry = 449B may have exhibited greater awareness of subtleties in usage. But as it is, we can still thank Photius (or his source) not only for recording different senses of *σαλάκων*¹⁷⁷ and its cognates but also for naming Theophrastus as someone who used the noun in reference to extravagance.

Neither *σαλάκων* nor *σαλακωνία* occurs in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, but *σαλάκων* is found in the *Eudemian Ethics*, where it is applied to the extravagant individual, who exceeds the magnificent individual, the *μεγαλοπρεπής* in expenditure. Since 449B tells us not only that Theophrastus used *σαλάκων* but also that he used it in regard to inappropriate expenditure, we may see in 449B some grounds for holding that Theophrastus was especially influenced by the *Eudemian Ethics* and that this treatise was written after the *Nicomachean Ethics*. (See the preceding comment on 449A.) But the issue is complicated. In the *Eudemian Ethics*, *σαλάκων* occurs twice. In the first occurrence, it is used without qualification for the person who exceeds the magnificent individual in expenditure (2.3 1221a35). In the second, the application is not so simple. We are told that the person who exceeds the magnificent individual, i.e., who spends excessively and inappropriately (*ἐπὶ τὸ μείζον καὶ παρὰ μέλος*)

¹⁷⁵ Cf. Aristophanes, *Wasps* 1168–1169, where Bdelycleon instructs Philocleon to proceed in the manner of the rich, adopting a voluptuous swagger: *πλουσίως ὥδι προβάς τρυφερόν τι διασαλακῶνισον*.

¹⁷⁶ Cf. Ps.-Aristotle, *Magna Moralia* 1.26 1192b4–5.

¹⁷⁷ Read a second time, it is clear that *δέ* (line 2) means “but,” signaling that a different use of *σαλάκων* is being introduced, for which Theophrastus is cited as a witness. We can imagine that prior to abridgement, Hesychius' text cited some other author as a witness to the use that is introduced first (lines 1–2). But that cannot be demonstrated.

lacks a name. But he has a certain affinity to those who are called ἀπειρόκαλοι and σαλάκωνες (3.6 1233b1). Apparently the first occurrence is misleading. As the second makes clear, the reason for using σαλάκων to refer to the man who exceeds the magnificent individual in expenditure is that he resembles him in being tasteless, ἀπειρόκαλος.¹⁷⁸

Not to be overlooked is a passage in Book 2 of the *Rhetoric*, where Aristotle describes the character of people who have been corrupted through wealth. They are said to become τρυφεροί and σαλάκωνες. The former condition is explained in terms of luxury and displays of happiness/well-being. The latter is explained by reference to a lack of good taste: people who are σαλάκωνες are σολοικοί, “ill-mannered/lacking good taste” (2.16 1391a3–7).¹⁷⁹ That seems very much in line with the second passage in the *Eudemian Ethics*. It is the tastelessness involved in inappropriately large expenditures that prompts Aristotle to use σαλάκων when referring to the person who is excessive in expenditure. He does not recognize σαλκωνία as a *terminus technicus* for the excess coordinate with μεγαλοπρέπεια. And that is true not only of the *Rhetoric* and the *Eudemian Ethics* but also of the *Nicomachean Ethics* in which neither σαλκωνία nor σαλάκων is found.

Where does this leave us with Theophrastus? Assuming that the list of coordinate dispositions in Arius Didymus’ summary of Peripatetic ethics, 449A, is taken from an ethical writing of Theophrastus (σαλκωνία is listed as coordinate with μεγαλοπρέπεια and μικροπρέπεια) and that what we read in 449B does not misrepresent Theophrastus, then it seems reasonable to say that Theophrastus, unlike Aristotle, adopted σαλακωνία as the *terminus technicus* for the disposition to spend large sums of money inappropriately, and that he used σαλάκων without reservation for the person who is so disposed. And we may find support for this position in the *Magna Moralia*, where the author uses σαλακωνεία for the disposition coordinate with μεγαλοπρέπεια and μικροπρέπεια (1.26 1192a37–38)¹⁸⁰ and uses σαλάκων in reference to the man who spends where it is not right: οὐ μὴ δεῖ (b2; cf. 449B ὅπου μὴ δεῖ). The author of the *Magna Moralia* exhibits no hesitation or discomfort in this usage, presumably because Theophrastus had given it legitimacy. And if

¹⁷⁸ On ἀπειρόκαλος, see LSJ s.v.

¹⁷⁹ At *Rhetoric* 2.16 1391a4, we are told that persons of wealth are apt to become σαλάκωνες δὲ καὶ σόλοικοι. The δὲ answers the preceding μέν (a3), and καὶ is exegetical. I.e., Aristotle feels the need to elucidate his use of σαλάκωνες and does so through the addition of σόλοικοι.

¹⁸⁰ The variation in spelling, σαλακωνεία *MM* vs σαλακωνία 449B, is unimportant.

that is the case, we should not be surprised that Hesychius refers to Theophrastus to attest that *σαλάκων* is used of the person who spends where he ought not to.

As stated, I find the preceding interpretation reasonable, but I want to be clear that it is not certain. Both the text of Arius Didymus and that of Hesychius involve abridgement, and were the originals available to us we might find that one or the other of these authors took note of a certain hesitation on the part of Theophrastus. Moreover, we cannot put much weight on the *Magna Moralia*, for the author is drawing on both the *Nicomachean* and *Eudemian Ethics* and making changes, simplifying, when it suits his purposes.

In 437 we read that Adrastus composed five books dealing with historical and lexical matters in Theophrastus' work *On Dispositions* (436 no. 1). It is possible that he discussed Theophrastus' use of *σαλάκων*, especially if Petersen is correct in suggesting that 449A, in which *σαλάκωνία* occurs, derives from *On Dispositions*.¹⁸¹ Nevertheless, a different origin for 449A cannot be excluded and in my judgment is more likely. See the commentary on 436 no. 1.

738.5 NEW: Scholium on Euripides' *Hippolytus* 265 (vol. 2 p. 39.3–8 Schwartz)

Literature: Lichtenberg (1902–1909) col. 2514–2515; Hanslik (1950) col. 1874–1875; Wehrli (1967–1978) vol. 5 pp. 42, 84

Text 738.5 is a scholium on Euripides' *Hippolytus* 265.¹⁸² The text was not known to us when the text-translation volumes were first published in 1992 and subsequently reprinted in 1993 with corrections. For that reason, it is not included in the existing text-translation volumes. In any new edition of these volumes, it will appear after 738 and be referred to from the present position after 449A–B.

The text of the scholium runs as follows:

Τὸ μηδὲν ἄγαν οἱ μὲν Χίλωνι τῷ Λακεδαιμονίῳ ἀνατιθέασιν, ὥς Κριτίας, οἱ δὲ Σωδάμῳ, ὥς τὸ ἐν Τεγέᾳ ἐπίγραμμα δηλοῖ·

ταῦτ' ἔλεγεν Σωδάμος Ἐπηράτου, ὅς μ' ἀνέθηκεν
μηδὲν ἄγαν, καιρῷ πάντα πρόσεστι καλά.

¹⁸¹ Petersen p. 69.

¹⁸² The text of Schwartz is based on four codices: M = Marcianus 471 (12th cent.), N = Neapolitanus II F 41 (15th cent.), A = Vaticanus 909 (13th cent.) and B = Parisinus 2713 (13th cent.).

ὁ δὲ Θεόφραστος, ὡς τὰ Σισύφου λεγόμενα καὶ Πιτθέως, οἷον μηδὲν ἄγαν, μηδὲ δίκαν δικάσῃς.

Some assign “Nothing in excess” to the Spartan Chilo, as Critias does, but others assign it to Sodamus, as the inscription in Tegea shows:

Eperatus’ son, Sodamus, who put me up, said the following:
 “Nothing in excess” “All that is noble is timely.”

And Theophrastus (understood?), as things said by Sisyphus and Pittheus, e.g., “Nothing in excess,” “Do not go to law.”¹⁸³

The scholion is a comment on the penultimate line of a speech by Phaedra’s Nurse early in the *Hippolytus* (250–266). At the time of the Nurse’s speech, Phaedra is in a state of extreme misery on account of her repressed lust for Hippolytus. The Nurse, who does not understand what is wrong with Phaedra, speaks of the pain that she herself feels as a result of her affection for Phaedra.¹⁸⁴ She has made the general point that affection should be kept moderate and not be allowed to reach the extreme marrow of the soul (253–255). Her closing words reinforce the point: οὕτω τὸ λίαν ἥσσον ἐπαινῶ | τοῦ μηδὲν ἄγαν. | καὶ ξυμψήσουσι σοφοί μοι, “Thus I praise the extreme less than nothing in excess. And the wise will agree with me” (264–266).

The scholium concerns the well-known phrase or saying μηδὲν ἄγαν, “Nothing in excess” (265).¹⁸⁵ In the first half of the scholium, we are told that some people attribute the saying to Chilo and others to Sodamus. In regard to Chilo, Critias is cited. In regard to Sodamus, an inscription is quoted, in which Sodamus states that he has put up the inscription and said what follows (ταῦτ’ ἔλεγεν). As Wehrli points out, the inscription does not support the idea that Sodamus originated the two sayings that follow. He merely said them, presumably in a positive way.¹⁸⁶ The first of the two sayings is the special concern of the scholiast. The second

¹⁸³ As I understand the phrase δίκην δικάζεσθαι (middle voice), it means “to go to law (as prosecutor)”. See LSJ II.1, where Lysias, *Oration* 12 (*Against Eratosthenes*).4 and Demosthenes, *Oration* 55 (*Against Callicles*).31 are cited. The verb δικάσῃς is aorist subjunctive, which in combination with μή expresses a prohibition. A single codex (M) reads μηδὲν διώκειν δέσσης.

¹⁸⁴ W. Barrett, *Euripides, Hippolytus* (Oxford: Clarendon 1964) pp. 209–210 emphasizes that the Nurse speaks of her affection, φιλία. Sexual desire, ἔρως, is Phaedra’s problem and not the focus of the Nurse’s remarks.

¹⁸⁵ In *Rhetoric* 2.21 1395a21–22, Aristotle places “Nothing in excess” among sayings that have become public property, δεδημοσιευμένα. Hence, the saying might be classified as a proverb or adage.

¹⁸⁶ Wehrli (1967–1978) vol. 5 p. 84.

introduces a new piece of wisdom, “All that is noble is timely.”¹⁸⁷ One can make a connection with “Nothing in excess”—what counts as excess often depends on the particular situation, and there are times when excess (now understood as unusually large or frequent) is desirable¹⁸⁸—but such connections do not explain why a second saying is introduced, when the first saying is the focus of attention. The explanation is obvious. The second saying is part of the inscription, which the scholiast has chosen to quote in full.

In the second half of the scholium, Theophrastus alone is named as a source for the attribution to Sisyphus and Pittheus. Once again we have two sayings, “Nothing in excess” and “Do not go to law.” The first is, of course, the focus of the scholium, but this time it is not clear why the second is added. Perhaps we should say that the litigious individual who frequently brings suit against others is engaging in undesirable excess and therefore is enjoined to stop doing so. That may be true: we can create a connection between the two sayings, but the connection seems a weak justification for adding the second saying in a scholium, whose focus is the Nurse’s use of “Nothing in excess.”

There is still another problem. The two sayings are introduced by οἷον, “such as/e.g.,” which seems appropriate to examples. But examples of what? The sorts of sayings that are attributed to Sisyphus and Pittheus? That might seem odd in regard to Sisyphus, who was a legendary trickster, best known for his punishment in Hades. He was required to push a large stone up hill only to have it roll back down and so on without end. To be sure, there is a more serious side to Sisyphus. He was considered the founder and king of Corinth, and as such he had a shrine on the Acrocorinthus and a grave on the Isthmus. But would Theophrastus pick him out as the (real) author of either of the two sayings? That strikes me as improbable, though Theophrastus might have mentioned him in a survey of sayings that are movable and attributed to various ancients with little concern for historical correctness.

Less puzzling is Pittheus. He is said to have been the son of Pelops, king of Troezen and grandfather of Theseus. Plutarch tells us that Pit-

¹⁸⁷ The idea that virtuous, noble action is timely, i.e., suits the particular occasion, is recognized by Aristotle and Theophrastus. On the latter, see e.g., 449A.30.

¹⁸⁸ In *Rhetoric* 2.21, Aristotle cites “Nothing in excess” as an example of a proverbial expression that one might contradict in order to manifest superior character: οὐδὲ τὸ μηδὲν ἄγαν· δεῖ γὰρ τοὺς γε κακοὺς ἄγαν μισεῖν, “Not (as the proverb says) ‘Nothing in excess,’ for at least vicious persons ought to be the object of extreme hate.”

theus enjoyed an outstanding reputation as a person skilled in words and exceptional in wisdom: λόγιος and σοφώτατος. Indeed, Plutarch cites Aristotle, who reported that a sententious verse in Hesiod's *Works and Days* was attributed to Pittheus: "Let the promised payment to a man who is a friend be sure/sufficient" (*Theseus* 3.2, citing *WD* 370 = Aristotle, fr. 598 R³). The saying fits Pittheus well, in that he was active as a judge (three white marble seats at his grave site are said to record the fact [Pausanias, *Description of Greece* 2.31.3]), and the same is true of the second saying quoted in the scholium: "Do not go to law" (assuming that it is directed against, e.g., overly litigious individuals). It is, I think, reasonable to assume that Theophrastus, like Aristotle, knew that Pittheus was regarded as a source of traditional wisdom. He may have cited him, perhaps together with Sisyphus, in a work like *On Proverbs* (727 no. 14). And on such an occasion he may have mentioned not only "Nothing in excess" but also "Do not go to law." But that is speculation, and I leave open the possibility that what the scholium offers is a case of mindless copying combined with omission.

Problematic as the scholium may be, we should not doubt that Theophrastus took seriously the saying "Nothing in excess." He will have known Euripides' depiction of Phaedra as a woman overcome by excessive sexual desire, and he is reported to have defined love/lust, ἔρως, as an excess of a certain irrational desire (557.1). Similarly with affection, φιλία, he will have known Euripides' depiction of Phaedra's Nurse and accepted her misery as a realistic depiction of what happens when one person becomes too emotionally entangled with another. Moreover, he knew that excessive affection can have quite different results. It can, for example, lead to anger, when a person thinks that he has been honored in a less than appropriate manner (542.7–10). I stop here, for there can be no doubt that Theophrastus, who adopted Aristotle's doctrine of the mean (449A.1–32), understood the wisdom conveyed by "Nothing in excess."

450 Passages in Theophrastus' *Characters* that are quoted or referred to by Philodemus in his book *On Flattery*

- 1 2.1] P. Herc. 222, col. 12.1–3 (*CErc* vol. 11 [1981] p. 109 Gragiulo) and P. Herc. 1082, fr. 10 (*CErc* vol. 1 [1971] p. 87 Kondo)
- 2 2.10] p. Herc. 222, col. 6.7 (*CErc* vol. 11 [1981] p. 107 Gragiulo)
- 3 5.1–10] P. Herc. 1457, fr. 6 and 7 (*CErc* vol. 1 [1971] pp. 74–75 Kondo)
- 4 6.1 and 5] p. Herc. 223, fr. 7 (*CErc* vol. 1 [1971] p. 87 Kondo)

Literature] see above, the references given in no. 1–4; also Regenbogen (1940) col. 1503–1504; Rusten (2003) p. 28; Diggle (2004) pp. 37–38, 50

These texts listed above are largely of philological and historical interest. They make clear that the *Characters* was known in the first century BC, and that some or all of the definitions that precede the individual sketches were part of the text at that time.

Text no. 1: the first entry = P. Herc. 222 col. 12.1–3 runs as follows: τὴν | ὑπό]κρισιν τὴν τοῦ φιλεῖν [εἰ]ς [κερδοῖς] τ' ἢ τὴν αἰσχροῦν ὁμιλίαν [ν συμφέρον] οὖσαν τῷ κολακεύοντι, “the pretense of being friendly for the sake of advantages, or shameful interaction which benefits the flatterer.” Here we have two definitions of flattery, the second of which corresponds to that found in *Characters* 2.1. Striking is the reference to benefit, for in the sketch that follows (*Char.* 2.2–13) there is no clear indication that the flatterer is motivated by the prospect of future benefits. That might be construed as evidence that the definition is spurious, but even if it is, the definition is in line with the *Nicomachean Ethics*, in which the flatterer is introduced as someone who is concerned with his own advantage (2.7 1108a29, 4.6 1127a8–10). Moreover, in the context of the *Characters* the definition serves to mark off the κόλαξ from the ἄρεσκος, the flatterer from the complaisant or obsequious individual.

We should not ignore the first definition, which Gragiulo attributes to Theophrastus. He supports the attribution with the following argument: Both definitions obviously depend on the verb λέγει (sing.), whose subject must be Theophrastus, for the second definition is his. It follows logically that the first definition, too, is Theophrastean. Gragiulo adds: it may be that the definition was found in the Theophrastean work Περί κολακείας, *On Flattery*, which is known from Diogenes Laertius 5.47 = 436 no. 25. The argument is by no means foolish, but we may wonder whether we can assume with complete confidence that both definitions depend upon λέγει, whose subject is Theophrastus. Be that as it may, it is, I think, quite certain that in *On Flattery* Theophrastus recognized a close tie between flattery and personal gain. I cite 547, which tells us that in *On Flattery* Theophrastus recorded how the flatterer Cleonymus repeatedly sat himself beside Myrtis, wishing to be seen even with the eminent men of the city, βουλόμενον δὲ καὶ μετὰ τῶν κατὰ τὴν πόλιν ἐνδόξων ὄρεσθαι (lines 3–4). Here Theophrastus makes a connection between flattery and enhanced reputation through perceived association with eminent individuals. Since enhanced reputation often results in greater influence and material gain, it is easy to see Cleonymus as an example of flat-

tery motivated by self-interest. But it is not clear that Cleonymus need be motivated by material gain. He might simply want to confirm his own self-worth. (See Chapter III “Titles of Books” no. 25 *On Flattery* and below Section 14 “Flattery” on 547)

Even if we follow Gargiulo and assign the first definition to Theophrastus, we may still have doubts concerning the second definition. To be sure, in the manuscript tradition the definition precedes the sketch of the flatterer, and we can imagine Theophrastus placing it there in order to make clear what motivates the behavior depicted in the sketch itself. (Behavioral regularities invite explanation.) But it may be that someone else added the definition to the sketch and did so on the basis of what he read in *On Flattery* or another work like *On Dispositions*. That would be in line with current scholarly opinion according to which the definitions are spurious. Philodemus, writing in the first century BC, knows the *Characters* through a copy available to him. It has the definition, which Philodemus accepts as genuine, even though it is an addition to the text by someone other than Theophrastus.

The second entry of Text no. 1 = P. Herc. 1082, fr. 10 line 5 runs τὴν δὲ κολακείαν ὑπολάβοι τις ἂν εἶναι, “someone might understand flattery to be.” With insignificant variation in word order, τις before ἂν, and the addition of εἶναι, that is the beginning of the definition of flattery in *Characters* 2.1. When combined with the first entry, it is clear that Philodemus had the whole of 2.1.

Text no. 2 is quite lacunose. In line 7, we read ἐπὶ τραπέζης. That might recall *Characters* 2.10, where the flatterer is said to take up something from the table: καὶ ἄρας τι τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς τραπέζης. In addition, two lines earlier we read καλ[, which might be expanded to καλούμενος, so that we are apt to think of a flatterer who has been invited to dinner. And that might suggest comparison with 548.1–4, where mention is made of Dionysius-flatterers, who pretended to see neither the food set before them nor the wine-cups. But caution is in order. What the papyrus offers is meager to say the least; it would be reckless to claim with confidence a connection between text no. 2 and *Characters* 2.10.¹⁸⁹

Text no. 3 names Theophrastus (fr. 6 col. 5.40) and contains the sketch of the ἄρσεκος (fr. 6–7), the complaisant or obsequious man

¹⁸⁹ See Gargiulo p. 120, Kondo p. 87 and C. Caini, *Sui papiri ercolanesi 222, 223 e 1082* (Napoli 1906) p. 9.

(*Characters* 5.2–10). Deterioration of the papyrus has resulted in the loss of the definition (*Char.* 5.1). Most important is the fact that the papyrus agrees with the manuscript tradition in presenting a text that appears to divide into two roughly equal parts that are incompatible with each other. The first half sketches the complaisant man: the person whose actions are pleasing to other people (5.2–5).¹⁹⁰ The second half presents a man who seems more concerned about calling attention to himself than pleasing others (5.6–10). Scholars have concluded that the second half belongs to a different sketch: in particular, that of a vulgar (βάνανσος) or vain (χαῦνος) individual. In both the *Nicomachean* and the *Eudemian Ethics*, Aristotle treats such individuals as distinct from those who are complaisant,¹⁹¹ and we might expect Theophrastus to maintain the separation. Apparently between the time of Theophrastus and that of Philodemus, the text of the *Characters* was corrupted in such a way that two sketches were joined together. The definition of the second sketch was lost and perhaps some descriptive material as well.

Text no. 4 contains a single word from Theophrastus' definition of ἀπόνοια, lack of sense: it is ὑπομονή, "tolerance" (6.1). After that reference is made to the person lacking sense, ὁ ἀπονεινοημένος (6.2) and a portion of the descriptive sketch follows: δεινὸς ... πανδοκεῦσαι καὶ πορνοβοσκῆσαι καὶ τελωνῆσαι, "apt ... to run an inn and to keep a brothel and to collect taxes" (6.5).

451 *Florilegium: Best and First Lesson*, no. 64 (WSt vol. 11 [1889] p. 21 Schenkl)

Literature: Sternbach (1887–1889) vol. 1 p. 26, (repr. 1963) p. 58; Kindstrand (1981) p. 136; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 175–176; Millett (2007) p. 149 n. 239

¹⁹⁰ The complaisant man greets others from afar and calls out compliments as he leaves (5.2); when serving on an arbitration board he wants to please both sides (5.3); he tells foreigners that their case is just (5.4) and at a dinner part he plays with the children of his host. Such behavior, when excessive, can be unpleasant, but on the whole the complaisant man acts in ways that give pleasure. Whether he has a particular goal in mind (like the flatterer) is not said and not implied. As sketched the complaisant man exhibits a behavioral regularity that may be explained in a variety ways.

¹⁹¹ Complaisance NE 2.7 1108a28, 4.6 1126b12, EE 2.3 1221a8, 3.7 1233b35; vulgarity NE 2.7 1107b19, 4.2 1122a31, EE 1.4 1215a29; vanity NE 2.7 1107b23, 4.3 1125a27, EE 2.3 1221a10, 3.5 1233a11. In the EE, only the adjective βάνανσος (not the noun) occurs and only in regard to the life devoted to vulgar arts.

Text 451 comes from the *Florilegium: Best and First Lesson*, in which the entries are arranged alphabetically according to the first letter. It is the fifth of seven entries beginning with theta.¹⁹² The text runs as follows: Θεόφραστος ἐρωτηθεὶς· “τί τῶν ἐν βίῳ ἀγαθὸν ὑπάρχει ἢ κακόν;” ἔφη· “γλῶσσα.” In translation we have: “When Theophrastus was asked, ‘Which of the things in life is good or bad?’ he said, ‘Tongue.’” The brevity is striking. A question is put,¹⁹³ but no further context is given (we are not told who put the question, what may have prompted the question, whether there were bystanders, etc.). In addition, the reply is a single word, “γλῶσσα.” In the text-translation volumes, we printed “The tongue,” which is more natural English. But omitting the definite article achieves maximum brevity, which adds punch to the response.

The response is attributed not only to Theophrastus but also to Anacharsis, Thales and Aesop (see the *apparatus criticus*).¹⁹⁴ Moreover, Plutarch relates how Amasis, the king of Egypt, sent a sacrificial animal to Bias (*On the Right Way to Listen to Lectures* 2 38B and *The Dinner of the Seven Wise Men* 2 146F) or according to a different version, to Pittacus (*On Garrulity* 8 506C), instructing the recipient to cut out the best and worst meat. In response, Bias or Pittacus cut out the tongue as being the instrument of both the greatest good and the greatest evil. 451 is quite clearly a movable anecdote, whose origin is almost certainly older than Theophrastus. Anacharsis, Thales and Aesop are all significantly older (6th century BC),¹⁹⁵ but the assignation of the response to these prominent individuals may be a later fiction.¹⁹⁶ And the same is true of Theophrastus. Indeed, the assignation may have occurred in the course of the gnomological tradition. Perhaps in an ethical writing or in a work like *Περὶ παροιμιῶν*, *On Proverbs* (727 no. 14), Theophrastus attributed the response to a particular person like Anacharsis, Thales or Aesop.

¹⁹² Entries beginning with θεός precede and follow 451.

¹⁹³ There is a typo in the text-translation volumes. Instead of ἐρωτητεῖς (line 1), read ἐρωτηθεὶς.

¹⁹⁴ Solon is missing from the apparatus of parallel texts to 451. He is included by Sternbach (1887–1889) vol. 1 p. 26 and Kindstrand (1981) p. 136, who cite Libanius, *Epistulae Lat.* II no. 7 p. 756a ed. J.Ch. Wolf.

¹⁹⁵ Add Solon to the list (see the preceding note) and the list includes a well-known figure who bridges the 7th and 6th centuries. Solon was born c. 640 B.C and died c. 560.

¹⁹⁶ Kindstrand (1981) p. 136 is more positive concerning Anacharsis. He says that the response is in accord with Anacharsis’ character. He speaks of an archaic flavor, refers to the connection with the seven Sages and concludes “There is no reason to assume a later attribution to Anacharsis.”

At a later date, an anthologist may have taken the question and answer from the Theophrastean work and included it in his collection. And in doing so, he may have carelessly or deliberately made Theophrastus the originator of the response. Or perhaps the change occurred at a still later stage, when a copyist nodded, or the question and answer was taken for inclusion in a new anthology.

Interesting but perhaps unimportant for our purposes is the fact that Plutarch refers to Theophrastus less than half a page before relating the story of Bias and the tongue of the sacrificial animal (*On the Right Way to Listen to Lectures* 38A = 293.2). More important is that Theophrastus unquestionably accepted the idea that underlies 451: namely, that the tongue, i.e., the capacity to speak brings with itself both good and bad. In 449A, he contrasts the man who says too much and the man who says too little with the man who achieves the mean relative to us. And in the four texts that follow 451, the fundamental idea is repeated in differing ways: the loquacious individual is someone to avoid (452); some jokes are appropriate and others inappropriate (453); education is related to speaking well of a person (453) and telling bad stories is corrupting (454).

452 *Gnomologium Vaticanum* no. 331 (WSt vol. 10 [1888] p. 259 Sternbach)

Literature: Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 176–178; Millett (2007) pp. 86–87

Text 452 is taken from the *Gnomologium Vaticanum*, in which it comes tenth among the fifteen sayings attributed to Theophrastus. 452 runs as follows ὁ αὐτὸς λάλῳ περιπεσὼν εἶπεν “αὔριόν σε ποῦ ἔσται μὴ ἰδεῖν,” “The same man (Theophrastus) encountering a babbler said, “Tomorrow where will it be possible not to see you?” What we have here is a truncated anecdote: a context is given (a man happens to encounter a babbler, i.e., a loquacious person or run-on talker) and a question is put (to the babbler); no reply is recorded and no lesson is explicitly drawn. As presented in the *Gnomologium Vaticanum*, the subject of the anecdote is Theophrastus: he is the “same man,” and the subject of “he said,” εἶπεν. But that may reflect compression in transmission. Originally Theophrastus may have told how another person, not Theophrastus, happened upon a babbler and put the question with which 452 ends. We can imagine an anthologist seeking impact through brevity and toward that end omitting any reference to the person who put the question. Or perhaps he wanted to increase his collection of Theophrastean sayings and for that reason omitted a reference to the person who came upon a

babbler. Or perhaps the original version did not mention Theophrastus. His name was a late addition by someone who thought the question worthy of the man who wrote the *Characters*.¹⁹⁷

452 is obviously funny and as such invites comparison with comedy in which the run-on talker, the *λάλος*, makes for a good laugh. The cook in Menander's *Samian Woman* may serve as an example. He is said not to need a knife, for he is such a chatterer that he can cut up everything: *ἱκανὸς γὰρ εἶ λαλῶν κατακόψαι πάντα πράγματα* (284–285 OCT).¹⁹⁸ A connection with ethics is equally obvious. In conversation and talking generally, there is a *μεσότης πρὸς ἡμᾶς*, a mean relative to us (i.e., to the individual or individuals in his or their peculiar circumstances [449A.4]), and the person who exceeds the mean on a regular basis—the *ἄδολεσχής*, the garrulous individual (449A.2), the *λάλος*, the loquacious individual (452, *Characters* 7)¹⁹⁹—is annoying. He is someone, whom others wish to avoid not only tomorrow, *αὔριον*, but also other days as well. Moreover, loquacity can serve as an example of a disposition that manifests itself in behavioral regularities without being tied to a particular wish or goal. That is clear in Theophrastus' sketch of the *λάλος* in the *Characters*. The initial definition of loquacity, even though today it is considered spurious, does not mislead. The disposition is defined simply as an inability to control one's speech, *ἀκρασία τοῦ λόγου* (7.1). That tells us what to expect, i.e., excessive talking, without explaining such behavior. In what follows, the loquacious individual is presented as someone who seeks out and dominates conversation. Occasionally a particular motive is suggested. When the loquacious individual claims to know everything (7.2) and when he recalls speeches by which he gained a good reputation among the people (7.6), he may be motivated by a desire to be

¹⁹⁷ In *Quellen* (1984) p. 176, I compared 453 with *Characters* 7.8. Both texts concern a *λάλος* and both texts end on a clever note. In 453 Theophrastus is made to put a question that is humiliating and for that reason amusing. In *Char.* 7.8, the children of a loquacious father make fun of the father when he wishes them to go to sleep. They say, "Talk to us a bit, in order that we may fall asleep." In both cases, the reader smiles or even laughs as he appreciates the way in which the speaker, i.e., Theophrastus, and the children show themselves to be superior. See the commentary on 453.

¹⁹⁸ Fortenbaugh (1981b) pp. 247–248; repr. (2003) pp. 296–297.

¹⁹⁹ The English translations are conventional. For the two Greek words, I have selected two English words that are largely, if not entirely, synonymous. The translations could be reversed. In the Loeb edition of the *Characters* pp. 61 and 79, Rusten translates *ἄδολεσχής* with "idle chatterer" and *λάλος* with "garrulous." In his Cambridge edition pp. 73 and 87, Diggel uses "chatter box" and "talker."

taken seriously. We can, however, easily imagine a man, who for a variety of other reasons finds it difficult to control his speech. He might for example find it frightening to be left alone, or he might suffer from a physical condition like too much warm black bile (see ps.-Aristotle, *Problems* 30.1 954a34).²⁰⁰ Perhaps then the sketch of loquacity is of interest for a variety of reasons. In that Theophrastus portrays the loquacious individual as a person who engages in run-on chatter in a variety of different situations, he helps us understand that a character trait like loquacity can be and in fact normally is conceived of as superficial behavioral regularity apart from deeper-lying explanations. And in that Theophrastus portrays the loquacious man making statements that suggest a desire to impress others, he helps us understand how a behavioral regularity makes room for deeper-lying explanations. And in that Theophrastus does not make the loquacious man on all occasions say things that exhibit a concern with self-importance, he helps us understand that a behavioral regularity need not be tied to a single explanation. Indeed, it may be based on various motives and causes (physiological as well as psychological), no one of which is essential to loquacity.

In my earlier comment on the title *Ethical Characters* (436 no. 4), I called attention to Theophrastus' sketch of ἀδολεσχία *qua* superficial behavior regularity. And in my comment on 449A, I took note of the fact that ἀδολεσχία is introduced in order to illustrate the mean relative to us, but in the following list of coordinate virtues and vices and in the discussion of persons who exhibit the several dispositions, neither garrulity nor loquacity nor any other social disposition, either attractive or unattractive,²⁰¹ is mentioned. Apparently Theophrastus was so impressed by the special status of the social dispositions that he kept that them separate from the moral virtues and vices. That is not surprising in Aristotle's pupil and successor. For in both the *Nicomachean* and the *Eudemian Ethics*, Aristotle is careful to mark off the social dispositions from cen-

²⁰⁰ In *Problems* 30.1, ps.-Aristotle discusses the melancholic individual, who has an excess of warm black bile and for that reason is dispositionally prone to loquacity. Such an individual is distinguished from the drunk. He too is apt to be loquacious, but his condition is momentary (953b9–19, 954a32–34). Theophrastus wrote a work *On Melancholy* (328 no. 7), in which he may have made similar observations.

²⁰¹ E.g. dignity, σεμνότης, is an attractive trait, and complaisance and self-will, ἀρέσκεια and αὐθάδεια, are unattractive. In the *EE* they are coordinate dispositions (2.3 1221a8, 3.7 1233b34–35).

tral cases of virtue and vice like courage, cowardice and recklessness, and temperance, intemperance and insensitiveness. But the matter is not simple, for there is an important difference between the *Nicomachean* and *Eudemian Ethics*. In the *NE*, mean dispositions in the sphere of social interaction are not dissociated from choice, προαίρεσις (4.6 1126b33, cf. 1127a3) and are spoken of as virtues (4.7 1127a16–17, b1). That is not true of the *EE*, in which mean dispositions in social interaction are said not to be moral virtues, for they lack choice (3.7 1234a23–25). For discussion, see Chapter III “Titles of Books” no. 32 on the (*Dialogue*) *concerning Social Interaction*.

On λαλιά and women, see 662.3 (discussed in Section 4 “Education, Exhortation and Censure” after 466B) and 486.16–19

453 *Gnomologium Vaticanum* no. 327 (*WSt* vol. 10 [1888] p. 258 Sternbach)

Literature: Sternbach (1888) p. 258, repr. p. 129; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 178–179

Like 452, text 453 is found in the *Gnomologium Vaticanum*: it comes sixth among the fifteen sayings attributed to Theophrastus. And like 452, it is concerned with speech, but their concerns are different. Whereas 452 makes fun of tiresome loquacity, 453 focuses on appropriate humor. It runs as follows: ὁ αὐτὸς δεῖν τὰ τῶν γελοίων ἔφη τοιαῦτα εἶναι, ἐφ’ οἷς ὁ μὲν ἀκούων ἡσθήσεται, ὁ δὲ λέγων οὐ κατασχυνθήσεται, “The same man (Theophrastus) said that the subjects of jokes ought to be the sort at which the listener is delighted and the speaker is not ashamed.” A close relationship to Aristotle’s remarks on wittiness, εὐτραπεία, in the *Nicomachean Ethics* 4.8 1127b33–1128b4 and in the *Eudemian Ethics* 3.7 1234a3–23 is clear. See too the ps.-Aristotelian *Magna Moralia* 1.30 1193a11–19.

The distinction between the listener and the speaker is important in that it helps us understand that wittiness takes two forms. I cite *EE* 3.7 1234a14–18: “Since there are two kinds of wittiness—for one kind consists in enjoying what is humorous, ἐν τῷ χαίρειν τῷ γελοίῳ, even humor that is directed against oneself, if it is funny, for instance a gibe, σκῶμμα; the other kind consists in being able to produce such (witticisms)—they (the two kinds) are different from each other, but both are mean dispositions, μεσότητες.” Here Aristotle recognizes that wittiness is exhibited not only in poking fun at another person but also in enjoying a poke directed at oneself. And in both cases, wittiness is a mean disposition. The person who pokes fun observes limits, and the

man who is the object of a poke does not find any and every poke funny. He reacts well to what is within the bounds of good taste and not to what is tasteless abuse.²⁰²

453 is saying much the same thing. Among friends and in polite company, the person who makes a joke must not only say things that are humorous, γελοῖα, (line 1) but also exhibit discretion: he must avoid saying things, of which he will be ashamed καταισχυνθήσεται (line 2). And what is said must be such that the listener will be pleased, ἡσθήσεται (line 2), not angered or disgusted. It should, however, be acknowledged that as formulated 453 applies to all kinds of verbal humor: not only to gibes that are directed at a person or group of persons but also to jokes that are not so directed. It covers, e.g., puns and off-color jokes that might be offensive to some people and not to others.

Theophrastus wrote a work entitled Περί γελοίου, *On the Ludicrous* (666 no. 23), in which he reported how Stratonicus, the cithara-player, made fun of the actor Simycas by pronouncing separately the words of the proverb “No rotten fish (is) large” (710.7–10). In this case, the words of Stratonicus were intended to humiliate Simycas and in that way to cause him pain. At the same time, Stratonicus and others who happened to be present will have felt themselves superior to Simycas. They will have been pleased and expressed their pleasure by smiling or laughing aloud.²⁰³ Theophrastus undoubtedly approved, but he also recognized that not all gibes are intended to cause pain. Among friends and generally in polite society, gibes that are moderate and suited to the circumstances give pleasure to all involved, and that includes the targeted individual. Assuming that he has a strong (educated) wit, he will appreciate the gibe and respond with laughter or a smile along with everyone else. Theophrastus may have discussed such cases in Περί γελοίου²⁰⁴ or in the Ὀμιλητικός, the (*Dialogue*) concerning Social Interaction, or in a special section of the Ἠθικά, *Ethics*. Like the Aristotelian ethical treatises, *Ethics* may have included a section on social relations, ὁμιλία, in which εὐτραπεία, witness, was discussed as a mean between two extremes.

²⁰² Cf. *MM* 1193a16–19.

²⁰³ Cf. 711. On superiority as a basis for laughter, see Fortenbaugh (1975a) p. 20 and (2000) pp. 337–339, 342–343; repr. (2003) pp. 94–95, 98.

²⁰⁴ Concerning the work *On the Ludicrous* (666 no. 23), see *Commentary* 8 (2005c) on rhetoric and poetics, pp. 141–145. Concerning texts 710 and 711, see pp. 376–394.

454 Mubaššir, *Choicest Maxims and best Sayings*, “Sayings by a number of Philosophers,” no. 38

Literature: Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 179–180; Gutas (1985) p. 93; Millett (2007) p. 30

454 is an Arabic text, which occurs in Mubaššir’s eclectic work entitled *Choicest Maxims and Best Sayings* (it draws on various sources representing both the gnomological and biographical traditions²⁰⁵). The work lacks a separate entry on Theophrastus; his sayings are found toward the end in a chapter that carries the heading “Sayings by a Number of Philosophers Known by Name, for None of Whom Enough Sayings are Recorded to Make a Special Chapter Possible.” In the text translation volumes, we translated 454 as follows: “Theophrastus said: The educated person is he who talks about the good qualities of people and conceals the evil.” The final word “evil” now seems to be unfortunate, for it suggests moral turpitude. “Bad qualities” is what is meant and should replace “evil” in any future edition. See below.

Choicest Maxims and Best Sayings was composed in the middle of the 11th century. In the 13th century, it was translated into Spanish and Latin. At the end of the 14th century, the Latin version served as the basis of English translations.²⁰⁶ In *Quellen zur Ethik Theophrasts*, the Spanish and Latin translations of 454 were printed together with the Arabic (no. L17). In the text-translation volumes (FHS&G), they are referred to in the apparatus of *fontes* together with the Arabic sources on which the 454 is based. For completeness’ sake, here are the Spanish and Latin texts: *e dixo Tenparastis: El bien enseñado es quien retrahe las bondades de los omes e encubre las sus maldades* (Bocados de Oro 23.25 [p. 170 Crombach]); *et dixit Theophrastus: bene morigeratus est ille qui bonitates hominum aperit et malicias celando recondit* (*Liber philosophorum moralium antiquorum* p. 559.7–9 Franceschini). In the nineteenth century, Hermann Knust held that both translations go back to the Arabic text,²⁰⁷ but in the twentieth century scholars have argued that the Latin translation is based on the Spanish.²⁰⁸

²⁰⁵ Gutas (1985a) pp. 69–70.

²⁰⁶ C. Bühler, *The Dicts and Sayings of the Philosophers* (London 1914) pp. 264–265.

²⁰⁷ *Mitteilungen aus dem Eskurial* (Tübingen 1879) pp. 573–574.

²⁰⁸ Bühler, *op. cit.*, pp. x–xi; E. Franceschini, “Il liber philosophorum moralium antiquorum,” *Atti del Reale Istituto Veneto di Scienze, Lettere ed Arti* 91.2 (1931–1932) p. 394;

The interpretation of this text depends in large measure on how one construes “the educated person,” *al-adīb*, which almost certainly translates ὁ πεπαιδευμένος.²⁰⁹ Most likely the reference is to the person who has been well brought up (Latin, *morigeratus*), so that he has good manners. In social intercourse, he overlooks the bad qualities or failings of other people and concentrates on their strong points.²¹⁰ The idea may be illustrated by an anecdote reported by Diogenes Laertius: πρὸς τὸν εἰπόντα: “κακῶς ὁ δεινά σε λέγει,” “καλῶς γάρ” ἔφη “λέγειν οὐκ ἔμαθε.” In translation: “To the person who said to Socrates, ‘Some person spoke ill of you,’ Socrates replied, ‘For he has not learned to speak well’” (2.35). Similar words are ascribed to Leotychides,²¹¹ Plato,²¹² Diogenes²¹³ and Zosimus (?).²¹⁴ We may compare Aristotle’s characterization of the free and educated individual (ὁ ἐλευθέριος καὶ πεπαιδευμένος), who exhibits tact in his jests (*NE* 4.8 1128a16–22). So, too, Theophrastus’ educated man avoids remarks that call attention to another person’s failings and thereby cause unnecessary hurt.

For clarity’s sake, I want to underline what Theophrastus is not saying: namely, that an educated person ignores serious vices that result in deplorable action. The translation “conceals the evil,” which is printed in the text-translation volumes, might suggest that and hence is to be avoided, as stated above. Rather, Theophrastus’ focus is on ordinary people in every day situations. In such circumstances, it is pointless to call attention to minor faults or failings, be they physical (an ugly face or squeaky voice) or behavioral (shyness that makes communication difficult or a tendency to eat too many sweets). Theophrastus understands

W. Mettmann, “Neues zur Überlieferungsgeschichte der sogenannten *Bocados de Oro*,” in *Festschrift für Fritz Schalk* (Frankfurt 1963) pp. 125–127; M. Crombach, *Bocados de Oro* (Bonn 1971) p. xviii.

²⁰⁹ See Endress-Gutas vol. 1 p. 136, where it is also seen that *adīb* translates κόσμος in the translation literature.

²¹⁰ Caveat: I do not want suppress the fact that παιδεία, understood as the moral training of young people, includes far more than training in manners, and that the πεπαιδευμένος is not only a tactful, well-mannered person but also someone who has been trained to control his emotions, responding to particular situations in an appropriate manner. Conversely, the ἀπαιδευτος need not be limited to bad manners. He may also be someone whose training has failed to bring his emotions under control. See, e.g., 577B.4–6.

²¹¹ Plutarch, *Spartan Sayings* 224E.

²¹² Stobaeus, *Anthology* 3.19.55 p. 530 Hense; *Gnomologium Vaticanum* 441 Sternbach.

²¹³ *Gnomologium Vaticanum* 179 Sternbach.

²¹⁴ Ibn Durayd, *Kitab al-Mujtana* = F. Rosenthal, “Sayings of the Ancients from Ibn Durayd’s *Kitab al-Mujtana*,” *Orientalia* NS 27 (1958) pp. 43 and 173.

that and therefore characterizes the educated person as one who avoids offending (or embarrassing) people when there is no need to do so.

In 454, we are not told why an educated person avoids talking about the failings of others. This lack of explanation is not unusual: many gnomic sayings are quite short, being recorded without an explanatory clause or sentence. Nevertheless, we can say with confidence that Theophrastus would have rejected or at least severely limited a motive like personal gain. The πεπαιδευμένος is not a flatterer. Rather, he is concerned that his remarks be appropriate (πρέποντα, cf. NE 4.8 1128a19). He is like Aristotle's friendly individual, in that both are concerned not only with advantage but also and primarily with what is noble (cf. NE 4.6 1126b28–30). Normally both ignore the weaknesses of other people. But should circumstances demand it, they will not hesitate to speak truths that cause discomfort. And they will do so for the sake of the addressee. They will discourage him from acting in some unacceptable manner, and in favorable circumstances they will encourage him to change his ways, i.e., to become a better person. See the commentary on 540.

Finally I call attention to the μεγαλόψυχος, the man characterized by greatness of soul or highmindedness. He is like the πεπαιδευμένος in that he tends not to speak ill of other people. But there is a difference: while the educated person is said to talk about the good qualities of other people, the highminded person tends to be silent about both the good and the bad qualities of others. He prefers neither to talk about himself nor about others—he is no ἀνθρωπολόγος—and much as he has no interest in hearing himself praised, he is not one to praise others (Aristotle, NE 4.3 1125a5–8).

455 *Choice Sayings and Lives of Philosophers and of other Wise Men and of Rulers*, chapter 12 (p. 135.15–16 D'Agostino)

455 is a saying that survives in Italian and runs as follows: *Corrompono li buoni costumi le scipidezze di mal favoleggiare*. We have translated: "The tastelessness of bad story telling corrupts good morals." The saying is found in a 13th century florilegium that carries the title *Fiori e vita di filosafi e d'altri savi e d'imperadori*. On this title and the sources of the collection see Chapter II "The Sources" no. 45.

In the *Fiori et vita*, 455 is the last of five sayings attributed to Theophrastus. The first four are known from elsewhere, including the *Speculum historiale* of Vincent of Beauvais. According to D'Agostino, Vincent via Adam of Clermont is the source of these sayings. The fifth saying is

not found in Vincent and presumably was added by Adam on the basis of a source other than Vincent. If that source is not in error concerning the attribution, then we have a Theophrastean saying that comes to us uniquely through the *Fiori e vita*. Of course, coming last may awaken suspicion (we might have a floating saying that needed to be entered somewhere), but it should be underlined that Theophrastus recognized a close connection between verbal interaction and moral character (451–454). Moreover, a similar saying is attributed to Theophrastus' pupil Menander: φθειρουσιν ἡθὴν χορήσθ' ὁμιλίας κακαί, "bad interaction destroys good habits" (fr. 187 K–T). The words are reported to have occurred in the play *Thais*.²¹⁵ The title almost certainly refers to a hetaira,²¹⁶ so that it is easy to imagine the saying being used in reference to malicious or ill-chosen gossip or the like. Be that as it may, when we consider not only 451–454 and the closely related saying in Menander but also the fact that Theophrastus wrote a work entitled Ὀμιλητικὸς, (*Dialogue*) *concerning Social Interaction* (436 no. 32), then there is good reason to accept the saying as genuine or more cautiously to recognize that it is in agreement with Theophrastus' interests and teaching.

- 456 *Depository of Wisdom Literature*, chap. on Theophrastus, saying no. 20
 457 *Depository of Wisdom Literature*, chap. on Theophrastus, saying no. 17
 458 *Depository of Wisdom Literature*, chap. on Theophrastus, saying no. 19
 459 *Depository of Wisdom Literature*, chap. on Theophrastus, saying 18

Literature: Gutas (1985) pp. 91–92

We have here four texts that appear together in Dimitri Gutas' edition of the *Depository of Wisdom Literature*, though the order is different (see above). Their content is both Peripatetic and common sense. There is noticeable overlap and at least one omission that is hard to ignore.

In translation, 456 runs as follows: "He (Theophrastus) said: the eloquent person is he who does not mix lies with truth, the generous he who does not restrict his gifts to the rich, and the pious he whom neither distress nor comfort swerves from his piety—an obstacle to rectitude when

²¹⁵ See the apparatus of parallel texts to fr. 187 in the edition of Koerte-Thierfelder.

²¹⁶ T. Webster, *An Introduction to Menander* (Manchester: University Press) p. 14. Although the verse is also attributed to Euripides and is quoted without attribution by St. Paul (*To the Corinthians* 1.15.33), the attribution to Menander is most likely correct. So Chadwick col. 1132.

in distress provides a better excuse than an obstacle to virtue when in comfort.” We have here three people or one person under three descriptions. The eloquent (ῥήτωρ?²¹⁷) person is not the clever, unscrupulous speaker who mixes in falsehood in order to be persuasive. Rather, he sticks with the truth, presumably because he is a man of virtue. The generous person (ἐλευθέριος) does not give only to the rich; were he to do so, he would seem to be motivated by personal gain, and he would fail to assess properly the individual circumstances of the persons to whom he might make gifts. The pious (εὐσεβής) individual engages in acts of piety no matter what his circumstance, whether it be distressful or comforting. To this statement a qualification is added: as an obstacle to rectitude distress is a better excuse than comfort.²¹⁸ That is correct, but in regard to piety Theophrastus might want to add a second qualifier: namely, what counts as an appropriate act of piety depends upon circumstances; at times of distress a quite modest sacrifice suffices (584A.143–153, cf. 523.1–3).²¹⁹

In translation, 457 runs: “He (Theophrastus) said: You shall feel no self-satisfaction in rule without justice, wealth without prudent management, eloquence without truth in speech, misplaced generosity, education without sound judgment, and beneficence without consideration.” The style is striking. Instead of being told in a positive manner what is required for self-satisfaction, we are confronted with a *quasi*-double negative construction: “no self-satisfaction” is followed by the preposition “without” (ἄνευ?) which is repeated five times. The repetition is relieved only once by the adjective “misplaced.” The style might mirror what Theophrastus wrote on some occasion, but equally and perhaps more likely it reflects the taste of a later anthologist. On the whole, the content is unexciting. Coupling rule with justice (δικαιοσύνη) is normal and may be compared with 601 = no. 8 Gutas. That wealth needs prudent management (οἰκονομία?) is clear enough. We have already met eloquence in combination with truth; so too the idea of misplaced generosity (both

²¹⁷ In private correspondence, Gutas has informed me that the Arabic word is *baligh*, which is used in the plural to translate ῥήτορες in Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* 2.11 1388b18. He also cautions that the use of *baligh* in translating the *Rhetoric* passage is no guarantee concerning the Greek word that may stand behind *baligh* in 457.

²¹⁸ Rectitude is more inclusive than piety, so that the qualifying statement has application beyond piety. But the mention of distress and comfort, which are found in the preceding characterization of the pious individual, make clear that Theophrastus still has piety in mind.

²¹⁹ Fortenbaugh (2003b) pp. 182–183.

in 456). “Education without judgment” may contrast abstract and bookish learning with the need for practical judgment concerning right and wrong (γνώμη).²²⁰ Odd is the concluding phrase “and beneficence without consideration.” In a footnote in the text-translation volumes, Gutas comments that the Arabic word that has been translated “consideration” means “doing something with a view to a reward in the afterlife.” Two explanations are offered: we have here an Islamic interpretation of the original Greek, or the entire last phrase is an Arabic addition to the Greek original.

458 is the longest of the four texts. I give the translation here, having inserted numerals in parentheses in order indicate clearly how I think the text divides: “He (Theophrastus) said: The perfect man is (1) he whom wealth does not render insolent or indigence humble, (2) who is not crushed by misfortunes and yet not immune to calamities, and (3) who does not forget the end and is not deceived by youth: he wastes no time as long as he still has days left, (4) his path is safe, he has succour, (5) his bridle is slackened, the place he steps is wide, his reach is extensive, and (6) his physical faculties are compliant, prompt to execute his bidding.” At the start of 458, the subject of the text is introduced: namely, the perfect man (τέλειος). The description that follows presents few problems, (1) That wealth and poverty affect character is all too clear. On wealth producing insolence (ὑβρις), see Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* 2.16 1390b32–33. (2) The idea that the perfect man is not immune to calamity fits well with Theophrastus’ view of both human character (463) and happiness (493). (3) The brevity of life and the importance of dealing correctly with time did not escape Theophrastus (1.54–55, 34A–B, 459). There is, however, a lack of clarity, due to compression, in saying “and is not deceived by youth.” Better might be a fuller statement: e.g., “and being mature does not make the mistakes typical of youth.” Maturity includes having had a good education combined with experience, both of which require time and therefore are not found in young people, νέοι. (4) That the path of the perfect man is safe and that he has succor takes account of external goods including friends who will offer assistance when needed (536, 546.4–5). The perfection that makes for a perfect life, happiness, is not good character alone. No matter what the Stoics say, external evils mar perfection. (5) A slack bridle, a wide space and an extensive reach seem to continue the focus on external goods, but we might also see here

²²⁰ Cf. Aristotle, *NE* 6.11 1143a19–b14.

an awareness of style or manner. The perfect man does what he does in a way that manifests freedom from constraint.²²¹ (6) The mention of physical faculties that are compliant and prompt to execute the bidding of the perfect man tells us that perfection requires good health, for without health a man cannot accomplish everything that he wants and ought to do. In sum, perfection requires not only goods of the soul and external goods but also those of the body. That is an inclusive account of the perfect man, but there is a striking omission: namely, wisdom and the life of philosophic contemplation. But we should not expect an excerpt in an anthology to say everything that might be said. And the anthology in question, the *Depository of Wisdom Literature*, does focus on philosophy elsewhere (no. 4 Gutas = 485).

459 runs: “He (Theophrastus) said: The intelligent person ought to deal with time in the same way as the non-swimmer who has fallen into a flowing stream deals with (water).” In 458 we have been told that the perfect man does not waste time. Now we are told that the intelligent person must deal with time. Such a person may combine practical wisdom, *φρόνησις*, with philosophic wisdom, *σοφία*, but in 459 the focus is almost certainly on the intelligent man *qua* *φρόνιμος*. Budgeting time is a practical activity that finds a place in household management, leading an army and running a philosophic school. To explain how the intelligent man deals with time, an analogy is drawn with the non-swimmer who falls into a flowing stream. In private correspondence, Gutas has suggested understanding the analogy as follows: “just as a person who does not know how to swim and falls into a flowing river should simply let himself be carried by the water and not to fight against it, because it is inevitable, so also the *φρόνιμος* should let himself be carried by time since it cannot be resisted. In essence, the point is, as in the American idiom, ‘Go with the flow.’” That understanding strikes me as very much on target. Only I would emphasize the idea of “dealing with” water. We should not think of a hapless individual who suddenly finds himself in water over his head, holds his nose, shouts for help and expects to drown. Rather we should think of the person who allows himself to be carried along, all the while keeping an eye out for rocks to grab or a shoal spot on which he can plant his feet. He is alert and will not miss the *καιρός*, the opportune moment that allows him to deal with misfortune and turn it into good fortune. That said, we should keep in mind that time does

²²¹ While not a perfect fit, cf. Aristotle, *NE* 4.3 1124b21–22, 1125a12–14.

not always provide opportunity for change. Aging and dying are obvious examples, but no less important is our inability to alter habits once they have become second nature (465.17–19).

- 460 Alexander of Aphrodisias, *Supplement to the Book On the Soul* 18 (*Suppl. Arist.* vol. 2.1 p. 156.21–27 Bruns)

Literature: Brandis (1860) pp. 361–362; Zeller (1879) vol. 2.2 p. 861 n. 2; Heylbut (1888) p. 195; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1480; Dirlmeier (1958) pp. 367–368; Donini (1975) vol. 3 p. 342; Moraux (1973) p. 386 n. 226; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 181–182; Sharples (1990) p. 56, (2001) pp. 609–611

Text 460 is taken from a discussion of the reciprocal relationship that exists between the virtues. The discussion carries the heading “Ὅτι ἀντακολουθοῦσιν αἱ ἀρεταί (p. 153.28)²²² and runs almost three pages. In the first half of the discussion (p. 153.29–155.13), Alexander concentrates on the impossibility of having one moral virtue without having all the others: e.g., it is impossible to possess justice without possessing courage, temperance etc. In the second half (p. 155.13–156.27), Alexander tells us that the human soul possesses two powers or faculties. One is characterized as rational, λογική, and the other as obedient, ὑπακούουσα (p. 155.16–17).²²³ The virtues of the soul are said to be excellences of these powers and not to exist apart from each other (p. 155.13–31). Alexander continues the discussion with a variation in terminology. He refers to the calculative and emotional parts of soul, the λογιστικόν and the παθητικόν (p. 155.31–18, cf. 155.20–21)²²⁴ and proceeds to discuss their virtues: practical wisdom and the moral virtues, φρόνησις and ἡθικαὶ ἀρεταί, respectively. Alexander does not lose sight of the mutual relationship that exists between the moral virtues (p. 155.38, 156.5–6), but his primary concern is the relationship between the moral virtues on the one hand and practical wisdom on the other. Here too the relationship is one of reciprocal implication, so that the man who possesses practi-

²²² The same heading is found in Alexander’s *Ethical Problems* 22 p. 142.22 Bruns. As Robert Sharples notes in his translation (1990) p. 56 n. 181, the argument in *Ethical Problems* 22 is similar to that found in *Supplement to the Book On the Soul* p. 155.38–156.25 Bruns.

²²³ Cf. Aristotle, *Pol.* 7.14 1333a16–18, where the verb ὑπακούειν is used in regard to the lower half of the bipartite soul.

²²⁴ Cf. Aristotle, *Pol.* 1.5 1254b8, where the adjective παθητικόν is used of the lower half of the bipartite soul.

cal wisdom possesses all the moral virtues, and the man who has moral virtue possesses not only all the moral virtues but also practical wisdom (155.31–156.6).

Our text 460 concludes the discussion. Alexander first tells us that it is impossible to act in accordance with any of the moral virtues in the absence of practical wisdom, and that all the virtues accompany practical wisdom (lines 1–5). Alexander then adds by way of explanation that according to Theophrastus it is not easy to grasp or conceive of the different kinds of (moral) virtue in such a way that they have nothing in common, but they acquire their names in accordance with what predominates (lines 5–8). Two questions suggest themselves. First, what is the common element that Theophrastus finds in all the moral virtues? And second, how are we to construe the phrase “in accordance with what predominates”?

Our answer to the first question may vary depending on whether we look back over the discussion of reciprocal implication, or focus narrowly on the concluding remarks that constitute text 460. If we take the larger context into consideration, we may mention the fine or noble, τὸ καλόν, which is said to be the goal for which moral virtue acts in all cases (p. 154.31). The virtuous man is described as a lover of what is noble, φιλόκαλος (154.32) and said to have as his goal the noble which is common to all virtue: τὸν κοινὸν πάσης ἀρετῆς σκοπὸν (p. 155.10). Certainly the occurrence of the adjective κοινόν invites comparison with κοινωνεῖν at 460.7, but that said, I am inclined to prefer the immediate context. For not only in the second half of the discussion that leads to 460 but also in the opening lines of 460, Alexander is focused on the relationship between moral virtue and practical wisdom. He states that the two do not come apart; all the virtues follow practical wisdom and *vice versa* (lines 1–5). Theophrastus is cited because he pointed out that differentiating between the several moral virtues does not rule out a common element (lines 6–7). To be sure, each of the moral virtues has its own definition, but each of these definitions necessarily contains a reference to practical wisdom.

Assuming that the common element is practical wisdom and given the fact that Alexander has just told us that practical wisdom brings with itself all the moral virtues (lines 2–3), it seems reasonable to conclude that Theophrastus would also say that it is equally difficult to form a conception of practical wisdom that ignores moral virtue. I.e., Theophrastus would recognize the reciprocal implication that exists between practical wisdom and moral virtue. And if that is correct, Theophrastus will have

followed Aristotle and argued that a man cannot possess practical wisdom in the absence of moral virtue (*NE* 6.13 1144b31–32, 10.8 1178a16–19, *EE* 8.1 1246b33). The deliberations and decisions of the practically wise man demand a correct goal or end, and that is provided by moral virtue (*NE* 6.13 1145a46, 10.8 1178a16–18; cf. Alexander p. 156.8–9, 17–18 and *Ethical Questions* 22 142.23–143.8).²²⁵

The second question introduced above concerns the phrase κατὰ τὸ πλεῖστον, “in accordance with what predominates” (line 8). Alexander tells us that according to Theophrastus the several moral virtues acquire their name according to what predominates. (The pronoun αὐταῖς in line 7 refers to τῶν ἀρετῶν τὰς διαφορὰς in line 6). The idea is common enough. For example, the physical philosopher Anaxagoras is said to have argued that while everything is mixed in everything, things have a different appearance and receive different names in accordance with the prevalence of one constituent, i.e., whatever predominates in the mix (Aristotle, *Physics* 1.4 187b1–7).²²⁶ And Antiochus of Ascalon is reported to have held that happiness (as against supreme happiness) gets its name from the greater part, i.e., from virtue and virtuous action (Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations* 5.22, 86).²²⁷ In regard to text 460, we can say the following. For Alexander, “virtue” is an apical term. It refers to an apex—an ἀκρότης (p. 155.13–14)—or excellence. Alexander realizes that everyday language allows one to speak of more or less virtue, but he is interested in virtue conceived of as a complete or perfect disposition, τέλειος ἀρετή (p. 155.22). That means an inclusive disposition that includes not only all the moral virtues but also practical wisdom, for without the total package a person can go wrong. E.g., he may fail to do what is just because he lacks, e.g., temperance, or he may fail because he deliberates poorly and decides upon a course of action that does not result in a just outcome. Hence, Alexander is correct to emphasize the reciprocal implication that exists among the virtues. But it does not follow that we err when we refer to an individual virtue or describe an action as one that exhibits courage. For the individual virtues are distinguished from each other by their field:

²²⁵ On the relation between moral virtue and practical wisdom, see 449A.31–37. That Theophrastus actually offered the analysis found there cannot be demonstrated on the basis of 460. See the commentary to 449A.

²²⁶ The occurrence of προσαγορεύεσθαι and πλεῖστον (*Phys.* 187b3, 6) may be compared with προσηγορία and πλεῖστον (460.7–8).

²²⁷ See below, Section 7, the commentary on 493 and 499.

e.g., courage is a correct disposition in regard to the emotion of fear,²²⁸ and temperance is a correct disposition in regard to appetite (p. 155.6–9). And when we describe an action as courageous, we are implying that the action was a correct response to something terrible. Our focus is on the emotional situation and our use of “courageous” is in accordance with what predominates. Indeed, in sudden alarms when there is no opportunity to deliberate about the best way to meet the situation,²²⁹ the emotional element is so dominant that no description other than courageous seems appropriate. But when the situation is not sudden and there is time to deliberate, then it is appropriate to speak of an exercise of practical wisdom. To be sure courage *qua* a disposition to control one’s fear is in play. Without courage the person in question might have fled or been too nervous to deliberate well. But that said, during the act of deliberation, the dominant element is the deliberation, and the act is properly described, κατὰ τὸ πλεῖστον, as an exercise of practical wisdom.

The phrase τῶν ἀρετῶν τὰς διαφορὰς (line 6) suggests assigning text 460 to the work Ἀρετῶν διαφοραί, *Varieties of Virtue* (436 no. 7).

- 461 Scholium on Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics* 6.13 1145a10–11 (no. L19, *QETHs* pp. 25–26 Fortenbaugh)

Literature: Heylbut (1888) pp. 195–196, 199; Jaeger (1928) pp. 407–410, (1929) pp. 275–278; Arnim (1929a) pp. 26–57, (1929b) p. 40; Walzer (1929) pp. 158, 191; Dirlmeier (1958) pp. 354–355; Donini (1965) pp. 126, 133–146; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 182–184; Wehrli-Wöhrle (2004) p. 551; Millett (2007) p. 35

Text 461 is a scholium or marginal note on the last words of *Nicomachean Ethics* 6.13. Aristotle has been considering the relationship between

²²⁸ Cf. Plato, *Laws* 12.11 963D–E, where the Athenian Stranger is discussing much the same issue as Alexander. He recognizes that courage and wisdom are both referred to by the common term “virtue” and yet spoken of as two distinct virtues, each having its own name. He asks why we speak of two virtues using two different names, and answers that courage is concerned with fear, περὶ φόβον (E4), and comes into being without reason and by nature, ἄνευ λόγου καὶ φύσει (E5–6). In contrast, a soul without reason is not wise. By referring to fear, the Stranger takes account of courage’s particular field or sphere. By saying that courage occurs without reason and by nature, the Stranger introduces a notion of natural virtue. And by saying that beasts have a share in courage, οὐ καὶ τὰ θηρία μετέχει (E4), he extends this notion of natural virtue to include animals, non-cognitive creatures, in the way that Aristotle does at *NE* 6.13 1144b3–9.

²²⁹ Cf. *NE* 3.8 1117a17–22, where Aristotle discusses courageous response to sudden alarms.

practical wisdom, φρόνησις, and theoretical wisdom, σοφία. His thesis is that practical wisdom does not have authority over theoretical wisdom. Rather, it gives directives for the sake of theoretical wisdom. He has drawn a comparison with medicine (it does not use health; instead, it considers how to secure it) and ends by introducing a comparison with political science: ἔτι ὅμοιον καὶ εἴ τις τὴν πολιτικὴν φαίη ἄρχειν τῶν θεῶν, ὅτι ἐπιτάττει περὶ πάντα τὰ ἐν τῇ πόλει, “Moreover, (to say that practical wisdom has authority over theoretical wisdom) would be like saying that politics rules over the gods, because it gives commands concerning everything in the city” (6.13 1145a10–11). The scholium explains that things in the city include building temples and matters of worship. That does not mean, however, that political science has authority over the gods: τοῦναντίον γὰρ ὑπηρετεῖται μᾶλλον τοῦτοις, ὧν χάριν τὰς οἰκείας ἐνεργείας ἐνεργεῖ. ταῦτα γὰρ ἐστὶν αὐτῆς τέλη, “On the contrary, it rather serves them (the gods), for whose sake it engages in its own activities, for these are its ends” (lines 4–6). The idea is not difficult. Politicians are subordinate to the gods, and in matters of religion they act in the interest of the gods. I add only that the mention of τέλη, “ends,” picks up what Aristotle has said only a few lines earlier: namely, that in matters of choice, moral virtue makes correct the end, τὸ τέλος, and practical wisdom makes correct the means to the end, τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος (6.13 1145a5–6). As conceived of by Aristotle, and we may add Theophrastus, practical wisdom has a subordinate role to play both in regard to personal behavior and in regard to civic affairs. In the former, it considers how best to achieve the goals that come with moral virtue, i.e., that have been acquired through moral education. And in the latter, it considers how to achieve civic goals including how to please the gods through building temples and appropriate forms of worship.²³⁰

The remainder of the scholion focuses on Theophrastus. We learn that he elucidated the relationship between practical wisdom and theoretical wisdom by comparing the relationship between slaves who act as stewards, οἱ ἐπιτροπεύοντες and their masters. The former, we are told, do everything that must be done within the house, in order that their masters may have leisure for the pursuits appropriate to free men. Similarly practical wisdom arranges what must be done, in order that theoretical

²³⁰ Caveat: I am not claiming that practical wisdom has no role at all to play in establishing the ends that are acquired through moral education and through the traditions and constitution of a city state. On the contrary, through reflection, it clarifies and justifies them and in this way strengthens them.

wisdom may have leisure for the contemplation of things most valuable, ἔν' ἣ σοφία σχολήν ἄγει πρὸς τὴν θεωρίαν τῶν τιμιωτάτων (lines 10–11). The comparison is also found in the *Magna Moralia* 1.34 1198b12–20, where it can be, and in my judgment ought to be, seen as a sign of Theophrastean influence on the author of the *Magna Moralia*. There are, however, differences between 461 and the *MM*. While Theophrastus mentions contemplation, θεωρία, as the activity of theoretical wisdom, σοφία, the author of the *MM* speaks vaguely of its task, τὸ αὐτῆς (sc. σοφίας) ἔργον (1198b19).²³¹ In addition, the author of the *MM* speaks of practical wisdom holding down and disciplining the emotions: κατέχουσα τὰ πάθη καὶ ταῦτα σωφρονίζουσα (1198b19–20). Here in a short dependent clause the author tries to indicate what practical wisdom does to promote contemplation. Consistent with the analogy between household and soul—the steward does things within the household to secure leisure for the master—the author looks within the soul and speaks of practical wisdom repressing and disciplining the emotions. That applies to persons who have profited from moral education but have not achieved complete virtue, so that they are troubled from time to time by unnecessary and unwanted emotions. Practical wisdom is conceived of as coming to the rescue, perhaps producing arguments that will cause emotion to subside, or recommending cold water or strong medicine that will extinguish passion through bodily change.²³² But if that is the proper way to construe what we read in the *MM*, then we should note that here “practical wisdom,” φρόνησις, does not imply full virtue, i.e., having all the moral virtues without qualification (449A.31–37, 460).²³³ Moreover, it would be a mistake to think that practical wisdom is always engaged in promoting contemplation. Neither Aristotle nor Theophrastus wants to reduce the good life to hiding in one's study with the door closed. They recognize that a complete life makes room for family and civic involvement, both of which call for exercises of practical wisdom that may have little or nothing to do with promoting contemplation.

According to Jaeger (1929) p. 276, the image of a slave acting as steward and a master given to undisturbed leisure derives from Theophrastus' own experience as an elderly bachelor, who in his study feels himself to

²³¹ See Donini (1965) p. 136, who argues that the author of the *MM* has doubts concerning the Aristotelian doctrine of theoretical wisdom and contemplation.

²³² According to Donini (1965) pp. 144–145 the phrase κατέχουσα τὰ πάθη καὶ ταῦτα σωφρονίζουσα is to be explained by the importance that the author of the *MM* places on the πάθη and instincts that are natural and irrational.

²³³ Later in this comment, I return to the various uses of φρόνησις.

be master of the household, even though within the house he has nothing practical to say. Dirlmeier correctly rejects this interpretation, citing Aristotle's *Politics*, where we are told that masters with sufficient resources engage a steward to perform troublesome tasks, while they engage in politics and philosophy (1.7 1255b35–37). Nevertheless, Dirlmeier's chronological thesis is unacceptable. The *Magna Moralia* is not the work of the young Aristotle; rather, it is the work of a member of the Theophrastean or post-Theophrastean Peripatos. Jaeger is correct in holding that the author of *MM* is primarily following *NE* 6.13 but at the end adds from Theophrastus the image of steward and master (1198b12–20). Only we should keep in mind that almost certainly *NE* 6 was originally the fifth book of the *Eudemian Ethics*, so that 461 in no way contradicts the thesis that the ethics of Theophrastus is more closely related to the *EE* than to the *NE*.²³⁴

Characterizing stewards as slaves (οἱ ἐπιτροπεύοντες δοῦλοι [lines 7–8]) has been labeled careless or crude: practical wisdom cannot be declared in earnest a slave.²³⁵ Perhaps, but it has also been suggested that we have here a sign of Theophrastus' quarrel with Dicaearchus. And the same may be true of the *Magna Moralia*.²³⁶ The author writes, "Does this (practical wisdom) rule over everything in the soul, as is thought and puzzled over, or is it not so? For it would seem not (to rule over) things that are better; e.g., it does not seem to rule over theoretical wisdom. But he (Dicaearchus?) says²³⁷ that it has everything under its care and is authoritative in issuing orders" (1198b9–11). It is certainly possible that Dicaearchus' criticism of the life devoted to philosophy so provoked Theophrastus that he characterized practical wisdom as the slave of theoretical wisdom. But however interesting the possibility may be, I choose not to speculate further.

The final word of 461, τιμιώτατα, describes the objects of contemplation as "most valuable." This description is not present in the corresponding section of the *MM*. It is also missing at the end of the *NE* 6 1145a5–11. It is, however, present earlier at 6.7 1141a20, b3, where theoretical wisdom is associated with things most valuable. It is clear that Theophrastus agrees with Aristotle that the superior forms of being, i.e., god,

²³⁴ See the commentary on 449A, 493.

²³⁵ Dirlmeier (1958) p. 355.

²³⁶ Jaeger (1928) p. 408, (1929) pp. 277–278.

²³⁷ "Says" translates φησι. Jaeger (1929) p. 277 argues persuasively that here φησι is not used of an imagined opponent as is common in the later diatribe style. See above, Section 2, the comment on 446 with n. 88 on *inquit* in Seneca, *On Anger* 1.12.1.

the first heaven, are objects of theoretical wisdom. Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* E.2 1026a10–32, K.6 1064a28–b6 and the notes of Burnet p. 267 and Dirlmeier (1967) p. 453.

It would be interesting to know whether in his ethical writings Theophrastus was entirely consistent in the use of φρόνησις and its cognate forms. I.e., did he always or at least for most part use φρόνησις as a *terminus technicus* such that it refers to practical wisdom accompanied by the several moral virtues? We know that in a metaphysical context Theophrastus was prepared to describe the competent thinker as τέλειος and φρονῶν (*Metaphysics* 11 6a19). In a political context, it seems, he could use ἐμπειρία, φρόνησις and δεινότης interchangeably (codex Vaticanus Graecus 2306 fr. B 36–105 = **Appendix** 7.10–28; caveat: it is not entirely certain that the text is Theophrastean; see the commentary on 521). But those passages do not answer the question concerning Theophrastus' use of φρόνησις in his ethical writings.

462 Simplicius, *On Aristotle's Categories* 10 13a17–36 (CAG vol. 8 p. 402.12–15 and 19–22 Kalbfleisch)

Literature: Brandis (1860) p. 363; Heylbut (1888) p. 198; Knögel (1933) p. 24; Fortenbaugh (1983) p. 213, repr. (2003) p. 124, (1984) pp. 184–186

Text **462** (like that which follows) concerns the loss of moral virtue. It is taken from Simplicius' *Commentary on Aristotle's Categories* 10, where Aristotle recognizes four ways in which things are said to be opposed, ἀντικεισθαι: as relatives, as contraries, as privation and possession, as affirmation and negation (11b17–19).²³⁸ In what immediately precedes **462**, Simplicius has been elucidating Aristotle's claim that contraries, ἐναντία, differ from privation and possession, στέρησις and ἔξις: while contraries can change into each other, i.e., change goes in both directions, possession and privation cannot change into each other, for change from privation to possession is impossible (13a17–36).²³⁹ In regard to contraries Aristotle is careful to note that the thing capable of receiving them must be there, ὑπάρχοντος τοῦ δεκτικοῦ, and that he is not speaking of contraries that belong to something by nature, φύσει, in the way that hot

²³⁸ As in **438**, so here I have adopted the translations of Ackrill in the Clarendon translation (1963) p. 31 and reprinted in the Revised Oxford Translation (1984) p. 18.

²³⁹ To illustrate the impossibility of change from privation to possession, Aristotle tells us that once a man has lost his sight he does not regain it, and once he has lost his hair or teeth he does not regrow them (13a34–36).

necessarily belongs to fire (13a17–20).²⁴⁰ To illustrate the contraries that he has in mind, he tells that the healthy can become sick and the white black and the hot cold. We may add “and vice versa” (13a21–22). As a final example, Aristotle says that it is possible to become bad instead of good and good instead of bad: καὶ ἐκ σπουδαίου γε φαῦλον καὶ ἐκ φαύλου σπουδαῖον.²⁴¹ This example he fleshes out by focusing on the bad man, ὁ φαῦλος, who is led into better modes of behavior and discourse. Such a person, we are told, would make progress, if only a little, toward the better. And once he has begun to make progress, he can continue to change in the direction of virtue. If time permits, he might completely, τελείως, change into the contrary state (13a22–31).²⁴²

Whereas Aristotle calls attention to the improvement of a bad man, in 462 Simplicius concentrates on the reverse case: that in which the character of a virtuous man deteriorates. In lines prior to 462, Simplicius has already mentioned that the Stoics deny such a deterioration (p. 401.27–28, 34–35).²⁴³ At the beginning of 462, he takes notice of the Platonist Nicostratus,²⁴⁴ who claimed that Aristotle’s distinction between contraries on the one hand and possession and privation on the other had not been accurately explained. For contraries do not always change into each other: e.g., a good man does not become bad, ἀπὸ σπουδαίου φαῦλος οὐ γίνεται (lines 1–4).²⁴⁵ In what follows, we read that Theo-

²⁴⁰ The example of fire being hot by nature occurs first at 12b37–40, where it is explicitly stated that it is not possible for fire to be cold.

²⁴¹ The pair σπουδαῖον and φαῦλον are mentioned earlier to illustrate contraries that admit intermediaries. In their case, the intermediaries lack a ready name, so that one speaks of neither good nor bad (10. 12a13–25). Although Aristotle seems to be thinking primarily of good and bad in a moral sense (cf. neither just nor unjust at 12a24–25), he does recognize non-moral usage when he says that the pair are predicated both of men and of many other things (12a13–15) and varies the pair with ἀγαθόν and κακόν (12a24).

²⁴² On the Stoic view of the προκόπτων, the person making progress toward virtue, see the introduction to this section on “Virtue and Vice” *ad fin.*

²⁴³ Not all Stoics agreed. See Diogenes Laertius 7.127, where Chrysippus is opposed to Cleanthes. We are told that the former held that virtue could be lost on account of drunkenness and melancholy, but the latter held it to be unlosable, ἀναπόβλητος.

²⁴⁴ Nicostratus (2nd cent. AD) is known to us primarily through Simplicius’ *Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories*, in which the commentator records objections by Nicostratus to the Aristotelian categories. He is to be identified with the Athenian Claudius Nicostratus, who is named in a Delphic honorary decree (Syll. II³ 868). See, K. von Fritz, “Nikostratos 26” in *Paulys Realencyclopädie* 17.1 (1936) col. 547–551, H. Dörrie, “Nikostratos 6” in *Der kleine Pauly* 4 (1972) col. 127 and J. Dillon, *The Middle Platonists* (Ithaca: Cornell 1977, rev. ed. 1996) pp. 233–236.

²⁴⁵ Although a Platonist, Nicostratus is here drawing on Stoic doctrine (see v. Fritz, *op. cit.* col. 547).

phrastus offered a sufficient counter-argument and that Aristotle considered being unlosable, τὸ ἀναπόβλητον, uncharacteristic of anything human (lines 4–7). Controversy between Zeno and Theophrastus may stand behind this report, but that is not proven by the words of Simplicius. What is certain is that Theophrastus followed Aristotle in holding that virtue can be lost through serious illness and the like (cf. *Cat.* 8 8b29–35).²⁴⁶

The adjective ἀναπόβλητον (line 5) recalls Arius' summary of Peripatetic ethics, in which the happiness of human beings is marked off from that of a god, because the virtue of a human being can be lost: οὐδὲ γὰρ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀναπόβλητον ἔτι τῶν σπουδαίων τὸ παρὰπαν, δύνασθαι γὰρ ὑπὸ πλήθους καὶ μεγέθους ἀφαιρεθῆναι κακῶν, “for the virtue even of good men is not altogether unlosable, for it is able to be removed by many and great evils” (2.7.18 p. 132.21–133.2 Wachsmuth). Unclear is how this statement, which is entirely Aristotelian and Theophrastean, relates to the later statement: τὰ δὲ κτήσασθαι μὲν ἀποβαλεῖν δ' οὐ, ὥς εὐψυχίαν, ἀθauμασίαν “(it is possible) to acquire some (good things) but not to lose (them), like goodness of soul (and) absence of wonder” (2.7.19 p. 136.23–24). The text printed by Wachsmuth involves conjecture: he prints εὐψυχίαν, ἀθauμασίαν instead of the transmitted words εὐτυχίαν, ἀθανασίαν, “good fortune (and) immortality.”²⁴⁷

463 Plutarch, *Pericles* 38.1–2 (*BT* vol. 1.2 p. 45.10–20 Ziegler)

Literature: Brandis (1860) p. 348; Zeller (1879) p. 857; Heylbut (1888) p. 199; Walzer (1929) pp. 80–81; Knögel (1933) p. 24; de Vries (1975) p. 193; Fortenbaugh (1981b) p. 252, repr. (2003) p. 300, (1984) pp. 184–186; Stadter (1989) pp. 342–344; Wehrli-Wöhrle (2004) p. 529; Tsouni (2010) p. 171

Text **463** comes from the penultimate chapter of Plutarch's *Life of Pericles*, in which an account is given of Pericles' death. The account divides into

²⁴⁶ According to Stark pp. 68–69, Theophrastus differed from Aristotle in that he devoted special attention to the problem, to what extent bodily suffering causes change in the soul. A difference in emphasis may hold for certain writings, but fundamentally the two Peripatetics were in agreement that virtue can be affected for the worse through physiological disturbance.

²⁴⁷ The adjective ἀθauμαστός, which is cognate with ἀθauμασία, is used by Zeno of a proper attitude of the soul toward things that are neither noble nor shameful (Athenaeus, *The Sophists at Dinner* 6.23 233B = *SVF* vol. 1 p. 57 no. 239).

two parts. First, we are told that Pericles fell victim to the plague, which broke out in Athens early in the Peloponnesian War.²⁴⁸ The plague slowly wore out his body while undermining his lofty spirit. In this condition Pericles is reported to have shown a friend an amulet that women had hung around his neck, indicating in this way that he was in such bad condition that he tolerated foolishness (38.1–2 = 463). Second, Pericles is said to be near death. Friends were sitting around him, discussing his accomplishments. They assumed that Pericles was no longer conscious, but he was attending to their words and expressed amazement that they praised things that were due as much to fortune as to himself, while failing to mention what was most noble and greatest: namely, that he was not the cause of any Athenian wearing a black cloak of mourning (38.2). The second part is conceived of as chronologically later, and together the two parts are intended to give insights into the character of a great man facing death. Such a death scene was common in ancient biographies. We may compare Diogenes Laertius' account of Theophrastus' death. The philosopher is said to have commented on the shortness of life and emptiness of ambition (5.40–41 = 1.53–59). Cicero offers a variation. The dying Theophrastus took note of the shortness of life and complained that he was dying just when he had begun to perfect his understanding (*Tusculan Disputations* 3.69 = 43A.1–6). Reports of final words can be accurate, but often the historical value of such a report is not what counts. It is the way in which final words portray character.

Both halves of the death scene presented by Plutarch are intended to give insight into the character of Pericles. That is hardly surprising in a Plutarchan biography. But Plutarch gives more. He reports his source for the first half, namely, Theophrastus, and he refers to Theophrastus' *Ethics* (lines 4–5). In addition, he tells us that in the *Ethics* Theophrastus put the question whether character traits including virtue shift in response to fortunes (lines 4–6). According to Zeller, the example of Pericles is intended to answer the question in the negative. Being afflicted by a bodily affliction such as plague does not affect virtuous character. Zeller is quite wrong. Aristotle recognized that disease can seriously

²⁴⁸ The plague broke out in summer 430 and ravaged the population of Athens (Thucydides, *History* 2.47–54). It took Pericles' life in autumn 329, two years and six months into the Peloponnesian War (2.65.6). Stadter (1989) pp. 342–343 observes that Plutarch's description of Pericles' sickness differs from the symptoms of the plague as reported by Thucydides. Stadter concludes that if Plutarch is accurate, Pericles' death must have been caused by something other than the plague.

affect for the worse states or dispositions like virtue and knowledge (*Categories* 8 8b29–35), and Theophrastus held a similar view. As I read 463, the example of Pericles is a clear illustration (lines 5–9). That does not mean that the two Peripatetics thought that being virtuous is an unstable condition, which is easily lost. They did not, and in regard to Aristotle, we have the evidence not only of the *Categories* (*loc. cit.*) but also of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. In 1.10 1100b12–14 we are told that virtue is comparatively stable, and in 1100b20–22, 30–33 we are told that normally a virtuous man endures a misfortune appropriately (cf. *Politics* 7.13 1332a19–20, where sickness is explicitly mentioned).

According to de Vries p. 193, “Plutarch obviously thought, on Theophrastus’ authority, that in the last days of his life Pericles’ spirit was broken.” Focusing on the words ὥς σφόδρα κακῶς ἔχων ὅποτε καὶ ταυτὴν ὑπομένοι τὴν ἀβελτερίαν, “as if to say that he was in extremely bad condition, when he endured even this silliness” (lines 8–9), de Vries suggests that “Theophrastus found these words in his source and put an erroneous interpretation on them (followed by Plutarch). If they were found in that source, it is highly probable that they are an authentic ἀπόφθεγμα by Pericles, a caustic remark, which shows that his spirit was still able to indulge in self-irony. If the words in question are a comment added by Theophrastus (or Plutarch? or Theophrastus’ source?), Pericles’ showing of the amulet would be a rather meaningless gesture. Why should he have shown it to his friend, if not in order to make the remark in question?” I have quoted de Vries at length, for I find his suggestion interesting and possibly correct. It finds some support in the second half of the death scene. As stated above, Pericles is said to have followed what his friends were saying and to have added a remark of his own on fortune. We can say that both halves present an alert Pericles who exhibits considerable self-awareness. But that does not mean that Plutarch is wrong to speak of Pericles’ spirit being broken. Were Pericles not suffering from disease, his pride would have kept the women at bay, and he would not have diminished his accomplishments with a reference to fortune and the many others who had done as much (38.4). Moreover, calling attention to the amulet that had been placed around his neck might need no comment. In context, the very act of showing the amulet might be a statement of self-awareness. And more importantly, clever/meaningful last words were the stuff of death scenes, so that if we think the words ὥς—ἀβελτερίαν are to be understood as spoken words, we must allow the possibility that they were created or at least modified to suit the situation. Without more context material, I prefer caution, asserting only that

Theophrastus and Plutarch saw in Pericles an example of good character being affected for the worse by bad fortune in the form of sickness.²⁴⁹

The question whether bad fortune affects character is related to but different from the question whether bad fortune can disrupt and destroy the happiness of a virtuous individual. To be sure, the person who loses his virtue loses happiness, for happiness is impossible without virtue.²⁵⁰ But this person is not to be confused with the person who finds himself in most unfortunate circumstances and nevertheless remains virtuous. The Stoics would say that he continues to be happy, for happiness is dependent upon virtue apart from bodily and external factors. Aristotle and Theophrastus disagree.

The preceding remarks have all been concerned with bad fortune affecting character. It should be noted that good fortune, too, can affect character for the worse. At least men who lack virtue find it difficult to deal with prosperity (wealth, power and the like).²⁵¹ They are apt to become arrogant or worse and act in ways that they come to regret. See 505.5–6 (describing Alexander the Great) and the commentary on that text.

464 Photius, *Lexicon*, on *tumbogerontes* (part 2 p. 610.1–3 Porson)

Literature: none

Text **464** is taken from Photius' *Lexicon* (Λέξεων συναγωγή) and runs as follows: τυμβογέροντες· πέμπτη ἡλικία γερόντων, ὡς καὶ Θεόφραστος· παραπλήγες καὶ τῇ διανοίᾳ παρηλλαγμένοι, "*tumbogerontes* (tomb-old): the fifth age of old men, as Theophrastus too (says); disturbed and out of their mind." Photius is not our only source: see the upper apparatus of parallel texts to **464**, in which references to Aelius Dionysius, the *Suda*, the *Etymologium genuinum* and the *Etymologium magnum* will be found.

²⁴⁹ On Theophrastus' use of historical material to elucidate ethical issues, see above, Section 1 "Writings on Ethics" on **437**.

²⁵⁰ As Aristotle puts it, happiness is activity in accordance with moral virtue *NE* 1.7 1098a16–17, 1.13 1102a5–6, *EE* 2.11219a38.

²⁵¹ When good fortune is detrimental to character, it is typically the acquisition of external goods (money, office, honors) that are the cause. Bodily goods like health and specific bodily attributes like speed and strength are less likely to affect character. But here, too, in the absence of virtue, bodily excellences can cause excessive pride and led to obnoxious behavior.

That a (very) old man is near death and will soon have need of a tomb or grave²⁵² is a fact of life that will have encouraged the use of τύμβος, “tomb,” to characterize²⁵³ and to address an old man²⁵⁴ in a negative manner.²⁵⁵ In addition, the two nouns τύμβος and γέρον were joined together to form the compound adjective τυμβογέρον, which is at once comical and demeaning (Pollux, *Nomenclature* 2.16, *LG* vol. 9.1 p. 10 Bethe).

In 464 Photius explains τυμβογέροντες with the phrase πέμπτη ἡλικία γερόντων, after which reference is made to Theophrastus, ὡς καὶ Θεόφραστος. The explanation is focused on the first part of the compound adjective, i.e., on τυμβο-: “fifth age” clarifies “tomb,” while “old men” in the genitive case, γερόντων, simply repeats the nominative, γέροντες. That introduces a certain ambiguity, for it makes possible two quite different interpretations. Either the life of a man (from birth to death) has five stages and the fifth stage belongs to very old men, or there are five stages of old age, the last being associated with the tomb and thereby with imminent death. The first interpretation presents difficulties. In the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle recognizes three stages (2.12–14 1388b31–1390b13), and we might expect Theophrastus to do the same. In a certain context (perhaps discussing the use of τυμβογέροντες in comedy²⁵⁶), he might give extreme old age special recognition by making it a special stage in life, but why would he make it the fifth stage and not the fourth? We are told that Pythagoras recognized four stages of life, each being twenty years in length: those of a boy, a youth, a young man and an old man (Diodorus of Sicily, *Library of History* 10.9.5).²⁵⁷ Perhaps there was some context in which Theophrastus played with these four stages and added a fifth, but I find that a stretch. Should we then say that the fifth stage is the last in a quinquartite old age. Perhaps in the work *On Old Age* (436 no. 18), Theophrastus chose to divide the progression of

²⁵² Cf. Phrynichus, *Sophistic Preparation* s.v. τυμβογέρον. There the lexicographer (2nd cent. AD) explains τυμβογέρον as ὁ τύμβου χρεῖαν ἔχων, “the person having need of a tomb” (I. Bekker, *Anecdota Graeca* vol. 1 p. 66.12).

²⁵³ E.g., Euripides, *Medea* 1209 and *The Children of Hercules* 167–168.

²⁵⁴ E.g., Aristophanes, *Lysistrata* 372.

²⁵⁵ In *The Children of Hercules* 166–167 the unflattering and generally negative force of this usage is well brought out by the addition of τὸ μηδὲν ὄντος, ὡς εἰπεῖν ἔπος “being that nothing, as the saying puts it.”

²⁵⁶ Regarding comedy, see I. Demianczuk, *Supplementum Comicum*, Aristophanes no. 55 (Kraków 1912) pp. 25–26.

²⁵⁷ Similarly Diogenes Laertius 8.10.

old age into five stages, of which the last is marked by the tomb. But there is no second text to support this suggestion,²⁵⁸ so that I leave the issue undecided.

Someone might ask why 464 has been placed last under the heading “Virtue and Vice.” The question is a fair one in that 464 makes no explicit reference to virtue or vice. Indeed, the text might have been more at home under, say, “The Ludicrous,” for in certain contexts τυμβογέρον could be central to a jest that has bite.²⁵⁹ Or the text might have been placed under “Human Physiology,” for many of the problems of old age are directly attributable to physiological changes in the body.²⁶⁰ And that holds in the case of old men who are disturbed and out of their mind: παραπλήγες καὶ τῇ διανοίᾳ παρηλλαγμένοι (line 2 of 464). To be sure, these words need not be Theophrastean (only the first part of 464, the idea of a fifth age, is clearly attributed to Theophrastus). Moreover, there may be cases in which the derangement of old men is more psychological than physiological, but it remains true that most cases, like those attributable to Alzheimer’s disease, are at root physiological. That said, there is one good reason for including 464 in the section on virtue and vice: the mental disturbances that come with aging and affect so many older people remove the ability to make sound choices. The immediately preceding texts, 462 and 463, make clear that virtue is not unlosable: it can be lost through sickness. Now 464 helps us understand that old age, too, can undermine virtuous character.

Since the word τυμβογέροντες refers explicitly to old age, it is reasonable to assign 464 to the work *On Old Age*, but that may not be correct. For 464 could come from *On Comedy* or *On the Ludicrous* (666

²⁵⁸ The idea of dividing old age into several stages is encouraged by Phrynichus, *op. cit.*, who first tells us that τυμβογέρον is applied to very old men, and then adds “e.g., being a tomb and no longer a man on account of a long old age.” After that Phrynichus lists four names for the man who is old. The first is ὠμογέρον, “raw/fresh old age,” which is explained by reference to the man who has grown old before the appropriate time. That suggests a first stage of old age (one that is premature), and given the opening references to “very” old men and a “long” old age, we might expect Phrynichus to develop the idea of different stages of old age. But in fact what follows is more about names than stages: we are told that γέρον is applicable to all old men, and σύφαρ is explained as a foreign or strange word meaning the garment of a snake. Moreover, τυμβογέρον is the fourth name, not a fifth, which would make Phrynichus’ text more relevant to 464.

²⁵⁹ Cf. 711.1.

²⁶⁰ An example is provided by 348, which concerns sneezing and is located among the texts on human physiology.

no. 22 and 23), in which Theophrastus will have discussed verbal humor. Or it might derive from *On Dispositions* (436 no. 1), in which not only the character of old men may have been discussed, but also interesting words like τυμβογέγων will have attracted the attention of Adrastus. He is reported to have written at length on history and style or expression, λέξις, in *On Dispositions* (437.2–4). The list of possibilities might be extended (why not add *On Lives*?), but it is already long enough to make clear the risk involved in assigning fragments to lost works.

4. *Education, Exhortation and Censure*

When Americans—I am one—speak and write about education, they naturally focus on the subjects taught in their primary and secondary schools and in their colleges and universities. In regard to schools, they think of a basic education in reading, writing and arithmetic, to which literature, history and science are added as a student's education progresses. There are also "enrichment" courses in music and art, and most likely some training in sport or physical education. In regard to colleges and universities, Americans think of a more specialized education in one or more of the areas already mentioned. In addition, there are new subjects that are oriented toward business and trades as well as professions like law and medicine. The preceding is woefully selective, but it may serve to highlight a striking omission: namely, training in values, i.e., moral education, which aims at producing young men and women who hold particular values. To be sure, such training can be found in certain schools and colleges, typically those that are private and especially those that have a church affiliation. But in public institutions, those paid for by tax dollars, and in many private ones as well, moral education is a matter of example and not a recognized part of the curriculum. There may be courses in ethics, but they rarely advocate a particular set of values. Rather, they analyze concepts, critique arguments for and against a particular doctrine, and compare different moral systems without taking a clear stand in favor of one system or another. That reflects America's separation of church and state as well as its multi-cultural make up.

In some respects education in Greece during the early Hellenistic period was quite similar. Students received a basic education in reading, writing and arithmetic; subsequently grammar and literature, geometry and arithmetical calculus were added. There was also training in

music and physical fitness.²⁶¹ Higher education was provided especially by rhetoricians and philosophers. In addition, there were physicians who taught medicine, but there were no teachers of law, and technical education (e.g., in engineering and surveying) was largely ignored. In these areas apprenticeship was the norm.²⁶² Moreover and for our purposes most important, a systematic training in values was rare. Aristotle makes the point when he says that Sparta is one of the few city-states in which educating young people is a matter of concern; in most states each person lives as he wishes, laying down ordinances for his children and wife (*NE* 10.9 1180a24–29). That may seem like positive confirmation of our present reluctance to teach virtue, but Aristotle was of a different mind. And in his *Ethics*, he points out that persons who have not been brought up properly are unlikely to respond to rational arguments concerning correct behavior. Training, he tells us, must begin with quite young people who live by their emotions. They must be trained to love what is good and to hate what is bad, and to act in accordance with these loves and hates, so that they are not only familiar with good behavior but also find it pleasant. Later when their capacity to reason has developed, they will be able to understand why their early training has been good for them and for the community in which they live. Indeed, they will become stronger in their loves and hates and therefore better able to withstand adverse fortune and strong temptation (10.9 1179a33–80a12). That is not the result that one expects from a modern graduate course in ethics. Perhaps it is expected in seminaries, but in secular colleges and universities there is so little agreement concerning correct loves and hates that the prudent teacher makes no claim to teach and strengthen the loves and hates that characterize a virtuous individual. More likely, he promises an appreciation of diversity.

Much more could be said about Aristotle's views on moral education, especially his remarks in *Politics* 8, but Aristotle's views are well known and often commented upon in the scholarly literature. Here I prefer to call attention to a single aspect of moral education: namely, the use of music to instill values. Aristotle recognized that young people are unable to endure whatever is unpleasant and that music is not only naturally

²⁶¹ In *Politics* 8.3 1337b23–26 Aristotle identifies four branches of education: γράμματα, γυμναστική, μουσική, γράφικη, “reading and writing, gymnastics, music, drawing.”

²⁶² For an overview, see H. Marrou, *A History of Education in Antiquity*, translated by G. Lamb, New York: Sheed and Ward 1956.

pleasant but also imitative of moral character. Accordingly, children can enjoy the pleasures of music and at the same be habituated to enjoy the virtuous characters and deeds that are depicted in rhythm and song (8.5 1340a1–b19). There is a slide here, but it is a virtuous slide. At first children enjoy the natural pleasures of music, but in time they transfer this pleasure to the virtuous characters and deeds depicted in song and dance. And once they have been habituated to delight in depictions of virtuous character, they have all but acquired a delight in virtuous character itself. Over time and with proper exposure to virtuous individuals doing what is noble, they will themselves become virtuous. They will love what is virtuous, hate what is vicious and perform noble deeds.²⁶³

In advancing this view of musical education, Aristotle is drawing on Plato, especially the *Laws*, in which virtue is referred to properly trained loves and hates (*Laws* 2.1 653B2–3; cf. *Pol.* 8.5 1340a15). And both philosophers recognize the limitations of music unaccompanied by words. In particular, Plato disapproves of wordless melodies and rhythms on the ground that it is difficult to tell what they represent (2.11 669E1–4), while Aristotle expresses disapproval of the aulos because it makes the use of words impossible (8.6 1341a25). That Theophrastus followed Plato and Aristotle in recognizing the role of music in moral education is not to be doubted. And on one reading of 720, he recognized limitations to the role of music, possibly because he too found music apart from words difficult to interpret. See, below, this section, the commentary on 720.

465 Stobaeus, *Anthology* 2.31.124 (vol. 2 p. 240.1–27 Wachsmuth)

Literature: Brandis (1860) p. 347; Sbordone (1935/1971) p. 171; Steinmetz (1959) pp. 230–235; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 191–193; Wehrli-Wöhrle (2004) p. 549; Millett (2007) pp. 34–35

Texts 465 is found in Stobaeus' *Anthology* under the heading Περί ἀγωγῆς καὶ παιδείας, *On Training and Education*. As usual, the poetic excerpts precede those from prose authors, though the division is not perfect.²⁶⁴ 465 is preceded and followed by comparatively long excerpts from the Stoic Musonius.²⁶⁵

²⁶³ I am largely repeating what I said in *Aristotle on Emotion* (1975a) pp. 48–49.

²⁶⁴ The prose authors begin with Xenocrates and Aeschines, after whom come Euripides and an unidentified comic poet. Prose begins again with Plato (2.31.22–26 p. 204.13–205.25 Wachsmuth).

²⁶⁵ Gaius Musonius Rufus lived in the 1st cent. AD and was the teacher of Epictetus. The excerpts that surround 465 are 2.31.123 p. 235.23–239.29 and 2.31.125–126 p. 240.28–247.2 W.

465 begins with the statement that education, παιδεία, improves the souls of men by increasing cooperation and affability (lines 1–3). It then draws a distinction between the many and those who have enjoyed a liberal upbringing and have the means to live in whatever way they choose.²⁶⁶ The latter are to be faulted, if they fail to ask what life is best (lines 3–6). The importance of choosing a particular manner of life is developed first by comparison with choosing a city, friends and relatives (lines 6–10), and then by comparison with embarking on a journey (lines 11–14). The latter comparison becomes the occasion for emphasizing the difficulty in undoing a bad choice. A person who has acquired an established character finds it all but impossible to change his ways. “One chooses and judges other things better, but nevertheless goes on living in the accustomed manner,” προαιρεῖται <μὲν> καὶ ἕτερά γε προκρίνει βελτίω, καταζῇ δ’ ὁμως ἐν τοῖς εἰωθόσιν (lines 19–20).²⁶⁷ So much is straightforward: it accords with common sense and is what we might expect from a pupil of Aristotle.²⁶⁸ Nevertheless, we may ask whether some qualification is needed, for it is not clear that any person including the man of means is ever entirely free to choose how he will live. For habits are acquired early in life, when a person is still under the influence of his parents and teachers, and these habits are likely to become deeply ingrained. It may be that in another context—perhaps in a work like Περὶ ἑκονοσίου, *On the Voluntary* (436 no. 6)—Theophrastus expressed himself more fully and carefully concerning the limitations involved in choosing the best mode of life, but no text tells us that. Hence we must read 465 with a measure of caution, recognizing that what Stobaeus offers is an excerpt from an unidentified work, whose style is protreptic and not characterized by careful distinctions.

The permanence or stability of habits that have been acquired over a long time is a fact of daily life. The poets of New Comedy treated the matter by focusing on the humorous consequences of such habits.²⁶⁹ Educators and philosophers focused on their serious side. Aristotle says explic-

²⁶⁶ The recognition that wealth is important for choosing and living the best life is not surprising. See Chapter III “Titles of Books” no. 19a *On Wealth* and below, the introduction to Section 9 on “Wealth.”

²⁶⁷ The mention of choosing in line 19 invites comparison with what Aristotle says concerning the morally weak individual: his choice, προαίρεσις, is good (*NE* 7.10 1152a17), but he acts contrary to his choice, παρὰ προαίρεσιν (7.8 1151a7).

²⁶⁸ Concerning Aristotle, see the paragraph that follows.

²⁶⁹ In his work *On Comedy*, Theophrastus reported a humorous story concerning the people of Tiryas and observed that a long-standing habit is incapable of being cured (709.9–10).

itly that habit is like nature and therefore difficult to change (*NE* 7.10 1152a30–31,²⁷⁰ cf. *Rhet.* 1.11 1370a6–7). As 465 shows, Theophrastus was in full agreement: “Time does not provide opportunity to change, and nature, ἡ φύσις, is unable to learn differently, μεταμανθάνειν, what is better, once it is trained, ἐντροφῇ, in worse ways” (lines 17–19). The verbs μεταμανθάνειν and ἐντρέφεσθαι are similarly combined in the *Misopogon* of Julian the Apostate: “Is it now impossible to put aside (my character) and to learn differently, μεταμαθεῖν, if previously some boorish character was inculcated, ἐντροφῇ, in me. Habit, men say, is second nature, δευτέρη φύσις. To fight against nature is hard; to remove a practice of thirty years is quite difficult (353A).” Although Julian mentions Theophrastus only a few lines later together with Plato, Socrates and Aristotle (353B), it would be rash to claim a direct connection between the words of Julian and 465. Friedrich Lenz connects Julian’s words with Democritus: “Nature and teaching, ἡ φύσις καὶ ἡ διδασχῇ, are similar; for teaching transforms a man and in transforming him creates his nature, φυσιοποιεῖ” (VS 68B33 Diels-Kranz).²⁷¹ For our purposes, the important point is that Theophrastus is in good company, holding that longstanding habits are apt to become ingrained and therefore difficult to remove.²⁷²

At the beginning of 465, we read that education seems to tame the souls (of men) by removing brutality and lack of sense: δοκεῖ γὰρ ἡ παιδεία ... ἡμεροῦν τὰς ψυχὰς, ἀφαιροῦσα τὸ θηριῶδες καὶ ἄγνωμον (lines 1–2). According to Steinmetz (1959) pp. 231–232, the phrase τὸ θηριῶδες καὶ ἄγνωμον refers to the two halves of the bipartite soul: τὸ ἄλογον and τὸ λόγον ἔχον, the alogical half and the logical half.²⁷³ I would be more inclined to follow Steinmetz, were the article τό repeated before ἄγνωμον. As it is, I prefer to construe the phrase τὸ θηριῶδες καὶ ἄγνωμον as a compound description of the condition that education removes from the soul. Since Theophrastus has just spoken of “taming the souls,” ἡμεροῦν τὰς ψυχὰς, and since there is no explicit mention or even suggestion that the souls are bipartite, it seems sensible to

²⁷⁰ Aristotle goes on to cite the sophist and poet Evenus, who observed that longstanding practice ends as nature, φύσις (7.10 1152a31–33).

²⁷¹ “Ἔθος Δευτέρη Φύσις,” *Transactions of the American Philological Association* 73 (1942) p. 218.

²⁷² See 503.2 and 504.8–9, where Theophrastus connects the nature, φύσις, of each person with fate. In doing so, he is likely to be thinking not only of innate nature but also of acquired nature, which may be referred to as second nature. See the commentary on 503 and 504.

²⁷³ On the bipartite soul, see above, the introduction to Section 3 on “Virtue and Vice.”

understand ἀπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς after ἀφαιροῦσα τὸ θηριώδες καὶ ἄγνωμον, without introducing the notion of bipartition. In fairness to Steinmetz, I want to acknowledge that one might find support for his view in the fact that Aristotle discusses γνώμη among the virtues of thought that belong to the logical half of the bipartite soul (*NE* 6.1 1139a1, 5), but on reflection it seems something of a stretch to interpret Theophrastus' use of ἄγνωμον as it occurs in 465 (line 2) on the basis of a quite separate discussion of γνώμη *qua* virtue of thought (*NE* 6.11 1143a19–24). Much the same holds for Steinmetz' attempt to support his view by reference to Theophrastus' rhetorical definition of γνώμη. The definition runs: γνώμη ἐστὶ καθόλου ἀπόφασις ἐν τοῖς πρακτικοῖς, “A maxim is a general assertion concerning matters of conduct” (676.7).²⁷⁴ From such a rhetorical definition, it would be rash to conclude anything concerning Theophrastus' use of ἄγνωμον in a text like 465.

465 begins with a reference to Theophrastus in the genitive case, Θεοφράστου. That suggests an excerpt that preserves Theophrastus' wording. To be sure, it is impossible to prove that no changes have been made in the course of transmission, but if changes were made, they are not obvious and in my judgment minimal. Moreover, the stylistic features of the text are so striking and so pervasive that it is hard to view the text as other than a continuous whole composed by an author, who had a keen interest in style. I am thinking especially of the use of metaphor and comparison. Instances of metaphor are the verb ἡμεροῦν, “to tame” (line 2) for “to educate or civilize”;²⁷⁵ the phrase τὸ θηριώδες, “the brutish” (line 2) for “what is savage or cruel in human character”;²⁷⁶ the adjective ὑγρότερα, “wetter” (line 3) for “compliant”; the verb ἐγκαλεῖν, “to bring a charge or accusation” (line 6) for “to reproach”; the participle κυβεύοντες, “rolling dice” (line 13) for “leaving to chance.” There are two comparisons that may be thought of as extended metaphors. The

²⁷⁴ For discussion of 676, see *Commentary* 8 on rhetoric and poetics pp. 205–207.

²⁷⁵ The verb ἡμεροῦν is used in regard to animals and plants. See, e.g., Aristotle, *History of Animals* 1.1 488a29 and Theophrastus, *Plant Explanations* 2.14.1 and 5.15.6. The application to men is metaphorical but not uncommon. See, e.g., Plato, *Laws* 11.13 935A, where the Athenian Stranger speaks of abuse making wild a soul that had once been tamed through education: ὑπὸ παιδείας ἡμερώθη ποτέ. For the cognate adjective, see, e.g., *Laws* 6.12 765E–766A, where the Stranger characterizes man as a tame animal, ἡμερον, and says that the man who combines a favorable natural disposition with a good education becomes a most blessed and tamed animal: θειότατον ἡμερώτατόν τε ζῷον.

²⁷⁶ Cf. Aristotle, *NE* 7.1 1145a26–27, 32–33, where we are told that θηριότης, brutishness or bestiality, is generically different from human vice and that θηριώδης is used as a term of opprobrium for persons who exceed others in vice.

first compares choosing a way of life with choosing a city, friends and relatives (lines 7–10). The second also concerns choosing a way of life, but this time the comparison is with making a journey (lines 11–17).²⁷⁷ The phrase ὁδὸν βαδίζειν, “to travel the road” (line 11), becomes a metaphor for traveling, βαδίζοντι (line 16), through life. And the nouns ἐκτροπή, “turning off” (line 15), and ἀναστροφή, “turning back” (line 16), apply first to the traveler who changes direction and then to the person who attempts to change the course of his life.

Also noteworthy are the following parenthetical phrases: καὶ τοῦτο πάντες ὁμολογοῦσιν, “and all agree on this” (line 1) preceding the metaphor of taming souls; τὸ λεγόμενον δὴ τοῦτο, “as one says” (line 13) used to introduce the metaphor of rolling dice; ὅπερ πολλάκις λέγεται, “what is said repeatedly” (line 20) used to introduce the commonplace “all men deliberate least concerning themselves.”²⁷⁸ In addition, we find the subordinate conjunction εἰ, “if” (line 11) postponed to a position midway through its clause, whereby prominence is given to the change in comparison: i.e., the change from choosing a city to making a journey. There is also the expanded clause ἂν οὕτω τύχῃ, “if it so happens” (line 14), where a single word like ἴσως or τάχα, “perhaps” would do. Whatever one thinks of the parenthetical phrases, a postponed “if” and an expanded clause, the use of metaphor and comparison—taming the brutish, choosing a city, making a journey, rolling dice—strikes me as quite effective. The use lends credence to Cicero’s favorable judgment concerning Theophrastus’ style.²⁷⁹ And when Athenaeus tells us that Adrastus wrote five books *On Questions of History and Style in Theophrastus’ (work) On Dispositions* (437.2–4), we can imagine that Adrastus found much to discuss in regard to style.

There are several works to which 465 might be attributed: e.g., *On Dispositions*, *Ethics*, *Ethical Lectures*, *On Education* or *On Virtue* or *On Temperance*, *On Bringing up Children*, another work on the same topic (436 no. 1–3, 9–11). Since education, παιδεία, occurs prominently in the first line, *On Education* or *On Virtue* or *On Temperance* is a likely but not certain candidate.

²⁷⁷ The idea of choosing the correct road or path through life is hardly new with Theophrastus. See Prodicus’ account of Hercules at the crossroads (VS 84B2 Diels-Kranz = Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 2.1.21–34).

²⁷⁸ These phrases, especially the second, recall the apologetic metaphor (689A–B) and the recognition that certain phrases may be used to soften a metaphor (690), on which see *Commentary* 8 (2005c) on rhetoric and poetics pp. 286–292.

²⁷⁹ See above, Section 1 “Writings on Ethics” the commentary on 437 p. 241 n. 20.

- 466A** Fārābī, *Prerequisites to the Study of Aristotle's Philosophy* 3, The Science with Which one Ought to Start the Study of Philosophy (p. 52.19–23 Dieterici)
- 466B** Abū-l-Faraj ibn-aṭ-Ṭayyib, *Commenatry of Aristotle's Categories*, Second Lecture (cod. Cairo, Dār al-Kutub, Hikma 1M, f. 5^v)²⁸⁰

Literature: Fortenbaugh (1984) p. 198; Gutas (1985) pp. 115–123, repr. (2000) Chapter X

Texts **466A** and **466B** are two Arabic texts; the first dating from the first half of the tenth century AD and the second a century later. Dimitri Gutas has interpreted the texts in terms of the Alexandrian discussion of the proper subject with which to begin the study of philosophy. He first refers to Ammonius, who asked where one ought to begin, πόθεν ἀρχτέον, and answered by placing logic before ethics on the grounds that understanding ethics requires logic. Gutas then moves on to Simplicius, Philoponus, Olympiodorus and Elias, showing that there was a progressive increase in the number of subjects under consideration (physics and mathematics were added to logic and ethics) and that there developed an interest in who advocated one or the other of the subjects. Among the Greek sources, Elias stands at the end of the development (mid-sixth century). He refers logic to Andronicus, physics to Boethus, and both mathematics and ethics to certain Platonists. Apparently the assignation of ethics to Platonists was deemed unsatisfactory, and in Paul the Persian, writing in Pahlavi or possibly Syriac but preserved in an Arabic translation,²⁸¹ ethics is assigned to the teachers of Aristotle's books (second half of the sixth century).²⁸² A more specific assignation is found in our Arabic sources. Fārābī (**466A**) has been thought to refer to Theophrastus, but in that case the transliteration in Arabic of the proper name (?twfrsts) would be unusual for Theophrastus (normally transliterated t?wfrsts). Gutas thinks that someone else such as Adrastus is more likely.²⁸³ In con-

²⁸⁰ Since the publication of the text-translation volumes, the text of Ibn- aṭ-Ṭayyib has been published in Cleophea Ferrari, ed., *Der Kategorienkommentar von Abū l-Farag 'Abdallāh ibn-aṭ-Ṭayyib = Aristoteles Semitico-Latinus* 19 (Leiden: Brill, 2006) p. 9.19–27.

²⁸¹ Gutas (1985) p. 119.

²⁸² See D. Gutas, "Paul the Persian on the Classification of the Parts of Aristotle's Philosophy: A Milestone between Alexandria and Baḡdād," *Der Islam* 60 (1983) pp. 238–239, repr. (2000) Chapter IX.

²⁸³ See the discussion of Gutas in "Adraste d'Aphrodise—Témoignages Arabes" in *Dictionnaire des Philosophes Antiques Supplément*, ed. R. Goulet (Paris: CNRS Éditions 2003) pp. 56–57.

trast, Ibn-aṭ-Ṭayyib (466B), who is drawing on the same source as Fārābī, clearly names Theophrastus. To be sure, the reading depends on a unique manuscript, but there is no good reason to doubt what the manuscript offers. As Gutas comments, “By the time Ibn-aṭ-Ṭayyib was writing, the name of Theophrastus would be far more easily recognizable than that of Adrastus or somebody equally less well known in the Arabic tradition.”²⁸⁴

Gutas’ argument is primarily concerned with the order in which the subjects of philosophy are to be studied. He correctly concludes that naming Theophrastus in connection with the πόθεν ἀρχτέον of philosophical studies is a fabrication that postdates Elias. It belongs to a tendentious retelling of the history of philosophy.²⁸⁵ That does not mean, however, that Theophrastus ignored the importance of moral training as a prerequisite for the philosophic study of ethics. Aristotle makes the point when he asserts that the person who is going to be an adequate student of things noble and just and generally of political matters must be trained in good habits (*NE* 1.4 1095b4–6). Theophrastus will have been of like mind. Even if 466A–B cannot be said to establish Theophrastus’ view concerning the importance of early training in good habits, neither text errs in connecting Theophrastus with such training: “Whoever does not improve his own morals cannot learn anything” (466A), and “It is incumbent on a man first to train his soul, accustom it to good habits” (466B).²⁸⁶

While both texts are correct to recognize the importance of acquiring good habits, there is some confusion or carelessness in the way they relate the acquisition of good habits to the philosophic study of ethics. 466A seems to identify the two (“that is to say”) or perhaps the philosophic study of ethics is never in play (“the science of improving morals” sounds overly practical). 466B seems to introduce the need to acquire good habits as an argument for or explanation of why the philosophic study of ethics (“the ethical sciences”) comes first. There is some truth here. Without good habits, one may find it difficult to learn anything let alone

²⁸⁴ Gutas (1985) p. 121.

²⁸⁵ *Ibid.* p. 122.

²⁸⁶ 466A and B speak of “the followers of Theophrastus” and “another group, whose leader was Theophrastus.” That may reflect caution on the part of whoever introduced the name of Theophrastus into the discussion of πόθεν ἀρχτέον, but it may be largely stylistic. We may compare the Greek phrase οἱ περὶ followed by a proper name. Often the phrase is of little or no importance; the person named is the subject of what follows. A Theophrastean example is 87E.2. Huby comments, “In this case we may accept the standard view that this (the Greek phrase οἱ περὶ Θεόφραστον) means no more than Theophrastus” (*Commentary* 2 [2007] on logic, p. 50). But Huby is also careful to note that there are cases in which the standard view does not apply (p. 30 n. 46).

ethics, but the importance of good habits does not contradict the need to study logic before philosophic ethics. And that takes us back too Ammonius, who held that logic is needed for the study of ethics, but also allowed that prior to studying logic one should be trained in good morals.²⁸⁷

661 Stobaeus, *Anthology* 4.28.7 (vol. 4 p. 678.6–8 Hense)

662 Stobaeus, *Anthology* 2.31.31 (vol. 2 p. 207.10–14 Wachsmuth)

Literature: Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 198–200; Mirhady (1992) pp. 241–243; Wehrli-Wöhrle (2004) p. 549

We have here two texts, **661** and **662**, which have been printed in the section on “Politics.” Both have as their subject the education of women. **661** is taken from the fourth book of Stobaeus’ *Anthology*, where it occurs under the heading Οἰκονομικός, “Estate/Household Manager” (p. 677.2 H). An excerpt from Euripides precedes, and one from Plutarch follows. **662** is taken from Stobaeus’ second book, where it is found under the heading Περί ἀγωγῆς καὶ παιδείας, “On Training and Education” (p. 199.13 W). It is preceded by an excerpt from Aristotle and followed by one from Iamblichus. Later under the same heading comes **465**, which is discussed above.

Theophrastus believed that women have a role to play within the household and that they should be educated accordingly. Such a view is hardly surprising in a member of the early Peripatos. Aristotle had asserted that women need to be educated, since half the free population of a city-state is composed of women (Pol. 1.13 1260b15–20). He also held that women are fundamentally different from men (1260a13) and should play a different role than men.²⁸⁸ And while they must possess the several virtues, e.g. temperance, courage and justice, their virtues will be different from those of men (1260a18–21). Theophrastus was of a like mind, but neither Peripatetic deemed woman’s role insignificant. They recognized that women are intelligent, and for that reason they assigned them a role that required the ability to plan and to make critical judgments.

²⁸⁷ Gutas (1985). p. 116, where reference is made to Ammonius, *On Aristotle’s Categories*, preface (CAG 4.4 p. 5.31–6.8).

²⁸⁸ Put succinctly, role should fit capacity. See Plato, *Rep.* 5.4 454B4–E4, and for discussion see my *Aristotle on Emotion* (1975a) pp. 57–61 and “Aristotle on Slaves and Women” in *Articles on Aristotle* vol. 2, ed. J. Barnes, M. Schofield and R. Sorabji (London: Duckworth 1977) pp. 135–139.

According to 661, Theophrastus recognized that a woman can be clever, δεινή; he also believed that her cleverness should be employed in matters of household management, ἐν τοῖς οἰκονομικοῖς and not in political affairs, ἐν τοῖς πολιτικοῖς. According to 662, Theophrastus held that educating women in letters is quite important, but he wanted to limit this education to what is useful for household management, μέχρι χρησίμου πρὸς οἰκονομίαν. By way of explanation, he added that further refinement will make women lazy in regard to their other responsibilities as well as garrulous and officious/overzealous, ἀργοτέρας τε ποιεῖ πρὸς τὰλλα καὶ λάλους καὶ περιέργους. Such a position will find few defenders today in western societies, but not all limitations need be objectionable.²⁸⁹ Moreover, within the Peripatos the idea of setting limits was not restricted to the education of women. I cite Aristotle, who discusses education aimed at political or civic virtue and in this context asserts that instruction in music should remain on an amateur level (*Politics* 8.6 1340b40–1341a17, 8.6 1341b8–18).

Especially important may be what text 662 does not say: namely, that all women (and only women) are lazy, garrulous and overzealous. There are, of course, women who are born chatterers, but there also men of this kind.²⁹⁰ Theophrastus was well aware of that, and in his *Characters* he included two sketches of men who talk too much: ὁ ἀδολέσχης, the garrulous man, and ὁ ἄλαλος, the loquacious man (3 and 7). Also included in the *Characters* is a sketch of the overzealous man (13). For laziness, I refer to text 21: Theophrastus is reported to have spoken reprovingly to Nicomachus, the son of Aristotle, who was lazy in doing philosophy. It may be objected that a collection of humorous sketches and a questionable anecdote prove little about Theophrastean doctrine. Perhaps, but the *Characters* demonstrate that Theophrastus had a keen eye for how people behave. He will not have been blind to the failings that some men share with some women.

Finally I refer to text 564, in which Athenaeus cites Theophrastus who said that in some places contests occur between women concerning temperance and household management, περὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ οἰκονομίας. Concerning the location of these contests, we are given less than

²⁸⁹ E.g., in the case of young people, limitations seem quite in order, and all the more so in the case of natural slaves (assuming that they do exist).

²⁹⁰ Drawing on the ps.-Aristotelian *Problems*, we might say that they suffer from an excess of warm black bile (30.1 953b10, 954a34). For a humorous encounter between Theophrastus and a babbler, see 452.

precise information: ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς βαρβάροις, “as among the barbarians.” Athenaeus goes on to say (presumably following Theophrastus) that beauty contests occur in other places. Beauty is said to be a matter of fortune and nature, whereas honor ought to be the reward for temperance. There is no mention here of education in letters, but the concern with temperance, a moral virtue, and the explicit recognition that beauty is prone to intemperance may be said to complement what we read in 662.

720 Philodemus, *On Music* 3.35 (no. L32, *QETHs* p. 30 Sedley)

721A Philodemus, *On Music* 3.37 (no. L33, *QETHs* pp. 30–31 Sedley)

721B Censorinus, *About the Day of Birth* 12.1 (p. 21.23–28 Hultsch)

Literature] Gomperz (1885) p. 23; Neubecker (1956) p. 79; Rispoli (1974) pp. 68, 72–73; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 196–198; Barker (2005) p. 132

In the text-translation volumes, texts 720, 721A and 721B are printed together in the section on “Music.” They are also referred to from the section on “Education, Exhortation and Censure,” because of their relationship to the moral education of young persons and to catharsis as a way of achieving relief from emotional disturbance. The discussion that follows will be largely limited to these concerns. Further discussion will be found in *Commentary* volume 9 on music and miscellaneous items.

720 is from Philodemus’ work *On Music*. Theophrastus is mentioned at the beginning as is virtue and children. It seems clear that Philodemus is discussing moral education, but there are difficulties. First and most importantly, it is not clear what has been lost in the lines that immediately preceded 720. David Sedley has suggested to me that words like μόγῃς μὲν τοὺς ῥυθμούς, “barely the rhythms,” may at least capture the sense of what is missing. Combined with the surviving text, that would give us “Since Theophrastus sees that (rhythms barely) contribute to virtue and only for children” (line 1). Sedley’s suggestion is interesting, for if it is correct, then Philodemus is reporting that Theophrastus significantly limited the contribution of music to moral education. In this regard, we should take note of an Arabic text that is found in the *Depository of Wisdom Literature*: “He (Theophrastus) said: Had any degree of virtue been associated with listening (to music), deer would have acquired thereby a share of it (virtue), since they are very fond of the sounds of musical instruments” (724 transl. Gutas). As Andrew Barker (2003) pp. 131–132 observes the text is a *reductio ad absurdum*, implying that music does not

have the power to improve the character of the listener. That would contradict Platonic and Aristotelian doctrine, so that the Arabic text might be dismissed as nonsense, which arose through transmission over some thirteen centuries. Nevertheless, the Arabic text need not be wildly off the mark, for 720, as restored by Sedley, tells us that Theophrastus claimed a quite limited role for music. And Theophrastus may have added, agreeing with Plato and Aristotle, that music is more effective when combined with words that convey sound moral principles.²⁹¹ Be that as it may, the lack of specific texts making clear Theophrastus' position in regard to music's role in education suggests that Theophrastus did not assign great importance to music taken by itself. Or is the available evidence distorted by the fortunes of transmission?

A second difficulty is the subject of the verb φαίνεται (line 2). Since Theophrastus is the subject of the preceding genitive absolute, it is reasonable to suppose that Theophrastus is not the subject of the main verb that follows, i.e., φαίνεται. (See Kühner-Gerth, *Griechische Grammatik*³ [1904] pp. 78–79, 110–111.) Sedley has suggested a second Peripatetic, whom Philodemus criticizes because he does not recognize the limits that Theophrastus set.

In line 2 of 720, Kemke, Gomperz and van Krevelen print *κολακίαν*, “flattery.” Nevertheless, the reading ἀ]κολασίαν, “intemperance,” is certain. It is supported not only by the papyrus but also by comparison with Philodemus, *On Music* 3.32–33.²⁹² It is no objection that Theophrastus' teacher, Aristotle, distinguishes between excessive pleasure in music and intemperance (*NE* 3.10 1118a7–8), for in context Aristotle is using ἀκολασία in a narrow sense (intemperance in bodily pleasures) that does not apply in all contexts. Moreover, Theophrastus will have followed Aristotle and recognized that music is used for amusement and relaxation.²⁹³ That this use can be over done is obvious,²⁹⁴ so that speaking of intemperance is not foolish. In addition, music may also be used to remove or mask over a pain like that of hunger or thirst (cf. 555.8–11). In the *Ethics*, Aristotle takes note of this use, commenting that “on account of this men

²⁹¹ See the introduction to this section on “Education, Exhortation and Censure” *ad fin.*

²⁹² See Rispoli pp. 68–69 n. 59.

²⁹³ *Politics* 8.7 1341b40–41: πρὸς διαγωγὴν, πρὸς ἀνεσίαν τε καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῆς συντομίας ἀνάπαυσιν.

²⁹⁴ See 723, an Arabic text (*Depository of Wisdom Literature*, chap. on Theophrastus no. 12), in which we read that music distracts the soul so that it neglects the body.

become intemperate and worthless,” διὰ ταῦτα ἀκόλαστοι καὶ φαῦλοι γίνονται (7.14 1154b14–15). Theophrastus will have known the passage and agreed (555.10–13).

If Sedley is correct concerning the subject of φαίνεται, what follows in lines 2–5 is not directly concerned with Theophrastus. Philodemus is addressing someone else and expressing his own view. When he speaks of some vices being expelled naturally, ἐν]α καὶ φ[υσι]κῶς κα[κιῶν ἀ]πορίπτ[εσθ]αι (line 3), he may intend to diminish the role of music in shaping character. And when he tells us that a tune is something capable of moving the body, τὸ μέ[λος δὲ] σώματος εἶναι τι [κεινητικόν] (line 4), he may intend to suggest that the utility of music is to be found elsewhere: e.g., it can be helpful in treating bodily ills and relieving emotional distress by working on the underlying physiological cause. Regarding the relief of bodily ills, we might compare 726A–C, and regarding the relief of emotional distress, I refer to Aristotle’s notion of catharsis (as I understand it) in *Poetics* 6 and *Politics* 8.7.²⁹⁵ That said I want to acknowledge that Aristotle’s doctrine of catharsis has been interpreted in various ways,²⁹⁶ and that according to Porphyry, *On Claudius Ptolemy’s* *Harmonics* 1.3, Theophrastus connected catharsis with movement of the soul. See 716.130–131 and the commentary on 719B. Here I add only that catharsis is different from education in that it has a comparatively short-term effect. Education, when successful, establishes a permanent disposition or one that is nearly so.

In 721A, Philodemus offers a series of denials. First, he denies asserting that music is irrelevant to serious pursuit but rather entirely concerned with relaxation and rest (lines 2–3). Next he denies asserting that music is imitative (lines 2–4). And finally he denies being proven wrong when Theophrastus writes, “it is unreasonable that music does not at all move and harmonize souls,” ἄλογον εἶναι ... τ[ὸ] μὴ κεινεῖν ὅλως καὶ ῥυθμ[ι]ζεῖν τὰς ψυχὰς τὴν μουσ[ι]κὴν (lines 5–7). At first reading the final denial might seem inconsistent with 720, but in fact the two texts—accepting Sedley’s restoration of 720—are in close agreement. In 720 we read that rhythms *barely* contribute to virtue. In 721A the idea that music does *not at all* harmonize souls is said to be unreasonable. Both texts allow that song and dance are part of moral education, and

²⁹⁵ Fortenbaugh (1975a) p. 22 and *Commentary* 8 (2005c) p. 374; cf. D. Lucas, *Aristotle, Poetics* (Oxford 1968) p. 283.

²⁹⁶ Not surprisingly: since emotion involves both thought and bodily change, purgation or relief may involve the removal of false belief as well as physiological change.

both texts recognize that the contribution is limited. The details of the Theophrastean doctrine are lost, but in the absence of evidence to the contrary I suggest that Theophrastus viewed music by itself as working a minimal effect, but when combined with words it becomes a valuable part of moral education. It is an effective way to convey moral principles that will be translated into action.²⁹⁷

721B is not a text of Philodemus. The author is Censorinus (3rd cent. AD), who tells us that according to Socrates music consists in voice alone, Aristoxenus adds bodily movement, and Theophrastus adds movement of the soul as well (lines 2–4). What is said here concerning Theophrastus is in line with 716.7–9, 130–132. See above, Section II “Emotions” on 719A–B, as well as Chapter II “The Sources” no. 23 on Censorinus. In what follows, we read that music has a great deal of divinity and great influence in moving our souls (lines 4–5). Considering what we read in Philodemus (720 and 721A), the final remark concerning divinity and influence seems overstated, but in fact Censorinus is speaking for himself; his citation of Theophrastus refers only to the three constituents of music (lines 3–4).

None of the three texts refers to a Theophrastean work. Most likely the Theophrastean material derives from the work *On Music* in three books (714 no. 1), but a work like *On Education*, or *On Virtues*, or *On Temperance* (436 no. 9a) is a possibility.

467 Plutarch, *Agis and Cleomenes* 2.1–3 (BT vol. 3.1p. 352.21–353.12 Ziegler)

Literature: Brandis (1860) p. 356; Heylbut (1876) p. 11; Zeller (1879) vol. 2.2; p. 864 n. 4; Mittelhaus (1911) pp. 52–54; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 194–195; Millett (2007) p. 32

Text 467 is found in Plutarch’s *Parallel Lives* of Agis and Cleomenes on the one hand and Tiberius and Caius Gracchus on the other. It occurs early in the introduction. We have been told that lovers of reputation or glory, φιλόδοξοι, consort with an image of virtue. They follow their ambitions and passions, and in political life, looking to glory, πρὸς δόξαν ὁρῶντες, they become servants of the multitude (1.1–2). After that comes text 467. The man who is completely good is said to have no need of

²⁹⁷ Other fragments of Book 3 of Philodemus’ *On Music* contain Peripatetic material, but it is difficult to determine what has been taken directly from Theophrastus. Especially interesting are 3.27.11–12 (compare τῆς ἀγριότητος ἀφαιρουμένης with ἀφαιρούσα τὸ θηριῶδες in 465.2) and 3.51–53 (on which see Kemke xiii–xiv and Rispoli 72–73).

reputation or glory except in so far as it facilitates action (lines 1–3). A youth, however, should be permitted to take pride in glory, for it will encourage him to develop into a virtuous adult (lines 3–7). Finally we are told that excess is everywhere dangerous, and in the case of political ambition it is destructive (lines 7–10).

It is clear that the whole of section 2 (lines 4–7) can be attributed to Theophrastus. The section is a single, coherent sentence: we are told that during youth virtues are established through praise and subsequently developed through pride. Theophrastus is named, and the participles *φυόμενοι* and *βλαστάνουσαι*, “growing” and “sprouting,” applied metaphorically to virtues suggest someone with a strong interest in botany. It is, however, doubtful that what precedes in section 1 (lines 1–4) ought to be attributed to Theophrastus. To be sure, Mittelhaus wants to do so, and in support he cites three related texts in Plutarch (*On Praising Oneself Inoffensively* 2 539F, *Philosophers Ought to Converse Especially with Leaders* 2 777E–F, *Precepts of Statecraft* 28 821C) and one in Cicero (*On Friendship* 61). The three Plutarchan texts relate closely to the words *πάροδον ἐπὶ τὰς πράξεις [καὶ] διὰ τοῦ πιστεῦσθαι δίδωσι*, “it provides a way to action through being trusted,” (lines 2–3), so that a connection with 467 cannot be denied. But none of the three texts exhibits a close relation to the sentence that is certainly Theophrastean (i.e., section 2). Mittelhaus also calls attention to the word *ἀπηκριβωμένος*, “highly finished/perfect” (line 1). The word occurs in a Theophrastean text found in Porphyry’s *On Abstinence* 3.25.3 = 531.19–20 and in Plutarch’s *Whether Land or Sea Animals Are Cleverer* 4 962B, where Gomperz has suspected Theophrastean influence. Finally Mittelhaus argues that the phrase *τελείως ἀγαθός*, “completely good,” recalls the Peripatetic notion of the perfect man, *τέλειος ἀνὴρ*. However, his reference to Aetius, *Opinions of the Philosophers*, 1 Preface 3 = 479.2 is misleading, for in this passage the perfect man is one who combines contemplation with practical activity: he is both *θεωρητικός* and *πρακτικός*. In 467 the man who is completely good seems to be the person who is active in political affairs and combines moral virtue with practical wisdom. In sum, the view of Mittelhaus merits consideration, but remains unproven.

Portions of our text appear in two places in Wimmer’s collection of Theophrastean fragments. His fragment 143 goes from *νέω δ’ ἔτι ὄντι* to *ἐπαιρόμεναι* (lines 3–7). It covers everything that is said about young people and for that reason seems to be a sensible excerpt. But we should not overlook the fact that the beginning of Wimmer’s fragment, i.e., the sentence beginning with *νέω δ’ ἔτι ὄντι* follows on what precedes without

any clear break in the text. That suggests to me that either the excerpt should be restricted to the sentence in which Theophrastus is named (lines 4–7) or, following Mittelhaus, the excerpt should extend to the beginning of 467 (lines 1–7). In any case, the larger context is of some importance, for if we limit ourselves to Wimmer’s fragment 143 or to the single sentence in which Theophrastus is named, then we will be inclined to think that Plutarch is drawing on a work, whose focus is the training of young people: either *On Education* or *On Bringing up Children* (436 no. 9–10). But if we consider the entire context including section 3 (lines 7–10), then we may think of a different work like *On Ambition* (436 no. 21).²⁹⁸

Wimmer’s other fragment that presents a portion of 467 is 86d. It begins with φυόμεναι γάρ and runs as far as to τὸ δ’ ἄγαν πανταχοῦ μὲν ἐπισφαλές: i.e., it includes the whole of section 2, the sentence in which Theophrastus is named, and the opening words of section 3 (lines 4–7). Picking out only the opening of section 3 strikes me as odd, for what follows in that section develops what the opening phrase asserts. In the text-translation volumes, we have printed the entire section, so that the reader can see the whole and make his own decision. My own view is that the section can be considered Theophrastean in the weak sense that it agrees with what Theophrastus will have said in certain of his writings, but the wording is Plutarchan.²⁹⁹ (The use of ὕπαιθρον, “manifest,” in line 9, is characteristic: see Plutarch’s *Cato the Elder* 16.) The Theophrastean excerpt ends with ἐπαιρούμεναι at the end of section 2 (line 7) and what follows should be treated as context material.

It is a common opinion, and one shared by Theophrastus, that a person should be honored for his good deeds (519). So too the view that a virtuous man should not be overly concerned with the honor and respect in which he is held (467 lines 1–3, 7–10, cf. 1.53–55). What is noteworthy in our text is the statement concerning youth. Virtues, we are told, are established in young persons through praise and thereafter increased by being stirred with pride (lines 6–7).³⁰⁰ Ambition and pride, φιλοτιμία

²⁹⁸ See Heylbut (1876) p. 11 n. 1 and Mittelhaus p. 53.

²⁹⁹ The words τὸ δ’ ἄγαν πανταχοῦ μὲν ἐπισφαλές recall the proverb μηδὲν ἄγαν, See 738.5, discussed above in Section 3 on “Virtue and Vice.”

³⁰⁰ The phrase τὸ λοιπὸν αὖξονται, “thereafter (the virtues) are increased/developed” is of interest in that it underlines the fact that virtue need not be thought of as an all or nothing condition (if one has moral virtue, one has practical wisdom, and *vice versa*, so that there is no room for improvement). See below, the introduction to Section 13 on “Friendship.” One of the benefits of friendship based on virtue, i.e., between morally good

and φρόνημα, are viewed positively, for they motivate young people to act virtuously and thereby to acquire good habits. They become virtuous adults who do what is right for its own sake without expecting special recognition.

In conclusion, I underline that nowhere in 467 is it suggested that ambition is something that needs to be instilled in young people. The combination young and ambitious, νέω δ' ἔτι ὄντι καὶ φιλοτίμῳ (line 3), needs no explanation for the combination is a frequent, observable fact. Indeed, as an innate condition it may be regarded as a natural virtue, an endowment that marks the born leader. See above, on the title *On Ambition* 436 no. 21.

468 Fulgentius, *Mythologies* 2.1 (BT p. 38.22–39.4 Helm)

Literature: Brandis (1860) p. 297; Whitehead (1971) p. 67; Fortenbaugh (1984) p. 188; Millett (2007) p. 113

Text 468 is taken from a work entitled *Mythologies*. The work was composed by Fulgentius, probably in the late 5th century AD, and runs for three books. Our text is from the second book and more precisely from a section that carries the heading *De Junone*, “On Juno.” At the beginning of the section, we are told that the goddess has her name from “helping,” *quasi a iuvando dicta est*, and that she is closely connected with kings and wealth (p. 38.15–21). In what follows, Fulgentius focuses on the negative consequences that follow on the pursuit of wealth and fame. The peacock is introduced by way of illustration (that is the beginning of 468), after which Fulgentius cites first Theophrastus and then Salomon, i.e., Solomon the son and successor of David as king of Israel. In regard to the latter, we read, *et Salomon: in obitu hominis nudatio operum eius*, “and Solomon: in his death are the deeds of a man laid bare” (line 7). Fulgentius is drawing on *Ecclesiasticus* 11³⁰¹ and combining what is said in sections 28 and 29: *in obitu hominis nudatio operum eius* combines *quoniam facile coram Deo in die obitus retribuere unicuique secundum vias suas*, “since it is easy before God in the day of death to reward each person according to his ways (28)” and *malitia horae oblivionem facit luxuriae magnae*

individuals is that the parties to such a friendship can assist each other in fine tuning their moral principles and in applying them in particular situations. The parties become better persons, and that enhances the friendship.

³⁰¹ Solomon (1033–975 BC) was reputed the wisest of men and the author of *Ecclesiasticus*.

et in fine hominis denudatio operum illius, “the badness of an hour produces forgetfulness of great extravagance, and in the end of a man is the disclosure of his works” (29).³⁰²

In the case of Theophrastus (line 6), Fulgentius quotes an exhortation: τὰ λοιπὰ γνῶθι, id est, *reliqua considera*. The Latin is clear enough: “I.e., Know what remains.” The addressee is advised to consider the consequences of his actions before acting. Nevertheless, the original Greek form is problematic. The manuscripts offer a transliteration, *tali panoti*, which Muncker converts to τὰ ἄλλα περιγνῶθι.³⁰³ That is not implausible, for it maintains a division of words, and with the prefix περι- it takes note of the Latin prefix *con-*. There are, however, reasons to reject Muncker’s version. The compound verb περιγινώσκειν seems to be unattested, and the division *tali* and *panoti* is of little importance since it dates to the middle ages.³⁰⁴ It is, I think, better to follow Helm and to print the simple form γνῶθι (cf. the Delphic exhortation γνῶθι σαυτόν in 483.1). The correct division of the Latin is *ta lipa noti*. The first “i” transliterates the Greek οι and the second “t” transliterates θι. The γ, with which γνῶθι begins, has been ignored or “g” has been lost in transmission. Hence, the Greek expression is τὰ λοιπὰ γνῶθι.

That Theophrastus advised considering the consequences of one’s actions before acting is not to be doubted. Cf. 473, where Theophrastus is reported to have said to someone who regretted what he had done: “If before doing bad things you were just as irritated with yourself as (you are) after having done them, you would not have erred.” Here I want only to warn against uncritically applying to Theophrastus the words “desire for riches and glory embellishes for the moment but lays things bare in the end” (lines 4–5). The words are those of Fulgentius, who is playing with the image of the peacock: *postrema tamen nudat*, “but lays things bare in the end” (line 5) picks up *posterioraque turpiter nudet*, “while disgracefully baring its rear-end” (line 4). Moreover, Theophrastus is not hostile to riches and glory *per se*. He is well aware that riches and

³⁰² The Latin text of 11.28–29 is that of the *Biblia sacra vulgata* (St. Jerome). A less literal translation is offered by *The New English Bible*, “The Apocrypha” p. 132: “Even on the day a man dies, it is easy for the Lord to give him his deserts. One hour’s misery wipes out all memory of delight, and a man’s end reveals his true character.”

³⁰³ Th. Muncker, Fulgentius, *Mythologicon* (1681) p. 69. He is followed by Brandis p. 297.

³⁰⁴ The earliest manuscript, Harleianus 2685 dates to the ninth or tenth century. Others are tenth century or later.

glory (fame, honor) are useful. They may be counted among the external goods, though an excessive appetite for riches and glory is destructive and vicious. See the commentary on Theophrastus' works *On Riches* (436 no. 19a–b) and *On Ambition* (436 no. 21).

469 Stobaeus, *Anthology* 3.31.10 (vol. 3 p. 671.6–7 Hense)

Literature: Brandis (1860) p. 363; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 187–188; Searby (2007) p. 720; Millett (2007) p. 69

Text 469 occurs in the third book of Stobaeus' *Anthology*. More precisely, it is entry 10 in the thirty-first chapter, which carries the heading Περί αἰδοῦς. "On Shame/Self-Respect" (vol. 3 p. 669.5 Hense). It is preceded by an excerpt from Iamblichus and followed by a report concerning Cato. The latter is closely related but not identical to 469. Cato is said to "have deemed it especially necessary that each person respect himself, for no one is ever apart from himself": μάλιστα δ' ἐνόμιζε δεῖν ἕκαστον αἰδεῖσθαι ἑαυτόν· μηδένα γὰρ ἑαυτοῦ μηδέποτε χωρὶς εἶναι (p. 670.9–10). Theophrastus begins in much the same way, but he ends differently: "Have respect for yourself, and you will not feel shame before someone else," αἰδοῦ σαυτόν, καὶ ἄλλον οὐκ αἰσχυνθήσῃ. Here a second person is introduced, before whom you (the unspecified addressee or simply "one") will not feel shame.³⁰⁵ We understand this second person as someone who might witness disgraceful behavior or in some other way become aware of it.

It is clear that 469 divides into two parts. First, there is the exhortation αἰδοῦ σαυτόν, which is only two words long. Such brevity befits a proverb. Cf. 738, where we are told that γνῶθι σαυτόν, "Know yourself," is understood to be proverb and that Theophrastus is a witness in his work *On Proverbs* (727 no. 14). The second part, καὶ ἄλλον οὐκ αἰσχυνθήσῃ, is also quite brief: counting καί there are only four words. It functions as an explanation (καί might be replaced by γάρ), so that taken together the two parts recall Aristotle's discussion of the maxim to which an explanation is added (*Rhetoric* 2.21 1394a1–b26). Moreover, the two parts have been joined with attention to style: the verbs αἰδοῦ and αἰσχυνθήσῃ bracket the pronouns σαυτόν and ἄλλον. As a result, 469 is marked not only by brevity but also by chiasmus. Cicero may have found

³⁰⁵ The contrast between αἰδεῖσθαι and αἰσχύνεσθαι is deliberate. Cf. Aristoxenus fr. 42a–c Wehrli.

such attention to style attractive (50–54), and it may have caught the attention of Adrastus (437.3), but we should not forget that on occasion an anthologist might dress up what a philosopher said in rather ordinary prose. Or perhaps Theophrastus included 469 in his work *On the Maxim* (666 no. 7) and in doing so added the stylistic features. Other possibilities can be imagined.³⁰⁶

The importance of αἰδώς for the ancient Greeks is often commented upon in the scholarly literature.³⁰⁷ For the most part it was regarded in a positive light, but it could be viewed negatively as an undesirable character trait that manifests itself in hesitation and inactivity. See Hesiod, *Works and Days* 317–319; Euripides, *Hippolytus* 385–387; Plato, *Statesman* 310D10–E3.³⁰⁸ In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle explains αἰδώς positively, first as a μεσότης, a mean disposition (2.7 1108a30–35) and then as a πάθος, emotion, that befits young persons (4.9 1128b10–35). For our purposes, it is important to understand that 469 does not offer a philosophic analysis of αἰδώς. Rather, we are confronted with practical advice, an exhortation to act in ways that do not result in feelings of shame. Cf. 453: “The subjects of jokes ought to be the sort at which the listener is delighted and the speaker will not be ashamed,” ὁ δὲ λέγων οὐ κατασχυνθήσεται.

The importance of self-respect is emphasized by Democritus, who said that a person must respect himself most, ἑαυτὸν μάλιστα αἰδεῖσθαι, and this law must be established in his soul, so that he does nothing improper (VS 68 B 264 Diels-Kranz). Also relevant are the words of Demetrius of Phaleron, contemporary of Theophrastus and a member of the Peripatos: τοὺς νέους ἔφη δεῖν ἐπὶ μὲν τῆς οἰκίας τοὺς γονεῖς αἰδεῖσθαι, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ὁδοῖς τοὺς ἀπαντῶντας, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἐρημίαις ἑαυτούς, “He (Demetrius) said that at home young persons ought to respect their parents, on journeys those whom they meet, and in solitary places themselves” (Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.82).³⁰⁹ It is clear that the exhortation αἰδοῦ σαυτὸν does not exclude respecting one’s parents and other persons with whom one interacts. But when a person, whether

³⁰⁶ For Theophrastus’ definition of the maxim, see 676.6 together with *Commentary* 8 (2005c) on rhetoric and poetics pp. 205–207.

³⁰⁷ See, e.g., C.E. Erffa, *Αἰδώς und verwandte Begriffe in ihrer Entwicklung von Homer bis Demokrit*, in *Philologus Supplementband* 30.2 Leipzig 1937; Stark pp. 119–133; Dirlmeier (1964) 394–396.

³⁰⁸ For discussion see Fortenbaugh (1975d) pp. 287, 302.

³⁰⁹ The text is Demetrius of Phalerum, fr. 1.121–122 SOD; cf. *Gnomologium Vaticanum* no. 255 (p. 99.14–16 Sternbach) = fr. 72 SOD.

young or a mature adult, finds himself in situations that do not involve other people, he is advised to act in ways that exhibit self-respect.

470 Antonius Mellissa, *Commonplaces* 2.71 (PG vol. 136 col. 1172A Migne)

Literature: Millett (2007) p. 132 n. 100

Text 470 occurs in the *Commonplaces* of Antonius Melissa³¹⁰ under the heading: Περί ἀντιλογίας καὶ θρασύτητος καὶ ἔριδος, “On Controversy and Rashness and Strife” (col. 1169B). It comes last, being preceded by the unattributed assertion that virtue is acquired by industry, nobility of character and fairness: πόνῳ καὶ γεν(ν)αιότητι καὶ ἐπιεικείᾳ (1169D).³¹¹ 470 runs as follows: Θεόφραστος ἰδὼν μειράκιον ἐρυνθριάσαν ἔφη· θάρρει· τοιοῦτον γὰρ ἡ ἀρετὴ ἔχει τὸ χρώμα. “Theophrastus, seeing a youth blush, said, ‘Cheer up! For virtue has just such a color.’” 470 differs from 469 in that it provides context—Theophrastus sees a young person who is blushing—and this context renders intelligible what follows. Being impetuous by nature and overly ambitious a youth cannot be expected to act properly on all occasions (cf. Arist. *Rhet.* 2.12 1389a3–16). But if he has acquired a sense of right and wrong (good moral principles), he will be ashamed of doing wrong, And if he feels intense shame, he will undergo bodily change and turn red (*NE* 4.9 1128b13). Such feelings of shame may be the result of some improper action, but they may also precede and impede improper action (1128b18). The latter may be in play in 470, but that is not explicitly stated. Be that as it may, when a youth feels shame and blushes, he has acquired certain principles and knows, at least in some cases and to some degree, the difference between right and wrong. Hence the remark attributed to Theophrastus, “Virtue has such a color.” To be sure the youth is not perfect in regard to virtue—were he perfect, he would not do or want to do wrong and therefore would not feel shame (1128b19–33)—but he is making progress. With further training and the support of virtuous friends, he will continue to perfect his character.³¹²

While it is possible that 470 reflects what Theophrastus said to some youth on some occasion, it is also possible and perhaps more likely that 470 is the creation of an anthologist or the like, who created a context for

³¹⁰ The name Antonius Melissa is a fiction. See Chapter II “The Sources” no. 41.

³¹¹ The facing Latin translation attributes the assertion to Euripides (col. 1170D).

³¹² On the role that friends can play in improving character that is good but not perfect, see below, the introduction to Section 13 on “Friendship.”

words that he found attributed to Theophrastus or decided to attribute them on his own. That said, what 470 offers is entirely in line with the teachings of Aristotle and, we may be sure, also in line with those of Theophrastus.

471 *Gnomologium Vaticanum*, no. 323 (WSt vol. 10 [1888] p. 257 Sternbach)

472 *Gnomologium Vaticanum*, no. 336 (WSt vol. 10 [1888] p. 260 Sternbach)

Literature: Gutas (1975) pp. 71, 238–239; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 190–191; Millett (2007) p. 18

We have here two texts, 471 and 472, each of which reports a saying attributed to Theophrastus. The texts are found in the *Gnomologium Vaticanum* among fifteen texts (no. 322–336), all of which are concerned with Theophrastus. 471 and 472 are alike in that each relates to education, but they do not occur together. 471 comes second, while 472 comes last among the Theophrastean texts.

According to 471, Theophrastus saw a youth praying to the gods that they might grant him intellect and a good mind. Theophrastus said to him: ὦ νεανίσκε, οὐ τοῖς εὐχομένοις νοῦς καὶ φρένες περιγίνονται, ἀλλὰ τοῖς μανθάνουσιν, “Young man, intellect and mind come not to those who pray but to those who learn.” The reference to prayer tells us little about Theophrastus’ views concerning religion in general and prayer in particular. Theophrastus wants to emphasize the value of self-help, here studying and learning for oneself, and toward that end he chooses a striking contrast: making a personal effort to learn versus seeking a gift from the gods. Such an emphasis on self-help in learning fits well with the tradition that Theophrastus himself was συνετώτατος καὶ φιλοπονώτατος, “very intelligent and industrious” (Diogenes Laertius 5.36 = 1.10) and with his alleged criticism of Nicomachus, the son of Aristotle.³¹³ Taking note of Nicomachus’ laziness in doing philosophy, Theophrastus said that it was good to be the heir not only of paternal

³¹³ The tradition that Nicomachus was the son of Aristotle and his concubine Herpyllis (Diogenes Laertius 5.1) is to be rejected. The mother of Nicomachus was Pythias, who predeceased Aristotle (see Düring [1957] pp. 266–267, Gottschalk [1972] p. 323 and C. Mulvany, “Notes on the Legend of Aristotle,” *Classical Quarterly* 20 [1926] pp. 157–158). Also to be rejected is the tradition of an erotic relationship between Theophrastus and Nicomachus (Diogenes Laertius 5.39, *Suda*, s.v. Θεόφραστος [vol. 1.2 701.27–28 Adler] and s.v. Νικόμαχος [vol. 1.3 p. 469.16 Adler] = Düring [1975] 9b p. 265). See Regenbogen col. 1360–1361.

property but also of the habits of that man (Aristotle) (21).³¹⁴ I have said “alleged,” because it is doubtful that the criticism of Nicomachus should be viewed as fact. To be sure, Nicomachus was raised in the house of Theophrastus after the death of Aristotle,³¹⁵ and we can imagine Theophrastus on some occasion encouraging an idle Nicomachus to take his studies seriously. But more likely the criticism of Nicomachus is a fabrication. Someone who knew that Nicomachus had been raised by Theophrastus decided to enliven sound advice (the way to wisdom is earnest study) by creating a biographical anecdote. The anecdote found acceptance³¹⁶ and was ultimately incorporated into the *Gnomologium Vaticanum* as a saying of Theophrastus (no. 330).

Like 471, text 472 reports a saying that concerns education or lack thereof. But while 471 provides context (a young man is praying to the gods), 472 is a saying without context: τοὺς εὖειδεῖς καὶ ἀπαιδεύτους ὁμοίους ἔφησεν εἶναι ἀλαβάστοις ἔχουσιν ὄξος, “he said that the handsome and uneducated are like alabaster perfume-vases holding vinegar.” The idea here is straightforward. If one sees a perfume-vase, an *alabastron*, which has a characteristic shape,³¹⁷ one expects to find perfume within. Similarly if one sees a person that has an attractive physical appearance, one has hopes that the inner person will be equally attractive. But in the latter case, one is all too often disappointed. The attractive person turns out to lack education. Exactly what kind of education is left unsaid, but it is reasonable to think not only of an education in academic subjects like grammar and mathematics but also of an education in ethical and social values: moral virtues and good manners.³¹⁸

In the Arabic tradition, 472 is attributed to Pythagoras and Plato. Gutas (1975) pp. 238–239 suggests that 472 has been attributed to Theophrastus through an error in transmission. A minor difference between the Greek and Arabic tradition is that in the latter the *alabastron* is replaced by a golden vessel. I.e., a valuable material occurs instead of a characteristic shape or form that appeals to the eye.

³¹⁴ Text 21 is *Gnomologium Vaticanum* no. 330. The anecdote has been mentioned above, this section on 662.

³¹⁵ Aristocles of Messene, fr. 2 *ap.* Eusebius, *Evangelical Preparation* 15.2.15 = 20.

³¹⁶ Creation of the anecdote and its acceptance will have been encouraged not only by the fact that Theophrastus raised Nicomachus but also by the idea that Theophrastus functioned as his teacher (so Aristippus *ap.* Diogenes Laertius 5.39).

³¹⁷ LSJ explains the *alabastron* as a globular vase without handles. See G. Richter and M. Milne, *Shapes and Names of Athenian Vases* (New York 1935) p. 17.

³¹⁸ On good manners, those that are viewed as attractive and elegant, see Chapter III “Titles of Books” no. 32 on the (*Dialogue*) concerning Social Interaction.

473 *Gnomologium Vaticanum*, no. 329 (WSt vol. 10 [1888] p. 259 Sternbach)

Literature: Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 187–188; Millett (2007) p. 31

Text 473 comes fifth in the list of sayings attributed to Theophrastus in the *Gnomologium Vaticanum*. It concerns feeling irritation and regret when one does wrong. It is preceded by a text, in which remembering by whom one has been well-treated is recommended (no. 328 = 525) and followed by one, in which laziness is censored (no. 330 = 21). Apart from obvious differences in subject matter, 473 differs from the preceding text in that it gives the saying a certain context: the saying is addressed to someone who is irritated with himself. It differs from the text that follows in that the person addressed is left unidentified.³¹⁹

473 runs as follows: ὁ αὐτὸς πρὸς τὸν δακνόμενον ἐπὶ ταῖς ἑαυτοῦ ἁμαρτίαις καὶ μεταμελόμενον ἔφη· εἰ οὕτω μέλλων πράττειν τὰ φαῦλα ἐδάκνου ὡς πράξας, οὐκ ἂν ἤμαρτες, “The same man (Theophrastus) said to one who was irritated with himself and feeling regret on account of his own errant actions, ‘If before doing bad things you were just as irritated with yourself, as (you are) after having done them, you would not have erred.’” That invites comparison with a saying attributed to Theophrastus in Stobaeus’ *Anthology* 3.31.10 = 469: “Have respect for yourself, and you will not feel shame before someone else,” αἰδοῦ σαντόν, καὶ ἄλλον οὐκ αἰσχυνθήσῃ. Both texts are concerned with avoiding the shame and regret that follows on bad behavior. And that is accomplished by self-respect and irritation prior to engaging in shameful action. It should be stated clearly that in 473 the noun ἁμαρτία and the verb ἁμαρτάνειν are not used in reference to mistakes that are attributable to the ignorance of some relevant fact (see 530 and the commentary on that text). Rather, they refer to moral and social wrongs that are avoided by men possessing self-respect. Similarly the φαῦλα referred to in 473 are not matters of bad luck (as in Aristotle, *Phys.* 2.5 197a26 and *Metaph.* 11[K].8 1065a35) but morally bad actions that merit blame (cf. Aristotle, *NE* 7.1 1145b10). Hence, the person addressed in 473 is not to be confused with Aristotle’s involuntary agent, i.e., the person who feels regret, μεταμέλεια, for acts done in ignorance (*NE* 3.1 1110b18–23).

The use of the verb δάκνειν is metaphorical. Dogs bite, but we also speak of biting criticism. In 473 the verb occurs twice: presumably the

³¹⁹ In *Gnom. Vat.* 330 = 21, the person addressed is Nicomachus. See the commentary on 471.

repetition is deliberate and intended to enliven the notion of irritation. But the metaphor involved in applying δάκνεν to mental pain is hardly new. It occurs already in Homer, *Iliad* 5.493 and (jumping over centuries) in, e.g., Aristophanes, *Acharnians* 1 and Aristotle, *Sophistical Refutations* 33 182b23.

474 *Depository of Wisdom Literature*, chap. on Theophrastus, saying no. 9

Literature: Gutas (1985, repr. 2000) p. 88

Text 474 is found in the *Depository of Wisdom Literature*, an Arabic gnomologium whose chapter on Theophrastus has been reconstructed by Dimitri Gutas. The text, which is no. 9 out of 29, records an anecdote concerning incompetent teaching. Theophrastus, we read, observed a teacher who had bad handwriting and was nevertheless teaching handwriting. He asked the teacher, “Why don’t you teach wrestling?” When the teacher replied, “Because I am not good at it,” Theophrastus responded, “Well, here you are teaching how to write and you’re not good at it either!” The response is clever and to that extent fits well with other sayings attributed to Theophrastus. But it seems certain that the attribution is a mistake. Other Arabic sources attribute the response to Theocritus, and in Stobaeus’ *Anthology* 3.4.68, there occurs a closely related anecdote in which a similar response is attributed to Theocritus. Gutas observes that the misattribution to Theophrastus is the fault of the Arabic compiler who misread “Theocritus” as “Theophrastus,” the two names looking alike in Arabic spelling.³²⁰

The Greek text found in Stobaeus runs as follows: Θεόκριτος γραμματοδιδασκάλῳ φαύλῳ ἀναγιγνώσκοντι προσελθὼν εἶπε “διὰ τί γεωμετρεῖν οὐ διδάσκεις;” τοῦ δ’ εἰπόντος “ὅτι οὐκ οἶδα,” “καὶ τί τοῦτ;” εἶπεν· “οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀναγιγνώσκειν.” (vol. 3 p. 236.4–7 Hense), “Theocritus, having approached a schoolmaster who was reading badly, said, ‘Why don’t you teach geometry?’ He (the schoolmaster) said, ‘because I don’t know (geometry).’ ‘And why this?’ (Theocritus) said, ‘Since you don’t (know) reading.’” In addition to the confusion between Theocritus and Theophrastus, there are certain obvious differences between the text of Stobaeus and that of the *Depository*. In Stobaeus the teacher reads badly and is asked why he does not teach geometry. In the *Depository*, the teacher has bad handwriting and is asked why he does not teach wrestling. The

³²⁰ The Greek poet Theocritus was a younger contemporary of Theophrastus. He was born between 310 and 300 BC.

difference between reading and handwriting may be of little importance, for in the γραμματοδιδασκαλεῖον, the primary school of letters, reading and writing were taught together.³²¹ The difference between geometry and wrestling is perhaps more striking, but in context the difference is of little importance. Whether the schoolmaster is asked why he does not teach wrestling or does not teach geometry, the answer is predetermined: he is incompetent. And either way, the question seems to involve a not so subtle poke. When asked why he does not teach wrestling, the suggestion may be that he is all body and devoid of intellect (a suggestion which is quite unfair to wrestlers). And when he is asked why he does not teach geometry, the suggestion is equally insulting: his brain is not good enough. Be that as it may, the schoolmaster is expected to recognize his incompetence in regard to reading and/or writing and to find a new livelihood.

5. *Happiness*

While the desire to be happy is all but universal among human beings, there is no clear agreement concerning what constitutes a happy life. And that is as true today as it was in antiquity. Some people think that the happy life is one of pleasure: physical comfort combined with pleasant food and drink. Other people seek happiness in the civic arena, taking satisfaction in the honor that comes with elected office. Still others distance themselves from everyday life; they find contentment in study and contemplation. We moderns may think of flower children who live a life of self-indulgence, career politicians who exhaust themselves seeking votes, and academics who retreat to the library and exit only at closing time. These are, of course, extreme cases, and most people would opt for a life that offers a mix of physical pleasure, civic activity and quiet reflection. But even a mix calls for the right proportions, and that may not be easy to determine, let alone achieve.

None of the above would be news to members of the early Peripatos. Indeed, toward the beginning of Book 1 of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle recognizes three distinct modes of life that are said to underlie differing conceptions of happiness. The masses, whose life resembles that of cattle, identify happiness with pleasure. Cultivated men of action, who engage in politics, seek to achieve honor. Still others embrace a life of

³²¹ Marrou (above, this section n. 262) pp. 42–43, 150–157.

contemplation. The first two of these life styles are briefly criticized. Discussion of the third is postponed until later (1.5 1095b14–1096a5).³²² If we ask where in the *Ethics* Aristotle discusses the third style, the obvious answer is toward the end of Book 10. For there an entire chapter is devoted to the subject, and by my count six arguments are advanced in favor of contemplation. 1) It is said to be an activity in conformity with man's highest virtue, i.e., the virtue of his best part. This part is *nous*, intelligence, which is either in itself divine or our most divine part, and which has cognizance of what is noble and divine. 2) We are able to contemplate continuously with greater ease than to perform any other kind of action. 3) Philosophy involves pleasures that are marvelous in their purity and certainty. 4) The life of contemplation is most self-sufficient. 5) Unlike practical pursuits, contemplation alone is loved for its own sake. 6) Happiness is thought to involve leisure. Contemplation is a far more leisured activity than political and military pursuits (10.7 1177a12–b25). No one of these arguments is sufficient, and one or two may seem quite wrongheaded,³²³ but taken together they have considerable force.³²⁴

With a view to the subsequent discussion of Theophrastean texts, I want to call attention to the fact that Aristotle is arguing in favor of an ideal life: one that is called divine (10.7 1177b31) and repeatedly labeled complete or perfect happiness, τελεία εὐδαιμονία (10.7 1177a17, b24, 10.8 1178b7). This life of contemplation is contrasted with the life of practical activity, in which a man exhibits justice, courage and other virtues while interacting with his fellow men. Such a life is assigned second place and called human as against divine (10.8 1178a9–14). Striking is the fact that Aristotle does not recognize a third mode of life that mixes contemplation with practical activities. That is in line

³²² Aristotle also mentions the life of money making, but he does so only to dismiss it on the grounds that money is not an end in itself but rather the means whereby one can lead some other kind of life (1096a5–7).

³²³ The idea that only contemplation is loved for its own sake (no. 5) is hard to accept, and persons with a secular orientation may find the introduction of the divine (no. 1) lacking in persuasive force.

³²⁴ Having presented this list of reasons for preferring contemplation, Aristotle adds that complete or perfect happiness, τελεία εὐδαιμονία, encompasses a complete span of life (10.7 1177b24–25, cf. 1.7 1098a18–20, 1.9 1100a5, cf. *EE* 2.1 1219b4–8). This means that a person who dies prematurely cannot be said to have enjoyed perfect happiness, however good a philosopher he may have been. We may agree with that if we focus on “prematurely,” but suppose a person enjoys contemplation throughout mid-life. What advanced age must he reach to have achieved perfect happiness?

with the discussion of lives at the beginning of Book 1, and perhaps of no consequence in Book 10, where Aristotle is concerned with setting forth an ideal.³²⁵ But that said, it is important to recognize that Aristotle acknowledges the limitations of his ideal life. For example, he tells us that we are better able to contemplate continuously than to engage in practical activities (1177a22), but he does not claim that contemplation can go on without pause. Rather, he thinks that the life of contemplation is more self-sufficient than other lifestyles. It too requires the necessities of life, and even though a single individual can engage in contemplation, the activity is enhanced when shared with colleagues (1177a27–b1). And when Aristotle rejects the claim that mortals should have mortal thoughts, he is careful to add a qualifier. He says that mortals should be immortal as far as possible (1177b31–33). All this is common sense. Aristotle sets forth an ideal, but he never forgets the limitations and complexity of being human.

After referring to the life of contemplation early in Book 1, Aristotle largely ignores the topic for the rest of the book. References to the final good, *τέλειον ἀγαθόν* (1.7 1097a25–33) and its self-sufficiency (1.7 1097b6–21),³²⁶ to the best of activities (1.8 1099a30) and to what is most divine (1.9 1099b16–17) might be thought to look forward to the discussion of contemplation in Book 10, but such references are the exception.³²⁷ On the whole, Aristotle is focused on man *qua* political

³²⁵ In an earlier article, I argued that in *NE* 10 Aristotle advances an exclusive view of happiness, according to which theoretical activity is the sole component of the best life (Fortenbaugh [1983] pp. 222–223 n. 57, reprint pp. 126–127). I do not think that the label “exclusive” is wrong, but I now prefer to speak of an “ideal” view of happiness. We might compare the opening chapter of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*, in which Aristotle presents a view of rhetoric that excludes emotional appeal in favor of arguing the issue. In the very next chapter, Aristotle opens the door to emotional appeal and persuasion through character. One way of explaining the shift is to say that Aristotle begins by advancing an ideal rhetoric and then turns to oratory as practiced by ordinary men in fourth century Greece. See Fortenbaugh (1996a) pp. 165–173, repr. (2006) pp. 389–396.

³²⁶ Aristotle uses the adjective *τέλειος* in two different but related senses. It may signify being at the end (*τέλος*) of a series. When a string of subordinate goals ends in a goal that is chosen entirely for its own sake, the last is the final end. In this sense, happiness may be called the final good, for it alone is not chosen for some further goal (1.7 1097a25–34). In addition, *τέλειος* may signify what is complete or perfect in that it lacks nothing (1.7 1097b6–16, 7.13 1153b16–17). On occasion, both senses may be in play (10.7 1177b16–21).

³²⁷ On one occasion, the verb *θεωρεῖν* occurs (1.10 1100b19), but in context the verb does not refer to contemplation as described in 10.7. I.e., Aristotle is not thinking of the contemplation that is central to a divine life as opposed to one that is human (1177b30–31). Rather, he is focused on human life (1100b9, 12–13) and on the man who does and

creature: one that is φύσει πολιτικός. He is clear that a solitary life is incompatible with happiness. One needs children, wife, friends, fellow citizens, and morally good ones at that (1.7 1097b8–11, 1.8 1099b2–6). And if happiness depends upon moral goodness, happiness will be shared by many people. For virtue is acquired through learning and practice, and therefore within the reach of anyone whose capacity for virtue is unimpaired (1.9 1099b18–20).³²⁸ None of this is incompatible with what we read in Book 10. Rather, Aristotle is focused on the polis and the role of politics in improving the lives of citizens (cf. 1099b29–32).³²⁹ A select group of philosophers may experience the bliss of contemplation, but if they have been properly educated from youth onward, they will not remove themselves from the polis. For they will understand the importance of moral virtue, family and friends. In conformity with their natural endowments, they will choose to mix contemplation with civic involvement and pleasurable relaxation.

These introductory remarks have now gone full circle, so that we are left with a puzzle mentioned in the opening paragraph: If being human calls for a life in which contemplation is mixed with other forms of activity, what constitutes a proper mix? A correct but largely unhelpful answer would be a mix in accordance with right reason, κατὰ ὁρθὸν λόγον. A more helpful answer would be a mix in which time spent in contemplation is maximized. Such a life would involve the fullest use of our most divine part, νοῦς, and achieve immortality to the extent that a human being can (10.7 1177b33). We may compare the final chapter of the *Eudemian Ethics*, where the same recommendation is made but with a difference in emphasis. We are advised to aim at serving and contemplating the god, and as far as possible to be unconscious of the alogical part of the soul (8.3 1249b20–23).³³⁰ In other words, we should minimize emotional response and actions driven by appetite. A philosopher like Theophrastus will have understood the appeal of such a recommendation, and occasionally he is likely to have expressed himself in a similar manner (see 481). But on such occasions, he will have

contemplates what is in conformity with virtue (1100b19–20). To be sure, in 479 θεωρεῖν is used in relation to the physicist who investigates reality; it is opposed to practical reflection that leads to action. But that is not true of 1.10 1100b19.

³²⁸ Cf. *EE* 1.3 1215a15–19.

³²⁹ Early in Book 1 Aristotle makes quite clear that his subject falls under politics (1.2 1094a27–28, b11), that the study of living well, i.e., happiness, belongs to politics (1.4 1095a14–20).

³³⁰ On the alogical part of the soul, see the commentary on 449A *ad init.* with n. 156.

recognized that he was advocating an ideal life that can only be realized to a limited extent. For not only are human beings political creatures, whose nature it is to marry and to engage in civic affairs, but also human beings are confronted by ever changing circumstances. What is possible is always a matter of the moment, i.e., the *καιρός*. And in this topic Theophrastus appears to have been keenly interested (see 589 no. 4a–b, 5 and 6).

475 Cicero, *On Ends* 5.86 (*BT* p. 198.22–26 Schiche)

Literature: Brandis (1860) p. 349; Zeller (1879) p. 856; Madvig (1876) pp. 758–760; Fortenbaugh (1984) p. 200, (2007b) pp. 279–281; Wehrli-Wöhrle (2004) 547

Text 475 marks a transition within the dialogue *On Ends*. In what precedes,³³¹ Cicero contrasts Antiochus' view of happiness with that of the Stoics: whereas Antiochus, founder of the Old Academy, distinguished between happiness and supreme happiness; the Stoics denied that happiness admits of degrees. Cicero praises the Stoics for consistency. They are said to hold that virtue alone is good; it does not admit degrees and is solely responsible for happiness, so that no one person can be happier than another. Finally Cicero draws a conclusion that is alleged to threaten the Peripatetics: if they hold that misfortunes are evils, then the man who suffers misfortune will not be happy; and if they deny that misfortunes are evil, then their entire system collapses (5.86 = 496).³³² That prompts a playful interchange between Cicero and Marcus Piso, who has been representing Antiochus.³³³ Piso says that Cicero is frightened that Lucius, Cicero's cousin, will become his (Piso's) pupil.³³⁴ In response Cicero says

³³¹ I.e., in 5.76–86.

³³² Fundamental to the Peripatetic system is the recognition of three kinds of goods and evils: psychic, bodily and external. Evils in the last two categories are largely (or at least often) misfortunes that are not attributable to vice. See the commentary on 496.

³³³ Early on (5.8) it is made clear that Piso will be presenting the doctrine of Antiochus, and at the end of Piso's long speech (5.9–74), it is again made clear that Piso has been representing the views of Antiochus (5.75). Problematic is whether a particular work of Antiochus stands behind some or much of what Cicero makes Piso say. See Chapter II, "The Sources" no. 4 on Cicero.

³³⁴ In 5.6 Lucius says that he is torn between Carneades and Antiochus. Carneades represents the New or Sceptical Academy, with which Cicero identifies himself. In 5.7 Piso says that he will urge Lucius to embrace the Old Academy of Antiochus. It is said to include not only Academics like Speusippus, Xenocrates, Polemo and Crantor but also

that he does not mind, for if Lucius joins Piso, he will still be with him.³³⁵ At this point, Piso addresses Lucius directly, telling him to pay attention. Theophrastus is cited, and the entire importance of philosophy is said to consist in the attainment of happiness. That is our text 475.

As printed in the text-translation volume, 475 involves an emendation. The words *ut ait Theophrastus*, “as Theophrastus says” (line 2), are found in the manuscripts after *tecum enim*, “for (I must address) you” (line 1). Lambinus transposed the words, so that they occur after *omnis auctoritas philosophiae* (line 2). This emendation has been accepted by most editors³³⁶ and incorporated into all modern editions.³³⁷ It occurs in the Teubner edition (1915, reprint 1961), on which 475 is based. The argument against the manuscript tradition is at least threefold. First, if the words *ut Theophrastus ait* are printed as they occur in the manuscript, then Theophrastus is addressing Lucius and that is chronologically impossible. Second, if the words in question are read in the opening sentence of 475, then they should follow *mihi*, i.e., *tecum enim mihi* (line 1). For what is being attributed to Theophrastus is the phrase *instituenda oratio est*. Third, the idea expressed by the words *tecum ... instituenda oratio est* is so general, that it would be absurd to mark it as Theophrastean.³³⁸ These considerations have some appeal, but they are not decisive. Here are four counter-considerations. First, the grammarian Nonius Marcellus (early 4th century AD), who cites the second sentence (lines 2–4), omits the words *ut ait Theophrastus*.³³⁹ Presumably he read them in the first sentence, where they occur in the manuscripts.³⁴⁰ Second, if the manuscript reading is accepted, we are not compelled to say that

the early Peripatetics. Later when Piso has finished presenting the doctrine of Antiochus, he asks whether he has convinced Lucius, whom he wishes to steal away from Cicero (5.75, cf. 5.95).

³³⁵ At 5.76 Cicero, whose sympathies are with the Sceptical Academy, maintains that it is open to him to approve the doctrines set forth by Piso, for one cannot fail to approve doctrines that appear probable.

³³⁶ To the best of my knowledge, the last editors to resist Lambin’s emendation are Orelli (1828) and Otto (1831), both of whom printed the reading of the manuscripts.

³³⁷ I.e., all editions since those of Orelli and Otto (see the preceding note). I have personally inspected the editions of Madvig (1839), Baiter-Halm (1861), Baiter-Kayser (1863), Klotz (1866), Mueller (1904), Rackham (1914), Schiche (1915), Martha (1930), Marinone (1958), Kabza (1960), Gigon (1988), Reynolds (1998) and Moreschini (2005).

³³⁸ Madvig (1876) 759.

³³⁹ *De compendiosa doctrina*, s.v. *comparare* p. 256.32 M = p. 389.13–14 L.

³⁴⁰ I have written “presumably,” because it is at least possible that Nonius viewed the words *ut ait Theophrastus* as irrelevant to his interests and simply omitted them. See Klotz (1866) p. xviii.

the text involves a chronological impossibility. Theophrastus is mentioned, but not as someone who speaks directly to Lucius. Rather, Piso is speaking to Lucius and in doing so he recalls a passage that occurs in some Theophrastean work. Third, the Theophrastean work in question is almost certainly *On Happiness*. That work has been cited in the immediately preceding section (in 5.85) and is being recalled in Piso's address to Lucius. Assuming that *On Happiness* was a dialogue,³⁴¹ then Piso may be recalling a passage in which Theophrastus, speaking in his own person, addressed an interlocutor in much the same way that Piso addresses Lucius. What will have made the Theophrastean passage memorable can only be guessed at. It may have occurred early in *On Happiness* or late in the work like 475 in *On Ends*. Either way, the Theophrastean passage is likely to have marked a transition as does the first sentence of 475. Fourth, there is no reason to deny that the idea expressed by the Latin words *tecum ... mihi instituenda oratio est* is in itself quite general. The same will have been true of the Greek words that stood behind the Latin: e.g., πρὸς σε γάρ μοι, after which came λόγος together with some verb, most likely one expressing necessity.³⁴² But as already indicated, it is probably the Theophrastean context that has special significance: a turning point in the dialogue *On Happiness* that was well known to Cicero and his intended readership.

If we do follow the manuscripts and read *ut Theophrastus ait* in the first sentence, should we say that the Theophrastean material extends no further than the first sentence? The question cannot be answered with certainty, but perhaps we can say that the idea expressed by the second sentence—namely, that the entire importance of philosophy, *omnis auctoritas philosophiae*, consists in bringing about a happy life—recurs in 498.5–6, where, however, the sentiment seems parenthetical and not closely tied to Theophrastus. Moreover, we know from Cicero's *Lucullus* 29 that Antiochus made the end of goods, *finis bonorum*, one of the two principle matters with which philosophy is concerned.³⁴³ And at *Academics* 1.34, Cicero has Varro, who is presenting the doctrine of

³⁴¹ See the discussion of *On Happiness*, above in Chapter III, "Ethical Titles," no. 12.

³⁴² Cf. Plato, *Gorgias* 474A and *Sophist* 251C. But in suggesting a Greek equivalent, I am speculating.

³⁴³ The second matter is the criterion of truth, which is characterized as the beginning of the process of knowledge *cognoscendi initium* (*Lucullus* 29 p. 41.28 Plasberg). See Barnes (1989) pp. 83 and 89, who argues that epistemology and ethics were the two major parts of Antiochus' philosophy. They were necessarily linked to each other, and epistemology was considered prior.

Antiochus, describe ethics as the most necessary part of philosophy. Hence, the second sentence of our text might be regarded as Antiochian. Nevertheless and more importantly, we find Aristotle making a similar assertion in the *Eudemian Ethics*: all inquiry, *πᾶσα σκέψις*, is to be directed to the question how one achieves living well (1.3 1215a9–10). That Theophrastus made a similar assertion in some work seems to me not only possible but also probable. He may have done so in an esoteric work (Aristotle's *Eudemian Ethics* is an esoteric work), but an exoteric work is equally possible. Assuming that Cicero is drawing on a dialogue of Theophrastus, i.e., *On Happiness*, a strong (challenging) assertion concerning the role or purpose of philosophy would be in place.³⁴⁴ What follows, however, in 5.87–96,³⁴⁵ need have no direct connection with Theophrastus, and on occasion we can firmly rule out any such connection: e.g., when Piso addresses Chrysippus and comments on his use of language within the classroom (5.89).

476 Codex Neapolitanus II D 22, sent. 18 (*Scritti di varia filologia* p. 171 Sbordone)

477 Codex Neapolitanus II D 22, sent. 19 (*Scritti di varia filologia* p. 171 Sbordone)

Literature: Sbordone (1935, repr. 1971) p. 171; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 200–201; Magnaldi (1991) p. 79 n. 24; Overwien (2001) pp. 115, 126; Tsouni (2010) p. 825

Texts 476 and 477 are taken from a collection of sayings found in codex Neapolitanus II D 22. Sbordone p. 168 suggests that the collection was put together by a grammarian of the 14th century for use in schools. The sayings follow two others that are attributed to Aristotle, but in the *Gnomologium Vaticanum* they are assigned to Theophrastus (452 and app. 558). Since the Neapolitan collection belongs to the *Gnomologium Vaticanum* tradition, it seems likely that the compiler of the Neapolitan

³⁴⁴ So would the concluding statement that we are all burning with a desire to live happily. The phrase *cupiditate incensi* may be compared with *cupiditate incensam* at 484.13. In both cases, however, the metaphor is too common to claim a direct connection with Theophrastus.

³⁴⁵ In 5.87–96, Piso cites Plato, Pythagoras and Democritus, all of whom are said to have been in search of happiness. The importance of virtue for happiness is stressed, and the possibility of degrees of happiness is affirmed (5.87–95). The conclusion is brief and playful. The idea that Lucius might be won over to Piso's position is repeated (*abducere* 5.86 and 95).

collection has nodded or been misled, perhaps by a faulty source in which two Theophrastean sayings were attributed to Aristotle.³⁴⁶

476 contains no surprises. That “it is difficult to select and to choose the best mode of life” (lines 1–2) “but it is much more difficult and more important, after making a selection and choice, to remain steadfast” (lines 2–3) is a matter of experience that will not have escaped Theophrastus. To be sure, Theophrastus held that the best life is one of philosophy or at least one in which intellectual activity occupied first place. But he also recognized that there are strong arguments for other modes of life, and in his work *On Lives* (436 no. 16), he will have considered the matter in detail.³⁴⁷ Concerning the difficulty of remaining by a decision, we may compare Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 3.1 1110a29–31: ἔστι δὲ χαλεπὸν ἐνίοτε διακρίναι ποῖον ἀντὶ ποίου αἰρετέον καὶ τί ἀντὶ τίνος ὑπομενετέον, ἔτι δὲ χαλεπώτερον ἐμμεῖναι τοῖς γνωσθεῖσιν, “it is sometimes difficult to decide between choosing one sort of thing over another, and which of two alternatives ought to be endured. And it is still more difficult to remain steadfast in decisions that have been made.” In this passage, Aristotle is thinking primarily of individual acts that are chosen on a particular occasion. But the idea is easily extended to choosing a mode of life that influences nearly everything a man does. For choosing a way of life multiplies the number of road-blocks that can impede one’s choice. A special case (it is discussed in the commentary on 465) is the man whose character in the course of time has become resistant to change. Such a man might choose a better life for himself, but he remains stuck in his habits. Hence, early education plays a crucial role not only in selecting a good lifestyle, but also in being able to realize one’s choice.

477 is remarkable for its pessimism: “All life is easy to denounce. For all things are small and weak and short-lived and mingled with pains” (lines 1–2). The complaint recalls 440A–C and 1.52–60, but it is one-sided and exaggerated. To be sure, Theophrastus understood how painful and frustrating life can be. In a particular context, perhaps in a dialogue, he may have expressed himself in words identical with or similar to those of 477. But he did not surrender himself fully to pessimism. Instead, he recognized the numerous disappointments that characterize human life, and yet called attention to the security and independence that come with education (491) and spoke glowingly of the divine character of the philosophic life (482).

³⁴⁶ See above, Chapter II “The Sources” no. 50 on the codex Neapolitanus II D 2.

³⁴⁷ *On Lives* was three books long (Diogenes, Laertius 5.42 = 1.87).

478 Depository of Wisdom Literature, chap. On Theophrastus, saying no. 21

Literature: Gutas (1985) p. 92

Text 478 is a saying in Arabic translation that is attributed to Theophrastus in the *Depository of Wisdom Literature* as reconstructed by Dimitri Gutas. In the text-translation volumes, the translation runs, “Men did not attain what they wished, what they left behind is beyond their reach, and they perished.” Gutas now recommends replacing “is” with “was,” so that we read “*was* beyond their reach.” That suits both the perfect tense of the Arabic verb and the concluding words “and they perished.”³⁴⁸

478 is like 477 in that both texts present a negative view, but they differ in that 477 is a general statement about “all life” and “all things,” while 478 refers to the past and taken literally seems to refer to particular persons, albeit unnamed. If that is correct, 478 is a comment on individuals who wished for things that they could not attain.

We should not overlook a second text in the *Depository of Wisdom Literature*. It is no. 22 and occurs in the text-translation volumes as 34B. Theophrastus is reported to have reproached nature from his deathbed, saying that cranes, crows and eagles are so constituted that they live a long time, while men live but a short time. As a result “those who need to live waste away quickly, while those who do not need to live last a long time.” Like 478, so 34B presents death as an impediment to fulfillment, but the fact that 34B presents a general complaint that explicitly refers to the brevity of life invites comparison with 477.2.

In the text-translation volumes, 34B is printed together with 34A, which is taken from the third book of Cicero’s *Tusculan Disputations*. In both texts men are compared with animals, though the animals cited are different except for crows. And in both texts, the brevity of life is seen as

³⁴⁸ In private correspondence Gutas has explained to me that “the Arabic perfect tense indicates as a rule what is termed ‘aspect’ by the grammarians, in this case, completed action, not necessarily past action: if a completed action has effects which are still valid and of consequence now, then Arabic uses the perfect. If you want to say in Arabic that a man has come and is present now, you use the perfect, something like our present perfect, ‘he has come’ in the sense that he is here.” That may explain the use of the perfect in the Arabic text, but in the English translation the use of “is” remains jarring. In general, what was true of a subject when alive is no longer asserted of him in the present tense when he ceases to exist. “He cannot attain his wish” becomes “he could not attain his wish.” Of course, one can write about the dead in the historical present, but that does not apply in the case before us. Aside from “is,” verbs in the past tense occur throughout the translation: “did not attain,” “wished,” “left behind” and “perished.”

preventing fulfillment. The loss is explained more fully in 34A. We are told that were the lives of men longer, their lives would be enhanced by all arts and learning. And that is followed by the comment, “Therefore, he (Theophrastus) was complaining that he was dying just when he had begun to understand those things” (34A.6).

If we take 34A at face value, we may want to describe Theophrastus as a complainer with an over-inflated ego: someone so confident in his own intellectual powers that he has lost all sense of human limitation. But such a reading of 34A would be simplistic. We should remember that the attribution and fabrication of dying words were common among ancient writers (Diogenes Laertius attributes other words to Theophrastus [5.40–41 = 1.51–60]) and that the words attributed to Theophrastus in 34A were movable. In Seneca’s *On the Shortness of Life* 1.2 a similar saying is assigned to Aristotle and described as quite unfitting for a man of wisdom.³⁴⁹

Returning to 478, we can say that it relates to both 34A and 34B in that all three texts recognize that death frustrates human aspirations. But the use of past time and the apparent reference to particular individuals in 478 remain puzzling. We might guess that in some lost context 478 (when fleshed out in greater detail) served as an example in support of the general thesis advanced in 34A–B. But guessing is dangerous, and in relation to a person’s dying words the guess seems preposterous. For Theophrastus, the great philosopher that he was, did not construct an argument by example on his death bed. Indeed, that Theophrastus reproached nature on his deathbed is not to be believed, unless we assume that Theophrastus, like Pericles (463), was so afflicted in body that his character and judgment were undermined.

479 pseudo-Plutarch, *On the Opinions of the Philosophers* 1, Introduction 874F–875A (*BT* vol. 5.2.1 p. 51.23–52.6 Mau)

Literature: Brandis (1860) p. 347; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 201–202; Huby (2001) p. 313; Millett (2007) p. 116; Tsouni (2010) p. 148 n. 714

Text 479 is taken from ps.-Plutarch’s epitome of Aëtius’ lost work on doctrines concerning physics or natural philosophy. The epitome contains five books; our text occurs within the introduction to the first book. We have already been told that an account of physics should be preceded by

³⁴⁹ It may be that Seneca has confused the two Peripatetics, but if so that only illustrates how easy it is for a saying to wander from one person to another.

a division of philosophy, in order that we may know the place of physics within philosophy. We have also been told that the Stoics divided philosophy into three parts: physics, ethics and logic. After that comes our text. Aristotle, Theophrastus and almost all the Peripatetics are said to have divided philosophy in such a way that the perfect man, the τέλειος ἄνθρωπος (line 2), necessarily contemplates reality and does what is right. Two examples of contemplating reality are given: investigating whether the sun is a living creature and investigating whether the universe is infinite. In regard to doing what is right, a single complex example is put forth: investigating how one lives in a fitting manner, how one guides children, how one rules and how one legislates. And in each case, the investigation is for the sake of action.

Almost certainly, Aristotle and Theophrastus are mentioned because they are the best-known Peripatetics and not because they are the immediate source of what follows their names.³⁵⁰ Indeed, what follows involves an awkwardness that may be attributable to the epitomist. For instead of being offered a division of philosophy, we hear of the perfect man and the two activities in which he necessarily engages. I am not saying that these activities are irrelevant to a division of philosophy: they invite a division into theoretical and practical philosophy. But the division is not made explicit in our text.

To avoid any possible confusion, we should distinguish clearly between the perfect man to which our text refers and two other kinds of perfect man. One is the man who has acquired all the moral virtues together with practical wisdom. From an ethical point of view, he might be called perfect or complete. But he is essentially a doer, a practical individual who may or may not engage in theoretical studies. The other man is the trained thinker, who can be regarded as τέλειος, because he is able to take an analysis to its proper end (cf. Theophrastus, *Metaphysics* 3 6a19).³⁵¹ But such a man may not be a man of action. In contrast, the perfect man of our text combines theoretical studies with virtuous action. He is both a thinker and a doer.

³⁵⁰ Cf. 479.1.

³⁵¹ I have written τέλειος, following Van Raalte and Laks-Most, who in their editions of Theophrastus' *Metaphysics* print τελέου; τὰ ἐφεξῆς εὐθύς ἀποδιδόναι καὶ μὴ μέχρι τοῦ προελθόντα παύεσθαι; τοῦτο γὰρ τελέου καὶ φρονοῦντος (3 6a17–19). For our purposes, it makes little difference whether a source text exhibits τέλειος or τέλειος, the latter of which occurs in 479 line 2. On the two forms, see LSJ s.v. *ad init.*, where we are told that Attic inscriptions up to the end of the third century B.C have only τέλειος.

Our text deviates in a small but interesting way from *Nicomachean Ethics* 10.7, where Aristotle sets forth an ideal notion of perfect happiness, τελεία εὐδαιμονία (1177a17, b24).³⁵² He speaks of contemplative activity, θεωρητική ἐνέργεια (1177a16–18), which is carried on by our best part and directed toward the highest objects of knowledge (1177a12–21). In addition, he notes the ease with which men are able to engage in continuous contemplation, θεωρεῖν (1177a21–22). He also praises this activity for the marvelous pleasures that it provides (1177a22–26) and calls it reasonable that time spent in knowledge is more pleasant than time spent in research or investigation: εὐλογον δὲ τοῖς εἰδόσι τῶν ζητούντων ἡδίω τὴν διαγωγὴν εἶναι (1177a26–27). The last assertion is remarkable, for most or at least many of us think that the pleasure of intellectual activity lies primarily in the investigation that leads to a new idea or discovery and more generally to an advance in knowledge. The thought that perfect happiness lies not in the activity of investigation but rather in the continuous contemplation of some result seems odd, not to say lazy and self-indulgent. Moreover, text 479 seems to provide a welcome correction, for here being one who contemplates, θεωρητικός, θεωρεῖν (lines 3–7), is elucidated by reference to investigation, ζητεῖν (lines 4–6). No hard line is drawn between investigating a problem and reflecting on what has been accomplished. The perfect man of 479 is one who engages in research, undoubtedly takes time to enjoy what he has accomplished, but then addresses a new problem or takes time off to engage in practical activities, i.e., those of the family and city-state.

Despite the ideal picture developed in *Nicomachean Ethics* 10.7, Aristotle was fully aware that human life and therefore human happiness necessarily include both practical and intellectual activities. See the introduction to this section. And despite texts like 481–484 and 486, Theophrastus will have agreed with his teacher: the man who lives a full life and lives it well makes room for family, friends and the larger community. See, e.g., 523.

The ideas expressed in text 479 may be assigned to *On Happiness*, but we should keep in mind that we are dealing with an epitome that may have only an indirect connection to an actual Theophrastean work.

³⁵² On NE 10.7 and ideal happiness, see above, the introduction to this section (IV.5).

480A Cicero, *On Ends* 5.72–73 (BT p. 192.2–8 Schiche)

480B Ambrose, *On the Duties of Ministers* 2.2 (PL vol. 16 col. 104A–B Migne)

Literature: Regenbogen (1940) col. 1482; Glücker (1978) pp. 58–59; Fortenbaugh (1984) p. 202; Barnes (1989) p. 86

Text 480A comes toward the end of a long exposition of Antiochus' doctrine concerning the ends of goods (5.8–73). Cicero puts the exposition in the mouth of Piso, who is said to have been studying under Antiochus for several months (5.8). The doctrine in question is a synthesis of Academic-Peripatetic teaching. Piso has emphasized the importance of virtue for the attainment of happiness, but he has not denied that there are other goods that carry some weight in regard to living a happy life (5.71–72). After that and by way of conclusion, he asserts that others have tried to seize small pieces and pass them off as their own (5.72).³⁵³ That is the beginning of 480A (lines 1–2).

We are told that Aristotle and Theophrastus have often and admirably praised for its own sake the very knowledge of things, *ipsa rerum scientia* (lines 2–3). The mention of the two leading Peripatetics is not surprising, for Piso has already made repeated reference to them (5.10–14, 54). The same is true of knowledge, for Piso has treated the subject in some detail, pointing out *inter alia* that love of learning and knowledge is innate in human beings (5.48),³⁵⁴ that knowledge is a source of enjoyment even when no advantage follows (5.50) and that intellectual activity provides alleviation in times of misfortune (5.53). In regard to alleviation, Theophrastus is mentioned as the teacher of Demetrius of Phalerum, who was banished from Athens and occupied himself in writing excellent books (5.54 = 18 no. 5 = Dem. Ph. fr. 36 SOD).

Piso is made to say that the Stoic Erillus³⁵⁵ was so captivated by Aristotle's and Theophrastus' praise of knowledge that he defended knowledge

³⁵³ The "others" include Erillus, Aristo of Chios, Hieronymus, Callipho and Diodorus (5.73).

³⁵⁴ The idea that human beings have an innate love of learning and knowledge is wide spread and turns up in non-philosophic texts. See, e.g., Xenophon's *Education of Cyrus* 1.2.1 where a strong love of learning is listed among Cyrus' natural attributes. Cyrus is not unique in possessing a natural curiosity to understand the world around him. Rather, it is the superlative degree of his curiosity (he is φιλομαθέστατος) that sets him apart. See Xenophon, *The Education of Cyrus* 1.2.1–2 with Fortenbaugh (2009) p. 122.

³⁵⁵ Erillus of Carthage (flor. c. 260BC) was a pupil of Zeno. Diogenes Laertius gives a brief account of his views and lists the titles of his writings (7.165–166). In Arnim's *Stoicorum veterum fragmenta*, Erillus is no. 2 among the pupils of Zeno (vol. 1 pp. 91–93 fr. 409–421).

as the highest good, holding that nothing else is to be sought for itself (lines 3–5). For our purposes, the important point is that Piso recognizes a difference between Aristotle and Theophrastus on the one hand and Erillus on the other. Whereas the two Peripatetics praised knowledge for its own sake, Erillus declared that nothing else beside knowledge is desirable for its own sake. In other words, he picked out a piece, a *particula* (line 1), and excluded everything else. That is not the considered view of either Aristotle or Theophrastus. Both recognized that human nature involves more than a divine intellect and that practical activities, i.e., exercises of moral virtue in conjunction with practical wisdom are valuable in themselves. To be sure, Aristotle's remarks concerning contemplation in *Nicomachean Ethics* 10.7 and Theophrastean texts like 481–483 may be said to encourage an extreme position such as that adopted by Erillus, but neither Peripatetic went so far as to claim that knowledge alone is desirable for its own sake.³⁵⁶

In fairness to Erillus it should be pointed out that Cicero describes the position of Erillus in two different ways. In *On Ends*, both in 5.73 = 480A and earlier in 5.23, Cicero refers only to knowledge: Erillus held that nothing else is good but knowledge (5.23); that knowledge is the highest good (5.73). In the *Lucullus*, however, knowledge is paired with inquiry or learning. We are told that Erillus placed the highest good *in cognitione et scientia* (129).³⁵⁷ We may be reminded of 479, where contemplation is conjoined with investigation, and both are characteristic of the perfect man. See also 482.2, where the life most similar to that of the gods is placed *in contemplatione et cognitione*. For Aristotle and Theophrastus as well as Erillus, acquiring knowledge is as important (or good) as contemplating what one has already learned. See the commentary on 479.

In his influential article entitled “Antiochus of Ascalon,”³⁵⁸ Jonathan Barnes offers a different interpretation of 480A. He tells us that Aristotle and Theophrastus “are named first among those who ‘snatched pieces’ from the system.” The two Peripatetics are presented as persons who “pillaged” an Academic construction. It is, of course, true that Piso names Aristotle and Theophrastus immediately after referring to others who tried to seize small pieces, and that may suggest including the two

³⁵⁶ On Aristotle, see the introduction to this section on “Happiness,” and regarding Theophrastus see 479, 523 and the commentary on these texts.

³⁵⁷ On *cognitio* in the sense of “inquiry” or “learning,” see Liddell and Scott s.v. I.A.

³⁵⁸ Barnes (1989) p. 86.

Peripatetics among those who “tried to appropriate small pieces” from the ethical system that Piso has been presenting. But the suggestion is misleading. For the system is explicitly said to be Academic-Peripatetic (5.7–8, 14), and when Piso discusses knowledge, he names Demetrius of Phalerum and describes him not only as a pupil of Theophrastus but also as eminent in the philosophy that is being recommended (5.54). Clearly the philosophy in question is Peripatetic or Academic-Peripatetic. And later when Piso speaks of others trying to appropriate small pieces, he is not thinking of Aristotle and Theophrastus stealing from themselves. Rather, Aristotle and Theophrastus are named in order to explain what influenced Erillus to focus on knowledge and to maintain that nothing else is to be sought for its own sake.³⁵⁹ Here the adverb *mirabiliter*, “wonderfully” or “admirably” is of some importance. Aristotle and Theophrastus are singled out, because they praised study and knowledge in a most striking manner³⁶⁰—especially in exoteric dialogues (but we need not exclude *NE* 10.7)—and this manner in addition to impressive arguments led Erillus to designate knowledge alone as the highest good.

Text 480B draws on 480A. Using Cicero’s words, Ambrose tells us that Erillus was influenced by Aristotle’s and Theophrastus’ praise of knowledge, and that he (Erillus) posited knowledge alone as the highest good (lines 1–3). Ambrose then adds correctly that the two Peripatetics did not praise knowledge as the only good (lines 3–4). In what follows, Ambrose characterizes the Peripatetic view of the happy life. It is said to consist in virtue, but to be made full by the goods of the body and those that are external (lines 4–7).³⁶¹ In the apparatus of parallel texts, we remark that this characterization of the happy life seems to depend on *On Ends* 5.71. The verb “seems” should be underlined, for neither Aristotle nor Theophrastus is mentioned in 5.71. Moreover, in the Ciceronian passage, Piso speaks of the most happy life being made full by bodily goods: *com-*

³⁵⁹ Much as the reference to Aristotle and Theophrastus precedes and introduces Erillus’ singular selection, so the subsequent reference to the members of our own school (*a nostris*) precedes and introduces Hieronymus’ selection of a *particula*: namely, freedom from pain (5.73).

³⁶⁰ Cf. 5.11 ad fin. = 482.3–4, where Aristotle and Theophrastus are said to have discussed the life of contemplation and study in a style that was brilliant and illuminating: *his de rebus et splendida est eorum et illustris oratio*.

³⁶¹ The use of *complere*, “to make full” or “to fill up,” at 480B.6 may be compared with the use of συμπληροῦν at 501.9. See also the use of *complere* in *On Ends* 5.71: *illa enim quae sunt a nobis bona corporis numerata complent ea quidem beatissimam vitam*.

*plent ea (sc. bona corporis) quidem beatissimam vitam.*³⁶² In the passage from Ambrose, we read of the happy life being made full by bodily and external goods: *compleri eius (sc. vitae beatae) beatitudinem etiam corporis atque externis bonis*. The occurrence of the verb *complere* in both passages may suggest dependence, but we should take notice of the fact that only Ambrose makes mention of external goods. That is significant. If Ambrose is influenced by *On Ends* 5.71, he is also thinking for himself. For he reports correctly the doctrine of Aristotle and Theophrastus: external goods like kinsmen, friends and fellow citizens are important components in a happy life. In contrast Piso, following Antiochus, has marked off external goods from bodily goods and declared them no part of the end or ultimate good (5.67–68).

481 Cicero, *To Atticus* 2.16.3 (*BT* vol. 1 p. 74.5–14 Shackleton Bailey)

Literature: Brandis (1860) pp. 346–347; Zeller (1879) vol. 2.2 p. 891; Heylbut (1888) p. 199; Arnim (1892) pp. 126–128; Jaeger (1928/1960) pp. 378–384, (1929) p. 278; Walzer (1929) p. 190; Brink (1940) p. 929; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1481–1482; Wehrli (1967–1978) vol. 1 p. 51; Moraux (1973) pp. 411–412; Donini (1965) pp. 142–143 n. 23, (1975) pp. 345, 351–354; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 202–204; Annas (2001) p. 121 n. 16; Huby (2001) pp. 311–328

Text 481 is taken from a letter written by Cicero to his friend Atticus in May of 59 BC. The so-called First Triumvirate of Pompey, Caesar and Crassus was now dominating Roman politics. Cicero refused to ally himself with these men, and feeling himself isolated left Rome for Antium and then for Formiae, where he wrote the letter, from which our text is taken. In earlier letters from this period, he had indicated his intention to retire from politics and to devote himself to a quiet life of literature and philosophy (*To Atticus* 2.5.2, 6.1, 13.2, 14.1). 481 continues this theme. Cicero refers to controversy within the Peripatos. Dicaearchus is said to have rated the life of action, the *πρακτικὸς βίος*, above all others, while Theophrastus assigned first place to the life of contemplation, the *θεωρητικὸς βίος* (lines 1–4).³⁶³ Cicero allows that he has sufficiently satisfied Dicaearchus, and that it is time for him to pay attention to the

³⁶² On the *beatissima vita* in contrast with the *beata vita*, see the commentary to 492 and 493.

³⁶³ Cicero has mentioned Theophrastus and Dicaearchus in earlier letters to Atticus (2.9.2 = 593 and 2.12.4) dating to this period, i.e., April and May of 59 BC.

other school, i.e., Theophrastus, who not only permits him to be at leisure but also faults him for not always having been at leisure (lines 4–7). What is meant by leisure is made clear, when Cicero speaks of splendid studies (line 8). He is referring to the life of contemplation (line 4), i.e., the quiet life of study that Theophrastus recommends.

Pamela Huby has called attention to the fact that the Latin word *controversia* need mean no more than “difference in opinion.”³⁶⁴ But what does the adjective *tanta*, “so great,” add when predicated of *controversia* (line 1). One possibility is that the adjective refers to the intensity of the controversy. Another is that it underlines the importance of the controversy. Both these possibilities may be combined. For not only do disagreements between members of the same school easily become nasty and polemical, but also disagreements intensify when they involve the fundamental tenets of a school. In the case of Dicaearchus and Theophrastus, a tenet of Peripatetic psychology may well have been involved. For Theophrastus followed Aristotle and recognized the divine character of the intellect, νοῦς (271). In contrast, Dicaearchus denied the immortality of the intellect; like Aristoxenos, he advanced a materialistic view of the soul (fr. 7–12 W = 14–19 Mirhady³⁶⁵).³⁶⁶ The importance of this difference becomes clear, when one considers *Nicomachean Ethics* 10.7, where Aristotle introduces a series of arguments, in order to establish the superiority of a contemplative life.³⁶⁷ Pride of place is given to the special character of the soul: If the intellect, νοῦς, is something divine in comparison with man, then the life in accordance with it will be something divine in comparison with human life (1177b30–31). If one denies the if-clause, then one is apt to believe that an individual *qua* mortal human being should focus his attention on what is mortal and human (1177B31–33).

Dicaearchus appears to have criticized Aristotle (fr. 26 W = 6 M); but his strongest remarks seem to have been directed against Theophrastus. His *Lesbian Books* contained a dialogue that was set in Mytilene and focused on the mortality of the soul (fr. 9 W = 27 M). Since Theophrastus was from Lesbos and since he spent c. two years in Mytilene with Aristotle (from 345/4 to 343/2 BC), it is plausible to suppose that the *Les-*

³⁶⁴ Huby pp. 313, 317.

³⁶⁵ Mirhady's edition of the fragments of Dicaearchus, together with English translation, will be found in *Dicaearchus of Messana* = Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities 10 (2001) pp. 1–142.

³⁶⁶ Zeller 891–892, Donini (1975) 352.

³⁶⁷ See the introduction to this section on “Happiness.”

bian Books criticized both Theophrastus' psychology and his preference for the intellectual life.³⁶⁸ Dicaearchus will not have denied that Theophrastus was interested in the life of action and in political issues (479, 590), but he will have labeled this interest theoretical and praised the ancients, who did not inquire whether they should engage in politics and how, but rather engaged in politics and did so nobly. Nor did they inquire whether it was necessary to marry, but having married properly, they lived together with their wives (fr. 31 W = 36 M).³⁶⁹ The last point concerning wives may have been especially irritating to Theophrastus, who never married and had no children. In any case, Theophrastus may have reacted strongly and in doing so emphasized the uncertainty of the life of action. Like Aristotle, he will have underlined the self-sufficiency of an intellectual life and the relative instability of other life styles. Since Dicaearchus seems to have introduced Socrates as a role model for living well (fr. 29 W = 43 M),³⁷⁰ we can imagine Theophrastus seizing on the death of Socrates and insisting that happiness is not compatible with being condemned to drink hemlock (cf. 493). In addition, Theophrastus may have made fun of political activity (cf. 610) and praised in an exaggerated manner the advantages of a life free from civic entanglements. While these details must remain speculations, I am inclined to believe that the controversy with Dicaearchus had some influence on the picture of Theophrastus that later generations came to hold. See the commentary on 491, 492 and 493.³⁷¹

One caveat is in order. As formulated by Cicero, the controversy between Theophrastus and Dicaearchus involves extreme positions. Dicaearchus is said to have put the active life far ahead of all others (line 3). There is no suggestion of a mixed life that would make room for contemplation, albeit less room than that assigned to action. In contrast, Theophrastus (*re vera*, his school) faults Cicero for not always having lived a quiet life. It was never proper to depart from a life of study

³⁶⁸ Wehrli (1967–1978) vol. 1 p. 51.

³⁶⁹ Little, if any, weight can be attached to reports that Theophrastus twice freed his homeland from tyranny (Plutarch, *Epicurus Makes a Pleasant Life Impossible* 15 1097B, *Reply to Colotes* 33 1126F). See Jaeger (1928/1960) pp. 383–384 n. 1, Regenbogen col. 1359 and Wehrli (1967–1978) vol. 9 p. 28. In any case, it seems certain that Theophrastus did not regard himself as a useful model of the political life. And neither will have Dicaearchus. See *Herculaneum Papyrus* 240 fr. 16.3–10 = 27.

³⁷⁰ Wehrli (1967–1978) vol. 1 p. 51.

³⁷¹ See also *Herculaneum papyrus* 240 fr. 16.3–10 = 27. This text is taken from Philodemus' *Notebook on Rhetoric* and commented on above in Chapter II "The Sources" no. 3 on Philodemus.

(lines 6–8). Here too there is no suggestion of a middle ground. Both sides have adopted such extreme positions that the gulf between them cannot be bridged. Perhaps that is the point of *tanta* in the phrase *tanta controversia* (line 1). But whatever truth concerning this phrase, what we read in Cicero misrepresents the considered views of Theophrastus and Dicaearchus. There is plenty of evidence that Theophrastus recognized the value of political and familial activity, even if he assigned greater importance to quiet contemplation (e.g., 479, 523). Similarly, we can be certain that Dicaearchus did not conceive of the active life as endless involvement in political and familial activities. He himself investigated the nature of the soul (fr. 5–17 W = 11, 13–32 M) and took an interest in geography, even to the point of measuring mountains (fr. 7–8 W = 118–120 M).

If we ask to what Theophrastean work text 481 may be assigned, *On Lives*, *On Happiness* and *Callisthenes* (436 no. 12, 15–16) come to mind. Another possibility is the work *On Ambition*, which only a few months earlier (December 60BC) Cicero asked Atticus to bring to him from his brother Quintus' library (*Att.* 2.3.4 = 436 no. 21). In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle first says that cultivated men of action pursue honor and then criticizes honor from several points of view (1.5 1095b22–30). In *On Ambition*, Theophrastus may have done the same, perhaps directing certain criticisms at Dicaearchus. Still another possibility is a thesis, in which Theophrastus defended the life of contemplation against the practical life of political involvement. Since theses were questions of a general nature that were argued both pro and contra, it is not impossible that Cicero read (or read about) a thesis, in which Theophrastus and Dicaearchus squared off against each other. Such a thesis might have survived independently or been available in a collection (68 no. 34–35).³⁷² A work of Dicaearchus may also stand behind our text, and so may the lectures and/or writings of Antiochus.³⁷³

482 Cicero, *On Ends* 5.11 (*BT* p. 161.1–5 Schiche)

Literature: Brandis (1860) p. 347; Zeller (1879) vol. 2.2 p. 858; Regembogen (1940) col. 1482; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 204–205; Annas (2001) p. 121 n. 16; Tsouni (2010) pp. 140–141

³⁷² For brief discussion of theses, see *Commentary* 8 on rhetoric and poetics, pp. 83–87.

³⁷³ Regarding Antiochus, see Chapter II “The Sources” no. 4 on Cicero.

This text is found toward the beginning of the fifth book of *On Ends*. Cicero has Piso agree to discuss the Academic-Peripatetic doctrine of the ends of goods (5.8). Piso begins by offering a threefold division of philosophy, which is said to be that of the Peripatetics and the rest of the schools.³⁷⁴ Piso deals first with natural philosophy, which includes physics as well as biology and botany (5.9–10). After that he takes up argumentation, which includes both dialectic and rhetoric (5.10). The third division to be dealt with is human wellbeing.³⁷⁵ It has two subdivisions: one part concerns private life and corresponds to what we call ethics; the other deals with public affairs and may be labeled politics. Piso takes up the latter first and names the two leaders of the Peripatos. From Aristotle we are said to learn about the customs, procedures and systems of almost all states. From Theophrastus we learn about laws.³⁷⁶ Both Peripatetics are said to have discussed the qualities of a good leader and the best form of government.³⁷⁷ In addition, we are told that Theophrastus considered more fully the changes in circumstances and the critical moments with which political leaders must deal (5.11 = 590).³⁷⁸ Immediately after these remarks, Piso considers the other sub-division, i.e., human well-being or ethics. What Piso says is our text 482.

We are told that both Aristotle and Theophrastus (*illis*, line 1) gave special approval to a quiet life devoted to contemplation and the examination of things. This life is said to be most worthy of the wise man, because it is most similar to that of the gods (lines 1–3). The mention of a quiet life invites comparison with Aristotle's insistence that the best life involves leisure (σχολή *NE* 10.7 1177b4, 22). The idea that the life of

³⁷⁴ On the threefold division of philosophy, see also Cicero, *Academics* 1.19, where the division is said to go back to Plato. See Chapter II "Sources" no. 4 on Cicero n. 37.

³⁷⁵ Since Piso is represented as presenting Antiochian doctrine, it is tempting to say that the order represents that which Antiochus preferred. But caution is in order. For in the *Academics*, where Varro is made to present Antiochian material, we find the same three divisions but in a different order (19–33). See Barnes (1989) p. 82, criticizing J. Dillon, *The Middle Platonists* (London 1977) p. 63.

³⁷⁶ Theophrastus wrote several works dealing with law: *Laws, in alphabetical order*, 24 books (589 no. 17a), *Summary of Laws*, 10 books (no. 18), *On Laws*, 1 book (no. 19). He also wrote a work entitled *Legislators* (no. 16) and another *On Illegalities*, 1 book (no. 20).

³⁷⁷ Theophrastus wrote *On the Best Constitution*, 1 book (589 no. 7) and *Notes on How States May be Best Managed*, 1 book (no. 8). He also wrote *On Kingship*, 2 books (no. 10), 1 book (no. 11), *To Cassander on Kingship*, 1 book (no. 12) and *On the Education of a King*, 1 book (no. 13).

³⁷⁸ Theophrastus wrote *Politics regarding Crises*, 4 books (589 no. 4a), *On Crises*, 2 books (no. 5) and *Crises* (no. 6), which is probably identical with one of the preceding titles.

contemplation is most similar to that of the gods may be compared with Aristotle's assertion that in contemplation human beings achieve something similar to the life of the gods (ὁμοίωμα τι NE 10.8 1178b27, cf. 10.7 1177b30–31). Theophrastus will have adopted similar positions (cf. 481 and 483). We should not, however, assume that either Aristotle or Theophrastus adopted a narrow view of human happiness that emphasized contemplation to the exclusion of all forms of practical/political activity. In regard to Aristotle, I cite Book 7 of the *Politics*, in which the Stagirite not only advances an inclusive notion of happiness but also refers to the intrinsic value of contemplation (7.3 1325b20) and the nature and activity of god (7.1 1323b21–26, 7.3 1325b23–30).³⁷⁹

At the end of 482, Piso is made to remark that the discourse of Aristotle and Theophrastus concerning these matters—i.e., quiet contemplation, its similarity to the life of the gods and its appropriateness to the wise man—is both brilliant and illustrious: *splendida et illustris* (line 4). This is a comment on style,³⁸⁰ and it may be on the whole correct. Certainly the subject matter mentioned by Piso is grand enough for an elevated style. And later when Piso concludes his account of the ends of goods, he remarks that Aristotle and Theophrastus praised the very knowledge of things for its own sake and did so in admirable fashion: *mirabiliter* (5.73 = 480A.2). The two passages are in agreement concerning style, and in regard to Theophrastus, Cicero is almost certainly thinking of some exoteric work.³⁸¹ *On Happiness* (436 no. 12a–b) comes to mind. For not only is *On Happiness* the sole Theophrastean work cited in *On Ends*, but also the work is referred to in the section that follows immediately upon 482, i.e., in section 5.12 = 498.9.³⁸²

483 Julian, *Orations* 9(6).5 185A–B (CB vol. 2.1 p. 149.21–150.3 Rochefort)

Literature: Brandis (1860) pp. 346–347; Zeller (1879) vol. 2.2 p. 828; Jaeger (1928/1960) p. 412; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1482; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 205–206

³⁷⁹ Cf. NE 1.7 1097b5–11.

³⁸⁰ On *oratio* (line 4) with special reference to style, cf. rhetorical text 684.3, and see Lewis and Short s.v. 4.

³⁸¹ See above, Chapter II “The Sources” no. 4 on Cicero.

³⁸² Out of all context and given the focus on contemplation and a life similar to the gods, text 482 might be assigned to *On Lives* (436 no. 16), but in context *On Happiness* is to be preferred.

Text 483 occurs early in the sixth oration of Julian the Apostate, who is displeased with the Cynics of his day (mid-4th cent. AD). He wishes to reform them and to demonstrate the unity of philosophy. Julian calls attention to the fact that men have a soul that is capable of reasoning (λογικὴ ψυχὴ 182C–D) and goes on to list three different ways in which philosophy is understood: 1) it is the art of arts and science of sciences, 2) it involves likening oneself to god as far as possible, and 3) it is a matter of knowing oneself, as the Pythian oracle enjoined. The three ways of viewing philosophy are said to be closely related (183A). To make the point, Julian turns to knowing oneself, which he explains as understanding both one's body and one's soul. Self-knowledge is said to control every science and every art, and to include a reasoned understanding of universals (183A–184A). Julian then takes up likening oneself to god. He first quotes Homer, saying that the gods know all things, after which he tells us that the gods surpass human beings in knowledge, and that in their case too self-knowledge is most noble. Julian concludes that philosophy is not to be divided into kinds or sects (αἰρέσεις). For even if there are different approaches to philosophy, a consideration of the leaders of the different sects, will show that all their doctrines are in harmony with one another (184A–185A). At this point 483 begins. It is introduced as a conclusion based on what has been said. “Therefore (οὐκοῦν) the god at Delphi proclaims ‘Know yourself’ (Γνῶθι σαυτόν) and Heraclitus (said) ‘I searched myself.’ Furthermore, Pythagoras and those who came after him down to Theophrastus speak of likening oneself as far as possible to god (κατὰ δύναμιν ὁμοιοῦσθαι θεῷ).” Julian adds that Aristotle does the same, “for what we are sometimes, god is always” (lines 1–4).

Concerning 483, Regenbogen col. 1482 comments, “In Julian, Theophrastus’ definition of the task (or work) of man is certainly one-sided and slanted. ... In accordance with Julian’s intention to show that the philosophers are united in establishing the goal (of life), Plato’s formulation (of the goal), τὸ κατὰ δύναμιν ὁμοιοῦσθαι θεῷ, has been transferred to Theophrastus” (col. 1482). This comment is by no means foolish. Regenbogen is correct that Julian, in his attempt to find agreement among all the leading philosophers, has ignored differences. But I am hesitant to follow Regenbogen in what he says about Theophrastus. For as I understand Theophrastus, he agreed not only with Plato³⁸³ but also with Aristotle³⁸⁴ in holding that a human being, because he possesses a

³⁸³ Plato, *Republic* 10.12 613A, *Theaetetus* 176B *Laws* 4 716C–D.

³⁸⁴ Aristotle, *NE* 10.7 1177b26–1178a2.

divine intellect, νοῦς,³⁸⁵ ought to liken himself to god.³⁸⁶ According to what we read in the *Metaphysics*, Theophrastus regarded the divinity as νοῦς (5.16 7b23), and from 482 we learn that Theophrastus, like Aristotle, gave special approval to the quiet life of contemplation, regarding it as most similar to the life of the gods.³⁸⁷ What Theophrastus may have said in his work *On the Divine Happiness in Response to the Academics* (436 no. 13) cannot be determined with certainty, but it is reasonable to suppose that he discussed the activity of the gods, characterized it as unbroken contemplation and perhaps made a connection with human happiness.³⁸⁸

The phrase “as far as possible,” κατὰ δύναμιν (line 3), makes clear that there are limitations to likening oneself to god. Julian has already indicated as much in his remarks on self-knowledge. He has told us that the man who knows himself understands that he is not simply soul. He has a body, and his soul is made up of different faculties, δυνάμεις (183B). He has also told us that the Delphic oracle instructs us to learn things divine through the divine part in us and to learn things mortal through the mortal part (184A). The details of this psychology are not spelled out (and the text is corrupt), but we can say two things that apply to Theophrastus. First, since man has a bodily side that is mortal, he cannot and indeed should not ignore this side of his being. Understanding his nature, he will become a member of his community, reflect on household management, civic governance, etc., and embrace, at least to some extent, an active life. Second, what a man is (his make-up or nature) determines what constitutes an appropriate life. In what follows 483, Julian makes the point with special reference to the Stoics. They too are said to have accepted the Delphic injunction. They made living in harmony with

³⁸⁵ At 271.4 νοῦς is characterized as καλεῖται τι καὶ θειότερον, “something better or more divine.” The use of the comparative θειότερον may be thought to indicate some hesitation on the part of Theophrastus, but if it does, he is no different from Aristotle, who at NE 10.7 1177a15–16 writes, εἴτε θεῖον ὃν καὶ αὐτὸ εἴτε τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν τὸ θειότατον, “whether this is divine or the most divine thing in us.”

³⁸⁶ 584B.2–3 should not be ignored. The passage is from Book 2 of Porphyry’s *On Abstinence from Eating Animals*. There Porphyry speaks of making every effort to liken ourselves to god and those around him. Four lines later, Theophrastus is mentioned by name, but he is not directly connected with the remark concerning likening oneself to god, and what intervenes is problematic. See below Section 12 n. 762.

³⁸⁷ On Aristotle, see NE 10.8 1178b21–27.

³⁸⁸ See Brandis 346–347, Zeller pp. 827–829, Jaeger (1928) pp. 412–413 n. 4 and Pötscher (1970) pp. 80–81 and 107–108.

nature, ὁμολογουμένως ζῆν τῇ φύσει, the aim or end of their philosophy. And that end is said to be unattainable by the person who does not know who and what sort of person he is by nature, τίς καὶ ὁποῖος πέφυκεν. For the person who does not know himself will fail to know what is fitting for him to do, ὅτι πράττειν ἑαυτῷ προσήκει (186A). That Theophrastus held a similar position is not proven by remarks that focus on the Stoa, but when 483 is read together with what precedes and what follows in Julian, and when one remembers that Aristotle argued in favor of the life of contemplation not only by characterizing intellect, νοῦς, as divine but also by suggesting that intellect is what each person truly is,³⁸⁹ then it is reasonable to believe that Theophrastus, too, appealed to human nature in deciding how a person ought to live.³⁹⁰

Concerning the phrase Πυθαγόρας οἱ τε ἅπ' ἐκείνου μέχρι Θεοφράστου, "Pythagoras and those who came after him down to Theophrastus" (lines 2–3), I offer two comments. First, the fact that Pythagoras enjoys pride of place is hardly surprising. Julian is not only respecting chronological precedence but also manifesting an interest in Pythagoras that he acquired from his reading of Iamblichus and his study with contemporary Neoplatonists.³⁹¹ Second, mentioning Theophrastus immediately after Pythagoras suggests to me that Theophrastus may have discussed the idea of likening oneself to god from a historical perspective, beginning with Pythagoras and ending with his own considered opinion.³⁹² I am speculating, but perhaps it is not too fanciful to compare Heraclides Ponticus, who has Pythagoras represent the intellectual life (fr. 85 Schütrumpf),³⁹³ and Dicaearchus who disagrees with Theophrastus concerning the best life (481). The latter characterizes Pythagoras as a representative of the active life.³⁹⁴ Involving Pythagoras and/or

³⁸⁹ NE 10.7 1178a2–8.

³⁹⁰ Aristotle makes the point in a striking manner, when he says that it would be strange if a man chose not to live his own life but that of another (NE 10.7 1178a3–4). Aristotle's function argument also appeals to the nature of man. See NE 1.7 1097b30, where Aristotle rejects the idea that man *qua* man is by nature (πέφυκεν) functionless. See the commentary on 507.

³⁹¹ Julian studied with the Pythagorean Maximos, and his *On the Pythagorean Life* is extant.

³⁹² See Iamblichus, *On the Pythagorean Life* 86 and 137: ἀκολουθεῖν τῷ θεῷ, and Stobaeus, *Anthology* 2.7.3–4 p. 49 Wachsmuth: ἔπου θεῷ. On Theophrastus' interest in Pythagoras and Pythagoreans, see the commentary on 523 with n. 653.

³⁹³ See Wehrli (1961) pp. 324 and 327 n. 9 and (1967–1978) vol. 7 pp. 89–90.

³⁹⁴ See E. Rohde, *Die Quellen des Iamblichus in seiner Biographie des Pythagoras = Kleine Schriften* (Tübingen 1901) vol. 1 p. 110, Jaeger (1928/1960) pp. 417–419 and Wehrli (1967–1978) vol. 1 pp. 52–53.

the Pythagoreans in a survey of ethical teachings may have been standard or at least common among the early Peripatetics.

Finally I take note of an excerpt in the *Anthology* of Stobaeus. It tells us that the Delphic exhortation to know oneself was regarded as a proverb, παροιμία, and that Theophrastus in his work *On Proverbs* is a witness. The excerpt goes on to state that most people think that the saying belongs to Chilo, but Clearchus thinks that it was said by the god to Chilo (738).³⁹⁵ Since proverbs must originate somewhere at some time, it is not impossible that Theophrastus not only characterized the exhortation as a proverb but also (perhaps in a different work) attributed it to the god: it originated in Delphi and over time it had become a commonplace that could be and was regarded as a proverb. Cf. Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 2.21 1395a21–22, where the Delphic exhortation is mentioned in order to illustrate maxims that have entered the public domain, δεδημοσιευμένα.

484 Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations* 1.44–45 (BT p. 240.1–19)

Literature: Brandis (1860) pp. 346–347; Zeller (1879) p. 829; Gigon (1951) p. 468; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 134–135

Our text is taken from Cicero's *Tusculan Disputations*. The work is divided into five books, each of which is devoted to a discussion held on a separate day at Cicero's Tusculan villa. In the introduction to Book 1, Cicero describes the several discussions as having actually occurred and then incorporated into the five books that have come down to us. Cicero tells us that he called on someone to put forward a subject that he wished to hear discussed and to express his opinion on the subject. After that Cicero says that he opposed the opinion (1.7–8). In the manuscripts, the participants in the discussion are labeled "Δ" or "Α" and "Μ" (beginning at 1.9).³⁹⁶ "Δ" is an abbreviation for *discipulus* and "Α" for *auditor* (cf. 1.7, 8: *quis/qui audire vellet*) The variation is unimportant. "Μ" designates either *magister* or *Marcus*, the latter being the praenomen of Cicero. If "Μ" does signify *magister*, it is nevertheless clear that the *magister* is in fact Cicero. For in the introduction, Cicero describes himself as sitting or standing in his Tusculan villa, while debating the issue that had been

³⁹⁵ The saying is associated with Chilo by Diogenes Laertius, but this time we are told that it belongs to Thales, though Antisthenes attributes it to Phemonoë and says that it was appropriated by Chilo (1.40).

³⁹⁶ The letters are later additions that have found their way into the manuscript tradition. See Philippson (1939) col. 1141.

put forward (1.7). And in regard to the published version, he says clearly that he opposed the opinion that had been advanced (1.8).³⁹⁷ Hence, in what follows, not only in this comment on 484 but also in subsequent comments on the *Tusculan Disputations* (i.e., on 493, 499, 505), I shall make no further reference to “M” and speak simply of Cicero.

The discussion in Book 1 begins with the auditor saying that death seems to him an evil (1.9). In what follows, Cicero argues that it is not an evil either for the living or for the dead (1.9–16). Cicero goes on to argue that death is in fact a positive good, for not only is the soul immortal (1.16–35), but also the soul is of such a substance that on death it breaks through the dense and compact air that surrounds the earth and is transported upward to a region whose light and heat resembles its own. There the soul finds its natural home, being nourished and maintained on the same food as the stars (1.36–43). At this point our text 484 begins. Cicero says that having been released from bodily desires and feelings of envy, we shall be happy (lines 1–4). For we possess by nature an insatiable desire of seeing the truth and shall be able to devote ourselves more freely and totally to contemplation. Indeed, the place to which we shall have come not only will give us a readier knowledge of celestial phenomena but also increase our desire for knowledge (lines 5–11). Cicero then cites Theophrastus, saying that the beauty of the heavens excited, even among persons still on earth, that philosophy “of fathers and grandfathers,” *patritam et avitam* (lines 11–12). Cicero adds that those who, while still on earth, desired to see through the surrounding gloom will especially enjoy this ancestral philosophy (lines 12–15). I.e., having risen above the dense and compact air that is nearest to the earth (cf. 1.42), they more than others will enjoy viewing the heavens in a way that is impossible here on earth.

Cicero describes the philosophy that is aroused by the beauty of the heavens as *patritam et avitam* (lines 11–12). Whether Cicero wrote *patritam* or *patriam* is questionable. See the *apparatus criticus* and Lundström p. 271.³⁹⁸ The Greek words that stand behind the Latin are also problematic. Zeller proposes *πάτριος καὶ παλαιά*, and G. Tischer offers *πατρῴος*

³⁹⁷ There are also plenty of indications within the five discussions that the main speaker is Cicero. See, e.g., Book 5, in which the first sentence uttered by “M” refers to “my (friend) Brutus” (5.12), whose encouragement Cicero acknowledges in the very first sentence of the entire work (1.1).

³⁹⁸ S. Lundström, *Vermeintliche Glosseme in den Tusculanen* (Uppsala 1964) p. 271 n. 2.

καὶ παπῶς.³⁹⁹ Neither suggestion is foolish.⁴⁰⁰ We may, however, wonder whether the Latin is an exact translation of Theophrastus' Greek. Two facts may be thought to speak for exact translation: the phrase *ut ait Theophrastus*, "as Theophrastus says," follows immediately on *patritam et avitam*, and the (questionable) adjective *patritus* is not common. In selecting it, Cicero may have had his eye on the Greek. But the fact that *patritus* together with *avitus* is attested for Varro (ap. Nonius, *De compendiosa doctrina* 161.8), and that similar phrases occur in the speeches of Cicero (*patria atque avita* in *Against Verres* 1.5.13, and *paterna et avita* in *On behalf of Caelius* 13.34) may suggest that Cicero has made use of a Latin formula that is intended more to capture the tone of Theophrastus' expression than to reproduce his words with exactitude.

Nothing else in our text is attributed to Theophrastus, and nothing else need be taken directly from him. We can, however, say that the idea of devoting ourselves to contemplation, together with a natural desire to see the truth (lines 6–8) suits both Aristotle and Theophrastus.⁴⁰¹ Moreover, we can say with confidence that Theophrastus valued the knowledge of celestial phenomena (line 10). In *On the Heavens* (137 no. 1c), he discussed the divine character of the heavens (159.27–32), and in the *Metaphysics*, he recognized the regularity of the heavenly bodies (11b17–19). He held that regularity belongs most properly to the most honorable forms of being (6b27–28) and that wisdom needs leisure for the contemplation of things most honorable (461.11). We can say that the contemplation of celestial beauty was for Theophrastus an essential part of that leisured activity through which a man likens himself to the god (482.1–3, 483.3). But that said, we should take note of Cicero's use of the noun *cognitio* and the verb *cognoscere* (lines 10, 12). Both suggest learning or investigation. The celestial beauty awakens that philosophy, which is kindled by a desire for acquiring knowledge.⁴⁰² For a human

³⁹⁹ Zeller p. 829 n. 3; G. Tischer, *Tusculanarum disputationum libri quinque* (Berlin 1884) p. 56.

⁴⁰⁰ With the suggestion of Tischer, cf. Demosthenes, *Oration 10 (Fourth Philippic)*.73.

⁴⁰¹ Cf. Aristotle, *EE* 1.4 1215b2, where the philosophic life is said to be concerned with contemplating the truth. On man's natural, innate desire for knowledge, see above p. 390 n. 354.

⁴⁰² The Latin phrase *cupiditate incensam* (line 13) may be compared with *cupiditate incensi* at 475.3, where Cicero says that "we are all burning with a desire to live happily." The metaphor is common (cf. Cicero, *Letters to his Friends* 5.12.1; and *On the Orator* 1.134, where *flagrare* replaces *incendere*) and need have no direct connection with a Theophrastean text.

being, at least, leading a philosophic life involves active inquiry or study as well as the contemplation of the truths to which study leads. See the commentary on 479 and 480A–B.

Our text may be assigned to *On Happiness*, to which Cicero appears to refer in Book 5 of the *Tusculan Disputations* (493.9–10).⁴⁰³

323A Denis the Carthusian, *On the Light of Christian Theory* 1.50 (vol. 33 p. 292bB ed. 1896–1913)

323B Denis the Carthusian, *On Peter Lombard's Four Books of Sentences* 1.1.3 (vol. 19 p. 116aA ed. 1896–1913)

Literature: Huby (1999) pp. 198–199

We have here two texts, both of which make intellect the source of happiness. Pamela Huby p. 197 describes the texts as “dubious report(s) concerning Theophrastus.” That is fair enough, given that both texts are taken from an author whose dates place him at the end of the Middle Ages and the beginning of the Renaissance. But Huby p. 198 also allows the possibility that Theophrastus expressed himself in ways that agree with 323A. In particular, Theophrastus may have embraced the idea that the intellect is separable and immortal (line 4).⁴⁰⁴ In addition, the idea that intellect finds its final and full felicity after death in the contemplation of the supermundane spirits (lines 7–8) relates closely to 484.6–11, where, however, the relevant material is not explicitly connected with Theophrastus.

Interesting are the closing words of 323A: *et hoc dicunt fuisse de mente Aristotelis*, “and they (Farabi, Theophrastus, Avicenna and Ghazali, line 1) say that this (the idea that intellect achieves full felicity in the contemplation of the supermundane) was in agreement with Aristotle’s view” (lines 8–9). In regard to Theophrastus, the words are readily intelligible. As Aristotle’s pupil and successor, he knew well the *Nicomachean Ethics*,⁴⁰⁵ in which Aristotle discussed perfect or complete happiness, *τελεία εὐδαιμονία*. Aristotle spoke of intellect as divine or the most divine thing in us (10.7 1177a15–16), used superlatives to describe

⁴⁰³ See above, Chapter III “Titles of Books” no. 12a–b *On Happiness*.

⁴⁰⁴ See 271.6–7 and 307A.3 with Aristotle, *On the Generation of Animals* 2.3 736b27–28. I have, however, expressed myself cautiously, for there is room for disagreement. See Huby (1999) pp. 25–30 on 271 together with my comments on that text in Section 2.

⁴⁰⁵ Theophrastus appears to have adopted verbatim the Nicomachean definition of virtue (449A.5–6).

perfect happiness (κρατίστη, συνεχεστάτη, ἡδίστη, αὐταρκέστατος 1177a19, 21, 23, b1) and nevertheless tacitly acknowledged that it does fall short (e.g., we are only more able to contemplate continuously than engage in actions; self-sufficiency belongs especially to contemplation, but it is better to engage in contemplation with others 1177a22, b34). Apparently Theophrastus not only recognized the shortcomings of contemplation during this earthly life but also stated that final and full felicity must await the after-life, when the immortal soul is able to be unfailingly in the presence of the supermundane spirits (lines 6–8). If that is correct, Theophrastus will have seen himself as following and perhaps developing Aristotelian doctrine. And if we can press the closing words of 323A, he asserted his agreement with Aristotle.

323B offers a longer and different list of names (Farabi, Alexander, Avempace, Theophrastus, Porphyry, Plotinus, Avicbron, Apuleius and Macrobius), but what it says regarding intellect and happiness is quite brief and adds nothing to what we learn from 323A. The fact that *beatitudo* (B.3) occurs and not *felicitas* (A.5) might be significant—at one time, I was tempted to argue that the former stands for εὐδαιμονία and the latter for μαχαριότης—but most likely the two nouns are used synonymously. And if there is a difference, it probably depends on the usage of Denis and not on that of Theophrastus. (I leave the matter to scholars who are more familiar with the writings of Denis.) The translation “supreme happiness” now strikes me as an over-translation. Originally it may have been intended to connect the single noun *beatitudo* with the fuller phrase *finalis et plena felicitas*. Or it may have been intended to acknowledge “connections with the beatific vision.”⁴⁰⁶ In either case, I would prefer to omit “supreme” and allow the reader to make pertinent connections.

Theophrastus wrote two works, whose titles mention happiness: *On Happiness* (436 no. 12) and *On the Divine Happiness in Response to the Academics* (436 no. 13). Our text might derive from one or the other, but there are works like the *Ethics* (436 no. 2) and *On Lives* (436 no. 16), which are also possibilities. And if there is a connection with any particular work, it will have been mediated through the tradition.

⁴⁰⁶ Huby (1999) p. 199 remarks, “*beatitudo* has connections with the beatific vision and should not be limited to ordinary happiness.”

485 *Depository of Wisdom Literature*, chap. on Theophrastus, saying no. 4

Literature: Gutas (1985) pp. 85–86

Text 485 is a saying found in the *Depository of Wisdom Literature* as reconstructed by Dimitri Gutas. Like all the sayings in the Depository, 485 is in Arabic. In English translation, it runs as follows: “He (Theophrastus) said: When the soul casts off the weight of worldly thoughts which hinder its movements toward the excellent object, it takes up philosophy with the least amount of trouble and effort and becomes like a lamp that is both luminous in itself and illuminating others. When an ignorant person adheres to it (philosophy) he becomes learned, and when a poor person follows it he is rich; and the higher it (the soul) rises the more it increases in knowledge, and one meets with abundant wealth.”

In a note to the translation, Gutas tells us that there is a variant and inferior reading of the first sentence: instead of “the weight of worldly thoughts” one finds “the weight of thinking (about) this world.” Gutas’ judgment concerning the inferiority of the variant reading is undoubtedly correct; moreover, the variant reading involves no change in meaning: “thinking about this world” is the equivalent of having “worldly thoughts.” Of greater interest are the final words of 485: “and one meets with abundant wealth.” According to Gutas (1985) p. 86, they are omitted in Shahrāzūrī’s version of the text. In the fuller version that is 485, the words seem to repeat the idea already expressed by “and when a poor person follows it (philosophy) he is rich.” In both cases, we are not to think of an increase in money and material goods but rather an increase in one’s intellectual life, which is of greater value. That might encourage preferring the omission, but the fuller text has the virtue of underlining through repetition the value of philosophy.

Gutas compares 485 with the Ciceronian text that is 484 and suggests that in 485 the “excellent object” refers to the heaven. That makes good sense, for in 485, as in 484, we seem to have a description of the soul, i.e., the mind or intellect removed from the body and better able to contemplate celestial phenomena.⁴⁰⁷ We may also compare 323A, in which Denis the Carthusian speaks of the intellect enjoying final and full felicity in the next life when it contemplates the supermundane spirits.

⁴⁰⁷ I have written, “we seem to have,” because 485 never explicitly refers to the soul having left the body. “Casting off worldly thoughts” could mean joining a philosophic sect and giving oneself fully to the life of contemplation (481.3–4), but the idea is not to be pressed. See the following note.

There are of course differences between 485 and 484. According to 485, the soul that has cast off the weight of earthly thoughts becomes like a lamp and illuminates others. The idea of “illuminating others” suggests that in some way souls, once separated from the body, are able to benefit each other. Of that there is no hint in 484, but neither is it excluded. In addition, 485 divides neatly into two parts. From the beginning to “illuminating others,” the focus is on the soul that is no longer troubled by worldly thoughts; this soul is able to do philosophy with the least trouble and effort. After that we return to the world of the living and hear of persons who are ignorant and poor.⁴⁰⁸ In 484 the division is less clean and more complicated. We are told that the beauty of the heavens excited philosophy among persons still on this earth. But the mention of philosophy is the occasion to quote Theophrastus and the mention of being on this earth sets up a contrast with a later time when philosophy will be especially enjoyed by those who had previously been desirous to see through the gloom. Both these elements are missing from 485.

6. *The Wise Man and Marriage*

Marriage has taken something of a beating in the last half-century. Daughters are no longer brought up to believe that finding a husband is of the highest priority. College is no longer a way to find a good provider, and should the right man turn up, that will in all likelihood occur after years in the work force. Among the well-educated, smaller families have become the norm, and an increasing number of couples are choosing not to have children. They do, after all, require attention, thereby impeding one's own development. And when children grow up and might be of help to their aging parents, children move far away in pursuit of greater opportunities. And if that is not enough, marriage itself has become unstable. Incompatibility is no longer tolerated and no-fault divorce makes it easy to end a marriage. After all there are plenty of fish in the ocean, and the next wife may be more to one's liking. Or perhaps marriage is an alto-

⁴⁰⁸ It might be argued that the first part of 485 never says explicitly that it is dealing with life after death. One can, as it were, cast off the weight of worldly thoughts while still alive on earth. Perhaps, then, both halves of 485 concern life on earth. And that might be thought to suit the reference to illuminating others. Nevertheless, I think the idea too fanciful and perhaps ruled out by the initial mention of soul. That suggests life after death, when the intellect (the essential person, cf. *NE* 10.7 1178a2) has left body and earth behind and at last can see clearly the beauty of the heavens.

gether bad idea. For a partner is almost always an annoyance and over the years likely to become an object of strong dislike, not to say hate.

Aristotle was of a different mind. To be sure, he understood the difficulties that come with marriage, but he regarded as natural both the union of husband and wife and the begetting and rearing of children (*Politics* 1.2 1252a26–30). From a modern point of view, Aristotle's insistence that husband and wife have different roles within a marriage seems overdone or just plain wrong, but to his credit he recognized the need to justify his position. He accepted the principle that a difference in roles follows from a difference in capacity, and held that men are by nature better than women (1.5 1254b13–14): in particular, men are better fitted to command (1.12 1259b2). That is in part a matter of man's physical superiority; a woman's lesser strength speaks for a role within the household. But there is more. Aristotle also recognizes a difference in psychological make-up. Women like men can be intelligent. Their capacity for reasoning to correct conclusions can be quite good, but it lacks authority in regard to their emotions (1.13 1260a13).⁴⁰⁹ Women have trouble controlling their emotions and therefore are not always reliable. An Aristotelian example is Penelope, whose faithfulness to Odysseus is laudable. But when Odysseus returned to Ithaca, he revealed his identity to his son Telemachus and not to Penelope. According to Aristotle, Odysseus acted in this way, because Telemachus could be counted on to control his emotions, while Penelope could not be so relied upon (*Homeric Problems* fr. 176 Rose³). We may wish that Aristotle had not adopted such a view of women, but it should be underlined that Aristotle married,⁴¹⁰ and in the *Nicomachean Ethics* he characterizes the relation between husband and wife as friendship, *φιλία*, albeit friendship between unequals (8.7 1158b11–14). He adds that husband and wife feel affection, *φιλοῦσιν*, for each other, even though the basis of their feelings, *φιλήσεις*, is different (1158b17–19). Moreover, he recognizes that family, i.e., wife and children belong to the self-sufficient life that is happiness (1.7 1097b7–11). He also tells us that a lack of good children spoils blissful happiness, *τὸ μακάριον*, and that the person who lives alone and lacks children, *μονώτης καὶ ἄτεκνος*, is not entirely happy, *οὐ πᾶν εὐδαιμονικός* (1.8 1099b2–6).⁴¹¹

⁴⁰⁹ The *βουλευτικόν* of a woman is said to be *ἄκυρον*. See Fortenbaugh (1975a, repr. 2002) pp. 57–61.

⁴¹⁰ Fr. 10a = 571 Düring (1957) pp. 267 and 375.

⁴¹¹ Wife and children are treated as external goods (1.8 1099a31).

Theophrastus seems never to have married, but I doubt that his view of marriage differed markedly from that of Aristotle. See 523.7–10. The only reason to think otherwise is 486, in which Saint Jerome attributes to Theophrastus a tirade against women and marriage.

486 Jerome, *Against Jovinian* 1.47–48 (p. 388.6–390.17 Bickel)

Literature: Petersen (1854) pp. 115–116; Brandis (1860) p. 355; Luebeck (1872) pp. 91–94, 205–206; Usener (1884) p. 101 n. 1; Arnim (1892) pp. 126–128; Brandis (1860) p. 355; Zeller (1879) vol. 2.2 pp. 858–859; Bock (1899) pp. 1–71; Praechter (1901) pp. 69, 79 n. 2, 129–131; Grossgerge (1911) pp. 5–18, 55–63; Bickel (1915) pp. 1–20, 213–220, (1916) pp. 448–449; Wageningen (1917) pp. 417–429; Schmid-Stählin (1920) p. 66; Walzer (1929) pp. 191–192; Gomperz (1931) pp. 408, 418; Wilamowitz (1932) vol. 2 pp. 284–285; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1488; Courcelle (1948) pp. 60–61; Delhay (1951) pp. 65–86; Hagendahl (1958) pp. 150–156, 324; Webster (1960) pp. 212–219; Pratt (1962) pp. 5–27; Wiesen (1964) pp. 113–115, 152–158, 164–165; Wehrli (1967–1978) vol. 4 p. 60; Schmitt (1971a) pp. 312–314, (1971b) pp. 259–267; Gaiser (1974) pp. 68–69; Kindstrand (1976) pp. 71, 272–273; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 207–212; Wehrli-Wöhrle (2004) p. 551; Millett (2007) p. 126 n. 65

Text 486 is taken from Saint Jerome's work *Against Jovinian*, which was written in 393 AD. Jerome is replying to a treatise, in which Jovinian had argued *inter alia* that a virgin is no better than a wife in the sight of God. Jerome's response to that claim occupies the whole of Book 1 (the first of two). After introductory remarks, Jerome interprets the teaching of St. Paul in *Corinthians* 1.7 (1.4–13) and the teaching of both the *Old* and *New Testaments* (1.14–39). After that Jerome denounces Jovinian (1.40), praises virginity, assigns lesser value to single marriages, and cites various examples drawn from pagan literature (1.40–49). Our text is part of the last segment. Jerome acknowledges that he has already offered more examples than are likely to be welcomed by a learned reader. But he chooses to continue, citing in justification the women of his time. They are said to appeal to apostolic authority and to repeat precepts concerning second marriage. Since they despise Christian modesty, they should learn chastity from the pagans (lines 1–6). At this point Jerome refers to Theophrastus, saying: *fertur aureolus Theophrasti liber De nuptiis* (line 7). We have translated "There is in the tradition a little golden book *On Marriage* by Theophrastus" (line 7). The exact force of *fertur* is not entirely clear. We have adopted a translation that is intended to be neutral concerning

the attribution of the book to Theophrastus. If one thinks that Jerome had reservations concerning Theophrastean authorship and therefore chose to express himself with caution, then one might follow Fremantle and translate "A little golden book *On Marriage* passes under the name of Theophrastus."⁴¹² But that may be overly clever, for in concluding the Theophrastean segment Jerome names Theophrastus without expressing hesitation: *haec et huiusmodi Theophrastus disserens*, "When Theophrastus says these and similar things" (line 79). It is, of course, possible that Jerome chose to conclude in this manner, because an expression of hesitation might weaken the force of what had been reported. Possibly, but as I see it, Jerome was pleased to introduce a text that not only speaks damningly of marriage but also is attributed to a well-known Peripatetic. That is what mattered to the Saint.

The phrase *aureolus liber* (486.7) may owe something to Cicero, *Lucullus* 135, where Crantor's work *On Grief* is said to be not large but a little golden book, and one that ought to be learned by heart. The Latin text runs: *est enim non magnus verum aureolus et, ut Tuberoni Panaetius praecipit, ad verbum ediscendus libellus*. "For (*On Grief*) is not large but a little golden (book), and as Panaetius instructed Tuberus, a little book to be studied word by word." If I understand the flow of the Ciceronian sentence, Panaetius is to be connected only with the injunction directed at Tuberus. The preceding use of *aureolus* to describe Crantor's work is Ciceronian. That need not mean, however, that Cicero was the first to use the diminutive of *aureus* to describe a small book. And Jerome need not have had the Ciceronian passage in mind when he wrote the words *aureolus liber*. Indeed, he may have copied the phrase from his source or simply remembered the phrase apart from any particular context.

In the little golden book, Theophrastus is said to have asked *an vir sapiens ducat uxorem*, "whether a wise man should marry" (lines 7–8). An affirmative answer is briefly considered (lines 8–10), after which a negative answer is given. It is both longer and strikingly harsh. According to Bock pp. 32–33 the negative response is directed against Aristotle. Bock's view is criticized by Praechter pp. 129–131, who thinks that Theophrastus' target was an early Stoic, either Zeno, who recommended that the wise man marry, or Cleanthes, who wrote a work *Περὶ ὕμεναίου*, *On Marriage* (Diogenes Laertius 7.121, 175).⁴¹³ On first reading, the harsh

⁴¹² W. Fremantle, *Select Library of Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers* (New York: The Christian Literature Company 1893) p. 383.

⁴¹³ Cf. Regenbogen col. 1488.

tone of the Theophrastean text (e.g., *stolidissimum est*, “it is quite stupid,” line 69) seems incongruous with the close relationship between Aristotle and Theophrastus, and the formulation of the problem in terms of the wise man, the *vir sapiens* (line 8), suggests that Theophrastus is directing his words against a Stoic.⁴¹⁴ But it is not impossible that the polemical character of the text and the focus on the wise man depend upon an intermediate source (e.g., Seneca).⁴¹⁵ Moreover, Aristotle himself not only spoke of the wise man, the σοφός, but also did so when addressing the self-sufficiency of the happy life (*NE* 10.7 1177a27–b1). For Aristotle the special worth of contemplation depends in part on the fact that this activity is comparatively independent of other persons. Such a view can easily have prompted Theophrastus to question the value of family connections. He might have agreed with Aristotle that the role of φρόνησις, practical wisdom, is to promote the activity of σοφία, theoretical wisdom (cf. 461) and at the same time asked whether the life of a bachelor—given that self-sufficiency is an essential mark of happiness (*NE* 1.7 1097b6–8 and 10.7 1177b21–22)—is not to be preferred. If family is of comparatively little value in comparison with philosophical activity (cf. 491) and if happiness can be diminished through unfortunate family relationships (cf. *NE* 1.7 1097b6–13, 1.8 1099b2–8) would it not be sensible to avoid marriage?⁴¹⁶ These considerations cannot decide where Theophrastus’ harsh critique of marriage may have been set forth, but they do show that it may have found roots in Aristotle’s doctrine of happiness. And that is entirely compatible with a deliberate attack on the Stoics and with an intermediary enhancing the sharpness of the attack.

A different motivation for Theophrastus’ negative remarks concerning marriage may have been his disagreement with Dicaearchus, who rated the practical life higher than that of contemplation (481) and commended the ancients for not inquiring whether they should marry. Instead, they married in the manner in which they were supposed to marry and lived together with their wives (fr. 36.15–17 Mirhady). Theo-

⁴¹⁴ Cf. Grosssgerge p. 58. In Diogenes Laertius’ outline of Aristotelian philosophy we read that the wise man will marry: τὸν σοφὸν γαμήσειν (5.31). These words might be seized upon to support the idea that Aristotle is Theophrastus’ target. But that would be a mistake, for the outline is not free of Stoic influence. Düring (1957) is correct, when he says that the ethical section of the outline has a “Stoical tinge” (p. 70) and that in the section that concerns us (5.31), “the author has the Stoical ideal of The Wise Man in mind” (p. 74).

⁴¹⁵ On Jerome’s source, see Chapter II “The Sources” no. 29.

⁴¹⁶ Bock formulates a similar argument in terms of external goods and with reference to 493 and 498.

phrastus may have felt himself attacked by this approval of an earlier period and the accompanying criticism of contemporaries who speak persuasively and appear to be great philosophers (36.12–13).⁴¹⁷ That our text is in fact a response to Dicaearchus cannot be demonstrated. Indeed, the response may have been in the reverse direction: from Dicaearchus to Theophrastus. What we can say, however, is that the disagreement with Dicaearchus might have provoked Theophrastus into portraying the disadvantages of marriage in an exaggerated manner.⁴¹⁸

Demetrius of Phalerum should also be mentioned. He was a student of Theophrastus (18 no. 5) and is reported to have written a work *Περὶ γάμου*, *On Marriage* (Diogenes Laertius 5.81 = fr. 1.93 and 88 no. 18 SOD). On the basis of Demetrius' involvement in politics, Wehrli suggests that Demetrius may have held different views from those of Theophrastus.⁴¹⁹ In addition, mention should be made of Bion of Borysthenes. He too was a student of Theophrastus (18 no. 3). According to Diogenes Laertius, when Bion was asked by someone whether he should marry, Bion replied: ἐὰν μὲν γήμῃς αἰσχρὰν, ἔξεις ποινὴν, ἂν δὲ καλὴν, ἔξεις κοινὴν, "If you marry an ugly woman, you will pay the penalty, and if a beautiful woman, you will hold her in common" (Diog. Laert. 4.52 = F61A Kindstrand). The reply suggests a negative attitude toward marriage and may be compared with 486.45–50. But the anecdote is movable, being also attributed to, e.g., Antisthenes (Diog. Laert. 6.3), so that it would be rash to claim Theophrastean influence on Bion.⁴²⁰

We should keep in mind that marriage was a popular topic that interested all levels of society. Not surprisingly the comic poets did not ignore marriage, and scholars have not failed to see connections between 486 and New Comedy.⁴²¹ Here are two examples from Menander. One is fragment 59 in which an older man advises a younger man not to marry. He likens marriage to a sea of troubles only worse: not one married man has been saved, γήμας δ' οὐδὲ εἷς σέσωσθ' ὅλως (fr. 59.9 K-Th). Such a negative view of marriage is in line with 486, only the advice offered to

⁴¹⁷ Cf. Arnim (1892) p. 127.

⁴¹⁸ It is possible that the disagreement with Dicaearchus stands behind other Theophrastean texts: e.g., 610: to the question what gain is there in government, Theophrastus responded "envy," and 493: Theophrastus explained at length why the man on the rack cannot be happy.

⁴¹⁹ Wehrli (1967–1978) vol. 4 p. 60.

⁴²⁰ For other occurrences of the reply, see Kindstrand p. 272, who points out the Bion was influenced by comedy and may have the reply from there. See the next paragraph.

⁴²¹ E.g., Petersen pp. 116–118, Wilamowitz p. 285 n. 1 and Gaiser (1974) p. 69.

the young man is entirely general and therefore without special reference to the wise man. A second fragment is equally negative. A father asserts that a wife is necessarily evil, ἀνάγκη γὰρ γυναῖκ' εἶναι κακόν, and he makes no exception of his daughter (fr. 581.13–17). In details, the father's words can be compared directly with our Theophrastean text. A wife is said to be irritable and gossipy: ὀργίλην, λάλον (fr. 581. 12–13, 486.16, 39). Taking a wife is compared unfavorably with the way in which purchases are made (fr. 581.1–9, 486.23–29). That is stock humor. What we need to keep in mind is that in a comedy a heavy-handed description of an unattractive wife is compatible with a joyful ending that includes marriage. The Theophrastean work *On Marriage* may have had a similar structure. Negative views could have been advanced after which a more positive view was put forward: most people including the wise were encouraged to enter into marriage, albeit with their eyes open.⁴²² Such a work is likely to have been exoteric (intended for an audience outside the school) and therefore written in a manner that appealed to a wide audience.

We should not ignore text 523.7–11, for there Theophrastus speaks positively of marriage. He says that a man “ought to take good care of his wife and children, for they return the service as their father grows old, while she will give back the kindness in times of sickness and in the daily management of the household.” That contradicts what is said in 486.51–59, 72–74.

At one time, I was attracted to the idea that 486 is a forgery based on certain facts regarding the life of Theophrastus. For example, he remained unmarried and had worries concerning the children and grandchildren of Aristotle (21, Diogenes Laertius 5.12–13, 53. Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Mathematicians* 1.258). But it now seems to me more likely that 486 derives from an exoteric writing, that put forth different views in a polemical manner. Or perhaps 486 derives from a collection of theses, in which positive and negative responses to an initial question were juxtaposed. We know that Theophrastus composed theses, and it is possible to view 486 as a negative response to the thesis “Should the wise man marry?” Since I have already considered this possibility when dis-

⁴²² In 486 the idea that the wise man might enter into marriage is put forward at the beginning (lines 8–10). I do not see that as an obstacle to imagining Theophrastus putting forth objections to marriage before taking a more favorable stance. What is said at the beginning is so brief that it hardly constitutes a serious defense of marriage. A more detailed defense might come later. Moreover, the opening may reflect some rewriting by Jerome or his source.

cussing the title *On Marriage*, I refer to the reader to the commentary on that title (Chapter III no. 17). But whatever the origin of 486—whether it was primarily a critique of Aristotle’s views, an attack on the Stoa, an exaggerated polemic against Dicaearchus, an exoteric work written in a popular manner, a clever forgery, or a classroom thesis—what has come down to us does not represent Theophrastus’ considered opinion.

Despite Regenbogen’s doubts, a relation between 486 and the *Characters* (436 no. 4a–c) is obvious. I cite the list of things that are said to be necessary for a wife (486.13–15) and the list of loquacious complaints that a wife expresses at night time (486.15–19). The second list recalls the Theophrastean sketches of ἀδολεσχία, garrulity (3), λαλιά, loquacity (7) and μεμψιμοιρία, faultfinding (17). And both recall Theophrastus’ effective use of lists in the *Characters*: the list of tools that the ἄγροικος, boar, has loaned out (4.14), the list of things possessed by the ἄρσεκος, obsequious individual (5.9), and the list of remarks that typify the εἰρων, ironical man (1.6).

A minor matter but one worth mentioning is the use of a clever ending that adds punch. In *On Marriage*, I am thinking of the phrase *parat venena*, “she prepares poison,” which underlines a wife’s desire to run the entire household (486.39). In the *Characters*, I think of the sketch of λαλιά. After two clever endings (7.2, 6) the sketch concludes with a request by the children of the loquacious man: Τάττα, λαλεῖν τι ἡμῖν, ὅπως ἂν ἡμᾶς ὕπνος λάβῃ. “Daddy, be loquacious, in order that we may fall asleep” (7.8). To be sure, the *Characters* offers no sketch of the wife, and some of the traits that come together in a wife (e.g., loquacity and fault-finding 486.16) are sketched separately in the *Characters*. But allowing for such differences, we can still say that 486 provides a clear example of how Theophrastus, in another context and for a different purpose, was able to apply the descriptive technique so effectively used in the *Characters*.

486.5 NEW: Bartholomew of Bruges, *Questions concerning Aristotle’s book of Household Management* 2 cod. Parisinus 16089 fol. 132^r col. 2 (CAG vol. 19 p. ix.7–12 Heylbut)

Literature: Rose (1871) pp. 74–75

The following text was not included in our collection of sources.

si enim vir habeat plures uxores illae contentent adinvicem. cum enim sint equalis gradus in domo, nulla volet alteri obedire in aliquo et sic q. semper contentent et per consequens causabunt divisionem in domus et accidit

ex hoc malum domui, unde dicit theophrastus, ut recitat aspitius supra 8. Ethicorum, quod plures uxores faciunt ad divisionem domus.

4–6 eadem verba Theophrasto attribuuntur denuo a Bartholomaeo fol. 133^r col. 1 (p. ix.32–33 Heylbut)

For if a man has several wives, they compete with each other. For since they are of equal rank within the household, no one (of them) wishes to obey the other in anything. And thus they will always be in competition and consequently cause division within the household, and from this harm befalls the household. Hence Theophrastus says, as Aspasius reports (in commenting) on the 8th Book of the *Ethics*, that several wives bring about division within a household.

The above text is that printed by Heylbut in the introduction to his edition of Aspasius, *On Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics*. It is based on the codex Parisinus 16089, which Pavel Blazek deems the most reliable of the several manuscripts that contain the *Questions* of Bartholomew.⁴²³ The *Questions* is securely dated to 1309 AD. The manuscript belongs to the 14th century.⁴²⁴

In 486.5 Bartholomew is discussing polygamy and arguing against it. He says that if there are several wives they will be rivals, so that conflict arises, the household is divided, and evil befalls it. Bartholomew then cites Theophrastus, who said that several wives create a divided house. In addition, Bartholomew tells us that he has the report concerning Theophrastus from Aspasius' commentary on Book 8 of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*. But does he? Neither the Greek text of Aspasius nor Grosseteste's Latin translation (1246–1247), with which Bartholomew was acquainted,⁴²⁵ attributes to Theophrastus the statement that multiple wives divide a household.⁴²⁶ Apparently Bartholomew is misreport-

⁴²³ P. Blazek, *Die mittelalterliche Rezeption der aristotelischen Philosophie der Ehe von Robert Grosseteste bis Bartholomäus von Brügghe (1246/1247–1309)* (Leiden: Brill 2007) p. 207.

⁴²⁴ C. Lohr, "Medieval Latin Aristotle Commentaries," *Traditio* 23 (1967) p. 376; C. O'Boyle, "An Updated Survey of the Life and Works of Bartholomew of Bruges († 1356)," *Manuscripta* 40 (1996) p. 80.

⁴²⁵ Blazek p. 124.

⁴²⁶ In our Greek text of Aspasius (p. 184.28 Heylbut), the commentator passes over the very sentence in the *NE* that might trigger a discussion of polygamy. I am referring to *NE* 8.12 1162a17–18, where we read that a human being is given to forming pairs, συνδυαστικόν. That speaks against threesomes and foursomes and so on. But Aristotle does not pick up the topic. Instead, he contrasts pairing with being political and tells us that the former is more natural inasmuch as the household is prior to and more necessary than the city (a18–19). In Grosseteste's translation, the sentence that refers to forming pairs is mentioned—συνδυαστικόν is translated with *coniugale* (p. 182.48

ing. My guess is that he has been influenced in some way or other by earlier discussions of marriage that take up the question of polygamy. Peter Lombard and Albert the Great come to mind. Peter discusses polygamy in his *Sentences* (1155–1158), and Albert does the same in the *Commentary on the Sentences* (1249) and in the first *Commentary on the Ethics*, i.e., on Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* (1250–1252).⁴²⁷ That tells us that Bartholomew was doing nothing unusual in taking up the issue of polygamy, but it does not account for the reference to Aspasius as a source for a Theophrastean statement concerning the evils of polygamy. In the case of Peter, no reference is to be expected, for he wrote some ninety years before Grosseteste's translation of Aspasius. Albert does know the translation, but the translation does not have the Theophrastean statement found in Bartholomew. Unless we posit some other predecessor who cited Aspasius for the Theophrastean statement, we are left wondering whether Bartholomew created his own error.

Leaving Aspasius and Bartholomew aside, we may still ask whether Theophrastus expressed himself negatively concerning polygamy. Given the paucity of evidence, I avoid a simple answer in favor of a twofold response. First, a text like 523 strongly suggests that Theophrastus had a positive view of marriage between one man and one woman. He would oppose taking two or more wives, and were he asked, he would agree that polygamy divides a household, which is an unwanted evil. Second, I am inclined to believe that Theophrastus never treated polygamy at length. Nowhere does Aristotle focus on polygamy and its negative consequences for domestic harmony, and I doubt that Theophrastus did differently. Like his teacher, Theophrastus will have viewed human beings as “given to forming pairs,”⁴²⁸ and saw no need to defend monogamy at length.

Regrettably, text 486.5 conveys no real news and is in any case erroneous in that it appeals to Aspasius for a report concerning Theophrastus. If 486.5 is of any value, it is as an example of deceptive context. Given

Mercken = *Aristoteles Latinus* vol. 26.1–3 fasc.3 p. 318.2 Gauthier)—but it does not trigger a discussion of polygamy. Apparently Grosseteste has added some material: he is commenting on the lacunose portion of Aspasius' commentary and fills in a hole. But he is not drawing on a more complete text of Aspasius. Rather, he is adding on the basis of Aristotle's *NE* and in particular on his own translation of the *NE* in which συνδυαστικόν is translated by *coniugale* (p. 172.80 M). On Grosseteste's additions, see Mercken (1973) p. 58*–63*.

⁴²⁷ On Peter and Albert, see now Blazek pp. 123–155.

⁴²⁸ See above, note 426.

Bartholomew's extensive work on Aristotle,⁴²⁹ the incautious reader might think that Theophrastus did address polygamy and in doing so made an advance over Aristotle, who was silent on the topic. But that would be a mistake.

7. *Fortune and Goods and Evils outside the Soul*

Most of us think that personal happiness depends partly, even in large part, on an individual's character. Through education including training in correct behavior and clear thinking, a person acquires moral virtue, practical wisdom and intellectual skills that enable him to make good choices and generally to lead a satisfying life. But most of us also believe that education and acquired character are not enough. One also needs a measure of good luck, for afflictions of the body like diseases and external events like loss of property are often beyond our control. The word "often" must be emphasized, for disease can be self-inflicted and loss of property can result through carelessness. But they can also occur—come upon us or happen to us—at times that cannot be anticipated and in ways that cannot be countered. And when minor blows occur one after another or a major disaster is experienced, most of us feel miserable. We speak of bad luck and do not call ourselves happy.

The preceding remarks do not present a view peculiar to the modern era. On the contrary, the ancient Greeks, like us, not only recognized the importance of luck or fortune but also distinguished three class goods and evils: those of the soul, especially virtue and vice, those of the body like health and disease, and those outside the body such as wealth and poverty.⁴³⁰ This threefold division may have been given formal recognition by the Pythagoreans. See Iamblichus, *Protrepticus* 24.3–25.2 Pistelli. It is certainly present in the writings of Plato. See, e.g., *Gorgias* 467E4, 477C1, *Republic* 10.15 618C8–D1 and *Philebus* 48E1–10.⁴³¹ Of especial interest is *Laws* 1 631B6–D1, in which goods are divided into those that are divine and those that are human. The former are called greater and the latter lesser. Wealth, an external good, is placed last among the lesser

⁴²⁹ For Bartholomew's writings on Aristotle, see Chapter II "The Sources" no. 36.

⁴³⁰ In speaking of the ancient Greeks, I am ignoring an important exception: namely, the Stoics. In the Hellenistic period (which is our concern), they quarreled with the Peripatetics, holding that only virtue is good. What the Peripatetics called bodily and external goods they referred to as preferred indifferents.

⁴³¹ For a fuller list of passages, see Dirlmeier (1964) p. 282.

goods. It is preceded by health, beauty and strength, all or which are bodily goods. Among the greater goods we find the virtues of the soul. Wisdom enjoys pride of place and is followed by temperance, justice and courage.

Aristotle adopted this tripartite division of goods: some are psychic or mental, others are bodily and still others are external (*NE* 1.8 1098b12–14, *Pol.* 7.1 1323a25–26). On occasion, this threefold division is presented as twofold: goods of the soul, wisdom and virtue, are marked off from those outside the soul, bodily and external goods. The superior value of the former is recognized, as is their importance for achieving happiness (*NE* 1.10 1100b9–10, *EE* 2.1 1218b32–33, *Pol.* 7.1 1323a27–34). Nevertheless, bodily and external goods are not dismissed as irrelevant to happiness. On the contrary, Aristotle is clear that they are necessary for leading a happy life, and that they can be adversely affected by fortune (*NE* 1.8 1099a31–b8, 7.13 1153b17–21). That might suggest accumulating external goods without limit in order to create an unbreachable barricade against misfortune. But Aristotle states emphatically that there are limits, and that external goods in excess are necessarily harmful (*Pol.* 7.1 1323b7–10, cf. *NE* 7.13 1153b23).⁴³²

Theophrastus will have departed little from this position. He recognized three classes of goods (493.8, cf. 677)⁴³³ and the affect that fortune can have on living well (492). To be sure, Cicero thinks that Theophrastus departs from Aristotle in assigning excessive importance to fortune (498.9–15), but Cicero may be overstating a minor difference. He may be drawing on exoteric works, especially dialogues, in which strong statements, even exaggerations, may find a place. And he may be influenced by polemical remarks directed against Zeno and Dicaearchus.⁴³⁴

487 Papyrus Pack² 1574 col. 3 v. 25–28 (CQ vol. 44 [1950] p. 129 Barns)

Literature: Barns (1950) pp. 129, 131–132; Masson (1951) pp. 441–442; Chadwick (1969) col. 1133; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 212–213

Text 487 is taken from a Hellenistic school anthology (perhaps 2nd century BC), of which only fragments survive. The fragments are all

⁴³² A similar position might be advanced in regard to bodily goods, especially health. Frequent walks and a careful diet might be recommended, but there are limits. Quite apart from lost time, an excessive concern with one's health can become hypochondria, and all manner of healthy practices may be no defense against plague.

⁴³³ On 677 see *Commentary* 8 on rhetoric and poetics pp. 207–213.

⁴³⁴ See the commentary on 481, 490–493 and 497.

concerned with τύχη, “fortune” or “luck.” 487 is preceded by verses drawn from New Comedy⁴³⁵ and followed by an excerpt from Demosthenes’ speech *On the Crown* (252). Ignoring letters marked as uncertain, 487 runs: Θεοφράστου ἢ Ἀναξιμένους· τὸ γὰρ δυσλόγιστον τοῦ βίου τοῖς ἀνθ[ρώποις τ]ύχην προσαγορεύειν εἰώθαμεν· εἰ γὰρ ταῖς γνώμαις κ]ατωρθοῦμεν, ὄνομ[α τ]ύχ[ης] οὐκ ἄ[ν ᾔ]ν,] We have translated: “Theophrastus or Anaximenes: For that element in life which is difficult to calculate we are accustomed to call fortune. For if we were (always) correct in our judgments, the word ‘fortune’ would not exist.”

The text is also found in Stobaeus’ *Anthology*, where it is attributed to Anaximenes alone. Theophrastus is not named. The Anaximenes in question is not the Pre-Socratic (fl. mid-sixth century BC). Rather, we should think of two contemporaries of Theophrastus, both of whom were from Lampsacus: the rhetorician to whom the *Rhetoric to Alexander* is often attributed and his like-named nephew who was a historian (Diogenes Laertius 2.3). The former is more likely. Clever remarks and gnomic sayings are attributed to him (*FGrH* 72 T 7, F 31–38 [all are found in Stobaeus]), and it is easy to imagine the idea expressed in 487 occurring in a rhetorical text (cf. Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1.5 1362a6–11). Nevertheless, it would be hasty to assume that Stobaeus, who compiled his anthology at a much later date (5th century AD), has the attribution correct. He is only as good as his sources, and he may have chosen to omit or simply failed to record the attribution to Theophrastus.

Two textual problems should be mentioned. We have printed κατωρθοῦμεν (line 3) instead of κατορθοῦμεν, which is found in the papyrus and in Stobaeus. That is an emendation by Meineke. It seems grammatically necessary (imperfect tense in a contrary-to-fact protasis) and for that reason has been accepted. Rather different is the occurrence of πάντα before κατορθοῦμεν/κατωρθοῦμεν in Stobaeus. It is not found in the school anthology (i.e., the papyrus) and has not been printed in the text of 487, despite the fact that it makes clearer the argument concerning τύχη. In order to eliminate the existence of the word τύχη, “fortune” or “luck,” it is not good enough to deliberate successfully concerning the future some or much of the time. It is necessary that our calculations are always correct, so that there need be no surprises that could not have been anticipated. Hence, the inclusion of πάντα in the text seems to be

⁴³⁵ According to Barns (1950) p. 130, “the style and language suggest Menander, and in many cases the sentiments and expressions find close parallels in the remains of the author.”

a welcome addition. But it does not follow that the addition was originally present in the text. An alert reader can easily supply πάντα, and in adding to the text he will be pleased with his own acumen.⁴³⁶ That could also be a reason for an anthologist to omit πάντα. Whereas Theophrastus or Anaximenes may have expressed himself fully and therefore ever so clearly, the compiler of a school anthology might chose to omit πάντα, in order to keep his students alert and to give them pleasure when they understand what must be supplied. Be that as it may, we have not printed πάντα as part of the Greek text, but we have included “always” in parentheses in the translation together with an explanatory footnote.⁴³⁷

The idea expressed in 487 is unexciting, but it is Peripatetic. In the *Physics*, Aristotle begins his investigation of τύχη, “fortune” or “luck” (and τὸ αὐτόματον, “the spontaneous”) by observing that there are people who express doubts concerning fortune or luck: οὐδὲν γὰρ δὴ γίγνεσθαι ἀπὸ τύχης φασίν, ἀλλὰ πάντων εἶναι τι αἴτιον ὠρισμένον ὅσα λέγομεν ἀπὸ ταῦτομάτου γίγνεσθαι ἢ τύχης (2.4 196a1–3). Aristotle then goes on to say that τύχη is not an αἴτιον *per se* but one *per accidens*, κατὰ συμβεβηκός (2.5 197a5–6). It is indeterminate (ἀόριστον 197a9) and incalculable (παράλογον 197a18), for calculation is concerned with what occurs always or for the most part, while τύχη is found in other occurrences (197a19–20). Such a well-formulated argument is not present in 487, but we are made to focus on what is difficult or impossible to calculate, τὸ δυσλόγιστον (line 1)—a notion that plays an important role in Peripatetic ethics.

488 Plutarch, *Condolence Addressed to Apollonius* 6 104C–D (BT vol. 1 p. 214.3–8 Paton, Wegenhaupt and Gärtner)

Literature: J. Schneider (1821) p. 206; Fortenbaugh (1984) p. 214; Magnaldi (1991) p. 79 n. 24; Tsouni (2010) p. 171 n. 825

Text 488 is taken from a work addressed to Apollonius, who had recently lost his son. The work is not mentioned in Lamprias’ catalogue of Plutarchan writings. It exhibits stylistic features that are not expected in a work

⁴³⁶ See, e.g., 696 and the discussion in *Commentary* vol. 8 pp. 310–316.

⁴³⁷ That an anthologist may alter a text for effect is well known, but it is of some interest that the excerpt from Demosthenes’ *On the Crown* 252, which follows our text, has been altered, presumably to achieve a rhetorical effect. The phrase ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι has been moved from later in the same section to the beginning of the excerpt. The reader not only recognizes that the excerpt is from an oration but also feels himself called upon to pay attention to what follows.

by Plutarch and seems excessive in the use of quotations. For these and other reasons the attribution to Plutarch has been forcefully attacked but perhaps not conclusively.⁴³⁸ Be that as it may, we should be grateful that the work contains so many and such interesting quotations from lost works. Our text is an example.

488 occurs early in the address to Apollonius. We have been told that changes in circumstances bring changes in one's fortune, (5 103B–F) and that reason is the best way to deal with grief (6 103F–104A). Demetrius of Phalerum is cited in regard to verses of Euripides concerning the swiftness with which fortune changes (104A–B).⁴³⁹ There follow additional verses of Euripides together with a quotation from Pindar (104B), after which we hear of Crantor, who spoke of uncertain fortune, ἄδηλος τύχη (104C). 488 follows. Plutarch first tells us that experiencing bad fortune, ἀτυχεῖν, is nothing new (lines 1–2) and then quotes Theophrastus: ἄσκοπος γὰρ ἡ τύχη καὶ δεινὴ παρελῆσθαι τὰ προπεποιημένα καὶ μεταρρῖψαι τὴν δοκοῦσαν εὐημερίαν, οὐδένα καιρὸν ἔχουσα τακτόν, “For fortune is aimless (or inscrutable) and capable of taking away the things which have been gained through toil and of turning upside down apparent prosperity—it having no fixed time (for striking)” (lines 2–4).

The extreme negative effect that fortune can have on a man's life is here fully recognized. And this effect is not conceived of as an intervention by some power or goddess that can be influenced for the better through prayer and sacrifice. Rather, Theophrastus is thinking of bodily and external evils, like sickness and disastrous events, which affect all men from time to time, and which can ruin a person's happiness even if he has a virtuous character.⁴⁴⁰

Fortune is called ἄσκοπος (line 2). This description can be understood in an active and in a passive sense. Construed actively, text 488 tells us that fortune is aimless: it strikes randomly or haphazardly. Taken passively, 488 says that fortune is inscrutable: it defies calculation. In favor

⁴³⁸ See, e.g., F. Babbitt's introduction to the Loeb edition (1928) pp. 105–106 and Ziegler's survey of the arguments against the attribution to Plutarch (col. 161–165). Ziegler speaks of a colorless rhetorical school exercise (“eine farblose Rhetorenschülerarbeit” col. 161), but M. Baltes, “Plutarchus” in *Brill's New Pauly* vol. 11 (2007) p. 419 does not mark the work as spurious. Although we treated the work as genuine in the text-translation volumes, I now incline to think that we erred. The issue is best left to the experts on Plutarch's writings.

⁴³⁹ Demetrius of Phalerum, fr. 83 SOD.

⁴⁴⁰ On the Peripatetic doctrine of three goods and evils, see the introduction to this section and the comment on 493.

of the active interpretation, we can cite what follows: fortune is said “to be capable of taking away and turning upside down” (δεινὴ παρελῆσθαι καὶ μεταρῶναι lines 3–4). In favor of the passive interpretation, we can cite the phrase “apparent (or seeming) prosperity” (δοκοῦσαν εὐημερίαν line 4), the preceding reference to Crantor (he spoke of “unclear or uncertain [ἄδηλος] fortune” 104C),⁴⁴¹ and the closing phrase “having no fixed time” (line 4). All that is in line with text 487.1–2: men are accustomed to use τύχη, the word “fortune,” in reference to τὸ δυσλόγιστον, “that which is difficult to calculate.” It also invites comparison with the words of Knemon in Menander’s *Grouch* (713–717 OCT):

ἐν δ' ἴσως ἤμαρτον, ὅστις τῶν ἀπάντων ῥόμην
αὐτὸς αὐτάρχης τις εἶναι καὶ δεήσεσθαι οὐδενός.
νῦν δ' ἰδὼν ὀξεῖαν οὔσαν ἄσκοπόν τε τοῦ βίου
τὴν τελευτὴν, εὖρον οὐκ εὖ τοῦτο γινώσκων τότε.
δεῖ γὰρ εἶναι καὶ παρεῖναι τὸν ἐπικουρήσοντ' αἰεί.

Perhaps I did make one mistake: I thought that I alone of all men was self-sufficient and would need no one. But now having seen that the end of life is swift and inscrutable, I have learned that I did not understand well at that time. For there must always be someone present who will help.

In these verses of Theophrastus' pupil, we have, as it were, a commentary on our text. Knemon recognizes that what life will bring is incalculable, and acknowledges that the apparent independence that he achieved through hard work was an illusion.⁴⁴² I am, therefore, inclined to construe ἄσκοπος (line 2) passively as opaque or inscrutable. But that said, I want to suggest that forcing a choice between the two interpretations of ἄσκοπος is of little moment from a practical point of view. For by striking randomly at no fixed time (line 4), fortune seems to be an aimless force. And it is this randomness, which makes fortune inscrutable and difficult to calculate.

⁴⁴¹ Cf. 5 103F, where Plutarch speaks of the uncertainty and instability of fortune and then tells us that seeking something stable in what is unstable is a trait of persons who do not reason correctly.

⁴⁴² See E. Handley, *The Dyskolos of Menander* (Cambridge MA: Harvard 1965) pp. 253–254, who cites Solon ap. Herodotus, *Histories* 1.32: ἀνθρώπου σῶμα ἐν οὐδὲν αὐταρχές ἐστι ... σκοπεῖν δὲ χρὴ παντός χρημάτων τὴν τελευτὴν καὶ ἀποβήσεται, “No single human being is self-sufficient ... it is necessary to look to the end of every matter, how it will come out.” Caveat: in this passage, the phrase “look to the end” does not imply that the end of a man's life can be foreseen through careful calculation or reflection. Rather, the phrase implies that we must wait for the end to occur in order to see how it comes out. Hence, understanding ἄσκοπος in 488 as inscrutable or opaque is quite in line with the use of σκοπεῖν in Herodotus 1.32.

Caveat, although Theophrastus recognizes that fortune can upset the best of plans and in extreme cases ruin a person's life, he does not downplay the importance of moral virtue and practical wisdom for leading a happy life. Good fortune may be important, but happiness is not to be identified with εὐτυχία, "good fortune." See 489-491.

In the context of Plutarch's address to Apollonius concerning the loss of his son, it seems reasonable to classify 488 as an ethical text, and that classification is supported by the references to "man" and to "all of us" (line 2). Nevertheless, what we are told in 488 can easily be transferred to politics. The prosperity of a city-state can be turned upside down by events that could not be anticipated; bad fortune that has no fixed time for striking: οὐδένα καιρὸν ἔχουσα τακτόν (line 4). Here the καιρός is a devastating moment (much as the son of Apollonius died before his time, so the plague that struck Athens in 430 BC could not have been predicted). But the καιρός can be a moment for success: i.e., the critical moment, which the politician of practical wisdom grasps and in doing so achieves a good outcome.⁴⁴³

It has been suggested that the Theophrastean portion of 488 derives from the work entitled *Callisthenes* or *On Grief* (436 no. 15a).⁴⁴⁴ That is certainly possible. Much as Plutarch's *Consolation Addressed to Apollonius* is motivated by the loss of a dear one, so the *Callisthenes* is motivated at least in part by the loss of a valued colleague, and much as Plutarch speaks of reason being the best remedy for grief (103F), we can imagine Theophrastus doing the same, pointing out that unfortunate events are part of the human experience and therefore must be accepted in accordance with practical reason. But there are other possibilities like *On Happiness* (436 no. 12) and *On Good Fortune* (no. 14) as well as an inclusive work like *Ethics* (no. 2) or a collection of problems (727 no. 4).

489 Athenaeus, *The Sophists at Dinner* 13.21 567A (BT vol. 3 p. 250.3-7 Kaibel)

Literature: Regenbogen (1940) col. 1481-1482; Wehrli (1983) p. 494; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 318-320

Text 489 comes from the thirteenth book of *The Sophists at Dinner*. At the beginning of the book, Athenaeus tells the interlocutor Timocrates that

⁴⁴³ Theophrastus wrote extensively on the καιρός in politics. See 589 no. 4-6.

⁴⁴⁴ Wytténbach *ap.* J. Schneider p. 206.

the topic will be eros (13.1 555A–B), and in what follows we are given a report of what the diners are imagined to have said. Theophrastus is first mentioned by Plutarch of Alexandria,⁴⁴⁵ who cites Theophrastus' (*Dialogue*) *concerning Love* and reports an analogy that the tragedian Chaeremon is said to have drawn between wine and eros (13.14 562E = 559). Some four and one-half pages later, Theophrastus is again cited, this time by Cynulcus,⁴⁴⁶ who is abusing Myrtilus.⁴⁴⁷ The latter had attacked the Stoics, recognized the importance of the eyes, made negative remarks about shaving and praised beauty. He is abruptly interrupted by Cynulcus, who accuses him of wallowing in wineshops with mistresses and carrying round books on prostitution (13. 21 566E–567A). At this point begins our text. Cynulcus speaks ironically of Myrtilus' wide learning, labels Myrtilus a teacher of lust, and in between says that Myrtilus is not at all like Theomander of Cyrene, who according to Theophrastus professed to teach good fortune (13.21 567A–B = 489). Our text is immediately followed by 561, in which Cynulcus tells Myrtilus that he is no different from Amasis, whom Theophrastus, in his (*Dialogue*) *concerning Love*, characterizes as clever in matters of love.

Theomander of Cyrene is mentioned only here (lines 1–2) in ancient literature.⁴⁴⁸ On the basis of our text we can say that he was referred to by name in Theophrastus' work *On Happiness* (436 no. 12), and that he was said to go round professing to teach good fortune (lines 2–3). The use of the participle *περνούοντα* suggests that he may have been a traveling teacher who made his way from city to city. We are not told what Theomander taught about good fortune, *εὐτυχία*, but it is quite possible that he identified good fortune with happiness. For Aristotle speaks of certain unnamed persons who adopted this identification (*NE* 1.8 1099b7–8, 7.13 1153b22, *EE* 1.1 1214a25). Certainly the mention of someone who identified good fortune with happiness would be appropriate in a Peripatetic work on happiness.

⁴⁴⁵ This Plutarch is not to be confused with the famous Plutarch from Chaeroneia. He may have been both a contemporary of Athenaeus and a friend; see Mengis p. 44.

⁴⁴⁶ See above, Section 1 p. 235 n. 1.

⁴⁴⁷ Myrtilus is a sophist/grammarian who on one occasion is compared with the like-named poet of Old Comedy (13.21 566E–F), but his identity remains obscure. He may be the creation of Athenaeus, or he may be related to some historical figure. In any case, he is the speaker in 562–564 and 567A. See Mengis 37–38.

⁴⁴⁸ Schweighaeuser vol. 7 p. 54.

Aristotle is quite clear that happiness is not identical with good fortune. In the *Ethics*, he defines happiness without mentioning good fortune or the good things that fortune brings (*NE* 1.7 1098a15–16, 1.9 1099b26, 10.7 1177a12, 10.8 1178b32, *EE* 2.1 1219a38–39).⁴⁴⁹ In the *Politics*, he says that each person's share in happiness is proportionate to his share in virtue, practical wisdom and action in accordance with virtue and wisdom. He also says that no person is virtuous on account of fortune (7.1 1323b21–29). In my judgment, Theophrastus never rejected this position. To be sure, in the work *On Happiness* and other writings, he took account of the importance of fortune for living a happy life (493), but that is different from rejecting a fundamental doctrine of Aristotelian ethics. We can, I think, say with some certainty that the teaching of Theomander (very likely the identification of good fortune with happiness) was introduced into *On Happiness*, in order to be criticized and ultimately rejected.

If *On Happiness* was a dialogue (and I think it was),⁴⁵⁰ it is tempting to imagine that Theomander appeared in the dialogue, identified happiness with good fortune, and was shown to be in error by Theophrastus, who had the lead role within the dialogue. One part of this scenario may well be correct: Theophrastus had the lead role and personally demolished the view of Theomander. But that said, two caveats are in order. First, in saying φησί Θεόφραστος ἐν τῷ Περί εὐδαιμονίας, “Theophrastus says in the work *On Happiness*,” Athenaeus is adopting his regular formula for mentioning an author and his work. He is neither saying nor denying that the author, Theophrastus, played a role within the work in question. Second, the idea that Theomander appeared in the dialogue as an interlocutor is not to be taken seriously. Theomander's activity is presented in indirect discourse in the manner of a report. Had Athenaeus wanted to indicate that Theomander actually appeared and spoke *qua* interlocutor, we would expect a quite different construction, e.g., one involving the verb ποιεῖν followed by a verb of speaking.⁴⁵¹

⁴⁴⁹ Dirlmeier (1937) p. 30.

⁴⁵⁰ See the commentary on 475.

⁴⁵¹ Cf., e.g., 1.39 21F: ποιεῖ αὐτὸν Αἰσχύλον λέγοντα, “he (Aristophanes) makes Aeschylus himself say,” and 13.16 564B: διαλεγομένην ποιήσας τὴν Ἴπποδάμειαν, “making or presenting Hippodameia discoursing.” The issue can be complicated by introducing the possibility that Athenaeus is repeating with little variation what he found in a secondary source. But the issue (i.e., Did Theomander appear as an interlocutor?) hardly justifies further discussion.

490 John of Lydia, *On the Months* 4.7 (BT p. 72.7–16 Wuensch)

Literature: Rose (1863) pp. 104–105; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 215–216, Annas (1993) p. 386

Text 490 is found in the seventh chapter of the fourth book of *On the Months*. The book is organized by months beginning with January. Chapter 7 occurs within the discussion of January and begins with a brief mention of the temple that the Emperor Trajan dedicated to Τύχη, Fortune, and of the sacrifice that occurred at the temple. That occasions a string of learned comments concerning fortune, some of which cite poets, while others refer to prose authors. Our text is immediately preceded by a mention of Plato, who is said not to have included fortune among the gods (p. 72.4–7). After that we read that Aristotle and Theophrastus and everyone like them deny the existence of fortune (luck), saying εἰ ἔστιν ἀρετή, οὐκ ἔστι τύχη, “if virtue exists, fortune does not” (lines 1–2). We are then told that in human affairs shifts in fortune are occasioned by wealth, power and especially injustice (lines 2–4). But persons who hold fast to virtue, are mindful of god and placing their hopes firmly in things immaterial despise the fine things of this world (lines 2–7). Our text concludes with a reference to Euripides, who is reported to have said that there is nothing secure in fortune (line 7). Four lines from the *Hypsipyle* follow (not printed in the text-translation volumes).

As a report about Theophrastus’ views concerning fortune or luck, 490 is problematic for at least two reasons. First, later in the discussion of the month of June, our text is repeated, but this time Theophrastus’ name is omitted (4.100 p. 140 Wuensch). A further difference between the two occurrences is that the reference to power, δύναμις, in 4.7 = 490.4 is omitted in 4.100. The omission of δύναμις is insignificant and should not be taken as evidence that John is drawing on two different sources. But is the omission of Theophrastus’ name in 4.100 similarly insignificant? My guess is that it is. Once again John has simply omitted an item that is recorded in the earlier passage and that was present in the common source of both passages.⁴⁵² Moreover and more importantly, the naming of Theophrastus after Aristotle is most likely conventional. Theophrastus is mentioned not because he is known to have said what

⁴⁵² That John is not drawing directly on Theophrastus but rather working with a secondary source can be assumed as certain. For completeness’ sake, I simply note the possibility, and in my judgment the improbability, that John on his own has added Theophrastus’ name in the earlier passage.

is reported in 490, but because he is one of the two best-known leaders of the Peripatetic School and as such is frequently mentioned alongside Aristotle. We may compare 479.1–2, where Theophrastus is named after Aristotle and reference is made to almost all the Peripatetics. The explicit mention of the Peripatetics, οἱ Περπατητικοί, differs from 490, but only slightly, for what we find in our text is largely equivalent: both texts have the adjective “all,” πάντες (though qualified by “almost” in 479), and the phrase “those like them,” οἱ κατ’ αὐτούς (490), seems to refer to the Peripatetics or at least to include them.

Second, the unqualified assertion “if virtue exists, fortune does not” is an exaggeration when attributed to Aristotle and Theophrastus. As explained (lines 4–5), the assertion concerns a select group of individuals, who hold fast (are attentive) to virtue, πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἔχοντες. It is true that such persons are largely unaffected by wealth, power and injustice (line 4). I.e., their character remains intact, so that they can deal with different kinds of situations in an appropriate manner. But being able to deal appropriately with different kinds of situations does not rule out chance occurrences that may be either fortunate or unfortunate. And it does not render a person totally immune to the effects of chance occurrences. At least Peripatetics like Aristotle and Theophrastus recognized that extraordinary misfortune can destroy a person’s happiness (492–498) and even affect his character for the worse (462–463).

The persons who hold fast to virtue are further characterized as “mindful of god and anchoring their stronger hopes on things immaterial and blessed”: θεοῦ μεμνημένοι καὶ κρείτονας ἐπὶ τῶν ἄϋλων καὶ μακαρίων πραγμάτων ἐλπίδας σαλεύοντες (lines 5–6). They are said to “despise the fine things of this world”: καταφρονοῦσι τῶν τῇδε καλῶν (lines 6–7). The metaphor of anchoring one’s hopes is striking and apparently late. LSJ cites Heliodorus (*scriptor eroticus* 3rd century AD). Similarly, the use of the adjective ἄυλος is suspicious. The apparent occurrence in Aristotle’s *On Generation and Corruption* 1.5 322a28 is dubious at best (see LSJ s.v.), and the adjective is not found either in the surviving works of Theophrastus or in another named fragment.⁴⁵³ Being mindful of god and placing one’s hopes in things immaterial and blessed might suggest

⁴⁵³ Coming so soon after the mention of virtue in line 4, one may be reminded of Plutarch, *On Moral Virtue* 1 440E, where we are told that it is possible for virtue to come into being and to remain entirely immaterial, ἄυλος.

Christian influence,⁴⁵⁴ but there is no reason why Theophrastus, in a particular context, could not express himself in more or less similar terms.⁴⁵⁵ Rather different is “despising the fine things of this world.” That is hardly Peripatetic and even overstatement for a Stoic, who would characterize himself as indifferent to most fine things. Hence, one is again tempted to see Christian influence in our text.

The preceding considerations make clear that 490 cannot be taken as a straightforward statement of Theophrastean doctrine. Indeed, the text might be best dismissed as simply wrongheaded. But that said, it is worth noting that we find a similar statement of Theophrastean doctrine in a text of Vitruvius (491). It is risky to combine texts by two authors who belong to quite different periods (Vitruvius was active at the end of the 1st century BC; John in the 6th century AD), but it is at least possible that the two texts represent a skewed interpretation that developed late in the Hellenistic period and was intended to defend Theophrastus against charges of subjecting virtue to the power of fortune (493).

A different possibility is that 490 goes back to a Theophrastean thesis. I.e., it derives from a school exercise in which opposing views concerning fortune were presented. 490 would represent one side of the debate: virtue can withstand the cruelest blows of fortune. A similar case may be 486, in which marriage is attacked in a way that does not represent Theophrastus’ considered opinion, but might be part of an exercise that took place in the Theophrastean Peripatos.

Still another possibility is that 490 goes back to a Theophrastean dialogue in which the power of virtue to withstand misfortune was subjected to scrutiny. The view presented in 490 may have been set forth by a spokesman for the Stoa (Zeno founded the Stoa during Theophrastus’ headship of the Peripatos)⁴⁵⁶ and then criticized by Theophrastus or his representative within the dialogue. The idea that we are dealing with a

⁴⁵⁴ John was a Christian, who lived during the reign of Justinian, whose zeal regarding Christianity is well known. But in his writings, John is largely silent about Christian matters. See Chapter II “The Sources” no. 33 on John of Lydia. In private correspondence, Bob Sharples agrees that the passage in question has a Christian ring, but he also remarks that the terminology and implied metaphysics suggests Neoplatonism. He refers to the passages cited in LSJ s.v. *ἄνλος*, but he is careful to point out that the passages may be selective.

⁴⁵⁵ On being mindful of god, cf. 523.1–4. The adjective *μακάριος* occurs at 440C.1, where it precedes a short saying of Theophrastus. On Aristotle’s use of *μακάριος*, see the commentary to 492.

⁴⁵⁶ But the view need not be tied to the Stoa. See Aristotle’s *NE* 7.13 1153b19–21, which is referred to in the commentary on 492 and 493.

dialogue is not new. More than a century ago, Rose (1863) pp. 104–105 expressed doubts about the reference to Aristotle (line 1) and suggested that if the reference is correct, then the text is taken from an Aristotelian dialogue. Rose holds a similar position regarding Theophrastus (line 1). He mentions the *Callisthenes* (436 no. 15), which he identifies as a dialogue. That dialogues can provide an occasion for statements that do not agree with the author's considered opinion is certainly correct. Whether one wants to attribute Callisthenes' death to bad luck is another matter. See the commentary on 436 no. 15 and 503–504.

491 Vitruvius, *On Architecture* 6, Introduction 2 (BT p. 121.8–19 Krohn)

Literature: Heylbut (1888) pp. 198–199; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1482; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 216–217; Annas (1993) p. 386; Huby (2001) pp. 311–328; Millett p. 149 n. 232; Tsouni (2010) p. 142

Text **491** is found early in the preface to the sixth book of *On Architecture*. The author, Vitruvius, begins by reporting an anecdote concerning Socrates' pupil Aristippus, who found himself shipwrecked on the coast of Rhodes. He was able to provide for himself and his companions by going to the gymnasium and engaging in philosophical discussions for which he was richly rewarded. When his companions wished to return home and asked Aristippus what they should report, he instructed them to say that men ought to prepare for their children possessions and provisions for a journey of such a kind that these possessions and provisions can swim away from a shipwreck together with their owner (6.pref. 1). Our text begins immediately after this anecdote and builds on the idea that has been set forth. We are told that the true defenses of life are those things that cannot be harmed by extreme misfortune, civil upheaval and the devastation of war. Theophrastus is said to have developed this line of thinking, urging men to be educated rather than trusting in money (lines 1–4). According to Vitruvius, he put it this way, "Of all men, the educated man alone is neither a stranger in foreign places nor lacking in friends, when the members of his household and relatives are lost. Rather, he is a citizen in every state and able to disdain without fear the hard accidents of fortune. But he, who thinks himself to be fortified not by the defenses of education but those of good luck, makes his way by slippery paths and is brought to ruin by a life which is not stable but infirm" (lines 5–10).

In the commentary to **490**, I suggested taking that text together with **491** as two texts that present an overstated view of virtue: one that

was attributed to Theophrastus in the late Hellenistic period in order to counter the charge of subjecting virtue to fortune. I do not want to withdraw the suggestion, but I do want to suggest a different way of viewing 491: namely, as a response to criticism by Dicaearchus of Messana, a Peripatetic and contemporary of Theophrastus. Cicero speaks of a controversy between Dicaearchus, who rated the active life far above all other modes of life, and Theophrastus, who gave precedence to the life of contemplation (481 = Dicaearchus, fr. 33 Mirhady). It is easy to imagine Theophrastus criticizing the position of Dicaearchus by pointing out how moral virtue and practical wisdom can only guarantee so much. Neither in the market place nor in the political arena, are they certain defenses against failure and disaster. Far securer is the life of contemplation lived in leisure among philosophers. In a writing directed against Dicaearchus—especially an exoteric writing—Theophrastus may well have taken an exaggerated stand, not only recommending the avoidance of disasters by leading a leisured life but also claiming that the educated man alone is “able to disdain without fear the hard accidents of fortune” (lines 7–8). That does not mean that the educated man diligently doing philosophy will never suffer shipwreck, literal or metaphorical, but he will know how to make the best of a bad situation. Understanding οἰκειότης, the natural relationship that exists among all men (531), he will never be a stranger in foreign places but rather a citizen in every state (lines 5–7). If that sounds more like an advertisement for the philosophic life rather than a statement of reality, it is. But we may take a cue from Vitruvius, who speaks of Theophrastus urging, *hortando* (line 4), men to put their trust in education. In an exoteric work like the Προτρεπτικός, *Exhortation* (436 no. 33), or in a protreptic passage elsewhere, Theophrastus may well have expressed himself in an enthusiastically exaggerated manner.

492 Cicero, *Lucullus* 134 (BT p. 95.17–96.2 Plasberg)

Literature: Brandis (1860) p. 350; Zeller (1879) p. 857; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1482; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 217–218

Text 492 comes from Cicero's long speech (64–146), which follows that of Lucullus (10–62). The focus has shifted from physics to ethics (129), and Stoic doctrine is being opposed to that of the Old Academy. Cicero says that he would like to follow the Stoics and wonders whether Antiochus, who represents the Old Academy, will give him permission to do so (132). Reference is made to the Stoic doctrine that all sins are equal, and Antiochus' strong disagreement is noted (133). At this point comes

our text. Cicero introduces an even greater disagreement: *multo maior etiam dissensio* (line 1). Whereas Zeno, the founder of the Stoa, thinks that the happy life is placed in virtue alone, Antiochus holds that the happy life, but not the most happy life—*beatam, sed non beatissimam* (*sc. vitam*)—depends on virtue alone (lines 1–3). This contrast between Zeno and Antiochus runs throughout text 492: *ille* and *illud* refer to Zeno and his doctrine, *hic* and *hoc* to Antiochus. The translation in the Loeb edition is faulty, in that it takes the second *hic* (line 7) as a reference to Theophrastus.⁴⁵⁷

According to Barnes, Antiochus was a syncretist,⁴⁵⁸ someone who attempted to paper over the disagreements between the Academy, Peripatos and Stoa. He held that the Peripatos and the Academy (the dogmatic Old Academy as against the skeptical New Academy) advanced a single doctrine that is Platonic in origin (*Lucullus* 15, *Academics* 1.17–18). The Stoa was not a new school but rather a correction of the Academy (*Academics* 1.35, 43), and if the Stoa appears to be at odds with the Peripatos, that is attributable to changes in terminology (*Laws* 1.54–55, *On Ends* 5.22, 74, *Nature of the Gods* 1.16). Antiochus' recognition of both a happy and a most happy life may be seen as part of his syncretism. By making virtue sufficient to guarantee a happy life, he was trying to accommodate the Stoics, who held that the wise man is happy in all circumstances. And by recognizing a most happy life that required more than virtue, i.e., bodily and external goods as well as virtue, he was acknowledging the Peripatetic doctrine of three kinds of goods and evils.⁴⁵⁹

It may be that certain passages in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* encouraged Antiochus to recognize two levels of happiness. Chapter 10 of Book 1 is a case in point. Aristotle is investigating whether a man may be called happy during his lifetime (1100a10–11). He acknowledges that we are unwilling to call people happy while they are still alive, for changes may befall them, and happiness is thought to be something permanent and in no way easy to change (1100a35–b3). But he also says that activities in accordance with virtue are decisive in regard to happiness, *κύριοι ... τῆς εὐδαιμονίας*, and that no other function of man possesses permanence as fully as activities according to virtue (1100b9–

⁴⁵⁷ I have discussed the error fully in *Quellen* (1984) pp. 217–218.

⁴⁵⁸ Or more cautiously, Antiochus “regarded himself as a syncretist and not as an eclectic.” So Barnes (1989) p. 87, cf. 78.

⁴⁵⁹ This attempt at mediation has been criticized in the literature. See, e.g., Barnes (1989) pp. 88–89 and Annas (1993) pp. 419–423.

10, 12–13). Here Aristotle certainly recognizes the special role of virtue in achieving happiness, and that might encourage developing a two-level doctrine of happiness. Virtue suffices for the lower level, but not for the higher level. That is, of course, the view of Antiochus, but even if Aristotle may be said to have encouraged the view, he resisted making it his own. Instead, he recognizes the limitations of virtue, telling us that happiness cannot withstand great and numerous disasters and that recovering from such disasters takes a long time (1101a10–12).

Aristotle's use of εὐδαιμονία and τὸ μακάριον in the *Nicomachean Ethics* may also be thought to encourage or anticipate Antiochus' distinction between a *beata vita* and a *beatissima vita*. Whereas εὐδαιμονία and the cognate form εὐδαίμων refer to a lower level of happiness, τὸ μακάριον and μακάριος refer to a higher level.⁴⁶⁰ The trouble here is that Aristotle regularly uses these words as synonyms,⁴⁶¹ i.e., as stylistic variants.⁴⁶² If there is an exception, it occurs at 1.10 1101a7.⁴⁶³ Aristotle is arguing that no one who is μακάριος can become wretched, ἄθλιος, for a person's activities determine the character of his life. The man who is μακάριος is truly good and wise and therefore will do nothing hateful. On the contrary, he will bear misfortune in a seemly manner, doing what is most noble as the circumstances allow (1100b33–1101a3). Aristotle introduces a comparison with the general and the craftsman, who make the best of their circumstances (1101a3–5) and concludes that the εὐδαίμων would never become wretched, though he would not be μακάριος, were he to fall into misfortunes such as those that overtook Priam (1101a5–8). As I understand this passage, Aristotle is not recognizing two levels of happiness. Rather he is focused on the possibility of becoming wretched through doing hateful deeds. He varies μακάριος with εὐδαίμων (1100b34, 1101a7) and concludes that misfortune need not make a happy man wretched—being virtuous he maintains his dignity through

⁴⁶⁰ Translators have attempted to capture the perceived (alleged) distinction by reserving “happy” and “happiness” for the lower level and using “supremely happy” and “bliss” for the higher level. See, e.g., Ostwald's translation (Bobs Merrill 1962) of *NE* 1.8 1099b2–3 and 1.11 1101b4–5.

⁴⁶¹ See *NE* 1.7 1098a19; 1.8 1099b2&3; 1.9 1099b12&18; 1.10 1100a15&16, a22&28–29, a33&b1; 1.11 1101b4&5, 1.12 1101b24.

⁴⁶² Annas (1993) pp. 383 and 420.

⁴⁶³ See Bonitz' *Lexicon* 442b3–6 s.v. μακάριος. At *NE* 7.11/*EE* 6.11 1152b6–8, Aristotle first tells us what most people say: namely, that εὐδαιμονία is accompanied by ἡδονή. He then adds that this is why the word μακάριος is derived from χαίρειν. The etymology is fanciful, but the passage does illustrate Aristotle's readiness to use μακάριος as a synonym for εὐδαίμων.

noble action—but he would not be happy. Indeed, no one would call a man like Priam happy (εὐδαμονίσειεν), unless he were defending a thesis (1.5 1096a2).

More interesting may be Aristotle's use of comparative words when discussing happiness. For example, in *Nicomachean Ethics* 1.10, he tells us that small amounts of good fortune are of no consequence for living a happy life. But frequent and large amounts of good fortune make a life happier, μακαριώτερος (1100b22–26). Here Aristotle may appear to be anticipating Antiochus by recognizing degrees of happiness. But if the appearance is real, it also runs up against the fact that Aristotle characterizes happiness as something that is self-sufficient and lacks nothing, so that no addition makes it more desirable (1.7 1097b14–21). It is complete or perfect (1.7 1097b8, 20; 7.13 1153b23–25; 10.7 1177a17, b24; 10.8 1178b7),⁴⁶⁴ and since being complete does not admit of degrees—something is either complete or incomplete—it follows that happiness cannot be more or less. A person may fall just short of happiness, but that does not make him happy.⁴⁶⁵ Hence, when Aristotle speaks of good fortune making a life happier (1100b22–26) or when he says that having evil children makes one less happy (1.8 1099b5), he is speaking loosely. As a philosopher, he ought to say that the man who has evil children is not happy, and in comparison with the man who lacks children, he falls far short of being happy (1099b3–4).⁴⁶⁶ Fair enough, but it would be a mistake to think that Aristotle fails to understand the logic of polar or apical terms. We need only think of his discussion of correct and incorrect constitutions in Book 3 of the *Politics*. Incorrect constitutions are not less correct; rather, they are deviations that fall short of correctness in varying degrees.⁴⁶⁷ Moreover, it seems overly fussy to insist that Aristotle always avoid everyday speech in favor of philosophic precision. That is especially true when he refers to his exoteric writings (*Pol.* 7.1 1323a22–23), for in these writings he will have felt free (even well advised) to speak of degrees

⁴⁶⁴ Cf. 480B.6 and 501.8–9. On the adjective τέλειος, see the introduction to Section 5 on “Happiness” n. 326.

⁴⁶⁵ Aristotle's insistence that happiness run over a complete lifetime (1.7 1098a18, 1.9 1100a5, 10.7 1177b25) complicates his position (see the introduction to Section 5 on “Happiness” n. 324), but it also reinforces the fact that Aristotle thinks of happiness as something complete or perfect.

⁴⁶⁶ On the benefits of children, see 523.7–8.

⁴⁶⁷ See “Aristotle on Prior and Posterior, Correct and Mistaken Constitutions,” *Transactions of the American Philological Association* 106 (1976) pp. 125–137, reprinted in Fortenbaugh (2006) pp. 265–277. On Antiochus and the *beatissima vita* as a perfection, see below, the commentary on 499.

of happiness much as ordinary people do. As long as Aristotle is not being obscure or misleading, there is no good reason for him to avoid an occasional comparative (e.g., *NE* 1.10 1100b26, *Pol.* 7.1 1323b21–23).⁴⁶⁸

Here it might be suggested that Antiochus' distinction between two levels of happiness has a firmer basis in Theophrastus' ethics. As a possibility that cannot be ruled out, but no text supports the idea. Certainly not 492, for although this text distinguishes between a *beata vita* and one that is *beatissima* (lines 2–3), Theophrastus is mentioned only parenthetically. Cicero has just expressed fear that Zeno attributes more to virtue than nature allows (lines 5–6). He then adds by way of explanation that Theophrastus has said much in an elegant and copious manner: *Theophrasto multa diserte copioseque dicente* (lines 6–7). I.e., Theophrastus has said much about the importance of bodily and external goods and the power of fortune to ruin happiness. Here Theophrastus is opposed to Zeno; no connection is made with Antiochus' distinction between levels of happiness.

Brandis and Regenbogen see in 492 evidence of a polemic by Theophrastus against Zeno. Such a polemic is easy to imagine and even likely. Theophrastus was head of the Peripatos when Zeno began teaching, and the views of Zeno would be seen as a criticism of the Peripatetics and their doctrine of three goods and evils. Moreover, the manner in which Theophrastus is introduced in 492 suggests confrontation with Zeno (see the preceding paragraph). We should not forget, however, that Theophrastus could have criticized other and earlier philosophers (cf. Aristotle, *NE* 7.13/EE 6.13 1153b19–21) and that Theophrastus seems to have been in open disagreement with Dicaearchus (481). His criticism of Dicaearchus will have called attention to the uncertainties of political life and more generally to the necessary involvement of external factors like wealth and friends in virtuous activity. Perhaps we should conclude that Zeno may have been Theophrastus' primary target, but what we read in 492 is compatible with multiple targets.

⁴⁶⁸ Aristotle might have done better to avoid characterizing happiness as something that is complete or perfect (it lacks nothing), for that is at best an ideal. Even the life of contemplation cannot be enjoyed without interruption, and like other styles of life, it is subject to chance and misfortune. Aristotle is clear about this (see the introduction to Section 5 on "Happiness") and therefore might have (should have) denied that human happiness is a perfection. He might have embraced difference in degree, recognized that in rare cases human happiness may come close to perfection—i.e., may be a very good life—but insisted that it still falls short of perfection. See the commentary on 499.

The use of *multa*, “much” (line 6), invites comparison with 493.10, where *multa* is translated “many arguments.” The phrase *diserte copiose* (lines 6–7) is more interesting. We have translated “in an eloquent and copious manner,” and that invites comparison with 493.7, where Theophrastus is called *elegantissimus omnium philosophorum*, “most elegant of all philosophers.” However, the translation may be questioned, for earlier at 493.4–5, we are told that when Theophrastus discussed the power of misfortune to make life miserable, he did not dare to speak *elate et ample*. In the text-translation, volumes we have translated the adverbs with “in a lofty and splendid manner.” If that translation is correct, then 492 and 493 seem to contradict each other. According to 492, Theophrastus expressed himself eloquently when he opposed Zeno and diminished the power of virtue. According to 493, he did not dare to speak in a lofty manner. Perhaps then the translation of 492.6–7 is faulty. For elsewhere Cicero draws a distinction between *disertus* and *eloquens*. The former adjective refers to speaking well or clearly, while the latter refers to elevated style (*On the Orator* 1.94 and *Orator* 18).⁴⁶⁹ If *deserte* at 492.6 means “well” or “clearly,” and if *copiose* is taken to refer to quantity and not style, then 492.6–7 may be said to be in line with 493.4–5. Cicero allows that Theophrastus may have spoken *bene*, “well,”⁴⁷⁰ but when his thoughts were base and poor (i.e., when he credited misfortune with great power), then his expression did not rise to the level of eloquence.⁴⁷¹ From a rhetorical point of view, that may be commendable (style fits substance), but that is not Cicero’s primary concern either in 492 or in 493. Rather, Theophrastus is cited for his emphasis on the power of misfortune to ruin happiness. If Theophrastus is correct and both Zeno and Antiochus are wrong, then virtue lies fallen (lines 10–11). It secures neither the happiness announced by Zeno nor the (low-level) happiness of which Antiochus speaks.

Text 492 may be assigned to *On Happiness*, *Callisthenes* or *On Good Fortune* (436 no. 12a–b, 14 and 15a–c); or it may be said to present a view that was present in several different works.

⁴⁶⁹ In *On the Orator* 1.94, the person who is *disertus* is said to be able to speak in a sufficiently pointed and clear manner: *satis acute et dilucide*. In contrast, the person who is *eloquens* is able to magnify and embellish his speech in a way that is more wonderful and more magnificent: *mirabilis et magnificentius*.

⁴⁷⁰ Strictly speaking, Cicero says the he is not inquiring how well Theophrastus spoke (493.5). I take that to be a tacit admission that Theophrastus’ words were well chosen and arranged.

⁴⁷¹ For further discussion, see the commentary on 499.

493 Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations* 5.24–25 (BT p. 415.12–416.15 Pohlenz)

Literature: Brandis (1860) pp. 349–350; Zeller (1879) pp. 856–857; Gercke (1888) pp. 357–358; Dümmmler (1889) pp. 211–212; Heylbut (1888) p. 199; Knögel (1933) pp. 24, 40–41; Stroux (1933) p. 229; Dirlmeier (1937) pp. 38–39; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1482–1483; Gigon (1951) pp. 560–561, (1958) p. 191; F.-A. Steinmetz (1967) pp. 64–65; Wehrli (1983) pp. 493–494; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 218–222; Magnaldi (1991) p. 78; Annas (1993) pp. 386–388; Sharples (1996) p. 100; Lucarini (2002) pp. 68–69; Millett (2007) p. 130 n. 89; Tsouni (2010) pp. 170–171

This text comes toward the beginning of the fifth book of the *Tusculan Disputations*. Cicero is in discussion with an auditor⁴⁷² who doubts that virtue is capable of guaranteeing happiness (5.12) and subsequently asks whether anyone can be happy as long as he is being tormented (5.14). As the discussion develops, the auditor is prepared to grant that persons free of emotional disturbance are happy and that the wise man is free of such disturbances (5.17). He also accepts that a happy life is secured by virtue, if virtue alone is good, and that nothing else but virtue is good, if the happy life is found in virtue (5.21, cf. 18). At this point, the auditor appears ready to accept a Stoic view of happiness. Nevertheless, the auditor appeals to Brutus, who holds, on the authority of Aristus⁴⁷³ and Antiochus, that happiness lies in virtue, even if there is some good other than virtue (5.21). In what follows, Cicero develops this idea by referring to Antiochus' distinction between a happy life and a supremely happy life. Virtue alone can secure the former, but the latter requires bodily and external goods. Cicero also reports what Antiochus says concerning the word "happiness," *beata vita*. Most things get their name from the greater part. Happiness is a case in point. Even if something should be deficient or missing,⁴⁷⁴ it gets its name from what forms by far the greater part (5.22).⁴⁷⁵ Cicero is not sympathetic to this Antiochian view of happiness and in response offers a Stoic objection. He says that he

⁴⁷² On the identity of the speakers in the *Tusculan Disputations*, see the commentary on 484 *ad init.*

⁴⁷³ Aristus is the brother of Antiochus of Ascalon.

⁴⁷⁴ Cicero uses a metaphor: *etiam si ex aliqua parte clauderet*, "even if it (happiness) is lame in some part."

⁴⁷⁵ The greater part is virtue or virtuous action, so that one can say that the virtuous man who suffers affliction is happy, albeit not supremely happy. Being named in accordance with the greater part is revisited by Cicero in 5.86. See below, the commentary on 499. Theophrastus is reported to have applied the same principle in naming the virtues. See 460.7–8.

does not understand what a happy man needs in order to be happier, for if anything is lacking, the man is not happy (5.23). The objection presupposes that happiness is something complete.⁴⁷⁶ In what follows, Cicero refers to the word “happiness.” He allows that there are words of the kind described, and then drops usage for a different consideration. He focuses on the claim that there are three classes of evils (as well as goods) and asks whether a man oppressed by all manner of bodily and external evils—*qui duorum generum (sc. corporis et externis) malis omnibus urgeatur, ut omnia adversa sint in fortuna, omnibus oppressum corpus et confectum doloribus*—will be said to lack but a little to secure a happy life—*huic paullumne ad beatam vitam deesse dicemus*—let alone a supremely happy life (5.23).

At this point, Cicero introduces Theophrastus and says that he was unable to defend the position (493 line 1), i.e., that the virtuous man in multiple afflictions lacks but a little in regard to living well. Cicero’s statement is largely polemical, for Theophrastus would not have tried to defend the position that is being foisted on him. On the contrary, he would have said that the man who is afflicted with every kind of bodily and external evil (*duorum generum malis omnibus*) falls well short of being happy.⁴⁷⁷ But equally he would have avoided taking an extreme position in the opposite direction. He would not have claimed that being happy requires partaking of all bodily and external goods. Were that requirement accepted, Theophrastus himself could not be happy, for he lacked children.⁴⁷⁸ Rather, Theophrastus will have adopted a commonsense position: happiness requires an adequate amount of bodily and external goods. And if one were to ask what constitutes an adequate amount, Theophrastus’ answer would be a mix of bodily and external goods sufficient for living an unimpeded virtuous life (political as well as contemplative).

An interesting question is whether Theophrastus’ emphasis on external goods supports the thesis that Theophrastus did not change the foun-

⁴⁷⁶ On Aristotle and happiness as something complete, see the commentary on 492.

⁴⁷⁷ The adjective “all” (*omnibus*) is not to be pressed. “Many” will do. Cf. 495.6 where we read that Theophrastus vehemently denies that the same man is happy and oppressed by many evils (*multis malis*).

⁴⁷⁸ At NE 1.8 1099b3–4, Aristotle adopts a strong position in regard to children, saying that the man who lacks children is not altogether happy. Aristotle’s mode of expression in this passage might be taken as an acknowledgment of degrees of happiness. But I see no reason why Aristotle must always speak with precision (must say that the man in question falls short of happiness) on all occasions. See the commentary to 492.

dation of Aristotle's ethical system; rather, he added to it and gave precision to its content (72A). The question is answered in various ways. According to Zeller, Theophrastus followed Aristotle in accepting the primacy of a life of contemplation. Given this fundamental orientation, he assigned somewhat greater importance to external circumstances, for only in favorable circumstance can scholarly activity be pursued in an unimpeded manner.⁴⁷⁹ The answer is, I think, one sided. We can agree that Theophrastus' preference for a quiet life of contemplation encouraged assigning special importance to external goods and evils, and yet at the same time we can hold that Theophrastus wanted to present an ethics that was firmly based on practical experience. In this regard, the Callisthenes affair (see 436 no. 15a–c, 504–505) is likely to have figured largely. It will have made clear to Theophrastus that not only the life of contemplation but all modes of living, including those of the historian and politician, are dependent on external circumstances.

A different answer is given by Gigon. In *NE* 1.10–11, we are told that Aristotle comes close to distinguishing between a happy life and a supremely happy life. And in one of his lost dialogues, Aristotle will have formulated the distinction with greater clarity. Here Theophrastus will not have followed his teacher. I.e., he will not have accepted the idea that a virtuous man afflicted by external evils occupies a middle position between the miserable individual and one who is perfectly happy. In doing this, Theophrastus will have been fulfilling his self-imposed task of removing infelicities from his master's work and thinking doctrines through to their logical end.⁴⁸⁰

Gigon's answer is attractive, for it may help explain why the Stoa directed its fire primarily against Theophrastus, whose position is clearly opposed to that of the Stoa. In contrast, Aristotle's position may be thought closer to that of the Stoa.⁴⁸¹ There are, however, grounds for hesitation. Here are two. First, one can doubt that *NE* 1 comes close to distinguishing between a happy life and one that is supremely happy. Indeed, Aristotle says clearly that no one calls happy the person who ends his life ἀθλίως, wretchedly, in the way that Priam did (1.9 1100a8–9). And when Aristotle says that the happy man cannot become ἄθλιος, wretched (1.10 1100b34, 1101a6–7), in context he may mean that the virtuous man

⁴⁷⁹ Zeller pp. 855–856.

⁴⁸⁰ Gigon (1951) p. 560.

⁴⁸¹ See A. Long, "Aristotle's Legacy to Stoic Ethics," *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies* 15 (1968) 74–76.

even in the worst of circumstances acts nobly (1100b20,30–31; 1101a1–3), that a virtuous man cannot be so affected by adverse conditions that he will do something base (1100b34–35). Be that as it may, there is a second consideration that may be of greater significance. If we follow Gigon and accept the idea of a difference between Aristotle and Theophrastus, we should underline that Gigon's thesis concerns the *Nicomachean Ethics* and not the other ethical works. In this regard, the words *in rotam ... beatam vitam non escendere* (lines 11–13) are of interest. According to Cicero, the report that Theophrastus used these words is false, but what he did say conveys the same idea.⁴⁸² Apparently Theophrastus will have expressed himself in a way that invites comparison with *NE* 7.13/*EE* 6.13 1153b19–21: οἱ δὲ τὸν τροχιζόμενον καὶ τὸν δυστυχίαις μεγάλας περιπίπτοντα εὐδαίμονα φάσκοντες εἶναι, ἐὰν ἢ ἀγαθός, ἢ ἐκόντες ἢ ἄκοντες οὐδὲν λέγουσιν. This text occurs in the third of the books common to the *Nicomachean* and *Eudemean Ethics* (*NE* 7 = *EE* 6); in particular it is found in the discussion of pleasure that is most likely of *Eudemean* origin. In the commentary to 449A, we have already observed a relationship between the ethics of Theophrastus and the *Eudemean Ethics*. Now it seems that this relationship extends to the common books (see the commentary on 461). I do not want to forget the first reason for hesitation; I shall, however, suggest that in some respects Theophrastus distanced himself from the *Nicomachean Ethics* and adopted positions of the *Eudemean Ethics*, which may be the later of the two Aristotelian treatises.

Gigon believes that Cicero had access to a copy of Theophrastus' work *On Happiness* (lines 9–10) and that he was able to consult the copy in order to establish what he reports concerning the words in *rotam ... beatam vitam non escendere*. That may well be correct. We cannot, however, rule out the possibility that Cicero possessed a copy of *On Happiness*, but engaged in a hasty search and for that reason failed to find the words in question. Heylbut adopts a even stronger position: he denies that Cicero had ever read the text of *On Happiness*.⁴⁸³ Regarding the reliability of Cicero as reporter of Theophrastean doctrine, see the commentary on Cicero as a source (Chapter II "The Sources" no. 4), the title *On Happiness* (436 no. 12a–b) and text 497.

We should not forget that on occasion Theophrastus plays down the power of misfortune. He tells us, e.g., that the educated man is able to

⁴⁸² See Gercke pp. 375–378, who is criticizing Heylbut (1888) p. 199.

⁴⁸³ Heylbut (1876) p. 38.

disdain without fear the hard accidents of fortune (491.7–8, cf. 490). In my judgment, both Aristotle and Theophrastus were capable of expressing themselves differently in different works (or parts of the same work), and that the Stoic attack on Theophrastus may depend more on other factors than on a fundamental difference in the views of Aristotle and Theophrastus concerning happiness and fortune. First, we should not forget that when the Stoa was founded, Theophrastus was the leader of the Peripatos. He, not Aristotle, was the natural target of Stoic criticism.⁴⁸⁴ Moreover, Theophrastus may have reacted strongly in opposition to the Stoic wise man and as result expressed himself more strongly than his teacher. In addition, Theophrastus appears to have discussed the power of fortune in considerable detail: not only in *On Happiness*, in which he had much to say (*in quo multa disputat*, line 10) but also in *On Good Fortune* (436 no. 14), *Callisthenes or On Grief* (15a–c) and the *Ethics* (2a–b), although the last named could be a composite work that included the first two.⁴⁸⁵ This detailed treatment in combination with especially provocative passages—e.g., his praise of the maxim *Vitam regit fortuna, non sapientia*, “Fortune rules life, not wisdom” (line 19 of 493)—will have encouraged the Stoics to direct their harsh words against Theophrastus.⁴⁸⁶ Finally, we can ask whether the disagreement between Dicaearchus and Theophrastus played a role, for a (harsh) disagreement within a school can negatively affect the reputation of one or both parties. We know that Dicaearchus represented the life of Socrates, including his death, as a paradigm of the life that combines philosophy with all forms of activity within the city-state (fr. 43.10–17 Mirhady). And we can imagine that Dicaearchus challenged Theophrastus, asserting that in Socrates we have a clear example of virtue successfully guiding a life and shielding it from external blows. Theophrastus may have responded by arguing forcefully that the happiness of a wise and virtuous man like Socrates is ruined by calamity, e.g., being condemned to die by drinking hemlock. Such a response is likely to have attracted the attention of the Stoics and been met with harsh criticism. See the commentary to 481.

On the reference to Theophrastus’ style—“he did not dare to speak in a lofty and splendid manner” (lines 3–4)—see the commentary on 492 and 499.

⁴⁸⁴ Dirlmeier (1937) p. 12.

⁴⁸⁵ On the *Ethics*, see Chapter III “Titles of Books” no. 2.

⁴⁸⁶ Dümmler pp. 211–216, Knögel p. 24.

Since our text refers to two different works of Theophrastus regarding two different points—to *On Happiness* regarding the words *in rotam ... beatam vitam non ascendere* and to the *Callisthenes* regarding the maxim *Vitam regit fortuna, non sapientia*—493 may be divided and the first half assigned to *On Happiness* and the second half to the *Callisthenes*.

494A *Antiatticist*, on *kephalotomein* (*Anecdota Graeca* vol. 1 p. 104.31 Bekker)

494B Phrynichus, *A Selection of Attic Phrases and Words*, on *kephalotomein* (no. 317, p. 94.72–74 Fischer)

Literature: Rutherford (1881) p. 427; Gercke (1888) pp. 357–358; Heylbut (1888) p. 199; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1482; Latte (1951) pp. 378–380, 383, 391; Fortenbaugh (1984) p. 222

We have here two brief notices taken from two different lexica. Both lexica date from the second century AD. The *Antiatticist* appears to be the earlier.⁴⁸⁷ Each of the notices concerns the word κεφαλοτομεῖν, “to cut-off-the-head,” and both name Theophrastus. The notice of the *Antiatticist* tells us that Theophrastus used κεφαλοτομεῖν in the work *On Happiness*. In contrast, the notice found in the lexicon of Phrynichus contains no reference to *On Happiness*. Instead, we are told to reject κεφαλοτομεῖν and to use κατατομεῖν, “to behead,” in its place.

We have placed 494A–B after 493, because the idea conveyed by κεφαλοτομεῖν suggests a connection with 493, in which we read that happiness does not ascend onto the wheel: *in rotam ... beatam vitam non ascendere* (493.11–12). The expression is striking, and Heylbut thinks that Theophrastus used κεφαλοτομεῖν in connection with it, i.e., in connection with the Greek equivalent. That, however, runs up against what Cicero tells us. He says that Theophrastus is thought, *putatur*, to use the expression *in rotam etc.* in the work *On Happiness*, but nowhere does he quite do so. Nevertheless what he does say comes to the same thing (493.11–14). It is, of course, possible that Cicero nodded while reading the Theophrastean work,⁴⁸⁸ and that the person or persons who thought that Theophrastus used the expression were correct.⁴⁸⁹ But in the

⁴⁸⁷ On the two lexica in relation to each other, see Chapter II “The Sources” no. 54 and 55 on the Anonymous author of the *Antiatticista* and Phrynichus of Bithynia.

⁴⁸⁸ Heylbut thinks that Cicero never read *On Happiness*. See above the commentary on 493.

⁴⁸⁹ That Cicero can be wrong in what he reports is clear. His reading of Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics* is unquestionably faulty as is his reading of the *Rhetoric*. See Chapter II “The Sources” no. 4 on Cicero.

absence of further textual evidence, we must conclude that Heylbut's suggestion cannot be accepted. Indeed, it is based on a faulty reading of 493.

Gercke suggests that the classic stories that are recorded in Book 5 of the *Tusculan Disputations* go back to Theophrastus, and that the word κεφαλοτομεῖν occurred in connection with the sword of Damocles (5.61–62). The suggestion is interesting, but in the absence of supporting material it remains speculation.

Texts 494A–B illustrate the lexical interest of later centuries in the writings of Theophrastus. Cf. 437.2–4 and 449B.⁴⁹⁰ Whether the word κεφαλοτομεῖν was correctly criticized by the Atticists is questionable. Rutherford comments, “This appears to be a matter of opinion. Euripides uses καρτομεῖν in *Rhes*. 586—Πάρην μολόντε χρεὶ καρτομεῖν—and Theophrastus uses κεφαλοτομεῖν There is not much basis for choice, as either word is a legitimate formation.”

It is tempting to cite the eighth book of Quintilian's *Oratorical Education*, in which the rhetorician reports a story about Theophrastus and an old Attic woman. She noticed the affectedness of a single word and called Theophrastus a foreigner. When asked to explain, she replied that he spoke too much like a person from Attica, *nimium Attice* (8.1.2 = 7B). That might suggest that Theophrastus was a master of Attic diction and that Phrynichus is wrong or overly fussy to fault his use of κεφαλοτομεῖν. But the story is certainly a fiction, and in the version reported by Cicero (7A), it is Theophrastus' pronunciation and not his diction that marks him as a foreigner.⁴⁹¹

Since 494A refers explicitly to the work *On Happiness*, our two texts (B as well as A) can be assigned to that work.

495 Cicero, *On Ends* 5.77 (BT p. 194.5–13 Schiche)

496 Cicero, *On Ends* 5.85–86 (BT p. 198.7–17 Schiche)

Literature: Heylbut (1888) p. 199; Dirlmeier (1937) p. 39; Wehrli (1983) pp. 493, 509; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 222–223; Magnaldi (1991) pp. 77, 80 n. 28; Annas (1993) p. 386 n. 4, 421–423

⁴⁹⁰ Text 449B is taken from Hesychius' *Lexicon*. It dates from the fifth or sixth century AD and therefore is considerably later than the *Antiatticista* and the lexicon of Phrynichus.

⁴⁹¹ See *Commentary* 8 on rhetoric and poetics, p. 273.

The two texts under discussion here come at the beginning and end of a unit within the dialogue *On Ends*. Piso has finished a long exposition of Antiochus' teaching concerning the end or final good: that at which the wise man aims and which constitutes human happiness. Along the way, Piso has recognized three classes of goods: mental (the virtues), bodily (health, strength, etc.) and external (kinsmen, friends, fellow citizens and the like). Each of the three classes is said to contain goods that are desirable for their own sake, but only goods of the first two classes are said to constitute the end. The third class, that of external goods, is not regarded as unimportant, but such goods are not components of the end. For no one would ever be able to achieve the end, if all the external goods were constituent parts (5.67–68). In addition, Piso has argued that virtue is sufficient to guarantee happiness but not supreme happiness. For the latter, bodily goods are also necessary: they fill up or add completeness to the life that is supremely blessed, the *vita beatissima* (5.71–72).⁴⁹² It is against this background that Cicero reacts.

In 495 Cicero tells Piso that he proceeded too quickly when he claimed that all wise men are always happy.⁴⁹³ Unless this claim is made good, the truth may lie with Theophrastus. I.e., it will be true that happiness is incompatible with (mis)fortune, grief and bodily anguish. The word translated with “grief” is *dolor*, and at first reading, one might construe *dolor* (line 3) in terms of bodily pain (see 493.14–15). Cicero would then be introducing Theophrastus in order to challenge Piso's claim that virtue is sufficient for (low grade) happiness: while bodily goods may add completeness, they are of such insignificance that happiness is possible without them (5.71–72). Nevertheless, I think it more natural to take *dolor* in an inclusive sense that covers not only bodily pain but also emotional grief and generally mental discomfort caused by external evils.⁴⁹⁴ For Theophrastus recognized three classes of goods and evils—mental, bodily and external (493.8, 21–22)—and held that all three are important to happiness. Minor misfortunes need not cause

⁴⁹² Regarding verb *comple*re, “make full,” cf. 480B, and see the commentary on that text.

⁴⁹³ The words *semper beatos* (5.77 = 495.2) recall *semper beati* in 5.71.

⁴⁹⁴ The reference to bodily anguish or torture, *cruciatu corporis* (line 4), which follows immediately upon *dolor*, might be thought to tell in favor of taking *dolor* as a reference to bodily pain and only bodily pain. But that is not necessary. Cicero first mentions (mis)fortune, which is likely to include external evils. He then mentions grief perhaps in an inclusive sense, and only third does he mention bodily suffering.

distress, but major misfortunes do cause grief and can ruin happiness, even the happiness of a virtuous man. See the commentary on 492 and 493.

In what follows, Cicero adopts a Stoic perspective and criticizes Piso's, i.e., Antiochus' position regarding happiness. The Stoics are said to be consistent, for they hold that the good alone is what necessarily makes a man happy. And since there is no good other than virtue, and since virtue does not admit of degrees, the virtuous man will always be happy and no man can be happier than another (5.83). In contrast, Piso is said to be inconsistent. He recognizes goods other than virtue, i.e., bodily and external goods, and at the same time holds that virtue is sufficient for happiness, albeit not for supreme happiness (5.84). Piso's position is indeed inconsistent as long as he is willing to follow Aristotle and presumably Theophrastus and to say that happiness lacks nothing: it is complete and self-sufficient (cf. *NE* 1.7 1097b6–21). Since a virtuous man may find himself lacking in bodily goods (Piso has characterized them as components of a happy life) and external goods (which are necessary for exercises of virtue), Piso cannot claim that virtue alone is adequate to guarantee (low grade) happiness, for happiness is complete and does not admit degrees. But Piso does make that claim and therefore is entangled in inconsistency. Cicero wraps up his criticism by appealing to both ordinary people and those who are intelligent. The former will not be persuaded that a virtuous man suffering multiple evils can be happy. The latter may doubt that the virtuous man will be happy inside the bull of Phalaris, but they will not hesitate to call the Stoics consistent and Piso inconsistent (5.85). 496 begins here. In frustration, Piso asks Cicero whether he is pleased with what Theophrastus says in the work *On Happiness*. Cicero's answer is guarded: if these things (the afflictions listed in 5.84) are evils (bodily and external), then he is pleased. And when Piso asks whether he thinks that they are evil, Cicero replies that whichever answer he gives, Piso will be forced to change his position. For "if they are evil, he who is in them will not be happy. (And) if they are not evil, the entire doctrine of the Peripatetics collapses" (lines 8–9). The second half of this response is immediately intelligible. The doctrine of three kinds of good and evil is fundamental to Peripatetic ethics; remove it and Peripatetic ethics collapses. The first half is perhaps more complicated. Since Piso recognizes other goods than virtue and other evils than vice, he has not insulated the virtuous man from misfortune. And since happiness is something complete, he cannot simply dismiss bodily goods as relatively unimportant. He has said that these goods are

parts of happiness, so that if they are absent as result of sickness or injury, happiness *qua* perfection will be absent as well.⁴⁹⁵

Since 496 makes explicit reference to Theophrastus' work *On Happiness* (line 1) and since Cicero refers to no other Theophrastean work in *On Ends*, 495 as well 496 may be assigned to *On Happiness*.

497 Cicero, *Academics* 1.33 and 35 (*BT* p. 14.23–29 and 15.17–22 Plasberg)

Literature: Heylbut (1888) p. 199; Dirlmeier (1937) p. 39; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1482; Fortenbaugh (1984) p. 223; Magnaldi (1991) p. 78; Annas (1993) p. 386 n. 4; Sharples (1996) p. 100; Tsouni (2010) p. 170

Our text comes from the first book of the *Academics*, in which Cicero asks Varro to recount the entire doctrine of the Old Academy. Atticus seconds the request (1.14), after which Varro begins an account that derives from Antiochus.⁴⁹⁶ He emphasizes that the Academy and the Peripatos both trace their origin back to Plato, and that while they are two schools, nevertheless at the outset they both embraced a single system of philosophy (1.17–18). “At the outset,” *primo* (1.18), is important for Varro, following Antiochus, is relating the Old Academy to the Peripatos. The skeptical New Academy is not under consideration. Varro proceeds by adopting a tripartite division of philosophy that he attributes (wrongly⁴⁹⁷) to Plato (1.19). Ethics is given pride of place, physics comes second and logic third.⁴⁹⁸ When Varro concludes his account, he describes it as the “primary system handed down by Plato” (1.33). He then asks whether he should expound the modifications that have reached him (he is referring to what he learned from Antiochus), and when Cicero and Atticus answer in the affirmative, he proceeds to tell us that Aristotle was the first to introduce change by undermining the Platonic Forms. Our text 497 follows. Theophrastus is said to have done even greater violence to the ancient system: he robbed virtue of its beauty and rendered it weak by denying that the happy life is situated in virtue alone (lines 2–5). There

⁴⁹⁵ I agree with Annas (2001) p. 141 n. 48, 146 n. 59, 423 that the argument in this part of *On Ends* presupposes that happiness is something complete or perfect: it lacks nothing. I wonder, however, whether she goes too far when she says that the point is made explicit in 5.69.

⁴⁹⁶ That is clearly indicated by Cicero, who refers to the books of Antiochus and to what he used to hear Antiochus say (1.13).

⁴⁹⁷ See Ps.-Plutarch, *On the Opinions of the Philosophers* 1, Introduction 874D–E.

⁴⁹⁸ On the position of ethics and its fundamental importance, see *Academics* 1.23 *ad fin.* and 1.34, where Varro tells us that Strato abandoned ethics, which is the most essential part of philosophy. See also 475.2–4.

follow brief remarks not printed in 497,⁴⁹⁹ after which Varro, with the approval of Cicero and Atticus, takes up the modifications that Zeno introduced. Ethics is treated first and Zeno is opposed to Theophrastus. Unlike the latter, Zeno is said not to have cut the sinews of virtue. On the contrary, he placed everything that pertains to happiness in virtue alone, and counted nothing good but virtue. (lines 5–9).

The opposition between Zeno and Theophrastus is expressed emphatically (*nullo modo ... sed contra*, lines 5–6) and briefly (not as briefly as at 492.6–7, where Theophrastus is mentioned parenthetically and his position is left unstated, but nevertheless briefly). Since Aristotle is cited only in regard to undermining the Forms (1.33), 497 implies that it was Theophrastus and not Aristotle, who diminished the importance of virtue in regard to leading a happy life. That Antiochus presented such a view and that Cicero accepted it is not to be doubted, but we may still wonder whether it is correct. See the commentary to 493 and 498. For polemic between Theophrastus and Zeno concerning the power of virtue, see the commentary to 492 and 493.

Our text begins with a favorable—though in context, largely irrelevant—judgment concerning Theophrastus’ prose style: it is *suavis*, “pleasant” (line 1).⁵⁰⁰ Next we hear of Theophrastus’ good character. That has a clear purpose. Theophrastus is going to be presented as someone who diminished virtue. We are meant to understand that Theophrastus’ assessment is not motivated by bad character; rather, it is the judgment of a virtuous individual and therefore ought to be taken seriously. The way in which Varro is made to characterize Theophrastus is striking. Instead of simply saying “a virtuous man,” Varro says “so disposed as to exhibit a certain integrity and uprightness” (lines 1–2). Such elevated style is maintained in what follows. We read that Theophrastus “broke the authority of the ancient system even more violently. For he plundered virtue of its beauty and rendered it weak by denying that the happy life is situated in it alone” (lines 3–5). Clearly Cicero enjoyed writing these lines.⁵⁰¹ They

⁴⁹⁹ The remarks concern Strato, various Academics and Zeno (34–35).

⁵⁰⁰ Cicero refers repeatedly to Theophrastus’ prose style. See 5B.1–2, 50.1, 51.3–4, 52A.2–3, 52B.5, 480A.2, 482.4, 492.6 and 493.4, 7. We find *suavis* not only at 497.1 but also at 51.4; *dulcis* occurs at 52A.3 and 52B.5.

⁵⁰¹ Cicero not only enjoyed writing in a style that captures the reader’s attention but also believed that philosophy ought to be written in this manner. See *Tusculan Disputations* 1.7 where Cicero tells us that he intends to combine philosophy with eloquence, for philosophy in its finished form is capable of discussing the greatest problems *copiose ornateque*: with fullness and ornament.

approach the level of purple prose. That makes for good reading, but it may also seduce us into believing that Theophrastus plundered virtue in a way that sets him significantly apart from Aristotle. Perhaps Theophrastus' thoughts concerning virtue were in fact "base and poor" (493.4, cf. 498.11–12), but we should not be led to that position by Cicero's engaging prose.

498 Cicero, *On Ends* 5.12 (BT p. 161.6–27 Schiche)

Literature: Brandis (1860) p. 363; Zeller (1879) p. 857; Dirlmeier (1937) p. 39; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1482; Wehrli (1983) pp. 493, 509; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 137–140, 223; Magnaldi (1991) pp. 77–78, 92; Annas (1993) pp. 387–388, 419; White (1995) p. 236; Wehrli-Wöhrle (2004) p. 547; Tsouni (2010) p. 32

In *On Ends*, text 498 follows immediately upon texts 590 and 482. In 590, Cicero has Piso call attention to several of Aristotle's and Theophrastus' contributions to political theory. After that in 482, Piso is made to tell us that Aristotle and Theophrastus considered the best life to be one of quiet contemplation. Such a life is said to be most worthy of the wise man, because it is most similar to that of the gods. Both Peripatetics are said to have handled the topic in a style that is brilliant and illustrious.

Text 498 begins by drawing a distinction between exoteric writings that were written in a popular style and esoteric writings (Cicero has Piso speak of "commentaries") that exhibited a more refined style (lines 1–3). I have discussed the distinction above, in the introduction to Chapter III on "Ethical Titles." Here I want to focus on what follows. Piso tells us that the difference between two kinds of writings sometimes creates the appearance of inconsistency. Aristotle and Theophrastus seem to be departing from what they said elsewhere, or they may seem to disagree with each other (lines 3–5). In itself, this observation is not exciting. An exoteric writing may overstate some issue to gain effect and in that way create the appearance of inconsistency or disagreement. But when Piso goes on to apply this observation to what Aristotle and Theophrastus say about happiness, our attention is aroused.⁵⁰² For a difference is claimed that may not exist. In particular, Piso tells us that Theophrastus, in his

⁵⁰² Here I pass over the claim that the happy life is the *one* subject that philosophy ought to consider (498.6), for the remark is largely parenthetical and contributes little to the apparent disagreement between Aristotle and Theophrastus that occupies Piso's (Cicero's) attention in what follows. A similar claim will be found in 475.2–3.

work *On Happiness*, attributed considerable importance to fortune. And if this attribution corresponds with what is in fact true, then wisdom would not be able to guarantee a happy life. This view is said to be more delicate than the gravity of virtue demands. Hence, Piso recommends embracing Aristotle and his son Nicomachus, though on other matters Theophrastus may be used (lines 5–17). The problem here is not what is said about Theophrastus. He undoubtedly recognized the importance of fortune, and on occasion he will have emphasized the way in which bad fortune can eliminate any chance of a truly happy life. But Aristotle's considered opinion is no different. He speaks of bodily and external goods, recognizes that they are important for living a happy life and categorically rejects the idea that a good man can be happy while experiencing extreme misfortune (*NE* 1.5 1096a1–2, 1.9 1100a5–9, 7.13 1153b17–21). That Cicero knew the *Nicomachean Ethics* well and still had Piso speak as he does would be a serious lapse. More likely Cicero had only passing knowledge of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. He is following Antiochus⁵⁰³ and has Piso present a disagreement that is more fiction than fact.⁵⁰⁴ Here it might be objected that Cicero must have had more than a passing knowledge of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, for he has Piso describe the work as written with care, *accurate* (line 14). I am not convinced. For Cicero often describes the precision and elevation of works by Aristotle and Theophrastus, and on occasion his description is problematic.⁵⁰⁵ Moreover, *accurate* may be little more than a variation on *limatius* (line 2), which Cicero adds to amplify the importance of Aristotle's alleged treatment of virtue. At risk of being unfair to the man from Arpinum, I suggest that Cicero was all too interested in filling out his own sentences, while giving the impression of wide reading.

Since text 498 makes explicit mention of *De beata vita* (line 9), the Theophrastean material contained in 498 may be assigned without hesitation to *On Happiness*.

⁵⁰³ See the commentary on 497.

⁵⁰⁴ For a view that differs in emphasis, see Dirlmeier (1937) p. 39. He thinks it makes no sense to say that Cicero had no knowledge of Aristotle's writings. For Cicero is emphatic that Aristotle and Theophrastus differed among themselves in regard to the self-sufficiency of virtue (lines 7–9). But *nota bene*: only a few lines earlier, Dirlmeier tells us that knowledge of the relevant passages in the *NE* was hindered by the fact that they are scattered throughout the work. In any case, I am claiming only that Cicero did not know the *NE* well.

⁵⁰⁵ See Chapter II, "The Sources," no. 4 and the commentary on 492 *ad fin.* and on 497 *ad fin.*

499 Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations* 5.85 (BT p. 443.12–22 Pohlenz)

Literature: Dirlmeier (1937) p. 39; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1482; Gigon (1951) p. 575; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 223–225; Annas (1993) p. 386 n. 4

Text 499 comes from Book 5 of the *Tusculan Disputations* in which Cicero investigates whether virtue has the power to ensure happiness. From text 493, we know that Theophrastus was introduced earlier into Book 5 as someone who denied that virtue alone has such power. He held that misfortunes can make life miserable (5.24), and even praised the maxim “Fortune rules life, not wisdom” (5.25). Later on Cicero adopts an Antiochian perspective, lumps together the Old Academy and the Peripatos, and challenges the members of these schools to say that the happy life will descend into the bull of Phalaris: i.e., happiness is compatible with extreme misfortune (5.75). After that, Cicero introduces the doctrine of three goods, denigrates the importance of bodily and external goods, and asserts that the goods of the soul extend their influence far and wide. Finally he asks why he should say that the person who possesses the goods of the soul, i.e., virtue is only happy and not supremely happy (5.76). This final question goes beyond what Antiochus claims for virtue. On his view, it guarantees happiness, but for supreme happiness bodily and external goods are also necessary. Not surprisingly, then, Cicero’s question is picked up by the interlocutor,⁵⁰⁶ who wants to know whether it would be consistent for members of the Old Academy and the Peripatos to take their cue from Cicero and to assert that wise (virtuous) men are always supremely happy (5.82). The answer offered by Cicero is less than satisfactory. He states that the Old Academics and the Peripatetics recognize three kinds of goods: mental, bodily and external (5.85) and then distinguishes between two groups of Peripatetics. That is the beginning of text 499.

Cicero marks off Theophrastus and anyone who follows him from the rest of the Peripatetics. He says that the former faintheartedly respond to pain with dread and fright, and that the latter may do what they almost always do, i.e., exalt the importance of virtue and tread under foot everything except virtue (lines 1–6). The qualifier *fere*, “almost always” or “for the most part” (line 3) is important, for Aristotle and other Peripatetics can hardly be said to have tread underfoot bodily and external evils. To be sure, they recognized the primary importance of virtue,⁵⁰⁷ but they also

⁵⁰⁶ On the interlocutor, *auditor*, see the commentary on 484 *ad init.*

⁵⁰⁷ See, e.g., *NE* 1.10 1100b33.

recognized its limitations. Nevertheless, Cicero wants to portray them as in essential agreement with the Stoics (see 5.83–84), and toward that end he argues that those who say that praise is to be sought with pain are not permitted to deny that those who have acquired virtue are happy.⁵⁰⁸ For although they may find themselves in certain evils, nevertheless the term “happy” extends far and wide (lines 6–9). The first part of this argument is no more than an assertion that seems unfounded. Indeed, if the Peripatetics are correct in holding that there are goods outside the soul (e.g., health and property) and that these goods are, at least in some measure, essential to happiness, then they seem well advised not to assert in an unqualified manner that virtuous men are happy. For when the goods outside the soul are absent or replaced by opposed evils (e.g. sickness and poverty) then the happiness of even virtuous men is likely to be obliterated. In addition, the supporting statement concerning the term “happy” does not do what is needed. For in saying that the term extends far and wide,⁵⁰⁹ Cicero introduces Antiochus’ argument concerning terms whose application depends on “the greater part.” Cicero has already discussed the argument in an earlier passage (5.22),⁵¹⁰ and he does so again in the section that immediately follows text 499. Much as terms like “profitable” and “productive” can be applied even where there are small loses, i.e., where the greater part is profitable and/or productive, so a life can be called happy not only when it is filled to the brim with all manner of goods but also when it is marked by a preponderance of goods (5.86). The trouble here is that the interlocutor wanted to know whether the wise (virtuous) man is always supremely happy (5.82), and Cicero has produced a linguistic argument that supports his being happy but not necessarily supremely happy. In addition Cicero has not succeeded in establishing agreement between the Stoics and the Peripatetics, for the Stoics reject degrees of happiness.

In fairness to Antiochus, we should take note of the fact that the linguistic argument presented in 5.86 refers to goods. We read that a

⁵⁰⁸ Here as in the text-translation volumes, *laudem* (line 7) has been translated with “praise.” That is probably correct, but if it is, then *illam* (fem. sing., line 8) finds its reference by jumping over *laudem* (fem. sing., line 7) and going back to *virtutis* (fem. sing., line 4). But if *laus* is used as a variant for *virtus* (as it seems to be in *Brutus* 28 and *Orator* 79 = 684.3 [see *Commentary* vol. 8 on rhetoric and poetics, p. 267]), then *illam* has a closer reference and one that makes (equally?) good sense: those who say that virtue is to be sought with pain are not permitted to deny that persons who have acquired virtue are happy.

⁵⁰⁹ The phrase “far and wide” (line 9) occurs earlier at 5.76 (cited above).

⁵¹⁰ See the commentary to 493 *ad init.*

life can be called happy not only when it is filled up with all manner of goods but also when it is marked by a preponderance of goods. The term “good,” does admit degrees—good, better, best; *bonus*, *melior*, *optimus*; ἀγαθός, ἀμείνων, ἄριστος—and as such it is properly compared to terms like “profitable” and “productive,” *quaestuosus* and *fructuosus*. When one thinks of happiness as a good, there is no reason not to speak of one life being better/happier than another. In addition, there is no reason not to speak of one life being the best of several different lives, i.e., the happiest among them. The superlative *beatissima* can be construed simply as “very happy” without implying perfection. But that said, we must recognize that Antiochus, as reported by Cicero, describes the *beatissima vita* as a life that is filled with all manner of good things (*undique referta bonis* 5.86).⁵¹¹ He seems to think of the *beatissima vita* as a limit and perfection. And if that is the case, then the linguistic rules change. For “perfect” is a polar or apical term like “straight.”⁵¹² Both terms rule out degrees. Hence if Antiochus thinks of happiness as a perfection, he should avoid saying that the virtuous person, even in the absence of bodily and external goods, leads a happy life. Such a person may fall only a little short of happiness, but strictly speaking, he is not happy. See the commentary on 492.

In 499 Theophrastus and his followers are labeled fainthearted and marked off from the rest of the Peripatetics (lines 1–3). That may suggest a small band of Theophrasteans opposed to mainstream Peripatetics. But is that correct? I have already said enough about Aristotle in previous comments. He may have differed from Theophrastus only in emphasis. Much the same may be said concerning Demetrius of Phaleron. He emphasized the role of fortune in history (fr. 82A SOD), called fortune blind (fr. 1) and cited Euripides in order to emphasize the instability of happiness (fr. 83). To be sure, Demetrius recognized that virtue is not easily affected for the worse (fr. 1), but equally he agreed with Euripides that only a short period of time is needed to turn a person’s life upside down (fr. 83). Similarly Aristo of Ceus cited Euripides regarding the sharp twists of fortune (fr. 21b SFOD) and cautioned that fortune can make one seek refuge among persons previously scorned (fr. 21g). Even Critolaus, who through the image of the scale assigns great weight to virtue, nevertheless did not claim that virtue alone is sufficient for supreme happiness

⁵¹¹ Cf. the use of *complevere* in *On Ends* 5.71, where Piso is presenting the doctrine of Antiochus. See also 480B.6 with the commentary to that text *ad fin.*

⁵¹² See above, the commentary on 492 with n. 467.

(fr. 21 W). And his students drew criticism for making bodily and external goods constituent parts of the end or final good (Stobaeus, *Anthology* 2.7.3b p. 46 Wachsmuth = fr. 19 Wehrli). Given what we read in the fragments of these Peripatetics and given what Aristotle says in his ethical treatises, it is hard to see Theophrastus as leading a small band of fainthearted rebels who greatly diminished the power of virtue. In fact, he seems to have been part of the mainstream, albeit outspoken and the target of Stoic barbs.

The Peripatetics who exalt the importance of virtue are said to be eloquent, *eloquentes*, and to extol virtue *copiose* (line 5). In the text-translation volumes, we have translated *copiose* with “at length.” That is a safe translation in that it emphasizes quantity, which is fundamental to the notion of *copia*: abundance and fullness. But if *copiose* is taken closely with *eloquentes* and construed as a reference to style, then it might be better to translate with a phrase like “rich in style.”⁵¹³ Be that as it may, text 499 does not associate eloquence and abundance with Theophrastus, who is said to respond to pain with dread and fright. That appears to be in line with 493.1–4, where we read that Theophrastus did not dare to speak *elate et ample*, “in a lofty and splendid (fulsome) manner,” since his thoughts were base and poor. I.e. Theophrastus did not speak elegantly when he acknowledged the power of beatings, bereavements and the like to make life miserable. In contrast to other Peripatetics who trumpeted the power of virtue, Theophrastus diminished the power of virtue in words that lacked elevation. That may be, but we should not forget 492.6–7, where Theophrastus is reported to have said much *diserte copioseque*. In context, Theophrastus is opposed to Zeno, who held that virtue alone guarantees happiness. The idea is that Theophrastus not only rejected that view but also said much on the subject. What causes pause is the combination *diserte copioseque*. Should we take the two adverbs as references to the style in which Theophrastus expressed himself? I.e., when he denied that virtue alone guarantees happiness, did he do so in an eloquent and copious manner? But if he did, that would seem to contradict what we read in 493. Or should we say that the adverbs are not focused on eloquence? Are they concerned with content and therefore might be translated “clearly and fully?” But then *copiose*, “fully” or “at

⁵¹³ See Lewis and Short, s.v. *copiosus* I.B and s.v. *copiose* 2. Gigon translates *copiose* (line 5) “reichlich,” and King in the Loeb edition combines *copiose* with *eloquentes* and translates “a fine flow of eloquence.”

length,” is redundant after *multa*?⁵¹⁴ I leave the matter undecided and add only that Cicero frequently throws in brief references to style, and on occasion may do so in a way that is inaccurate and/or inconsistent.

Gigon suggests that the assertion *laudem cum dolore petendam esse*, “praise is to be sought with pain” (line 7) comes from Theophrastus’ work *On Ambition* (436 no. 21). To support this suggestion, Gigon cites Cicero’s *Letter to Atticus* 2.3.3, where Cicero asks Atticus to bring him the copy of *On Ambition* that was available in the library of his brother Quintus. The letter dates from 60 BC, which is some fifteen years before the composition of the *Tusculan Disputations*. Maybe Cicero kept the book or remembered what he had read in it, but the gap in time seems to diminish whatever support the letter may lend to Gigon’s suggestion. More important, however, is the context in the *Tusculan Disputations*, for the assertion in question is most naturally referred to those Peripatetics who are marked off from Theophrastus and his followers, i.e., those who are said to exalt the dignity of virtue and to extol it to heaven (lines 4–5).

Text 499 may be assigned to *On Happiness* or *Callisthenes* (436 no. 12 and 15), but as all too often certainty is elusive.

500 Cicero, *On Laws* 1.37–38 (CB p. 21.3–23 de Plinval)

Literature: Brandis (1860) p. 348; Zeller (1879) p. 856; Philippon (1939) col. 1121; Kenter (1972) pp. 142–153; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 225–226; Barnes (1989) p. 88

This text comes from Book 1 of Cicero’s work *On Laws*. The work is a dialogue in which Cicero presents himself in discussion with his brother Quintus and his friend Atticus. Cicero’s work *On the State* is finished, and *On Laws* is conceived of as a sequel to that work (1.15, 20).⁵¹⁵ The focus will not be on the peculiarities of Roman civil law. Rather, it will be on universal justice and law (1.17). Cicero locates the origin of law in nature and argues at length that man is so constituted that he possesses reason. And if he is not corrupted, he will possess right reason and therefore the gift of law, which is right reason in the sphere of command and prohibition (1.18–35). Cicero allows that he is following the teaching

⁵¹⁴ Concerning *diserte*, see the commentary on 492.

⁵¹⁵ The dialogue *On Laws* was begun while *On the State* was being composed, i.e., between 54 and 51 BC. Work was broken off in 51, when Cicero assumed a provincial governorship. It appears that Cicero was again at work on the dialogue in 46, and that he never brought it to completion.

of the philosophic schools, in which matters like law and justice are discussed systematically. That prompts Atticus to say that in accepting the authority of others, Cicero has lost his independence in debate (1.36). Cicero's reply (*re vera*, the first half of his reply) is text 500.

Cicero begins by saying that the present discussion aims at strengthening states, their customs and populations, and for this reason, he wants to avoid laying down principles that have not been diligently investigated. He allows that not everyone will accept the principles that he sets forth, and says that he looks for the approval of those "who have concluded that all things right and honorable are to be sought after for their own sake, and that either nothing at all is to be numbered among good things except what is praiseworthy for its very self, or certainly nothing is to be considered a great good, unless it can truly be praised on its own" (lines 5–9). The second half of the quotation reflects a difference between the Stoics and the Academic-Peripatetics. Whereas the former held that only virtue is to be counted as a good, the latter recognized three kinds of goods but rated virtue superior to the other two kinds: namely, bodily and external goods. The notion of a great good, *magnum bonum* (line 8), as opposed to lesser goods suggests a connection with Antiochus (he is named later in 1.54). He distinguished between supreme happiness and (low-level) happiness and explained the distinction by reference to different kinds of goods. For (low-level) happiness virtue, a great good, suffices: the life of the virtuous man is marked by a preponderance of goods, i.e., virtuous actions, even though minor goods may be missing. See *Tusculan Disputations* 5.86 and the commentary on 499.

Also suggestive of Antiochus is the list of philosophers that follows.⁵¹⁶ Cicero wants the approval of Academics like Speusippus, Xenocrates and Polemo, Peripatetics like Aristotle and Theophrastus, orthodox Stoics like Zeno and unorthodox Stoics like Aristo (lines 9–16). The approval of the Epicureans and members of the Sceptical Academy will not be sought (1.39, which follows immediately on 500). Apparently Cicero is interested in those philosophers, whose approval will lend a measure of dignity and credence to his argument. Certain differences between the schools are mentioned, but with the exception of Aristo (lines 13–16),⁵¹⁷ the differences are either trivial or left undeveloped. I am thinking of the claim that the Peripatetics differ from the Academics in their manner of

⁵¹⁶ See G. De Plinval, *Cicéron, Traité des Lois*, 2nd ed. (Paris: Les Belles Lettres 1968) p. 21 n. 1.

⁵¹⁷ Regarding Aristo, cf. 1.55.

teaching, and the assertion that Zeno has made changes in vocabulary and not in substance (lines 11–13).⁵¹⁸ Moreover, there is no suggestion that Theophrastus departed from Aristotle in his treatment of the three kinds of goods. That may arouse interest, for in other texts Cicero marks a distinction between the two Peripatetics. Theophrastus is said to have departed from Aristotle by diminishing the power of virtue to withstand misfortune and therefore to guarantee a happy life (497–499). In contrast, text 500 makes no reference to the power or weakness of virtue and therefore says nothing that contradicts what we read in John of Lydia: namely, that according to Aristotle and Theophrastus, “if virtue exists, fortune does not exist” (490.2). But that text is highly problematic. At the very least it exaggerates the power that the two Peripatetics attribute to virtue. Be that as it may, in 500 Cicero is not attempting a carefully formulated statement of Peripatetic doctrine concerning virtue and fortune and therefore ignores alleged differences that he might have mentioned in a different context. Indeed, what we read about the two Peripatetics runs less than two lines and picks out their method of instruction for comment.

- 501 Plutarch, *Against the Stoics on Common Conceptions* 23 1069E–F (LCL vol. 13.2 p. 736.17–19, 738.1–8 and 740.1–3 Cherniss)

Literature: Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 226–228; Dillon (2003) pp. 139–140; Tsouni (2010) p. 48

This text, 501, occurs in Plutarch’s dialogue *Against the Stoics on Common Conceptions*. The speaker is Diadumenus, an Academic philosopher, who is Plutarch’s spokesman in the dialogue. Prior to our text, Diadumenus has criticized the Stoics for holding both that things in conformity with nature are useless and indifferent (22 1069C) and that without these things life is not worth living (1069D–E). At the beginning of our text Diadumenus imagines a Stoic (sc. Chrysippus⁵¹⁹), who understands the criticism and replies by putting a question: “Where, then, am I to start? And what starting point of appropriate action and material of virtue am I to take, having given up nature and what accords with nature?” (lines 1–2). Diadumenus responds with his own questions. He asks where the Peripatetics Aristotle and Theophrastus and the Academics Xenocrates

⁵¹⁸ The latter point concerning Zeno needs to be explained. At 1.54–55, it is explicitly connected with Antiochus. See Barnes pp. 87–89 and the commentary to 492.

⁵¹⁹ See the note of H. Cherniss in the Loeb edition (1976) p. 737.

and Polemon take their start, and whether Zeno has followed these philosophers in assuming that nature and what accords with nature are the elements of happiness. An affirmative answer to the second question is implied (lines 2–6). Diadumenus then turns his attention back to the Peripatetic and Academic pairs and asserts that they were contented to view nature and what accords with nature as choiceworthy, good and beneficial. They held that virtue works in and with nature and what accords with nature, and together these are the elements that constitute a perfect and whole life (lines 6–10).

While the Peripatetics recognize goods that are outside the soul, the Stoics maintain that such things, even if they are according to nature, should not be classified as goods. They are preferred indifferents, which the wise man will select, when doing so in no way compromises his virtue. This difference between the two schools is touched upon in 500 and further developed in 501. Striking, not to say puzzling, is the polemical statement that Zeno has followed Aristotle and Theophrastus as well as Xenocrates and Polemon in assuming that nature and what accords with nature are elements, στοιχεῖα, of happiness (lines 4–6).⁵²⁰ If στοιχεῖα here are understood to be μέρη, parts or components, then Diadumenus, who represents Plutarch, has erred. For among the Peripatetics, it is not Aristotle and Theophrastus, but Critolaus and his students, who regarded things that are in accordance with nature, i.e., goods outside the soul as constituent parts of happiness. In this regard, the next sentence of 501 is noteworthy, for the words ἐκ τούτων ... συμπληροῦν (lines 8–9) recall a passage in Stobaeus' *Anthology*, where we read that the younger Peripatetics who take their start from Critolaus, maintain that the end or goal, the τέλος, is filled up, συμπεπληρωμένον, with goods of all three classes (2.7.3b p. 46.10–12 Wachsmuth = fr. 19 Wehrli).⁵²¹

Another passage in Stobaeus' *Anthology* preserves three Peripatetic definitions of happiness that predate Critolaus. They are: 1) χοῆσις ἀρετῆς τελείας ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ προηγουμένη, 2) ζωῆς τελείας ἐν ἐννοργείᾳ κατ' ἀρετήν and 3) χοῆσις ἀρετῆς ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν ἀνεμπόδιστος (2.7.18 p. 130.18–21 W). Apart from the absence of a single word, the second

⁵²⁰ That τούτοις refers to both pairs of philosophers is not to be doubted. The use of the singular τὸ κατὰ φύσιν instead of the normal plural τὰ κατὰ φύσιν seems to have no special significance. See A. Long, "Carneades and the Stoic Telos," *Phronesis* 12 (1967) p. 65. Concerning the Stoic doctrine of τὰ κατὰ φύσιν, see, e.g., Long pp. 59–90, I. Kidd, "The Relation of Stoic Intermediates to the Summum Bonum," *Classical Quarterly* NS 5 (1955) pp. 181–194 and Sharples (1996) pp. 100–103.

⁵²¹ The passage has already been referred to in the commentary to 499.

definition is identical with that found in the *Eudemian Ethics* ζωῆς τελείας ἐνέργεια κατ' ἀρετὴν τελείαν (2.1 1219a38–39). The first and third definitions are attributed to Theophrastus by Dirlmeier. That is a guess, but not without grounds.⁵²² The third definition is of special interest for two reasons. First, the final word ἀνεμπόδιστος invites comparison with two Aristotelian definitions, *NE* 7.13 1153b9–12 and *Pol.* 4.11 1295a36–37, both of which contain the word ἀνεμπόδιστος. Second and for our purposes the more important reason, the mention of things in accordance with nature, things that are κατὰ φύσιν, invites comparison not only with 501 but also with two other texts that contain important evidence of an early Peripatetic interest in nature as a standard for evaluating what is right and wrong in human character and action. One of these texts is 449A.16, where we are told that the man who lacks appetite does not desire things that accord with nature. In contrast, the temperate man, who desires the right things at the right time, is in accordance with nature. The second text is 507.2–5, in which we read that each living thing seeks its own good, which is what is in accordance with nature; all living things strive for the condition that is in accordance with nature. On the basis of these two texts together with other texts that are either Theophrastean or seem to reflect a Theophrastean point of view, e.g., the third definition of happiness given in the passage from Stobaeus and certain Ciceronian passages (e.g., *On Ends* 5.88 *bonum apello quidquid secundam naturam est*, “I call good whatever is in accordance with nature”), we can, I think, assert that Theophrastus assigned a normative function to nature. And in doing so, he was neither setting himself up in opposition to Aristotle, nor was he anticipating the Stoics by advancing a doctrine of οἰκείωσις (as against οἰκειότης 531). But he did contribute to an ethical doctrine in which what accords with nature is a standard for moral judgment.

8. Fate, Nature and the Death of Callisthenes

Most of us think that we are free to act as we choose. To be sure, there are times when we are prevented from doing something that we would otherwise choose to do. We might be quite sick, or we may have been careless and lost the keys to the car, or we may have been captured by criminals, tied up and hidden from anyone who might rescue us.

⁵²² See the discussion of Dirlmeier (1937) pp. 14–19; also Moraux (1973) pp. 355–356.

But these are exceptions. For most of us, sickness is not a common experience, nor is carelessness of the kind described. And being captured by criminals is something we never expect to endure. Hence, we do not doubt our ability to make real choices. I.e., we believe that on the whole we do what we do voluntarily, and we accept praise when our actions are virtuous and censure when they are vicious. Nevertheless, we also recognize that natural endowment and upbringing play a role in how we act. We may be by birth more intelligent than other people, and as a result we may make better choices. And our innate temperament may be better suited to thoughtful action. Or the reverse may be the case. In addition, parents and teachers affect us for better or worse. Legislators do not ignore their role, and in rare cases we blame them for corrupting a child. But that said, most of us believe that natural endowment and early training do not excuse our adult behavior. Responsibility for virtuous and vicious behavior is still ours.

What I have just described is not news, and would not have been news to the members of the early Peripatos. I cite Book 3 of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, in which Aristotle discusses voluntary and involuntary behavior. The latter is explained in terms of external constraint and ignorance;⁵²³ the former is marked by the absence of these features (3.1). Choice is said to be voluntary, concerned with what is possible and closely related to virtue (3.2). After remarks on deliberation and wish (3.3–4), Aristotle discusses individual responsibility in relation to virtue and virtuous action. He argues that if we have the power to act nobly, and if such action constitutes our being good, then we have it in our power to be good persons. (3.5 1113b11–14). Corroboration is found in the practice of private individuals and lawgivers who honor those who act nobly and punish those who do evil (1113b21–26). Aristotle recognizes that vicious acts may be due to an established character, but he considers that no excuse, for only a total fool can be ignorant of the fact that repeated acts result in a fixed character. Initially a vicious individual had the power to become a different sort of person, but through his own behavior he has become a vicious person voluntarily (1114a9–13). Aristotle goes on to consider the possibility that a man's idea of the end (the good at which he ought to aim) is innate. To make correct moral judgments and to choose virtuous actions it is necessary to be well endowed by nature, εὐφρῆς (1114b8, cf. b12). And if that is the case, the vicious man is no

⁵²³ For completeness' sake, I add that an action done in ignorance is not counted as involuntary unless it is followed by regret (3.1 1110b19–20).

more responsible for his condition, than a person who is born blind or in some other way maimed at birth. Aristotle's response is abrupt. He tells us that vice is voluntary, because a man's idea of the end is not simply determined by nature, but is in some way in his power. Or the end is given by nature, but a man's moral character is voluntary in that he does what he does to achieve the end voluntarily (1114a31–b25). That is hardly a satisfactory response. But Aristotle is committed to the common sense idea that people are at least co-responsible for their characters (συνάιτιοι 1114b23) and do act voluntarily. He breaks off discussion and turns his attention to the individual moral virtues.

Theophrastus shared this common sense idea with Aristotle (502). But he was also keenly interested in innate character, and in the *Callisthenes* he focused on the way in which temperament can combine with circumstances to bring about a fateful result (503–506).

502 pseudo-Plutarch, *On the Life and Poetry of Homer* 2.120 (BT vol. 7 p. 396.6–12 Bernardakis)

Literature: Ziegler (1964) col. 238; Sharples (1980) p. 90 n. 4; Fortenbaugh (1984) p. 228, Keaney and Lamberton (1996) pp. 22, 188–191

Text 502 is found within an essay in which the author (definitely not Plutarch of Chaeronea⁵²⁴) presents Homer as the original source of theoretical and practical knowledge. After a brief introduction (2.1–6)⁵²⁵ and a lengthy discussion of style (2.7–73), the author turns to “discourse as practiced among men.” Three fields are picked out for consideration: historical, theoretical and political discourse. In each case, the author intends to show that the beginnings or origins (ἀρχαί) are to be found in Homer (2.74, cf. 2.92). Within theoretical discourse three sub-divisions are recognized: physics, ethics and dialectic. The discussion of physics begins with issues of matter and the several forces that create motion and change in the heavens and on earth (2.93–111). The gods are taken up next. Homer is said to have not only believed in the existence of gods but also understood that Zeus can only be grasped by thought and is himself intelligence or mind (νοῦς 2.114). That leads on to providence and fate (πρόνοια καὶ εἰμαρμένη), which are explicitly referred to the gods and their intentions (2.115). Homer is said to have recognized divine prov-

⁵²⁴ See Chapter II “The Sources” no. 14 on ps.-Plutarch.

⁵²⁵ *On the Life and Poetry of Homer* falls into two distinct parts by different authors. The introduction referred to here is the introduction to the second part.

idence in that he portrays the gods as interacting with men and working alongside them. Zeus' fondness for mankind (φιλανθρωπία 2.116) is mentioned as is the gods' desire that men live justly (2.118). In regard to fate, the author cites Homer's words, "No man, whether good or bad, has escaped his fate"⁵²⁶ and then adds by way of qualification, "Nevertheless he (Homer) also believes—just as the most famous philosophers after him, Plato and Aristotle and Theophrastus, (do) too—that not everything occurs according to fate, but something also depends upon men" (2.120). That is the beginning of text 502 (lines 1–3).

In what follows we read: "For their voluntary (contribution) does exist, but in a way the necessary attaches to it, when someone, having done what he wants, falls into what he does not want" (lines 3–5). There is a minor textual issue here. In the text-translation volumes, following Bernardakis, we have printed the genitive plural ὧν (line 3) and translated with "their." In the most recent edition, that of Keaney-Lamberton (1996),⁵²⁷ ὧν has been replaced by the dative singular ᾧ, which is translated with "who." I.e., "men, who have freedom of will." The translation is not literal, for the dative singular must refer back to τι, "something" (line 3), but the sense conveyed is quite correct. Moreover, it matters little whether we read ὧν or ᾧ. On the one reading (FHS&G), we are being told that "their (men's) voluntary (contribution) does exist," and on the other (K–L), we are told that "the voluntary attaches to what (depends upon men)." The former puts the emphasis on the agent or agents, while the latter focuses on what is voluntary, i.e., a particular choice or action.

In the lines that follow text 502 (i.e., in the remainder of 2.120, which is not printed in the text-translation volumes), the author adds two illustrative examples: one from the *Iliad* and the other from the *Odyssey*. Both involve the gods and both are intended to illustrate someone doing what he wants to do and then falling into what he does not want (line 5). The example from the *Iliad* concerns Achilles, whose anger is said to have caused destruction among the Greeks. Achilles believes (rightly) that he has been insulted by Agamemnon. He withdraws from battle, and wanting revenge on Agamemnon, he appeals to his mother Thetis to persuade Zeus to so inspire the Trojans that they will inflict heavy casualties on the Achaeans. Zeus is persuaded, but he also decides that Achilles' beloved friend Patroclus will enter the fighting and meet his

⁵²⁶ *Iliad* 6.488–489.

⁵²⁷ Kindstrand (1990) anticipates Keaney and Lamberton in reading ᾧ.

death. That is a consequence, which Achilles did not foresee and did not want.⁵²⁸ The example from the *Odyssey* is different in that involves a warning. The seer Teiresias and the sorceress Circe tell Odysseus that his companions will not return to Ithaca, if they harm the cattle of the sun-god Helios. In turn Odysseus makes his companions swear that they will stay away from the cattle. Nevertheless, the companions violate their oath. They kill and eat the cattle and as a result are drowned at sea by Zeus, who is responding to a request by Helios. The fate of the companions is unwanted, but it could have been avoided. As Homer states clearly at the very beginning of Book 1, they were killed by their own recklessness.⁵²⁹

In the context of *On the Life and Poetry of Homer*, the examples from the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* are intended to establish that the most respected philosophers, οἱ δοκιμώτατοι τῶν φιλοσόφων (lines 1–2), took their start from Homer. The examples hardly achieve their goal, but they may be said to illustrate the fact (or claim) that not everything occurs according to fate, but something also depends upon men (ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις); that the voluntary (τὸ ἐκούσιον) exists in human affairs (lines 3–4). Achilles withdrew himself from battle and requested that the Trojans be reinvigorated. Odysseus' companions made their own decision to kill and eat the cattle of Helios. Moreover, there is nothing to be faulted in citing Plato, Aristotle and Theophrastus as eminent philosophers who recognized that men can and often do act in a voluntary manner. In regard to Plato, we may cite *Laws* 9, where the Athenian Stranger is made to introduce the voluntary, in order to distinguish between acts of injustice and mere harm. He first says that all legislators distinguish between voluntary and involuntary injustices (861B3–5) and then draws an important distinction between voluntary acts of injustice and doing harm. The latter is said to be involuntarily and to call for compensation, not punishment (861E6–862C4). In regard to Aristotle, I refer to the introduction to this section,⁵³⁰ where I have summarized Aristotle's remarks in the *Nicomachean Ethics* 3.1–5. Here I want only to call attention to similar remarks in the *Eudemian Ethics* 2.6–11. There, too, Aristotle is clear that it is often within the agent's power to act or not to act: ἐφ' αὐτῷ/ἑαυτῷ (2.6 1233a7, 2.9 1225b8; cf. *NE* 3.1 1110a17 ἐπ' αὐτῷ and ps.-Plut. line 3 ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις), and that when an agent acts in ignorance for which he is not responsible, then his act is involuntary. He may be ignorant of

⁵²⁸ *Iliad* 1.1–7, 352–354, 407–412, 509–510, 523, 15.59–77.

⁵²⁹ *Odyssey* 1.6–10, 11.110–113, 12.127–141, 271–419.

⁵³⁰ Above, pp. 459–460.

the person acted upon or the instrument or the result/aim: ἢ ὄν ἢ ὅ ἢ οὗ ἔνεκα (1225b2). The list invites lengthy discussion, but I limit myself to a single issue: namely, use of the phrase οὗ ἔνεκα, which is replaced by ὅ a few lines later (b6). Rackham translates with “result.”⁵³¹ He seems to be thinking of, e.g., the daughters of Pelias (1225b4), who on the advice of Medea cut up their father and boiled the pieces, thinking that this would restore his youth. The result, however, was an unwanted surprise. The trouble here is that an unwanted and unanticipated result may lie far in the future and be seemingly irrelevant to deciding whether an act was voluntary or involuntary. What is relevant is the result at which the agent aims and which belongs to a full description of what an agent is doing. Hence, Solomon translates οὗ ἔνεκα with “aim,”⁵³² and Aristotle sees no difficulty in substituting ὅ for οὗ ἔνεκα. In the case of the daughters of Pelias, their intention or goal, οὗ ἔνεκα, was to restore the youth of their father, but what actually came to pass, ὅ, was something very different. Assuming the daughters were not careless or overly gullible (Medea had a reputation for working the remarkable),⁵³³ their action was involuntary. In contrast, the companions of Odysseus aimed at and succeeded in killing and eating the cattle of Helios. And in doing so, they did what they wanted to do and then later fell into what they did not want (line 5). Whether Theophrastus picked up on this point and developed it in his work *On the Voluntary* (436 no. 6) will never be known, but I would like to think that this is one of those cases where Theophrastus developed an idea concerning which his teacher might have said more (cf. 72A.7–10).

If one must assign 502 to a particular work, *On the Voluntary* comes to mind, but some discussion of the voluntary and its relationship to what occurs according to fate, κατ’ εἰμαρμένην (lines 2–3), would not be out of place in the *Callisthenes* (436 no. 15, cf. 504.8–9).

503 Stobaeus, *Anthology* 1.6.17c (vol. 1 p. 89.2–5 Wachsmuth)

504 Alexander of Aphrodisias, *Supplement to the Book On the Soul* (*Suppl. Arist.* vol. 2.1 p. 185.11–17, 186.13–14 and 28–31 Bruns)

Literature: Brandis (1860) p. 345; Zeller (1879) pp. 828, 854; Knögel (1933) p. 24; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1484; Gigon (1951) p. 508; Baldry

⁵³¹ Rackham in the Loeb edition p. 285.

⁵³² Solomon’s translation of the *Eudemian Ethics* is printed in the Oxford translation, Bollingen Series vol. 71.2; see p. 1941.

⁵³³ On carelessness, see *EE* 2.9 1225b11–16, and cf. *NE* 3.5 1114a1–3.

(1965) p. 142; Donini (1974) pp. 160–161; Sharples (1975) pp. 267–271; (1980) pp. 79–83, (1983) pp. 21–26, 112–115; (2001) pp. 526–533; Fortenbaugh (1979) pp. 372–375; (1984) pp. 228–234; Runia (1996) p. 376; Mansfeld (2001) pp. 17–18 n. 2, p. 56 n. 96

We have here two closely related texts, 503 and 504, that are not easy to interpret and are best discussed together. Both concern fate, εἰμαρμένη, and the nature, φύσις, of an individual.

Text 503 is taken from Stobaeus' *Anthology* 1.6, where it appears under the heading Περί τύχης ἢ ταῦτομάτου, "On Fortune or Chance." As often, Stobaeus has cast a wide net. He begins with Menander and includes not a few selections from comedy, tragedy and lyric poetry. At the end come prose authors: Aristotle, Plato and Theophrastus. The selection that concerns Theophrastus is not a fragment in the strict sense but a report. We are first told that Theophrastus added to the causes another labeled κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν, "by choice." The verb προσδιαρθροῖ, "distinguishes besides" (line 1), implies a context that is not reported. One way to recover (or create) a context is to relate 503 = *Anth.* 1.6.17c to the second of two lemmata concerning Aristotle that precede 503 in *Anth.* 1.6.17a. There reference is made to Aristotle's notion of the accidental: what happens κατὰ συμβεβηκός (p. 87.21–22). In addition, four causes are listed: intelligence, nature, necessity and fortune: νοῦς, φύσις, ἀνάγκη and τύχη, and fate is said to be a cause that attaches to what is necessary (p. 87.23–88.6). According to David Runia, not only the additional Aristotelian material—i.e., the four causes and the statement concerning fate—but also the report concerning Theophrastus derive from the physical doxography of Arius Didymus. "It (sc. the report concerning Theophrastus) appears to continue the theme of causes discussed in the previous Aristotelian passage, i.e., Theophrastus is reported to add to the causes related to εἰμαρμένη that of προαίρεσις missing in Aristotle."⁵³⁴ That may be correct, but there are grounds for hesitation. First, it is difficult to believe that a knowledgeable doxographer like Arius—and one who also concerned himself with ethical doxography—thought that Aristotle failed to recognize προαίρεσις, choice, as a cause, so that Theophrastus had to add it. Second, the mention of νοῦς in the Aristotelian list of causes (p. 88.1) seems to cover προαίρεσις, for προαίρεσις is deliberate choice and deliberation falls under νοῦς. It is, of course, possible that Theophrastus added choice not as a cause coordinate with νοῦς but

⁵³⁴ Runia p. 376.

as a subdivision or particular manifestation of νοῦς, but that is something of a stretch, if we think of 503 as a continuation of the Aristotelian passage that precedes. (I return to this point below in discussing *NE* 3.3 1112a31–33.) Third, we can imagine a context that is different from the four causes listed under Aristotle's name. For example, we can imagine Theophrastus contrasting fortune with craft or art, τύχη with τέχνη,⁵³⁵ and then introducing choice, προαίρεσις,⁵³⁶ for like craft it involves reasoning, but unlike craft it also involves (its correctness depends upon good) moral character. Fourth, Runia tells us that a lemma referring to Theophrastus would be unique among the physical fragments of Arius Didymus that have come down to us.⁵³⁷ That prompts me to ask whether we might be dealing with a fragment from Arius' ethical doxography. A considerable portion of that doxography survives in the Book 2 of Stobaeus' *Anthology*, and in that portion we have an explicit reference to Theophrastus (449A.1).⁵³⁸ Since, Stobaeus has placed a selection from Plato's *Laws* immediately before 503, it seems to me possible that 503 comes from Arius' ethical doxography. But if scholars who know the fragments of Arius well deny the possibility, I am content to say that the first sentence of 503 is at best puzzling, and that what we can assert with confidence concerning that sentence is limited: namely, that Theophrastus recognized choice as a cause.

Immediately after the sentence concerning choice, we read φέρεται δέ πως εἰς τὸ εἰμαρμένῃν εἶναι τὴν ἐκάστου φύσιν (line 2). In the text-translation volumes, we have translated “and he (sc. Theophrastus) inclines in a way to the view that the nature of each individual is fate.”⁵³⁹ Runia has objected to this translation, suggesting that the verb φέρεται should be translated “it contributes.”⁵⁴⁰ If that is correct, then we are being told that the cause “by choice” contributes in a way to the view that the

⁵³⁵ For τύχη distinguished from τέχνη, see Plato, *Laws* 4 709A1–D3 = Stob. *Anth.* 1.6.17b, and for τύχη distinct from τέχνη and φύσις, see *Laws* 10 888E4–6.

⁵³⁶ For τέχνη and προαίρεσις together and προαίρεσις coming second, see Alexander, *On Fate* 5 p. 168.12 and *Supplement* 25 p. 181.28–182.4.

⁵³⁷ Runia p. 376.

⁵³⁸ The verb προσδιαρθροῦν, which is rare (see LSJ s.v.) and occurs at 503.1, is found in Arius' ethical doxography (*Anth.* 2.7.6a p. 76.1 W). Arius may have used the verb in his physical as well as his ethical doxography, but equally he may have used it more than once in his work on ethics.

⁵³⁹ For φέρεσθαι used of holding a view or opinion, see LSJ s.v. B.II.3. Bob Sharples reports that David Sedley compared Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Logicians* 2 (*Math.* 8).274 *ad fin.*

⁵⁴⁰ Runia p. 376 n. 38.

nature of each individual is fate. If I understand correctly, that would be an awkward or compressed way of saying that once fate is agreed to be different from necessity in that it admits of exceptions, then connecting fate with the nature of an individual finds support in the fact that the nature of an individual can be overridden by choice (i.e., by nature a man is prone to a certain mode of behavior, but occasionally he may choose to act differently).⁵⁴¹ I have no quarrel with the idea that considering choice is important for developing a notion of fate. Indeed, choice itself needs to be eliminated as a contender.⁵⁴² But that said, I am unwilling to accept Runia's suggestion, for comparison with 504.8–9 speaks strongly for understanding Theophrastus as the subject of φέρεται. He is the subject of the preceding sentence (line 1) and continues to be the subject (line 2).

Here it might be objected that what is said in the second sentence of 503 differs from what is said in 504.8–9, so that the latter passage cannot be used to elucidate the former. The objection is not foolish, for in 503 we find the words τὴν ἐκάστου φύσιν, while in 504 we read κατὰ φύσιν. Nevertheless, the objection loses its punch, once it is observed that in 504 κατὰ φύσιν is used repeatedly in what immediately precedes. Alexander has cited *Physics* 5.6 230a31–32, in which the phrase occurs, and in the comment that follows, he uses the phrase four times in six lines (p. 186.23–28). He is arguing that what is in accord with fate is the same as what is in accord with nature: ταῦτόν ... τῷ κατὰ φύσιν τὸ καθ' εἰμαρμένην (185.25–26), and having completed the argument he refers to Theophrastus for additional support. In doing so, he uses the identical words, albeit with a reversal in word order: ταῦτόν ... τὸ καθ' εἰμαρμένην τῷ κατὰ φύσιν. What is new is the reference to the work *Callisthenes*, and that suggests a connection with the φύσις of an individual like Socrates and Callias, who are mentioned earlier (185.14 = 504.3–4). Most likely the Theophrastean work will have focused on Callisthenes as an individual and made clear that his fate was determined in part at least by his φύσις. And in developing that theme, Theophrastus is likely to have expressed himself in general terms and in more than one way. He is likely to have said that “the nature of each individual is fate” (503.2) and that “what is in accordance with fate is the same as what is in accordance with nature” (504.8–9).

⁵⁴¹ See Alexander, *Supplement* 25 p. 185.6–8, 21–23.

⁵⁴² *Ibid.* 25 p. 185.6–11.

A further worry is the gender of ἐκάστου, “each.” It may be masculine or neuter. The former is, I think, strongly supported by 504.3–4, where Socrates and Callias are named, and by 504.9, where the title *Callisthenes* occurs. But that said, I want to acknowledge that a neuter is possible. Theophrastus may have been thinking inclusively. I.e., he may have had in mind any number of things that most often come to be in a certain order, but nevertheless can be prevented from doing so. For example a body of a certain constitution is apt to be affected by disease that ends in death, but that pattern can be broken through medical intervention.⁵⁴³ Finally, one might ask whether εἰμαρμένην is the subject of the verb εἶναι. On the basis of grammar (with the copulative εἶναι, the definite article typically marks the subject⁵⁴⁴), a negative answer is called for.⁵⁴⁵

What follows in 503 (lines 2–3) is not at all clear. If the relative pronoun ἧ refers to φύσιν and if the corrections proposed by Canter and Heeren are accepted and the verb εἶναι is understood, then the text says that choice, nature, fortune and necessity, προαίρεσις, φύσις, τύχη and ἀνάγκη, are located in nature. But that cannot be correct, for now nature is said to find its place in nature. It is of little help to reject φύσεως as a supplement in line 3, for a fourth cause is called for (τεττάρων αἰτιῶν, line 3), and φύσεως is strongly suggested by φύσιν in the preceding line. Moreover, its omission can be explained by homoeoteleuton: a scribe’s eye jumped from εως on the end of προαιρέσεως to εως on the end of φύσεως with the result that φύσεως was passed over and dropped out of the text that has come down to us.

In private correspondence, Bob Sharples has suggested to me that the list of four causes—including the supplement φύσεως—is an unfortunate gloss. If I understand correctly, he accepts Runia’s thesis that 503 = 1.6.17c is taken from Arius Didymus, where it followed an earlier report in which a list of four causes is attributed to Aristotle: νοῦς, φύσις, ἀνάγκη and τύχη (1.6.17a = p. 88.1). At the beginning of 503, we are told that Theophrastus added προαίρεσις to the list (Aristotle’s list), but that jars with what we read at the end of 503. For there we find a new list in which προαίρεσις replaces νοῦς instead of being added to Aristotle’s four causes, as we might expect if 503 follows closely upon and develops what is said in the passage concerning Aristotle. The argument is clear

⁵⁴³ *Ibid.* 25 p. 185.17–20.

⁵⁴⁴ See, e.g., W. Goodwin, *A Greek Grammar* (Bungay: Clay 1894) no. 956 p. 208.

⁵⁴⁵ In 504.1 τὴν εἰμαρμένην is clearly the subject of εἶναι, but I am not tempted to follow 504 and to supply τὴν before εἰμαρμένην in line 2 of 503.

and may well be correct, but the fact that 503 presents a list different from that attributed to Aristotle may be seen in a different light. It may be seen as an additional reason for questioning Runia's thesis concerning the close relationship between the two Stobaeus texts. Be that as it may, my own inclination is to say that the final sentence of 503 is seriously corrupt. More than a few words or even sentences have been lost after the relative pronoun, so that it is imprudent to build anything on this part of 503.

Despite these difficulties, it is clear that the list of causes in 503.3 is no creation *ex nihilo*. We can point to Plato's *Laws* 10.4 888E–889A and to various Aristotelian texts including Stobaeus 1.6.17a.⁵⁴⁶ Here I want to call attention to *Nicomachean Ethics* 3.3, in which Aristotle discusses deliberation in conjunction with choice and says the following: αἰτίαι γὰρ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι φύσις καὶ ἀνάγκη καὶ τύχη, ἔτι δὲ νοῦς καὶ πᾶν τὸ δι' ἀνθρώπου, "For nature and necessity and fortune are thought to be causes, and also intellect and everything that depends on man" (3.3 1112a31–33). A relationship to 503.3 is obvious, and the phrase "everything that depends on man" may help us understand the first sentence of 503. "Everything," πᾶν, refers not to a cause but to a range of actions that are initiated by human intelligence, νοῦς. In particular, exercises of craft take their start from and are guided by intelligence.⁵⁴⁷ The same holds for actions that are peculiarly moral: e.g., acts of generosity and courage. Such acts are intelligent in that they involve choice, προαίρεσις. A person chooses to support another financially or to withstand danger, and he does so because such acts are instances of what is good and noble. Hence, when we read in 503 that Theophrastus added choice to the causes, we should not understand that he was adding a coordinate cause to the four causes that are attributed to Aristotle earlier in Stobaeus (p. 88.1). Rather we should understand that Theophrastus is adding a cause that is subordinate to intelligence. More precisely, he is calling attention to one of several ways in which intelligence manifests itself in the behavior of human beings. That may be what 503 is telling us, but if it is, then we should keep two things in mind. First, if Theophrastus had his eye on *Nicomachean Ethics* 3.3 (or a similar passage), then he need not have stopped with choice. A full (πᾶν, "everything") list of the different manifestations of intelligence should

⁵⁴⁶ For further references, see Gauthier and Jolif vol. 2 p. 199.

⁵⁴⁷ Taking a cue from *NE* 3.3, we may think of performing medical procedures, acquiring wealth, steering a boat and physical training (1112b4–5).

include exercises of craft, which are not incompatible with moral choice but are often carried out skillfully without any need to consider what is good and noble.⁵⁴⁸ Perhaps Theophrastus spelled that out, but 503 gives no indication that he did. Second and more important, nature, φύσις, in 503 is not to be confused with nature in the *Nicomachean* passage. For there φύσις covers *inter alia* regularly occurring phenomena like the summer and winter solstice and the rising of the sun (1112a25–26). Men do not deliberate about such phenomena, because these objects are not subject to human control (1112a30, cf. *Rhetoric* 1.10 1368b33–37). 503 is different. Here φύσις covers the character of an individual, φύσις ἐκάστου, i.e., traits of character for which a man himself may or may not be responsible and about which a man ought to deliberate in order to prevent unwanted consequences. For Theophrastus, his friend and fellow student Callisthenes was a painful example. This will become clear as we consider text 504.

504 is taken from Alexander of Aphrodisias' *Supplement to the Book on the Soul* and in particular from a section entitled Περὶ εἰμασμένης, "On Fate." Alexander begins by putting two questions—What is fate? and In which of the things that are is it located? (p. 179.25–26, cf. 181.2–3)—and by addressing the second question first. He establishes that fate is not to be located in things that are eternal and always the same. Rather, it is to be found in things that are subject to coming-to-be and passing away (p. 181.27). He then points out that some things that come to be do so in accordance with skill, others in accordance with choice and still others in accordance with nature. He rules out skill and choice and is left with those things for which nature is the cause (182.4–5). And of these, Alexander adds, fate is found especially in living creatures (182.8–9). In what follows, necessity is distinguished from fate, as are fortune and chance. Finally Alexander concludes (by process of elimination) that "fate is nothing other than the peculiar nature of each thing." That is the beginning of 504 (lines 1–2). Alexander immediately explains that nature here is not a matter of what is universal and common, e.g., being a living creature or a man. Instead we are to understand the nature of

⁵⁴⁸ It might be suggested that a full list should mention scientific investigation and philosophic contemplation. Indeed, such activities are exercises of intelligence and belong in a full list of such exercises. But in *NE* 3.3 such intellectual activities (mathematics is an example) are dissociated from practical deliberations (1112b21–23), i.e. deliberations that lead to a result or change brought about by human agency (δι' ἡμῶν 1112a30, δι' ἀνθρώπου 1112a33).

individuals, like Socrates and Callias, in whom a particular nature is the beginning and cause of an ordered pattern of behavior. From this nature on the whole come the lives and the ruin of lives of individuals (lines 2–7). Alexander goes on to report that Aristotle mentions fate, and Theophrastus, in his *Callisthenes*, shows that what is in accordance with fate is the same as what is in accordance with nature (lines 7–10). The first and longest part of 504 (lines 1–7) relates to Theophrastus' understanding of fate, but it is Alexander speaking. The reference to an "ordered pattern" (τάξις, line 5) picks up a theme that Alexander has mentioned more than once in what precedes (p. 181.26, 185.2). Similarly, the qualifier "on the whole" (ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ πᾶν, line 5) reflects Alexander's recognition that fate can be defeated: it can be guarded against, impeded, averted and broken (p. 182.29, 183.11, 184.11, 185.6–7).

As already argued, Alexander's report concerning Theophrastus (504.8–9) relates to what we read in Stobaeus (503.2). In both passages, we are told that Theophrastus saw a close relationship between an individual's nature and his fate.⁵⁴⁹ And from Alexander we learn that this relationship was clearly stated in the *Callisthenes* (504.9). Apparently Theophrastus explained that a man's nature is an important factor in determining what a man does and how his life develops. What we need to ask is how we should understand the nature, φύσις, of an individual person. If we think of passages like *Nicomachean Ethics* 2.1 1103a17–19, 2.5 1106a9–12, 7.5 1148b28–31, in which φύσις is distinguished from ἔξις and ἔθος, then we may understand φύσις as an innate trait of character. Since Callisthenes' fate can be explained in terms of a physiological condition, lethargy (see below), we may suspect that Theophrastus used φύσις to refer to innate traits. Nevertheless, it is also possible that Theophrastus used φύσις in a wide sense that covered not only innate traits of character but also acquired characteristics like moral virtues and vices. See *NE* 7.14 1154a32–34.⁵⁵⁰ We know that Theophrastus had both a botanical (*Plant Explanations* 4.11.5–7) and an ethical interest (465.14–19 and 709.9–10) in habits that over time become second nature. And we

⁵⁴⁹ As stated above, I see in 504.8 strong support for translating φέρεται in 503.1 as we have done in the text-translation volumes: "he (sc. Theophrastus) inclines to the view that."

⁵⁵⁰ Albrecht Dihle, *Studien zur griechischen Biographie* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1956) p. 85 and "Zur antiken Biographie" in *La biographie antique*, ed. E. Ehlers (Geneva: Foundation Hardt 1998) p. 134 n. 31 errs, when he argues that Aristotle never uses φύσις to refer to an acquired disposition. See Fortenbaugh (2007a) pp. 58–60.

can easily imagine him using the term εἰμαρμένη in order to emphasize the way in which both innate and acquired dispositions determine how a man lives and dies.

Here it might be objected that construing φύσις, “nature,” widely, so that it includes acquired dispositions like virtue and vice, is ruled out by Alexander. For he marks off προαίρεσις, choice, from nature; and choice is a defining mark of virtue not only for Aristotle (*NE* 2.6 1106b36) but also for Theophrastus (449A.5). Moreover, text 503 distinguishes between choice and nature. To be sure, the context is uncertain and φύσεως in line 3 is a supplement, but given what we have, the text seems to speak for a narrow understanding of nature that excludes acquired virtues and vices. The objection is well taken, but two counter-considerations should be mentioned. First, Alexander himself does not neatly distinguish nature from acquired dispositions. In a portion of text falling within but not printed as part of 504 (i.e., in the portion omitted in line 7), Alexander illustrates nature as fate by citing persons who exhibit different character traits (p. 185.26–33). There are four: the person who is quick-to-fight, another who is intemperate, still another who has an enduring nature and finally one who is marked by meanness. The last of the four, the mean individual (ἀνελεύθερος), is most naturally understood in terms of an acquired vice. Through his upbringing and interaction with peers, he has learned to overvalue money and property in general. The importance of procuring material goods has become a principle that guides his life, so that he acts unjustly, neglects his own well-being and ultimately is the cause of his own death. Similarly the intemperate individual (ἀκόλαστος) may be thought to have an acquired vice. Through bad training and peer pressure, he has come to believe that he should always pursue the present pleasure⁵⁵¹ and therefore chooses to do what is pleasurable whenever he can. In contrast, the man who is quick-to-fight (ἀψίμχος) may be driven by an innate nature. His disposition has little to do with what he has learned from his parents and in school. Rather, it is attributable to a fiery temperament or an inherited vivacity. In much the same way, the person who has an enduring nature (καρτερικός) may have a disposition that is largely (but perhaps not exclusively) physiological. If this analysis is correct, then we have in Alexander’s remarks on nature *qua* fate a neat illustration of φύσις used inclusively. But having said that, I want to state clearly—and this

⁵⁵¹ Cf. *NE* 7.3 1146b22–23.

is the second consideration—that the doctrine of Theophrastus cannot be reconstructed with any certainty from a passage in which Alexander is speaking for himself and without special reference to Theophrastus.⁵⁵² That reference comes a full page later and then some.

My own guess is that Theophrastus, like Aristotle, recognized that the word φύσις can be used both exclusively and inclusively, and that he used it in both ways, allowing context to make clear how it is being used. In the *Callisthenes*, he will have used it in both ways, but he will have put the emphasis on φύσις *qua* innate disposition. And he may have taken note of the way φύσις and τύχη can work together to bring about a result that is unwelcome. For an example of φύσις and τύχη working together, I turn to Theophrastus' pupil Menander (18 no. 12), whose comedy the *Woman Who Was Shorn* (the *Perikeiromene*) features a professional soldier named Polemon. He is presented as a σφοδρός (128 OCT = 8 Teubner), an intense, impetuous individual, whose temperament predisposes him to respond straightway and strongly to provocative situations. When this temperament is aroused by a chance combination of events—his unannounced return from war and an apparent intimate embrace between his common-law wife Glykera and her brother Moschion—Polemon responds by cutting off the hair of Glykera. Here nature and chance combine to produce a regrettable result. (See Fortenbaugh (1974) pp. 430–443, and for φύσις p. 434 n. 7 = reprint p. 228 n. 7.) Whether nature and fortune worked together in the case of Callisthenes is problematic. One is tempted to say that his execution was unfortunate in that he found himself in the company of a hot-tempered individual, Alexander the Great, whose character was negatively affected over time by repeated success. (See 505.) Only misfortune in the sense of bad luck that could not be foreseen would presuppose that the change in Alexander and the events that followed were quite unexpected. I.e., a reasonable person could not be expected to foresee them. That this condition was fulfilled would be difficult to demonstrate, and I doubt that Theophrastus tried to do so in the work that carries the title *Callisthenes*. It is more likely that Theophrastus took note of two quite different temperaments. We learn from Plutarch that Alexander's bodily condition made him a choleric individual (*Table Talk* 1.6 623E, *Life of Alexander* 4.3–4), and from Diogenes Laertius that Aristotle attributed to Callisthenes

⁵⁵² The occurrence of Stoic vocabulary at 185.30 (ἀδιάφορον) need not mean that what is being said about nature and fate is incompatible with Theophrastean doctrine, but it is an indication that Alexander is not focused on Theophrastus.

a lethargic nature (*Lives* 5.39).⁵⁵³ Theophrastus could easily have argued that the innate dispositions of these two individuals determined an awful outcome.⁵⁵⁴ A different possibility is that Theophrastus described Callisthenes as a man whose habit was to talk often and openly (cf. Diogenes Laertius 5.5). Such a habit could have a physiological basis: namely, an excess of black bile, which in the pseudo-Aristotelian *Problems* is said to be a cause of loquacity (30.1). In the presence of a choleric king, such a nature might well be fateful. Indeed, Plutarch tells us that Callisthenes earned the enmity of Alexander in part because he refused to drink from the king's great cup, saying that he did not wish to be in need of Asclepius' cup (*Table Talk* 1.6 623F–624A). Alexander would not thereby be exonerated. Even if he was by birth a choleric individual, he should have taken steps to control his temperament.⁵⁵⁵ But that said, the character of Callisthenes was also an important contributing factor, so that Theophrastus could refer to his nature as fate. For it played a determining role in regard to his death by execution.

Since text 504 makes explicit reference to the *Callisthenes*, 504 may be assigned to that work with confidence. Given the close relationship that exists between 504 and 503 (both associate nature with fate), it seems reasonable to assign 503 to the *Callisthenes*. In saying that, I do want to ignore the possibility that 503 derives from a physical doxography of Arius Didymus and that the text goes back to a physical writing of Theophrastus. A discussion of nature and fate would be appropriate in both an ethical and a physical treatise. Nevertheless, economy speaks for assigning both texts to a single source: namely, the *Callisthenes*.⁵⁵⁶

505 Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations* 3.21 (BT p. 327.18–25 Pohlenz)

Literature: Hirzel (1895) p. 317 n. 2; Stroux (1933) pp. 230–234; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1484; Gigon (1951) p. 508, (1958) p. 189; Wehrli (1983) p. 494; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 234–236; Lucarini (2002) pp. 68–69

Text 505 is taken from the third book of the *Tusculan Disputations*. Each of the books represents a separate discussion that is said to have

⁵⁵³ Being νοῦθος τὴν φύσιν, Callisthenes was said to need a spur (5.39).

⁵⁵⁴ On intense and lethargic temperament, see Plato, *Statesman* 307B5–311A12. And for fuller discussion, see Fortenbaugh (1975d) pp. 283–305.

⁵⁵⁵ Cf. Alex., *Suppl.* p. 185.19–21, 32–36.

⁵⁵⁶ A further possibility is that the original source of both texts is the *Callisthenes* and that at a later date either Arius or his source decided to mention Theophrastus' identification of nature with fate in a physical doxography.

taken place at Cicero's Tusculan villa. An auditor or interlocutor puts forward an opinion that is subsequently criticized by Cicero.⁵⁵⁷ In the third book, the auditor says that the wise man seems susceptible to *aegritudo*, "distress" (3.7).⁵⁵⁸ This is a challenge to the Stoic doctrine that the wise man is free of all *perturbatio*, "disturbance" or irrational emotion. Cicero responds from a Stoic point of view. He argues that the wise man, being brave and temperate, is free of distress (3.14–18). Moreover, if the wise man were capable of feeling distress, he would also be capable of feeling anger, pity and envy. But he is immune to these emotions and therefore is free of distress (3.19–21).

Text 505 concerns pity and envy. Cicero has already argued that if the wise man is susceptible to (capable of) distress, then he is susceptible to pity and envy (3.20). Now he tells us that pity and envy are experienced by the same person, for the person who is pained by the misfortune of another is also pained by another's prosperity (lines 1–2).⁵⁵⁹ After that reference is made to Theophrastus' negative reaction to the death of Callisthenes and the success of Alexander. Theophrastus is said to have deplored (*deplorans*, line 3) the death of his companion Callisthenes and to have been troubled (*angitur*, line 4) by the success of Alexander. The latter reaction is not to be identified with envy (*φθόνος*) as conceived of by Aristotle: i.e., it is not an unjustified emotional response tied to bad character (*NE* 1107a9–11, 1108b2; *EE* 1221a3, 1234a30; *Rhet.* 1386b33–1387a3), for in the context of the execution of Callisthenes, Theophrastus' reaction to the success of Alexander seems to be justified and more one of indignation than of envy. Only if envy is conceived of in an inclusive manner can Theophrastus' reaction be described as envy. Apparently such a conception of envy is in play in 505, for envy is defined simply as distress at the success of the other person: *invidentia aegritudo est ex alterius rebus secundis* (3.21). It is possible that Theophrastus recognized

⁵⁵⁷ See the commentary on 484 *ad init.*

⁵⁵⁸ White (1995) p. 226 n. 14 objects to the traditional translation "distress." He refers to 3.27, where *aegritudo* is described as *carnificina* and says that in current usage "distress" understates the gravity of the topic. He prefers a translation like "suffering." Given my own sense of current usage, I am content to stay with "distress" but do not want to quarrel over what is a minor issue.

⁵⁵⁹ The argument presupposes that pity and envy are variant forms or sub-divisions of distress, *aegritudo* = λύπη (3.21 [lines that immediately follow upon 505 but are not printed as part of that text] and 4.16). Distress is one of the four major divisions of disturbance, *perturbatio* = πάθη (4.11).

such a conception of envy,⁵⁶⁰ but that he actually did so cannot be established on the basis of 505. For here Cicero is concerned with a Stoic argument and with a conception of envy that can be regarded as Stoic. Cf. 4.17, where we read *invidentiam esse dicunt (sc. Stoici) aegritudinem susceptam propter alterius res secundas, quae nihil noceant invidenti*, “They (the Stoics) say that envy is distress that is felt on account of another person’s successes, which do no harm to the envious person.” In 505, Theophrastus’ reaction to Alexander’s success is mentioned only as an example intended to support the claim that pity and envy are experienced by the same person. We are not told how Theophrastus himself conceived of envy.⁵⁶¹

⁵⁶⁰ For a positive notion of envy, see Hesiod, *Works and Days* 11–26, where the poet recognizes a good kind of strife (“ΕΡΙΣ, the older daughter of Night) that arouses an advantageous form of ζῆλος and φθόνος (23, 26). See also Polybius, *Histories* 6.7.5 and 6.9.1, where the word φθόνος refers to an emotion that is justified and a motivating force in the rotation of constitutions.

⁵⁶¹ Lucarini pp. 68–69 cites 505 together with 493 as part of an argument concerning Cicero’s *Hortensius* fr. inc. s. II Grilli: *qui cum publicas iniurias lente tulisset suam non tulit*, “who having born public (civic) losses calmly did not bear his own (in similar fashion).” According to Lucarini, the fragment is from Hortensius’ speech, which exhibits an Epicurean patina. We know that Epicurus had an aversion to Theophrastus and that the Epicurean Philodemus criticized Theophrastus for not participating in public life (27). In addition, we know that Theophrastus did not bear the loss of Callisthenes in a manly fashion (505) and that provoked a hostile reaction among all philosophers (493). Put these observations together, and we may want to say that *qui* in fr. inc. s. II refers to Theophrastus. Cicero has drawn on Epicurean hostility to Theophrastus as well as on a negative view of Theophrastus according to which he exhibited a lack of manliness when confronted with personal loss. The argument is clear, and Lucarini is careful to characterize it as only a hypothesis. Here I offer four comments. 1) To support the assertion that Hortensius’ speech has an Epicurean patina, Lucarini cites Grilli. In doing so, Lucarini is referring to what Grilli says in the commentary to his edition of the *Hortensius* (Milano: Istituto Editoriale Cisalpino 1962) pp. 82–89. That is not quite correct. Grilli p. 89 tells us that Cicero has given Hortensius’ speech a generic patina, to which he has adapted Epicurean material. That may not matter, for Grilli does make specific reference to elements that he considers Epicurean, and that may suffice for Lucarini’s argument. 2) There is an oddity in attributing a speech with Epicurean elements (arguments) to Hortensius who was both unphilosophical and spoke in a manner that Cicero called Asianist (*Brutus* 325). Again, that may not matter, for what I take to be an oddity is attributable to Cicero, who is not always concerned with historical accuracy. 3) The move from Epicurus’ dislike of Theophrastus to Philodemus’ characterization of Theophrastus as someone who spent his whole life in private is something of a leap (two centuries), but on reflection the leap is important (a virtuous leap), for with Philodemus, we have an Epicurean who was not only critical of Theophrastus but also a contemporary of Cicero. 4) When we are told that Theophrastus bore the fate of Callisthenes in an unmanly manner and that this provoked criticism among all the philosophic schools, two different texts have been combined. In 493.17–19, what is said to have called forth universal condemnation among all philosophers is Theophrastus’ praise of the maxim:

As in the case of Pericles (463), so in that of Alexander we have an illustration of how fortune (τύχη) can affect a person's character. Only in the former case, the fortune in question is bad luck (sickness combined with the expectation of death), while in the latter, it is supreme good fortune and success (lines 2 and 5). Aristotle was fully aware that for men who lack virtue goods like noble birth, political power and wealth can be harmful. In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, he tells us that in the absence of virtue, such goods make men haughty and arrogant, and prone to do whatever they please (4.3 1124a26–b2). And in the *Rhetoric*, he says that good fortune makes men supercilious and reckless (2.17 1391a33–b1). This conception of good fortune is adopted by Theophrastus and applied to the case of Alexander.⁵⁶² It explains the behavior of the Macedonian and at the same time provides a reason why Aristotle, who served as the tutor of Alexander, should not be held responsible for his subsequent moral collapse. In this connection, I refer to a letter of Cicero to Atticus, in which we read that Aristotle's pupil excelled in natural ability and restraint, but after he began to be addressed as king, he became haughty, cruel and immoderate (13.28.3).⁵⁶³ Aristotle may have instructed his pupil in matters of temperance, but in the course of time the power of fortune had a corrupting effect that was irresistible.

What has just been said should not be taken to imply that external goods like wealth and political power always have a corrupting effect. I.e., it is not the case that moral virtue never withstands the temptations of extreme good fortune. Theophrastus will have made the point not only in his ethical writings but also in political works. In the latter (possibly in *On Kingship* 589 no. 10–11), he described Philip, the father of Alexander, as someone who combined good fortune with virtuous character (606). It is conceivable and perhaps likely that Theophrastus, in one of his writings,

"Fortune rules life, not wisdom." In 505.2–6, we are told not only that Theophrastus deplored the death of Callisthenes but also that he was distressed by the success of Alexander, who was ignorant of how one ought to handle prosperity: *ignarum quem ad modum rebus secundis uti convenirent*. Here Alexander is described as ignorant, but there is no suggestion that another person might not know how to manage prosperity. Indeed, the larger context is concerned with Stoic doctrine, so that the reader understands that another man, i.e. the Stoic wise man, would not have acted like Alexander. Whether there is any difficulty in beginning from an Epicurean patina and ending with a passage that is Stoic in orientation may be decided by others. I leave the issue open.

⁵⁶² Stroux p. 233.

⁵⁶³ Stroux p. 230 and Regenbogen col. 1484 suggest that what Cicero says about Alexander's change of character may go back to Theophrastus.

opposed the character of Philip to that of Alexander. See Cicero, *On Duties* 1.90, where however Theophrastus is not named.

Since text 505 mentions not only pain felt on account of another person's misfortune but also the death of Callisthenes, the text may be assigned to *Callisthenes* or *On Grief* (436 no. 15a–c).

506 *Light of the Soul B, Anthology*, chapter 8, On Eagerness

Literature: Sharples (1984) p. 189; Millett (2007) pp. 71, 146 n. 206

Text 506 is taken from a medieval anthology entitled *Light of the Soul*, whose entries are quite unreliable.⁵⁶⁴ I have already discussed one passage from *Light of the Soul*, in which a patently Stoic view is attributed to Theophrastus: namely, that no passion, i.e., an irrational emotion can enter into the soul of the wise man, for passion is opposed to judgment and wisdom.⁵⁶⁵ Text 506 is, I think, similar. It reports a Stoic doctrine concerning the passions. In particular, it focuses on *alacritas*, “eagerness” (line 1), as a manifestation of *laetitia*, “delight.” To support this interpretation, I refer to Cicero's *Tusculan Disputations*, in which *laetitia* is listed as one of the four sub-divisions of *perturbatio*, “(emotional) disturbance” (4.11), and *inanis alacritas*, “empty eagerness,” is glossed as *laetitia gestiens*, “exuberant delight” (4.36, cf. 37). The Stoic wise man, we are told, will never be “transported with eagerness,” *effferetur alacritate*; rather, his virtue keeps him free from such an evil (4.35).

To avoid confusion, I note that while *alacritas* and the cognate adjective *alacer* may be used as *termini technici* to refer to an emotional disturbance that is hostile to good judgment, they may also be used quite positively to refer to a commendable form of enthusiasm.⁵⁶⁶ For example, earlier in the *Tusculan Disputations*, the adjective describes the cheerful spirit with which the Roman legions took up a position from which they did not expect to return: *alacres in eum locum profectas, unde redituras se non arbitrantur* (1.101). And in *On the Republic*, the younger Scipio is encouraged to be more eager, *alacrior*, to defend the state (6.13). Moreover, *alacritas* may characterize dolphins as they move through the sea:

⁵⁶⁴ See Chapter II “The Sources” no. 49.

⁵⁶⁵ See above, Section 2 “Emotions” on 448.

⁵⁶⁶ The same may be said of *laetitia* and *laetus*. See TD 4.67, where the playwright Naevius is cited.

inciti atque alacres rostris perfremunt delphini (*On the Nature of the Gods* 2.89).⁵⁶⁷ In this usage, *alacritas* might be considered a stylistic trait that need not be attached to emotion.

506 has been placed at the end of the section on “Fate, Nature and the Death of Callisthenes,” because the mention of “an unfortunate outcome in the future” (line 2) encourages one to think of Theophrastus’ fellow pupil Callisthenes, whose nature or character (whether innate or acquired) seems to have contributed to his fateful ending (504.8–9). Only Callisthenes seems not to have been a person given to excessive eagerness (506 line 1). Rather, he is said to have been lethargic, νωθρὸς τὴν φύσιν (Diogenes Laertius 5.39), which may have left him indecisive or simply slow to act, when he needed to remove himself quickly from the presence of Alexander the Great. A more apt example may be the man who is quick-to-fight, the ἀψίμαχος. According to Alexander of Aphrodisias, his nature generally determines how he lives and dies. He most often meets a violent death, which is said to be his fate and nature (*Supplement to the Book On the Soul* p. 185.24–28 Bruns). See the commentary on 503–504.

Given what has been said in the preceding paragraph, it is, I think, possible that the attribution to Theophrastus in 506 is not a mistake. The anthologist may be reporting a tradition that has its roots in Theophrastus’ *Callisthenes* (436 no. 15) or some other work, in which Theophrastus recognized that excessive eagerness (enthusiasm, impetuosity⁵⁶⁸) all too often results in an unfortunate outcome. Nevertheless, I am inclined to take 506 together with 448. Both texts are fundamentally Stoic and mistakenly attributed to Theophrastus.

9. Wealth

The very words “wealth” and “wealthy” can excite strong emotions. Some persons respond positively. They desire to be wealthy and admire the person who enjoys wealth, especially if his wealth is the product of his own hard work. Others respond negatively. They reject wealth and do not admire wealthy individuals. They are apt to view them as misguided persons who are socially irresponsible and perhaps criminal in their pursuit

⁵⁶⁷ Cicero is quoting from the *Medea* of Accius.

⁵⁶⁸ On impetuosity, σφοδρότης, and the damage it can cause, see the commentary on 503–504.

of wealth. These attitudes may be extreme, but most of us recognize that poverty is an impediment to living a good life and that a certain amount of substance, money and property, is necessary not only for living a pleasant life but also for addressing the needs of neighbor and state in a way that makes a difference for the better.

The ancients were no exception. They knew that poverty could be crushing and that wealth promised an easier life. A person like Smindyrides was renowned for his wealth and luxurious style of life, but Diogenes the Cynic was proud to reject such a life.⁵⁶⁹ Not surprisingly political parties, democrats and oligarchs, differed in their attitudes to wealth, and the philosophic schools including the Peripatos discussed the topic in various works of varying length. Aristotle, the founder of the Peripatos, wrote a dialogue *On Wealth*,⁵⁷⁰ in the *Rhetoric* he devoted a chapter to character and wealth,⁵⁷¹ and in both the *Nicomachean* and the *Eudemian Ethics* he discussed the proper and improper use of wealth. He distinguished between two virtues: ἐλευθερία, generosity, and μεγαλοπρεπεία, magnificence. Both are explained as mean dispositions in relation to material goods, χρήματα, i.e., all things whose value is measured in terms of money (*NE* 4.1 1119a22–27, 4.2 1122a19). The generous man, we are told, spends and gives his substance because it is noble to do so, τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα (4.1 1120a24), but he is not careless or wasteful. He makes gifts in accordance with his own substance or property and spends his money on what he ought, κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν δαπανῶν καὶ εἰς ἃ δεῖ (1120b24, cf. b7–9). I.e., he gives to the right persons the right amount and on the right occasion, οἷς δεῖ καὶ ὅσα καὶ ὅτε (1120a25–26). Moreover, he does so with pleasure or without pain, ἡδέως ἢ ἀλύπως, for what is in accordance with virtue is pleasant or painless and least of all painful, ἡδὺν ἢ ἄλυπον, ἥκιστα δὲ λύπηρόν (1120a26–27).⁵⁷² And if he happens

⁵⁶⁹ On Smindyrides and Diogenes, see 550 and 511.

⁵⁷⁰ Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.22.

⁵⁷¹ *Rhetoric* 2.16 1390b32–1391a19.

⁵⁷² Ostwald translates ἥκιστα δὲ λύπηρόν with “and certainly not painful.” Following Ross, I have translated “and least of all painful.” For Aristotle does not hold that virtue renders a person immune to pain. To be sure, a courageous person feels far less pain when confronted with danger, but when confronted by overwhelming danger, he may experience fear, which is a painful emotion. Similarly a generous person normally is pleased with appropriate expenditures, but Aristotle recognizes that on occasions he may experience pain. See *EE* 3.4 1231b29–32, where Aristotle marks off the generous individual from persons who are stingy or extravagant: only the generous person feels both pain and pleasure as he ought.

to err by spending his money in a way that is other than proper and noble, then he will feel pain in moderation as befits moral virtue, λυπήσεται, μετρίως δὲ καὶ ὥς δεῖ (1121a2). In several important ways the magnificent man is no different. He makes gifts because it is noble (4.2 1122b6–7), takes account of his own circumstances (1122a25) and is pleased with what he does (1122b7). He differs, however, in that he exhibits his character only in expenditure and by surpassing generosity in the amounts given (1122a20–22). He spends much and achieves results that are worth the expense (1122b2–6) and evoke admiration (1122b16–18).

The Eudemian discussion is similar to the Nicomachean in that it considers both generosity and magnificence (3.4 1231b27–1232a18 and 3.6 1233a31–b15), recognizes a difference in level of spending and refers magnificence to expenditure alone (3.6 1233a32–34). As in the Nicomachean discussion, generosity is referred to both acquisition and expenditure (3.4 1231b28–29). The ps.-Aristotelian *Magna Moralia* also discusses generosity and magnificence (23–24 1191b40–1192a20 and 1.26 1192a39–b18), but it differs in that it quite emphatically dissociates generosity from the acquisition of money. Instead, an analogy is drawn between courage and generosity: just as the virtue of courage does not provide the courageous man with the arms he needs in order to fight, so generosity does not provide the generous man with money. It is the art of making money, χρηματιστική, which provides the money needed for making gifts (24 1192a15–20). That may bring generosity into line with magnificence, neither is concerned with acquisition, but the argument is faulty. For the generous individual is typically a person of average means. He needs to acquire sums, if he is to continue making gifts, and proper acquisition is never or rarely reducible to technical skill alone. To be sure, choosing a good investment and getting a high interest rate may depend largely on the art of money making, but the generous man *qua* virtuous person will want to consider, e.g., whether a good investment has unacceptable social consequences and whether his treatment of other individuals is selfish and unjust. These are considerations that presuppose proper values, such that reaching a correct decision involves moral virtue as well as technical skill.

Theophrastus followed Aristotle in distinguishing between generosity and magnificence (449A.11–12). He is criticized by Cicero for endorsing lavish outlays on public spectacles (514.9–13), but the criticism seems wrongheaded, and in any case Aristotle too associates magnificence with the support of public events: e.g., equipping a chorus or trireme or underwriting a feast (1122b22–23). Perhaps there is some difference

between the two Peripatetics in regard to the cost of sacrifices (1122b19–21; 523.1–3), but if there is, I doubt that it constitutes an important disagreement.⁵⁷³ In regard to financial dealings, Theophrastus exhibits his practical side: he recommends prudence in making loans (523.10–13) and even counsels tax collectors to prefer gentleness to force and aggression (634).

507 Scholium on Plato's *Laws* 1.6 631C (p. 303.23–304.3 Greene)

Literature: Dirlmeier (1937) pp. 10–11; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1487, 1541; Wehrli (1983) p. 510; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 240–241; Magnaldi (1991) p. 9 n. 15; Wehrli-Wöhrlé (2004) pp. 532, 548; Millett (2007) p. 107; Tsouni (2010) pp. 44–46

Text 507 is a scholium on a passage in the first book of Plato's *Laws*. Immediately prior to the passage, Plato has the Athenian Stranger say that the laws of the Cretans are well-regarded, for they make those who use them happy and provide all things that are good: πάντα γὰρ τὰ ἀγαθὰ πορίζουσι (1.6 631B). The Stranger continues by distinguishing two kinds of goods: those that are human and those that are divine, τὰ ἀνθρώπινα and τὰ θεῖα. The dependence of the former on the latter is asserted and within each kind a ranking of goods is given. Among the lesser, i.e., human goods, health is placed first followed by beauty, strength and wealth: ὑγίεια, κάλλος, ἰσχύς and πλοῦτος. Among the greater, i.e., divine goods, wisdom comes first followed by temperance, justice and courage: φρόνησις, σωφροσύνη, δικαιοσύνη and ἀνδρεία. The four divine goods are said to be ranked by nature, φύσει, ahead of the four human goods. The Stranger is emphatic that the lawgiver must do the same (631B–D).

When the Athenian Stranger lists wealth fourth among the human goods, he comments: “not blind wealth, but keen-sighted wealth, providing it follows along with wisdom,” οὐ τυφλός, ἀλλ’ ὁξὺ βλέπων, ἀνπερ ἅμ’ ἔπεται φρονήσει (631C). The mention of blindness will have reminded Plato's readers of the god Plutus, who was regularly represented as blind.⁵⁷⁴ In 507, the scholiast does not mention the god; instead he refers to Theophrastus, who commented that “if wealth had life it would go only to good men, for each (living) thing seeks its own good, and for

⁵⁷³ See the commentary on 523.

⁵⁷⁴ See the commentary on 512A–B.

wealth it is good to become the tool of good men” (lines 1–3). The argument presupposes that every living thing naturally seeks its own good. We may compare *Plant Explanations* (384 no. 2), in which we read that nature always sets out for (hastens toward) what is best: ἡ δ’ (sc. φύσις) ἀεὶ πρὸς τε τὸ βέλτιστον ὁρμᾷ (1.16.11).⁵⁷⁵ As 507 continues, Theophrastus makes this very point: “For what is good for each (living) thing is also that which is sought, and this is also according to nature for it. All (living) things strive for the condition that is in accordance with nature” (lines 3–5).

To avoid any misunderstanding, I call attention to the fact that the argument concerns living things that are uncorrupted. Plants that are good specimens develop into mature plants that are in accordance with their nature. But a defective plant is apt to grow in a way that is not in accordance with its nature and as a result ends in a condition that is harmful to the plant. Similarly, human beings who are innately sound and well brought up do what is in accordance with nature and develop into mature individuals whose condition is in accordance with nature. In regard to bodily pleasures, they are temperate in accordance with nature, κατὰ φύσιν (449A.19). In contrast, the person who is deficient in appetite, whether through a birth defect or repressive training, fails to desire what is in accordance with nature (449A.16).

Dirlmeier (1937) sees in 507 confirmation of the thesis that Theophrastus departed from Aristotle in regard to the norm or standard of ethical judgment. Whereas Aristotle appealed to the σπουδαῖος, the morally good man, (*NE* 3.4 1113a29–33),⁵⁷⁶ Theophrastus saw the norm in φύσις, nature. As we read in 507, each living thing seeks its own good (line 2), and that is what is in accordance with nature, κατὰ φύσιν (lines 4–5). It may be that we should pay attention to the σπουδαῖος, for his virtue and practical wisdom enable him to make sound judgments. But what is sound about his judgment is that it determines correctly what is in accordance with nature, not only in general but also in particular cases including decisions about the acquisition and distribu-

⁵⁷⁵ Cf. Theophrastus, *On Sensations* (264 no. 4) 32: ἅπαν δὲ φύσει πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον ἐστὶ, “everything by nature is oriented toward the better,” and Aristotle, *On Generation and Corruption* 2.10 336b27–28: ἐν ἅπασιν ἀεὶ τοῦ βελτίονος ὁρέγεσθαι φαμεν τὴν φύσιν, “we say that in all things nature always strives for what is better.”

⁵⁷⁶ In *NE* 3.4 we read that the σπουδαῖος judges everything correctly (1113a29–30); he is, as it were, the standard and measure, κανὼν καὶ μέτρον, of things noble and pleasant (1113a33).

tion of wealth. That is how I understand Dirlmeier, and if I have not erred, then he is partly correct and partly wrong. He is correct in holding that Theophrastus sees the norm in what is according to nature, i.e., what is appropriate to the nature of a human being. To be sure, all human beings (ruling out birth defects) desire pleasure: that desire is innate, so that we can say human beings naturally, φύσει, desire pleasure. But the desire can exceed or fall short of what is good for a man. For the desire to be appropriate it must be in accord with a man's nature. But that said, I think that Dirlmeier errs or is unfair in his treatment of Aristotle. For while Aristotle does think that the judgments of the σπουδαῖος are important, he cannot be said to ignore the nature of the human being. In Book 1 of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, he depends upon a function argument to pin down how human beings differ from animals and how their rational soul and its exercise are fundamental in achieving happiness (1.7 1097a15–b21). And much the same is true in Book 10, where Aristotle focuses on intellect and suggests that a human being is intellect, so that one should attempt to live in accordance with intellect at least as far as that is possible for a human being (10.7 1177b27–1178a8). See above, the commentary on 483 and 501.

When we read that it is good for wealth to become the tool of good men, τὸ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ὄργανον γίνεσθαι (line 3), we are apt to recall Aristotle's doctrine of the natural slave, who is said to be an ensouled or living tool, ἔμψυχον ὄργανον (*NE* 8.11 1161b4, *Pol.* 1.4 1253b32–33), and as such finds advantage in serving a good master (*Pol.* 1.5 1254b19–20, 1255a3). Nevertheless, there is a significant difference between wealth *qua* tool and the natural slave. For the natural slave benefits from a master, who cares for him and respects his limited capacities. In particular, the master offers reasoned admonition, explaining why the slave is being told to do certain things.⁵⁷⁷ For the most part, that has no parallel in the case of wealth. Money, houses, utensils and the like are without soul and cannot be admonished. Cattle and other animals have soul, but lacking thought they are closed to admonition. Slaves are the exception, but in most cases they are only a small part of a person's wealth. Of course, money and other non-human possessions can be cared for (protected against theft etc.), accumulated and built up into a fortune. But that is very different from caring for a human being that can think, albeit in a limited way.

⁵⁷⁷ On the admonition of slaves, see Fortenbaugh (1975a, repr. 2002) pp. 54–57.

In 507 the focus is on what is good for wealth. The comparison between living creatures and wealth makes that clear: “Each (living) thing seeks *its own* good, and *for wealth* it is good to become the tool of good men” (lines 2–3). If we think of a tool or instrument like the aulos whose function is to make music, the idea is simple enough. Should an aulos be possessed by a non-musician, it is likely to be damaged, and damaged or not, it will not be used to produce music of high quality. Wealth is a more complicated case, for it is not an individual tool or instrument, whose condition (good or bad) is easily tested. It is more like a mass or stuff, which can be piled up endlessly. And in the case of wealth, the person who accumulates and protects wealth need not be the user. He may be a manager who possesses the art of money making. Nevertheless, the function of wealth—its use, i.e., the purpose for which wealth is accumulated⁵⁷⁸—sets a limit to its accumulation. For not only is an over-abundance of wealth unnecessary and wasteful, but also too much may actually impede a happy life, which is the very reason for accumulating wealth. At least Aristotle, who looks upon wealth as a tool (*Nicomachean Ethics* 1.7 1097a27, 1.8 1099b1 and 28) recognizes that the unlimited accumulation of wealth is harmful (*Politics* 1.8 1256b35–37 and 7.1 1323b7–10). That Theophrastus was of the same mind is all but certain. See 509 and the commentary on that text.

Finally a caveat may be in order. When we think of a tool and its correct use, we are likely to say that the user must have certain technical skills. In the case of wealth, however, technical skill is not sufficient. To make proper use of wealth, one must possess moral virtue and practical wisdom, i.e., be a good person (lines 2–3). Otherwise, wealth may be used for not only wasteful but also evil purposes. As the scholium has it, “lacking life, wealth also falls to evil persons” (lines 5–6), and such persons are prone to misuse it.

⁵⁷⁸ Cf. *NE* 1.5 1096a7, where wealth is said to be useful and for the sake of something else, ἄλλου χάριν, and 1.7 1097a26–27, where wealth, auloi and generally tools or instruments, ὄργανα, are said to be chosen on account of something else, δι’ ἕτερον. Caveat: it would be a mistake to think that all Peripatetics embraced a single view of wealth. See, Arius’ survey of Peripatetic ethics in Stobaeus’ *Anthology* 2.7.19. There in a section devoted to different classifications of things good, we find wealth listed first among things good in themselves, καθ’ αὐτά (p. 135.4 W) and later among goods that are only productive and not both productive and chosen for themselves, δι’ αὐτὴν αἰετὰ (p. 137.5–7). See the remarks of Arnim (1926) pp. 47–63 and those of Moraux (1973) pp. 365–377 (esp. p. 373), who is properly critical of Arnim. That Theophrastus considered classifying wealth in various ways is nowhere stated or implied in the surviving fragments.

508 *Depository of Wisdom Literature*, chap. on Theophrastus, saying no. 6

Literature: Gutas (1985) p. 87

Text 508 is a saying drawn from the chapter on Theophrastus in the *Depository of Wisdom Literature* as reconstructed by Dimitri Gutas. The saying is reported without context, is laconic and divides into two parts. First, we are told, “Wealth is not good.” So much seems straightforward, but what follows in the second part is highly condensed, if not lacunose: “but how wealth is good.” Gutas suggests understanding “but how wealth is (made to be) good” and adding at the end “is what is good.”⁵⁷⁹ Put all the pieces together, and we have “Wealth is not good, but how wealth is made to be good is what is good.” That is the translation printed in the text-translation volumes. If I understand correctly the phrase “how wealth is (made to be) good” refers to the use to which wealth is put and which gives wealth a positive value. Alternatively, we might understand the second part as referring to the acquisition of wealth and decide against adding words at the end. In that case, we might translate: “Wealth is not good, but how wealth is (made, i.e., acquired is) good.”⁵⁸⁰ Certainly how an individual acquires wealth is relevant to a positive or negative assessment of that person’s wealth, but the former interpretation (i.e., valuing the use to which wealth is put) strikes me as the more likely to be the intended meaning. Cf. 507.3 where wealth is described as a tool. It enables an individual to accomplish virtuous acts and to achieve happiness.

What causes pause is that as transmitted, the saying has a Stoic ring. The opening words, “wealth is not good,” might be thought to anticipate Stoic doctrine, according to which wealth is not a good but a preferred indifferent. And the following words, too, might be viewed as Stoic: wealth is preferred as a means to virtuous action. There is no commitment here to success. It is only important that wealth be used in an attempt to act rationally, i.e., virtuously. Such a reading of 508 creates difficulties, for it seems certain that Theophrastus followed Aristotle and classified wealth among the external goods that are important for leading a happy life.⁵⁸¹ Perhaps we should say that the problem lies in the brevity

⁵⁷⁹ Gutas (1985) p. 87 note a to the translation suggests that the Greek underlying the Arabic may have been οὐχ ὁ πλοῦτος ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ πῶς ἀγαθόν <ἀγαθόν>. The final ἀγαθόν will have been lost through haplography.

⁵⁸⁰ For “acquired,” see Gutas *loc. cit.*

⁵⁸¹ See the introduction Section 7 “Fortune and Goods and Evils outside the Soul.”

of the text. The first part needs to be fleshed out so that Theophrastus is saying that wealth is not a good like wisdom or even health: it is an external good and not a good of the soul or of the body.⁵⁸²

509 *Depository of Wisdom Literature*, chap. on Theophrastus, saying no. 16

Literature: Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 241–242; Gutas (1985) p. 91

Like text 508, so text 509 is taken from the *Depository of Wisdom Literature*, and like 508, it concerns wealth. This time, however, the words of Theophrastus are presented as a response to a question, “Is wealth or philosophy worthier of pursuit?” The response has two parts. First comes an analogy: “Philosophy is the wealth of the soul while property is the wealth of the body.” The four terms of the analogy are “philosophy-soul” and “property-body.” “Wealth” is closely related to “property,” and in the initial question it seems to refer narrowly to external possessions. But in Theophrastus’ answer it is used broadly to express “what is good for” soul and body. I.e., it expresses the relationship that is common to both halves of the analogy. That is, I think, correct, but the analogy seems odd, for the combination “health-body,” not “property-body,” seems more natural: “As philosophy is good for the soul, so health is good for the body.”

The oddity is real, but perhaps we can say that associating property with the body as against the soul serves to highlight the greater value of philosophy in comparison with property. We may compare another Peripatetic text which Rose (1863) p. 609 tentatively assigned to Theophrastus’ work *On Happiness* (436 no. 12). The text occurs in the *Anthology* of Stobaeus under the heading “On Practical Wisdom” (vol. 3.3 pp. 200–201, no. 25 Hense), and the text recurs with minor variations that need not concern us in the *Commonplaces* of ps.-Maximus Confessor under the heading “On Education and Philosophy” (chap. 17, PG vol. 91 col. 823). In both places, the text is attributed to Aristotle. Here is the version found in Stobaeus.

νόμιζε δὲ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οὐκ ἐν τῷ πολλὰ κεκτηῖσθαι γίνεσθαι, μᾶλλον δ’ ἐν τῷ τὴν ψυχὴν εὖ διακείσθαι. καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ τὸ σῶμα οὐ τὸ λαμπρῶ ἐσθῆτι κεκοσμημένον φαίη τις ἂν εἶναι μακάριον, ἀλλὰ τὸ τὴν ὑγίαιαν ἔχον καὶ σπουδαίως διακείμενον, καὶ μὴδὲν τῶν προειρημένων αὐτῷ παρῆ· τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ψυχὴν ἐὰν ᾗ πεπαιδευμένη, τὴν

⁵⁸² It is not impossible that a saying with a Stoic flavor has been wrongly attributed to Theophrastus. But possibility is not probability. The idea is not to be pressed.

τοιαύτην καὶ τὸν τοιοῦτον ἄνθρωπον εὐδαίμονα προσαγορευτέον ἔσ-
τίν, οὐκ ἂν τοῖς ἔκτος ἢ λαμπρῶς κεκοσμημένος, αὐτὸς μηδενὸς ἄξιος
ὢν.

Understand that happiness is not found in the possession of many things but rather in the proper disposition of the soul. For no one would say that the body that is decked out in splendid clothing is blessed, but (rather) the (body) that is healthy and well disposed, even if none of the aforementioned are present to it. In the same way, the soul too, if it is educated, being in such a condition and the person in such a condition are to be called happy, and not if (the person) is splendidly decked out with externals, while being himself entirely worthless.

In this text, as in 509, the relative unimportance of external possessions is made clear, and in both texts such possessions are associated with the body. Only in Stobaeus/ps.-Maximus mention is made of health, so that the unimportance of fancy clothing and other kinds of property becomes even clearer. The happy person is seen to be someone who is well educated, and not the person who is wealthy enough to have a large and splendid wardrobe. We must, however, keep in mind that neither Aristotle nor Theophrastus would have said that philosophy (together with virtue and practical wisdom) is sufficient for happiness in the absence of all external goods. Such a claim is Stoic and was emphatically rejected by Theophrastus (493–499).

The second part of Theophrastus' response sets forth two reasons for deeming wealth of the soul, philosophy, more valuable than wealth of the body, clothing and possessions in general. The first reason is that when the soul becomes enriched it survives. This has nothing to do with a life after death. The claim is much simpler: namely that the soul that is enriched through the study of philosophy has acquired wisdom that persists through turbulent times. That is not true of a person's property. It is all too easily lost when misfortune occurs. Cf. 491 and 513.

The second reason is that "wealth of the soul is extensive, while wealth of the body is limited." The claim here is not that the possession of wealth *qua* property is in itself limited. That would be a false claim. The acquisition of money knows no limit (in theory it can be accumulated indefinitely), and the same holds for clothing and firewood and slaves. Rather, the claim is that property *qua* means to achieving happiness is limited. A person needs moderate wealth to be happy, but too much wealth can be an obstacle to happiness. That is especially true of material possessions that must be stored and constantly monitored. Money may be easier to accumulate and to maintain, but even here attention is required,

and the larger the sum the more attention that may be required. In regard to philosophic wisdom and generally the virtues of the soul, the situation is different. Here there is no excess that hinders happiness. We may compare Aristotle's *Politics* 7.1 1323b7–12.

τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐκτὸς ἔχει πέρας, ὥσπερ ὄργανόν τι, πᾶν τε τὸ χρήσιμον εἷς τι ὧν τὴν ὑπερβολὴν ἢ βλάβειν ἀναγκαῖον ἢ μηθὲν ὄφελος εἶναι τοῖς ἔχουσιν, τῶν δὲ περὶ ψυχὴν ἕκαστον ἀγαθῶν, ὅσῳ περ ἂν ὑπερβάλλῃ, τοσοῦτ' ἄλλῳ χρήσιμον εἶναι, εἰ δεῖ καὶ τοῦτοις ἐπιλέγειν μὴ μόνον τὸ καλὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον.

The external (goods) have a limit, as does a tool, and everything useful (is useful) for something. An excess of these (goods) necessarily harms or is of no use to those who possess (them). But each of the goods of the soul, by however much it may exceed,⁵⁸³ by so much more is it useful—if it is necessary to speak even of these (goods) not only as noble but also as useful.

Regarding wealth as an ὄργανον, tool (1323b7–8), see 507.3 and the commentary on that text.

456 *Depository of Wisdom Literature*, chap. on Theophrastus, saying no. 20

457 *Depository of Wisdom Literature*, chap. on Theophrastus, saying no. 17

458 *Depository of Wisdom Literature*, chap. on Theophrastus, saying no. 19

Literature: see above, Section 7 “Virtue on Vice,” where the literature together with discussion will be found.

510 *Florilegium Monacense* 202 (vol. 4 p. 283.7–9 Meineke)

Literature: Mannebach (1961) p. 72; Fortenbaugh (1984) p. 242; Overwien (2001) pp. 118, 120; Millett (2007) p. 149 n. 232

Text 510 is taken from a collection of sayings that carries the title *Maxims Selected from Democritus, Epictetus and Other Philosophers, Poets and Rhetors*. Two sayings are attributed to Theophrastus, one after the other. The first is no. 201 = our 621: an army without a general is likened to a large beast without a head. The saying that follows, no. 202 is our 510: “We ought to accustom ourselves to live on a little in order that we may do nothing shameful for the sake of money.” The advice/exhortation offered here is not peculiarly Peripatetic. It conveys everyday wisdom and was attributed to various persons. See the upper apparatus of parallel texts.

⁵⁸³ I.e., increase or be added to.

According to 510, “we ought to accustom ourselves to live on a little, in order that we may do nothing shameful for the sake of money.” On first reading, the saying may appear to be a rejection of material well-being and hence more appropriate to someone like Diogenes the Cynic (cf. 511). But there is another way of understanding the saying that seems to me preferable. The saying admonishes us to learn or to accustom ourselves to live modestly, in order that lack of resources, perhaps due to bad luck, will not lead us to seek money and other forms of substance in a way that is shameful. For although wealth is not to be rejected—it belongs among the external goods—it ranks far below virtue and virtuous action.

There are, of course, various circumstances that may tempt us to act ignobly for the sake of money. A special case is that which concerns generosity and extravagance. I cite Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics*, in which the generous man is one who enjoys making gifts and does so within his means. In contrast, the extravagant man makes gifts beyond his means and as a result is apt to seek means from elsewhere including inappropriate sources that bring discredit (4.1 1121a30–b3). If I understand 510 correctly, that is not the sort of case upon which the saying is focused. Rather, it is warning us against a luxurious or simply painless existence, which ill-prepares a person for the day when the cupboard is bare or nearly so. Unaccustomed to living on a little, a person will be tempted to do and all too often does something shameful for the sake of money.

511 Diogenes Laertius, *The Lives of the Philosophers* 6.22 (OCT vol. 2 p. 257.7–10 Long)

Literature: Hirzel (1895) vol. 1 pp. 311–312 n. 2, 317; Dudley (1937) pp. 19, 23–24; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1541; Steiner (1976) pp. 36–40; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 242–244; Tsouni (2010) pp. 140–141

Text 511 is found in the sixth book of Diogenes Laertius’ *Lives of the Philosophers*. The book begins with the life of Antisthenes (6.1–19), after which comes that of Diogenes the Cynic, who hailed from Sinope on the Black Sea. In regard to the latter, we are first offered differing accounts of his alleged exile from Sinope: all revolve around adulterated coinage (6.20–21).⁵⁸⁴ Next we are told that Diogenes went to Athens, where through persistence he was able to become the pupil of Antisthenes. In

⁵⁸⁴ The story of Diogenes’ exile appears to be a fabrication: part of the legend that grew up around Diogenes. See Döring pp. 282–283.

addition we read that being an exile, he began to live a frugal life (6.21).⁵⁸⁵ The mention of Diogenes' life style is followed by 511, in which Theophrastus' Μεγαρικός, *Megarian* (*Dialogue*) is cited for a report concerning how Diogenes found a way to deal with his circumstances. He is said to have observed a mouse running about in a carefree manner—μήτε κοίτην ἐπιζητοῦντα μήτε σκότος εὐλαβούμενον ἢ ποθοῦντά τι τῶν δοκούντων ἀπολαυστῶν, "neither seeking a bed nor avoiding darkness or desiring any of the things considered enjoyable"—and in this way to have learned how to deal with his situation (lines 1–4). As Regenbogen observes, the report is anecdotal.⁵⁸⁶ The Cynics in general and Diogenes in particular became the stuff of legend, so that all ancient reports must be viewed with a critical eye. 511 is no exception. What is reported is, of course, possible, but that Diogenes actually discovered, ἐξεῦρε (line 3), how he should deal with his peculiar circumstances is not to be believed. The idea is too clever/appealing, and whatever credibility it has depends on a truism: men can learn from observing how animals behave. Nevertheless, the text is of some interest, for it preserves an early and perhaps contemporaneous anecdote concerning the way in which Diogenes came to believe that external goods are of little importance. What we are not told and can only guess at is how Theophrastus handled the anecdote, and in particular how he related the anecdote to his own doctrine.

In 6.23, not long after 511, we read that Diogenes had written to an unnamed person in order to find a place to live in Athens. The person in question was slow to respond, and Diogenes made a tub in the Metroön his home. It has been suggested by Dudley that this story should be attributed to Theophrastus.⁵⁸⁷ The suggestion is no more than a guess and in my judgment a bad one. For nothing seems to point to Theophrastus as the source of the story. Immediately after 511, we are offered a string of details concerning Diogenes: his folded cloak, his pouch that held food, his use of any place for any purpose, a remark about the Athenians providing him with a place to live. All relate to Diogenes' style of life, but none is connected with Theophrastus. In fact, they are

⁵⁸⁵ Diogenes Laertius presents Antisthenes not only as the teacher of Diogenes (6.21) but also as the originator of the Cynic way of life (6.2, 19). That Diogenes studied under Antisthenes is almost certainly correct, but that Antisthenes was the founder of the Cynic school is rejected by modern scholars as a fabrication attributable to Hellenistic doxography: e.g., D. O'Connor, "Antisthenes" and J. Moles, "Diogenes" in Zeyl pp. 42 and 194, respectively.

⁵⁸⁶ Regenbogen col. 1541.

⁵⁸⁷ Dudley pp. 23–24.

referred to certain unnamed persons (κατά τινας, “according to some people”) and follow on 511 without a connecting particle (6.22). What comes next concerns Diogenes’ use of a staff. Here three witnesses are named (Olympiodorus, Polyeuctus and Lysanias), Theophrastus is not (6.23). At this point comes the anecdote that Dudley wants to attribute to Theophrastus. There is, however, no indication that Laertius has suddenly returned to Theophrastus. We should resist the suggestion that he has.

A further suggestion of Dudley is that Theophrastus’ work Τῶν Διογενούς συναγωγῇ, *Collection of the (Doctrines) of Diogenes* (Diog. Laert. 5.43 = 1.95 = 137 no. 39) concerns the Cynic from Sinope.⁵⁸⁸ More likely, however, the work focuses on the physical philosopher from Apollonia (64 A 5 Diels Kranz).⁵⁸⁹

Hirzel thinks that the Μεγαρικός (Diog. Laert. 5.44 = 1.129 = 436 no. 20 = 511.2) was a dialogue and that Diogenes the Cynic was a speaker in the dialogue. He also believes that the Theophrastean work was identical with Περί πλούτου, *On Wealth* (436 no. 19). I agree that the Μεγαρικός was a dialogue, but I am not prepared to assert the identity of the two works.⁵⁹⁰ That the Cynic had a speaking part in the dialogue is quite possible, but the idea is not supported by a closely related text found in Aelian’s *Miscellaneous History* 13.26. At the beginning of the chapter, we are told that Diogenes lived by himself, was poor and morose. After that we read:

ἡθύμει οὖν ὁ Διογένης <καὶ μᾶζαν> καὶ φύλλων ἄκρα ἤσθιε. ταῦτα γάρ οἱ παρῆν. τοῖς δὲ ἀποπίπτουσι τοῦ ἄρτου θρύμμασι μὺς ἐχρῆτο ἐπιφοιτῶν. ὁ οὖν Διογένης φιλοπόνως κατεσκέψατο τὸ πραττόμενον, καὶ μειδιάσας καὶ ἑαυτοῦ γενόμενος παιδρότερός τε καὶ ἴλεως εἶπεν· “ὁ μὲν μὺς οὗτος τῆς Ἀθηναίων πολυτελείας δεῖται οὐδέν, σὺ δέ, ὦ Διόγενες, ἄχθῃ [φησὶ] ὅτι μὴ συνδεινεῖς Ἀθηναίους.” καὶ ἐπόρισεν ἑαυτῷ εὐκαιρον εὐθυμίαν.

Therefore Diogenes was dispirited and ate barley bread and the tips of leaves, for these were available to him. A mouse used to come and take the crumbs that fell. Diogenes observed with care what was happening; he smiled and became contented and more cheerful than he had been, saying, “This mouse has no need of the extravagance of the Athenians, but you, Diogenes, are upset that you do not dine with the Athenians.” And he gave his spirit an opportune lift.

⁵⁸⁸ Dudley p. 19.

⁵⁸⁹ See Usener (1858) pp. 25–26 and Sharples, (1998) *Commentary* vol. 3.1 p. 29.

⁵⁹⁰ See the discussion of the Μεγαρικός, above Chapter 3 on 436 no. 20.

In this text, neither Theophrastus nor a work entitled Μεγαρικὸς is mentioned.⁵⁹¹ Moreover, Aelian presents Diogenes speaking with himself. That is compatible with Diogenes playing a role in a dialogue, but it hardly establishes that he did so.

A different anecdote concerning Diogenes the Cynic should be mentioned. It is found in the *Common Places* of pseudo-Maximus Confessor 61 (PG vol. 91 col. 987A–B Migne)⁵⁹² and in the Russian florilegium *Pcela* pp. 363–364 Semenov (Munich 1968), which dates from the 12th or 13th century.⁵⁹³ We read that Diogenes requested ten drachmas from a youth who had consumed his inheritance. The youth responded by asking why Diogenes requested drachmas, when he took one obol from other persons. To that Diogenes replied that he hoped often to receive money from the others, but from the youth never again. What interests us here is that in three of the seven Russian manuscripts that were studied by Semenov the name “Diogenes” seems to be replaced by “Theophrastus.”⁵⁹⁴ That Theophrastus engaged in begging is not to be believed. It is, however, possible that the anecdote occurred in Theophrastus’ *Megarian Dialogue*, and at a later time Theophrastus’ name was mistakenly substituted for that of Diogenes.

Most of us recognize that we are in important ways related to animals and that we can learn from observing their behavior. Theophrastus was no exception. Perhaps he focused on mice not only in regard to Diogenes but also and more generally in order to illustrate people whose avarice manifests itself in unlimited hoarding. We may compare Plutarch’s work *Περὶ φιλοπλουτίας*, *On Love of Wealth*, in which men who hoard wealth and never share it with their children are likened to mice that eat the ore in gold mines. Just as the mice must die and be cut open before the miners can obtain the ore, so the children of hoarders must await the death of their fathers before they receive any benefit (7 526A–B). Since Theophrastus in his work *On Creatures that Appear in Swarms* (350

⁵⁹¹ Theophrastus is mentioned in 4.20 = 513, but the texts are widely separated and related in no explicit way. To be sure, both texts diminish the importance of material goods, but that is not enough to establish a close connection.

⁵⁹² In *Quellen* p. 243, I referred simply to Maximus Confessor (without “pseudo”). That was an error. The *Common Places* in question postdate the Byzantine monk by some four centuries. See above, Chapter II “The Sources” no. 40.

⁵⁹³ See also Diogenes Laertius 6.67.

⁵⁹⁴ See Semenov p. XLIX.6–7 and LXXI.

no. 5b) speaks of mice that eat gold ore (359A.52–54), one may wonder whether Theophrastus anticipated Plutarch and likened human hoarders to these mice.⁵⁹⁵

512A Plutarch, *Lycurgus* 10.2–3 (BT vol. 3.2 p. 15.4–10 Ziegler)

512B Plutarch, *On Love of Wealth* 8 527A–B (BT vol. 3 p. 342.18–343.4 Paton, Pohlenz and Sieveking)

Literature: Brandis (1860) p. 364; Rose (1863) p. 103; Zeller (1879) vol. 2.2 p. 858; Hirzel (1895) vol. 1 p. 312; Wehrli (1983) p. 510; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 244–245; Wehrli-Wöhrle (2004) p. 532

Text 512A is taken from the *Life of Lycurgus*, in which Plutarch comments on the reforms introduced in Sparta by the lawgiver Lycurgus.⁵⁹⁶ The establishment of the Council of Elders is given pride of place, after which come the redistribution of land, a change in currency, the banishing of unnecessary arts and finally the introduction of common meals (5.6–12.7). In regard to the last, we are told that Lycurgus wished to counter luxury, to eliminate the desire for wealth (10.1) and to prevent the Spartans from ruining not only their characters but also their bodies (10.2). At this point comes 512A. Introducing a mode of dining that preserved health is called a great achievement, but more important, we are told, was making wealth “unenviable and unwealth” (lines 1–3). With rich and poor dining together on the same food, wealth was no longer useful in regard to either enjoyment or spectacle (lines 3–5). The descriptive phrase “unenviable and unwealth” is explicitly attributed to Theophrastus (line 2).

What we are not told and what we would like to know is whether Theophrastus used the phrase to describe the effect of introducing common meals in Sparta. Since Jerome tells us that Theophrastus discussed the common meals of the Spartans (*Against Jovinian* 2.13), one might suppose that Theophrastus used the phrase in a context similar to that of Plutarch’s Lycurgus. However, the report of Jerome is almost certainly dependent on Porphyry, *On Abstinence* 4.4, and Porphyry reproduces Plutarch, *Lycurgus* 10.2–3 verbatim. It follows that the report of Jerome

⁵⁹⁵ In *On Love of Wealth*, Plutarch cites Theophrastus only one page after speaking of the mice that eat gold ore (8 527B = 512B), but I draw no conclusion from this proximity.

⁵⁹⁶ “Lawgiver,” νομοθέτης, is Plutarch’s initial description of Lycurgus (1.1). He is the traditional founder of Spartan εὐνομία, “good order.” See Herodotus, *Histories* 1.65, who reports the Spartan view that Lycurgus brought his reforms to Sparta from Crete.

cannot be viewed as an independent source. Like the text of Porphyry, it is mentioned only in the apparatus of texts parallel to 512.

Text 512B comes from a different Plutarchan work, *On Love of Wealth*, in which criticism is directed against the accumulation of unnecessary and useless wealth. Plutarch calls it madness and misery when a person's desire for wealth prevents him from using his substance to satisfy basic needs (4 524F). In addition, Plutarch opposes the idea of laying up wealth for one's children. For in doing so, a father harms his children, first by making them avaricious and ultimately by robbing them of their leisure, once they have acquired their inheritance (7 526A–527A). After that, Plutarch cites Aristotle,⁵⁹⁷ saying that some people fail to use their money, while others use it badly, and neither is appropriate (8 527A). Text 512B follows. Plutarch asks “What is the use for which wealth is admired?” and suggests that it is “the use of what is sufficient” (lines 1–2). If that is correct, it follows that the rich are no better off than those of moderate means. As Theophrastus puts it, wealth is “unwealth and truly unenviable” (lines 2–4). The point is reinforced by the introduction of examples: Callias, the richest of the Athenians, and Ismenias, the most well off of the Thebans, are contrasted with the Athenian Socrates and the Theban Epaminondas (lines 4–6). To these examples is added that of Agathon, who is said to have dismissed the flute-players from the banquet on the grounds that conversation would be sufficient (8 527B). The example appears to be taken from Plato's *Symposium*, albeit with a change. In the *Symposium*, the banquet takes place in the house of Agathon, and the dismissal is the idea of Eryximachus (174A, 176E).⁵⁹⁸ In any case, there is little reason to think that Plutarch has the example from Theophrastus. Whether the preceding examples, Callias *et al.*, were cited by Theophrastus cannot be decided with certainty. To be sure they are tied to the Theophrastean sentiment, wealth is “unwealth and truly unenviable,” by an *if*-clause, and they are intended to elucidate and confirm that sentiment, but these considerations do not rule out the possibility that Plutarch has added material from a different source or on his own. There are, however, no good reasons against Theophrastean origin, so that I am inclined to agree with Wimmer, who includes them in his fr. 78.

⁵⁹⁷ Fr. 56 Rose³, which includes Plut., *Life of Pelopidas* 3.1 as well as *On Love of Wealth* 8 527A.

⁵⁹⁸ Cf. Plato, *Protagoras* 347C–D.

In his collection of Theophrastean fragments, Wimmer separates 512A and B (they appear as fr. 86f. and 78). The separation is unfortunate, for the texts contain the same Theophrastean phrase, albeit in two different contexts. There is variation in word order—ἄζηλον before ἄπλουτον in 512A and ἄπλουτος before ἄζηλος in 512B—but the variation is not significant. Of greater interest is the use of two alpha-privatives to qualify the single noun πλοῦτος. A similar use of alpha-privatives is found in 551.7–8: ἀκατάσκευος and ἀνεύρετος modifying βίος (implied). Taken together, the two texts appear to exhibit Theophrastus' concern with style (λέξις).⁵⁹⁹ In saying that, I do not want to ignore the fact that in 512B, Wimmer prints τυφλός in place of ἄπλουτος. This reading is found in a single manuscript⁶⁰⁰ and in my judgment should not be accepted. To be sure, one might cite *Table Talk* 5.5 679B, where Plutarch's grandfather is made to criticize rich people who invite numerous guests to a banquet, after which he is made to excuse them: ἄπλουτον γὰρ οἶονται τὸν πλοῦτον καὶ τυφλὸν ἀληθῶς καὶ ἀνέξοδον (ἀδιέξοδον *codd.*), ἂν μὴ μάστιγας ἔχῃ καὶ καθάπερ τραγωδία θεατάς, “for they think that wealth is unwealth and truly blind and without effect, if it has no witnesses just like a tragedy that has no spectators.” At first reading one might think that this text supports printing τυφλός instead of ἄπλουτος in 512B, for only a few lines earlier Theophrastus has been mentioned (679A = 577A). In the lines that follow, Plutarch might still be thinking of Theophrastus and quite deliberately have his grandfather recall the phrase in question. Nevertheless, in 679B Theophrastus is not named, and in my judgment Plutarch does not intend to quote Theophrastus with verbatim accuracy. The words καὶ τυφλὸν ἀληθῶς καὶ ἀνέξοδον are better compared with the *Life of Lycurgus* 10.4: ὥστε τοῦτο δὴ τὸ θρυλούμενον ἐν μόνῃ τῶν ὑπὸ τὸν ἥλιον πόλεων τῇ Σπάρτῃ σώζεσθαι, τυφλὸν ὄντα τὸν πλοῦτον καὶ κείμενον ὥσπερ γραφὴν ἄψυχον καὶ ἀκίνητον, “as a result it is only in Sparta among all the cities under the sun that we find preserved the common saying ‘wealth is blind’ and lying like a picture that lacks life and motion.” Moreover, we should keep in mind that the blindness of wealth is a traditional image or metaphor. (See Hipponax, fr. 29, vol. 1 p. 275 Diehl; Timocreon, fr. 5, vol. 2 p. 122 Diehl; Aristophanes, *Plutus* passim; Plato, *Laws* 1 631C4). A

⁵⁹⁹ See the commentary on 437.

⁶⁰⁰ See the critical apparatus to 512B.

copyist, especially one familiar with *Table Talk* 679B, might easily be misled into replacing the unusual word ἄπλουτος with the everyday word τυφλός.⁶⁰¹

Neither 512A nor 512B names a Theophrastean work as the source of the phrase “unenviable and unwealth.” If we focus on 512B, it is hard not to think of Theophrastus’ work *On Wealth* (436 no. 19a–b). That is the view of Hirzel vol. 1 p. 312, and it may well be correct. The phrase in question concerns πλοῦτος and therefore would be at home in a work entitled Περὶ πλούτου. But there are other possibilities. Rose p. 103 suggests the *Laws* (589 no. 17a–c), which finds support in 512A. Lycurgus was a lawgiver, who is said to have introduced common meals whereby wealth was rendered unwealth (lines 2–3).⁶⁰² 512A might also support assigning the phrase to *On Legislators* (589 no. 16). It was three books long and is likely to have discussed the reforms of Lycurgus, for he belongs among the best-known lawgivers.⁶⁰³ In addition, we should not rule out *On Piety*. For in that work, Theophrastus argues for inexpensive sacrifices over those that involve a display of wealth.⁶⁰⁴ In such a context, he might say that in regard to honoring the gods wealth is irrelevant: it is “unenviable and unwealth.” Nevertheless, I deem *On Piety* a long-shot, and if asked to choose, I might decline, pointing out that the phrase may have occurred in more than one work: *On Wealth*, the *Laws* and *On Legislators*.

513 Aelian, *Miscellaneous History* 4.20 (BT p. 72.1–13 Dilts)

Literature: Gigon (1950) p. 541; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 245–246; Millett (2007) p. 142 n. 170; Tsouni (2010) p. 136

Text 513 occurs in the fourth book of Aelian’s *Miscellaneous History*. It is preceded by two reports concerning Dionysius II, the tyrant of Syracuse, and one concerning Philip of Macedon. In regard to Dionysius, we are told that he personally received Plato on his second visit to Syracuse,

⁶⁰¹ Regarding ἄζηλος πλοῦτος see Plutarch, *Spartan Sayings* 226D and Arsenius, *Violetum* 23, 25–26 Walz = Apostolius, *Centuria* 1.53 Leutsch, *Paroemiographi Graeci* vol. 2 p. 253.

⁶⁰² Caveat: Rose p. 103 confuses Plutarch, *Pelopidas* 3 with 512B and identifies the former with 512A.

⁶⁰³ See, e.g., Arist., *Pol.* 2.9 1270a7, 2.10 1271b25, 2.12 1273b33, 1274a29 with Mirhady (1992) p. 92.

⁶⁰⁴ A holy sacrifice that pleases the gods is one that is inexpensive (εὐδάπανον 584A.130, 132, 136, 142–143, 152) and easy to acquire (εὐπόριστον 584A.130, 143).

and that he allowed Plato to enter his presence without being searched (4.18). Regarding Philip, we read that he strongly honored education and supported the studies of Aristotle. In addition he honored Plato and Theophrastus (4.19 = 28). Text 513 follows. Democritus of Abdera is said to have been a wise individual, who desired to be unnoticed. For that reason, he traveled widely, visiting priests and sages. When his father died, Democritus took only silver as money for his travels and left the rest for his brothers (lines 1–7). On account of this, Theophrastus used to praise Democritus, contrasting him favorably with Menelaus and Odysseus, whose wanderings were motivated by a desire to collect material things (lines 7–11). At this point, Aelian adds a further report concerning Democritus. We read that the Abderites called him Philosophy, that he laughed at everyone and that he was admired by Hippocrates (4.20).

In the earlier discussion of sources,⁶⁰⁵ I said that Aelian tends to avoid systematic arrangement. Here I want to acknowledge that 513 is not entirely unrelated to the material that precedes and follows. Theophrastus is mentioned along with Plato immediately before 513, and the segment that follows 513 (introduced by ὅτι) continues the focus on Democritus. Nevertheless, it would be an exaggeration to claim that these passages constitute an instance of systematic arrangement. To be sure, Theophrastus is mentioned immediately before 513, but only in passing as someone honored by Philip. And in 513, Theophrastus does not become the subject of a further report. Instead, he is mentioned half way through (line 7) as a source concerning Democritus. More cohesive is 4.20 taken as a whole. Both segments concern Democritus and both are complimentary to the Abderite, but what follows in 4.21 (introduced by ὅτι) is quite unrelated. We are told that Alcibiades was the favorite of Socrates, as was Dion of Plato.⁶⁰⁶

Text 513 opens with a report (a story or tradition: λόγος ἔχει) that Democritus was a man of wisdom who accepted only a portion of his

⁶⁰⁵ See Chater II “The Sources” no. 21 on Aelian.

⁶⁰⁶ Section 4.21 is quite short. Aelian has abridged his source, which is not named. As observed by Wilson (Loeb edition pp. 13 and 137 note b), the use of ὅτι regularly signals abridgment. In 4.21 it also introduces an entirely new subject. In 4.18 and 4.20 it does not introduce a new subject (Dionysius and Democritus remain the subjects), but new facts are related in an abridged form. The abridgment in 4.20 is manifest in the rapid movement from one detail to the next: Democritus was called Philosophy; he laughed at everyone; he was admired by Hippocrates. In contrast, the first segment of 4.20 = 513 stays more or less focused on Democritus *qua* traveler in pursuit of wisdom.

inheritance, which he used to support his extensive travels during which he met with priests and men of wisdom (lines 1–7). For this reason he was praised by Theophrastus, who contrasted his travels with those of Odysseus and Menelaus, who sought to collect material things (lines 7–11).⁶⁰⁷ We may compare 491, in which we are told that Theophrastus urged men to be educated rather than to rely on money, which is subject to the whims of fortune. Also relevant is 507, where wealth is likened to a tool which falls into the hands of bad men as well as good men. In the hands of bad men, it will be misused for purposes that bring no benefit and may even be harmful. In the hands of good men, it will be used properly for worthwhile ends including the attainment of wisdom.

The travels of Democritus are mentioned in connection with those of Pythagoras and Plato in Cicero's dialogue *On Ends* 5.50, where the Peripatetic doctrine of the intrinsic value of knowledge is under discussion (cf. 5.87) and in *Tusculan Disputations* 4.44, where there is discussion of the usefulness that Peripatetics attribute to *πάθη* including the desire for wisdom (cf. 4.55). That Theophrastus gathered information from many parts of the world is well-known. There is, however, no report that speaks explicitly of Theophrastus himself traveling abroad in order to gather information: e.g., details concerning the laws of the barbarians (cf. 590.5). Concerning the possibility that Theophrastus did at least some traveling in order to gather information for his botanical studies, see O. Kirchner, "Die botanischen Schriften des Theophrast von Eresos," *Jahrbücher für classische Philologie*, Suppl. 7 (1874) pp. 451–539; Regenbogen col. 1358, 1467–1469; W. Capelle, "Theophrast in Kyrene?" *Rheinisches Museum für Philologie* 97 (1954) 169–184; "Theophrast in Ägypten," *Wiener Studien* 69 (1956) pp. 173–186.

Gigon (1951) p. 541 follows Diels-Kranz 68 A 16 and suggests that Theophrastus' report concerning Democritus was to be found in the work *On Happiness* (436 no. 12). That is certainly possible, but other works like *On Lives* and *On Wealth* (436 no. 16 and 19) cannot be excluded. The use of the imperfect in line 17—Theophrastus used to praise (ἐπῆναι) Democritus—might suggest that Theophrastus praised Democritus in a similar manner on various occasions, i.e., in several places.⁶⁰⁸ That too is possible, but I doubt that the use of the imperfect in this context is a reliable indicator.

⁶⁰⁷ See Homer, *Odyssey* 3.301–302 and 4.90–91.

⁶⁰⁸ Cf. 516, where we read that Theophrastus mentioned Simonides' love of money in two different works.

514 Cicero, *On Duties* 2.55–56 (BT p. 96.14–29 Atzert)

515 Cicero, *On Duties* 2.64 (BT p. 100.14–26 Atzert)

Literature: Brandis (1860) p. 364; Zeller (1879) p. 864 n. 4; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1487; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 246–248; Sollenberger (1984) pp. 328–329; Annas (1993) p. 385; Dyck (1996) pp. 440–442, 452–453; Wehrli-Wöhrle (2004) p. 532; Millett (2007) pp. 70, 81

In the second book of *On Duties* at section 52, Cicero turns his attention to kindness and generosity and draws a distinction between benefiting another through service, *opera*, and through money, *pecunia*. The latter is said to be easier, especially for a rich man, but the former is deemed more glorious and more worthy of a strong and eminent individual. Notice is taken of the fact that large and repeated gifts of money exhaust one's resources, so that such gifts are no longer possible. Moreover, gifts of money tend to corrupt the recipient, who comes to expect further gifts (52–53). Nevertheless, Cicero allows that there are times, when gifts of money are appropriate. Only one must use discretion and limit one's giving in accordance with one's means (54–55). At this point, text 514 begins. Cicero distinguishes between two kinds of lavish givers. There are prodigal persons, *prodigi*, who squander their money on public banquets and gladiatorial games and generally those things that leave behind a brief memory or none at all. There are also generous persons, *liberales*, who ransom captives, assume the debts of friends and help them increase their means (lines 1–8). That prompts Cicero to wonder what got into the mind of Theophrastus in the book that he wrote *On Wealth: itaque miror quid in mentem venerit Theophrasto in eo libro quem De divitiis scripsit* (lines 8–9). Cicero does allow that Theophrastus said many excellent things, but he also condemns as absurd the praise that Theophrastus lavished on providing public spectacles. A similar judgment is passed on Theophrastus' belief that the fruit of riches is the capacity for such outlays (lines 9–12).

This criticism of Theophrastus is quite wrongheaded. For even if Cicero is correct that Roman spectacles like gladiatorial games do not justify large expenditures, Theophrastus will not have had such spectacles in mind when he discussed spending large sums of money. We know that Theophrastus recognized magnificence, μεγαλοπρέπεια, as a virtue (449A.12), and we can assume with confidence that he followed Aristotle in deeming it appropriate to fit out a chorus, equip a trireme or give a feast for the city (*NE* 4.2 1122b22–23). To be sure, he knew that uneducated,

tasteless individuals are likely to perform such services in an inappropriate manner (cf. *NE* 1123a19–27) and that the masses have short memories (524). But Theophrastus will have agreed with Aristotle that there are occasions when wealthy individuals ought to use their resources to support works that are not only expensive but also honorable, τὰ τίμια (*NE* 1122b19).

Immediately after his criticism of Theophrastus, Cicero turns to Aristotle and quotes him in translation at some length. We read that Aristotle condemns wasteful spending, saying that it does not relieve need, fails to increase dignity and provides only brief gratification, after which it is quickly forgotten. Cicero praises the words of Aristotle as “weightier and truer” (2.56). The contrast is with Theophrastus, which is unfair, but the praise of Aristotle’s position is not to be faulted. If there is a problem, it is that the quotation cannot be matched with any surviving portion of the *corpus Aristotelicum*. That is, however, only an apparent problem, for what Cicero reports almost certainly derives from a lost dialogue. Aristotle’s work Περὶ πλούτου, *On Wealth*, is most likely.⁶⁰⁹

After praising Aristotle, Cicero turns to Rome and focuses on the lavish entertainments that were expected from wealthy persons who obtained the office of aedile. Cicero recognizes that the expectation cannot be easily ignored and that there can be personal advantage in responding positively, providing one’s largess is proportionate to one’s means (57–60). Cicero next takes up generosity, *liberalitas*, and touches on some subjects that have already been mentioned: e.g., improving another person’s means and ransoming a prisoner (61, 63; cf. 55 = 514.5–8). He emphasizes the advantages inherent in acts of generosity—not only is the beneficiary grateful but also others who are aware of the generosity and respond positively—while reminding us not to exceed our means. Text 515 develops these remarks. Cicero introduces hospitality and tells us that Theophrastus praised it and did so correctly.⁶¹⁰ For 1) it is fitting that the homes of illustrious persons be open to illustrious persons from abroad, and it is also a mark of honor for the city. 2) It is useful to have resources and favor abroad as a result of guest friends (lines 1–7). These two reasons are presented by Cicero as his own: *ut*

⁶⁰⁹ See D. Ross, *Aristotelis Fragmenta Selecta* (Oxford 1955) pp. 56–57, and cf. Rose (1863) p. 104 and O. Heine, *De Officiis* (Berlin 1871) pp. 155–156, who correctly defends the received text against editors who wish to read “Aristo” instead of “Aristotle.” See also Dyck p. 441, who cites additional literature.

⁶¹⁰ Cf. *NE* 4.2 1122b35–1123a4, where Aristotle lists hospitality shown to foreigners among the greatest and most honorable of expenditures.

mihi quidem videtur, “on my view at least” (lines 1–2). They may be based on reasons that Theophrastus gave in support of his praise, but we are not told that. What we are told is that Theophrastus wrote—no work is named—that at Athens Cimon was hospitable even to the people of his own district: he instructed his stewards that should any member of the district visit his villa, everything should be made available to him (lines 7–10). There is a jump here from guest friendships abroad to hospitality at home, but Cicero is aware of the jump and emphasizes it: *quidem ... etiam in suos curiales*, “indeed ... even to the people of his own district” (lines 7–8). Having one’s home open to members of one’s district as well as to persons from abroad builds useful relationships that can provide important benefits at a later date. But exactly what Theophrastus may have said concerning hospitality to visitors from abroad remains unclear.

The example of Cimon can help us to avoid a one-sided understanding of magnificence, μεγαλοπρέπεια. In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle emphasizes the connection between moral virtue and actions chosen for their own sake. That is in line with his conception of moral virtue as a disposition to value certain actions as noble, καλόν, and his assertion that the magnificent individual, the μεγαλοπρεπής spends large sums for the sake of what is noble, τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα, for this is the common goal of all virtues (4.2 1122b6–7). The magnificent individual does not spend lavishly for his own sake but for the community (1123a4–5). Such assertions have the advantage of distinguishing the magnificent individual from the person who lacks moral virtue and gives away large sums, but not for the sake of what is noble. Rather he wants to exhibit his wealth and in that way attract admiration (1123a23–26). Nevertheless, such assertions can be misleading, for one is tempted to understand the magnificent individual as someone who never considers his own advantage. That would be a mistake for at least two reasons. First, magnificent expenditures produce results that are great and noble and as such are admired (1122b16–18). The magnificent individual is no fool; he knows full well that he is enhancing his reputation. Second, to think that the magnificent individual is oblivious to his own advantage is to ignore the complexity of human motivation. In this regard, the example of Cimon is instructive. Cimon exhibits magnificence by welcoming the members of his district into his house and putting everything at their disposal. And at the same time he gains respect and political power. See the Aristotelian *Constitution of the Athenians* 27.3, in which the political advantages of Cimon’s generosity are in the foreground. See also Plutarch’s *Life of Cimon* 10.1–2,

where the Aristotelian report is repeated and a different version is added, which does not limit Cimon's generosity to members of his own district. Ignoring quibbles concerning the value of political power and political ambition,⁶¹¹ it is, I think, clear that a simultaneous gain in respect, even when it is consciously sought after, need not diminish the virtuous character of a magnificent contribution or gift. For μεγαλοψυχία, greatness of soul, is entirely compatible with μεγαλοπρέπεια, magnificence (449A.11–12). As a magnificent individual, a virtuous person does well by other people, for freely supporting another is noble. And as a great-souled individual, he is conscious of his own worth. He recognizes that doing well by other people is a mark of superiority (cf. *NE* 4.3 1124b9–11).

515 mentions no Theophrastean writing, but 514 refers to the work *On Wealth* (436 no. 19). That work was almost certainly a dialogue, as was the like-named work of Aristotle. It seems reasonable to refer both 514 and 515 to the same work, but it would be a mistake to conclude *tout court* that Cicero knew the Theophrastean work well through his own reading. Perhaps he did have the work in his hands at some time, but scholars have argued that Cicero is reporting at second hand *via* Panaetius.⁶¹² Indeed, Cicero cites Panaetius by name between 514 and 515, reporting that he disapproved of expenditures on temples, colonnades and the like (2.60). But Cicero also speaks for himself in the very same context, stating that out of respect for Pompey his criticism of such expenditures is rather reserved.⁶¹³ In regard to Books 1 and 2 of *On Duty*, it is clear that Cicero's main source is Panaetius (1.9 and 3.7 and *To Atticus* 16.11.4), but Cicero himself insists that he is prepared to correct and to add material on his own (1.6, 3.7). Our question is whether the Theophrastean material in 514 and 515 is attributable to Cicero or to Panaetius, and whether the misrepresentation involved in 514 is Ciceronian or Panaetian. Certainty is elusive, but I would not be surprised, should the misrepresentation turn out to be Ciceronian. Whether he was drawing on Panaetius, or on notes that he had made on an earlier occasion, or simply remembering what he had once read in *On Wealth*, he may have failed to notice/remember, e.g., that the view in question had been put in the mouth of an interlocutor other than Theophrastus. Or he may have chosen to ignore that detail. Either way, Cicero may have seen an opportunity to enhance his own

⁶¹¹ See the commentary on the title *On Ambition* (436 no. 21) above pp. 186–192.

⁶¹² See Heylbut (1876) p. 38 and Dyck pp. 441, 453, who cites additional literature.

⁶¹³ 2.60: *verecundius reprehendo propter Pompeium*. See Dyck p. 20.

character by setting himself above a well-respected predecessor: namely, Theophrastus.⁶¹⁴ But I am speculating and leave the matter quite open.

516 Anonymous, *On Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics* 4.2 1121a7 (CAG vol. 20 p. 180.15–17 Heylbut)

Literature: Petersen (1859) p. 65; Brandis (1860) p. 348; Zeller (1879) pp. 854–855 n. 3; Heylbut (1888) p. 197; Mercken (1973) p. 20*, (repr. 1990) p. 428; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 248–249; Moraux (1984) pp. 326–327, 329; Barnes (1999) p. 15; Wehrli-Wöhrle (2004) p. 532

Text 516 is taken from an anonymous collection of scholia on the *Nicomachean Ethics* 2–5. The focus is on Book 4, Chapter 2 and in particular on four words: τῷ Σιμωνίδῃ οὐκ ἀρσεκόμενος, “(the generous person) is not pleasing to Simonides” (1121a7). The four words appear as a lemma at the beginning of the scholium,⁶¹⁵ after which we are told that “(Aristotle) is speaking of the lyric poet. For others mention him as fond of money, as does Theophrastus in his *On Dispositions* and in his *On Wealth*” (lines 1–3).

Closely related to 516 is a scholium that occurs in the margin of codex Parisinus 1854 of the *Nicomachean Ethics*.

Σιμωνίδην τὸν μελοποιὸν λέγει· τοῦ γὰρ ὡς φιλαργύρου μέμνηται ἄλλοι τε καὶ Θεόφραστος ἐν τοῖς Περὶ ἡθῶν.

(Aristotle) means Simonides the lyric poet. For among others, Theophrastus in *On Dispositions* mentions him as a lover of money.

The codex dates from the 12th century, and the scholia found therein have been published by J. Cramer in volume 1 of *Anecdota Graeca Parisina*, Oxford 1839. The scholium concerning Simonides is recorded on p. 194. Cramer p. 181 n. 1 reports that the majority of the scholia are in the same hand as the scribe who produced the text of the *NE*, but some are more recent, perhaps from the 14th century. That means that more than one scholiast has been at work and that the scholiasts are likely to have drawn on a variety of sources. It is, however, noteworthy that the scholium in cod. Par. 1854 that follows immediately on the scholium quoted above agrees word for word with what we read in the Anonymous p. 180.127–128. That suggests strongly that both scholia in Par. 1854 are

⁶¹⁴ See above, Chapter II “The Sources” no. 4 on Cicero and *Commentary* 8 (2005c) on the rhetorical and poetic texts, page 327–329 on text 702.

⁶¹⁵ I ignore δέ, which is transitional and added by the Anonymous (line 1). In the *NE*, καὶ precedes the four words of the lemma (1121a7).

dependent on the Anonymous, for the scholium concerning Simonides is very close to 516, i.e., the text of the Anonymous, in vocabulary and word order. The most striking difference is that the scholium in Par. 1854 makes no reference to the work *On Wealth*, *Περὶ πλούτου*. At first reading, that might be thought to count against dependence on the Anonymous, but on reflection it seems most likely that the scholiast simply stopped copying. Having identified Simonides as the lyric poet and having indicated why Aristotle's generous individual is not pleasing to Simonides—a φιλάργυρος, a person fond of money, does not share the values that Aristotle attributes to the generous individual—the scholiast may have thought it sufficient to refer vaguely to other writers, to name Theophrastus and to cite a single Theophrastean work.⁶¹⁶

In antiquity, Simonides' love of money was famous. See, e.g., Aristophanes, *Peace* 697–699. Peripatetic interest in this aspect of Simonides is attested not only by the Nicomachean passage but also by passages in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* 2.16 1391a8–12 and 3.2 1405b23–28, and in Athenaeus' *The Sophists at Dinner* 14.73 656C–E, where Chamaeleon is quoted (fr. 33 Wehrli = fr. 36 Martano). The fact that the Anonymous knows that persons other than Theophrastus, ἄλλοι (line 2), made mention of Simonides' avarice, but chooses to name only Theophrastus may be attributable to a desire to keep things simple (not unlike the scholiast in Par. 1854 omitting the second Theophrastean title), but the fact that the Anonymous is commenting on a Peripatetic text and in particular on a work by Aristotle may have played a role in his singling out Aristotle's pupil. But naming only Theophrastus may also be an indication that Theophrastus offered especially fulsome and memorable remarks concerning Simonides in two different works.

As a character type, the φιλάργυρος is of some interest, for he can be connected with προαίρεσις *per se*, choosing something or some course

⁶¹⁶ There are any number of reasons why a scholiast might break off before fully copying a source. Here are two. 1) One is suggested by the text of the Aldine edition of 1536, whose page breaks are marked in the margin of Heybut's edition of the Anonymous. The words ἐν τοῖς Περὶ ἠθῶν conclude fol. 51^r and the words καὶ ἐν τοῖς Περὶ πλούτου occur on fol. 51^v. In such a case, a copyist/scholiast might simply fail to turn the page. But that does not explain why the scholiast of Par. 1854 failed to add καὶ ἐν τοῖς Περὶ πλούτου, for the Aldine edition postdates the work of the scholiast. 2) A scholiast might think that the omitted material is less apposite to the text on which he is commenting. In the case of Par. 1854, the scholiast might be focused on virtuous and vicious dispositions, ἡθῆ, and on Simonides as a person disposed to avarice. If that were his mind set, then the title *On Wealth*, *Περὶ πλούτου*, might seem less apposite than *On Dispositions*, *Περὶ ἠθῶν*. But that is a stretch and too clever, I fear, to be taken seriously.

of action for its own sake. By way of illustration, I cite a comedy by Theophrastus' pupil, Menander (18 no. 12). In the *Aspis*, Smikrines is presented as a φιλόργυρος (123 OCT), who wants to possess everything (119–120). He is ready to prevent a wedding from taking place in order that he can obtain an inheritance (138–142) and to have one girl cast aside if another seems more profitable (353–355). This unrestrained desire for wealth makes Smikrines uncritical (326–327), and in the end it leads to the misfortune that had been prophesized by the goddess Tyche (143–146). For our purposes, the important point is that Smikrines seems to choose wealth for its own sake. He calls the acquisition of plunder καλόν (33) and has no other interest than possession (120). It is, of course, impossible to prove that Theophrastus thought of Simonides in exactly this manner, but it is interesting to contemplate the possibility that Theophrastus characterized Simonides in this way in the work *On Dispositions*. For in that case, Theophrastus may have made use of a historical figure in order to distinguish between two different dispositions: φιλαργυρία, conceived of as a disposition to choose wealth for its own sake, and ἀνελευθερία conceived of as a purely negative disposition, lack of generosity, which is compatible with a variety of motives.⁶¹⁷ Indeed, Theophrastus may have considered several such dispositions and concluded that an adequate understanding of human character must take account not only of those dispositions that are conceptually tied to *per se* choice but also those that are not.

10. *Kindness, Honor and Vengeance*

Human beings live and work together. That is not only natural but also necessary. For in community, humans are able to protect themselves against external dangers and to acquire the necessities of life: food, shelter and the like. Humans also come together to reproduce, and through

⁶¹⁷ Cf. *Characters* 22.1, where ἀνελευθερία is defined as a lack of that love of honor that involves expenditure. In citing this definition, I am not claiming that it is genuine. It may well be a later addition to the Theophrastean sketch, but even so, it does offer an example of one way in which, ἀνελευθερία, lack of generosity, may be conceived of negatively. And in this regard, it is important to note that Aristotle makes clear that ἀνελευθερία can be conceived of in several ways. It may combine deficiency in giving with excess in taking, but equally one or the other of these attributes may be missing. In particular, there are people who fall short in giving and yet are reluctant to take another person's property on account of honesty or fright. They are satisfied neither to take nor to give (*NE* 4.1 1121b17–31; cf. *EE* 3.4 1232a10–15).

their offspring they ensure the continuation of their own kind. All that is clear, but it would be a mistake to overlook the importance of kindness, honor and vengeance for the human community. We learn very early in life that treating others in a kindly way is something good. Our parents teach us that, but there is also a natural satisfaction that people experience when they help each other and do so without regard to personal gain. The value of this experience is hard to overstate, but it is not enough. For human beings are sensitive to imbalance. They notice when one party is continually giving and only infrequently, perhaps never, receiving. Such one-sidedness leads to bad feelings that can and do threaten community. For that reason, honors are important. Good deeds need to be recognized, and so do bad deeds. Harms, especially injustices disrupt a community, if they are ignored. Hence individuals seek revenge and a community punishes wrongdoing. There are various reasons for punishment: retribution, deterrence and reformation, but it is retribution, which seems most natural and most likely to bring closure.⁶¹⁸

The ancient Greeks would agree. Parents, teachers and philosophers all taught the importance of kindness, while city-states promoted honors and instituted penal systems. According to Aristotle, city-states erected sanctuaries of the Graces, ἱερὰ Χαρίτων in prominent places in order to promote reciprocal kindness, χάρις (NE 5.5 1133a2–5).⁶¹⁹ Aristotle also takes note of honor, which he sees as the greatest of the external goods (4.3 1123b20–21) and a reward for beneficence (8.14 1163b4). In addition, he recognizes the role of punishment within the city-state. It serves as a threat that may restrain behavior, and when that fails it is imposed on those who do wrong (10.9 1179b11–13, 1180a8–9). There is, however, an important difference between bestowing honor and inflicting punishment. The latter is something forced upon the agent; it would be better were punishment never needed. In contrast, the former, bestowing honor, is not forced upon the agent; it is an act of intrinsic nobility (*Pol.* 7.13 1332a10–16).

⁶¹⁸ Many people react negatively to the idea of retribution, but unless a penal system is based at least in part on retribution, it is difficult if not impossible to find acceptable limits to punishment. Both deterrence and reformation are compatible with open-ended punishment. See the discussion of the title *On Retribution* (436 no. 22) in Chapter III “Titles of Books” no. 22.

⁶¹⁹ Gauthier and Jolif vol. 2.1 p. 375 call Aristotle’s explanation ingenious but misleading in regard to the cult of the Graces. On the origin of the cult, the number of Graces and variations in their representation, see Pausanias, *Description of Greece* 9.35.1–7.

Like his teacher, Theophrastus was concerned with these topics. He wrote separate works entitled *Περὶ χάριτος*, *On Kindness* (436 no. 24), *Περὶ φιλοτιμίας*, *On Love of Honor* (436 no. 21)⁶²⁰ and *Περὶ τιμωρίας*, *On Retribution* (436 no. 22). In Diogenes' catalogue of Theophrastean works the last two works are said to have been two books long. The first is listed as one book in length. Perhaps the first was quite short, being little more than a chapter like Aristotle's treatment of kindness in the *Rhetoric* (2.7 1385a16–b10), but it may have been considerably longer. In any case, each of the three topics was deemed sufficiently important to receive individual treatment.

517 Stobaeus, *Anthology* 4.1.72 (vol. 4 p. 23.17–19 Hense)

Literature: Brandis (1860) p. 364; Hands (1968) p. 49; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 110, 250; Millett (2007) pp. 94–95

Text 517 is one of several sayings included in this section, and like many sayings attributed to famous people, it takes the form of question and answer: Θεόφραστος ἐρωτηθεὶς ὑπὸ τινος, τί συνέχει τὸν τῶν ἀνθρώπων βίον, ἔφη “εὐεργεσία καὶ τιμὴ καὶ τιμωρία,” “When Theophrastus was asked by someone, what holds together the life of men, he said, ‘Kindness and honor and vengeance.’” The saying is found in Stobaeus' *Anthology*, Book 4, Chapter 1,⁶²¹ which carries the heading *Περὶ πολιτείας*, “On Political Arrangement.” As usual, the chapter begins with excerpts from poets, no. 1–31, after which come prose texts, no. 32–161. 517 is no. 72. It is preceded by an excerpt from Demosthenes' *Fourth Philippic* 41 (all the citizens taken together are to be regarded as the parents of the city-state; their needs are not to be overlooked) and followed by a saying of Carillus,⁶²² drawn from Plutarch's work *Sayings of Kings and Commanders*, s.v. Carillus 189F (asked why Lycurgus enacted so few laws, Carillus replied that people who use few words do not need many laws). Both excerpts easily fall under the heading *Περὶ πολιτείας*, but only the excerpt from Demosthenes can be said to relate at all closely

⁶²⁰ In the text-translation volumes the title *Περὶ φιλοτιμίας* has been translated *On Ambition*. That may suggest a narrow treatment concerning the focused pursuit of victories, especially in politics but also in games like the Olympic contests. The translation *On Love of Honor* is more literal and in my judgment better, because it seems more inclusive. See Chapter III “Titles of Books” no. 21.

⁶²¹ For other locations, see the apparatus for parallel passages to 517.

⁶²² An early Spartan King.

to what we read in 517: namely, that kindness, εὐεργεσία contributes to holding together the life of men (lines 1–2). In its context, the Demosthenic excerpt is concerned with strengthening the city-state by reducing class warfare. The wealthy are to satisfy the needs of all the citizens—in particular, the less fortunate—and in that way help to unify the city-state by removing grounds for discontent. Such an action can be regarded as a particular case of εὐεργεσία. But the argument of Demosthenes is complex in that it depends partly on the fact that the poor have a legal claim to assistance through the Theoric Fund. Be that as it may, the primary reason for selecting the Demosthenic passage for inclusion in an anthology is the striking comparison between a biological parent and the citizens of a city-state. No such comparison is present in 517. If there is anything striking, it is the brevity of the text, which makes it suitable for inclusion in an anthology.

We have translated τιμωρία (line 2) with “vengeance.”⁶²³ Hands p. 49 offers a very different translation: “the giving of assistance.” It is true that LSJ s.v. II gives “succour” as a possible translation of τιμωρία, and text 525 says that “expressing thanks belongs to a better character than avenging oneself.” But that hardly rules out seeking revenge on the right occasion, and text 526 makes clear that the man of practical wisdom will take revenge, only he will not do so hastily and in a way that causes harm to himself. Cf. 527A–B. Theophrastus wrote a work *On Retribution* (436 no. 22) and will have recognized that on occasion retribution is necessary for maintaining civic life. (Cf. Aristotle, *NE* 10.9 1179b11–13, 1180a8–9 [cited in the introduction to this section] and Solon as reported by Cicero, *Ad Brutum* 24.3; *is [Solon] rem publicam contineri duablis rebus dixit: praemio et poena.*) Finally, “giving assistance” renders 517 repetitive, for it is covered by εὐεργεσία (line 2).⁶²⁴ We should, therefore, reject the interpretation of Hands.

Diogenes Laertius describes Theophrastus as an εὐεργετικός, someone ever ready to do a kindness, but he does not elaborate (5.17 = 1.12). Theophrastus’ popularity not only with students (they numbered 2,000 [5.37 = 1.16]) but also within the city (the indictment for impiety was a failure [5.37 = 1.14–15]; the city turned out *en masse* for the funeral procession [5.41 = 1.60–61]) suggests that the description has a basis in

⁶²³ Cf. Wimmer, who translates *vindicta* (fr. 86e).

⁶²⁴ Cf., e.g., 523.10–11, where a wife’s care for a sick husband and her household management are characterized as returning εὐεργεσία.

fact.⁶²⁵ But factors other than εὐεργεσία are also likely to have played a role: e.g., an understanding of social interaction (he wrote a work on the subject [5.47 = 1.219 = 436 no. 32]) and a pleasing voice (Strabo, *Geography* 13.2.4 = 5A). Such attributes can be viewed (and in most contexts will be viewed) positively, but they also can be viewed with suspicion. See 519 on honors, τιμαί, that are acquired as a result of one's manner and charm.

518 pseudo-Aristotle, *Letters* 4.1–5 (BT p. 31.7–32.2 Plezia)

Literature: Düring (1968) p. 165; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 250–251; Millett (2007) p. 151 n. 258

This text is a forgery. We have a letter in which Aristotle is supposedly addressing Philip of Macedon, whom he urges to engage in acts of kindness. In the very middle of the letter, Theophrastus is referred to as an associate (ὁ ἡμέτερος γνώριμος), and he is praised for having said that “doing a favor (χάρις) is not to be regretted and bears noble fruit (in) the praise of those who are well-treated” (lines 8–10). Praise is, of course, only one of several benefits that treating others well can bring. That is made clear in the text that surrounds the saying attributed to Theophrastus. In what precedes, we are told that reciprocal acts of kindness hold together the lives of men (lines 2–5), and in what follows, we are encouraged to do favors for many persons, for in changed circumstances someone will give back the favor (lines 11–14). In addition, the good character of one who acts kindly is stressed. In what precedes, we read that it is noble and just to pity undeserved misfortune and that pity is the mark of a refined soul (lines 5–7),⁶²⁶ and in what follows, we are urged to be ready with kindness and to control anger, for the former is kingly and refined, while the latter is barbaric and hateful (lines 14–16).

⁶²⁵ We may add that Theophrastus is said to have endowed a philosophic symposium (Athenaeus, *The Sophists at Dinner* 5.2 186A = 36.5–8). Whether our source is correct or incorrect in making the endowment a testamentary matter, providing a sum for such an activity can be seen as an instance of εὐεργεσία.

⁶²⁶ In his *Rhetoric*, Aristotle associates the emotion of pity, pain felt at the unjustified suffering of another individual, with good character (2.9 1386b9–12). But in the *Ethics*, he does not identify a particular moral virtue as the mean disposition in regard to pity, and as far as can be determined from texts like 449A, Theophrastus too failed to assign a moral virtue to pity. One likely reason is that Aristotle and Theophrastus think of moral virtues as practical dispositions: they are manifested in action. Pity, however, lacks an essential tie to action: people often feel pity when there is nothing that can be done. See *Aristotle on Emotion* (1975a, 2nd 2002) pp. 82–83.

Strikingly, the very end of the letter underlines advantage. Having stated that acts of kindness and control of anger are marks of a refined soul, the author advises doing everything else (τὰ δ' ἄλλα) according to one's own judgment without disregarding profitable calculations (μὴ παρορῶν τὰς λυσιτελεῖς ψήφους lines 16–17). At first reading, these words seem to call for a sharp discontinuity in our behavior. At certain moments, we ought to be refined and to offer assistance and pity, while at other times (most of the time), we should look to our own advantage. Such a reading of the text is not foolish, but it puts too much weight on “everything else,” takes too little account of the letter as a whole and ignores the fact that in helping others we are also doing ourselves a favor by binding our community together and laying up favor for repayment at a later time. That is, of course, one of the appealing features of Peripatetic ethics. Noble action and advantage are so closely tied together that we no longer view them as incompatible.⁶²⁷

In 518, χάρις is used both in regard to an initial act of goodwill and in regard to making a return. In other words, it may be a simple doing or giving of a favor (δόσις and δίδοναι) as well as a return (ἀμοιβή and ἀνταποδίδοναι lines 3–5). In both cases it is a kindness or good deed, an εὖεργεσία, as referred to in 517.2. Hence, Theophrastus says that χάρις bears a noble fruit. Acts of kindness that benefit another garner praise if nothing more (lines 9–10). And the author of the letter goes on to say that men of sense lay it (favor) up with others, knowing that the favor will be given back (lines 11–14). Χάρις goes in two directions and for that reason binds people together.

From beginning to end, 518 seems quite in line with Theophrastean doctrine. And twice the wording invites comparison with other Theophrastean texts. The phrase συνέχει τοὺς τῶν ἀνθρώπων βίους, (kindness) “holds together the lives of men” (lines 2–3) is identical with what we read in 517.1–2 except that the latter has the singular βίον, “life,” instead of the plural βίους, “lives.” The contrast between the soul that is ἥμερος, “tame” or “refined,” and that which is ἀπαίδευτος, “uneducated,” (lines 6–7) may be compared with 465.1–2, where we are told that education seems to tame souls: δοκεῖ ἡ παιδεία ἡμεροῦν τὰς ψυχάς. Also

⁶²⁷ Cf. the three motives for sacrificing to the gods: honoring the gods, making a return for some benefit bestowed by the gods and seeking to deflect evils and to acquire goods (584A.217, 219–221). The third motive, which concerns the advantage of the person performing the sacrifice, is compatible with the other two motives. See below, Section 12 “Natural Relationship” on 584A–D ad fin., where 584A.216–217, 221 and 223–237 are cited.

noteworthy is the very last sentence of 518. Philip is advised to be ready with kindness, to control his anger, and in other matters not to ignore profitable calculations, λυσιτελεῖς ψήφους (lines 14–17). We may compare 526, in which we read that a person ought not to act out of anger and in a manner that is not beneficial to himself, ἀλυσιτελῶς ἑαυτῷ. These comparisons hardly prove that a Theophrastean text is the source for the entire letter, but it does indicate that the author of the letter is familiar with Peripatetic writings on kindness and self-interest.

519 ps.-Maximus Confessor, *Commonplaces* 46 (PG vol. 91 col. 937B Migne)

Literature: Fortenbaugh (1984) p. 251; Millett (2007) p. 15, p. 125 n. 56; Searby (2007) vol. 1 p. 286 and vol. 2 p. 668

In the text-translation volumes, 519 is assigned without qualification to Maximus Confessor. That assignation is now demonstrably false, so that I have added “ps.-” above. What we have is a collection of Christian and pagan sayings that dates to c. the 10th century AD. In regard to the pagan sayings, the collection is dependent upon an earlier collection known as the *Corpus Parisinum*. New editions of both ps.-Maximus and the *Corpus Parisinum* have appeared in recent years: the former by Sibylle Ihm (2001) and the latter by Denis Searby (2007).

Text 519 runs as follows: Θεοφράστον· οὐ γὰρ ἐξ ὁμιλίας δεῖ καὶ χάριτος τὰς τιμὰς, ἀλλ’ ἐκ τῶν πράξεων λαμβάνειν, “Theophrastus: For one ought not to get honors as a result of one’s manners and charm—or as a result of association and favor⁶²⁸—but as a result of deeds.” In Searby’s edition of the *Corpus Parisinum*, the saying is no. 3.497: Greek text on p. 286 of vol. 1 and the translation on p. 668 of volume 2. The saying is grouped together with another saying of Theophrastus concerning the need for and creation of laws (3.496 = 628). The collocation reflects the identity of attribution and not a similarity in content.

In Ihm’s edition of ps.-Maximus, the saying is found on p. 724 within a section that carries the heading Περὶ δόξης, “On Reputation” (PG col. 932C = p. 717 Ihm). In the text that precedes, we hear of an Indian archer, who enjoyed a great reputation. When Alexander asked him to demonstrate his skill, he refused and was condemned to death. He was, however, spared when Alexander learned that the archer was out of practice and preferred to die rather than appear unworthy of his

⁶²⁸ This alternative translation will be found in a footnote to the translation in the text-translation volumes.

reputation, τῆς δόξης ἀνάξιος φανῆναι. In the text that follows, Heraclitus is reported to have said that the shortest road to a good reputation, εἰς εὐδοξίαν, is to be good (= fr. 135 FVS 22 B 135 D–K). Our text 519 is also concerned with reputation, only now the word δόξα or some cognate fails to occur. Instead we hear of acquiring honors, τιμὰς λαμβάνειν.

519 can be regarded as either an ethical or political text. If we focus on politics, we may prefer to translate the phrase ἐξ ὁμιλίας ... καὶ χάριτος with “as a result of association and favor” (line 1). In other words, by making friends and doing favors for other people a person can gain honors, i.e. political office.⁶²⁹ Nevertheless, the translation “as a result of one’s manner and charm” is not inappropriate. For an ingratiating mode of interaction that approaches flattery can win honors including political office. I cite Aristotle’s *Politics*, in which we are told that in extreme democracies, demagogues are flatterers of the masses, and in tyrannies persons who adopt a submissive manner, ταπεινῶς ὁμιλοῦντες, are held in honor, ἔντιμοι, (5.9 1313b39–1314a1, cf. 4.4 1292a17).

Searby translates the phrase ἐξ ὁμιλίας with “from persuasion.” That is certainly possible. See LSJ s.v. ὁμιλία I.1, where the phrase is translated “by *persuasion* and opposed to βία.” In the earlier LS (1901, without J), the translation is fuller: “by talking, by persuasion.”⁶³⁰ The inclusion of “talking” is instructive, for it reminds us that interaction between human beings is above all verbal. Well-chosen words can be charming and effective in securing honors.⁶³¹ But human interaction is not exclusively verbal, and in the absence of context material I prefer to construe ὁμιλία widely so that it covers all kinds of pleasing interaction: whatever wins over other people/citizens and secures honors.

In regard to ethics and private life, different translations are again possible. By associating with people and doing them favors, a person can become an honored member of his society or circle. And the same is true if we think of the person who develops a pleasing manner that

⁶²⁹ Regarding τίμη used to refer to political office, see Aristotle, *Politics* 3.10 1281a31–32: “We say that the offices are τιμαί, and when the same people always hold office it is necessary that the others are without honor, ἄτιμοι.”

⁶³⁰ Both LS and LSJ cite Demosthenes, *Letters* 1.12 (1466): καὶ κρῖναι τί τῶν πραγμάτων ἐξ ὁμιλίας δυνατὸν προσαγαγέσθαι καὶ βίας προσδεῖται, “and to judge which of the affairs (objectives) can be advanced through persuasion (negotiation) and which requires force as well.” Cf. Plato’s *Sophist* 222C–D, where the προσομιλητική τέχνη is classified as a πιθανουργική τέχνη.

⁶³¹ There is nothing wrong *per se* with charming words, but when honors are awarded solely on the basis of charm without consideration of accomplishments, then we are apt to say, “Deeds, not words.” Cf. the opposition between deed and talk in 520.

is marked by charm. I prefer the latter interpretation, for it presents a clearer contrast with ἐκ τῶν πράξεων, “as a result of deeds” (line 2). Doing someone a favor is a deed: it is an act that benefits another. Manner and charm are different in that they are primarily stylistic and can be exhibited in a wide variety of deeds or actions, many of which provide no benefit. And in social interaction, a pleasing, charming manner can be inappropriate and misused in order to win oneself favor and honor. See Theophrastus’ *Characters*, where flattery is presented as a disgraceful mode of interaction, ὁμιλία αἰσχρὰ (2.1), and that is correct, whether or not the definition of flattery is deemed spurious.⁶³²

Caveat: The preceding comments have emphasized a pleasing manner. That is, I think, helpful in regard to understanding the saying before us. It also makes clear why we have printed the translation “as a result of one’s manner and charm” and given “as a result of association and favor” in a footnote. It should, however, be acknowledged that the printed translation is more of an interpretation and less literal than what appears in the footnote. The primary meaning of ὁμιλία is “interaction” or “association.” It can be honorable or disgraceful (see above), and it can be charming or unattractive, complaisant or offensive. The phrase ἐξ ὁμιλίας καὶ χάριτος involves two nouns, but we can and, I think, should understand the second noun as the more important. We could, as it were, rewrite the phrase as ἐξ ὁμιλίας χαριέσεως and regard the adjective as the important element.⁶³³ Either way, style or manner is being contrasted with actions or deeds, πράξεις (line 2), which ought to be the basis for receiving honors.

At first reading, it may appear that 519 contradicts what is said in 518, for in 518 χάρις is presented in a positive light. That cannot be said of 519. Nevertheless, the contradiction is only apparent. It depends on the fact that χάρις is used in two different senses. In 518, it is used of reciprocal favor, mutual kindnesses that hold together the lives of men. In 519, it refers to a mode of interaction, which can and often does come apart from praiseworthy behavior. And on the interpretation that I prefer, the emphasis is on charm, which includes superficial features like one’s appearance and manner of speech.⁶³⁴ Such features are, of course,

⁶³² See the discussion of the *Characters* above in III “Titles of Books” pp. 137–143.

⁶³³ Cf. Isocrates, *Antidosis* 204: ἐν ταῖς ὁμιλίαις χαριεστέρους ὄντας, “being more gracious in social interaction.”

⁶³⁴ See, e.g. Stobaeus, *Anthology* 2.7.23 p. 143.17–23 Wachsmuth and Dicaearchus, fr. 40.4–5 Mirhady.

desirable in a person of moral virtue, but in a person of poor character they are likely to result in undeserved honor and damaging influence.

I can imagine someone reacting negatively to 519 on the grounds that it is confusing: both ὁμιλία and χάρις can be used in different ways, so that the saying is ambiguous and seems to be concerned now with politics and now with ethics. Theophrastus could have done better. Such a reaction would be understandable, but it fails to take account of at least three things. First, the saying comes to us without context. Were it embedded in a political or ethical writing, the surrounding material might make clear—and immediately clear—how we should construe ὁμιλία and χάρις. Second, famous persons attract sayings; it is not impossible that an anthologist got hold of an unassigned saying and attributed it to Theophrastus, with or without good reason.⁶³⁵ That does not help with comprehension, but it does get Theophrastus off the hook. Third, in a saying, especially one selected by an anthologist, lack of clarity is not always bad. The occurrence of words that can be construed in more than one way may add interest, and the possibility of understanding the saying from more than one point of view may enlarge the appeal of the saying.

- 520 Ḥunayn ibn-Ishāq, “Sayings collected from the *Apophthegms of the Philosophers*, translated by Ḥunayn,” cod. Istanbul Köprülü 1608 f. 36^r v. 3–5 (RUSCH 2 [1985] p. 100 saying no. 29 Gutas)

Literature: Gutas (1985) p. 95

Text 520 is a short saying without context. It is preserved only in Arabic translation and only in a single manuscript. In English it runs as follows: “Theophrastus said: A small deed in recompense for good and evil⁶³⁶ is more (weighty) than a lot of talk, because talk is an accident that perishes, while a deed is a substance that endures.” The saying must be treated with caution for at least three reasons. First, the collection in which the saying is found depends upon an earlier Arabic collection, which in turn is

⁶³⁵ An excellent example of attributing a saying to a famous person without good reason is 22: “When his wife scolded him for not allowing his useless son to come near and said that (the son) was his, Theophrastus spat and said, ‘And indeed this too is mine, but it is not useful.’” Theophrastus never married and had no offspring, but he was regarded as fair game for a floating saying or anecdote, which is also assigned to Socrates, Aristippus and others. It is no. 6.78 in Searby’s new edition of the *Corpus Parisinum*.

⁶³⁶ In the text-translation volumes, “done” is printed in parentheses after “good and evil.” It was originally added to make clear that the adjectives refer not to the moral character of a person but rather to his deeds. Since the preceding mention of recompense makes the point by implication, the addition is unnecessary and should be omitted.

based on an unknown Greek source or sources. Errors in translation and copying as well as deliberate alterations can have occurred at either of the two stages. In addition, there is no guarantee that the Greek from which the Arabic translation was made goes back without error or alteration to Theophrastus. Indeed, it may be that the saying as a whole or in part should not be attributed to Theophrastus.

Second, the attribution to Theophrastus is not unambiguous. What the Arabic manuscript offers can be read as Theocritus. Confusing Theophrastus with Theocritus occurs elsewhere (see 474 with the *apparatus criticus* to that text) and could easily arise as one Arabic anthologist drew on another.⁶³⁷ But as historical figures, Theophrastus and Theocritus are quite distinct. To be sure, they were roughly contemporaries, but Theocritus was considerably younger and outlived Theophrastus by some twenty-eight years. More importantly, Theocritus was a poet and Theophrastus a philosopher. That is relevant to the attribution of 520, for the distinction between accident and substance in the closing clause suggests a philosophic and not a poetic author.

A third reason for caution is the very distinction between accident and substance. If we think of an accident as a non-essential attribute that characterizes a substance in the way that paleness qualifies a person (a pale man or woman), then the introduction of the accident-substance distinction seems sound. For just as paleness is apt to come and go, while the person endures, so talk has a short life, while a deed in recompense endures for a long time. And opposing a large amount of talk to a small deed introduces a contrast that serves to emphasize the difference in endurance: much talk has little endurance, whereas a small deed has a long-lasting effect. If we stop there, then the accident-substance distinction seems sound, but further reflection may give pause. For when we consider 1) that neither talk nor a deed in recompense is readily conceived of as a substance, and 2) that talk (praising a good deed and condemning a bad one) is itself a deed or action, i.e., a *πρᾶξις* that can exhibit good and bad judgment (522), then we may want to question the soundness of the accident-substance distinction. If the saying does in fact go back to Theophrastus, my guess is that it was put forward in a context that discouraged scrutiny (an exoteric dialogue?). Or perhaps the saying is the creation of a non-philosopher, who wanted to create a saying with a philosophic ring.

⁶³⁷ Gutas (1985) pp. 83, 95.

Here it might be objected that the above reflections miss the mark, for they ignore the elliptical nature of the saying. It is not simply a lot of talk and a small deed that are being contrasted. Rather it is their capacity to work an effect over time: hence the supplement “weighty” that has been added in parentheses to the translation. Talk (praise or condemnation) is soon forgotten, so that the subject of the talk soon ceases to benefit or suffer as a result of what was said. With deeds it is different. When we reward a person with money or elect him to office or put up a plaque in his honor, then our action is likely to have a positive effect that persists. And when we punish someone with a prison term or force him to submit to corporal punishment, then the negative consequences may be lasting, and that is true even if we imprison the person for a relatively short period or apply a mere hundred lashes. So much is, I think, correct, but it does little to remove the difficulties that accompany the accident-substance distinction.

From the above remarks, it should be clear that I am inclined to reject the attribution to Theophrastus. Nevertheless, it should be underlined that Theophrastus was keenly interested in proper recompense (the texts being discussed in this chapter on “Kindness, Honor and Vengeance” make that clear), so that in the absence of any further evidence (a text that assigns the same or a similar saying to someone other than Theophrastus) I prefer to leave the door ever so slightly ajar.

521 Stobaeus, *Anthology* 2.15.31 (vol. 2 p. 190.15–17 Wachsmuth)

Literature: Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 251–254; Millett (2007) p. 85

Text 521 is taken from the second book of Stobaeus’ *Anthology*. It occurs in Chapter 15, which carries the heading “on seeming and being and that a man ought not to be judged by his words but by his character, for in the absence of deeds all talk is superfluous” (p. 185.15–17). As usual, excerpts from poets come first (no. 1–28); excerpts from prose authors follow (no. 29–49). Text 521 comes third in the latter category and is preceded by an excerpt from Myson of Chen:⁶³⁸ “It is necessary to judge the actions (of a person) not from his words, but his words from his actions.” Following 521, there is an excerpt from Demosthenes: “All speech in the absence of action seems vain and empty.”⁶³⁹ 521 is of a piece in that it too emphasizes deeds or action over speech or words: οὐ τὸν

⁶³⁸ Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 1.13, 106–108 treats Myson alongside the Seven Sages.

⁶³⁹ The excerpt is from the *Second Olynthiac* 12.

βίον ἐκ τῆς τοῦ λόγου δεινότητος πιστοῦμεν, ἀλλὰ τὸν λόγον ἐκ τῆς περὶ τὸν βίον εὐταξίας, “We do not make our life trustworthy as a result of cleverness in speech, but our speech as a result of orderliness in our life.” Here the word βίος, “life,” is to be understood concretely, i.e., as the various actions that together make up a person’s life.

There are textual problems. Reading οὐ at the beginning (line 1) with the codex Parisinus seems certain in light of the contrast that follows (ἀλλά line 2). More problematic is the conjecture πιστοῦμεν (line 1) for πιστεύομεν, which is found in the manuscripts. Against the latter is the fact that with πιστεύειν one expects the dative. Of course, πιστεύειν can be used with an accusative plus infinitive and also elliptically with a simple accusative, but the Aristotelian examples cited in LSJ s.v. I.3 are not closely related to our text. They involve a neuter article, adjective and pronoun (*NE* 6.8 1142a19, *Pr. An.* 2.23 68b13, *GA* 1.2 716a7). Moreover, were we to read πιστεύομεν, we would need to flesh out τὸν βίον: e.g., we believe that the life of another person is truly noble, τὸν βίον ἄλλου ἀληθῶς καλὸν εἶναι, because of the orderliness of that life. Such fleshing out is common enough with excerpts, but it introduces unwanted speculation. I prefer, therefore, to follow Nauck and to read πιστοῦμεν, even though the middle form is usual. But whatever the correct reading, it is clear that 521 is taking account of the fact that clever speech—even a well-formulated philosophical argument—may be quite divorced from what a person does, and that noble words can conceal evil intentions (cf. *NE* 7.3 1147a18–24, 10.8 1178a30–31, *MM* 1.19 1190b1–6).⁶⁴⁰

A related text is codex Vaticanus 2306, fr. B. It is anonymous but may be Theophrastean, and for that reason it has been printed as **Appendix 7** in the second of the text-translation volumes. Toward the beginning of this text we read: κράτιστον δ’ εἴ τις ἐκ τῶν βίων καὶ τῆς ἀγωγῆς, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας λαμβάνει τὴν πίστιν, ὅπερ ἡ παιδεία καὶ τὰ ἔθνη τὰ χρηστά τῆς πολιτείας ἀποτελεῖ, “It is best if one (an elector) obtains trust (or confidence in the candidates’ qualifications) not from the property but from the lives and upbringing (of the candidates), and this is accomplished by the education and the good customs of the political

⁶⁴⁰ Or turning the matter round, words that lack cleverness or for some other reason fail to be persuasive can gain credence through the life or actions of their author. An example concerning ethical theory is provided by the tenth book of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. There we are told that the words or arguments of Eudoxus were trusted more on account of his virtuous character than on their own merits: ἐπιστεύοντο δ’ οἱ λόγοι διὰ τὴν τοῦ ἡθους ἀρετὴν μάλλον ἢ δι’ αὐτοῦς (1172b15–16).

arrangement" (lines 3–5). The phrase ἐκ τῶν βίων καὶ τῆς ἀγωγῆς (**Appendix 7** line 3) invites comparison with ἐκ τῆς περὶ τὸν βίον εὐταξίας (521.2). The idea that a person's life reveals his character is common to both texts. Only in 521, a person is said to gain trust for what he says, while in **Appendix 7** a person is best able to judge the character of a candidate through his life and upbringing. As **Appendix 7** continues, we read that in choosing a general one should observe whether a candidate possesses not only virtue and wealth but also, ἐμπειρία, experience (lines 13–15). After that experience is replaced by φρόνησις, practical wisdom (line 16), and still later practical wisdom is combined with δεινότης, cleverness, and distinguished from πίστις, trustworthiness (lines 24–25). At first reading—and assuming that **Appendix 7** is Theophrastean—there appears to be a difficulty here, for elsewhere Theophrastus seems to follow Aristotle and to maintain that moral virtue and practical wisdom imply each other (449A.31–37).⁶⁴¹ In **Appendix 7**, this mutual implication appears to be forgotten. The difficulty is, however, only apparent. In an ethical context, Theophrastus is apt to focus on full or perfect virtue and therefore to emphasize the mutual implication of moral virtue and practical wisdom.⁶⁴² In a political context, where the focus is on qualifications for office, he may use φρόνησις in a non-technical sense, combine it with δεινότης and separate it from the πίστις that is based on good character. A relationship to 521 is again clear. In both texts, cleverness, δεινότης is distinct from the trustworthiness, πίστις (πιστοῦμεν), that men acquire through virtuous character.

521 has an obvious relation to rhetoric. There is Aristotle's discussion of persuasion through speech, πίστις διὰ τοῦ λόγου (*Rhet.* 1.2 1356a1). Three kinds are recognized, of which one is persuasion through ἥθος, character. It is a means by which an orator makes himself or someone else ἀξιόπιστος (1.2 1356a5–6, 1.9 1366a25–28). Moreover, there is the δεινότης of an orator, to which reference is made already in the sophistic period. I cite Thucydides, who has Cleon warn against its negative effects (*Hist.* 3.37.5). Later Isocrates contrasts δεινότης in words with the character and life of a man, and states his preference for the latter (*Or.* 1 [*To Demonicus*].4,⁶⁴³ *Or.* 12 [*Panathenaicus*].87). What may cause con-

⁶⁴¹ See above, Section 3 "Virtue and Vice" on 449A *ad fin.*

⁶⁴² Although no text says so explicitly, we can, I think, assume that in an ethical context Theophrastus will have followed Aristotle in distinguishing between φρόνησις and δεινότης—the latter not being tied to moral virtue (*NE* 6.12 1144a22–b1).

⁶⁴³ *To Demonicus* 4 is part of an introduction to a paraenetic discourse. Isocrates (or ps.-Isocrates) states that he is going to advise Demonicus as to how he will gain

fusion is the later use of δεινότης as a technical term in regard to style. That usage is found in Demetrius Rhetor, who is not to be identified with Demetrius of Phalerum. The latter was a student of Theophrastus and secured land in Athens for the Peripatos. Demetrius Rhetor lived somewhat later, perhaps at the end of the third century BC and used δεινότης to refer to the forceful style. The usage is certainly of interest, but it is not to be confused with the use of δεινότης in 521.

Finally, I mention the comic playwright Menander who is said to have been the pupil of Theophrastus (18 no. 12). A surviving fragment runs τρόπος ἔσθ' ὁ πείθων τοῦ λέγοντος, οὐ λόγος, "The speaker's character is what persuades, not his words." (fr. 407/472). The fragment is closely related to 521, albeit more economical: τρόπος does the work of ἡ περὶ τὸν βίον εὐταξία, and λόγος does that of ἡ τοῦ λόγου δεινότης. There is, however, a difference. Menander's verse is focused on the credibility of what a speaker says and not the speaker's life. We might say that Menander's verse is a succinct description of rhetorical persuasion through character.

522 *Gnomologium Vaticanum* no. 325 (WSt vol. 10 [1888] p. 258 Sternbach)

Literature: Fortenbaugh (1984) p. 254; Millett (2007) p. 31

Text 522 (= no. 325 S) is one of 15 sayings that are grouped together and assigned to Theophrastus in codex Vaticanus 743. It comes fourth and is immediately preceded by 524 (= no. 324 S) and followed by 538E (= no. 326 S). The position of 522 after 524 might relate to the fact that both texts involve the adverbs καλῶς and κακῶς. But were that the case, then one would expect 525 (= no. 238) to be grouped together with 522 and 524, but it is not: two sayings intervene. As often with lists of sayings and excerpts, the surrounding material may be only loosely related or not at all. It follows that the surrounding material cannot be used except with considerable caution in interpreting any given saying or excerpt.

522 runs as follows: ὁ αὐτὸς ἐπαινεῖν καὶ κατηγορεῖν οὐ τοῦ τυχόντος ἔφη εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τοῦ διεληφότος περὶ ἀνθρώπου † καλῶς καὶ κακῶς, "The same man (Theophrastus) said that to praise and to blame are not the part of (do not belong to, are not properly carried out by) just

repute for good character. And this advice will actually set right or improve Demonicus' character, τὸν τρόπον ἐπανορθοῦν. Subsequently when Isocrates begins to offer this advice, he begins with recommendations (13–14) that invite comparison with 523. See the commentary on that text.

anyone, but rather of one who has distinguished the good and the bad in regard to man.” In the codex, the final words are corrupt, so that a *crux* has been placed between *περὶ ἀνθρώπου* and *καλῶς καὶ κακῶς*. Reading *περὶ ἀνθρώπου τὸ καλῶς καὶ κακῶς ἔχον* is a simple correction. Görgemanns would omit *ἔχον*, which is certainly possible and shortens the emendation, but only by one word. Either way, the translation presupposes such an emendation.

The person who has distinguished the good and the bad is not someone who has previously studied and reached a decision concerning some particular act that is going to be praised or blamed. Rather, the person is someone who has acquired a general understanding of what is praiseworthy and what calls for blame. To be sure, this understanding will be based *inter alia* on a study of particular cases, but the knowledge acquired through this study is general in the sense that it can be applied to new cases. The person in possession of this knowledge is above all the *φρόνιμος*, someone who has acquired practical wisdom (*NE* 1.5 1095b28, cf. 8.8 1159a22–24). Moreover, practical wisdom is tied to moral virtue, so that the *φρόνιμος* will not (except in extraordinary circumstances)⁶⁴⁴ choose to misrepresent a person’s accomplishments in order to benefit himself or someone else. That point is not made explicitly in 522, but it needs to be kept in mind, for people who shower praise or turn to blame may be clever—they have a good grasp of community standards and know how to invoke them—but they may be liars as well as lacking in goodwill (cf. Plato, *Protagoras* 337B4–7). Hence the epideictic orator is like the deliberative and judicial orator, in that he does not ignore persuasion through character. In offering praise and distributing blame, he will present himself as a person of wisdom, virtue and goodwill (*Arist., Rhet.* 2.1 1378a8).

On the use of praise in educating young people, see 467.4–7. Here too and perhaps more so, it is important not to leave the bestowal of praise to just anyone. The *φρόνιμος* must at very least provide oversight.

523 Stobaeus, *Anthology* 3.3.42 (vol. 3 p. 207.16–208.14 Hense)

Literature: Brandis (1860) p. 346; Bernays (1866) p. 74; Zeller (1879) p. 863; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1481; Pötscher (1964) pp. 48–50, 164; Schmidt (1965) pp. 88–94; Gottschalk (1969) p. 342; Fortenbaugh (1983)

⁶⁴⁴ On extraordinary circumstances, see the commentary on 534.

pp. 215–216, repr. pp. 127–130, (1984) pp. 254–256, (2003b) 183, 190–191; Wehrli-Wöhrle (2004 p. 549); Millett (2007) pp. 95–96; Tsouni (2010) p. 164

Text 523 occurs in Book 3, Chapter 3 of Stobaeus' *Anthology*. The chapter carries the heading Περί φρονήσεως, "On Practical Wisdom" and exhibits only imperfectly the usual division into excerpts drawn from the poets and those taken from prose writers.⁶⁴⁵ Our text is no. 42. It is preceded by an excerpt from Plutarch's treatise "*Whether Foreknowledge of Future Events is Beneficial*," in which practical wisdom is explained as a vision of events before they occur in order that they may be dealt with in the best possible way (no. 41 = Plutarch, fr. 23 Sandbach). And it is followed by Democritus' statement that the task of practical wisdom is to guard against future injustice (no. 43 = FVS 68 B 193). Practical wisdom is also under consideration in our text, but it is referred to explicitly only toward the end (twice in line 11⁶⁴⁶).

523 is an interesting and complicated text. It begins with a conclusion (τοίνυν line 1), touches on piety, justice, advantage and friendly relations in business transactions (lines 1–13), appears to be marred by a lacuna (line 10) and concludes with remarks that have been subjected to emendation (lines 10–13).⁶⁴⁷ That scholars have differed in their interpretations should be no surprise. In what follows, I shall record the differences, refer to Theophrastus works *On Piety* and *On Marriage* and resist assigning the text to a particular Theophrastean work.

Brandis cites the opening lines of the text: "Therefore the man who is going to be admired for his relationship to the divinity must be one who likes to sacrifice, not by offering large sacrifices but by honoring the divinity frequently, for the former is a sign of wealth and the latter of holiness" (lines 1–3). In citing these lines, Brandis p. 346 wants to support the claim that Theophrastus encourages a readiness to sacrifice, but does so only in so far as this readiness consists in a desire to honor the divinity and not in extravagant offerings. This claim, while unobjectionable in itself, has had the unwanted consequence of focusing attention on the opening lines of 523, so that on occasion the rest of the text has received little consideration. Bernays p. 74 and Pötscher (1964) pp. 48–50, 164 cite the lines focused on by Brandis and refer the text to the work

⁶⁴⁵ Excerpts no. 24–28 interrupt the poetical fragments.

⁶⁴⁶ Caveat: the line no. "10" in the text-translation volumes is misplaced. It stands next to line 9. Hence, what appears to be line 10 is in fact line 9 and so on.

⁶⁴⁷ In line 11, φρονιμωτέρου is an emendation. It is discussed later in this comment.

On Piety (580 no. 3). A relationship to *On Piety* is undeniable, but it is doubtful that the text is drawn from that work. The concluding lines concerning friendliness in business transactions (lines 10–13) have only the remotest connection with piety and are related by Zeller p. 863 n. 4 to the work *On Friendship* (436 no. 23). Again a connection is undeniable. The exhortation to exhibit caution when entering into a business contract invites comparison with the caution that should be observed when making friends (cf. φρονιμωτέρου [line 12] with *prudētis* in Rutilius Lupus, *On Figures* 1.6 = 538D.1). But even allowing for this connection, it seems highly unlikely that 523 as a whole is taken from the work *On Friendship*. Hence we may be attracted by other suggestions. Regenbogen col. 1481 asks whether 523 might belong to the work *Varieties of Virtue* (436 no. 7), which he thinks is identical with *On Virtue* (436 no. 8) and *On Education* or *On Virtue* or *On Temperance* (436 no. 9a). Gottschalk (1969) p. 342 names no particular work, but suggests that 523 is taken from a discussion of Justice, of which piety forms a part. This suggestion is compatible with answering Regenbogen's question in the affirmative. But whatever the source, it should be underlined that analyzing piety in terms of justice is known to us from the pseudo-Aristotelian work *On Virtues and Vices* (5125ob15–24) and from Arius' summary of Peripatetic ethics (Stobaeus, *Anthology* 2.7.25 p. 146.17 W). That Theophrastus offered a similar analysis seems likely. See Chapter III "Titles of Books" no. 7 as well as *Quellen* (1984) p. 271.

Although I am not prepared to follow Pötscher pp. 40–50 and to assign 523 to *On Piety*,⁶⁴⁸ I do think that Pötscher is correct in emphasizing the similarity between 523 and 584A both in wording and in content. Most important is the fact that in both texts piety is treated as a mean-disposition that is incompatible with extravagant spending.⁶⁴⁹ That said, I want to underline that being pious requires satisfying several criteria, of which only a few can be easily quantified.⁶⁵⁰ It is, for example, easy to quantify the size of a given sacrifice, the cost of a sacrifice and the frequency with which sacrifices are offered, but it is not easy to quantify the intention and attitude, which are fundamental to a pious act. Moreover, the quantitative criteria differ among themselves. Large and expensive sacrifices are not demanded (μὴ τῷ πολλὰ θύειν 523 line 2), because

⁶⁴⁸ Pötscher wants to place 523 immediately after the words μεγάλη τίς ἐστι τιμή 523 line 168.

⁶⁴⁹ See *Quellen* (1984) pp. 270–271.

⁶⁵⁰ That holds for all virtues. See Aristotle, *NE* 2.6 1106b21–23.

most people cannot afford them and they are compatible with unworthy motives. In contrast, frequent sacrifices are demanded (ἀλλὰ τῷ πυκνῷ τιμᾶν τὸ θεῖον 523 lines 2–3), for repeated prayers are typical of the pious individual. In other words, frequency in prayer and sacrifice is necessary, albeit not sufficient to establish piety.⁶⁵¹

Here a caveat is in order. Although 523 and 584A agree in emphasizing frequent sacrifice and good character as against large sacrifices that require large expenditure (cf. 523.1–3 with 584A.129–133, 142–144), we should hesitate before concluding that Theophrastus wanted to ban totally expensive sacrifices. To be sure, we are told, “what is neither holy nor inexpensive should never be sacrificed, even if it is at hand” (584A.132–133). But this injunction is put forward in the context of animal sacrifice. Indeed, we are immediately told, “animals do not belong to the class of things easily acquired and inexpensive” (584A.134). In a different context, especially an esoteric treatise that discussed virtue at some length, Theophrastus may well have followed Aristotle and stated that the magnificent individual, the μεγαλοπρεπής, will on occasion engage in honorable sacrifices (NE 4.2 1122b19–20). He will consider his own means and not avoid a large expenditure, if it is appropriate to the occasion and to his own situation (1122b25–26).

Interesting are the remarks of Schmidt pp. 88–94, who focuses on similarities between the pseudo-Aristotelian *Virtues and Vices* 5 1250b15–24 and Aristoxenus’ *Pythagorean Sayings*, fr. 33–34 W. Schmidt thinks that these texts depend on a common source and suggests that the source is to be found in the ethical writings of Theophrastus. In support of this suggestion, Schmidt cites the first half of 523 (lines 1–7). That includes the remarks on caring for one’s parents and not violating the laws of nature and the city-state (lines 3–7). In addition, he compares Plato’s *Laws* 4.8 717A–B and comes to the conclusion that originally the opening portion of 523 followed remarks concerning gods and daemons. In the *Laws*, heroes are also mentioned, but since they are not referred to by either pseudo-Aristotle or Aristoxenus, Schmidt assumes that Theophrastus passed them over.

In my earlier commentary on Theophrastus’ ethics, I responded to Schmidt’s remarks with some words of caution. I allowed the possibility

⁶⁵¹ The idea of frequent sacrifice invites comparison with 584A.129–133, where the focus is on sacrificing what is inexpensive and easy to come by. The latter is said to be available for continual piety, πρὸς συνεχῇ εὐσέβειαν ἔτομον.

that a Theophrastean text might stand behind Aristoxenus, fr. 33–34—both 523 and the fragments of Aristoxenus are alike in moving from divinities to parents and laws, and there are noticeable similarities in expression⁶⁵²—but also suggested that both authors might be developing a topic and expressing themselves in a way that was common among the Peripatetics. In addition, I suggested that we need additional evidence before assuming that Theophrastus anticipated Aristoxenus in constructing a Pythagorean ethics on the basis of Academic-Peripatetic material. Our text contains no historical material and in itself cannot count as evidence of Theophrastean interest in Pythagorean ethics (*Quellen* [1984] pp. 255–256). I do not want to withdraw my comment in its entirety,⁶⁵³ but I do want to replace the first half of my comment with a reference to an article by Carl Huffman, who has argued convincingly that Aristoxenus' *Pythagorean Sayings*—from which fr. 34 derives—is not a creation of Aristoxenus, who is drawing on an earlier non-Pythagorean source.⁶⁵⁴ On the contrary, the *Sayings* reports Pythagorean doctrine as it was taught in the fourth century BC. If Huffman is correct, and I believe that he is, then the idea that Theophrastus might stand behind fr. 34 (and we may add fr. 33, which contains similar material) should be discarded. That does not mean, however, that what text 523 says about sacrifice, parents and law is based on Pythagorean teachings. The ideas were widespread and such that Theophrastus would embrace them quite apart from any consideration of Pythagorean teaching.

Stefan Schorn has pointed out to me that 523 may be classified as paraenetic literature, i.e., literature in which a series of precepts are presented succinctly with a view to virtuous living. As an example he

⁶⁵² Cf. the use of *κατασκευάζειν* in 523 lines 4–5 with Aristoxenus, fr. 33 p. 18.10 W.

⁶⁵³ It remains true that our text *by itself* is weak evidence for Theophrastean interest in Pythagorean ethics. Moreover, in our section on “Ethics,” only one text names Pythagoras (483.2). In the commentary on that text, I suggest that Theophrastus may have discussed the idea of likening oneself to god from a historical perspective and begun with Pythagoras, but that is speculation. Stronger evidence for an interest in Pythagorean ethics is provided by the work *On Piety*. In the text-translation volumes, the fragments are printed under the heading “Religion” and contain an explicit reference to the Pythagoreans (584A.312). There is also an explicit reference to Empedocles (584A.178), whose Pythagorean connections are not to be doubted (Diogenes Laertius 8.54–56). And quite apart from such references, it is difficult to imagine Theophrastus ignoring the Pythagoreans while discussing animal sacrifice and abstinence from eating flesh. Indeed, Wehrli (1965) p. 223 suggests that *On Piety* was a dialogue in which a Pythagorean had a speaking role.

⁶⁵⁴ See above, Chapter III “Titles of Books” no. 14 *On Good Fortune ad fin.*

has called my attention to (pseudo?) Isocrates' address *To Demonicus*.⁶⁵⁵ The address divides into three parts of which the first is introductory. We learn that Demonicus is the son of Hipponicus, who is now dead. The work is said to be a proof of Isocrates' goodwill toward the son and a sign of friendship with the father (1–12). The second part contains a string of precepts, which if followed will lead Demonicus to virtue and win him high repute (13–43). The third part is a kind of epilogue. Isocrates allows that some of the precepts included in the second part do not apply at the present time but will as Demonicus matures. Emphasis is placed on the pleasure that follows on virtuous toil, and Demonicus is enjoined not only to abide by the precepts already set forth but also to acquaint himself with the poets and other wise persons (44–52).

Of special interest are sections 3–5, which occur within the introductory portion. There Isocrates refers to persons who write protreptic discourses (προτρεπτικοὶ λόγοι 3), which are directed toward their friends. These authors are said to undertake a noble task, but others perform a more important one. For they instruct young persons in the ways that win repute for good character. They are said to provide a greater benefit than those (the first mentioned) who only exhort (παρακαλοῦσιν 4) their readers in regard to speech. Not surprisingly Isocrates aligns himself with those who provide the greater benefit. He says that he has written a paraenetic work (παραίνεσις 5), and that he intends to counsel Demonicus concerning the goals for which young people ought strive, what actions they should avoid, with what sort of people they should associate, and how they should organize their lives. In general, the contrast here is between a rhetorical education that aims to convey cleverness in speech (δεινότης ἐν τοῖς λόγοις 4) and a basic moral education that aims to improve character (τὸν τρόπον ἐπανορθοῦν 4). The references to protreptic discourses (προτρεπτικοὶ λόγοι 4) and to hortatory address (παρακαλεῖν 4, παράκλησις 5) refer especially to sophistic tracts that are intended to win young men to the study of rhetoric. The reference to paraenetic address (παραίνεσις 5) refers to the bundle of precepts that makes up the second part of *To Demonicus*.⁶⁵⁶

⁶⁵⁵ Whether *To Demonicus* is genuine has been long debated. For arguments pro and con, see J.E. Sandys, *Isocrates, Ad Demonicum et Panegyricus* (London: Rivington 1872) pp. xxxi–xl. The debate remains open. David Mirhady (the most recent translator), *Isocrates I* (Austin: University of Texas 2000) p. 19 accepts the attribution to Isocrates, but A. Marlierbe, *Moral Exhortation, A Greco-Roman Sourcebook* (Philadelphia: Westminster 1986) pp. 19, 125 does not.

⁶⁵⁶ LSJ s.v. παράκλησις II cites the Isocratean passage in question and distinguishes

Toward the conclusion of the introduction, Isocrates tells Demonicus that he should imitate and emulate his father's virtue and style of life. And that requires a mind that is full of noble precepts. Accordingly, Isocrates announces that he will set out concisely certain practices through which Demonicus can make the most progress toward virtue and also win high repute among all other men (12). What follows is the paraenesis proper (13–43), and it is largely in line with Isocrates' announcement. The number of individual precepts is not especially large, and the individual precepts, although they vary in length, are comparatively concise. For our purposes, the beginning of the paraenetic segment, sections 13–14, is important. In translation it runs:

13) First, then, be pious in regard to matters concerning the gods, not only engaging in sacrifices but also remaining true to oaths. For the former is a sign of material prosperity, but the latter is proof of fine and good character. Honor always the divine, and do so especially on civic occasions. For in this way you will be thought both to sacrifice to the gods and to abide by the laws. 14) Be the kind of person toward your parents that you would pray your children might be toward you (1.13–14).

These lines exhibit striking similarities to the initial two-thirds of 523. I shall mention five.

1) Both the text of Isocrates and that of Theophrastus begin with a transitional word or phrase—*πρῶτον ... οὖν*, “first then” (*Dem.* 13) and *τοίνυν*, “therefore” (523 line 1)—which indicates a connection with what precedes. In the case of *To Demonicus* the connection is clear. Isocrates has said that he will set out practices that will be useful to Demonicus and marks the transition to these practices with *πρῶτον ... οὖν*. It is impossible to say with certainty what preceded the Theophrastean fragment, but we might take a cue from the Isocratean text and guess that the preceding material was in some way introductory to or explanatory of the precepts that follow.

between *παράκλησις* as a mere address to feelings and *παραίνεσις* as counsel to act rightly. This way of construing *παραίνεσις* is encouraged by the use of *συμβουλεύειν* that follows (5). For discussion of the distinction between protreptic discourse and paraenesis, see, e.g., Marlherbe, *op. cit.* pp. 122–125 (a portion of *To Demonicus* [9–15] is printed in translation on pp. 125–126), J. Gammie, “Paraenetic Literature: Toward the Morphology of a Secondary Genre” in *Paraenesis: Act and Form*, ed. L. Perdue and J. Gammie (Atlanta: Scholars Press 1990) pp. 41–77 (on *To Demonicus* pp. 51, 55) and A. Grözinger, *Historisches Wörterbuch der Rhetorik* vol. 6 (2003) col. 552–553.

2) Both texts begin by focusing on sacrifice (*Dem.* 13; 523 lines 1–3) and then move on to parents and children: the importance of caring for one's parents is recognized as is the care that children may return at a later time (*Dem.* 14; 523 lines 3–10). Beginning a series of action-guiding precepts with recommendations concerning the gods, parents and children seems entirely proper (one might say in accordance with nature), and that adds some (modest) support to the preceding guess: like *To Demonicus* 13–14, text 523 begins a list of precepts that was at one time preceded by introductory material.

3) In connection with sacrifices, both texts take note of wealth. Theophrastus is explicit in denying the importance of large, expensive sacrifices. He puts the emphasis squarely on character, *οσιότης*, holiness (523 lines 2–3). Isocrates' view is not very different. He writes, *μη̄ μόνον θύων, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ὅρκοις ἐμμένων· ἐκεῖνο μὲν γὰρ τῆς τῶν χρημάτων εὐπορίας σημεῖον, τοῦτο δὲ τῆς τῶν τρόπων καλοκαγαθίας τεκμήριον*. “not only sacrificing but also keeping your oaths, for the former is a sign of material affluence and the latter a proof of noble and good character” (*Dem.* 13). The *μη̄ μόνον—ἀλλὰ καὶ* construction puts the emphasis on the second half as does the use of *τεκμήριον* in combination with *τῶν τρόπων καλοκαγαθίας*. And that is line with later remarks in which Isocrates diminishes the importance of wealth. E.g., after telling *Demonicus* to believe that many precepts are more important than many possessions (i.e., wealth), he explains that the latter are quickly lost, while the former persist through all time (19). Still later he enjoins *Demonicus* not to delight in the excessive possession of goods but rather in the moderate use of such things (27). Why then does Isocrates characterize sacrifice as a sign of affluence? The answer is, I think, simple. Sacrifice can be and often is an indication of wealth. Isocrates adds no qualifier concerning appropriate size, because the precepts that he is stringing together are intended to be brief. Moreover, wealth attracts attention and is important to persons who wish not only to acquire a reputation for generosity but also to be admired for honorable sacrifices.⁶⁵⁷ Isocrates sees nothing wrong with that. In the introduction, he acknowledges repeatedly the importance of good repute⁶⁵⁸ and in what follows he sees in good repute a motive for

⁶⁵⁷ On honorable sacrifices, see above, this comment on the magnificent individual *NE* 4.2 1122b19–20.

⁶⁵⁸ In the introduction, he speaks positively of persons who strive for distinction (*τοὺς δόξης ὀρεγόμενους* 1) and of those who benefit young persons by advising them how to

practicing self-control (21).⁶⁵⁹ None of this is foreign to Theophrastus. He not only counts wealth and reputation among the external goods⁶⁶⁰ but also believes that a young person's desire for praise can play an important role in education. The virtues, he says, are established through praise and subsequently increased (developed) by being stirred with pride (fr. 467.5–7). And at the beginning of 523 he recognizes reputation as a motivating factor in regard to piety. He says that the man who is going to be admired (τὸν μέλλοντα θαυμασθήσεσθαι line 1) for his relationship to the divinity must be one who likes to sacrifice.

4) In both texts, the authors add explanations.⁶⁶¹ That is of some importance, for it suggests that neither Isocrates nor Theophrastus is satisfied with simple directives. A paraenetic address is directed toward a human being, and human beings by nature want explanations when they are told how they should act. And that is true not only of mature adults but also of children and generally young people who have not fully matured and lack experience. In this regard, it is worth remembering that when Aristotle speaks of admonishing slaves he recommends adding an explanation. He thinks that slaves (i.e., “natural” slaves) lack the capacity to reason for themselves, but they can follow the explanations offered by their masters, and as a result they are more amenable to orders.⁶⁶² The situation is not very different in dealing with children and generally young people. Their ability to reason is less than fully developed, but they can appreciate appropriate explanations and hence are more likely to accept precepts to which an explanation is added. Caveat: I am not claiming that in *To*

win repute as men of good character (4). At the end of the introduction, he says that the practices that he is going to recommend will result in good repute (εὐδοξμῆσαι 12).

⁶⁵⁹ Isocrates tells Demonicus that he will attain self-control, if he recognizes as gain those things through which he will acquire good repute (21).

⁶⁶⁰ Concerning external goods, see the introduction to Section 7 on “Fortune and Goods and Evils outside the Soul.”

⁶⁶¹ In 523 γὰρ, “for,” is used four times to introduce an explanation. In *Dem.* 13, γὰρ occurs twice. It is prominent throughout *Dem.* 13–43, but as *Dem.* 14 makes clear not every precept is followed by an explanation introduced by γὰρ. In *Dem.* 14, the second half of the precept does double duty. It is needed to explain how Demonicus is to conduct himself towards his parents. It also provides (or more cautiously, implies) an explanation why Demonicus should treat his parents well: if he does so, his children are likely to treat him well.

⁶⁶² Slaves are able to perceive or appreciate reason (*Pol.* 1.2 1254b22–23). Hence, we should admonish them even more than we do children (*Pol.* 1.13 1260b5–7) and not withhold reasoning when we punish them (*Rhet.* 2.3 1380b18–20). See *Aristotle on Emotion* (London: Duckworth 1975a, repr. 2002) pp. 54–55.

Demonicus every precept is accompanied by an explanation. Some are not, but the majority are, so that it is reasonable to count explanation as a point of agreement between the Isocratean and Theophrastean texts.

5) Both texts make use of the second person singular imperative. As befits an address directed toward a particular individual, Isocrates uses this form in the opening sections of the paraenetic portion (*Dem.* 13–14) and continues to use it throughout (14–43).⁶⁶³ After that he comments on the precepts and urges *Demonicus* to achieve nobility in his behavior (44–52). Second person address recedes, and in the final two sections we find δέῃ plus an infinitive (51, 52) as well as the pronoun τις. In 523 Theophrastus also makes use of the second person singular imperative, but not immediately. At the beginning and for three-quarters of the text, the second person imperative does not occur: we have an impersonal construction involving χρή plus infinitive, the verbal ending in -έον, and finite verbs in the third person (lines 1–10). Only at the conclusion, does the second person imperative appear: πειρῶ “try” (line 10). If we take *To Demonicus* as our guide, we might say that lines 1–10 are excerpted from an introduction that precedes advice directed at an individual in the second person.⁶⁶⁴ Tempting perhaps, but there is no good reason to think that Theophrastus follows Isocrates in every detail,⁶⁶⁵ and I know of no rule according to which second person imperatives must be used throughout a paraenetic address. It is, I think, more likely that we have in 523 a case of variation intended to avoid monotony. If Theophrastus is addressing a particular individual, then lines 10–13 address that individual in the second person, while lines 1–10 offer advice but in a more general format. And if Theophrastus is addressing a wider audience with no particular individual in mind, then the second person imperative is a simple (ordinary language) variation for “one ought.”

Hense marks a lacuna in line 10. That is not unreasonable when one considers the rather striking jump from god and family (lines 1–10) to lend-

⁶⁶³ For an exception, see, e.g., *Dem.* 25: ἄριστα χρήσει τοῖς φίλοις, “You will use or treat your friends best.”

⁶⁶⁴ Cf. *Dem.* 5: ὅν χρή τοῖς νεωτέρους ὀρέγεσθαι etc. The words occur early in the introductory portion of *To Demonicus*, where Isocrates tells the addressee in general terms what he will be recommending.

⁶⁶⁵ At one time or another, Theophrastus may well have read *To Demonicus*; he may have studied it with care. But it would be reckless to think that Theophrastus chose *To Demonicus* as a model, from which deviation is a failing.

ing money (lines 10–13). The lacuna might be attributed to Stobaeus or to his source or to transmission. Moreover, since neither the length of the lacuna nor its content can be determined with certainty, we might declare further discussion otiose. I am sympathetic to such a position, but equally I think it important to take note of an unstated assumption: namely, that paraenetic addresses ought to proceed and regularly do proceed in an orderly manner. For persons with a well-ordered mind, the assumption has its appeal, but I know of no rule according to which a paraenetic address must be so ordered that related subjects follow each other. Indeed, in *To Demonicus*, immediately following the precepts concerning gods, parents and children, Isocrates jumps to physical exercises that promote health,⁶⁶⁶ and from there to violent laughter (15). Subsequently he returns to gods and parents (16). Those of us with a penchant for coherent arrangement may want to fault Isocrates for jumping about. Or we might guess that he drew upon an existing collection that was already jumbled. But in the texts before us, it seems prudent to keep in mind that our preferences may not be those of the authors.⁶⁶⁷ Indeed, it might be helpful to recall that Aelian defends jumping about as a way to prevent boredom.⁶⁶⁸ But of course, he lived many centuries after Isocrates and Theophrastus.

A possible concern is the lack of a transitional word in line 10 of 523, i.e. at the beginning of the precept concerning the loaning of money. In what precedes transitional words are used to mark the move from sacrifice to parents (ἐπειτα, “then,” line 3) and from parents to wife and children (καὶ μὴν, “furthermore,” line 7), so that one is apt to feel the absence of such a word or expression in line 10. And that in turn might encourage one to mark a lacuna. But again I know of no rule requiring transitional words between each and every precept. Moreover, if *To Demonicus* is our guide, then we can assert that precepts independent of one another need no transitional word.⁶⁶⁹ That does not mean that

⁶⁶⁶ Wefelmeier p. 15 n. 1 describes the jump as *völlig überraschend*.

⁶⁶⁷ I am not suggesting that either Isocrates or Theophrastus regularly ignored coherent arrangement. My point is simply that a preference that is appropriate in certain contexts may not hold or be in play everywhere. Paraenetic address is a case in point. As Gammie (*op.cit.* pp. 49, 52) observes, unconnected sayings occur frequently in paraenesis.

⁶⁶⁸ Aelian, *On the Nature (Peculiarities) of Animals* p. 435.4–18 Hercher.

⁶⁶⁹ Wefelmeier p. 12 is correct to see two precepts in section 13. The second, which begins with the imperative τίμα, “honor,” lacks a connecting particle and offers its own explanation just as the first precept does (in both cases the explanation is marked by γὰρ).

Hense is wrong to posit a lacuna. There may be one, but the absence of a transitional word is not proof. What we can say is that the use of transitional words in lines 1–10 suggests that Theophrastus viewed the material as a unit, and the fact that line 10 lacks a transitional word suggests a new beginning or unit.

Noteworthy is the repeated use of words having the same root in the last sentence of our text. Initially we are confronted with an adjective and an adverb sharing the root *φρον-*: “It is characteristic of the wiser man, *φρονιμωτέρου*, to put out money wisely, *φρονίμως*” (line 11). The repetition underlines the need for sound judgment in financial transactions and generally in doing business.⁶⁷⁰ After that come three adverbs, each of which begins with *φιλ-*: “and regain it on friendly terms, *φιλικῶς*, rather than to contract with benevolence, *φιλανθρώπως*, and then recover the loan with hostility, *φιλαπεχθημόνως*” (lines 13–14). After the first two adverbs which have a quite positive connotation, the occurrence of the third with its negative connotation makes a strong impression, as does the combining of two roots, *φιλ-* and *ἐχθ-*, that are normally opposed. Perhaps the anthologist was so taken by the collocation of these three adverbs each beginning with *φιλ-* as well as the preceding pair beginning with *φρον-*, that he jumped over intervening material and ended his excerpt with this striking (and in my judgment, conscious) display of style.

It should be pointed out that *φρονιμωτέρου* in line 11 is an emendation proposed by Cobet (see the *apparatus criticus*). Hense finds the two words *φρονιμωτέρου* and *φρονίμως* (both in line 11) suspicious and asks whether the words are not attributable to the anthologist, who wished to justify bringing 523 under the heading *Περὶ φρονησεως*.⁶⁷¹ Hense suggests reading *όσιωτέρου* instead of *φρονιμωτέρου*. Questioning the received text is understandable, for in the preceding lines there is no explicit mention of either *φρόνησις* or the *φρόνιμος*. Nevertheless, the emendation *φρονιμωτέρου* is only a slight departure from the transmitted text, and Gottschalk is almost certainly correct in saying that the occurrence of *φρονιμωτέρου* and *φρονίμως* explains the inclusion of 523 in a chapter whose heading is *Περὶ φρονησεως*, and not the other way round. In addition, the occurrence of *φρονιμωτέρου* and *φρονίμως*

⁶⁷⁰ Concerning the importance of sound judgment in doing business, see Stobaeus, *Anth.* 2.7 p. 146.18, 147.9–12 W and 4.2.20 p. 130 H = 680.39–43.

⁶⁷¹ See above, this comment *ad init.*

are quite at home in their sentence—making wise decisions is important when dealing with money (lines 11–12)⁶⁷²—and in no way incompatible with what precedes. The man who is pious and just (lines 1–7) also acts with wisdom.

In conclusion, I want to underline that lines 3–10 of 523 are of special importance, for they contradict the negative remarks concerning wives and children that are found in Jerome's *Against Jovinian* 1.47–48 = 486. In 523 we are told that wives are to be treated well and humanely, because during sickness and in the daily management of the household good treatment is returned. In 486.51–59 we find a quite different view: for household management, slaves are better than wives, and in sickness friends and slaves are to be preferred. In addition, 523 tells us that children who have been well cared for take care of their aged parents. In contrast, 486.69–74 expressly rejects the idea that children will be a help in old age. Almost certainly, 486 is not presenting Theophrastus' considered view. See the commentary on that text.

Much closer to Theophrastus' view is what we read in the so-called third book of the pseudo-Aristotelian *Οἰκονομικά*, *Matters of Household Management*. There the partnership of a married couple is viewed as *sanctus* (p. 141.27–28 R³) and the same is true in regard to raising children, who will care for their parents in their old age (p. 143.1–4). A man of sound mind does not forget the honors that he owes to his parents, his wife and his children, for in giving to each what is appropriate he becomes *iustus* and *sanctus* (p. 144.3–6). That does not mean that the third book is to be attributed to Theophrastus.⁶⁷³ It can, however, and in my judgment does reflect Theophrastean thought better than 486.⁶⁷⁴

⁶⁷² Aristotle tells us that in business matters a generous individual is easy to deal with. For not valuing money, he can be treated unjustly (*NE* 4.1 1121a4–5). That is not to deny that generosity is an admirable trait: it involves a good attitude toward using one's substance to assist others. But unless it is joined with practical reason, φρόνησις, the generous individual is apt to spend his substance in a way that he will come to regret. Hence generosity as a virtue is not to be separated from practical wisdom.

⁶⁷³ Rose (1863) p. 644 connects the third book with *Regulations for Man and Wife*, which is no. 166 (p. 88 Düring) in Hesychius' catalogue of Aristotelian works. Regenbogen col. 1488 (cf. col. 1522) agrees with K. Praechter, *Hierokles der Stoiker* (Leipzig 1901) p. 131 ff., who regards the book as colorless and late.

⁶⁷⁴ On wives and household management, see (in addition to 486) 661–662 and 564.

524 *Gnomologium Vaticanum*, no. 324 (WSt vol. 10 [1888] p. 527 Sternbach)

525 *Gnomologium Vaticanum*, no. 328 (WSt vol. 10 [1888] p. 529 Sternbach)

Literature: Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 257–258; Millett (2007) p. 91

Both 524 and 525 are sayings attributed to Theophrastus. They are found along with 13 other sayings in codex Vaticanus 743. Both of the sayings concern remembering good and bad treatment. Despite the common theme, 524 and 525 are not placed side by side in the codex, but that is of little or no significance in a collection of sayings such as the one before us (see the commentary on 522). Neither 524 nor 525 gives a context for the words attributed to Theophrastus.

In 524 Theophrastus advises against treating the masses either well or badly. The text runs as follows: ὁ αὐτὸς ἔφη τοῖς ὄχλοις μήτε καλῶς μήτε κακῶς ποιεῖν “κακῶς μὲν γὰρ πάθοντες εἰς τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον μνημονεύουσιν, εὐεργετηθέντες δὲ παραχρῆμα ἐπιλανθάνονται,” “The same man (Theophrastus) said to treat the masses neither well nor badly. ‘For if they are ill-treated they remember forever, but if they have been done a service they forget immediately.’” In his notes on this text, Sternbach refers to Seneca, *On Benefits* 1.1.8. There we are told that we ought not to benefit a person in an insulting manner, for human nature is so constituted that injuries make a deeper impression than kindnesses; the latter pass quickly out of the mind, while the former are tenaciously preserved in memory: *nam ... ita natura comparatum sit, ut altius iniuriae quam merita descendant et illa cito defluant, has tenax memoria custodiat*. A relationship to 524 is obvious, but it would be a mistake to assume that the context in Seneca (doing a favor in an insulting manner) is a guide to the context from which 524 is taken. Moreover, while Seneca is making a point about human nature in general, the Theophrastean saying focuses on the masses, ὄχλοι (line 1). That gives 524 an aristocratic slant, which suggests that the saying may have originated in a political context. But as with so many sayings, it is hard not to wonder whether the saying has been assigned to Theophrastus by an anthologist, who had little interest in the correctness of the assignation and even less in identifying a particular work like *On Kindness* (436 no. 24) in which the saying might have occurred.

Text 525 runs as follows: ὁ αὐτὸς ἔφη δεῖν μᾶλλον μνημονεύειν ὑφ’ ὧν καλῶς τις πέπονθεν ἢ ὑφ’ ὧν κακῶς· καὶ γὰρ τὸ εὐχαριστεῖν τοῦ τιμωρεῖσθαι βελτίονος ἤθους εἶναι, “Theophrastus said that one ought more to remember by whom one has been well-treated than (to

remember) by whom (one has been) ill-treated. For, indeed, expressing thanks belongs to a better character than avenging oneself.” That expressing thanks is a mark of better character (ἡθὺς line 3) than seeking revenge needs no special comment. I shall only underline that 525 presents a comparison (μᾶλλον ... ἢ lines 1–2), which does not totally rule out remembering ill treatment and avenging oneself (τιμωρεῖσθαι line 2).⁶⁷⁵ We know that Theophrastus wrote a work *On Retribution* (Περὶ τιμωρίας 436 no. 22), and in 517 we read that vengeance (τιμωρία) is one of three things that hold together the life of human beings. If remembering and returning a favor exhibit good character, so too a desire to revenge an evil deed may manifest a praiseworthy disposition. To be sure, all or almost all persons desire to avenge perceived injustice, because they have a natural capacity for anger. But persons who are well brought up exhibit virtue by seeking revenge on the right occasions and doing so in the right way. See 526 and the commentary on 436 no. 22.

526 Stobaeus, *Anthology* 3.19.12 (vol. 3 p. 532.1–13 Hense)

Literature: Rose (1863) p. 111; Zeller (1879) p. 862; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 258–259, (1993) pp. 451–455, repr. pp. 166–170; Millett (2007) p. 76

Text 526 occurs in the third book of Stobaeus’ *Anthology* within a chapter whose heading is Περὶ ἀνεξικακίας, “On Forbearance.” The division whereby poetry comes first followed by prose is not perfectly maintained. Our text follows two stray excerpts from poets: Sophocles’ *Ajax* 1357 and Theognis, *Elegies* 695–696. The latter is of some interest, for the poet urges his θυμός to be patient. That connects with 526, in which θυμός is the cause of hasty action. But in the verses of Theognis, θυμός is used generally of the soul and its desires, while in 526 θυμός is used narrowly for strong anger or rage. The excerpt that follows 526 is taken from Epictetus, presumably quoting his teacher Rufus. Again the excerpt is of interest, for as in 526 revenging oneself, τιμωρεῖσθαι, is under consideration. The Spartan King Lycurgus is said to have been blinded in one eye by a youth, who was then turned over to him, in order that he

⁶⁷⁵ The translation that is printed in the text-translation volumes may be misleading, in that the use of “rather ... than” might be thought to deny any value to remembering ill treatment. But that is not what is being recommended. The issue is one of degree, so that above I have used “more ... than” in translating the saying.

might avenge himself as he wished. Lycurgus amazed the Spartans, for he did not take revenge. Rather, he educated the youth so that he became a good person: παιδεύσας δὲ αὐτὸν καὶ ἀποφήνας ἄνδρα ἀγαθόν. Here reformation trumps retribution, and of that there is no hint in 526.

Our text 526 is concerned with anger (ὀργή/θυμός lines 1–2), an emotion that has revenge as its goal.⁶⁷⁶ It is experienced by an individual when he believes that he has been wronged. He wants justice (δίκη line 6), and in 526 that means doing harm (βλάπτειν line 7) to the offender. The offence and the revenge may take place within the household and concern one's property: e.g., slaves (οἰκέται line 5) may have done some wrong. But there are others (ἄλλοι line 5): some will be acquaintances and some will be strangers. As offenders they are considered enemies (ἐχθροί lines 6, 10), whom one seeks to chastise (κολάζειν line 10). Only, one should not act in haste. For the person who seeks revenge immediately after being wronged acts without deliberation and all too often does something that he will later regret. In taking revenge, he injures himself and ends up paying a penalty (δίκη line 8) no less than extracting one.

The shift from ὀργή to θυμός, “anger” to “rage” (lines 1–2), is of importance. Like Aristotle, Theophrastus was not against all episodes of anger. He recognized that anger can be a reasonable response and that there are occasions when taking revenge is noble.⁶⁷⁷ However, Theophrastus also recognized that emotions can be excessive (449A.13) and that anger is no exception. Hence, in the work *On Emotions*, he distinguished between ὀργή and θυμός, anger and rage, on the basis of the more and the less (438.6–8). In 526 Theophrastus concentrates on excessive anger, i.e., θυμός, which is marked by heat and swiftness (cf. Aristotle *NE* 7.6 1149a30). Such anger rules out πρόνοια, forethought (line 2, cf. *NE* 5.8 1135b26) and causes a person to do what he would not have done, had he taken time to reflect on his course of action (cf. 441.3–5, 9).

The use of φρόνιμος (line 1) may be compared with its use in 523.12. In both texts its use concerns thoughtful, cautious behavior: the φρόνιμος is the person who lends money and takes revenge without harmful consequences. The focus here is practical and largely amoral (cf. 527A–B), but the forethought in question is entirely compatible with practical wisdom, i.e., φρόνησις in combination with ἠθικὴ ἀρετή.

⁶⁷⁶ See the introduction to Section 2 “Emotions,” item no. 3.

⁶⁷⁷ See Chapter III “Titles of Books” no. 22 *On Retribution* 436 no. 22.

The phrase τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων τὰς τιμωρίας, “revenge for misdeeds” (line 4), takes no account of the Aristotelian distinction between actions attributable to ignorance, ἁμαρτήματα, and actions that are unjust, ἀδικήματα (NE 5.8 1135b11–27). That does not mean, however, that Theophrastus rejected the distinction. In another context, he will have turned his attention to different kinds of harm and explained ἁμαρτήματα as harms due to ignorance and therefore not to be confused with acts of injustice. See the commentary on 441 and 530.

Our text may be compared with another text that is found in the fourth book of Stobaeus’ *Anthology* (4.2.20 p. 127.21–130.26 Hense = 650) and most likely derives from the eighteenth book of Theophrastus’ *Laws, in alphabetical order* (Diogenes Laertius 5.44 = 1.136 = 589 no. 17).⁶⁷⁸ After having stated when a sale is valid (650.35–38), Theophrastus says: “But one should add the following determination, (that the purchase and sale are valid) if (the deposit is received) from one who is not drunk, not acting from anger or contentiousness, not of unsound mind but mentally competent and in general (acting) lawfully, which also should be added at the point when (the lawgiver) is determining from whom the purchase should be made. For such (transactions) seem to occur as a result of crisis and emotion, but they should be made from deliberate choice, for in this way justice will be served” (650.39–43). The mention of anger, contentiousness and mental competence (ὀργή, φιλονεικία, φρονεῖν 650.40) invites comparison with the opening lines of 526.⁶⁷⁹ The emphasis on justice (δικαίως 650.41) is explained by the context, for in what precedes, the discussion concerns laws and in particular which regulations can ensure that men purchase and sell in a just manner (δικαίως 650.28). For fuller discussion of 650, see Szegedy-Maszak pp. 63–73 and Mirhady pp. 214–229.

Rose thinks that 526 should be assigned to *On Retribution* (436 no. 22), which is a reasonable conjecture, even if *On Emotions* (436 no. 5) cannot be ruled out.

⁶⁷⁸ Mirhady is cautious, speaking of a “working hypothesis.”

⁶⁷⁹ The mention of not being drunk, μὴ μεθύοντος, in 650.39 might be compared with being drunk, μεθύων, in 526.3, but the difference is greater than the similarity in wording. For in 650.39 the drunkenness under consideration is alcohol induced. In 526.3, the drunkenness is metaphorical: it is induced by contentiousness.—The nouns ὀργή and φιλονεικία are also found together in 577B.5–6, but there the combination is attributable to Plutarch.

527A Codices Parisini Latini 2772, 4718, 4887, sayings 27–30 (p. 40.3–6 Woelflin)

527B Engelbert of Admont, *Moral Sayings*, chapter on Enemies, sayings 4–7 (AHMA vol. 45 [1978] p. 278.8–15 Fowler)

Literature: Heylbut (1876) p. 40; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 299–303; Millett (2007) p. 215

We have here two texts, each of which contains four sayings attributed to Theophrastus. They have been grouped together as A- and B-texts, because the first saying in each text is the same. The other three sayings differ in certain ways, but all can be said to focus on revenge and doing harm. Nevertheless, this common focus depends to some extent on omission. For in the codices Parisini, the four sayings are preceded by a Theophrastean saying whose focus is friendship. We are told that it is advantageous to make friends once they have been tested and not to test friends after having made them friends. No such saying precedes in the collection of Engelbert. That is immediately intelligible in a chapter that carries the heading “Enemies.” The same may be said of our decision to include under the rubric “Kindness, Honor and Vengeance” only four of the five sayings contained in the codices Parisini. The saying concerning making friends would be a poor fit, and for that reason, it has been separated and printed in our section on “Friendship” (538C). In a fragment collection organized by topics, that may not be a fault. But for studying the sources of our texts and the relationship between different collections of sayings, there is a down side to the arrangement. At very least, it obscures the fact that the codices Parisini differ from Engelbert in the presentation of sayings, and perhaps more importantly, we may fail to notice that the codices Parisini are not alone in treating friendship together with enmity and vengeance. I think especially of Walter Burley, who credits Theophrastus with a string of sayings, in which the first twelve are focused on friendship (p. 282.26–284.7 Knust) and the next two or three on revenge (p. 284.8–10 = 527A.1–3).

I have written “two or three,” because the same sayings that number three in the codices Parisini (no. 27–29) are reduced to two in Burley, who joins the first two together by means of the conjunction *enim*, “for.” Whereas the codices Parisini announce a new saying with the pronoun *idem*, “the same man” (527A.2), Burley offers: *gravius enim adversarium securitate decipies*, “for you will deceive an adversary more severely through his (false sense of) security” (p. 284.8–9). That is an

example of taking a statement that can stand on its own and adding it as an explanation to another saying. Aristotle discusses this kind of addition in *Rhetoric* 2.21, where he focuses on the γνώμη, “maxim,” and speaks of adding an ἀπόδειξις, a “demonstration,” or an ἐπίλογος, a “supplemental argument,” when a maxim is paradoxical or disputable (1394b7–10). Whether the saying *ex inimico vindictam, si inimicum te senserit, perdidisti*, “you have lost revenge on your enemy, if he has perceived you to be an enemy” (p. 284.8 = 527A.1–2) actually needs an explanation may be doubted. In fact, the short version, i.e., with no explanation may be preferred as conveying information more quickly and therefore having more punch. Nevertheless, the sayings as joined in Burley create no difficulty and may said to illustrate Aristotle’s remarks in *Rhetoric* 2.21.⁶⁸⁰

In regard to Theophrastus’ ethical doctrine, the sayings are of interest in that they do not treat revenge as an unworthy goal. Indeed, in combination with 517 (in regard to holding life together, vengeance ranks alongside kindness and honor) and 526 (in taking revenge one should follow reason and avoid haste), the sayings make clear that Theophrastus recognized the value of anger in human society. That does not mean that Theophrastus recommended revenge over all other goals (525). Nor does it mean that Theophrastus gave lectures on how best to fool an enemy and to do him harm. It does, however, mean that Theophrastus so conceived of moral virtue that it is compatible with anger and desire for revenge. But the virtuous man will be attentive to the particular situation and take revenge on the right occasions and in the right manner.

In the preceding paragraph, I have spoken of anger. It might be objected that the equivalent Latin word, *ira*, does not occur in either text. What we have is a single mention of hate, *odium* (527B.3), and for Aristotle and presumably Theophrastus, there is an important difference between the two. Anger is personal and an angry man seeks to revenge himself, while hate is not personal and the man who hates is satisfied if the hated individual simply ceases to exist. That is indeed what Aristotle teaches in *Rhetoric* 2.4 (1382a1–15), but there is no compelling reason to understand *odium* as a translation of μῖσος as analyzed by Aristotle

⁶⁸⁰ In 676.6–7, we have Theophrastus’ definition of the maxim: “a general assertion concerning matters of conduct.” What follows concerns maxims that are disputed and need supplemental arguments, but this subsequent material is taken from Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* and therefore cannot be attributed to Theophrastus. See *Commentary* volume 8 (2005c) on rhetoric and poetics pp. 205–207.

in the *Rhetoric*. On the contrary, both sets of sayings are concerned with anger, which all too often becomes rage. It is painful (527A.3–4)—which hate is not (*Rhet.* 1382a12–13)—so that the angry person has difficulty in remaining silent (527B.3–4). He gives himself away and ends up hurting himself.

Asked to assign the sayings to a particular Theophrastean work, *On Retribution* (436 no. 22) is the obvious candidate. But we should keep in mind that there are other possibilities (*On Emotions* [436 no. 5] is one), and as with most sayings, it is hard to be certain that the sayings have not been adapted, and that the attributions are not the product of a later intervention.

528 *Depository of Wisdom Literature*, chap. on Theophrastus, saying no. 7

Literature: Gutas (1985) pp. 83, 87

We have here a saying that is found in Arabic translation in the *Depository of Wisdom Literature* as reconstructed by Dimitri Gutas. The saying proper is quite short, but it comes with context. In English translation, it run as follows: “He (Theophrastus) saw a wrestler who, unable to throw anybody down, abandoned wrestling and became a doctor. He said to him, ‘Now you can throw down whomever you wish.’” Elsewhere similar sayings are attributed to other well-known persons. The orator Demosthenes and the Cynic Diogenes are named in Greek sources (gnomologia and Diogenes Laertius), while Socrates and Plato are named in Arabic sources (gnomologia). See the apparatus of parallel passages to 528. It seems all but certain that we are dealing with a movable saying that was attributed to Theophrastus, either deliberately or by mistake, but in either case falsely.

In regard to content, the saying is playful. A wrestler who is unable to throw anyone down is said to have abandoned his sport and become a doctor. There is so little connection between wrestling prowess and medical skill that the change strikes one as bizarre. At very least, it is unexpected and therefore likely to evoke a smile or gentle laugh.⁶⁸¹ And Theophrastus’ alleged remark to the former wrestler not only plays with the notion of a throw⁶⁸² but also treats the wrestler as something of

⁶⁸¹ See the *Tractatus Coislinianus* 3 p. 51 Kaibel = p. 65 Koster = sec. VI p. 36 Janko: laughter arises from what is contrary to expectation, ἐκ τοῦ παρὰ προσδοκίαν.

⁶⁸² In the Greek versions, we find the verb καταβάλλειν, “to throw down.” The choice of verb indicates that the kind of wrestling under consideration is upright wrestling, ὁρθή

a dolt, so that we are apt to join Theophrastus and any bystanders in thinking ourselves superior, smiling and even laughing aloud.⁶⁸³ Perhaps, then, a reference to text 528 might be placed in the text-translation volumes within the section on the “Ludicrous,” for there we read about the enjoyment that is afforded by cleverness: it causes pain to the persons mocked and pleases those who are present (711.1–3).⁶⁸⁴ That does not mean, however, that 528 contributes nothing to the section on “Kindness, Honor and Vengeance.” I cite the immediately preceding texts, 527A–B, in which we are told that you will be unable to take revenge on your enemy if he perceives you to be an enemy, and that the person who betrays his intent to do harm does not know how to do harm. So long as the wrestler was engaged in his sport, he was an obvious opponent (his moves were anticipated) and failed to throw his adversary. But in the role of doctor (an orthopedic surgeon or a skilled trainer) he can pretend to treat former opponents in a professional manner while secretly ruining their bodies and careers. And he can do the same to his other patients (“whomever he [you] wishes”), and if he is lucky he can do so for years to come. Ridiculous, yes, but not unheard of. We might say that 528 combines humor with a practical lesson in exacting revenge.

In private correspondence, Gutas has suggested to me a different way of looking at the text. The former wrestler is finally able to accomplish his goal of throwing people down, and he is “doing it as a doctor (= killing his patients), which means that he is also very bad at this profession as well.” If we think of wrestlers as people of low intelligence and if we think that the former wrestler was incapable of mastering the art of medicine, then he is likely to harm his patients. On such a reading of 528, Theophrastus hits the former wrestler with a double whammie: the insult is greater and so may be the laughter of any bystanders. Nevertheless, there is a difficulty. When Theophrastus is made to say, “You can now throw down whomever you wish,” he seems to imply that the former wrestler has acquired the medical knowledge necessary to control outcomes. Harming a patient

πάλι, in which the object is to throw one’s opponent to the ground. The former wrestler to whom Theophrastus speaks lacked skill in throwing an opponent, καταβλητική τέχνη. He quit the sport, became a doctor and in doing so acquired a different skill whereby he was able to throw down whomever he wished.

⁶⁸³ On laughter as a pleasurable expression of one’s own superiority when one deems another inferior, see *Aristotle on Emotion* (1975a, repr. 2002) pp. 20–21 and “An Aristotelian and Theophrastean Analysis of Laughter” (2000, English version 2003) p. 98.

⁶⁸⁴ On the humor involved in 711, see *Commentary* 8 (2005c) on rhetoric and poetics pp. 390–394.

is not random; it is a matter of wish or choice. But enough! It is wrong to make too much of a humorous anecdote, which is almost certainly misattributed to Theophrastus.

11. *Justice*

Everybody wants justice for himself and most of us want justice for family, friends and fellow citizens. Quite young children learn the word “fair” and soon thereafter add “just” to their vocabulary. In America, school children memorize and recite daily the Pledge of Allegiance. It ends with the words “With Liberty and Justice for All.” That is a fine sentiment and one which most people in democracies all over the world would endorse. But asked to explain what exactly justice is and what constitutes a just life, most of us would find it difficult to offer a reply that is both comprehensive and coherent. We know that there are laws that our parents told us to obey, and we know that judges are often referred to as justices. They meet out justice when someone breaks the law. But is living a just life simply a matter of being law-abiding? Surely not, for there are times when the law enjoins one course of action, but a different course seems better. We speak of the “right” thing to do and say that legislation is imperfect, for extraordinary situations inevitably arise in which strict obedience to the law is a wrongheaded course of action. Much more might be said, but it should already be clear that when we turn our attention to justice and injustice, just action and unjust action, we quickly find ourselves asking questions that call for serious reflection.

The ancients realized that, and philosophers like Plato have left us interesting discussions. I think of the *Gorgias*, in which Callicles is made to draw a sharp distinction between conventional and natural justice. The former is exhibited in law-abiding behavior, i.e., following the laws that communities enact. The latter is exhibited in pursuing one’s own interest even at the expense of other people. An example is Heracles, who took for himself the oxen of Geryon without paying for them or receiving them as a gift. He acted in accordance with natural law; his act was just by nature (482E–484C). In the *Republic*, Glaucon is made to advance a similar position (2.2 358E–2.3 360D), after which Socrates develops a very different view of justice. He draws an analogy between the human soul and the city-state. Both soul and state are regarded as tripartite, and justice is said to occur when each part performs its own task (4.10 433A–4.16 443B). Much could be said concerning this analysis, but for our

purposes further discussion would contribute little, for at the end of his life, Plato wisely abandoned the tripartite soul in favor of bipartition,⁶⁸⁵ which was embraced by Aristotle and made fundamental to his ethical writings.

Most important for our purposes is Aristotle, who discussed justice in several works including a lost dialogue *On Justice*, which was four books long, and another work entitled *On Just (Actions)*, which ran for two books (Diogenes Laertius 5.22 and 24).⁶⁸⁶ Our special concern is Book 5 of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, which is entirely devoted to the subject of justice. At the outset, Aristotle tells us that “justice,” δικαιοσύνη, is used in more than one sense, but because the different uses are closely related, the differences escape notice (5.1 1129a26–28). In what follows, Aristotle elucidates the difference by distinguishing between the law-abiding person, ὁ νόμιμος, and the person who is fair, ὁ ἴσος (1129a33–34), between what is lawful, τὸ νόμιμον, and what is fair, τὸ ἴσον (1129a34). In regard to law, Aristotle makes clear that he is speaking of codes of law that are correctly enacted: they make pronouncements about everything and aim at the common advantage, i.e., what is good for everyone, or the best persons or the rulers. In such cases, the laws enjoin people to act in accordance with courage, temperance, gentleness and similarly with all the other virtues. We are told that justice in this sense is perfect or complete virtue, but not in an unqualified sense; rather, it is perfect virtue in relation to others. And for this reason, justice often seems to be the highest of the virtues (1129b12–28). This notion of justice is distinguished from a more limited notion that is spoken of as partial. It is said to fall within the same genus as justice *qua* law-abiding in that it too is manifested in relation to other people. But it is different in that it is exercised within a limited sphere, i.e., in the distribution of honors, material goods and whatever else can be divided among the members of a political community. A just or fair distribution is not one in which each recipient automatically receives an identical share. Rather, the more deserving individual gets a proportionately larger share than the less deserving individual.⁶⁸⁷

⁶⁸⁵ In the *Laws*, Plato works with a bipartite soul. See *Aristotle on Emotion* (1975a, repr. 2002) pp. 23–37.

⁶⁸⁶ Regarding the second title, *Περὶ δικαίων*, Moraux (1951) p. 96 compares *Politics* 3.1 1275a8 and suggests that the title refers to judicial rights: the power to bring suit and to defend oneself in court.

⁶⁸⁷ If we ask what is the criterion of deserving more or less, one answer is the size of the contributions to the common fund (5.4 1131b29–31). E.g., the man who has contributed more money to an investment fund receives a larger share when the fund is dissolved.

That is distributive justice, and corrective justice is a matter of rectifying an unjust distribution (5.2 1130a14–5.4 1132b20).

That is not all that captures Aristotle's attention in Book 5. He goes on to discuss reciprocal justice conceived of as the exchange of goods in terms of a proportion and not exact equality (5.5 1132b31–1133a19). Justice is explained as a sort of mean, but different from the mean that defines the other moral virtues (5.5 1133b30–34a16). What is just by nature is distinguished from what is just by convention (5.7 1134b18–1135a5), and inflicting harm or injury is discussed in relation to unjust action (5.8 1135a15–1136a9). The possibility of voluntarily suffering unjust treatment is considered (5.9 1136a10–1136b14), equity in relation to law and justice is investigated (5.10 1137a31–1138a3), and so is the possibility of doing unjust harm to oneself including taking one's own life (5.11 1138a4). Most likely Theophrastus discussed these several problems, perhaps together in his *Ethics* (436 no. 2) or in various specialized treatises like *On the Voluntary* (436 no. 6). But our evidence is meager. In what follows two texts from commentaries on Book 5 of the *Nicomachean Ethics* will be discussed. References to other texts will be found in the comments or notes to the comments.

529A Anonymous, *On Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics* 5.3 1129b29–30 (no. L89, *QETHs* pp. 52–53 Fortenbaugh)

529B Michael of Ephesus, *On Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics* 5.3 1129b29–30 (CAG vol. 22.3 p. 8.10–14 Hayduck)

Literature: Usener (1878) p. 70; Heylbut (1888) p. 197; Walzer (1929) p. 80; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1479–1480; Groningen (1966) p. 58; Mercken (1973) p. 21*, (1990) p. 429; West (1978) p. 164; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 259–261; Moraux (1984) pp. 326, 329; Magnaldi (1991) pp. 40–41 n. 18; Barnes (1999) p. 15; Wehrli-Wöhrle (2004) p. 529

Text **529A** is taken from the anonymous commentary or collection of scholia on Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*. The focus is on Book 5,⁶⁸⁸ in which justice *qua* law-abiding is said to be complete virtue in relation to another (person): τελεία ἀρετὴ πρὸς ἕτερον. For this reason, it seems

But it is not clear that every distribution fits this model, and as Aristotle notes democrats, oligarchs, persons of good birth and aristocrats disagree concerning the criterion of deserving (5.3 1131a25–29).

⁶⁸⁸ Εἰς τὸ πέμπτον τῶν Ἡθικῶν Νικομαχείων σχόλια (p. 203.1 Heylbut).

to be the highest of the virtues, more wonderful than the morning and evening stars, and the subject of a proverb: ἐν δὲ δικαιοσύνῃ συλλήβδην πᾶς ἀρετὴ ἔνι, “In justice every virtue is brought together” (5.1[3 Bekker] 1129b26–29). Aristotle does not comment on the proverb, but the Anonymous does. He tells us that the proverb comes from the poet Theognis, and in support he quotes three lines, the third of which is the proverb in slightly altered form: πᾶς ἀρετὴ ἔνι has become πᾶσα ἀρετὴ.⁶⁸⁹ Nevertheless, the Anonymous allows that the words in question occupy the place of a proverb. He also tells us that in the first book of *On Dispositions* Theophrastus mentions them as a proverb, but in the first book of the *Ethics* he said that Phocylides made mention of them. The Anonymous concludes that both Phocylides and Theognis may have used the words in a similar manner (lines 1–8).⁶⁹⁰

Text 529B is taken from the commentary of Michael of Ephesus, which is based on that of the Anonymous.⁶⁹¹ In the text before us, it is obvious that Michael has followed the Anonymous closely.⁶⁹² There is, however, one difference that calls for comment. Whereas the Anonymous says that in *On Dispositions* Theophrastus mentions the words “In justice every virtue is brought together” as a proverb, Michael cites *On Dispositions* to establish that the words are taken from Theognis. That raises the question whether Michael had additional information, according to which Theophrastus, in *On Dispositions*, not only labeled the words a proverb (so the Anonymous) but also assigned them to Theognis. That is possible, but in the absence of additional evidence, it is not to be believed. Michael is dependent on the Anonymous and has either introduced a guess of his own concerning what was said in *On Dispositions*, or has been careless in reproducing the report of the Anonymous. The latter seems more likely.

According to 529A.5–7,⁶⁹³ Theophrastus mentioned the proverb in two different works. In *On Dispositions*, he spoke simply of a proverb, but in the *Ethics* he attributed the proverb to Phocylides. That need not be a sign of confusion. In both works, the proverb will have served an

⁶⁸⁹ Theognis, *Elegies* 145–147 (vol. 1 pp. 180–181 West), where for metrical reasons πᾶς ἀρετὴ ὅτιν replaces πᾶς ἀρετὴ ἔνι.

⁶⁹⁰ Both Phocylides and Theognis belong to the sixth century. Phocylides hailed from Miletus and Theognis from Megara on the Greek mainland.

⁶⁹¹ V. Rose, “Commentare zur Ethik des Aristoteles,” *Hermes* 5 (1871) p. 71, Hayduck in CAG vol. 22.3 p. vi.

⁶⁹² Th. Bergk, *Poetae Lyrici* (Leipzig 1882) vol. 2 p. 72.

⁶⁹³ I ignore 529B.2–4, but later in the paragraph I shall have occasion to refer to 529B.4–5.

illustrative purpose (it functioned as an example of justice conceived of as complete justice), so that Theophrastus was under no constraint to decide issues of attribution. It was sufficient that he refer to the proverb in a way that was clear to his contemporaries. An accurate or at least a considered statement concerning the origin of the proverb could be reserved for another occasion, e.g., the work *Περὶ παροιμιῶν*, *On Proverbs* (727 no. 14). But that is not the end of the matter. According to Kroll, the word *δικαιοσύνη* postdates Theognis and Phocylides. It first occurs in Herodotus, *Histories* 1.92.⁶⁹⁴ And if that is correct, Theophrastus will have been in error along with the two commentators, both of whom suggest that Theognis and Phocylides may have made use of the verse (529A.7–8 and B.4–5). Presumably the error (and I think that it is one) is due to the fact that Theognis and Phocylides were both known for their paraenetic poetry,⁶⁹⁵ so that an unattached verse or several verses with ethical import might be assigned to one or the other or both of the poets.⁶⁹⁶ Moreover, we need not believe that the proverb came into existence as a hexameter. According to Usener, the proverb is pure prose that was forced into a hexameter and only became the work of Theognis with the addition of the pentameter.

Walzer cites 529A to support the view that Theophrastus was more interested in historical details than Aristotle. Here we should be cautious, at least in regard to *On Dispositions*. For 529A taken by itself tells us only that Theophrastus regarded the verse in question as a proverb, and that is no advance over what Aristotle says in the *Nicomachean Ethics*: καὶ παροιμιαζόμενοι φαμεν κτλ. (1129b29). Nevertheless, I do not want to overlook the fact that 529B connects the attribution to Theognis with *On Dispositions*, and both 529A and B tell us that Theophrastus referred to Phocylides in the *Ethics*. Moreover, in 437.2–5 we read that Adrastus wrote five books *On Questions of History and Style in the On Dispositions of Theophrastus and a sixth on Aristotle*. Perhaps we should not push the difference between five books and a single sixth to support the claim

⁶⁹⁴ Also problematic is the use of εὐσεβέων in 529A.2. See J. Kroll, “Theognis-Interpretationen,” *Philologus*, Suppl. Bd. 29.1 (1936) p. 213, J. Carrière, *Theognis de Mégare* (Paris: Louis Jean-Gap 1948) p. 106 and Gauthier and Jolif p. 342.

⁶⁹⁵ See, e.g., Isocrates, *To Nicocles* 43, where Theognis and Phocylides are named along with Hesiod as poets who are said to offer the best advice concerning human conduct.

⁶⁹⁶ According to West p. 164, Theognis wrote elegiacs and Phocylides wrote hexameters. The verse that concerns us is a hexameter, but that does not affect the attribution to Theognis, for elegiacs include a hexameter as well as a pentameter (529A.2–4).

that Theophrastus exhibited a greater interest in historical detail than his mentor, but the fact that Adrastus wrote five books concerning *On Dispositions* is in itself evidence that Theophrastus had a strong interest in historical matters. See the commentary on 437.

The remarks of the Anonymous and Michael are so brief, that we can glean very little concerning Theophrastus' thoughts on justice. Most likely he followed Aristotle, who distinguished two kinds of justice: one that is complete justice in regard to other persons and a second that is a part of virtue, being concerned with distribution and rectification (5.2 1130b30–1131a9). Problematic is how Theophrastus analyzed the second kind of justice. We know that on occasion he could analyze justice as a mean disposition between two extremes (449A.11, 23–25). But Aristotle offers a different analysis according to which justice is not a proper mean (5.5 1133b30–1134a1). I would like to believe that in one of his writings Theophrastus set forth these two conceptions of justice and commented on them in detail. But that cannot be demonstrated.

The first kind of justice is also problematic in that Aristotle connects it with both being law-abiding and possessing complete virtue in relation to another person. At first reading Aristotle's remarks seem straightforward. When laws have been correctly enacted, they enjoin the citizens to act courageously, temperately and generally in accordance with all the virtues. In such a city-state, being law-abiding and being completely virtuous would come together. With that Theophrastus would surely agree? Perhaps, but he would want to add a significant qualification. For he well understood that laws are written "for the most part" (629, 630), so that particular situations are likely to arise that call for action contrary to what the law enjoins. And in situations of this kind, the man of perfect virtue—one who combines practical wisdom with moral virtue—will choose to act contrary to the law. Hauled before a magistrate, he will be able to explain why he has acted against the law, and if the magistrate possesses complete virtue, the offender will receive a pardon.⁶⁹⁷

Wehrli (1973) p. 494 refers to 529A–B as evidence that the *Ethics* of Theophrastus was organized in a manner different from that of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*. He is correct in that the proverb concerning com-

⁶⁹⁷ See my "Theophrastus on Law, Virtue and the Particular Situation" (1993, repr. 2003). Also relevant are 534 on assisting a friend contrary to the law and 614 on Aristeides, who was supremely just in his personal dealings and toward fellow citizens, but in matters of state he was prepared to act unjustly in order to benefit country.

plete virtue occurred in different books: in Book 1 of the Theophrastean work and Book 5 of the Aristotelian. But from that fact alone, it does not follow that the overall treatment of virtue in the two works was significantly different. We should compare the pseudo-Aristotelian *Magna Moralia*, in which justice *qua* complete virtue receives comment in the first book (1.33 1193b2–10) and in that portion of the first book that corresponds to *NE* 5, i.e., it comes after the discussion of the individual moral virtues (1.20–32 1190b9–1193a38). The same may well have been true of Theophrastus' *Ethics*. Only in the Theophrastean work (as against the *Magna Moralia*), the proverb/verse concerning complete justice will have been cited and referred to Phocylides.

Finally, it should be kept in mind that the *Ethics* may have been a composite work that was put together at a later date, perhaps in the second half of the first century BC when Andronicus is thought to have edited the works of Theophrastus.⁶⁹⁸ And if that is the case, then the overall organization of the *Ethics* was not Theophrastean but rather that of Andronicus.

- 530 Anonymous, *On Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics* 5.10 1135b11–19 (CAG vol. 20 p. 237.35–238.2 and 9–10 Heylbut)

Literature: Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 261–262, (2005c) p. 99

Text 530, like text 529A, comes from the scholia of the Anonymous on Book 5 of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*. This time the focus is on the distinction between different kinds of harm or injury, βλάβη (5.8[10 Bekker] 1135b11). Aristotle first speaks of mistakes, ἁμαρτήματα, which are harms attributable to ignorance. Next this class of harms is subdivided into misfortunes, ἀτυχήματα, and mistakes, ἁμαρτήματα, in a restricted sense. Both are acts done in ignorance, but in the case of misfortunes an injury is inflicted contrary to reasonable expectation, παραλόγως. That is not true of mistakes. After that Aristotle turns to unjust acts, ἀδικήματα, and distinguishes between injuries that are inflicted with full knowledge but without previous deliberation, μὴ προβουλευσας, and injuries that are inflicted not only with full knowledge but also from choice and forethought, ἐκ προαιρέσεως, ἐκ προνοίας. Both are unjust acts, but only the latter marks the agent as an unjust person

⁶⁹⁸ See Chapter III "The Titles" no. 2 on the *Ethics*.

(1135b11–1136a9). There is much here that invites comment,⁶⁹⁹ but our concern is with the Anonymous and what he says concerning Theophrastus.

In his remarks, the Anonymous discusses the different kinds of βλάβη at some length. In the text-translation volumes, we have printed a short excerpt, 530, that concerns Aristotle's general or inclusive use of ἀμαρτήματα, his distinction between ἀτυχήματα and ἀμαρτήματα narrowly construed, and a sentence in which Theophrastus' and Aristotle's understanding of ἀτυχήματα and ἀδικήματα is touched upon: Θεόφραστος μέντοι τὰ ἀτυχήματα οὐχ ὑπάγει τοῖς ἀδικήμασιν· ἔοικε δὲ μηδὲ Ἀριστοτέλης "Now, Theophrastus does not subsume misfortunes under unjust acts, and Aristotle does not seem to do so either" (lines 4–5). As a brief report concerning one aspect of Theophrastus' analysis of ἀτυχήματα, the report is clear and unproblematic. Only the cautious manner in which the Anonymous expresses himself concerning Aristotle (ἔοικε, "seems") is artificial or stylistic at best. There can be no serious doubt that for Aristotle as well as Theophrastus an unjust act is different from a misfortune and *vice versa*. For both Peripatetics a misfortune is involuntary and often attributable to ignorance, while an unjust act is voluntary and done with full knowledge.⁷⁰⁰

Texts 516 and 529A are both taken from the Anonymous and both mention Theophrastus' work *On Dispositions* (436 no. 1). As stated above, the Anonymous has the Theophrastean material from Adrastus,

⁶⁹⁹ Of especial interest is the distinction between injustices that are not preceded by deliberation but occur on account of emotion and injustices that are chosen and mark a person as unjust and wicked (1135b20–27). See the commentary on 526.

⁷⁰⁰ In Quellen (1984) p. 261, I referred to the sentence concerning Theophrastus and Aristotle as a kind of footnote, *fussnotenartig*. That is not entirely wrong, but the sentence may be thought to serve a structural purpose. Some fifteen lines earlier, the Anonymous had indicated that he would comment on how or when an injury is an unjust act (p. 237.31). What follows is not irrelevant, but there is no explicit mention of an unjust act. Instead, injuries inflicted in ignorance are distinguished from those inflicted with knowledge (p. 237.31–32), and injuries inflicted contrary to reasonable expectation are distinguished from injuries in which the outcome should have been expected (p. 237.32–35). At this point, 530 begins: the inclusive sense of "mistakes" is noted and so is the division into misfortunes and mistakes (lines 1–4 = pp. 237.35–238.2). There follow illustrations of misfortunes and mistakes that have been omitted from 530 (p. 238.2–9). After that comes the remainder of 530: Theophrastus and Aristotle are said not to subsume misfortunes under unjust acts (lines 4–5 = p. 238.9–10). Naming Theophrastus is something of a surprise, and breaking up the discussion of injuries inflicted in ignorance with a reference to unjust acts seems awkward, but separating unjust acts from misfortunes serves to remind us of the question with which all this began: how an injury comes to be an unjust act (p. 237.31).

who discussed at length historical and lexical material found in *On Dispositions* (437.3–4).⁷⁰¹ 516 reports Theophrastus' characterization of the poet Simonides, and 529A tells us that Theophrastus mentioned a verse of Theognis as a proverb. Text 530 is also taken from the Anonymous, but this time there is no mention of *On Dispositions*. We are told only that Theophrastus, like Aristotle, did not subsume ἀτυχήματα under ἀδικήματα (lines 4–5). Economy recommends that here too the Anonymous is drawing on Adrastus, whose lexical interests prompted him to take note of ambiguity in the use of ἀμαρτήματα and to mention Theophrastus with special reference to ἀτυχήματα. We can imagine Theophrastus discussing mistakes in *On Dispositions*, focusing on persons who cause harm unwittingly, and distinguishing between a general use of “mistakes” and a restricted use that does not apply to acts whose consequences occur contrary to reasonable expectation. After that Theophrastus will have followed his teacher in marking off mistakes from unjust acts. That is the most economical way to interpret 530. As in 516 and in 529A, so in 530 the Anonymous is drawing on Adrastus, who reported what he read in Theophrastus' *On Dispositions*.

I am inclined to accept the preceding interpretation, but there are grounds for caution. Here are two. First, in 516 the Anonymous refers not only to *On Dispositions* but also *On Wealth*. Similarly in 529A, the *Ethics* is mentioned together with *On Dispositions*. That shows that the Theophrastean material cited by the Anonymous and presumably drawn from Adrastus is not limited to the work *On Dispositions*. Indeed, there are various works in which Theophrastus might have distinguished different uses of “mistakes.” I have just mentioned the *Ethics* and will add *On Injustices* (666 no. 10) and *On the Voluntary* (436 no. 6).⁷⁰² The second reason for caution is that the report concerning Theophrastus is extremely brief. It may be that the Anonymous is drawing on a passage in which Adrastus was concerned with ambiguous usage, but that is not stated explicitly. It may even be that Adrastus does not stand behind 530, and that what the Anonymous reports is based on a Theophrastean passage, in which lexical interests are not paramount or even mentioned. Rather, Theophrastus may have been concerned to distinguish between

⁷⁰¹ See the commentary on the Anonymous in Chapter 2 on “The Sources” no. 18, as well as the commentary on 437, 516 and 529A.

⁷⁰² Had Theophrastus written a work entitled Σύγκρισις τῶν ἀμαρτημάτων, that work would be still another possibility, but in my judgment Theophrastus never wrote such a work. See above, Section II “Emotions” on 441.

acts that are unjust and call for retribution and acts that involve innocent mistakes and as such invite forgiveness. Acts of the latter kind may require some form of making good (repair the damage that may have occurred) but do not call for retribution.

The final sentence of 530 refers to Theophrastus but makes no mention of the distinction between ἀτυχήματα and ἁμαρτήματα (lines 4–5). In regard to the ethical doctrine of Theophrastus, that seems to me insignificant, and above I have suggested that in *On Dispositions* Theophrastus will have taken notice of the distinction before marking off ἀδικήματα from ἁμαρτήματα widely and narrowly construed. Nevertheless, the distinction drawn in the final sentence of 530, i.e., the distinction between an ἀτύχημα and an ἀδίκημα is of interest in that it occurs in a verse of Theophrastus' pupil Menander (fr. 359 Koerte-Thierfelder):

ἀτύχημα καὶ ἀδίκημα διαφορὰν ἔχει·
τὸ μὲν διὰ τύχην γίνεται, τὸ δ' αἰδέσσει

misfortune and an unjust act have a difference;
the one occurs on account of fortune (chance) and the other through
choice.

Unless one assumes that Menander *qua* pupil of Theophrastus enjoyed incorporating arcane philosophical distinctions into his plays, the quoted verses suggest strongly that the distinction between ἀτύχημα and ἀδίκημα was popular in Theophrastus' time. And if that is correct, we may want to ask whether the Theophrastean writing that stands behind the Anonymous' report was an exoteric writing, in which distinctions were drawn that were easily understood by ordinary people as well as the philosophic elite. But having said that, I want to state clearly that an exoteric work, a dialogue, does not rule out serious discussion and fine distinctions, especially those that are important both in ethical theory and in the life of the city-state.

12. *Natural Relationship*

We recognize that a special relationship exists between ourselves and our parents. They are responsible for our birth and in most cases for the care that we received while growing up. So too we recognize a special relationship between ourselves and our children. We brought them into the world and provided support during their early years. These relationships involve kinship, a shared bloodline, and can be extended to grandparents and grandchildren and to siblings and their children.

These relationships are also based on interaction. Giving and receiving care binds us together and creates a close-knit family. There is nothing unusual here. The relationships are part of the human experience and may be said to extend beyond one's immediate family to neighbors and fellow citizens. In some cases there are bonds of kinship (distant cousins and the like), and often there is tangible give and take. This relationship of our common humanity can even be extended to all mankind, but there are limits. Most of us draw the line at animals. We regard them as different in kind: lacking intellect and available for our use and pleasure. We do, of course, recognize that animals feel pain and therefore hesitate to inflict unnecessary pain on them. But we do not speak of treating animals justly and unjustly.

The preceding statement is very much in line with Aristotle's view of mankind. He regards the union of man and woman as natural (*φυσικόν* *Pol.* 1.2 1252a29). It exists for both procreation—a natural desire to leave someone like oneself behind—and for protection (1252a30–31). Equally natural is the association of families in villages, i.e., in close-knit communities that were originally made up of persons who were suckled by the same milk (*ὁμογάλακτες* 1252b18) and related through kinship (*συγγένεια* 1252b22). As Aristotle sees it, human beings are political creatures (1253a2–3), in whom a social instinct has been implanted (1253a29–30), so that they come together and form city-states naturally (*φύσει* 1252b30, 1253a2). They are by nature well-disposed toward each other (*φιλόανθρωποι* *NE* 8.1 1155a20). Indeed, anyone traveling abroad can see that all men are related and friendly to one another (*ἴδοι δ' ἂν τις καὶ ἐν ταῖς πλάναις ὡς οἰκεῖον ἅπας ἄνθρωπος ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ φίλον* 1155a21–22). But Aristotle does not extend this relationship to animals. To be sure, they are like human beings in having voice, but their voice is an indication of pleasure and pain. Human voice is very different in that it indicates what is advantageous and what is just (*Pol.* 1.2 1253a10–18). And this difference reflects a fundamental difference between animal and human soul. Whereas animals experience sensations, they lack intellect, which is a defining mark of human beings. They, therefore, fall outside the human community. They exist for the sake of man (1.8 1256b15–22), who can use them wisely or unwisely, but neither justly nor unjustly (*NE* 8.11 1161a30–b3).⁷⁰³

⁷⁰³ See *Quellen* (1984) pp. 269–270 and my article “Theophrastus: Piety, Justice and Animals” (2003b) p. 184.

Here it may be objected that Aristotle's treatment of barbarians and natural slaves is inconsistent with his assertion of a natural relationship existing among all men. For Aristotle denigrates barbarians and treats slaves as property. There is, of course, good reason to protest Aristotle's attitude toward barbarians and slaves, but in regard to the fundamental relationship that concerns us, I do not think that a charge of inconsistency is appropriate. For Aristotle never says that the souls of barbarians and slaves differ in kind from those of the Greeks. The peoples of northern Europe are said to be full of spirit and deficient in thought and skill. They may be weak thinkers, but they are not like animals in being totally without cognitive capacity. In contrast, the people of Egypt are highly intelligent but lacking in spirit. This too is difference in degree, and it is said to be manifested even among the Greek races (*Pol.* 7.7 1327b23–36).⁷⁰⁴ It follows that barbarians may be regarded as worse off than many or all of the Greek races, but they still can and should be recognized as members of the human community, to whom goodwill and justice should be extended. Much the same is true of the natural slave. He suffers from a deficiency of soul, only in his case the ability to deliberate is totally lacking (1.13 1260a12). But that does not mean that he is altogether without cognitive capacity. I.e., he is not thereby reduced to the status of an animal. On the contrary, the natural slave experiences human emotions and can follow the reasoning of his master, who is therefore enjoined to use admonition when giving orders to a slave (1.5 1254b22, 1.13 1260b5–7). And when the master heeds Aristotle's injunction and employs admonition, he respects the psychic capacity of a fellow human being and thereby treats his slave in a just manner.⁷⁰⁵

We do not know how Theophrastus viewed Aristotle's doctrine of the natural slave, but we can say that he recognized a natural relationship that unites all human beings including barbarians. More problematic is his view of animals. It is certain that he opposed animal sacrifice, but it is not immediately clear why he opposed this practice. It may be that Theophrastus attributed cognitive capacity to animals and in so doing extended to them the natural relationship that unites all human beings.

⁷⁰⁴ Although words like ἄθνημα and μονόκωλον (7.7 1327b28, 35) might suggest a complete absence and not more or less, it is clear in context that Aristotle is talking about difference in degree (so ἐνδεέστερα 1327b25).

⁷⁰⁵ Since I first discussed the natural slave (1975a) pp. 53–57 and (1976) pp. 135–137, much has been written on the subject. I have returned to the subject in “Aristotle's Natural Slave” (2006) pp. 249–263, in which I reply to certain criticisms.

Alternatively, Theophrastus may have opposed animal sacrifice, because killing animals inevitably causes pain and more importantly robs animals of their life. See the commentary on 531.

- 531 Porphyry, *On Abstinence from Eating Animals* 3.25.1–4 (CB vol. 2 p. 185.11–186.20 Patillon)

Literature: Brandis (1860) p. 344; Bernays (1866) 96–102; Zeller (1879) p. 851; Arnim (1926) pp. 131–149; Gomperz (1931) pp. 416, 511; Philippson (1931) pp. 445–466; Knögel (1933) pp. 42–43; Hausleiter (1935) p. 238; Dirlmeier (1935) pp. 248–250, (1937) pp. 47–100; Pohlenz (1940) pp. 1–47, (1964) p. vol. 1 pp. 111–118, vol. 2 64–68; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1493–1496; Brink (1955) pp. 123–145, (1958) pp. 193–198; Gorteman (1958) pp. 88–96; Giusta (1964–1967) vol. 1 pp. 89–100, 283–287, 337; Pötscher (1964) pp. 95–99, (1970) p. 98; Baldry (1965) pp. 141–147, 190–194, 209–210; F.A. Steinmetz (1967) pp. 14–24; Pembroke (1971) pp. 114–149; Stark (1972) pp. 96–109; Kerferd (1972–1973) pp. 177–196; Mingay (1973) pp. 261–275; Moraux (1973) pp. 316–349; Donini (1975) pp. 343–345; Dierauer (1977) pp. 170–177; Patillon (1979) pp. 135–136, 148–151, 250–251; Görgemanns (1983) pp. 165–189; Wehrli (1983) p. 510; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 274–285, (2003b) p. 181 n. 23, 185–186, (2010b) pp. 399–403; Magnaldi (1991) pp. 33–46, 54 n. 12; Sorabji (1993) pp. 45–47; Clark (2000) pp. 96–97, 176–177; Wehrli-Wöhrle (2004) pp. 548–549; Tsouni (2010) pp. 88–90, 153–156

Text 531 is found in the third book of Porphyry's treatise *On Abstinence*. In the preceding two books, Porphyry has argued that eating animals contributes neither to temperance and simplicity nor to piety, which are of especial importance in regard to leading a contemplative life. Now in the third book, Porphyry turns to justice, which at its finest is said to embrace piety towards the gods (3.1.1–2). He agrees with his opponents (οἱ ἀντιλέγοντες 3.1.4), primarily the Stoics,⁷⁰⁶ that justice should be extended only to similar creatures (ταύτην [sc. δικαιοσύνην] πρὸς τὰ ὅμοια δεῖν μόνον παρατείνειν) but denies their claim that justice extends only to human beings. According to Porphyry, animals have soul and

⁷⁰⁶ Porphyry refers to his opponents not only at 3.1.4 but also subsequently at 3.18.1 and 3.22.2. Citing 1.4.1–3 and 3.2.1, Clark p. 162 explains the reference to opponents as “clearly Stoics rather than Peripatetics.” That is correct, and in what follows Porphyry treats Aristotle, Theophrastus and Strato as allies. But in 3.24.6, where Porphyry is concluding two long excerpts from Plutarch, the Peripatetics are grouped together with the Stoics. See below.

every soul is rational (λογική) in that it has perception and memory (αἰσθησις and μνήμη 3.1.4). It follows that animals are like human beings in regard to psychic capacity, and that calls for treating animals with justice.

To develop this thesis, Porphyry introduces the Stoic distinction between internal and external reason or discourse (ἐνδιάθετος and προφορικὸς λόγος 3.2.1) and proceeds to discuss the psychic capacities of animals in terms of this dichotomy: first external or expressive *logos* (3.3–6) and then internal *logos* (3.7–8).⁷⁰⁷ In regard to both forms of *logos*, Porphyry makes reference to Theophrastus' teacher, Aristotle, whom he treats as an ally. Aristotle, we are told, speaks of animals having been seen teaching their young and learning many things not only from each other but also from human beings (3.6.5, cf. Arist. *HA* 9.1 608a17–19). In addition, Aristotle is said to have recognized that animals have a share in *logos* (3.6.7) and to have suggested that the souls of animals differ from those of human beings only in degree and not in essence (ἐν τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον and not ἐν οὐσίᾳ 3.7.1, cf. *HA* 8.1 588a18–31). Indeed, the souls of animals exhibit variation: animals with keener perception are more intelligent (3.8.6, cf. *HA* 9.1 608a19–21). Making as it were a new beginning, Porphyry announces his intention to demonstrate that rational soul (λογική [*sc.* ψυχή]) is present in animals and that they are not deprived of wisdom (φρόνησις 3.9.1). In this context, Aristotle is said to have shown himself more inquisitive than the other ancients who wrote on animal intelligence, περὶ ζώων φρονήσεως. In particular, he said that all animals construct their home with a view to survival (3.9.5, cf. *HA* 9.11 614b31–32). Finally Porphyry cites Aristotle in regard to the existence of savage animals that attack human beings. Aristotle, we are told, said correctly that if an abundance of food were always present, animals would not be savage either to each other or to human beings (3.12.4 cf. *HA* 9.1 608b19–32). These citations are based on Aristotle's zoological writings, in particular, the *History of Animals* (*Research concerning Living Creatures*),⁷⁰⁸ where Aristotle takes account of similarities between

⁷⁰⁷ Although Porphyry refers the distinction between external and internal *logos* to the Stoics (3.2.1), he does not regard the distinction as peculiar to the Stoics. Indeed, he offers a definition of external reason ("voice that signifies with the tongue affections occurring internally and in the soul" 3.3.2) that is said to be general and not dependent on any one school. Patillon pp. 232–233 compares Aristotle's definition of spoken sounds as symbols of affections in the soul (*On Interpretation* 1 16a3–4).

⁷⁰⁸ Whether Aristotle is in fact the author of *History of Animals* 8 and 9 is a matter of scholarly debate. I return to the issue below.

animal and human behavior, and in doing so, may be said to promote the humanization of animals. What is missing is an acknowledgment that in the *History of Animals* Aristotle expresses himself with caution and qualification,⁷⁰⁹ and that in other writings Aristotle expresses himself very differently. That is especially true of the work *On Soul*, in which Aristotle sets forth a *scala naturae* that sharply distinguishes between plant, animal and human life. He assigns nutrition to all three forms of life, sensation to animals and human beings, and thinking to humans alone.⁷¹⁰ The fact that Porphyry ignores this side of Aristotle may be faulted, but it is in line with Porphyry's overriding purpose in writing *On Abstinence*. He wants to convince his friend Firmus Castricius, who had been a practicing vegetarian, to return to the practice. Towards this end, Porphyry finds it useful to cite an authority like Aristotle and to present him as someone who attributed intelligence to animals. Being like us, animals should not be eaten, for that involves killing them and thereby treating them unjustly.

Whatever we think of Porphyry's treatment of Aristotle, it is clear that he focuses on a side of Aristotle (or a portion of the *corpus Aristotelicum*) that encourages viewing animals in human terms, and one that seems to have been taken seriously by Peripatetics after him. A case in point is Theophrastus' pupil, Strato of Lampsacus. As part of a long excerpt from Plutarch's dialogue *Whether Land or Sea Animals are Cleverer* (Porph. 3.20.7–3.24.6 = Plut. 2 959E–5 963F), Porphyry attributes to Strato (fr. app. 112 W = app. 62 S)⁷¹¹ an argument demonstrating that perceiving does not occur at all apart from thinking (λόγος ... ἀποδεικνύων ὡς οὐδὲ αἰσθάνεσθαι τὸ παράπαν ἄνευ τοῦ νοεῖν ὑπάρχει). Letters, we are told, often meet our eyesight and sounds impinge upon our ears, but they escape our notice and pass us by, because our mind is elsewhere (on other things). Later it returns and runs over what has been said, so that one says “the mind sees, the mind hears” (νοῦς ὁρᾷ, νοῦς ἀκούει).⁷¹²

⁷⁰⁹ E.g., Aristotle uses a qualifier like “as if” (ὥσπερ HA 9.48 631a27) in regard to calculation; he speaks of resemblances of intelligent understanding (ὁμοιότητες 8.1 588a24) and introduces analogy alongside the more and less (8.1 588a28).

⁷¹⁰ On the *scala naturae*, see *On Soul* 2.2–3 413a20–415a12.

⁷¹¹ The letter “S” refers to Robert Sharples' edition of the fragments of Strato in *Strato of Lampsacus: Texts, Translation and Discussion* = Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities 16 (New Brunswick NJ: Transaction 2011) pp. 5–229.

⁷¹² Here Plutarch is citing a well-known verse of Epicharmus (fr. 249 Kaibel). Presumably the verse was part of Strato's argument and not an addition by Plutarch, whom Porphyry is excerpting. The verse is found elsewhere in the *Moralia* (*On Fortune* 3 98C and *On the Fortune of Alexander* 3 336B). See Patillon p. 247.

For when the ears and the eyes are affected, no perception is produced, unless thinking is present (3.21.8). There follows an example involving Cleomenes,⁷¹³ after which the conclusion is stated: in all creatures that are perceiving, it is necessary that thinking is also occurring (ἀνάγκη πᾶσιν οἷς τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι, καὶ τὸ νοεῖν ὑπάρχειν 3.21.9). Porphyry's interest in Strato is straightforward. As with Aristotle so with Strato, Porphyry sees him as an ally, whose view of animal soul is in line with his own. It lends credence to the claim that animals have a share in *logos* and therefore ought to be treated with justice. Only Porphyry is not citing Strato directly. Rather he cites him through an intermediary: namely, Plutarch (Porph. 3.21.8–9 = Plut. 2 961A–B). And in doing so, Porphyry drops the final words of the conclusion as we read it in Plutarch. There the conclusion takes the form of an if-then hypothetical, in which the protasis comes last: “In all creatures that are perceiving, it is necessary that thinking is also occurring, if by nature we perceive through thinking,” εἰ τῷ νοεῖν αἰσθάνεσθαι πεφύκαμεν. As remarked earlier in Chapter II, “The Sources,”⁷¹⁴ the protasis may have been omitted by Porphyry, because he regarded it as an expression of doubt that might weaken his case. But whatever motivated Porphyry, it seems likely that by omitting the if-clause, Porphyry is not misrepresenting Strato. For there are additional fragments of Strato that testify to his belief that perception involves thought or even is identical with thought (fr. 109 W = 61 S)⁷¹⁵ and that every animal has a share in intellect (fr. 48[117] W = 47 S).⁷¹⁶ We can, therefore, say with some confidence that Strato is aptly cited by Porphyry, albeit drawing on Plutarch.⁷¹⁷

⁷¹³ The example does not derive from Strato. See Chapter II, “The Sources,” no. 24 on Porphyry, with n. 213.

⁷¹⁴ See II no. 24 with note 214.

⁷¹⁵ Fr. 109 W = 61 S: αὐτὴν (sc. διάνοιαν) εἶναι τὰς αἰσθήσεις, καθάπερ διὰ τινων ὀπῶν τῶν αἰσθητηρίων προκύπτουσιν, “others (say) that it (thought) is the senses, peeping out through the sense-organs as through apertures.”

⁷¹⁶ Fr. 48[117] W = 47 S: πᾶν ζῶον νοῦ δεκτικὸν εἶναι, “every living creature is capable of thought.” See also fr. 118 W = 79 S: ὅτι, ὡς ἁρμονία ἁρμονίας δξυτέρα καὶ βαρυτέρα, οὕτω καὶ ψυχὴ ψυχῆς, φησὶν ὁ Στράτων, δξυτέρα καὶ νοθεστέρα, “that as the one attunement is sharper or flatter than another, so too one soul is, Strato says, keener or more sluggish than another.” Wehrli p. 76 suggests that this fragment comes from a discussion of animal and human soul and that Strato recognized only a gradual difference between animal and human soul. If I understand correctly, Wehrli is suggesting that Strato recognized only a quantitative difference. Analogy (HA 8.1 588a28) is no longer necessary, for there is no difference in kind between animal and human soul.

⁷¹⁷ For further discussion, see my article “Theophrastus and Strato on Animal Intelligence” (2011b) pp. 399–412.

At the end of the extended excerpt from Plutarch (3.24.6), Porphyry says that he has recorded the arguments advanced by Plutarch in many of his books against the Stoics and the Peripatetics. The statement is problematic for two reasons. 1) The mention of “many” books seems exaggerated. As far as we can tell, Porphyry has drawn on only two of Plutarch’s works. For the first we have no title; the excerpt runs from 3.18.3 to 3.20.6 and is no. 193 in Sandbach’s edition of the fragments of Plutarch (Loeb vol. 429 = *Moralia* vol. 15 pp. 352–356). The second work is that named above, i.e., *Whether Land or Sea Animals are Cleverer*. 2) Strato, who was head of the Peripatetic school after Theophrastus, has been cited for advancing a view that the Stoics firmly deny: i.e., that perceiving (αἰσθάνεσθαι) never occurs without thinking (νοεῖν). Most likely Strato did hold such a view, and if so, grouping the Peripatetics together with the Stoics and saying that they have been an object of attack is odd. Moreover, Porphyry proceeds immediately to Theophrastus, the second head of the Peripatetic School, and attributes to him a doctrine whereby men are said to be akin or related to animals, for their souls are not naturally different. Some may be more highly finished, but the same capacities are present in men and animals (3.25.3 = 531.12–21). Apparently Porphyry has not observed the difficulty that he has created by listing the Peripatetics alongside the Stoics as opponents. But, of course, Porphyry is bringing to an end a long excerpt from Plutarch and follows the latter in bringing together Stoics and Peripatetics (he is drawing on Plut. 6 963F). That may explain the oddity in Porphyry: he has, as at were, nodded and mindlessly ended his excerpt from Plutarch with words that are incompatible with what precedes and what will follow. More puzzling is why Plutarch has lumped the Peripatetics together with the Stoics. For as the Plutarchan dialogue develops, both Aristotle and Theophrastus are cited as witnesses to the intelligent behavior of land and sea animals.⁷¹⁸ Add in Strato, and we have three Peripatetics, which only intensifies the puzzlement.

Porphyry’s remarks on Theophrastus in 531 focus on οἰκειότης, “relatedness” (line 21), i.e., the relationship or kinship that exists between human beings and animals (οἰκείους εἶναι, line 2; συγγενεῖς, line 10). We are told that Theophrastus recognized a natural relationship not only between men who share the same parents but also among men who are more distantly related through the same forefathers. In addition,

⁷¹⁸ Between 9 965 and 36 985C, Plutarch has Aristotimus and Phaedimus debate the relative intelligence of land and sea animals. Aristotle is named at 19 973A, 27 978D, 29 979E, 31 981B, 33 981F. Theophrastus is named at 27 978E = 365D, on which see below.

citizens are related by virtue of sharing land and interacting with each other, whether or not they share a common ancestor (lines 1–8). This thinking is extended to the entire human race: all Greeks are related as are all barbarians and all human beings, either because they share the same ancestors or because they share food and habits and are all members of the same (human) race (lines 8–12). There is also kinship between men and animals, for all are marked by skin and flesh and fluids. And what is more important, their souls are not naturally different. All share in desire, anger, calculation and above all in perception. To be sure, there are differences in the degree to which these faculties are perfected,⁷¹⁹ but it remains true that all humans and animals share in the same psychic faculties. The relationship of emotions is said to make this clear (lines 12–21).

It is generally agreed that οἰκειότης, as presented in 531, is not to be confused with Stoic οἰκείωσις. The former is an objective, reciprocal relationship that interests Porphyry, because he wishes to establish that animals share with humans the same psychic faculties and therefore ought to be treated justly in much the same way that humans treat each other. The latter is different: it is a developmental theory⁷²⁰ that has nothing to do with extending justice to animals. Indeed the Stoics deny that animals can be treated either justly or unjustly.⁷²¹ That said, it should be noted that Theophrastean οἰκειότης, understood as an objective relationship, is not incompatible with recognizing the affection that human beings feel

⁷¹⁹ In regard to animals, cf. 354.2–4, discussed briefly in Chapter II “The Sources” no. 35 on Albert the Great.

⁷²⁰ Stoic οἰκείωσις, “appropriation,” is a theory, according to which a newborn creature exhibits a first impulse toward or instinct for self-preservation. In the case of human beings, this instinct is modified over time. Reason teaches that the possession of virtue is something more important and congenial (οἰκεῖον) than mere soundness of body (Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 7.85–87 and Cicero, *On Ends* 3.16–25). Moreover, there also develops an awareness of and identification with other people. Parents have a natural affection for their children (Plutarch, *On Stoic Self Contradictions* 13 1038B), and this attitude is said to be the source of community and justice among human beings (Plutarch, *Whether Land or Sea Animals are Cleverer* 4 962A). Ultimately it so unites mankind that no human being should be regarded as alien to any other (Cicero, *On Ends* 3.62–63). Here there is a considerable leap from one’s own children to the entirety of humanity, and scholars have argued that the Stoics made use of Theophrastean οἰκειότης to bridge the gap (Brink p. 138, Pembroke p. 121, Mingay p. 268, and Moraux [1973] p. 348). But even if that is the case, οἰκειότης as it appears in 531 is fundamentally different from Stoic οἰκείωσις, for οἰκειότης is an objective relationship between living creatures, and compatible with more than one theory of human development.

⁷²¹ See, e.g., Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 7.129, Plutarch, *Whether Land or Sea Animals are Cleverer* 4 962A–B, and Porphyry, *On Abstinence* 3.1.4.

for each other. Indeed, it is plausible to argue that οἰκειότης is closely tied to, even underlies, the love and more generally the friendly feelings that human beings experience in relation to each other. That is obvious in regard to the family. Parents see their children as *their own* and care for them in a loving manner. Aristotle makes the point in *Nicomachean Ethics* 8.12, where he says that parents love their children as something belonging to them, στέργουσι τὰ τέκνα ὡς ἑαυτῶν τι ὄντα (1161b18); what comes from something is proper to its source, οἰκεῖον τῷ ἀφ' οὗ (b22–23). Theophrastus is making a similar point when he tells us that a father wishes good things for his son and does so for the sake of the son himself, δι' αὐτὸν τὸν υἱόν, if he loves him in accordance with nature, ἄν γε κατὰ φύσιν φιλήῃ (533.16–17).⁷²² As time passes, the affection goes in both directions. Father and son form a bond or friendship in which the superiority of the father is recognized (533.7–9). And when a child's parents become old, the child cares for them, which is said to be in conformity with the laws of nature, τῆς φύσεως νόμοι (523.5–6).⁷²³ In addition, Theophrastus tells us not only that a husband should take care of his wife in a way that is humane, φιλάνθρωπως, but also that she will return the kindness (523.7–9). Moving beyond the household, Theophrastus tells us that kindness, εὐεργεσία, holds together the life of men (517.1–2)⁷²⁴ and that in the proper circumstances a person will endure a diminution in honor if he is able to assist a friend (534.44–49).

Among the named texts that constitute our collection (FHS&G), there is no text that traces man's natural affection for family, friends and fellow citizens to the whole of mankind. Nevertheless, we can say with considerable confidence that Theophrastus will have agreed with Aristotle that humane individuals, φιλάνθρωποι, receive praise, and that when traveling abroad one can see how near and dear, οἰκεῖον καὶ φίλον, every man is to every man (*NE* 8.1 1155a20–22). To be sure, Theophrastus will have recognized that the affection felt toward a stranger is likely to be weaker than the affection felt toward child or spouse, so that speaking of goodwill, εὐνοία, might be more appropriate.⁷²⁵ But that is no more than a qualification. Theophrastus could still hold that the affection and concern which is strongest within the family extends far and wide, albeit with

⁷²² Theophrastus immediately adds, ὥστ' ἔοικε φύσικὴ τις φιλία αὕτη εἶναι μᾶλλον, "As a result this friendship seems rather to be one that is natural" (533.17).

⁷²³ Theophrastus makes the point negatively (the child who does not do this is disdainful of the law of nature), and he adds to the laws of nature those of the city (523.5–6).

⁷²⁴ Cf. Aristotle, *NE* 8.1 1155a22–23.

⁷²⁵ Aristotle 9.5 1166b30–34.

diminishing intensity. In this regard, later authors who report Peripatetic doctrine, especially Cicero and Arius Didymus, are of considerable interest, for they do make the connection with all mankind. The material has been well presented by Georgia Tsouni in her recent dissertation (2010). Here I limit myself to a single text that occurs early in Arius Didymus' survey of Peripatetic ethics (*ap.* Stobaeus 2.7.13).⁷²⁶ There we are told that the *per se* love which parents feel for their children⁷²⁷ extends to kinsmen, other related persons, οἰκεῖοι, and fellow citizens. For not only do certain relationships, οἰκειότητες, exist naturally, ἐκ φύσεως, between these people, but also man is a social animal given to mutual affection, φιλόλληλον. And if *per se* love toward fellow citizens is desirable, so too is love toward persons of like race and indeed toward all mankind, πρὸς πάντας ἀνθρώπους (2.7 p. 120.8–20).⁷²⁸ Here we have a clear statement of the affection that all human beings naturally feel for each other.⁷²⁹

Tsouni also argues for a peculiarly Theophrastean notion of οἰκείωσις.⁷³⁰ She holds that Theophrastus recognized a natural, innate inclination or impulse toward what is appropriate to human nature. Initially this impulse manifests itself in self-preservation, but as a human being matures, he comes to understand his own nature and to desire what is proper or befitting, οἰκεῖον, not only in regard to his body but also in regard to his soul. And that includes a range of things including family, friendship, involvement in civic life, scientific research and contemplation of things divine. This account of human development is not spelled out in the named fragments (FHS&G), but Tsouni, citing Cicero and

⁷²⁶ The text is discussed by Tsouni on pages 156–158 of her dissertation.

⁷²⁷ 2.7.13 p. 120.8–9: τῶν δὲ τέκνων ... ἀγαπωμένων κατὰ τὸ <δι> αὐτῷ αἰρετόν.

⁷²⁸ Cf. p. 121.16–17: φανερόν οὖν ὅτι πρὸς πάντας ἐστὶν ἡμῖν εὐνοία φυσικὴ καὶ φιλία, “It is therefore clear that we have a natural goodwill and love/friendship toward all persons.” Since “all persons” includes strangers and persons with whom contact may never be possible, the use of εὐνοία, “goodwill,” alongside φιλία seems entirely appropriate. Cf. Cicero, *On Ends* 5.65, on which see Tsouni pp. 156–164.

⁷²⁹ I would like to believe that this passage from Arius goes back to a writing of Theophrastus without significant alteration. That is quite possible, but we must keep in mind that Arius draws on a variety of sources and that Theophrastus is mentioned only later in Arius' survey (2.7.20 p. 140. 8 = 449A.1). Moreover, it is not certain that Arius Didymus (i.e., the author of the ethical survey preserved by Stobaeus) is to be identified with the philosopher Arius of Alexandria, who was closely associated with the Emperor Augustus. If that identification is accepted, then Arius Didymus was well positioned both temporally and politically to take advantage of Andronicus' edition of Aristotelian and Theophrastean treatises (39.7–8). But the identification has recently come under criticism. See Chapter II “The Sources” no. 39 on Stobaeus.

⁷³⁰ Tsouni pp. 54–69.

Arius, has made a strong case for attributing it to Theophrastus. Again I limit myself to a single text in Arius' survey (Stobaeus 2.7.13). After being told that man excels other living creatures in body and soul, and that man aims at perfection in both, ἀμφοῖν τῆς τελειότητος ἐφίεσθαι (p. 118.11), we read that a man first desires to exist, ὀρέγεσθαι τοῦ εἶναι (p. 118.12), and strives to preserve his health, ὑγίειαν περιποιεῖσθαι σπουδάζειν (p. 118.15), because existence and health are according to nature and worthy of being chosen for their own sake. Moreover, if his body is dear, φίλον (p. 118.20), to a man, so is his soul: its parts, capacities and activities. And that gives rise to the impulse, ὁρμή (p. 119.3), to preserve one's capacities, to act appropriately and to be virtuous. A human being, we read, is naturally familiar with himself, φύσει οἰκειῶσθαι πρὸς ἑαυτὸν (p. 118.12–13), and as he develops a secure understanding, βέλβαιος εἰδησις (p. 119.12), of what is consonant with his nature, he is better able to make appropriate choices. And that includes choosing to act humanely φιλανθρωπῶς, not only to his kin and fellow citizens but also to all mankind.⁷³¹

Turning now to the final lines of 531, i.e., section 4 (lines 22–27), it should be noticed that the argument announced at the beginning of section 1 (line 1) is almost certainly concluded at the end of section 3 (line 21). What then should we say about the rest of 531 (lines 22–27) and what follows 531 in *On Abstinence* 3.26 (not printed as part of 531)? Dodds believes that Theophrastean material extends not only throughout 3.25 but also into 3.26.⁷³² In contrast, Bernays pp. 96–97, Brink (1955) pp. 125–128, Pötscher (1964) pp. 182–184, Moraux (1973) p. 344 n. 92, Dierauer pp. 170–172 and Patillon pp. 135–136, 149–150 believe that the Theophrastean material (what may be regarded as a fragment) is best limited to 3.25.1–3. In my judgment, Dodds' view is the less likely. To be sure, the reference to the character and intelligence (ἦθη and φρονεῖν) of animals in 3.25.4 may call to mind the Theophrastean work *On the Intelligence and Character of Living Creatures* (Περὶ ζῴων φρονήσεως καὶ ἡθους 350 no. 11), and the subsequent introduction of Pythagoras in 3.26.1 could derive from Theophrastus, but equally and with greater probability these passages may be attributed to Porphyry. Indeed, there is something of a break between 3.25.4 and what precedes.

⁷³¹ For further discussion, especially regarding the evidence of Cicero's *On Ends*, see Tsouni pp. 57–61.

⁷³² Review of A.J. Festugière, *La Révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste*, in *Journal of Roman Studies* 40 (1950) p. 148.

In 3.25.1–3 the focus has been on relationship (οἰκειότης); then in 3.25.4, attention is turned to the generation of habits (ἡ τῶν ἡθῶν γένεσις). Habits have been mentioned in what precedes (line 11) but not their generation. Moreover, the mention of intelligence (line 23) may simply reflect Porphyry's stated goal: to demonstrate that the soul of animals is rational and not deprived of intelligence (ὅτι τοίνυν καὶ λογικὴ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἔστιν καὶ οὐκ ἀφίρηται φρονήσεως ἐπιδεικτέον 3.9.1). And the same may be said of the reference to Pythagoras, who is named early on, when Porphyry tells us that he intends to present a view that is true and also Pythagorean, by demonstrating that every soul is rational (ἡμεῖς τὴν ἀληθὴ τε ὁμοῦ καὶ Πυθαγόρειον δόξαν παραστήσωμεν, πᾶσαν ψυχὴν ... λογικὴν ἐπιδεικνύντες 3.1.4). In addition, the emphatic rejection of eating meat in 3.26.3–4 is most naturally taken as an expression of Porphyry's primary concern throughout his treatise.

There remains the fact that the striking phrase καθάπερ ὑπὸ τινος πνοῆς τῆς ἰδίας φύσεως καὶ μοχθηρίας φερομένων, “as it were, borne along by a certain driving wind of their own nature and depravity,” in 3.26.2 occurs earlier in 2.22.2, where Porphyry is quite certainly drawing on Theophrastus' work *On Piety* (580 no. 3).⁷³³ That might encourage someone to argue that the occurrence of the phrase in 3.26.2 is part of an excerpt from Theophrastus and that all the material in 3.25–26 is taken from *On Piety*. Nevertheless, I find a different explanation more convincing. In 3.25.1–3 (lines 1–21), Porphyry is drawing on either Theophrastus' work *On Piety* or his work *On the Intelligence and Character of Living Creatures*. In what follows, Porphyry is no longer drawing on one of these works (either directly or indirectly through an intermediary), but he has not put Theophrastus entirely out of his mind. He recalls what he wrote earlier in the second book and repeats verbatim the striking image of the driving wind. It is possible that he checked his memory perhaps by consulting the earlier passage at 2.22.2, but that is hardly necessary.⁷³⁴ Be that as it may, no portion of 3.26 has been printed in the text-translation volumes. In contrast, 3.25.4 does appear at the end of 531, on the (remote) chance that it may derive from *On Piety*.

According to Dierauer p. 171, text 531 is marked by clumsiness. In particular, we are twice told (without a single intervening sentence) that all human beings are related to each other (lines 9–13); on three occasions

⁷³³ Bernays, Pötscher and Bouffartigue all agree in assigning of 2.22.2 to the work *On Piety*. For an overview, see Fortenbaugh (1984) p. 264.

⁷³⁴ See Pötscher (1964) p. 96, who rejects the argument of Bernays pp. 99–100.

we meet the phrase λέγω δέ/δή (lines 2, 14, 17); the phrase τῷ τὰς ἐν αὐτοῖς ψυχὰς ἀδιαφόρους πεφυκέναι strikes the reader as especially cumbersome (line 17). Although we are dealing here with issues of style, concerning which differences of opinion are common, I want to say that in my judgment the lines in question are not so clumsy that some alteration of the original Theophrastean text must be suspected. The repetition of the relationship that exists between all human beings is explained (or at least mitigated) by the fact that it first concludes one part of Theophrastus' argument and subsequently prepares for the transition to animals. The threefold use of λέγω δέ/δή seems to me not inappropriate. Confronting a disputed issue, Theophrastus wants to set out an argument that clearly and emphatically expresses his own position. Hence at the outset he uses the phrase to explain what he means by "born to the same (persons)." He uses it again when he moves to clarify what he means by "principles of their bodies." And he uses it for the third time when he needs to clarify the controversial claim that the souls of animals and human beings are "not different."⁷³⁵ Finally, the phrase τῷ τὰς ἐν αὐτοῖς ψυχὰς ἀδιαφόρους πεφυκέναι is in my judgment clear and quite in place within the argument where it introduces the transition from body to soul.

In arguing against Dierauer's assertion of clumsiness, I am not claiming that Porphyry has recorded Theophrastus' argument without a single alteration. His earlier excerpt from Plutarch's *Whether Land or Sea Animals are Cleverer* shows that he may add and subtract.⁷³⁶ But allowing that material taken over from one work and integrated into another regularly calls for minor adjustments if not a major overhaul, I am not prepared to recognize an inconsistency in Theophrastus' argument that is attributable to Porphyry. I am thinking of Dierauer's claim that within a few lines psychic differences between humans and animals are first denied and then recognized (p. 171 n. 5). As I read 531, Theophrastus first says that the souls of humans and animals are not different in regard to desires, angry impulses, calculations and sensation (lines 17–19). After that Theophrastus acknowledges that there are differences in degree. In some animals the soul is highly finished, and in others it is less so

⁷³⁵ I add that using the verb λέγειν to introduce what one means is not unusual Greek (LSJ III.9) and therefore would not strike the reader as clumsy. If anything, it might appear pedantic when used three times in close succession. But here Theophrastus is, as it were, teaching and might choose to be pedantic if it contributes to clarity and provides emphasis.

⁷³⁶ See Chapter II "The Sources" no. 24 on Porphyry.

(lines 19–20). Since difference in degree is compatible with possessing the same faculties—in fact it presupposes the same faculties—Theophrastus can without contradiction go on to say, “Yet for all of them the principles (of the soul) are naturally the same” (lines 20–21).

Of greater moment is Dierauer’s claim that the attribution of calculations (λογισμοί line 18) to animals is the work of Porphyry (p. 172). If I understand correctly, Dierauer bases his claim on two considerations. First, he accepts the suggestion of earlier scholars that Books 8 and 9 of the *History of Animals* are compilations that contain considerable Theophrastean material. In particular, the well-known introduction to Book 8 is said not only to be Theophrastean but also to derive from the introduction to Theophrastus’ work *On the Intelligence and Character of Living Creatures*. According to this text, animals possess psychic capacities that may be compared with those of human beings. In some cases, there is a difference in degree (τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον 588a25), and in others, comparison depends upon analogy (τῷ ἀνάλογον 588a28). To the latter group belong those capacities that invite comparison with human skill, wisdom and intelligence (τέχνη, σοφία and σύνεσις 588a29). They are said to be resemblances of intelligent understanding (τῆς περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν συνέσεως ὁμοιότητες 588a23–24), but they are not the same, i.e., identical in kind, for in that case they would differ in degree and not be the same by analogy.⁷³⁷ If that is the considered view of Theophrastus, and according to Dierauer it is, then the unqualified attribution of calculation to animals in 531 is not the work of Theophrastus. It is attributable to Porphyry.⁷³⁸

The second consideration concerns a Theophrastean text that has been preserved for us in Photius’ *Library* 278 528a40–b27 = 362A. The text is an excerpt from Theophrastus’ work *On Creatures Said to be Grudging*

⁷³⁷ Resemblance or similarity based on analogy involves four terms and two relationships that are recognized as similar: one thing is related to another in a way that is similar to the relation existing between two other things. E.g., evening is related to day as old age is related to life. Evening is conceptually distinct from old age, but the four-term relationship allows us to substitute “evening” for “old age” and to speak metaphorically of the “evening of life.” (Cf. Aristotle, *Poetics* 21 1457b16–33). Applied to HA 8.1, we can say that intelligent understanding is related to human beings as “some other such natural faculty” (τις ἕτερα τοιαύτη φυσικὴ δύναμις 588a30–31) is related to animals. The two faculties are different (“other”), but we can speak metaphorically of animal intelligence.

⁷³⁸ For an example of qualified attribution of calculation to animals, see HA 9.48 631a27, where we read of dolphins restraining their breath as if through calculation: ὥσπερ ἀναλογισάμενοι.

(line 1)⁷³⁹ and divides into two parts. In the first, we read what men say about the gecko: begrudging men a benefit (φθονῶν τῆς ὠφελείας τοῖς ἀνθρώποις), it swallows its skin when it sheds it, for the skin is a remedy for epilepsy. Similarly, the stag acts grudgingly when it buries its right horn, which is useful against toad's poison. The list of examples continues with the mare, seal, hedgehog and lynx, all of whom are said to begrudge men some benefit. In the second part, Theophrastus puts forth a correction. It is clear to everyone, we are told, that animals do not do these things because they are grudging (διὰ φθόνον). Men have imposed a motive upon them, for how could irrational creatures (ἄλογοι) have so much knowledge, seeing that rational ones (λογικοί) only acquire it by prolonged study. Rather, the gecko's action manifests some natural affection (φυσικόν τι ποιῶν πάθος), and the same can be said of the other cases. E.g., the hedgehog makes water on its skin, not in order to spoil it, but on account of fear or because it is affected in some other natural way (διὰ φόβον ἢ δι' ἄλλο τι πάθος φυσικόν). Here we have a text that first reports what men say about the behavior of certain animals (lines 2–10), after which comes Theophrastus' reply: what men say implies that the animals in question are highly intelligent (they possess wisdom, σοφία), but in fact their behavior manifests some sort of natural affection (lines 11–23). Exactly how we should understand this natural affection is not made clear in Photius' text, but we can say that it is opposed to intelligent actions that depend upon prolonged study (lines 13–14). And that is consistent with what we read in *History of Animals* 8.1: namely that the skill and wisdom exhibited by animals is analogous to that of human beings and not identical.

At this point, one is tempted to say that Dierauer is correct: Theophrastus remained true to Aristotle in withholding intelligence from animals. That may well be the case, but it should be underlined that the authorship of *History of Animals* 8–9 is uncertain, and the most recent editor, David Balme, inclines to attribute the work to Aristotle.⁷⁴⁰ In addition, the Photius passage never draws a general conclusion concerning all animal behavior. Instead, we are told that human beings impose on animals a motive of their own (and an unattractive one at that) and do so in

⁷³⁹ The work is listed by Diogenes Laertius 5.43 = 1.111 in his catalogue of Theophrastean writings. The title as reported by Diogenes differs only slightly from that found in Photius. For easy comparison, see 350 no. 7a and b.

⁷⁴⁰ I am thinking of D.M. Balme, whose introduction to Loeb volume 439 = Aristotle vol. 11 (1991) pp. 1–30 is instructive.

cases that might be thought to involve considerable learning. In itself that does not rule out recognizing limited intelligence in animals. It remains possible that Theophrastus began to question the strict divisions of Aristotle's *scala naturae* and was prepared to grant animals cognitive capacity, albeit feeble and limited in comparison with that of human beings.

In this regard, we should not ignore the fragments of Theophrastus' work *On Creatures that Change Color*. The fragments are not numerous, but on one reading they may suggest that Theophrastus not only allowed animals cognitive capacity but was also careful to distinguish between cases in which animals undergo a natural, innate affection and those in which animals respond to a situation in an intelligent manner. Photius' *Library* 278 525a30–b21 = 365A contains an excerpt from the work, but it only touches on our issue. Much is said about a fanciful animal called the tanandrus, whose hairs are said to change color. We hear less about the chameleon. It is said to change color by means of its breath and to puff itself up when agitated. The octopus is mentioned early on but no details are given. More informative is a text of Athenaeus 7.104 317F = 365B, in which the octopus is not only mentioned but its change of color also receives comment. We read that it takes on the color of stony places and does so through fear and for the sake of self-protection, φόβῳ καὶ φυλακῆς χάριν (line 3). Still more informative may be what Plutarch reports in *Whether Land or Sea Animals are Cleverer* 27 978E–F = 365D. We are first told that the chameleon does not change color by design but from fear and to no purpose. After that Theophrastus is cited in regard to the large amount of breath, which makes possible the chameleon's change of color. The text (as printed in the text-translation volumes) continues by introducing the octopus, whose change of color is said to be an act as against a mere affection (an ἔργον as against a πάθος). The octopus changes color as a result of forethought and with design (ἐκ προνοίας and μηχανῇ), in order to hide itself from creatures that it fears and to catch those on which it feeds (lines 6–9). That does seem to support the idea that Theophrastus attributed cognitive capacity to animals. In some cases like the octopus, he was even prepared to attribute calculations (λογισμοί) as stated in 531.⁷⁴¹ There is, however,

⁷⁴¹ Aristotle recognizes that a goal-directed emotion like fear—it involves safety as a goal—makes men deliberate (*Rhet.* 2.5 1383a5–8). The same may appear to be the case with certain animals. If the octopus changes color through fright and for the sake of safety (φόβῳ καὶ φυλακῆς χάριν 365B.3), might not this creature have some small

a different way to read 365D: namely, by cutting off the Theophrastean material at line 6. This is what Wimmer does (fr. 189), and his thinking is clear enough. Text 365D is found in that section of Plutarch's work *Whether Land or Sea Animals are Cleverer*, in which Phaedimus is made to argue in favor of sea animals. He denigrates the chameleon's change of color as a mere physical response, cites Theophrastus in support of this interpretation (the chameleon is full of breath), and then—no longer drawing on Theophrastus—says that the octopus' change of color exhibits forethought. A sea animal is claimed to be capable of design (μηχανῇ in line 7 picks up μηχανώμενος in line 1). To be sure, there is no hard break in the text in line 6 (where Wimmer cuts off the fragment) and it is not impossible that Theophrastus distinguished between change of color in the chameleon and in the octopus, but equally 365D cannot be said to decide the issue. We know that Theophrastus discussed the octopus in *On Creatures that Change Color*, but exactly what he said about the octopus' change of color remains uncertain. He may have mentioned fright, safety and breath (365B.3, C.2–3, D.3–6) and left it at that.

At this point, something should be said about the concluding sentence of Theophrastus' argument in 531: δηλοῖ δὲ ἡ τῶν παθῶν οἰκειότης, "The relationship of emotions makes this clear" (line 21). It is tempting to say that this assertion fits nicely with what we read in both 362A and 365B–D. For in the former, what might appear to be intelligent behavior on the part of animals is referred to a certain natural affection, φυσικόν τι πάθος (lines 16 and 18). And in the latter, there are references to fright and agitation. It is tempting to conclude that in all three texts Theophrastus is referring to innate, i.e., instinctive reactions that do not depend on cognitive activity and therefore are not to be confused with human emotions.⁷⁴² Tempting to be sure, but on closer examination it is, I think, clear that the preceding interpretation overlooks a significant difficulty: namely: that the final sentence of 531 is not easily restricted to non-cognitive reactions. Read in context, this sentence picks up and confirms ("makes clear") the immediately preceding assertion that the

share in deliberation? Moreover, if it is true that the octopus changes color not only when frightened but also when hunting for food, then the octopus changes color in two quite different circumstances. And the second of the two, i.e., looking for dinner seems especially amenable to explanation in terms of deliberation or forethought, πρόνοια (365D.7).

⁷⁴² On thought as the efficient cause of human emotion, see the introduction to Chapter IV, Section 2 on "Emotions."

same psychic principles, i.e., faculties are present (in differing degree) in all living creatures (line 21). Since we are not told otherwise, that should include calculation, λογισμός (line 18).

Also problematic is the meaning of πάθος (gen. pl. παθῶν, line 21). Context aside, πάθος can refer to pleasant and painful sensation and to the behavior caused by such sensation quite apart from any thought or belief. It can also be used of the thinking that occurs in the soul⁷⁴³ and of the behavior that is caused by what a person thinks. In regard to such behavior, emotional response immediately comes to mind, for Aristotle regularly refers to emotions as πάθη, and in *Rhetoric* 2 he makes thought the efficient cause of emotional response. Moreover, since the behavior of animals is regularly described in terms of emotion (we say that animals are frightened and angered), we should not be surprised to read that the relation of emotions (ἡ τῶν παθῶν οἰκειότης) makes clear that animal souls are not different from those of human beings. For animals flee in the way that humans do when avoiding danger, and they exhibit aggression much like humans when provoked. In addition, they engage in behavior that strongly suggests calculation. I think especially of the oft-cited hunting dog that smells a hare and is moved to pursuit.⁷⁴⁴ The dog's initial response might be dismissed as a mere reaction to a certain kind of sensation.⁷⁴⁵ But what about the dog when it takes up pursuit, follows the scent and comes to a cross roads, where the hare may have gone in any one of three directions? The dog sniffs out two possibilities, and not having detected the scent, immediately takes off in the third direction. The dog appears to have performed a disjunctive hypothetical syllogism of the form: Either A or B or C; but neither A nor B; therefore C.⁷⁴⁶ Almost certainly Theophrastus took an interest in such syllogisms,⁷⁴⁷ and we can imagine him being impressed with the dog's apparent calculations, λογισμοί, or those of some other animal. He

⁷⁴³ See Aristotle, *On Soul* 1.1 403a2–8, where τὰ πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς extends to νοεῖν. And cf. the use of παθήματα at *On Interpretation* 1 16a3–4.

⁷⁴⁴ Sextus Empiricus, *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* 1.69; Plutarch, *Whether Land or Sea Animals are Cleverer* 13 969A–B; Aelian, *On the Characteristics of Animals* 6.59; Porphyry, *On Abstinence* 3.6.3.

⁷⁴⁵ Cf. Aristotle, *NE* 3.10 1118a18–20.

⁷⁴⁶ In Stoic logic, this is the fifth complex indemonstrable syllogism. See Sextus Empiricus, *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* 1.69. The example of the dog can be simplified by placing him at a two-pronged fork in the road. He then appears to perform a simple disjunctive syllogism of the form: Either A or B, but not A; therefore B. See Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 7.81.

⁷⁴⁷ J. Barnes, "Theophrastus and Hypothetical Syllogistic," in *Theophrastus of Eresus: On*

may have decided to attribute a limited degree of reasoning capacity to animals. Or he may only have found the idea intriguing, and in some work or works, especially an exoteric work like *On Piety*,⁷⁴⁸ he may have expressed himself in a way that he would not have done in a strictly scientific treatise.

Having referred to *On Piety* as an exoteric work, I want to call attention to Porphyry's work *On Abstinence from Eating Meat*.⁷⁴⁹ In Book 2, Section 22.1–2, which is generally agreed to be an excerpt from *On Piety*. We first read that when friendship and perception of kinship (τὸ συγγενές) prevailed, men did not kill animals, because they deemed them related (οἰκεῖα). But when strife began to prevail, men began to kill animals. After that we are presented with an analogy concerning the proper treatment of men and animals. Just as we have a relationship (οἰκειότης) with men and yet think it necessary to kill those that are evil, so with animals it is proper to kill those that are unjust and evil. And much as it is unjust to kill men who do us no harm, so it is unjust to kill animals that do nothing unjust and harmful (584A.191–202). At first reading, we are tempted to say that Theophrastus not only attributes moral character to animals, but also believes that animals can be treated justly and unjustly in the same way that men can. That would be a significant departure from Aristotle and a step forward in the humanization of animals. Nevertheless, we should keep in mind that *On Piety* is likely to have been an exoteric work in dialogue form. Theophrastus is arguing against animal sacrifice and in addressing a general audience he may have chosen to express himself in a way that departs from his considered opinion. We have an example of that in earlier remarks, where Theophrastus confronts an objection to sacrificing the fruits of plants. The objection is that in doing so we deprive the plants of something that is theirs. Theophrastus replies by saying that we do not take the fruits against their will: παρὰ ἀκόντων, “from unwilling (plants)” (2.13.1 = 584A.118). That might suggest that plants have wishes that can be honored or dishonored, but of course, Theophrastus does not

his Life and Work, ed. W. Fortenbaugh, P. Huby and A. Long = Rutgers Studies in Classical Humanities 2 (1985) pp. 125–141 and Fortenbaugh (1998) pp. 39–45 and (2000) pp. 66–69.

⁷⁴⁸ I agree with those scholars, who hold that *On Piety* was an exoteric work in dialogue form. See Chapter II “The Sources” no. 24 on Porphyry with n. 210.

⁷⁴⁹ Porphyry's work is four books long. The first presents arguments against abstinence, i.e., against vegetarianism, after which abstinence is defended with special reference to temperance. In Book 2 the focus is on piety and in Book 3 on justice. Book 4 offers a historical discussion, which has suffered in transmission.

believe that.⁷⁵⁰ He merely chooses to express himself in a striking manner. Similarly in regard to animals, Theophrastus may have chosen to express himself in a way that goes against his considered view but is effective in a treatise whose aim is to discourage animal sacrifice.

I want to conclude this discussion of animal soul by calling attention to the emphasis that Theophrastus places on sense perception in text 531. I am thinking of the phrase *καὶ μάλιστα πάντων ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν*, “and above all in their sensations” (lines 18–19). We may have here a less controversial, but equally effective basis for arguing against animal sacrifice. Theophrastus could agree with Aristotle that a relationship of justice is only possible where the parties share something in common. But instead of looking to cognitive capacity and claiming that animals can hold beliefs, make moral judgments and even calculate, he could focus on sensation as a shared experience. Both men and animals feel pleasure and pain, and just as it is wrong to inflict needless pain on other men, so we ought not to cause animals unnecessary pain by sacrificing them to the gods. Moreover, when we sacrifice an animal, we not only cause it pain but also rob it of its life. I do not know what Aristotle would say to this argument, but he should take it seriously, for he is against abortion, once the fetus has acquired sensation and life. At this point, abortion becomes a violation of divine law: it is no longer “holy” (ὅσιον *Pol.* 7.16 1335b25). And that is a primary concern of Theophrastus in his argument against animal sacrifice. A sacrifice is something holy (ἡ θυσία ὁσία τίς 584A.109–110), and doing harm to animals while robbing them of their life is not holy (οὐχ ὅσιον 584A.113).

Above I suggested that in *On Abstinence* 3.25.1–3 = 531.1–21, Porphyry is drawing on either Theophrastus’ work *On Piety* (580 no. 3) or his work *On the Intelligence and Character of Living Creatures* (350 no. 11). I much prefer the former, and that for two reasons. First, establishing a natural relationship between human beings and animals is essential to Theophrastus’ argument against animal sacrifice. A zoological work focused on animals might assume such a relationship without arguing for it.⁷⁵¹ Second, since it seems certain that the Theophrastean material that Porphyry introduces into Book 2 of *On Abstinence* is taken from *On Piety*,⁷⁵² it is simplest to assume that he has drawn on the same work in Book 3.

⁷⁵⁰ That Theophrastus did not challenge the lower division of Aristotle’s *scala naturae* (that between plants and animals) is clear at 531.14–15.

⁷⁵¹ See Patillon p. 150.

⁷⁵² See Chapter II “The Sources” no. 24 on Porphyry with n. 208.

- 584A Porphyry, *On Abstinence from Eating Animals* 2.5.1–9.2, 11.3–15.3, 19.4–31.1, 31.7–32.3 (CB vol. 2 p. 74.17–79.9, 80.19–83.24, 87.9–98.3, 99.3–20 Bouffartigue)
- 584B Porphyry, *On Abstinence from Eating Animals* 2.43.3–4 (CB vol. 2 p. 109.20–110.10 Bouffartigue)
- 584C Porphyry, *On Abstinence from Eating Animals* 2.53.3 (CB vol. 2 p. 116.16–23 Bouffartigue)
- 584D Porphyry, *On Abstinence from Eating Animals* 2.59.1–61.2 (CB vol. 2 p. 121.10–123.2 Bouffartigue)

Literature: Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 262–274, (2003b) pp. 173–192 and the discussion by Stefan Schorn in his forthcoming *Commentary* 6.2 on religion. References to other works therein

In the text-translation volumes, texts 584A–D are printed in the section on “Religion,” and reference has been made to them in the section on “Natural Relationship” immediately after 531, because they, too, concern man’s relation to other living creatures. The primary discussion of texts 584A–D will be found in Stefan Schorn’s *Commentary* 6.2 on religion. For that reason and because I have already discussed the texts in some depth (see “Literature” above), I limit myself to brief remarks concerning material relevant to our understanding of Theophrastus’ ethical thought.

584A–D are taken from Porphyry’s work *On Abstinence from Eating Meat*.⁷⁵³ Since these four texts are all taken from Book 2, they occur earlier in Porphyry’s work than 531, which is found in Book 3. Scholars are generally agreed that the Theophrastean material in Book 2 is from Theophrastus’ work *Περὶ εὐσεβείας*, *On Piety* (580 no. 3). Most likely the same is true of 531. (See the end of the preceding comment on 531.) What we read in Porphyry makes clear that Theophrastus recognized a special relationship between men and animals that does not exist between men and plants. And this relationship is fundamental to Theophrastus’ aversion to animal sacrifice. Theophrastus did not deny that animals exist for use by man; that would have been a significant departure from Aristotle (*Politics* 1.8 1256b20–22). But Theophrastus did argue against animal sacrifice. He held that sacrifice should cause no harm and

⁷⁵³ Porphyry’s work is four books long. The first presents arguments against abstinence, i.e., against vegetarianism, after which abstinence is defended with special reference to temperance. In Book 2 the focus is on piety and in Book 3 on justice. Book 4 offers a historical discussion, which has suffered in transmission.

that sacrificing an animal does harm (584A.105–109). It robs the animal of its life, which is said to be unjust. To be sure, there are destructive animals, which must be prevented from doing harm, and that may mean killing them. Such animals are spoken of as irrational creatures—they belong among the ἄλογα ζῷα—and said to be unjust by nature and evil-doers, ἄδικα τὴν φύσιν καὶ κακοποιά. In addition, they are likened to those human beings who are borne along by a stormy wind of their own nature and wickedness, ὑπό τινος πνοῆς <τῆς> ἰδίας φύσεως καὶ μοχθηρίας φερομένου (584A.196–200). But if killing these animals is not an act of injustice, sacrificing them is not an acceptable way to honor the gods. And since sacrificing other animals would be treating them unjustly—in depriving them of their souls, we would be doing injustice, ἀδικοῦντες (584A.224, cf. ἀδικήσιν 226)—animal sacrifice is wrong. There are problems here. Most important is how we should understand the comparison between animals and evil men. Did Theophrastus think that animals can be unjust in the way that human beings are? I.e., are animals able to formulate moral principles, which involve cognition and are action guiding? Despite the apparent attribution of λόγισμοι to animals in 531.18, I doubt that he did. See the commentary on 531. Here I call attention to a detail. When we read that certain animals are ἄδικα τὴν φύσιν καὶ κακοποιά, we have already been told that animals are without reason, ἄλογα (584A.199). That suggests emphasizing τὴν φύσιν. Being ἄλογα, animals cannot formulate moral principles, but they may have a natural, i.e., innate disposition that drives them to act in ways that are destructive to both humans and other animals. Against this interpretation, it might be argued that the word φύσις is used in close proximity to both humans and animals (584A.197 and 199, respectively). Given not only the proximity but also the comparison that is being made, isn't it reasonable to say that φύσις is being used in a single sense. In both occurrences, it refers to wickedness, conceived of as vice based on one or more action-guiding beliefs (e.g. the intemperate man believes that he ought always to pursue the immediate pleasure, NE 7.3 1146b22–23). Perhaps, but φύσις is notoriously ambiguous. It may refer to an innate condition like temperament which is common to animals and men, but equally it can refer to what might be called second nature, i.e., an acquired disposition like moral virtue and vice.⁷⁵⁴ And if *On Piety* was an exoteric writ-

⁷⁵⁴ See above, the commentary on 503–504 with n. 550 on Dihle.

ing and in particular a dialogue, which most likely it was,⁷⁵⁵ ambiguous usage would not be unusual and on occasion welcome. To draw numerous distinctions which the reader can easily draw for himself is tedious, and when something is left for the reader to determine, he is pleased with himself and transfers this feeling to the author. In the case before us, the repeated use of φύσις would not fool the alert reader, and to explain it would be tedious. The reader understands on his own and is pleased with his own ability to spot ambiguity. And if he appreciates the way in which repetition strengthens the comparison between animals and men, he is doubly pleased.⁷⁵⁶

Instead of sacrificing animals, Theophrastus approves of sacrificing fruits and leaves and other kinds of vegetable matter. He does, however, recognize an objection: When we sacrifice the fruits of plants, are we not depriving plants of what is theirs? And is that not unjust? Theophrastus counters that taking the fruits of plants does not occur against their will, ἀκόντων (584A.118). They allow their fruit to fall, and the taking of their fruit is not accompanied by their destruction. The reply is clever, but it is not to be pressed. We are not to imagine that plants can suffer involuntary harm. Their soul is limited to vegetative capacity, so that strictly speaking we should not speak of plants acting or suffering either voluntarily or involuntarily (against their will). As already indicated, *On Piety* is almost certainly an exoteric writing, a dialogue, which admits imprecision, especially when it serves a purpose economically and with punch.

Although Theophrastus approves of sacrificing vegetable matter, he is careful to warn against extremes. An excessively large sacrifice gains no favor with the gods, and neither does one that is extremely small. It is the mean and the mean in relation to us, the μεσότης πρὸς ἡμᾶς, which is acceptable.⁷⁵⁷ For a poor individual, a small quantity of grass may be pleasing to the gods; for a rich individual, grains embellished

⁷⁵⁵ See Fortenbaugh (1984) p. 127 and (2003b) p. 175 n. 10 and the references given there.

⁷⁵⁶ On the importance of permitting the reader or listener to supply what has been omitted, see *Commentary* 8 on rhetoric and poetics, pp. 312–316.

⁷⁵⁷ For the phrase μεσότης πρὸς ἡμᾶς, see 449A.4. In Arius' summary of Peripatetic ethics, piety is treated as a mean-disposition. It is defined as a ἕξις to worship gods and daemons, which (disposition) lies between atheism and godfearfulness (Stobaeus, *Anthology* 2.7.25 p. 147.1–3 W). The definition does not occur in that portion of Arius' summary that is explicitly connected with Theophrastus, but it is clearly Peripatetic. Interestingly piety is treated together with holiness, uprightness, good fellowship and

with incense may be an acceptable sacrifice.⁷⁵⁸ And in the context of an agrarian society, the average person does well to sacrifice cakes and other products that were absent in an earlier age.

Theophrastus recognizes three motives for sacrificing to the gods. They are honoring the gods, making a return for some benefit bestowed by the gods, and seeking to deflect evils and to acquire goods. These are everyday motives, which prompt ordinary people to sacrifice. But they are also the motives that ought to prompt men to sacrifice.⁷⁵⁹ That is important, for it tells us that Theophrastus is not against seeking a benefit, providing it is appropriate to the person performing the sacrifice and does not harm others in some way that is unacceptable. Moreover, the list is disjunctive.⁷⁶⁰ One may sacrifice for all three reasons or for two or only one. In regard to honoring the gods, single motivation is recognized in the words *κατὰ ψιλὴν τῆς ἀγαθῆς αὐτῶν ἕξεως ἐκτίμησιν*, “simply to do honor to their good character” (584A.221). The phrase *κατὰ ψιλὴν ... ἐκτίμησιν* rules out additional motives. As I understand the text, it is not an injunction against honoring the gods in combination with other motives. Rather, we are to understand that honoring the gods relates closely to acts of moral virtue, e.g., acts of courage and generosity, in that honoring the gods can be and often should be chosen *per se*, i.e., without consideration of other goals. Indeed, honors given *simpliciter* are the clearest and best expression of piety, and perhaps for that reason pride of place is given to honoring the gods when the three motives are first introduced, *διὰ τιμὴν* (584A.216–217), and later when the discussion is concluded (584A.223–237).

In addition to having proper motives, people who sacrifice ought to be of good character. We are told that they should be *καθηραμένους τὸ ἦθος* “cleansed in character” (584A.154). Having a clean body, bright clothing and a soul *μὴ καθαρὰν κακῶν*, one that is “not cleansed of evils” (584A.158) is unacceptable. We are also told that the god takes

fair dealing: *δαιοσύνης, χρηστότης, εὐκοινωνησία* and *εὐσυναλλαξία*. All are defined as mean-dispositions, and all are considered subordinate forms of justice (p. 146.17–18, 147.1–12 W).

⁷⁵⁸ Within a discussion of changes in sacrifice that occurred as agriculture developed, we are told that men added to their sacrifices anything that beautified their life and had a fragrance suitable to divine perception (584A.39–43). One wonders whether the work *On the Divine Happiness in Response to the Academics* (436 no. 13) had something to say about divine perception.

⁷⁵⁹ *θυτέον* 584A.216, 237, 238.

⁷⁶⁰ 584A.217, 219–221.

delight in the most divine thing within us when it is cleansed, since it is by nature akin to him. The idea that the soul is akin to the god or gods is important not only in regard to piety but also in regard to happiness and the philosophic life.⁷⁶¹ That said, good character is not to be construed as a disposition to retreat from the world into some refined life devoted to sacrifice and contemplation.⁷⁶² On the contrary, 523 tells us that the man who is going to be admired for his relationship to the divinity must be obedient to the laws of nature and of the city. In addition to making frequent sacrifices, he must also take good care of his parents, his wife and children, and be wise in other aspects of his life.⁷⁶³

13. *Friendship*

Friendship comes naturally. No one had to tell us to make friends. Rather, we began making friends in our younger years, and we continue to do so throughout life. To be sure, in the case of very young children, we may prefer to speak of playmates as against friends, but we also recognize that their curiosity concerning each other and their readiness to interact constitute important first steps toward friendship. Older children, adolescents and even young adults do make friends, but their relationships are often fleeting. They come and go so quickly, that we apt to qualify such friendships as youthful, thereby indicating that they lack the stability expected of friendships between mature adults. Moreover, very old

⁷⁶¹ Regarding happiness and the philosophic life of contemplation, see the introduction to Section 5 on “Happiness,” where Aristotle’s position is stated in summary form. For Theophrastus, see 481–485 with the commentary on these texts.

⁷⁶² In 584B.2–4, Porphyrius speaks first of “making every effort to liken ourselves to god and those around him,” and then says, “this occurs through freedom from emotion and the articulated conception of things that really are.” The idea of likening oneself to god is Aristotelian and Theophrastean, but the idea of freedom from emotion, stated without qualification, is neither Aristotelian nor Theophrastean. To be sure, the *Eudemian Ethics* 8.3 1249b20–23 not only speaks of serving and contemplating the god, but also recognizes the importance of being aware of the alogical part of the soul as little as possible, ἥμισυ. The qualifier ἥμισυ is important. When contemplation is the goal, emotions are to be kept in check to the greatest extent possible, but they cannot and ought not to be fully eradicated, if one is a human being whose goal is to lead a happy human life. Moreover, Theophrastus is mentioned only later at 584B.6–7, where we are advised to sacrifice κατὰ τὰ εἰρημένα τῷ Θεοφράστῳ, “according to what Theophrastus has said.” Such a brief reference to Theophrastus contributes little or nothing to what is said in 584B.2–4.

⁷⁶³ Although the closing lines of 523 are problematic (see the commentary on 523), it is clear from what precedes that being of good character includes doing what is right by one’s family and fellow citizens.

people sometimes become grumps and quite incapable of maintaining friendships let alone forming new ones. But there are others who suffer the ravages of old age with grace, maintaining longstanding friendships while entering into new relationships. In between these extremes, most of us make friends over time and maintain stable friendships that enrich our lives. We speak of good or close friends, whose character we find compatible, who are a source of pleasure and who provide assistance when needed. Other friendships may be more limited. We enjoy spending time with people who are funny but otherwise quite useless to us. We also cultivate relationships with persons who provide material benefits and little more. Most of us are cognizant of these differences and occasionally we draw verbal distinctions. A compatible friend is described as my kind of guy, the friend who provides pleasure is called an amusing fellow, and the useful friend is often described as a business partner.

What is true of the present day was equally true of ancient Greece. There were people, for whom friendship seems to have been quite impossible. The playwright Menander portrays such a person in his *Grouch*: namely, Knemon, who prefers to live alone (30, 150, 329), thinks himself self-sufficient and suspects the motives of everyone else (713–729). Like the playwright, Aristotle too calls attention to the grouchiness of old men; he also takes note of young people, whose friendships were apt to be unstable and of short duration (*NE* 8.3 1156a31–b6, cf. 539). But there were many others, indeed, the majority who made friends and did so much as we do today: on the basis of character and pleasure and utility. The idea is set forth explicitly in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, in which Aristotle recognizes three kinds of friendships and offers a sophisticated analysis of the ambiguity involved in using a single word, *φιλία*, to refer to each of the three. He recognizes that each kind is purposeful. It is directed toward a goal and defined in terms of that goal: the good or virtuous, the pleasant and the useful. There are then three distinct kinds of friendship, each essentially different from the other, but they are not unrelated, and the use of a single word to refer to each is not simple, unmitigated ambiguity.⁷⁶⁴ On the contrary, the three friendships are related in that they are analogous to each other—as friendship based on goodness stands to what is good (it is directed toward the good and virtuous), so friendship based on pleasure stands to what is pleasant, and friendship based on utility stands to the useful. And when things are related by analogy, then it is as if they

⁷⁶⁴ A case of simple or unmitigated ambiguity is the use of “cape” to refer to a cloak and to a point of land.

enjoy a single nature.⁷⁶⁵ That is sufficient to mitigate the ambiguity, but it is not the only way in which the ambiguity is mitigated. Aristotle also relates the three kinds of friendship on the basis of similarity. He holds that friendship directed toward what is good and virtuous is also pleasant and useful, and that creates a tie to friendships based on pleasure and on utility. The last two kinds of friendship are not directly related to each other on the basis of similarity (a friendship based on pleasure need not be useful, and one based on utility need not be pleasant), but the friendship based on goodness can mediate a relationship between the two. It is the primary or central case that has everything looked for in a friendship including pleasure and usefulness. It follows that all three kinds of friendship are related not only by analogy but also on the basis of similarity, and together the two mitigate the ambiguity involved in the way the word *φιλία* is used.

The analysis of friendship in the *Eudemian Ethics* is quite different. It tells us that friendships based on pleasure and utility are focally related to friendship based on goodness, but it fails to spell out how we are to understand this relationship. Instead, reference is made to similarity, which is quite a different matter. For discussion I refer to my brief remarks in the commentary on 533 and fuller remarks in “Aristotle’s Analysis of Friendship: Function and Analogy, Resemblance, and Focal Meaning” (1975b) pp. 57–62.

In describing friendship based on virtue, Aristotle emphasizes an ideal relationship: one that is perfect or complete, *τελεία* (NE 8.3 1156b7, 8.4 1156b34, 8.6 1158a11). The partners in such a relationship are said to be good; they are similar in respect to virtue and identical or similar in their actions (8.3 1156b7–8, 17). Moreover, such a friendship is stable, because it involves everything necessary for people to be friends (1156b17–19). Most importantly, the parties involved are virtuous, and virtue is stable (8.8 1159b3). But however desirable relationships of this kind may be, Aristotle finds it natural that they are infrequent, for men of such character are rare: *σπανίας δ’ εἰκὸς τὰς τοιαύτας εἶναι ὀλίγοι γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι* (8.3 1156b24–25). This is a view that Theophrastus shares (532.2) as do people from many walks of life. Only we should be clear that there are several reasons why perfect friendship is rare. Not only does it require partners both of whom are virtuous, but it also demands time and familiarity before it can take hold (8.3 1156b25–29, 9.5 1167a11–12), and

⁷⁶⁵ Cf *Posterior Analytics* 2.14 98a20–23 and *Topics* 1.18 108b23–28.

once established the parties will enjoy an intimacy that makes it difficult to have more than a few friends (9.10 1170b20–1171a20).

The fact that Aristotle speaks of perfect friendship between virtuous individuals may suggest a stagnant relationship in which two people, each possessing perfect virtue (1.9 1100a4, 1.13 1102a6, 5.1 1129b26), are joined together in mutual admiration. And when they are moved to interact, each partner gives the other the same or something similar to what he receives (8.4 1156b34–35). The suggested reading is not foolish, but it fails to take account of passages in which Aristotle recognizes that friendships involving good character can (and often do) leave room for improvement. E.g., after referring to the tripartite division of friendship, Aristotle tells us that within each of the three kinds, people may be friends on the basis of equality or one party may be superior to the other. In regard to friendship based on virtue, we are told that the friends may be not only equally good but also differ in degree, one being better than the other (8.13 1162a34–b1). And when Aristotle emphasizes the importance of equality in friendship, he goes on to speak of a wide disparity in virtue being incompatible with friendship, thereby leaving the door open to minor differences in moral character.⁷⁶⁶ That is, of course, common sense, for people who have enjoyed a good upbringing and have acquired good moral principles may still need to fine-tune their principles and to gain experience in applying them to individual cases. In addition, Aristotle holds a doctrine of natural virtue, according to which all people possess straightway from birth the several moral virtues, albeit in a form that needs to be developed and perfected through moral education. But not everyone possesses each of these virtues equally, for natural endowment varies from individual to individual (6.13 1144b3–6, 34–35). A consequence is that most individuals, even well-educated adults, are likely to exhibit a weakness in regard to one or more virtues. Hence, there is room for improvement, which may be hastened by friends who also value virtue.

⁷⁶⁶ Cf. NE 9.8 1168a33–35, where we read that a good man acts from a noble motive, and the better he is, the more he acts from a noble motive and for the sake of a friend while neglecting what is his. It might be objected that this is part of a popular criticism of self-love and as such does not represent Aristotle's considered view. I agree that this passage sets forth a popular criticism, but Aristotle does not say that the criticism is wrongheaded in all details. In particular, I doubt that he wanted to restrict friendship based on virtue to persons of perfect virtue. He might recognize an ideal friendship that requires perfect virtue, but he would also recognize that friendship based on virtue is open to good men who fall short of perfection. Fundamental is a proper orientation: valuing virtuous character and trying to do what is noble.

Assistance in improving and maintaining good moral character can be a primary reason for joining together in friendship. Aristotle understands that and says as much in several passages. Here are three. First, after telling us that men who are similar in virtue neither request nor render any service that is base: οὔτε δέονται φαύλων οὔθ' ὑπηρετοῦσι τοιαῦτα (8.8 1159b5), Aristotle adds that good men neither go wrong themselves nor let their friends do so: τῶν ἀγαθῶν ... μήτ' αὐτοὺς ἀμαρτάνειν μήτε τοῖς φίλοις ἐπιτρέπειν (8.8 1159b5–7). In saying, “nor let their friends do so,” Aristotle may mean that virtuous people keep their friends from making simple mistakes (e.g., getting a fact wrong), but after the preceding reference to what is base, φαύλα, it seems reasonable to think of mistakes that have an ethical component. In particular, it seems reasonable to think of particular situations that are difficult to assess (9.2 1164b22–1165b35), so that a friend can help his partner decide what course of action is morally correct.⁷⁶⁷ Second, Aristotle says that living together with good men may become a kind of practice or training in virtue: γίνονται δ' ἄν καὶ ἀσκησίς τις τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐκ τοῦ συζῆν τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς (9.9 1170a11–12).⁷⁶⁸ Third, at the end of Aristotle's discussion of friendship, we read, “The friendship of good men is good, being augmented by their interaction; and they seem to become better through their actions and by making straight (i.e., improving) each other.” ἡ δὲ τῶν ἐπεικῶν ἐπεικῆς, συναυξανομένη ταῖς ὁμιλίαις· δοκοῦσι δὲ καὶ βελτίους γίνεσθαι ἐνεργοῦντες καὶ διορθοῦντες ἀλλήλους. (9.12 1172a11–12). Here “becoming better” and “making straight” almost certainly have a moral connotation. Virtuous men come to friendships based on virtue with a set of good moral principles, but there is still work to do. Perhaps the principles themselves can be refined or their interconnection better articulated, but it is the particular situation that is most likely to trip up a good person. He may understand that temperance is a virtue, but still have difficulty when actually confronted with certain pleasures. And even when weakness is not involved, he may still have trouble applying his principles. For

⁷⁶⁷ Note the repeated use of καλόν at NE 9.2 1164b29, 1165a4, 23. Cf. EE 3.7 1233b29–34, where friendliness is distinguished from flattery and animosity. The friendly person, we are told, neither goes along with nor opposes each pleasure. Rather he falls in with what seems to be best. I am not suggesting that φιλία as used here in the EE is to be identified with φιλία as used by Aristotle in his discussions of friendship, but the idea of opposing a wrongheaded action is the same.

⁷⁶⁸ Aristotle goes on to cite Theognis. The verse he has in mind (35 Diehl) is found later at 9.12 1172a13–14. See Gauthier and Jolif p. 755, who point out that the verse is also found in Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 1.2.20.

moral principles are like laws: however well formulated, they do not take account of all possible situations. A friend may be invaluable in choosing the right course of action.

The preceding remarks are of some importance, for in a recent article Gregory Sterling (1997) p. 213 cites Aristotle's words concerning men who are similar in virtue and "neither request nor render any service that is base" (8.8 1159b5), after which he tells us that Theophrastus was not satisfied with the judgment of his teacher. In discussing whether it is right to assist a friend contrary to what is just (534.11), Theophrastus, we are told, took a more nuanced position, saying that "a small and slight disgrace or bad repute is to be endured, if by this a great advantage can be gained for a friend" (534.44–45). I agree that the Theophrastean text cited by Sterling is nuanced, but I doubt that it represents a significant departure from the teaching of Aristotle. For the importance of the particular situation was recognized by Aristotle,⁷⁶⁹ who also recognized that friends can help each other avoid missteps. Indeed, had Aristotle's work *On Friendship* and his two books of *Theses concerning Friendship* survived,⁷⁷⁰ we would more than likely find him discussing problematic situations, in which the very best/wisest of men are uncertain how to act.⁷⁷¹

Having emphasized the importance of a friend in one's practical life, I want to take brief notice of the life of contemplation. Aristotle holds that the pursuit of theoretical wisdom (doing philosophy) is not only exceptionally pleasant but also especially self-sufficient. A wise man is able to reflect on his own, and the wiser he is the better he can do so (10.7 1177a22–34). That is important, but Aristotle does not recommend going it alone. He catches himself and adds, "Perhaps one is better (able to contemplate) if one has persons who work with him" (1177a34). Here there is no explicit mention of friends, but it seems reasonable to say that the philosopher will have philosophers as friends (they are most like him in character), and they will assist him in the pursuit of knowledge.⁷⁷²

⁷⁶⁹ See above and the commentary on 534 *ad fin.*

⁷⁷⁰ The works are listed in Diogenes' catalogue of Aristotelian writings (5.22 and 24).

⁷⁷¹ In 534.16–17, we read that Chilo, one of the traditional Seven Wise Men, was in doubt concerning "how far he ought to have gone for a friend contrary to law and justice."

⁷⁷² Cf. NE 9.9 1170a5–6, where we are told that it is not easy to be continuously active all by oneself. With others and in relation to others it is easier.

532 Jerome, *On Micah* 2.7 (CCSL vol. 76 p. 509.192–194 Adriaen)

Literature: Heylbut (1876) p. 6; Zeller (1879) vol. 2.2 p. 862; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1485–1486; Courcelle (1948) p. 60, transl. 1969 p. 71, Hagendahl (1958) p. 135; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 285–286; Wehrli (1983) p. 495; Wehrli-Wöhrle (2004) p. 532

This text is taken from Jerome's commentary on the book of *Micah*. It focuses on Chapter 7, in which the prophet speaks of the corruption of the Jewish people and of the punishment that will soon come upon them. He advises against trusting a friend, speaks of the way in which members of the same household treat each other, and states that he will look to the Lord for his own salvation (7.4–7). Our special concern is with Jerome's comment on Micah's advice not to trust a friend. After quoting *Second Timothy* 3.1–4 concerning the sinful behavior that will occur during the last days, Jerome states that trustworthiness is already a rarity. He cites the injunction *si habes amicum, in temptatione posside eum*, "If you have a friend, possess him on trial,"⁷⁷³ and reports having read *amicus diu quaeritur, vix invenitur, difficile servatur*, "A friend is sought for over a long period, scarcely found and preserved with difficulty" (p. 509.180–192 Adriaen).⁷⁷⁴ After that comes 532, in which Jerome reports that Theophrastus wrote a work *On Friendship* in three books, that he preferred friendship to all other forms of affection, and that he witnessed to its rarity in human affairs. The final portion of Jerome's report fits well with what immediately precedes: that friendship is rare (*raram in rebus humanis* line 2) reinforces both the statement that trustworthiness is rare (*rara fides est* p. 509.187) and that a friend is scarcely found (*vix invenitur* p. 509.194).

The idea that friendship is rare and difficult to find is, of course, a commonplace, but Theophrastus will have qualified the claim by drawing on Aristotle's distinction between friendships based on virtuous character, pleasure and utility.⁷⁷⁵ Friendships based on pleasure and utility are in fact common; but friendship based on virtue is rare. And while

⁷⁷³ The injunction is from *Sirach* (Vul.) 1.6.7. The injunction continues: *et non facile credas illi, (8) est enim amicus secundum tempus suum et non permanebit in die tribulationis*; "and do not readily trust him, (8) for he is a friend according to his own time (circumstance or opportunity) and will not remain (a friend) in a day of affliction."

⁷⁷⁴ Jerome does not identify his source (he speaks of a certain person, *cuiusdam*). In commenting on the text, Hagendahl leaves the source "unidentified," but in a note he compares Jerome's *Epistle* 3.6 (p. 135 with n. 2; *Epistle* 3.6 is printed on p. 102 n. 8).

⁷⁷⁵ For an explicit reference to the three kinds of friendship, see 533.4.

friendships based on pleasure and utility are unstable (when one partner is no longer pleasant or useful, the friendship is likely to dissolve), friendship based on virtue is stable, for virtuous character endures except in extraordinary circumstances.⁷⁷⁶

We are told that Theophrastus preferred friendship to all (other kinds of) affection: *omni eam (sc. amicitiam) preferens caritati* (lines 1–2). No explanation of the word *caritas* is given, and most likely there was none in Jerome's source.⁷⁷⁷ It is possible that Jerome himself understood the word *caritas* as the Latin equivalent of ἀγάπη, for in translating the *Bible* he regularly uses *caritas* to translate ἀγάπη. However, it is quite unlikely that Theophrastus contrasted ἀγάπη with φιλία, for the substantive ἀγάπη seems to have come into common usage after Theophrastus.⁷⁷⁸

What can be said with some certainty is that Theophrastus contrasted φιλία with a positive feeling of affection such as goodwill, εὔνοια, which belongs to friendship but falls short, for it can be felt toward strangers and is compatible with inaction (cf. 438.7–10 together with Aristotle, *NE* 8.2 1155b31–1156a5a3–5). In this regard, Cicero's *Laelius* (*De amicitia*) is instructive, for there Laelius is made to speak first of *caritas* between parents and children and then of a *similis sensus amoris*, that is aroused by virtuous character (27). This feeling is certainly admirable, but it is not identical with friendship, for it need not involve familiarity and interaction. E.g., a person can think of other individuals whom he has never seen *cum caritate aliqua benevola*, “with a certain well-wishing affection” (27).⁷⁷⁹ To be sure, Cicero's immediate source is unlikely to have been Theophrastus (Panaetius is a candidate; see the commentary on 436 no. 23 and 533), but even so, Cicero's use of *caritas* is, I think, instructive.

That Theophrastus' work *On Friendship* was three books or rolls long: *tria volumina* (532.1) is also reported in the catalogue of Theophrastean writings preserved in Diogenes Laertius 5.45 = 1.165. In Vincent of Beauvais, *Looking-Glass of History* 5.2 (vol. 4 p. 138 col. 1.5–7 ed. 1624)

⁷⁷⁶ Theophrastus will also have qualified the paraenetic saying, *si habes amicum, in temptatione posside eum*, “If you have a friend, possess him on trial” (p. 509.190–191). For he recommends testing before making friends (538A–F) and would hold that a friendship based on virtue, assuming it to have been tested, will be highly stable.

⁷⁷⁷ That Jerome drew directly on Theophrastus' work *On Friendship* is not to be believed; see Chapter II “The Sources” no. 29 on Jerome.

⁷⁷⁸ In LSJ s.v. ἀγάπη, the earliest occurrences cited are from the Septuagint, whose composition (translation from the Hebrew) began toward the middle of the third century BC, presumably after the death of Theophrastus in 286.

⁷⁷⁹ Cf. Aristotle, *NE* 8.2 1155b34–35: πολλοὶ γὰρ εἰσιν εὔνοι οἷς οὐχ ἑωράκασι.

and in Walter Burley, *On the Life and Character of the Philosophers* 68 (p. 284.10–12 Knust), the text of 532 recurs almost word for word. Missing, however, is a reference to three books. That is no more than omission and should not be seen as grounds for doubting that *On Friendship* was three books in length.

Only a few lines after 532, Jerome speaks of friendship either admitting or making the parties equal (2.7 [CCSL vol. 76 p. 510.1–3 Adriaen]). On this passage, see the commentary on 533.

- 533 Aspasius, *On Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics* 8.8/7⁷⁸⁰ 1158b11–28 (CAG vol. 19.1 p. 178.1–18 Heylbut)

Literature: Brandis (1860) p. 352; Heylbut (1876) p. 14; Zeller (1879) vol. 2.2 p. 863; F.-A. Steinmetz (1967) pp. 9, 125–131; Becchi (1983) p. 97; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 286–288; Moraux (1984) p. 260; Konstan (1997) pp. 71–72, (2001) pp. 34, 47 n. 41, (2006) pp. xii, 178–179, 207 n. 455; Schroeder (1997) p. 45; Barnes (1999) pp. 26–27

Text 533 is taken from Aspasius' discussion of *Nicomachean Ethics* 8.7 1158b11–8.8 1159b4. In this portion of the *Ethics*, Aristotle's focus is on friendships in which one partner is superior to another. Equality is said to depend upon the superior partner receiving more affection than he bestows on the inferior partner. The remarks of Aspasius that concern us are immediately preceded by his comments on 8.7 1158b23–28 (the affection that the superior partner receives must be proportionate to his merit) and followed by comments on 1158b29–1159a3 (in the case of justice, "equal" is used primarily of proportionate equality; in the case of friendship, "equal" refers primarily to strict equality and secondarily to proportionate equality). In the middle, Aspasius says that one might inquire whether friendships involving superiority occur in friendships based on virtue, pleasure and utility.⁷⁸¹ We are immediately told that both Eudemos and Theophrastus hold that they do (lines 1–4).

What follows divides into two parts. Aspasius first considers virtuous friends, σπουδαῖοι φίλοι. When one partner is a ruler and the other is ruled (e.g., when one party holds a political office that gives him

⁷⁸⁰ In the text-translation volumes, the heading to text 533 refers to NE 8.8. That reflects the edition of Bekker. Above I have added a reference to 8.7, which is in accordance with the *Oxford Classical Text* and with my practice in this commentary.

⁷⁸¹ As yet Aristotle has not addressed this issue explicitly, though some indication of his position may be seen in 1158a34–36, b25–26. An explicit assertion that friendships involving superiority occur in all three kinds comes later at 8.13 1162a34–36.

command over the other) the two will be friends, φίλοι, in other respects, but they will maintain the law: the one being superior and the other inferior as dictated by the law. So, too, a virtuous father and a son: above all else, the son will grant paternal superiority to the father. Similarly with a virtuous wife and husband: each following nature, the husband will rule, and the wife will be ruled (lines 5–11).

In the second part, Aspasius considers persons who are not virtuous but rather in the middle or average. He allows that they can be friends, φίλοι, on account of pleasure or utility, the one being superior and the other inferior. He first makes brief mention of ruler and ruled and of husband and wife, after which he introduces a puzzle concerning father and son. He asks whether a utility friendship is possible. Can a father wish good things for a son for any other reason than for the sake of the son himself, assuming that the father's friendship is in accordance with nature?⁷⁸² Such a friendship, we are told, seems to be natural and when it is natural to be accompanied by pleasure and utility (lines 11–19).

It is generally recognized that the mention of Eudemus (line 3) is a reference to the *Eudemian Ethics*, which Aspasius attributes to Eudemus. In the upper apparatus of parallel passages, we have referred to *EE* 7.4 1239a1–12, which puts us in good company (MorauX [1984] p. 260 cites *EE* 1239a1–4, as does Barnes [1999] p. 27 n. 73). At the outset of 7.4, the threefold division of friendship based on virtue, usefulness and pleasure is recalled. Next these three kinds are divided into two: one being based on equality and the other involving superiority and inferiority. We are told that both are friendships, φιλίαι, but only when the parties stand on an equal footing are the parties friends, φίλοι. It would be strange, we are told, were a man a friend of a child, though he does feel affection for the child and receives it from the child (a1–7). Finally, we are told that there are times when the superior party ought to receive affection but ought not to feel affection, because the other party is unworthy. For the sake of clarity, several different kinds of superiority/inferiority are recognized—age, virtue, birth and the like—each of which is said to justify the superior party feeling less or no affection. And that holds both for friendships based on utility and for those based on pleasure (a7–12).

Taken by itself, the Eudemian passage is only loosely related to what we read in Aspasius. Most striking is the absence of family relation-

⁷⁸² In a utility friendship, wishing well takes the form of wishing that the other party remain a good provider of benefits. I.e., it is a self-interested wish and not the selfless wish that marks a father, whose affection for his son is in accord with nature.

ships. Instead of father and son, πατήρ and υἱός, as is found in Aspasius (p. 178. 8, 14 H = 533.9, 14), we read of man and child, ἀνὴρ and παῖδιον (1239a5), i.e., a difference in age, ἡλικία (1239a9).⁷⁸³ So too there is no explicit mention of husband and wife. They might be covered by “virtue,” ἀρετή (1239a10 [the virtue of wife/woman being different from that of a husband/man]) in the way that son might be covered by “age,”⁷⁸⁴ but that is neither said nor hinted at in the passage under consideration. In addition, the reference to birth or family, γένος (1239a10), has no obvious or not so obvious relation to what we read in Aspasius.⁷⁸⁵ Nevertheless, this difference between the *Eudemian Ethics* and what we find in Aspasius can be mitigated if we begin the Eudemian passage one section earlier with 7.3. For here Aristotle is already focused on friendships involving superiority, and in this context he takes notice of family relationships: father and son, husband and wife (1238b22–24). In addition, we find παῖς⁷⁸⁶ used in a context where it almost certainly means “one’s own child” or “son” (1238b31). We can say, then, that what we read in Aspasius has a direct relationship to *EE* 7.3,⁷⁸⁷ but that still leaves 7.4, which seems to speak with a new voice.

There is also the Eudemian distinction between friendship and friends: whereas friendship between superior and inferior parties is recognized, it is explicitly stated that being friends, φίλοι, implies being on an equal footing (7.4 1239a4–5, 19–21).⁷⁸⁸ That is not stated in the text of Aspasius and even seems to be contradicted by the text as printed in Heylbut’s edition. For there we read that in friendships between average individuals

⁷⁸³ Konstan (1997) p. 68 obscures this difference by translating ἄτοπον γὰρ ἂν εἴη εἰ ἀνὴρ παιδίῳ φίλος (*EE* 1239a6) with “it would be absurd for a father to be a friend [*philos*] to his child.” In another context, it might be proper to translate ἀνὴρ with “father,” but the use of παῖδιον instead of παῖς (see below on 1238b31), the subsequent reference to difference in age (δι’ ἡλικίας ἔλλειψιν 1239a9–10) and the failure to mention other family relationships suggests strongly that here in the *EE* ἀνὴρ refers generally to an adult male. In contrast, Aspasius uses πατήρ for “father” and pairs ἀνὴρ with γυνή, in which combination it clearly means “husband.”

⁷⁸⁴ Cf. Aspasius p. 176.13–14 H, where friendship between father and son is treated as a particular kind of the more general friendship that exists between older and younger individuals: ἡ γὰρ πατρός πρὸς υἱὸν φιλία καὶ ὅλως πρεσβυτέρου πρὸς νεώτερον.

⁷⁸⁵ We may also take note of what is missing in the *Eudemian Ethics*: namely the distinction between ruler and ruled in a relationship established by law (533.5–7).

⁷⁸⁶ But not παῖδιον.

⁷⁸⁷ Hence, I recommend changing the reference to the *Eudemian Ethics* in the upper apparatus of parallel passages to 533.3 to include 7.3 as well as 7.4.

⁷⁸⁸ In the Loeb edition, Rackham translates 1239a4–5 φιλαί μὲν οὖν ἀμφοτέρω, φίλοι δ’ οἱ κατὰ τὴν ἰσότητα with “Though both sets, therefore, are friendships, only when they are on an equality are the parties friends.” At first reading, “only,” may seem to be an

it is possible for a superior and inferior person to be friends, ἐγγωρεῖ ... φίλους εἶναι (lines 11–12 = p. 178.11–12 H), on the basis of pleasure and of utility, as for example a ruler and one who is ruled, and a wife and a husband can both be friends, ἀμφοτέρους ἔστι φίλους εἶναι (line 14 = p. 178.13 H.)

Heylbut's text concerning a wife and a husband who are average, γυναῖκα δὲ <καὶ> ἄνδρα ἀμφοτέρους ἔστι φίλους εἶναι (line 12), has been challenged by David Konstan. In three separate publications,⁷⁸⁹ he reports that a majority of the manuscripts read φιλία instead of φίλους (second occurrence = line 14) and that one manuscript reads ἀμφοτέροις instead of ἀμφοτέρους (line 14). He prefers to read ἀμφοτέροις ἔστι φιλίαν εἶναι and to translate "it is possible that both a wife and a husband have love (on this basis)." If that is correct, the passage in Aspasia does not say that husband and wife can be friends, though they can enter into friendship. Konstan may be correct. His reading certainly suits his larger thesis concerning not only husband and wife but also father and son and more generally persons who are akin to each other. These persons are related in important ways and their relationship may be brought under the umbrella term φιλία, but they were not normally described as friends, φίλοι.⁷⁹⁰ With this larger thesis, I have no difficulties, but I do have worries concerning the preferred reading: ἀμφοτέροις ἔστι φιλίαν εἶναι. Here are four.

1) Concerning the manuscript tradition, Konstan writes, "Heylbut's critical apparatus notes that a majority of the manuscripts have *philia* rather than *philo*."⁷⁹¹ That is correct, but the difference is a single manuscript, and the total number is three: I.e., two manuscripts read φιλίαν, and one reads φίλους. In addition, the Aldine edition reads φίλους, and the Aldine is often treated as a manuscript, since the manuscript behind the edition has not survived.⁷⁹² Moreover, in support of reading ἀμφοτέροις Konstan can cite only one manuscript. In a second, the ending is reported

over-translation, but in fact the combination "though—only" neatly renders the μὲν—δέ construction, while giving an appropriate emphasis to what the Greek sentence is saying. Cf. 1239a19–20.

⁷⁸⁹ Konstan (1997) p. 71, (2001) pp. 34, 47 n. 41, (2006) pp. 178, 207 n. 455.

⁷⁹⁰ See Konstan (1997) pp. 9, 59 "normally," pp. 68, 72 "ordinarily," p. 71 exceptions occur "occasionally."

⁷⁹¹ Konstan (1997) p. 71.

⁷⁹² It is clear from the introduction to CAG vol. 19 p. vii that Heylbut does not know the manuscript that underlies the Aldine edition.

to be unreadable. There are other problems, but it may suffice to agree with Konstan when he writes, “the MSS are perturbed.”⁷⁹³

2) We should not overlook the fact that the disputed words (less than one line) occur within a larger context: namely, a discussion of virtuous and not so virtuous, i.e., average persons, who are friends despite inequality (some thirteen lines). The discussion divides into two parts: first virtuous persons and later those who are average. In the opening sentence of the first part, there is a reference to friends, φίλοι (line 5). So too when Aspasius turns his attention to average individuals, the opening sentence mentions friends, φίλους (lines 12). That strongly suggests that Aspasius will speak of friends throughout the passage under consideration. And that impression is reinforced by the repeated mention of friends in the second sentence concerning virtuous individuals: φίλοι twice (line 6). In what follows, nothing is said that suggests a departure from this usage. Indeed, when we read καὶ πατήρ καὶ υἱὸς σπονδαῖοι (lines 7–8), it is hard not to understand either γένοιτο ἂν φίλοι or ἔσσονται φίλοι from what precedes.⁷⁹⁴ “Also a father and son may become (will be) virtuous friends.”⁷⁹⁵ In the subsequent remarks concerning average individuals, there is on my understanding of the text no change in usage. Aspasius begins with a reference to friends: ἐγγωρεῖ καὶ δι’ ἡδονὴν φίλους εἶναι καὶ διὰ τὸ χρησίμον, “it is possible to be friends both on account of pleasure and on account of utility” (lines 11–12), and in what follows he introduces three examples: ruler-ruled, wife-husband, son-father (lines 13–19). In this context, it is, I think, not only possible but also apposite that two lines after the initial reference to average friends (line 12), there occurs a second reference to friends: φίλους (line 14).

3) Konstan says that the reading ἀμφοτέρους (line 14) is pointless.⁷⁹⁶ He does not elaborate, but if I understand him, he thinks that being friends is always two sided: if A is a friend of B, B must be, in some way or another, a friend of A. That is correct, and if that renders ἀμφοτέρους pointless, so be it. But in my judgment the use of ἀμφοτέρους in the

⁷⁹³ Konstan (2001) p. 47.

⁷⁹⁴ The phrase γένοιτο ἂν φίλοι occurs in line 5, and ἔσσονται φίλοι in line 6.

⁷⁹⁵ Konstan avoids the issue by translating “So too a worthy father and son” ([2006] p. 178), but in a note he gives an alternative translation that seems to understand γένοιτο ἂν φίλοι: “A father and a son may become worthy friends” (p. 207 n. 454).

⁷⁹⁶ Konstan (2001) p. 47 n. 41 and (2006) p. 207 n. 455. His earliest discussion (1997) pp. 71–72 does not dismiss the reading ἀμφοτέρους as pointless.

passage in question is not pointless but emphatic. We should keep in mind that Aspasia began his discussion by asking whether friendships involving superiority occur in the three recognized forms. In the case of persons who are not virtuous, there is no possibility of friendship based on virtue, but it is possible to be friends both on the basis of pleasure and on the basis of utility. Aspasia will not argue the point in regard to ruler and ruled, and wife and husband. Rather, he asserts emphatically that the possibility is clear, δῆλον (line 11), and after referring to wife and husband, he adds “both,” ἀμφοτέρους, thereby emphasizing without arguing that the marks of being a friend are found in both husband and wife: mutual affection, a source of pleasure and usefulness.⁷⁹⁷ Aspasia’s special interest is the bond between father and son (Can it take the form of a utility relationship?), which he immediately goes on to discuss.

4) It might be objected that I am ignoring Konstan’s observation concerning everyday Greek usage. The term φίλος is normally reserved for someone who has been made (chosen as) a friend and will cease to be a friend, should one party or the other choose to break off the relationship. In contrast, φίλος is rarely used of persons who are related by kinship. They remain kin even when they are deemed unpleasant and useless. That is, I think, correct. Indeed, it corresponds to ordinary American usage. E.g., married couples are rarely spoken of as friends, but there are exceptions. Occasionally we hear, “My wife is my best friend.” And after a divorce, one or the other partner has been known to say, “We have remained friends,” suggesting that being married involves being friends.⁷⁹⁸ There are, then, occasions when everyday usage does not hold, and the same is true in ancient Greek, as Konstan is careful to point out and to document.⁷⁹⁹ The question becomes: Is normal Greek usage decisive when it comes to establishing the text of Aspasia? I think not. For *qua* Peripatetic philosopher, Aspasia will have understood the logic of extended usage, and in the case before us he may have chosen (consciously or unconsciously)

⁷⁹⁷ A misogynist might claim that a wife is no friend, for without exception she is an unpleasant complainer and useless in time of need like sickness (cf. 486.15–19, 51–59). Rather than argue against such nonsense, Aspasia asserts emphatically that in the case of a wife and her husband it is clearly possible for both to be friends.

⁷⁹⁸ Such remarks are attention getting and are intended to be so. The husband who says that his wife is his best friend intends to pay a compliment that will be noticed. And the divorcee who speaks of remaining friends is seeking to assure his or her listener that the quiet goodwill that characterizes the best of marriages has been found in divorce.

⁷⁹⁹ Konstan (1997) p. 72.

to simplify his remarks by extending the use of φίλος to cover persons related by kinship. His primary concern is whether friendships, φιλία, involving superiority can be found in friendships based on virtue, pleasure and utility (lines 1–2), and his answer comes in two parts: the first focuses on virtuous individuals who are characterized as friends, and the second on average individuals who are likewise characterized as friends. Throughout each part, Aspasius speaks of individuals, whom he divides into three groups: ruler and ruled, father and son, husband and wife. The discussion flows smoothly and without confusion. For φίλος is readily understood as a paronym: i.e., it is derived from and semantically dependent upon φιλία. In the case of ruler and ruled, the pair may be φίλοι in the ordinary sense. For the most part, they are not kin but rather everyday friends, one of whom happens to find himself in a superior office within the political community. In the case of husband and wife, the two are not ordinarily spoken of as φίλοι, but here they are, and no confusion results. For it is clear that φίλοι is being used paronymously. Its meaning depends upon φιλία, which in this case involves kinship.

Whatever the truth concerning the disputed words (lines 13–14), the several differences between 533 and the *Eudemian Ethics* (the absence of family relationships in the *EE* 7.4, the mention of birth, the explicit statement that being friends implies being equals) raise the question whether Aspasius has based his remarks on Theophrastus, who is named alongside Eudemus (line 3). The possibility is tempting and perhaps encouraged by a text like 523.8, in which there is mention of treating wife and children in a humane manner, φιλανθρωπῶς. On reflection, however, I am reluctant to claim that Aspasius is following Theophrastus closely, for Aspasius proceeds in a way that seems to be his own way. In particular, he continues in the manner that guides his discussion of *NE* 8.7 1158b11–28, i.e., lines 177.8–22, 28–178.1 H, which immediately precede 533. First, Aspasius speaks of ruler and ruled (who can be conceived of not only in terms of political and military roles but also quite generally); after that he takes up father and son, and husband and wife (family pairs), which is how he proceeds in 533.⁸⁰⁰ Moreover, the use of μέσοι at 533.11 in reference to persons who are neither virtuous nor vicious but somewhere in the middle is attributable to

⁸⁰⁰ Explicit mention of husband and wife occurs only at the end of the first of the two segments just mentioned, i.e., at 177.21–22 H. But husband and wife are covered in the second segment by the concluding reference to “others” at 177.33.

Aspasius. Cf. 168.24–25 H: οὐδέτερον (= μηδέτερον NE 1157a18) δὲ λέγει τὸν μέσον, ὃς οὔτε φαῦλος οὔτε ἀγαθός ἐστιν. (At EE 7.2 1238a36 μηδέτεροι occurs.) These observations do not rule out loose agreement with some Theophrastean text, but in my judgment they make it unlikely that Aspasius has based his remarks closely on a Theophrastean text.

The fact that Theophrastus is mentioned together with Eudemus raises yet another question: whether Theophrastus' treatment of friendship between unequals may have been influenced by what he read in *Eudemian Ethics* 7.4 1239a1–21. When one thinks of texts like 449A and 545, which exhibit a close relation between Theophrastus and the *Eudemian Ethics*, one is tempted to answer in the affirmative. To be sure, there is a difficulty here: if what we read in 533 is largely shaped by Aspasius and at best loosely related to Theophrastus, then an affirmative answer (indeed, any answer) is on uncertain footing. Nevertheless, it strikes me as a real and interesting possibility that Theophrastus took a cue from the *Eudemian Ethics* and strongly recommended that friendships be based as far as possible on equality. To be clear, this is not a suggestion concerning language, i.e., the usage of φίλος and φιλία. Like Aristotle, Theophrastus had a healthy respect for ordinary language and knew how to explain ambiguous usage. Rather, I am suggesting that Theophrastus may have chosen to emphasize the importance of equality for satisfying and durable friendships. That would at any rate fit the picture that F.A. Steinmetz tentatively advances.⁸⁰¹ He cites Cicero's work *On Friendship* 69–70, in which Laelius is made to emphasize the importance of equality: *maximum est in amicitia superiorem parem esse inferiori. Saepe enim excellentiae quaedam sunt, qualis erat Scipionis in nostro, ut ita dicam, grege. Numquam se ille Philo, numquam Rupilio, numquam Mummiio anteposuit, numquam inferioris ordinis amicis. Q. vero Maximum fratrem, egregium virum omnino, sibi nequaquam parem, quod is anteibat aetate, tamquam superiorem colebat suosque omnis per se posse esse ampliores volebat. quod faciendum imitandumque est omnibus, ut, si quam praestantiam virtutis ingeni fortunae consecuti sunt, impertiant ea suis communicentque cum proximis.* "But it is most important in friendship that the superior be equal to the inferior. For often there are certain excellences, such as was the case with Scipio in our, so to speak, herd. Yet he never put himself before Philus or Rupilius or Mummius or friends of inferior rank. Indeed, he treated as a superior his brother Quintus Max-

⁸⁰¹ F.A. Steinmetz pp. 125–131.

imus, an outstanding man in all respects but in no way his equal, because he (Quintus) took precedence in age. And he wished that through himself all his friends might gain in stature. And this all men should do and imitate, so that if they have attained any pre-eminence in virtue, intelligence, fortune, they may impart it to their relatives and share it with those who are closest.” According to Steinmetz, Cicero is likely to be following Panaetius, who may have been influenced by Theophrastus.⁸⁰² The latter will have strongly recommended the elimination or at least the mitigation of inequality and in this way influenced Panaetius and through him what we read in Cicero’s *De amicitia*.

We should not ignore Plutarch’s work *On Brotherly Love*, for twice in this work Plutarch mentions Theophrastus by name (535.1 and 538F.1). In another passage in which Theophrastus is not named, we find Plutarch urging the elimination of inequality: τῷ μὲν οὖν ὑπερέχοντι παραινέσειεν ἄν τις, πρῶτον μὲν ἐν οἷς δοκεῖ διαφέρειν, ταῦτα κοινὰ ποιεῖν τοῖς ἀδελφοῖς, συνεπικοσμοῦντα τῇ δόξῃ καὶ συνεισποιοῦντα ταῖς φιλίαις, “one might advise the (brother) who is superior, first to share with his brothers those things in which he seems to differ (i.e., to be superior), adorning (them) with his (good) reputation and involving them in his own friendships” (12 484D). It cannot be demonstrated that Plutarch is here drawing on Theophrastus, but the idea is not foolish. In the way that Plutarch took Theophrastus’ words concerning the friends of friends and applied them to the special case of brothers (see the commentary on 535), so too he may have taken Theophrastus’ remarks on friends and inequality and, without naming Theophrastus, applied them to brothers.⁸⁰³

In Jerome’s work *On Micah*, we read the following: *amicitia pares aut accipit aut facit: ubi inaequalitas est et alterius eminentia, alterius subiectio, ibi non tam amicitia quam adulatio est*. “Friendship either admits or makes (the parties) equal; where there is inequality, superiority of the one, inferiority of the other, there not so much friendship occurs as adulation” (2.7 [CCSL vol. 76 p. 510.1–3 Adriaen]). In *Quellen* (1984) p. 291, I followed Knust and printed this text as part of the discussion of L97 = 536.⁸⁰⁴ That was not off the mark, for like the text of Jerome, 536 is concerned with inequality. Only in 536 the focus is limited to sharing

⁸⁰² On Panaetius, see above, Chapter III “Titles of Works” no. 23 *On Friendship*.

⁸⁰³ The advice conveyed in 484D by the words συνεπικοσμοῦντα ταῖς φιλίαις is hardly different from what we read in 490E = 535.2–3 δεῖ κοινοῦς τῶν φίλων τοὺς φίλους.

⁸⁰⁴ The text is cited by Knust (in his edition of Walter Burley p. 167) as a parallel text to a version of 536 that is attributed to Demosthenes. See the upper apparatus of parallel texts to 536.1–3.

riches, while in Jerome the issue of inequality is expressed in general terms, which is more in line with our present discussion. Moreover, the words of Jerome occur in *On Micah* only a few lines after 532. In that text, Theophrastus is named along with his work *On Friendship* (436 no. 23b). Proximity to a named fragment together with the fact that the text in question favors equality in friendship might suggest attribution to Theophrastus. But that would be no more than a guess, which I am not prepared to make.⁸⁰⁵

Before leaving 533, I want to take brief notice of the fact that twice there is mention of what occurs naturally. First, concerning the virtuous husband and wife, we are told that with each following nature, ἐκάτερος ... ἀκολουθῶν φύσει, the husband will rule and the wife be ruled (line 10). Second, concerning the father and son who are average, the question is put whether a father can wish good things for his son for any reason other than for the sake of the son himself, assuming at least that the father's friendship (his affection for his son) is in accordance with nature, κατὰ φύσιν (lines 16–17). The implication is that there is no other reason, which is underlined by Aspasius' comment: "This friendship seems rather to be one that is natural, φυσική (line 17), but perhaps there follows even upon this kind of friendship when it occurs naturally, φυσικῶς, both pleasure and utility" (lines 14–19).⁸⁰⁶ The emphasis in these passages upon what is natural has a Stoic ring,⁸⁰⁷ but it does not follow automatically that Aspasius is imposing Stoic doctrine on the early Peripatetics. As Moraux points out, by the time of Aspasius Stoic words and phrases had become part of philosophical discourse without involving a commitment to Stoic doctrine.⁸⁰⁸ And more importantly, in the case before us the emphasis upon nature is not foreign to Peripatetic thinking. We may compare Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, where friendship between husband and wife is characterized as being according to nature, κατὰ φύσιν, and a human being is said to be more inclined by nature, φύσει, to live in couples than as a political being (8.12 1162a16–18). And in the *Politics* we read that human beings share with animals and plants a natural, φυσικόν, urge to reproduce (1.2 1252a29–30). Not surprisingly, therefore, the *Ethics* speaks of parents loving their children as soon as

⁸⁰⁵ See Hagendahl p. 136, who leaves open the question of Jerome's source.

⁸⁰⁶ For the son returning the service that he has received, see 523.9.

⁸⁰⁷ Cf. Mercken (1990) p. 439.

⁸⁰⁸ Moraux (1984) pp. 268–269.

they are born (8.12 1161b24–25). That Theophrastus, too, recognized the importance of nature in family relations and in ethics generally is not to be doubted. See the commentary on 501 and 507.

- 534 Gellius, *Attic Nights* 1.3 chapter heading and 8–14 and 21–29 (OCT vol. 1 p. 41.21–24, 42.22–44.1 and 44.26–46.20 Marshall)

Literature: Brandis (1860) pp. 352–354; Mercklin (1860) pp. 653–654, 683–685; Heylbut (1876) pp. 6, 9–10; Zeller (1879) vol. 2.2 p. 863; Hornsby (1936) pp. 75–84; Dirlmeier (1937) pp. 8–9; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1486; F-A. Steinmetz (1967) pp. 62–70, 105–114; Wehrli (1983) pp. 494–495; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 288–289, (1990) pp. 457–468, reprint (2003) pp. 150–161; Holford-Strevens (1989) p. 200; Wehrli-Wöhrle (1989) p. 200; Konstan (1997) pp. 132–133; Schroeder (1997) pp. 45–46; Sterling (1997) pp. 213–214; Millett (2007) p. 152 n. 263

Text 534 is found in Book 1 of Gellius' *Attic Nights*. It is part of a chapter that considers Chilo's decision to help a friend contrary to the law (1.3). On either side occur quite unrelated chapters. The one that precedes reports how Herodes Atticus used a passage of Epictetus to put down a boastful youth (1.2), and the one that follows tells how Antonius Julianus analyzed a passage in Cicero's speech *In Defense of Gnaeus Plancus* (1.4). Such lack of connection between chapters is typical of *Attic Nights* and acknowledged by Gellius (*usi sumus ordine rerum fortuito pr. 2*).

The chapter that concerns us begins with a deathbed scene. His life ebbing away, Chilo is surrounded by friends, to whom he says that he is troubled by the way he once helped a friend who was guilty of a capital offense. Chilo was one of three judges at the trial and devised a plan that would free the friend and yet allow him to vote in accordance with the law. He persuaded the other two judges to vote for acquittal, while he secretly voted for conviction (1.3.1–7). The story is not the creation of Gellius; he tells us that it can be found in the books of biographers (1.3.1).⁸⁰⁹ But the story need not be believed: it may have been attached to Chilo as one of the seven Wise Men.⁸¹⁰ In any case, it has not been printed in the text-translation volumes.

⁸⁰⁹ According to Mercklin p. 654, Gellius' source for the deathbed story is Plutarch, who is the only of the several persons named in 1.3, who wrote biographies: *qui vitas resque gestas clarorum hominum memoriae mandaverunt* (1.3.1). Regenbogen col. 1486 thinks it possible that the story was to be found in Theophrastus' *On Friendship*.

⁸¹⁰ Attaching stories and sayings that are intended to illustrate the character of a well-known person is common. An example that relates closely to the case of Chilo

In what follows—and this is printed in the text-translation volumes—Gellius tells us that many philosophers carefully investigated the question whether one should assist a friend contrary to what is just, and (if so) to what extent and in situations of what sort. He gives the Greek, εἰ δὲ βοηθεῖν τῷ φίλῳ παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ μέχρι πόσῳ καὶ ποῖα (lines 11–12), and tells us that the question was discussed most diligently by Theophrastus in the first book of *On Friendship* (line 16). Gellius qualifies this report with the words “if I remember correctly” (*si recte meminimus* line 18). The qualifier has been taken seriously,⁸¹¹ but more likely it is stylistic.⁸¹² A different matter is whether the Greek formulation of the question derives from Theophrastus. That cannot be demonstrated. To be sure, the fact that Theophrastus is named in close proximity (4 lines later) encourages the attribution, but in context the Greek words are attributed to philosophers (plural), so that the words may have been used by someone else,⁸¹³ or by several philosophers, or served as a heading within a book that collected and organized by topic memorable sayings and brief excerpts from well-known and not so well-known authors.⁸¹⁴

Gellius continues by introducing Cicero, who, we are told, seems to have read (*videtur legisse* line 19) the work of Theophrastus. This time the qualifier has some point. Cicero never names Theophrastus, so that Gellius is drawing a conclusion based on his reading of both authors. But his reading will have been done carefully. At least, Gellius tells us that Cicero translated certain passages in a pleasing and apt manner but hardly touched upon what Theophrastus had to say concerning the question under investigation (lines 18–38). There is no reason to doubt that judgment, which would be nonsense or a lie, if Gellius had not read the Theophrastean work or at least portions of that work. Of course, it

concerns the Athenian Themistocles. According to Plutarch, Themistocles was naturally unscrupulous. When told that he would be a good ruler if he were fair and impartial to all, he is said to have replied, “May I never sit on a bench, where my friends will have nothing more from me than strangers” (*Life of Aristides* 2.2, 4).

⁸¹¹ Mercklin p. 654 suggests that at some time Gellius had read Theophrastus’ work, but at the moment of composition he is working from another source, perhaps Plutarch, who does not specify the book number. Hence Gellius writes from memory “in the first book” (line 18). The suggestion is more clever than convincing.

⁸¹² Cf. e.g., *quantum nobis memoriae est* at 6.16.4.

⁸¹³ Favorinus and Plutarch come to mind, for they are cited later in the chapter, 1.3.27 = line 65 and 1.3.31 (not printed in the text-translation volumes).

⁸¹⁴ Cf. the thirty collections whose titles are given in the preface 6–9.

is conceivable that Gellius has taken over someone else's judgment and reported it as his own, but I am not prepared to go that far in order to diminish the value of Gellius as a source.⁸¹⁵

The text-translation volumes omit several sections, in which Gellius complains that Cicero does not tell us in what ways and to what extent we ought to act unjustly in order to benefit a friend. Nor are we told how unjust the desires of a friend may be, before assistance must be denied (1.3.13–19). Gellius then recalls Pericles' statement, "One ought to help one's friends, but only as far as the gods allow" (1.3.20),⁸¹⁶ after which he returns to Theophrastus (the printed text resumes here at line 39). Theophrastus is said neither to evaluate individual deeds nor to make use of the certain evidence of examples. Rather, he deals with classes of things summarily and generally. He speaks of enduring a small disgrace if the gain of the friend is great. And he tells us that the honor of a person's reputation is of greater weight than the advantage of a friend, but when the stain to one's reputation is trivial, then the advantage of friend may weigh more heavily, much as a large quantity of bronze may be of greater value than a small portion of gold. After that Gellius cites Theophrastus in Greek: one class or kind may be more valuable than another, in the way that gold is more valuable than silver, but a small portion of the more valuable class may on occasion carry less weight in our assessment (lines 39–64). The report is teasing, for Cicero tells us that Theophrastus ignores individual cases, but what Theophrastus is reported to say about classes and particular portions makes clear the special importance of the individual case. Indeed, after a brief reference to Favorinus that interrupts the presentation of Theophrastean material (lines 65–68),⁸¹⁷ Gellius develops the point by citing Theophrastus' concern with full descriptions of particular cases. The persons involved, the conditions, the

⁸¹⁵ Cf. my earlier essay (1990) p. 461, reprint (2003) pp. 153–154.

⁸¹⁶ Plutarch attributes a similar sentiment to Pericles, but Plutarch speaks of the "altar" and not of the "gods" (*Sayings of Kings and Commanders* Per. 3 186C, *On Compliancy* 6 531D, *Precepts of Statecraft* 13 808B). Mercklin p. 654 suggests that Gellius is following Favorinus.

⁸¹⁷ The reference to Favorinus occurs between lines 39–64 and 69–74. It does constitute an awkward break in the discussion of Theophrastean material, but it is not irrelevant. Having reported in Latin that Theophrastus allows a departure from strict justice in order to benefit a friend, and then having quoted Theophrastus in Greek, Gellius cites Favorinus' definition of such an indulgence in favor: "a relaxation of exactness on the right occasion" (lines 65–68). In a modern work, Favorinus' definition might be reported in a footnote.

times and the necessities of the circumstances are said to influence our assessments, and yet they do not allow precepts that are straightforward and clear in regard to individual cases (lines 69–81). Gellius had wanted such a precept and claims to have said so in the first part of his essay (*in prima tractatus istius parte* line 81). That would seem to be a reference to the story of Chilo with which the essay begins (1.3.1–8), but no such desire is expressed there. If the claim does have a reference, it would seem to be to the middle of the essay, where Gellius speaks of most needing instruction and desiring to know when one must act contrary to the law for the sake of a friend (see 1.3.17 and 19, not printed in the text-translation volumes).⁸¹⁸

The chapter concludes with two sayings attributed to Chilo. In shortened form they run: “Love as if you will hate,” and “If you have no enemies, you have no friends” (1.3.30–31, not printed). The sayings may be sage advice and so appropriate to Chilo *qua* one of the Seven Wise Men, but they are irrelevant to the question that is central to the essay.⁸¹⁹ Perhaps Gellius would have removed them, had he revised the essay, but he left them together with other blemishes: the interruption concerning Favorinus and the imprecise reference to the first part of the essay.

In regard to Theophrastus’ ethical theory, most important is the clear recognition that precepts can never be simple, for there are a variety of factors that govern our choices. And even carefully thought out precepts may fail us, for circumstances occur that had not been anticipated.⁸²⁰ We may compare Aristotle’s discussion of friendship in the *Nicomachean Ethics* 9.2.⁸²¹ There Aristotle discusses conflicting claims and adopts a

⁸¹⁸ In my earlier article (1990) p. 460, reprint (2003) p. 152, I suggest that the opening section on Chilo was originally separate from the material on Cicero and Theophrastus. When the materials were combined, the reference to the first part needed to be but was not changed, in order that it might correctly refer to the central part of the essay.

⁸¹⁹ The sayings are, of course, relevant to the general topic of friendship, and that may explain how they came to be added at the end of 534. But they are irrelevant to the question concerning doing wrong for the sake of a friend. We may compare *Attic Nights* 8.6 = 543, in which the final topic, the affection of friendship, is different from the topic that precedes, the uselessness of mutual recriminations, though both can be brought under the general heading of friendship.

⁸²⁰ Two political fragments, both preserved in Justinian’s *Digest*, make clear that Theophrastus recognized a similar limitation regarding legislation. 629 tells us that laws should be enacted for the type of situation that occurs for the most part, and 630 says that legislators neglect situations that occur once or twice. Cf. Plato, *Statesman* 294A10–B1 and 295A4–5.

⁸²¹ Hornsby p. 78.

position similar to that of Theophrastus. Aristotle asks *inter alia* whether one ought to render service to a friend rather than to a good man, and whether one ought to return a favor to a benefactor or freely do a favor for a bosom companion, if it is not possible to do both. In response, Aristotle observes that it is not easy to draw exact lines of demarcation, for many and various considerations make one case different from another in greatness and smallness and nobility and necessity. In general, one ought to repay good deeds rather than do a favor for a bosom companion, just as a loan ought to be paid back to a creditor rather than a gift made to a bosom companion. But perhaps it is not always so. When a man has been ransomed from robbers, ought he to ransom in return his ransomer (should the ransomer be captured), regardless of who the ransomer is, or ought he to repay the amount if the ransomer demands repayment, or ought he to ransom his father? Aristotle opts for the father, and adds that as a general principle, a debt ought to be repaid, but if making a gift is greater in nobility and necessity, then one must turn aside, i.e., abandon the general principle (1164b25–1165a4). All that is in line with what Gellius reports concerning Theophrastus. So too is Aristotle's failure to cite a particular case. To be sure, Aristotle does consider specific kinds. He speaks of a father and a ransomer, but he never reaches the level of particulars, e.g., an individual like Chilo who found himself in a particular court judging a particular case involving a particular friend.⁸²² Apparently both Aristotle and Theophrastus recognized that it is easy to list factors that are relevant to deciding between competing claims, but particular individual cases—at least those that interest and challenge us—can be difficult to resolve. All too often they introduce new factors or degrees or combinations that had not been thought of and therefore never made part of an action-guiding precept. One is thrown back on common sense, or better still, on practical wisdom, *φρόνησις*.⁸²³

⁸²² Aristotle does speak of not offering every sacrifice to Zeus (1165a15). Zeus is an individual (first among the gods), but the circumstances and choices are not fleshed out. To have a particular example in all its complexity, we need to know what other gods are candidates, which festivals are under consideration, what kind of sacrifice is planned and so on.

⁸²³ I develop this idea more fully in my earlier article (1990) pp. 463–468, reprint (2003) pp. 156–161.

- 535 Plutarch, *On Brotherly Love* 20 490E (BT vol. 3 p. 250.24–27 Paton, Pohlenz and Sieveking)

Literature: Heylbut (1876) pp. 12–13; F.A. Steinmetz (1967) p. 88 n. 278, 108 n. 321, 129; Betz (1978) pp. 259–260; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 290–291; Gallo-Pettine (1988) p. 189; Schroeder (1997) p. 46; Millett (2007) p. 95

Text 535 comes from Plutarch's work *On Brotherly Love*. In what precedes our text, there has been discussion of how brothers can avoid quarrels including those caused by some inequality such as difference in age or capacity (12 484B–18 490A).⁸²⁴ Moreover, we have been told that when quarrels do arise, a brother should associate with the friends of his brother and avoid the enemies of his brother, for they will seek to deepen the rift (19 490A–E). At this point comes our text: διὸ τοῦ λόγου τὸ συνεχὲς ὑπαγορεύοντος, εὖ μὲν εἶπε Θεόφραστος ὥς εἰ κοινὰ τὰ φίλων ἐστὶ, μάλιστα δεῖ κοινούς τῶν φίλων εἶναι τοὺς φίλους. οὐκ ἦκιστα δ' ἄν τις ἀδελφοῖς τοῦτο παραινέσειεν "Wherefore—my subject suggests the connection—Theophrastus put it well, that if the possessions of friends are common, it is especially necessary that the friends of friends be common; and not least upon brothers one might urge this advice."

In the time of Theophrastus, the expression κοινὰ τὰ φίλων, "the possessions of friends are common," (line 2) was a proverb. It occurs not a few times in Plato⁸²⁵ and is called a παροιμία by Aristotle (*NE* 8.9 1159b31, 9.8 1168b6–8). A scholion on Plato's *Lysis* 270C cites the historian Timaeus, who reported that the proverb originated in Magna Graeca in the time of Pythagoras. In addition, the same scholion cites the Peripatetic Clearchus for a report that connects the proverb with the god at Delphi. Reference is also made to Menander and his comedy entitled *Brothers* (p. 120 Greene).⁸²⁶

Heylbut tells us that Theophrastus took the original proverb κοινὰ τὰ φίλων and extended it to the friends of friends, μάλιστα δεῖ κοινούς τῶν φίλων εἶναι τοὺς φίλους (lines 2–3). He supports his argument with the observation that the particular application to the friends of friends is not

⁸²⁴ Text 533 deals with the question whether friendships involving inequality (superiority and inferiority) occur in friendships based on virtue, pleasure and utility.

⁸²⁵ See the upper apparatus of parallel texts to 535 in the text-translation volumes.

⁸²⁶ In addition to Timaeus, Clearchus and Menander (all of whom are contemporaries of Theophrastus), Plato and Aristotle are also mentioned in the scholion.

found in Aristotle.⁸²⁷ I am uneasy concerning what Heylbut tells us for three reasons. First, 535 does not quite say that Theophrastus was the first to apply the proverb κοινὰ τὰ φίλων to the friends of friends. What we are told is that Theophrastus expressed himself well. That does not rule out an earlier application of the proverb to the friends of friends. Second, even if Plutarch knows of no earlier application, given the popularity of the original proverb in the fourth and third centuries, there may well have been one. Third, when Aristotle discusses the number of friends a person should have, he says that it is not possible to live together with many friends and to divide oneself among them. He continues ἔτι δὲ καὶ κείνους (sc. φίλους) δεῖ ἀλλήλοις φίλους εἶναι, εἰ μέλλουσι πάντες μετ' ἀλλήλων συνημερεύειν· τοῦτο δ' ἐργῶδες ἐν πολλοῖς ὑπάρχειν, "One's friends ought to be friends with one another, if they are all going to live with one another; but that would laborious among many persons" (NE 9.10 1171a4–6). The words καὶ κείνους (sc. φίλους) δεῖ ἀλλήλοις φίλους εἶναι come close to what we read in 535.2–3: δεῖ κοινοὺς τῶν φίλων εἶναι τοὺς φίλους. But even if close is not close enough, the three considerations taken together do, I think, constitute sufficient reason for hesitation before crediting Theophrastus with an original move. He may have simply expressed himself well (εὖ εἶπε) by taking an accepted idea and formulating an argument whose brevity adds impact. We are given a major premise that is both brief and proverbial (κοινὰ τὰ φίλων, "The possessions of friends are common") and a conclusion (μάλιστα δεῖ κοινοὺς τῶν φίλων εἶναι τοὺς φίλους, "It is especially necessary that the friends of friends be common"), from which the minor premise is easily understood (τοῖς φίλων [μάλιστα] ὑπάρχουσι φίλοι, "To the possessions of friends belong [especially] friends"). Given the abbreviated form of the argument, μάλιστα can be restricted to the conclusion and seen as way of underlining the necessity with which the conclusion follows. But it is also easy to understand μάλιστα as emphasizing the importance of friends among a person's possessions. But either way the argument is zippy through abbreviation, involves a proverb that has its own appeal and can be described as well stated.⁸²⁸

⁸²⁷ Heylbut p. 13: *de suo Theophrastus hanc sentiam auxerat ... quod in Aristotelis libris non legitur.*

⁸²⁸ Above I have treated Theophrastus' argument as a categorical syllogism. But it is also possible to view the argument as a conditional hypothetical syllogism: "If the possessions of friends are common, then the friends of friends ought to be common; but the possessions of friends are common; therefore it is necessary that the friends of friends be common" (it being understood that the possessions of friends includes their

Plutarch cites Theophrastus, because he thinks that the advice put forward by Theophrastus can be usefully applied to brothers. Common friends will strengthen the bonds between brothers, and should a quarrel arise between the brothers, the common friends can be of assistance in putting to rest the disagreement. It is interesting that the proverb κοινὰ τὰ φίλων occurs in the fragments of Menander's play *The Brothers* (fr. 9 Kock = fr. 10 Koerte-Thierfelder). We do not know how the proverb figured in the play, but it is possible that it was applied to brothers. If it was, it is possible that Menander had the idea from Theophrastus (Menander is said to have been a pupil of Theophrastus [18 no. 12]). But it is also possible that Menander came up with the idea on his own (perhaps Theophrastus got it from Menander: teachers learn much from their pupils), or the application was already common currency, so that Menander was drawing on everyday wisdom. Be that as it may, we should not overlook *Nicomachean Ethics* 8.9 1159b31–33: καὶ ἡ παροιμία “κοινὰ τὰ φίλων” ὀρθῶς· ἐν κοινωνίᾳ γὰρ ἡ φιλία. ἔστι δ' ἀδελφοῖς μὲν καὶ ἐταίροις πάντα κοινά, τοῖς δ' ἄλλοις ἀφωρισμένα. “And the proverb ‘the possessions of friends are common’ is correctly (stated). For friendship occurs in community. And for brothers and bosom companions all possessions are common, but for others (only) limited possessions.” It is but a short step from this Aristotelian text to what read in Plutarch. And if we keep in mind the fragment of Menander, we may want to say that Theophrastus took a cue from his teacher as well as his pupil and applied the proverb not only to the friends of friends but also to brothers. But here we must be cautious. The connections just made do not add up to Q.E.D., and the final sentence of 535, οὐκ ἥκιστα δ' ἂν τις ἀδελφοῖς τοῦτο παραινέσειεν, “and not least upon brothers one might urge this advice,” reads as if Plutarch is speaking for himself. To be sure, we could imagine a context in which Theophrastus applied the proverb to the particular case of brothers and then felt moved to underline the idea by adding an impersonal injunction: “one might urge this advice” (line 3). But I find that a bit of a stretch. In the preceding chapter, Plutarch has already focused on the importance of a brother avoiding his brother's enemies and associating with his friends. Now at the beginning of Chapter 20, Plutarch chooses

friends). On Theophrastus and hypothetical syllogisms, see the commentary on 536 and my articles “Theophrastus of Eresus: Rhetorical Argument and Hypothetical Syllogistic,” *Aevum* 74 (2000) pp. 89–103 and “Cicero, *On Invention* 1.51–77: Hypothetical Syllogistic and the Early Peripatetics,” *Rhetorica* 16 (1998) pp. 25–46, reprinted in *Theophrastean Studies* (2003) pp. 35–50 and 51–67.

to enhance his recommendation by citing what was well said by Theophrastus (εὖ εἶπε line 1), after which he adds what is missing in Theophrastus' concise argument: namely that the advice conveyed applies to brothers.

With insignificant variation, the words of Theophrastus are found in Plutarch's work *How to Tell a Flatterer from a Friend*. Plutarch is describing the disposition of a true friend toward his friend. He tells us that a true friend is continually at work in order that his friend may have many friends and be much honored. After that comes: κοινὰ γὰρ τὰ φίλων ἡγούμενος οὐδὲν οὕτως οἶεται δεῖν κοινὸν ὥς τοὺς φίλους ὑπάρχειν. "Believing that the possessions of friends are common, he (the true friend) thinks that no possession ought to be held so much in common as their friends" (24 65A). Here we have the argument of 535 presented in a more informal manner. The initial participial phrase corresponds to the if-clause in 535.2, and the subsequent phrase in indirect discourse corresponds to the conclusion in 535.2–3. However, Theophrastus is not named, and the subject is different: Plutarch is not concerned with the relation of a brother to his brother but with the difference between a friend and a flatterer. From this context, we cannot draw any conclusions concerning the original context in Theophrastus. Nevertheless, it should be observed that less than a page later, we find Plutarch discussing Alexander, Callisthenes and the affect that good fortune has on the soul. These remarks recall 505 and prompt the question whether Plutarch has taken from Theophrastus more than the words concerning common friends.

On the basis of *How to tell a Flatterer from a Friend* 65A, F.-A. Steinmetz supposes that Theophrastus valued πολυφιλία positively.⁸²⁹ The supposition seems to me either wrong or in need of significant qualification. To be sure, Plutarch says that a friend is continually at work in order that his friend may have many friends: be πολύφιλος. But in saying that, Plutarch is not implying that friends need a large number of friends. Rather, he is sharpening the contrast between a true friend and a flatterer. The latter would be happy were the object of his fawning devoid of friends, for then he (the flatterer) would be without competition in his quest for favors. Moreover, it is Plutarch and not Theophrastus who is writing here. That Theophrastus recommended πολυφιλία is neither said nor likely in regard to private life. In the sphere of politics, Theophrastus

⁸²⁹ F.-A. Steinmetz p. 88 n. 278.

will have recognized that benefits can flow from πολυφιλία (cf. Aristotle, *Politics* 3.13 1284a20–22, b26–27), but in the text that is our special concern, i.e. 535, Theophrastus is focused primarily on private life (brothers). Here he will have recommended a limited circle of friends, in which the members enjoy a close association (cf. Aristotle, *NE* 9.10 1170b20–1171a20).

While it is reasonable to hold that the Theophrastean material in 535 is drawn from the work *On Friendship* (436 no. 21)—the work was three books in length, so that there was plenty of room to discuss the well-known proverb κοινὰ τὰ φίλων and its application to the friends of friends—it should be acknowledged that the proverb may well have been cited in other works: not only in some ethical or political writings,⁸³⁰ but also in the work *On Proverbs* (727 no. 14), which may have made room for considerable discussion of the proverbs collected therein.

- 536 Thomas of Ireland, *Flowers of Almost All Learned Men*, chap. on Friendship, dk (p. 42.1215 ed. Cologne 1616)

Literature: Fortenbaugh (1984) p. 291; Schroeder (1997) p. 46

Text 536 is found in an anthology (florilegium), *Flowers of Almost All Learned Men*, by Thomas of Ireland. It occurs in a chapter that carries the heading *Amicitia*, “Friendship.” The text runs as follows: *Theophrastus, cum quidam diceret*,⁸³¹ “*ille illius amicus est*,” “*cur ergo*,” inquit, “*illo divite pauper est? amicus non est qui fortunae particeps non est*.” We have translated: “When someone said, ‘He is that man’s friend’ Theophrastus remarked ‘Why then is he poor, while that man is rich? He is not a friend who is not a sharer in (one’s) fortune.’” We have here an anecdote with minimal context. A question is put to Theophrastus, and he is made to respond. His response presupposes the truth of the proverb κοινὰ τὰ φίλων, “The possessions of friends are common” (535.2), and that possessions, as understood in the proverb, include riches. Those two assumptions give rise to a conditional hypothetical argument. “If two persons are friends, then their riches are shared, but their riches are not shared, therefore the two are not friends” (If A then B, but not B, therefore not A). We do not know whether Theophrastus ever set forth

⁸³⁰ An obvious candidate is *On Flattery* (436 no. 25)—a possibility that is suggested by Plutarch, *How to Tell a Flatterer from a Friend* 24 65A, discussed above.

⁸³¹ In the text-translation volumes we have erroneously printed *diceret* (plural) instead of *diceret* (singular).

the argument of 536 in such a formal manner, but given his interest in conditional hypothetical syllogisms, it is possible that he did.⁸³²

We must, however, be cautious, for the assignation of 536 to Theophrastus is doubtful. The question and answer format might be thought to reflect an actual occurrence, but the reverse is equally or even more likely. For the question and answer format is common in anthologies (cf. 509, 517, 537). It might be introduced in order to enliven a saying and at the same time to create an air of credibility. Moreover, the attribution to Theophrastus may be the work of Thomas. In codex Monacensis 6292, the words of our text with only insignificant variation are attributed to Menefranes,⁸³³ while Walter Burley connects a somewhat longer but similar version with Demosthenes.⁸³⁴ Publilius Syrus offers a metrical version that will have been spoken by a stage figure in a lost mime,⁸³⁵ and Martial begins an epigram with κοινὰ φίλων, and ends it by asking the addressee, Candidus, whether a man of his wealth shares nothing with his trusted comrade, while mouthing the phrase κοινὰ φίλων.⁸³⁶ It is clear that we are dealing with a movable saying, whose attractive qualities encouraged imaginative attribution. Nevertheless it seems reasonable to believe that somewhere in his work *On Friendship* (436 no. 23), Theophrastus discussed the common possessions of friends. The discussion may have been extensive (*On Friendship* was three books long, Diogenes Laertius 5.45 = 1.65) and the issue of shared riches may have been given more than a nod. For example, Theophrastus may have considered the various ways in which a person may share his riches with a friend⁸³⁷ and warned against self-impoverishment through excessive generosity.⁸³⁸

⁸³² On Theophrastus' interest in hypothetical syllogistic, see the articles referred to above in note 828 (to the commentary on 535).

⁸³³ Fol. 86^v v. 3–5 (p. 24.13–15 Woelfflin). The name “Menefranes” is likely to be corrupt; Roth proposes “Menophanes.”

⁸³⁴ 37 (p. 166.15–18 Knust).

⁸³⁵ Sent. 827 (p. 54.10 Orelli).

⁸³⁶ *Epigrams* 2.43.1, 15–16 (vol. 1 p. 43 Ker).

⁸³⁷ See 514.6–8, where Cicero lists several ways in which a generous person can assist a friend: He may assume the friend's debts, help the friend arrange the marriages of his daughters and lend assistance in acquiring property or in increasing it. The fact that the focus in 514 is primarily on generosity does not render the text irrelevant to friendship. For the best kind of friendship is based on virtue including a proper attitude toward wealth.

⁸³⁸ See Aristotle, *NE* 4.2 1122a25–26 and b23–31. The focus is on the virtue of magnificence, but as observed in the immediately preceding note, that does not make the text irrelevant to friendship. Indeed, a full consideration of friendship based on virtue inevitably involves consideration of individual virtues.

537 *Depository of Wisdom Literature*, chap. on Theophrastus, saying no. 10

Literature: Gutas (1858) p. 88

Text 537 is a saying taken from the *Depository of Wisdom Literature*, an Arabic gnomologium whose chapter on Theophrastus has been reconstructed by Dimitri Gutas. The saying, which is no. 10 out of 29, is presented as a response to the question, “Who are your friends?” Theophrastus’ answer is. “How should I know? I am rich!” There follows an explanation: “I.e., I have lots of money and hence no friends.”

537 relates closely to 536 in that both texts concern wealth. In 536 the message is immediately clear: friends share possessions (cf. 535.2) including wealth. In 537 the point of Theophrastus’ reply, “How would I know? I am rich!” is not obvious. Theophrastus might be saying that a rich person does not make friends—he deliberately keeps to himself—either because he does not need friends or because he cannot trust would-be friends, for they are sure to be after his money and nothing else. Alternatively, Theophrastus may be saying that there are persons with whom he interacts in a friendly manner, but he cannot tell the true friends from those whose primary aim is to benefit from his wealth. The closing words of the explanation, “(I have) no friends,” might be thought to favor the former interpretation—he keeps to himself—but the explanation is almost certainly a late addition to the saying by someone who found the preceding answer unclear and therefore in need of explanation.⁸³⁹ In fact, the first part of the answer, “How would I know” all but rules out the former interpretation. For if a person has no friends because he has deliberately kept to himself, he will know that he has no friends.⁸⁴⁰ Hence, I very much favor the alternative explanation. A rich person does make friends, but he has trouble distinguishing between true friends and friends who after his money and what his money can buy. With the latter group he may not mind forming friendships based on utility and pleasure, but he will know that these friendships are not based on virtue and that the people in question are apt to desert him, should his funds dry up.

⁸³⁹ Gutas suggests (correctly, I believe) that the explanation has been added either by the translator who rendered the Greek text in Arabic, or by the compiler of the *Depository of Wisdom Literature* (p. 88 n. a).

⁸⁴⁰ One might construe the question, “How would I know?” as an expression of annoyance rather than a straightforward answer to the original question. But that seems to me no more than a possibility.

The second part of the answer, “I am rich,” is factually correct. Diogenes Laertius records Theophrastus’ will, in which specific bequests of both property and money make clear that Theophrastus was a man of considerable substance.⁸⁴¹

Theophrastus recognized the importance of testing potential friends before entering into friendship (538A–F). Should we imagine that he was in doubt concerning the quality of his friendships, or did he trust his practical wisdom to make good choices, at least most of the time?⁸⁴² But maybe these reflections are leading us astray, for it is quite possible that the Theophrastean origin of our text is not a historical event but rather a passage in a Theophrastean writing that was picked up and turned into a saying by a later writer. It may even be that the origin was a Theophrastean dialogue in which the speaker was not Theophrastus. At a later time the words became detached from the speaker and attributed to Theophrastus as the author of the work.⁸⁴³

538A Codex Vaticanus Graecus 1144 f. 210^r v. 20–21 (no. 25, *RhM* vol. 47 [1892] p. 133 Elter)

538B Seneca, *To Lucilius* 1.3.2 (*OCT* vol. 1 p. 4.11–15 Reynolds)

538C Codices Parisini Latini 2772, 4718 and 4887, sent. 26 (p. 40.2–3 Woelfflin)

538D Rutilius Lupus, *On Figures* 1.6 (p. 10.1–4 Brooks)

538E *Gnomologium Vaticanum*, no. 326 (*WSt* vol. 10 [1888] p. 258 Sternbach)

538F Plutarch, *On Brotherly Love* 8 482B (*BT* vol. 3 p. 231.6–12 Paton, Pohlenz and Sieveking)

Literature: Brandis (1860) p. 352; Heybut (1876) pp. 22–27; Zeller (1879) p. 863; Grossgerge (1911) pp. 17–18; Bickel (1915) p. 13; F.A. Steinmetz (1967) pp. 115–119, 129; Brooks (1970) pp. 59–60; Betz (1978) p. 247; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 292–293; Schroeder (1997) p. 46; Millett (2007) pp. 95–96

Texts 538A–F are all concerned with a single theme: the importance of judging a person before making him a friend. The idea is everyday

⁸⁴¹ Diogenes Laertius 5.51–57 = 1.295–365. See Sollenberger (1992) pp. 3864–3869.

⁸⁴² Cf. 538D.1.

⁸⁴³ The phenomenon is common in Athenaeus. See above, Chapter II “The Sources” no. 20 *ad fin.*

wisdom. It is also associated with several persons who predate. Theophrastus: e.g., Pittacus (*Gnomologium Vaticanum* 561 Sternbach), Solon (Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 1.60) and Socrates (Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 2.6). We can be confident that Theophrastus, in his work *On Friendship*, emphasized the importance of choosing friends with care. In doing so, he may have wished to weaken the advice of Bias: one should be friends as if one will hate someday (*ita amare oportere ut si aliquando esset osurus*, Cicero, *Laelius* 59).⁸⁴⁴ In addition, Theophrastus may have discussed the difficulties involved in choosing friends without the practical experience that comes with friendship.⁸⁴⁵

As arranged in the text-translation volumes, the texts do not proceed chronologically. Rutilius Lupus (538D) is the earliest of the source-authors, being active in the last years of the Augustan principate. Seneca (B) comes second; he was compelled to commit suicide in 65 AD. And third is Plutarch (F), whose dates are c. 45–120 AD. The other three texts are taken from later anthologies.⁸⁴⁶ 538A has been placed first, because it is comparatively simple and in Greek. We read: ὁ αὐτὸς παρεκελεύετο τοὺς φίλους δεῖν δοκιμάσαντας αἰρεῖσθαι, οὐχ ἐλομένους δοκιμάζειν. “The same man (Theophrastus) used to give the advice that men ought to choose friends after having tested them, not to test after having chosen them.” The message is unmistakable and the style simple. There is a measure of chiasmus, i.e., reversal in word order (ABBA): at first δοκιμάζειν precedes αἰρεῖσθαι after which the order is reversed. But the effect is greatly weakened in that αἰρεῖσθαι (line 1) changes its stem when it recurs as ἐλομένους (line 2). The texts that follow (i.e., B–F) illustrate how a saying can be modified and expanded.

In 538B the message is the same, but now there is context. Lucilius is told to consider everything with a friend,⁸⁴⁷ after which comes the message: “but before that consider him” (line 1). Next we hear of persons who get things backwards. Contrary to the precepts of Theophrastus, after they have made friends they judge them; they do not make friends

⁸⁴⁴ In Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*, the saying is applied to old men whose experience is said to make them distrustful, so that they experience strongly neither friendly affection nor hate, but following the advice of Bias they feel affection as if they are going to hate and hate as if they will feel affection: φιλοῦσιν ὡς μισήσοντες καὶ μισοῦσιν ὡς φιλήσοντες (2.13 1389b24–25).

⁸⁴⁵ See Heylbut (1876) 22–27 and F.-A. Steinmetz 115–119.

⁸⁴⁶ See Chapter II “the Sources” no. 48, 50 and 52 on the *Gnomologium Vaticanum*, codices Parisini Latini 2772, 4718, 4887 and codex Vaticanus 1144, respectively.

⁸⁴⁷ The injunction *omnia cum amico delibera*, “consider everything with a friend” can be regarded as a special application of the proverb κοινὰ τὰ φίλων (535.2).

after having judged them. Here there is no straightforward translation of Theophrastus' words. Rather we have a description of wrongheaded procedure, which involves reversing the order of the subordinate and main clauses (first *cum* and the perfect tense followed by the indicative; then the indicative followed by *cum* and the perfect). But in regard to the important words there is no chiasmus (*amare* precedes *iudicare* twice).

538C is of some interest for only here do we have a passive construction, *amari* and *probari*. That is combined with chiasmus in wording: passive forms of *probare* come first and last: *probatos, probari*.

538D is an excerpt from Rutilius' *On Figures*, which is a Latin translation of a Greek work by Gorgias of Athens. In *On Figures*, Theophrastus is cited to illustrate the rhetorical figure of ἀντιμεταβολή = *commutatio*, "transposition." We may compare the *Carmen de figuris* v. 17: *permutatio ... sumere iam cretos, non sumptos cernere amicos* (*Rhetores Latini* p. 64 Halm), where Theophrastus is not named. Brooks, following Schneidewin, rejects the idea that the author of the *Carmen* had before him the work of Rutilius. Rather, he looked back to the Greek text of Gorgias of Athens.⁸⁴⁸ Brooks also follows Schneidewin in holding that verse 17 of the *Carmen* more closely approximates what Theophrastus wrote. In this regard, he cites the Greek as found in Plutarch (538F.1–2) and calls attention to the close etymological association between *cernere* (Carman) and κρίνειν (Plutarch). *Probare* is said to have no such association. That is correct, but it is noteworthy that in both Rutilius and the *Carmen* the negative "not," *non*, occurs in the second clause, while in Plutarch it occurs in the first clause, after which ἀλλά, "but," introduces the second clause. For punch I much prefer the formulation of Plutarch. But whichever formulation is deemed preferable, it should be observed that Rutilius alone makes reference to the prudent individual, the φρόνιμος or man of practical wisdom. And instead of an explicit injunction, advice is implied in the description of what a prudent individual does.⁸⁴⁹

538E offers advice indirectly: we are told that Theophrastus approved of making friends after having judged them and not the other way around. There is chiasmus in wording, and as in 538F "not" is followed by "but:" μὴ φιλήσαντα κρίνειν, ἀλλὰ κρίναντα φιλεῖν (line 1). What is new is the addition of hate. We are told that Theophrastus also approved of hating with reason and not with passion: καὶ μισεῖν λόγῳ καὶ μὴ πάθει (line 2). In my judgment, the addition is not to be attributed to

⁸⁴⁸ Brooks p. 60.

⁸⁴⁹ On the importance of prudence for a favorable outcome, cf. 523.12–14.

Theophrastus, but it can be elucidated by reference to Aristotle's analysis of individual emotions in Book 2 of the *Rhetoric*. There *μῖσος* is treated together with *φιλία* and said to occur without pain (2.4 1382a13), which is normally considered a defining mark of emotion. Apparently Aristotle and Theophrastus—at least in certain contexts—conceived of hate as a peculiarly cool emotion that was marked by rational thought and therefore compatible with sound deliberative and judicial decisions. I have stressed “in certain contexts,” for this treatment of hate is not consistently maintained. We may compare 542.8–10. There we are told that according to Theophrastus excessive affection, *λίαν φιλεῖν*, is likely to become the cause of hate, *μισεῖν*, which Plutarch construes as strong anger, *χαλεπαίνειν*.

I have already touched on 538F above when discussing 538D. Here I add that 538F exhibits chiasmus: οὐ φιλοῦντα δεῖ κρίνειν ἀλλὰ κρίναντα φιλεῖν. Moreover, context illustrates how the words of a well-known person can be used to introduce a related but different point. Plutarch is recommending that brothers not be strict faultfinders in regard to each other. He first focuses on persons who are unrelated. Theophrastus is cited and we are told that it is not right to make friends before judging them (lines 1–2). Plutarch then turns to persons who are related by birth. He comments that nature does not give judgment the lead in regard to goodwill; instead, the beginning of friendship occurs at birth.⁸⁵⁰ After that Plutarch remarks that for brothers “it is right to be neither harsh nor strict examiners of faults” (lines 2–5).

In Stobaeus, there is a closely related but much abbreviated version of 538F. It was printed in *Quellen* (1984) p. 71 = L98, but in FHS&G it was reduced to the apparatus of parallel texts, in which only the last four words are printed. Here it is complete: Θεοφράστου· Θεόφραστός φησιν, ὅτι τοὺς μὲν ἀλλοτρίους οὐ φιλοῦντα δεῖ κρίνειν, ἀλλὰ κρίναντα φιλεῖν, τοὺς δὲ ἀδελφοὺς ἔμπαλιν. “Theophrastus: Theophrastus says that with unrelated people it is not right to make friends and then judge them, but to judge and then make friends. With brothers it is

⁸⁵⁰ To avoid any possible confusion, I note that lines 2–4 should not be read in such a way that *εὖνοια*, goodwill, is identified with *φιλία*, friendship. To be sure, goodwill is a mark of friendship, but it is not all there is to friendship. Moreover, it can be felt toward a wide variety of persons and can be aroused with comparative speed, which is not true of friendship. Cf Plutarch, *Table Talk* 4, preface 659F–660A, where Plutarch refers to the Peripatetic Dicaearchus (Theophrastus' contemporary) and reports that Dicaearchus thought it necessary to arouse goodwill in all people but to make friends with those who are good. And that requires time as well as virtue (fr. 35 Mirhady).

contrariwise.” Here the treatment of brothers is much abbreviated and attributed to Theophrastus. That Theophrastus was capable of adding a qualification concerning brothers to the common idea that judgment should precede actually becoming friends is not to be denied.⁸⁵¹ But it is clear that the Stobaeus text is based on that of Plutarch⁸⁵² and that includes the observation concerning brothers.

Obvious, perhaps, but I make the point anyway: not all family members are members by birth. One’s partner in marriage is an example. See 486.23–29, where Theophrastus is made to complain that there is no choice involved in taking a wife. A husband learns about her defects after the wedding. The complaint is exaggerated and not to be taken as Theophrastus’ considered opinion. But it is in line with Theophrastus’ recognition that good judgment is important when entering into an intimate relationship like friendship.

Finally, in each of the versions discussed above Theophrastus is made to offer practical advice that is quite general: test a person before making him a friend. That might leave one wondering how the testing is to be accomplished. Put differently, one may want more specific advice. An example of such advice together with an explanation occurs in Isocrates’ paraenetic address *To Demonicus* 24: “Make no one a friend until you investigate how he has used his former friends. For you must expect him to behave toward you just as he has toward them.”⁸⁵³

539 Stobaeus, *Anthology* 4.11.16 (vol. 4 p. 340.13–16 Hense)

Literature: Hense (1909) p. cviii; Regenbogern (1940) col. 1481; Fortenbaugh (1984) p. 293; Millett (2007) p. 32

Text 539 is taken from the *Anthology* of Stobaeus. It occurs under the heading Περί νεότητος, “On Youth,” and is preceded by an excerpt from Plato’s *Laws*, τὰ γὰρ τῶν νέων ἦθη πολλάς μεταβολὰς ἐν τῷ βίῳ μεταβάλλειν ἐκάστοτε πέφυκε, “for the characters of young men are by nature subject to frequent change in the course of life” (11.9 929C), and followed by one from Homer’s *Iliad*, αἰεὶ ὁ ὀπλοτέρων ἀνδρῶν

⁸⁵¹ Cf. 535, where it is Theophrastus, who takes the proverb “the possessions of friends are common” and extends it to the friends of friends. The subsequent application to brothers is by Plutarch. See the commentary on 535.

⁸⁵² Most striking is the occurrence of the words τοὺς ἀλλοτρίους in the same position within their clause in both 538F.1 and the text of Stobaeus.

⁸⁵³ The advice comes at the beginning of a string of precepts put forward by Isocrates. For brief discussion, see Wefelmeier p. 32.

φρένες ἡερέθονται, “the minds of young men are always turning with the wind” (3.108). 539 is well placed between these excerpts, for it too concerns the instability of youthful character: Θεοφράστου· χαλεπὸν καταμαντεύεσθαι περὶ τῶν νέων· ἀστόχαστος γὰρ ἡλικία καὶ πολλὰς ἔχουσα μεταβολὰς ἄλλοτε ἐπ’ ἄλλο φερομένη, “Theophrastus: It is difficult to prophecy concerning young people, for (the character of) youth is hard to guess at and marked by many changes, being carried on different occasions in different directions.”

The passage cited from the *Iliad* is of interest for two reasons. First, it makes clear that the instability of youthful character was not a new idea in the time of Theophrastus. On the contrary, it is as old as Greek literature and even older. Second, immediately after the line quoted from the *Iliad*, a contrast with old age is introduced: we read that an old man looks forward and backward to ensure the best outcome (3.109–110). Contrasting youth with old age is a commonplace and may have prompted Hense to suggest that 539 should be assigned to Theophrastus’ work *On Old Age* (436 no. 18).⁸⁵⁴ The suggestion is by no means foolish, but there are other equally good candidates: especially, *On Friendship* and *On Dispositions* (436 no. 23 and 1). We might add the *Ethics* and *On Education* (436 no. 2 and 9).

In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle says that the friendship of young persons is based on pleasure, and as they become older their pleasures change, so that they become friends and cease to be friends quickly (8.3 1156a31–b1, cf. *EE* 7.2 1236a38–b1). Theophrastus will have agreed and perhaps pointed out that in the case of young people a critical examination of a potential friend’s character is likely to be of little value, for it is difficult to prophecy, χαλεπὸν καταμαντεύεσθαι (line 1), what a young person will find pleasant as he ages. In order to make a reliable judgment, the testing period and the accompanying period of restraint will be impractically long, for the period would need to extend to maturity and the acquisition of a stable character. Hence the use of καταμαντεύεσθαι is entirely appropriate. We may compare the use of μαντεύεσθαι in Plato’s *Phaedrus*, where Socrates is asked what message he has for Isocrates. At first Socrates says that Isocrates is still young, but then adds: ὁ μέντοι μαντεύομαι κατ’ αὐτοῦ, λέγειν ἐθέλω “Nevertheless, I am willing to say what I prophecy about him,” (278E).

⁸⁵⁴ See the apparatus to Hense’s edition of Stobaeus 4 p. 340.

F.A. Steinmetz pp. 64 and 132 suggests that Cicero's *Laelius* 33–34, 74 expresses the thinking of Theophrastus concerning friendships between younger people. In regard to the Scipio-segment (33–35), see the commentary on 436 no. 23.

Finally, the word ἀστοχάστος, translated with “hard to guess at” (lines 1–2), introduces an archery metaphor, “not aimed at,” and may be viewed as a stylistic enhancement, which would be attractive to an anthologist. Nevertheless, the adjective seems quite at home in a Peripatetic text. The verb στοχάζεσθαι and the adjective στοχαστικός occur often in Aristotle; the adjective ἄστοχος occurs once in the *History of Animals* 7.10 587a9 (see Bonitz' *Index Aristotelicus* pp. 116 and 705).

540 Codex Vaticanus Graecus 1144 f. 210^r v. 19–20 (no. 24, *RhM* vol. 47 [1892] p. 133 Elter)

Literature: Milobenski (1964) p. 92; Fortenbaugh (1984) p. 294; Schroeder (1997) p. 46

Text 540 is found in codex Vaticanus Graecus 1144 within a string of ten sayings, each of which is concerned with friendship. Two sayings are attributed to Theophrastus: 540 which comes ninth among the ten sayings and 538A which is last. 540 is also attributed to Theophrastus in codex Parisinus Graecus 2571.

The text of 540 runs as follows: Θεοφράστου· ἄγνοιαν μὲν καὶ ἁμαρτίαν ἢ φιλία φέρει, φθόνον δὲ καὶ δυσμένειαν οὐ φέρει. Two interpretations are possible, for the verb φέρειν, like the English verb “to bear,” is ambiguous. It can mean “to bring” and “to endure.”⁸⁵⁵ If the first meaning is adopted, then Theophrastus is saying, “Friendship brings (causes) ignorance and mistakes, but it does not bring envy and ill-will.” If the second meaning is preferred, then we are being told, “Friendship bears (endures, puts up with) ignorance and mistakes, but it does not bear envy and ill-will.” This ambiguity was pointed out in *Quellen*, but no notice was taken of it in the text-translation volumes. Only the second of the two translations is given (vol. 2 pp. 365, 367). A note should be added to the English translation in which the first translation is given or the ambiguity of φέρειν stated. It may be that the original context would make clear which of the two interpretations is to be preferred, but it may also

⁸⁵⁵ See LSJ s.v. III and IV.3.

be that the formulation is deliberately ambiguous. For that could generate discussion together with exhortation. Be that as it may, the ambiguity is likely to have appealed to a collector of sayings, so that he selected the saying for inclusion in an anthology.

On either understanding of φέρειν, the first part of the saying is intelligible. 1) The idea that friendship brings ignorance and mistakes is present in text 541, in which we read that the judgments of friends (i.e., friends whose affection for each other is strong) are blind. 2) The idea that friendship endures ignorance and mistakes is not explicitly stated elsewhere in our collection of Theophrastean texts, but we can say the following. When mistakes are not the result of bad character (i.e., when they are factual errors),⁸⁵⁶ a friend will be patient with his partner, either overlooking the mistake or offering constructive and tactful advice. But if the mistake is a moral failing, then the friend will combine patience with admonition and possibly mild rebuke and do so for the sake of the partner.⁸⁵⁷

Concerning the second part of the saying, 1) we can say that friendship does not bring envy and ill-will, for friendship involves wishing well, and that holds not only for friendship based on virtue but also for friendships based on pleasure and utility. In the latter, the parties involved want their partners to continue to be pleasant or useful and perhaps even more so. To be sure, their moral character may be less than good and for that reason not rule out feelings of envy and ill-will regarding areas not directly related to their friendship. But such feelings are not brought about by their friendship but by their character. They are only coincidentally or accidentally related to the friendship. 2) We can also say that all three kinds of friendship do not endure envy and ill-will. Since feelings of envy and ill-will are tied to bad character, they are incompatible with friendship based on virtue. And in friendships based on pleasure and utility, although the parties may choose to endure a modest amount of envy and ill-will providing their desires are being met, there are limits, i.e., such friendships break down when the feelings become disruptive and unbearable to one or both parties.

⁸⁵⁶ I am inclined to understand ἄγνοια and ἁμαρτία (line 1) in this way. See 530 and the commentary on that text.

⁸⁵⁷ In *NE* 9.12 Aristotle acknowledges that friends can improve each other. See the introduction to this section on “Friendship.” See also the commentary on 454 ad fin.

Here something should be said about friendships in which there is superiority and inferiority, for such friendships seem especially prone to feelings of envy and ill-will. When the inferior party reflects on his own status vis-a-vis his partner, the inferior party is apt to be jealous and wish that his partner be brought down a notch or two or more. In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle tells us that in friendships involving superiority and inferiority, equality can in a way be achieved, if the inferior party shows greater affection for the superior party (8.7 1158b11–28).⁸⁵⁸ That would create a kind of proportionate equality, in which increased affection would block feelings of envy and ill-will. The idea is appealing, but it may be largely wishful thinking, for it seems to suppose that the inferior person is not deficient in virtue or not seriously so. When that condition is not met, then envy and ill-will are likely to surface. That may explain at least in part why Aristotle goes on to say that in friendship quantitative equality, i.e., strict equality, is primary and proportionate equality secondary. He adds that when there is a large difference in virtue between the two parties, they will not be friends. Here difference in virtue is not singled out as especially important. Rather, it is mentioned alongside vice, wealth and anything else (1158b29–1159a3).⁸⁵⁹ In the *Eudemian Ethics*, Aristotle seems to go one step further, for after recognizing friendships between equals and unequals, he asserts that friends are those who relate to each other as equals (7.4 1239a4–5).⁸⁶⁰ In what follows, Aristotle does recognize proportionate affection between unequals (1239a19–20), but he also repeats with emphasis his earlier assertion concerning equality: it is clear, we are told, that men are friends when their relationship involves equality (1239a19–20⁸⁶¹). That Theophrastus took note of the Eudemian position and adopted a strong position concerning equality between friends is, I think, an interesting but unprovable possibility. See the commentary on 533.

⁸⁵⁸ 8.7 1158b27–28: ὅταν γὰρ κατ' ἄξϊαν ἡ φίλῃσις γίνεται, τότε γίνεται πως ἰσότης, ὃ δὴ τῆς φιλίας εἶναι δοκεῖ. “When the affection is proportionate, then there is in a way equality. And that seems to be part of friendship.”

⁸⁵⁹ 8.7 1158b33–34: δῆλον δ' ἂν πολὺ διάστημα γένηται ἀρετῆς ἢ κακίας ἢ εὐπορίας ἢ τινος ἄλλου· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι φίλοι εἰσὶν ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἄξιοῦσιν. “It is clear, if the difference in virtue or vice or wealth or anything else is large. For then they are no longer friends, nor do they not claim to be.”

⁸⁶⁰ 7.4 1239a4–5: φίλῃαι μὲν οὖν ἀμφοτέραι, φίλοι δ' οἱ κατὰ τὴν ἰσότητα. “Both (kinds) are friendships, but (only) those on an equal footing are friends.”

⁸⁶¹ 7.4 1239a19–20: φανερόν δὲ ὅτι φίλοι μὲν, ὅταν ἐν τῷ ἴσῳ.

541 Jerome, *On Hosea* 3, Preface (CCSL vol. 76 p. 109.140–145 Adriaen)

Literature: Brandis (1860) p. 352; Luebeck (1872) p. 94; Heylbut (1876) p. 25; Courcelle (1948) p. 60, transl (1969) p. 71; Hagendahl (1958) pp. 218–219; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 294–295

Text 541 comes from Jerome's commentary on *Hosea*, one of the books of the *Old Testament* and the first of the books of the twelve Minor Prophets. The commentary was written at the urging of Jerome's patron, Pammachius, whom Jerome praises in the several prefaces, while making allusions to Greek and Latin secular literature.⁸⁶² In the preface that concerns us, Jerome acknowledges that he is responding to encouragement from Pammachius, who is compared to Polio, the patron of Vergil. *Eclogue* 3.86 is quoted (p. 108.135–136). After that, Jerome expresses joy that Pammachius is an open supporter according to the law of friendship, but adds that he has misgivings concerning Pammachius' silent judgment. Jerome's rivals, who speak disparagingly, are said to be envious. They should not be called judges but rather accusers (p. 108.136–109.140). At this point begins 541. Jerome refers to Pammachius' love and credits him with focusing on the facts. That prompts a remark about love and error: *quamquam et amor recipiat errorem, pulchrumque sit illud Θεοφράστιον, quod Tullius magis ad sensum quam ad verbum interpretatus est, τυφλὸν τὸ φιλοῦν περὶ τὸ φιλούμενον, id est "amantium caeca iudicia sunt."* Our translation runs, "though even love admits error, and that Theophrastean (saying) is beautiful, which Tully renders more according to sense than literally: 'Blind (is) what loves concerning what is loved,' i.e., 'The judgments of lovers are blind'" (lines 2–5). In what immediately follows (not printed as part of 541), Jerome addresses Pammachius: *attamen in istam partem peccato magis, ut labaris non odio, sed amore*, "nevertheless, err more in that direction, so that you do not slip on account of hate, but rather love" (p. 109.145–146). Hate is what governs the judgments of Jerome's rivals. There is no danger that Pammachius will adopt their attitude. Nor is there any serious doubt about his objectivity. To be sure, Jerome urges him to err on the side of love, but we are to understand that in the case of Pammachius love and sound judgment are compatible.

The references to Theophrastus and Cicero illustrate Jerome's readiness to cite Greek and Latin authors. Here he manages to mention two ancients while complimenting Pammachius. That may add a certain

⁸⁶² For examples, see Hagendahl p. 218.

charm to the compliment, but we are left wondering whether Jerome has not erred in regard to the authors he cites. For the Greek form of the saying attributed to Theophrastus occurs with only minor variation in Plato's *Laws*: τυφλοῦται περὶ τὸ φιλούμενον ὁ φιλῶν (5.4 731E), and both Plutarch and Galen attribute the saying to Plato, albeit in a form that is closer to what we read in Jerome than what Plato offers: Plutarch has τυφλοῦται τὸ φιλοῦν περὶ τὸ φιλούμενον, while Galen has τυφλῶττον τὸ φιλοῦν περὶ τὸ φιλούμενον.⁸⁶³ In both authors, the subject has become neuter, τὸ φιλοῦν, and now precedes the clause περὶ τὸ φιλούμενον. And in Galen the participle τυφλῶττον has replaced the finite verb. Furthermore, the Latin version is not found in any Ciceronian text that has come down to us.⁸⁶⁴ Given the context, it seems reasonable to say that Jerome's primary focus is on his relationship with Pammachius and that the attribution of the saying in question is very much a secondary concern to which he has given little thought. It is possible that Jerome knows the saying from Plutarch or Galen,⁸⁶⁵ and that he confuses it with a different saying of Theophrastus. In this regard, 538F comes to mind, which Cicero introduces into his *Laelius* (85) without naming Theophrastus.⁸⁶⁶

Despite what is said in the preceding paragraph, I am not prepared to banish 541 from a collection of sources regarding the ethics of Theophrastus. For it is conceivable that Theophrastus made reference to the blindness of love in, e.g., his work *On Friendship* (436 no. 23), and in doing so he may have used the words reported by Jerome. Moreover, Jerome's assessment, "that Theophrastean saying is beautiful" (lines 2–3), is suggestive, for the saying as reported by Jerome is, I think, more attractive or at least stylistically more interesting than what we read in Plato. Indeed, the latter comes across as an ordinary sentence, while the former has the earmarks of a proverb: a feeling of concision is gained through the omission of a verb, and the repeated use of the neuter singular is striking. It, therefore, seems possible that Theophrastus took the words of Plato, altered them so as to be more pleasing and in this way affixed his name

⁸⁶³ Plutarch, *How to Tell a Flatterer from a Friend* 1 48E and *How to Profit from One's Enemies* 7 92A and 11 92E, and Galen, *On Diagnosis and Treatment of Disturbances in the Soul* 2 (vol. 5 p. 6.9 Kühn).

⁸⁶⁴ The Latin version also occurs in Jerome's work *Against John of Jerusalem* 3 (PL vol. 23 col. 373B).

⁸⁶⁵ Since it is but a short step from τυφλῶττον to τυφλόν, one might prefer Galen as Jerome's source.

⁸⁶⁶ 538F runs τοὺς ἀλλοτρίους οὐ φιλοῦντα δεῖ κρίνειν, ἀλλὰ κρίναντα φιλεῖν, and Cicero has *cum iudicaris, diligere oportet, non, cum dilixeris, iudicare*. See Luebeck p. 94.

to the saying. Alternatively Theophrastus could have taken over a version that predates Plato: one that he either reshaped or one that already had the appearance of a proverb.⁸⁶⁷ Other possibilities are not to be excluded; I simply want to caution that the Platonic text does not rule out the occurrence of a closely related but nevertheless different version in some writing of Theophrastus.

542 Plutarch, *Cato the Younger* 37.1–4 (BT vol. 2.1 p. 62.9–19 Ziegler)

Literature: Heylbut (1876) p. 35; Bock (1898) p. 542; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 265–266

Text 542 is taken from the middle of Plutarch's *Life of Cato the Younger*. It concerns events on Cyprus to which Cato had been sent by Clodius (elected tribune in 58 B.C) to wrest control of the island from Ptolemy, a younger brother of Ptolemy Auletes, the king of Egypt. Ptolemy committed suicide before Cato arrived, leaving much treasure to be sold. Cato is said to have distrusted everyone and to have taken the task upon himself. In doing this, he offended his friends including Munatius Rufus,⁸⁶⁸ who is said to have been most intimate with Cato and to have reacted with all but incurable anger. Plutarch adds that Caesar dwelt on this episode in his work denouncing Cato (34–36). After that begins 542, in which Munatius' version of the episode is reported.

According to Munatius, who is said to have published a work on Cato (lines 3–4), his anger was not a reaction to Cato's distrust but to inconsiderate treatment and a certain jealousy that he felt toward Canidius (lines 1–3), a friend of Cato who had been sent to Cyprus in advance in an effort to persuade Ptolemy to give up his kingdom without a fight (35.1). Munatius felt himself insulted, when Cato did not receive him upon his arrival in Cyprus.⁸⁶⁹ A moderate complaint by Munatius

⁸⁶⁷ In a letter from Marcus Aurelius to Cornelius Fronto, Marcus seems to suggest that the saying derives from Thucydides: *puto Thucydides* (no. 18 p. 50.24 van den Hout). Haines suggests reading "Theophrastus" instead of "Thucydides." Haines may well be correct, but even if he is, the text should remind us that sayings are moveable, and that the origin of a saying may predate the earliest surviving occurrence.

⁸⁶⁸ That Munatius Rufus was Cato's close friend is attested by Valerius Maximus, *Memorable Deeds and Sayings* 4.3.2, who may have had direct access to Munatius' work on Cato. See F. Münzer, "Munatius" (37), *Paulys Realencyclopädie* 16.1 (1933) col. 554.

⁸⁶⁹ In line 6, Cato is said to be inside "looking after something," *σχευωρούμενου* τι, with Canidius. But *σχευωρούμενου* might be translated "contriving" (LSJ s.v. II), or we might adopt the reading of two codices, *σκαυωρούμενου*, which could be translated "devising mischievously" (LSJ s.v. *σκαυωρεῖσθαι*). Both would cast a negative light on

was met with an immoderate reply: “Excessive affection is likely, as Theophrastus says, often to become the cause of hate. ‘Since you, too,’ (Cato) said, ‘on account of intense affection are angered thinking yourself honored less than is appropriate.’” The Greek text runs: κινδυνεύει τὸ λίαν φιλεῖν, ὥς φησι Θεόφραστος, αἴτιον τοῦ μισεῖν γίνεσθαι πολλάκις. “ἐπεὶ καὶ σύ,” φάναι, “τῷ μάλιστα φιλεῖν ἥττον οἰόμενος ἢ προσήκει τιμᾶσθαι χαλεπαίνεις.” (lines 7–10). Cato goes on to explain that on account of experience and trust, δι’ ἐμπειρίαν καὶ διὰ πίστιν, he makes use of Canidius more than others, for Canidius came to him at the outset and has shown himself to be pure in character, καθαροῦ φαινομένῳ (lines 10–12). The flow of the text and the literary nature of the reference to Theophrastus strongly suggest that the reference to Theophrastus is attributable to Munatius and not to Cato. But the matter is not simple. I offer three considerations.

First, we are told not only that Munatius wrote a work on Cato, but also that Thræsea followed Munatius (line 4). From what has been said earlier in the *Life* (25.2), it seems clear that Plutarch knows Munatius’ work through Thræsea.⁸⁷⁰ And that leaves open the possibility, albeit unlikely, that Thræsea added the reference to Theophrastus. Second, attributing the reference to Cato and not to Munatius would agree with the description of Cato that Plutarch gives at the beginning of the *Life*. For there we are told that Cato was a sluggish student but remembered whatever he comprehended, and that while he was an obedient student, he regularly asked for a reason or explanation (1.6–7, 10). And that is what is offered in the lines quoted above. Third, I see no way to rule out with certainty an insertion by Plutarch himself: he may have chosen to embellish or add a scholarly touch to the account of Munatius.

That immoderate affection can result in negative feelings is not a view peculiar to Theophrastus. It is everyday wisdom that recurs often. See, e.g., Aristaenetus, *Epistles* 1.22 p. 52.4–5 Mazal: αἴτιον δὲ ἦν τοῦ βούλεσθαι μισεῖν τὸ λίαν φιλεῖν, which agrees closely in wording with what we read in 542 (lines 8–9). In *Quellen* pp. 295–296, I made a connection between 542 and Plutarch’s *On the Education of Children* 13

Cato’s refusal to receive Munatius, but it would not (or need not) affect Munatius’ assessment of Cato’s behavior. I prefer, therefore, to follow recent editors, print σκευωροῦμένου and to stay with our translation.

⁸⁷⁰ P. Clodius Thræsea Paetus was a Stoic, who was condemned by Nero in 66 AD. Plutarch is drawing on Munatius through Thræsea: see Münzer *op. cit.* col. 554 and R. Flacelière and É. Chambry, *Plutarque*, Vies, CB t. 10 (1976) pp. 65–66.

9A–B, where reference is made to the excessive affection of fathers for their children: ἤδη δέ τινας ἐγὼ εἶδον πατέρας, οἷς τὸ λίαν φιλεῖν τοῦ μὴ φιλεῖν αἴτιον κατέστη. “In time gone by I have seen certain fathers, for whom excessive affection resulted in lost affection.” Here, too, an excess of love has a negative effect: in their eagerness for their children to excel, fathers put excessive pressure on the children, and that works an effect opposite to what is desired. But here the effect is on the object of affection, the children; in 542 the effect is on the person who feels the excess of affection, Munatius. Hence, the passage is of minimal relevance to 542. Moreover, Theophrastus is mentioned neither in 13 9A–B nor anywhere else in *On the Education of Children*.

The mention of experience together with trust (line 11) invites comparison with 538A–F, where the importance of testing potential friends is emphasized. And the mention of pure character (line 12) suggests friendship based on virtue, of which mention is made in 533.4. But here caution is in order, for it would be a mistake to think of Canidius’ relationship to Cato as a paradigm example of friendship based on virtue. Indeed, we are told that after Ptolemy had committed suicide and Cato had not yet arrived in Cyprus, Cato did not totally trust Canidius and for that reason sent Brutus to Cyprus. In addition, Munatius is described as the most intimate of Cato’s friends. Canidius belongs among the others (36.1–2, 5). It seems, then, that the friendship between Cato and Canidius was one of utility. Cato viewed Canidius as trustworthy and useful up to a point (“I use him more than the others” [line 11]): he was the right person to dispatch to Cyprus in order to dissuade Ptolemy from engaging in battle, but on other occasions his reliability and usefulness was in doubt.

543 Gellius, *Attic Nights* 8.6 chapter heading (OCT vol. 1 p. 275.5–8 Marshall)

Literature: Zeller (1879) p. 863 n. 4; Schäfer (1955) p. 343; F-A. Steinmetz (1967) p. 149; Fortenbaugh (1984) p. 296; Holford-Strevens (1989) pp. 68, 201

Book 8 of Gellius’ *Attic Nights* has been lost. What we know of it derives from summaries that were written to inform the reader of what he would find throughout the work (it ran for twenty books). Like the other books, Book 8 exhibits a random ordering of the individual chapters. 8.6, the chapter that interests us, is said to have discussed the reconciliation of friends. The preceding chapter 8.5 dealt with two Latin expressions, and the following chapter 8.7 had memory as its topic.

What comes first is common sense: “When reconciliation takes place after slight offences, the occurrence of mutual complaints is not the least helpful” (lines 1–2). After that we hear of a discourse on this subject by Taurus and words, i.e., a quotation on the same subject taken from Theophrastus’ book. Finally mention is made of Cicero: what he “thought about the affection of friendship is added with his own words” (lines 2–4). The discourse of Taurus was most likely a talk or lecture by the Platonist. Gellius studied with him during his year in Athens and will have made notes,⁸⁷¹ so that when Gellius got round to writing 8.6, he will have drawn on his records as well as his memory. In the case of Theophrastus, it is reasonable to believe that Gellius excerpted one or more passages in Greek from the work *On Friendship* (436 no. 23).⁸⁷² Gellius does that in 534 and will have done the same in 8.6. And as in 534, Gellius is likely to have added some commentary to what he excerpted. Much the same will hold for Cicero. Gellius quoted one or more passages in Latin together with comment.

Schäfer suggests a close relationship between the Theophrastean material excerpted by Gellius and what Cicero says in *On Friendship* 88. Schäfer is thinking of the sentence: *una illa sublevenda offensio est, ut et utilitas in amicitia et fides retineatur*, “That one displeasure is to be removed, in order that both usefulness and trust might be retained in the friendship.” There are several reasons not to accept the suggestion. First, the reading *sublevenda* is generally rejected by the editors; *subeunda* is preferred.⁸⁷³ Second, once *subeunda* is read, one sees that the Ciceronian sentence is not about the futility of mutual recriminations. Rather, it is about a particular cause of offense, i.e. admonition and rebuke, which must be accepted, in order that the usefulness in friendship and the loyalty be preserved.⁸⁷⁴ Third, Panaetius and not Theophrastus seems to have been Cicero’s immediate source in this portion of *On Friendship*.⁸⁷⁵ For these reasons I prefer not to follow Schäfer and instead to call attention to the fact that in 543 Theophrastus and Cicero are mentioned in regard

⁸⁷¹ On Gellius taking notes, see his remarks in preface 2.

⁸⁷² Holford-Strevens p. 201 says that in the lost chapter 8.6, Theophrastus’ *On Friendship* “may have been cited through Taurus or, like Cicero’s adaptation, independently.” I vote for the latter possibility.

⁸⁷³ So the most recent editor, P. K. Marshall, in the OCT (1968).

⁸⁷⁴ The sentence in question is immediately followed by these words: *nam et monendi amici saepe sunt et obiurgandi, et haec accipienda amice, cum benevole fiunt*, “for friends are often to be admonished and to be rebuked, and these are to be accepted in a friendly manner, when they occur with goodwill” (88).

⁸⁷⁵ See F-A. Steinmetz p. 149.

to two quite different topics: Theophrastus is mentioned in connection with the uselessness of mutual faultfinding, while Cicero is mentioned regarding the affection of friendship. And that agrees nicely with the fact that in *On Friendship* Cicero never addresses directly the incompatibility of reconciliation and recrimination. It also agrees with what we find in 534: namely that at the end of the chapter, Gellius adds material that is unrelated to the primary question under discussion (see above, p. 596).

It should be mentioned that in the first sentence of 543, Gellius speaks of slight offences, *offensiunculae* (line 1). That raises a series of questions: Did Theophrastus restrict his remarks concerning reconciliation to trivial wrongs? If he did, did he discuss what counts as a trivial wrong, and did he attempt to elucidate the matter by introducing particular concrete examples? In 534.41–43, we are told that Theophrastus failed to provide examples when discussing the help one ought to provide a friend contrary to what is just. He may have done the same in regard to minor offences, but now I am speculating.

In the apparatus of parallel texts to 543, we have referred to a letter addressed to Theophrastus that circulated under the name of Aristotle, (*Epistulae integrae quae Aristotelis fuisse ferebantur*, ed Plezia, no. 6: Θεοφράστῳ).⁸⁷⁶ In the first section of the letter, the author distinguishes between a wrong or injustice that is πρόχειρος, ready at hand or hasty, and one that is πολυχρόνιος, of long duration. We are told that the former is remembered for a short time and can often be settled peacefully, but the latter preserves hostility and causes unceasing enmity (6.1). In the next two and final sections of the letter, the author writes: διὸ φημι δεῖν τὴν ἑταιρίαν μάλιστα μὲν μὴ ἀδικεῖν—οὐδὲ γὰρ εὐλογον ἔχει τὴν πρόφασιν—εἰ δὲ μὴ γε, ἀκουσίως τοῦτο πράξασαν, θᾶπτον διαλύεσθαι τὴν ἔχθραν. (3) τὸ μὲν γὰρ μὴ ἀδικεῖν ἴσως ὑπὲρ ἀνθρωπὸν ἐστὶ, τὸ δὲ πλανηθέντα διασώσασθαι ἐπιφέρει τι καλὸν καὶ σφόδρα τοῦτο εὐσταθοῦς διανοίας ἰδιὸν ἐστίν. If I understand correctly, the group-word ἑταιρία is being used for the individuals that make up comradeship or more generally a friendship. For the sake of easy understanding, I use “comrades” in place of “comradeship” and translate as follows: “For this reason, I say, comrades (or friends) especially ought not to act unjustly—for they have no reasonable excuse—but if not, having done this involuntarily, they (ought) to dissolve the hostility as quickly as possible. For not

⁸⁷⁶ The letter is spurious. For brief discussion of letters falsely attributed to Aristotle, see above, II.1 “The Sources” no. 1.

acting unjustly is perhaps superhuman. But after going wrong, to have saved oneself brings something noble,⁸⁷⁷ and that is very much a property of a stable (or sound) mind” (6.2–3). There is a clear relationship here with 543. Both texts concern offences, wrongs or injustices, and both focus on reconciliation. The idea of a slight offence (543.1) may be compared with one that is hasty and of short duration, but the comparison is not perfect, for a hasty act can be a serious injustice: e.g., sudden irrational rage resulting in murder. In this regard, the reference in the letter to acting involuntarily, ἀκονσίως, takes on meaning. For when one does a wrong involuntarily, one may admit to having caused harm and still deny any intent to do someone an injustice. In many such cases, the offence might be described as slight, albeit regrettable, and reconciliation might be achieved with relative quickness.

544 Mubaššir, *Choicest Maxims and Best Sayings*, “Sayings by a Number of Philosophers,” no. 119

Literature: Rosenthal (1965) p. 192; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 296–297; Gutas (1985) p. 94

Text 544 is an Arabic text that contains practical advice concerning the avoidance of harm: “When you are enemies with someone, do not contract the enmity of his entire family, but rather befriend some of them, for this is one of the things that will restrain his doing harm.”⁸⁷⁸ By way of contrast, texts 527A–B offer advice concerning how to do harm to an enemy: e.g., “You have lost revenge on your enemy, if he has perceived you to be an enemy.” We are not to assume that Theophrastus thinks that

⁸⁷⁷ I find the Greek words τὸ δὲ πλανηθέντα διασώσασθαι ἐπιφέρει τι καλὸν puzzling, for πλανηθέντα can be both masculine accusative singular and neuter accusative plural. The above translation assumes the former. If one opts for neuter plural, then one might translate “and having preserved or rescued what has gone awry (i.e., the relationship between comrades) brings something noble.”

⁸⁷⁸ There are Spanish and Latin versions of 544. The former is found in the *Bocados de Oro* 23.88 (p. 177 Crombach): *e dixo: quando desamares algunt ome, non desames a toda su compañía; mas pugna en ganar amor con algunos dellos, con aquello menguará el su nunzimiento*. The latter is found in the *Liber philosophorum moralium antiquorum* 571.1–3 (Franceschini): *et dixit: cum aliquem odieris, non abhorreas totam ipsius familiam, immo ad amorem alicuius ex eis innitaris, quo minuetur nocumentum ipsius*. The former depends on the Arabic and the latter on the Spanish. Since there is no textual problem or ambiguity in the Arabic text, the Spanish and Latin versions are of interest only in regard to the later tradition.

happiness is to be found in harming enemies and dodging their blows. Rather, he is being practical. Enmities are a fact of life, and as such need to be dealt with.

In 544 the focus is very much on self-interest: friendship is recommended as a way of protecting oneself. We should be clear that the friendship being recommended is not one based on virtuous character. Rather it is a utility friendship whose purpose is narrowly defined and which is not intended or expected to endure.⁸⁷⁹ Of course, it might happen that the family members of one's enemy are virtuous people and that friendships based on virtue develop, but that would be rare and incidental to the original reason for entering into friendships.

544 does not speak of a preexisting friendship based on virtue that has been transformed (deteriorated) into enmity. If that were Theophrastus' concern, we might expect him to recommend embracing family members, because they can assist in restoring friendship.⁸⁸⁰ Or if the problems between the parties cannot be resolved, the family members can at least contribute to a peaceful and gentlemanly dissolution of the friendship. But there is no hint of that. Apparently Theophrastus is focused on the present situation, i.e., on enmity and self-protection.

Concerning the dissolution of friendships, see Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 9.3 1165a36–b36. On the basis of this text and Cicero, Laelius 35, 60, F.-A. Steinmetz argues that Theophrastus differs from Aristotle in that he views the dissolution of friendship between virtuous men as an unwanted last resort.⁸⁸¹ The contrast is, I think, contrived, for both Peripatetics recognize that good character can be corrupted (*NE* 1165b13, 462–463), and almost certainly both would agree that such a change, if it persists, makes friendship based on virtue quite impossible.

- 545 Mubaššir, *Choicest Maxims and Best Sayings*, "Sayings by a Number of Philosophers," no. 120

Literature: Rosenthal (1965) p. 192; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 297–299; Gutas (1985) p. 94; Millett pp. 111, 156–157 n. 298

⁸⁷⁹ In 546.3–4 we read that friendships ought to be long, but the saying concerns friendships between virtuous individuals.

⁸⁸⁰ Reconciliation is the subject of 543.

⁸⁸¹ F.-A. Steinmetz p. 107 n. 320, 134–135.

Text 545 comes to us in Arabic from the same collection as 544,⁸⁸² and both concern utility friendships. In 544 the focus is on forming friendships that will restrain an enemy. In 545 the focus is on interacting with evil people for mutual benefit. As translated by Dimitri Gutas, the text runs: “He (Theophrastus) said: Sometimes there is need to resort to evil people for mutual benefit, just as the sandalwood tree and snakes benefit each other: the snakes gain its fragrance and coolness, and they prevent the sandalwood tree from being felled.”

With text 545 we may compare *Nicomachean Ethics* 8.4 1157a16–20 and especially *Eudemian Ethics* 7.2 1236b6–16, 1238a32–b9, for in the latter work utility friendships are associated with animals.⁸⁸³ Moreover, the example of the crocodile and *trochilus*⁸⁸⁴ (1236b9–10) also occurs in the ninth book of the *History of Animals* (9.6 612a20–24). Since this book has been thought to exhibit a Theophrastean character,⁸⁸⁵ it is tempting to assert a close relationship between the Eudemian account of friendship and that of Theophrastus.⁸⁸⁶ We must, however, observe caution for at least two reasons. First, scholars today are apt to emphasize the Aristotelian character of the ninth book,⁸⁸⁷ so that using the book to develop an argument concerning Theophrastus is problematic. Second, in all likelihood 545 was not selected by Mubaššir for inclusion in his collection of sayings, because it accurately reflects zoological and botanical elements in the ethics of Theophrastus. Rather, the comparison with animals and plants will have caught the eye of the anthologist in his search for appealing material. And even if the Arabic text accurately reports what Theophrastus said, we cannot assume that the saying goes back to an esoteric treatise like the two Aristotelian *Ethics*. It could just as well go back to an exoteric dialogue. We may compare 511, in which the behavior of a mouse is said to have influenced the Cynic Diogenes’ style of life. Whether or not we think that human beings should learn

⁸⁸² Unlike 544, text 545 seems not to have been translated into Spanish and then into Latin.

⁸⁸³ The connection with animals is missing not only in the *Nicomachean Ethics* but also in the *Magna Moralia*.

⁸⁸⁴ In the Loeb *EE*, τροχίλος is translated “sandpiper,” and in the Loeb *HA*, it is transliterated and in a foot note explained as “crocodile bird.” Dirlmeier (1962) p. 67 has “Strandläufer.”

⁸⁸⁵ H. Joachim, *De Theophrasti libris περὶ ζώων* (Bonn 1892), Dirlmeier (1937) pp. 55–60, Regenbogen col. 1425–1426, 1432–1434, Düring (1966) p. 508.

⁸⁸⁶ On connections between the *Eudemian Ethics* and Theophrastean doctrine, see the commentary on 449A, 461, 493, 533.

⁸⁸⁷ See above, the commentary on text 531 at n. 740.

from mice, it is instructive that 511 cites Theophrastus' Μεγαρικός, a work that was almost certainly an exoteric dialogue (436 no. 20). Similarly, a Theophrastean remark concerning people, who benefit from each other in the way that animals and plants do,⁸⁸⁸ might well derive from a dialogue, and within the dialogue the remark may have been made by someone other than Theophrastus.

All people, including the virtuous, need to interact with persons who fall short of virtue, perhaps well short to the point of being bad or evil. That is unavoidable, for not only simple survival but also an elevated mode of life require that we interact with others, often without considering their moral character. Text 545 describes such interaction as mutually beneficial, and indeed it is. But we may still want to ask whether a good or virtuous person will choose to interact in a way that helps an evil person achieve an evil goal. Here *Eudemian Ethics* 7.2 1238b1–9 is of interest, for in this text Aristotle tells us that it is possible for a bad man to be a friend of a good man: ἐνδέχεται δὲ καὶ τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ φαῦλον εἶναι φίλον. The bad man will be useful, χρήσιμος, to the good man in regard to his intended or chosen course of action. Similarly, the good man will be useful to the bad man. If the latter is morally weak, the good man will be useful in regard to his present intention or choice. And if he is vicious, the good man will be useful to him in regard to the intention or choice that is in accordance with his nature: πρὸς τὴν (προαίρεσιν) κατὰ φύσιν (1238b5). If I understand this passage correctly,⁸⁸⁹ “nature” here refers not to an innate condition like an excitable temperament, but to an acquired nature: one that we call “second nature.”⁸⁹⁰ And in this context, it is to be construed as a vicious character that has been acquired through faulty education and repeated acts that reinforce what one has been taught.

If the preceding analysis is correct, Aristotle has acknowledged that on occasion a good man will be useful to a vicious individual, but he has not said that the good man directly assists a vicious individual when the latter

⁸⁸⁸ On plants that are friendly to one another, see *Plant Explanations* (384 no. 2) 2.17.5, 3.10.4, 5.5.1–4.

⁸⁸⁹ The preceding summary of *EE* 1238b1–5, involves interpretation. On my reading, προαίρεσις is used inclusively for purpose or intention. It covers both the principled choices of a virtuous and a vicious man as well as the choice of a morally weak man who does not do what he thinks he ought to do. The adjective φαῦλος is also inclusive. At least it seems to cover the morally weak man as well as the vicious man who acts in accordance with his moral principles.

⁸⁹⁰ On φύσις referring to an acquired disposition, i.e., second nature, see the commentary on 503–504.

acts in character. The good man may only provide indirect assistance in that he purchases goods from the vicious individual, employs him because of some skill or engages in barter. In other words, through interaction, the vicious individual is able to gain what he needs (e.g., money) for realizing intentions that are in accordance with his character. Moreover, Aristotle adds that the good man will wish, βουλήσεται,⁸⁹¹ for things that are good: in an unqualified way (generally) he wishes for unqualified (absolute) goods, ἀπλῶς μὲν τὰ ἀπλᾶ,⁸⁹² and starting from this assumption or postulate, ἐξ ὑποθέσεως,—i.e., with a view to what is absolutely good⁸⁹³—the good man will wish for the vicious individual things that are good for him, as poverty or sickness may be beneficial (1238b5–7). These conditions are likened to the medicine that a man drinks in order to become well. In saying this, Aristotle wants to make clear that a good man is not indifferent to the character of a vicious individual. The good man wants the vicious individual to acquire absolute goods (correct values that translate into virtuous action) and toward that end he wishes him experiences that may be unpleasant but will so affect him that he abandons his vicious ways in favor of good ones.

The Eudemian passage goes beyond what we read in 545, but it introduces nothing that Theophrastus would reject. He recognized that all human beings are related (531.1–13) and as such are inclined to interact in ways that are mutually beneficial. That does not mean that a good man makes himself useful at all times to all men including those who are vicious. The Eudemian passage does not say that, and 545 introduces the qualifier “sometimes.” The particular situation governs (534), and when a virtuous man realizes that he will be contributing in some important way to the behavior of a vicious man, he will withdraw. In addition, Theophrastus recognized that an established character is hard to change, if not impossible (709.9–10). Indeed, there are persons whose evil is so entrenched that they must be removed from society (584A.195–198). But change does occur and it may come through misfortune like sickness

⁸⁹¹ The use of βούλεσθαι is important. The good man does not take action to correct the vicious individual. The interaction that is mutually beneficial is not interrupted. But the good man does wish him improvement (new moral principles that lead to virtuous behavior).

⁸⁹² The codices read ἀπλᾶ. Rieckher conjectured ἀπλῶς, which is printed in the OCT.

⁸⁹³ The preposition ἐξ expresses the origin of the good man's thoughts or the grounds that underlie his thought and action. For ὑπόθεσις meaning the ἀρχή, which initiates deliberation and action, see *EE* 2.10 1227a5–8, b29–30. It is the τέλος (a7, b30), which is morally good in the case of a virtuous individual and reprehensible in the case of a vicious individual.

and poverty. In the case of Pericles, sickness brought a change for the worse (463.1–9), but perhaps there are cases in which it has an opposite effect or at least prompts a person to reflect earnestly on his goals and actions.

- 546 Walter Burley, *On the Life and Character of Philosophers* 68, sayings 2–12 (p. 282.26 and 284.1–7)

Literature: Heylbut (1876) pp. 22–27, 33, 39–41; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 299–304, Millett (2007) pp. 85, 97, 152 n. 267

Within Burley's work *On the Life and Character of Philosophers*, there is a list of 16 sayings, all of which are attributed to Theophrastus. The list follows an excerpt from Aulus Gellius concerning the selection of Theophrastus as Aristotle's successor (p. 282.16–25 = 8) and precedes Theophrastus' last words as reported by Cicero (p. 284.13–286.2 = 34A). As printed in 546, the list is not complete. Saying no. 1, which recommends choosing friends after testing them, is omitted. It is referred to in the apparatus to 538C, which makes a similar recommendation. The final four sayings are also omitted. No. 13 and 14, which concern taking revenge, are mentioned in the section on "Kindness, Honor and Vengeance." They exhibit an obvious relationship to 526 and are mentioned in the apparatus to 527A. No. 15 concerns the faulty judgment of persons in love and is reported earlier in the present section in the apparatus to 541. And no. 16, which concerns the rarity of friendship, is also referred to in the present section; the reference will be found in the apparatus to 532. This way of distributing the material found in Burley's list has the virtue of avoiding redundancy and not giving the appearance that our sources preserve more material than in fact they do. The negative is that persons interested in evaluating Burley as a source will find it more difficult to examine Burley's list as a whole. The entire list is printed as whole in *Quellen* (1984) L106 pp. 73–74 with individual sayings repeated elsewhere.

The first twelve of Burley's sayings are also found in the codex Monacensis 6292, which dates to the 10th century AD. I have discussed that codex in *Quellen* pp. 299–302 and pointed out that Woelfflin's edition is in certain respects philologically unacceptable. Here I call attention to a major difference between what we find in Burley and in the codex: while the Codex has all twelve sayings concerning friendship that Burley attributes to Theophrastus (XV.7–20 = no. 1–12), the codex attributes only one to Theophrastus (XV.7 = no. 1). All the others are attributed to

Pythagoras, except for one that the codex attributes to Socrates (XV.20 = no. 12). That raises questions concerning the reliability of both lists.⁸⁹⁴

Heylbut pp. 40–41 expresses considerable skepticism concerning the Theophrastean origin of the majority of the sayings. He thinks that Burley's no. 1 and 13–14 were the first sayings to appear in collections as the words of Theophrastus (cf. codices Parisini 2772, 4718 and 4887, in which these sayings occur⁸⁹⁵) and that later no. 15 and 16 were added from Jerome (532 and 541). The other sayings were added still later and all are suspicious. Indeed, Burley himself assigns no. 4 to Socrates, no. 5 to Chilo and Bias, versions of no. 6 to Chilo, Perianther and Isocrates, a version of no. 7 to Zeno and versions of no. 10 to Socrates and Aristotle. See the apparatus of parallel texts to these sayings.

A word concerning Burley's no. 6 (= codex Monacensis XV.14) may be instructive: *fortunato amico vocatus, infortunato non vocatus presto sis*, "Be at the service of a fortunate friend when invited, an unfortunate one when (even if) not invited." This saying or a similar one is attributed not only to Theophrastus, Pythagoras, Chilo, Perianther and Isocrates (see above), but also to Demetrius of Phalerum (Diogenes Laertius 5.83). What interests me is that the two Peripatetics, Theophrastus and Demetrius, are reported not only to have offered a version of Burley's no. 6 but also to have shared a historical interest in sayings. Theophrastus wrote a work *Περὶ παροιμιῶν*, *On Proverbs* (Diogenes Laertius 5.45 = 1.148 = 727 no. 14), and Demetrius collected the sayings of the seven Wise Men (Stobaeus, *Anth.* 3.1.172 pp. 111–125 Hense = 81 no. 4 and 87 SOD). It is, I think, possible that some of the sayings that are attributed to the two Peripatetics were originally put forward as explanations of and variations on older sayings. Demetrius may have reported the words of Chilo: ἐπὶ τὰ δεῖπνα τῶν φίλων βραδέως πορεύου, ἐπὶ δὲ τὰς ἀτυχίας ταχέως, "Be slow in attending your friends' dinners, quick in attending to their misfortunes" (87.38–39), and of Perianther: φίλοις εὐτυχοῦσι καὶ ἀτυχοῦσι ὁ αὐτὸς ἴσθι, "Be the same person to friends in prosperity and in adversity" (87.106–107), and then offered as a variation the following: τοὺς φίλους ἐπὶ μὲν τὰ ἀγαθὰ παρακαλουμένους ἀπιέναι, ἐπὶ δὲ τὰς συμφορὰς αὐτομάτους, "Friends set out to (share) good times upon invitation, but to (share) calamities of their own accord"

⁸⁹⁴ In *Quellen* pp. 301–302, lists of the sayings found in Burley and the codex Monacensis as well as in codices Parisini 2772, 4718 and 4887 (no. 26–30 p. 40.2–6 Woelfflin) are set out in parallel columns for easy comparison.

⁸⁹⁵ Burley no. 1 = 538C and no. 13–15 = 527A.1–3.

(Diog. Laert. 5.83 = 1.123–125 SOD). Similarly with Theophrastus, it is at least possible that he discussed the words of Chilo and Periander, say, in his work *On the Wise Men* (DL 5.48 = 1.231 = 727 no. 12)⁸⁹⁶ and in this context formulated a saying that resembled the Latin version recorded by Burley.⁸⁹⁷

It is clear that Burley's list is highly problematic, but that does not mean that the collected sayings contradict Theophrastus' thoughts on friendship. Indeed, there is only one saying that seems incompatible with Theophrastus' views concerning friendship. It is no. 5: *ita amicus esto ut inimicus esse non timeas*, "Be a friend in such a way that you are not afraid to be an enemy" (546.4). Aristotle not only attributes this saying to Bias but also characterizes the saying as one appropriate to a treacherous person (*Rhet.* 2.13 1389b24, 2.21 1395a26–30 cf. Cicero, *Laelius* 59–60). It is highly unlikely that Theophrastus adopted the saying without considerable qualifications. He might, for example, have said that there is an important difference between friendship based on virtue and friendship based on utility. In the latter case, it is imprudent to deprive oneself of all defenses, for a change in the relationship is always possible.⁸⁹⁸ Moreover, even in regard to friendships based on virtue, Theophrastus' interest in fortune, τύχη, and his awareness that a virtuous character can change in unfavorable circumstances (462–463) might have prompted him to discuss the saying of Bias (or Chilo) and to express himself in an unexpected or unusual manner.⁸⁹⁹

Saying no. 2 (the first printed in 546) runs: *amicicias immortales esse oportet*, "Friendships ought to be immortal." The idea is clear, though two qualifications are in order. First, "immortal" is overstatement in that friends *qua* human beings are mortal, so that their friendships are mortal. Strictly speaking, friendships ought to be stable and enduring. Second, the saying is appropriate to friendships based on virtue, for it is virtue that makes friendships stable. Friendships based on pleasure and utility are expected to dissolve when they no longer provide pleasure and advantage (cf. *NE* 8.3 1156b11–12, 8.8 1159b4–5, *EE* 7.2 1237b7–12). These qualifications in no way diminish the attractiveness of the saying.

⁸⁹⁶ Usener (1876) p. 10 conjectures that the full title was *On the (Seven) Wise Men*.

⁸⁹⁷ Regarding saying no. 6, cf. Arist., *NE* 9.11 1171b20–28, *EE* 7.2 1238a15–20, 7.12 1245b38–1246a20. At *EE* 7.1 1235b9–12, Aristotle calls attention to pretenders who are present in misfortune on account of an ulterior motive, i.e., they are looking forward to being friends in better times.

⁸⁹⁸ Cf. Demosthenes, *Oration* 22 = *Against Aristocrates* 122.

⁸⁹⁹ Heylbut (1876) pp. 25–27 and F.-A. Steinmetz pp. 106–108.

Indeed, stating the limitation to friendships based on virtue would make the saying wordy, and dropping “immortal” in favor of, e.g., “stable” would remove a striking feature that gives the saying punch. Most likely it is the use of “immortal” combined with brevity that prompted an anthologist to select the saying for inclusion in a collection.

Not very different is saying no. 3: *quanti est sine anima corpus, tanti est sine amicis homo*, “A man without friends is worth as much as a body without soul.” Here we have a four-term analogy: as A soul relates to B body, so C friends relate to D a man.⁹⁰⁰ We might quibble that the analogy brings together two pairs in which the members are related in different ways: at least for an Aristotelian, soul and body are tied together as form to matter, while in friendship (at least that between virtuous individuals) the partners are generally on an equal footing: they are similar, and capable of existence should one die. But such an analysis misses the point. The saying is intended to emphasize the extraordinary importance of friendship to the happiness of human beings, and it succeeds admirably by introducing the soul which is essential to human life.

Saying no. 4 runs: *cum amicis oraciones breves, amicitias longas esse oportet*, “Conversations with friends ought to be brief, friendships long.” The second half of the saying is straightforward. That friendships (based on virtue) ought to be “long” is simply a less impressive way of saying that friendships ought to be “immortal.” What may give pause is the first half, for unless *oraciones* is used narrowly for harangues in which one lectures a partner without listening, it is not clear why discourse ought to be brief. Or perhaps the offensive speech is to be thought of as unbearably loquacious, so that the listener’s patience is exhausted (cf. 452). But if *oraciones* is used widely so that it covers discourse in a variety of forms, then it seems odd to recommend brevity without recognizing exceptions some of which are important: e.g., discussing right and wrong courses of action and important philosophical issues.

Saying 7: *amicum blandum cave cuius verbum semper est dulce*, “Beware of a charming friend whose word is always pleasant,” presents no serious difficulty. For unbroken charm may be tied to flattery. To be sure, a charming, pleasant manner seems appropriate in a friendship based on pleasure, but even here there is the danger that the manner masks flattery and is driven by some ulterior motive. (For a charming manner resulting in honors, see 519.) In the case of friendship based on virtue,

⁹⁰⁰ Concerning metaphor based on analogy, see Aristotle *Poetics* 21 1457b16–17.

unbroken charm is unquestionably suspect. For friends committed to virtue wish to support and improve each other, and that will on occasion involve correction, which may be forceful and even unpleasant. (See the introduction to this section on “Friendship.”).

Regarding saying 8: *bonus amicus (lesus) gravius irascitur*, “A good friend when hurt is more grievously angered,” see Plutarch, *Cato Minor* 36.5–37.3, where we read that Munatius, who was quite intimate with Cato, flew into a rage when he felt himself distrusted by Cato. A different version has Munatius responding to a slight. More important, we are told that according to Theophrastus excessive affection gives rise to hate (37.3 = 542.8–9).

Saying 9: *amicum ledere nec ioco quidem oportet*, “One ought not to hurt a friend even with a joke,” may be compared with 453, where we are told that “the subjects of jokes ought to be the sort at which the listener is delighted.” But we should keep in mind that both 453 and saying 9 are applicable primarily to friendships based on virtue. In a friendship based on utility, it may on occasion be entirely appropriate to bring a partner to his senses through a witty rebuke that causes pain (cf. 711.2, 4–5). Moreover, friendships based on virtue need not be restricted to ideal relationships between partners who enjoy moral virtue and practical wisdom in their fullness. There are also friendships based on virtue in which decent men of goodwill, who nevertheless fall short of perfection, come together with a view to *inter alia* maintaining and improving their character. In such a friendship, a tactful poke, even one that causes embarrassment and pain, may be deemed appropriate if it helps the partner better assess what he has done wrong, and avoid similar behavior in the future.⁹⁰¹

Saying no. 10 runs: *amico exhibere ea te decet que tibi exhiberi velis*, “It is right for you to grant those things to a friend which you would wish to be granted to you.” The idea expressed fits nicely with the doctrine of three kinds of friendship: that based on pleasure, that based on utility and that based on virtue (534.4). When two people become friends for the sake of, e.g., pleasure, their friendship lasts so long as each provides the other with what he wants: namely pleasure. And the same holds for

⁹⁰¹ When criticism takes the form of a witty remark or joke, the humor may make it easier for the partner to accept the criticism. And when the remark or joke occurs in private, i.e. when there are no bystanders who appear to join in the ridicule (cf. 711.3–4), then the criticism will be easier to accept. But among friends of goodwill, there will be occasions when waiting to be alone is inappropriate.

utility and virtue, though the case of friendship based on virtue may be more complex, for providing virtue takes many forms. The friends may share in virtuous deeds, or one friend may provide the other with an opportunity to do something virtuous. But each friend also presents himself *qua* virtuous individual as someone worthy of admiration and affection. And being a human being and therefore subject to weakness and liable to error, a friend will welcome a partner who is able to prevent an occasional lapse in good behavior and over time to help him become a better person.

Regarding saying 11: *amici fides coagulum est amicicie*, “The fidelity of a friend is the bond of friendship,” compare Aristotle, *NE* 8.3 1156b28–29, where we read that people cannot be friends until they have gained each other’s confidence, and *EE* 7.2 1237b12–16, where we are told that a stable friendship is impossible without trust or confidence.

Finally, regarding saying 12: *pro amico occidi expedit magis quam cum inimico vivere*, “To be killed for a friend is more advantageous than to live with an enemy,” compare Aristotle, *NE* 9.8 1169a18–20, 25, where we are told that a good man does many things for the sake of friends and country, even if he must give his life for them. And in giving his life he is choosing what is noble.

14. Flattery

The flatterer is all too familiar. He offers multiple compliments, he engages in repeated acts of deference, he presents himself as always ready to lend assistance. He seeks to win favor and wants his efforts to be noticed. When they are likely to pass unnoticed, he speaks of them in ways that bring credit to himself. Such a person is likely to gain favor for a short period of time, but for most of us he soon becomes tiresome. And as his motives become obvious, they arouse disapproval, so that his character is viewed as vicious.

Ancient Greece was no different. There were flatterers, who provided pleasure but also met with disapproval. In Plato’s *Phaedrus*, Socrates is made to describe the flatterer, κόλαξ, as a dreadful beast and a great harm, in whom nature has combined a certain charming pleasure (240B). In the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle acknowledges that being flattered, κολακεύεσθαι, is pleasant but then characterizes the flatterer as an apparent admirer and an apparent friend (1.11 1371a22–24). Fuller are Aristotle’s remarks in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. Flattery, κολακεία, is treated

together with obsequiousness, ἀρέσκεια, as closely-related dispositions concerned with the way people interact both in their words and deeds. The two are marked off from friendliness, φιλία, and grouchiness, δυσκολία, which are also concerned with interaction. Friendliness is presented as a mean disposition, such that the friendly individual is pleasant as he ought to be, given the particular situation. In contrast, grouchiness is a deficiency in regard to being pleasant: the grouch is in all things unpleasant and quarrelsome. Finally, both flattery and obsequiousness are excesses in regard to pleasant interaction. The flatterer is pleasant for the sake of some advantage, typically money or what money can buy. The obsequious individual is different in that he has no further motive. Rather, he is pleasant in all matters, thinking that he ought to avoid causing pain (2.7 1108a11, 26–30, 4.6 1126b12–14, 1127a7–8).

The *Eudemian Ethics* also contains a discussion of the four dispositions κολακεία, ἀρέσκεια, φιλία and δυσκολία (3.7 1233b29–34), but there are some differences from the Nicomachean treatment. In particular, the *EE* associates these dispositions with emotion and dissociates them from προαίρεσις, choice (1233b18, 1234a23–27). That is not the case in the *NE*, where friendliness is said to be without emotion and to involve per se choice (1127a23, 33, 1127a2–3). In the *EE*, grouchiness is now referred to as enmity, ἔχθρα (1233b30), which in the *Rhetoric* is identified with the emotion of hate (2.4 1382a1). Moreover, obsequiousness is no longer placed along side flattery in opposition to friendliness and grouchiness. Instead, obsequiousness has been grouped together with dignity, σεμότης, and self-will, αὐθάδεια (1233b35–38),⁹⁰² while flattery is now grouped with friendliness and enmity. Interestingly, no special motive is mentioned. That invites comparison with Theophrastus' sketch of the flatterer in *Characters* 2,⁹⁰³ but in 547 the behavior of Cleonymus is perhaps best understood as flattery motivated by personal benefit. See the commentary on 547.

⁹⁰² The *Magna Moralia*, exhibits the same grouping as the *Eudemian Ethics*: obsequiousness is treated together with self-will and dignity. Moreover, the obsequious individual is characterized without reference to underlying beliefs or motives. We are told that he interacts with all men in all ways and all circumstances (1.28 1192b34–35). That characterization, albeit extremely brief, does seem to align the *MM* with the *EE* and perhaps with Theophrastus as well.

⁹⁰³ I am referring only to the sketch proper as against the preceding definition, in which flattery is clearly tied to personal benefit as a goal. See above, Chapter III "Titles of Books" no. 25 and this chapter, Section 3 on 450 no. 1.

547 Athenaeus, *The Sophists at Dinner* 6.65 254D–E (BT vol. 2 p. 68.2–9 Kaibel)

Literature: Petersen (1854) p. 77; Ribbeck (1883) p. 91; Fortenbaugh (1975c) pp. 71–76, repr. (2003) pp. 137–141; (1984) pp. 303–304; P. Steinmetz (1960b) vol. 2 pp. 76, 82, 87; Wehrli-Wöhrle (2004) p. 532; Millett (2007) pp. 88–89

Text 547 is found in the sixth book of *The Sophists at Dinner*. The speaker is Democritus,⁹⁰⁴ who has replaced Plutarch.⁹⁰⁵ The latter had discussed the parasite (6.26–52 234C–248C). Now the focus is on the flatterer. Democritus acknowledges the closeness of the two topics⁹⁰⁶ and goes on to speak at length concerning flattery (6.53–80 248C–262B).⁹⁰⁷ Our text occurs toward the middle of Democritus' speech. After a string of remarks critical of the fawning behavior of the Athenian people (6.62–65 252F–254C), Democritus cites the comic poet Anaxilas: "Flatterers are worms in rich men's property,"⁹⁰⁸ and Plato: "In the flatterer, a terrible beast and quite destructive, nature has nevertheless added a certain pleasure that is not unrefined"⁹⁰⁹ (254C–D). At this point, 547 begins. Democritus refers to Theophrastus' work *On Flattery* (436 no. 25), in which the Peripatetic reported an anecdote concerning Cleonymus, a dancer and flatterer, who repeatedly sat himself beside Myrtis⁹¹⁰ the Argive and his fellow judges. Cleonymus, we are told, wished to be seen with the distinguished men of the city but ended up humiliated. Myrtis grabbed Cleonymus by the ear, dragged him from the chamber and in the presence of many people said, "You will not dance here, nor will you hear

⁹⁰⁴ On this Democritus, see above, this chapter, Section 1 n. 2.

⁹⁰⁵ Not the famous Plutarch of Chaeronea, but one of the diners, Plutarch of Alexandria. See Mengis p. 44.

⁹⁰⁶ At 6.53 248D Democritus is made to say: οὐ μακρὰν δ' ἐστὶν ὁ κόλαξ τοῦ τῶν παρασίτων ὀνόματος.

⁹⁰⁷ At the conclusion of the segment on flattery, Democritus will turn the discussion to slaves (6.81–98 262B–270A).

⁹⁰⁸ Fr. 33.1–2 (vol. 2 p. 274 Kock).

⁹⁰⁹ Phaedrus 240B.

⁹¹⁰ The proper name "Myrtis" has been challenged. Whereas codex C reads μύρτις, and codex A has μύρτις μύστις, Wilamowitz wished to read μίτυς. The idea is by no means foolish. There was a Mitys of Argos, who was killed during civil discord and whose murderer is said to have died when a statue of Mitys fell upon him (Aristotle, *Poetics* 10 1452a7–9, Plutarch, *On the Delay of Divine Justice* 8 553D). Nevertheless, the correct reading is almost certainly Μύρτις and the person referred to is probably the Myrtis mentioned by Demosthenes, *On the Crown* (18.)295 and Polybius, *Histories* 18.14.3. See Reincke, "Myrtis 2" in *Paulys Realencyclopädie* 16.1 (1933) col. 1167.

us.” The last words οὐδ’ ἂμῶν ἀκούσει, “nor will you hear us” (lines 5–6), reflect Myrtis’ perspective. He is annoyed that Cleonymus often sat himself down where he could listen to the judges’ conversation. We are to understand that Cleonymus himself was more interested in being seen with the judges than in hearing what they had to say. The bystander would be impressed by Cleonymus’ apparent familiarity with important people. But the outcome was quite the opposite. Cleonymus was removed from the chamber and verbally rebuked in the presence of many persons, who learned at first hand that Cleonymus was no important person.

Since 547 makes explicit reference to the work *Περὶ κολακείας*, *On Flattery* (436 no. 25), and Cleonymus is explicitly labeled a κόλαξ, a flatterer (lines 1–2), it is natural to compare 547 with Theophrastus’ sketch of the κόλαξ in *Characters* 2. But what we read in 547 also recalls Theophrastus’ sketch of the ἄρεσκος, the obsequious individual in *Characters* 5. For just as Cleonymus is said to sit repeatedly beside Myrtis and the other judges (lines 2–3), so the obsequious individual is characterized as one who is apt to sit near the generals whenever there is a show in the theater (5.7). According to Petersen, this similarity in behavior shows that in the work *Περὶ κολακείας* the notion of flattery was not defined with complete accuracy. Rather, Theophrastus introduced related material, because he found it difficult to collect historical examples, in which fine distinctions were maintained. This claim seems to me misguided, for the introduction of related material can be of considerable help in developing an accurate analysis, not only in marking off one closely-related trait from another but also in avoiding an analysis that is too narrow or restrictive. Indeed, Petersen fails to consider the possibility that flattery and obsequiousness are not neatly distinguishable. I.e., the two traits are not only closely related but also overlap in that they share certain behavioral patterns. Instead of criticizing Theophrastus, we might do better to thank him for bringing together strings of examples that help us appreciate more fully the complex way in which two traits relate to each other.

Steinmetz is interested in the motives that underlie behavior. He suggests that the obsequious individual is motivated by a need for recognition⁹¹¹ and calls attention to the fact that a flatterer can be similarly motivated. To be sure the flatterer often aims at his own advantage understood as material gain (cf. *NE* 4.6 1127a9–10: property/money and what that can buy), but when the flatterer places himself next to a group of judges

⁹¹¹ Steinmetz (1960) vol. 2 p. 82: “Sicherlich ist die letzte Wurzel der Verhaltensweise Geltungsbedürfnis.”

as in 547, he need not have material gain in mind. He may only want to be recognized and in that way to confirm his own worth,⁹¹² much as an obsequious individual might do when he sits near people who have standing within the community.⁹¹³ Nevertheless, I am made uneasy by Steinmetz' focus on motives. For we may come to believe that all traits of character including obsequiousness are to be understood in terms of underlying motives. But they are not, and as I understand Theophrastus, he views obsequiousness as a behavioral regularity apart from deeper-lying motives. The obsequious individual regularly makes a pleasant impression, but his manner is not tied to a specific motive and in some cases the manner may be no more than ingrained habit. Early upbringing has inculcated a mode of interaction that is most often pleasing to other members of the community, but when overdone is better described as unctuous.

548 Athenaeus, *The Sophists at Dinner* 10.47 435E (BT vol. 2 p. 447.15–19 Kaibel)

Literature: Heylbut (1876) p. 28; Ribbeck (1884) pp. 49–52, 83; F.-A. Steinmetz (1967) p. 156; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 304–306; Gallo-Pettine (1988) p. 181

Text 548 is found in Book 10 of Athenaeus' *The Sophists at Dinner*. The speaker is Democritus,⁹¹⁴ who has replaced Ulpian (10.28 426C) and will later be replaced by Pontianus (10.61 443C). In the portion of the speech that concerns us, Democritus is made to report the drinking habits of various rulers including Darius, the kings of India and Persia, Alexander the Great, Alexander's father Philip, Dionysius the Younger, Nysaeus, Apollocrates and Hipparinus. He is also made to name a variety of sources including Ctesias, Duris, Acarystius, Aristotle, Hieronymus, Theopompus and Theophrastus (10.45 434D–10.47 436B).⁹¹⁵ The heavy drinking of the rulers is illustrated with details that will keep the reader interested. We are told that Alexander's drinking left him indifferent to sexual intercourse, that Philip stayed up all night drinking with boon

⁹¹² We can, of course, extend the notion of gain to include increased self-esteem, but I doubt that either Aristotle or Theophrastus or most other ancients and moderns have that in mind when they refer flattery to advantage or gain.

⁹¹³ Steinmetz (1960) vol. 2 p. 76.

⁹¹⁴ On this Democritus, see above, this chapter, Section 1 n. 2.

⁹¹⁵ I have cut off the list with Hipparinus. The list continues with Timolaus of Thebes, for whom Theopompus is cited as Democritus' source.

companions and at dawn went to drink with ambassadors from Athens, and that Dionysius the Younger ruined his eyesight through drinking.

The report concerning Alexander's indifference to intercourse is said to be taken from Hieronymus who is quoting Theophrastus. That is text 578.⁹¹⁶ The report concerning Dionysius' ruined eyesight is referred to Theophrastus. That is our text 548. No intermediate source is cited, but we cannot conclude that Athenaeus is drawing directly on a text of Theophrastus. Most likely he is not.

Problematic is the ultimate source of 548. Does it go back through an intermediary to Theophrastus' work *On Drunkenness* (436 no. 31) or to some other work? There are good reasons to opt for *On Drunkenness*: Book 10 of *The Sophists at Dinner* is concerned with wine, earlier in the book there are three references to Theophrastus' work *On Drunkenness* (10.22 423F = 574.1, 10.24 424E = 576.5, 10.30 427D = 570.2), and 548 is surrounded by examples of heavy drinking. But that does not decide the matter. For in 548 Dionysius' comrades are spoken of as flattering his tyranny, *κολακεύοντας τὴν τυραννίδα* (lines 1–2), by pretending to lack sight and by allowing their hands to be guided by the tyrant. For this reason they were called Dionysius-flatterers: *διὸ κληθῆναι Διονυσιοκόλακας* (line 4). Moreover, a quite similar report concerning the Dionysius-flatterers is found in Book 6, where Athenaeus' theme is flattery (6.56 249F). It is possible and perhaps even likely that this report derives ultimately from the same Theophrastean source as 548. But even if it is,⁹¹⁷ that does not decide the issue in favor of *On Flattery* (436 no. 25), for neither in 548 nor in 249F is a Theophrastean work referred to by title.⁹¹⁸ What we can say with certainty is that the two texts demonstrate that the behavior of the Dionysius-flatterers can be considered from more than one perspective and that Theophrastus himself could have introduced the same material in two distinct works.

The behavior of the Dionysius-flatterers as described in 548 is a particular case of the flatterer's penchant for imitation. According to Athe-

⁹¹⁶ Text 578 is Hieronymus fr. 30 White, in RUSCH 12 (2004) p. 154.

⁹¹⁷ In LSJ s.v. *Διονυσιοκόλακες*, Athenaeus 249F is cited to support the attribution to Theophrastus. That is hasty or rather a mistake, for Theophrastus is not named in 249F.

⁹¹⁸ Also relevant is Plutarch, *How to Tell a Flatterer from a Friend* 9, where we are told that flatterers pretend to be sickly in the same way as those whom they flatter: e.g., they will feign poor eye sight as did the flatterers of Dionysius (53F). That is in line with 548 and is an additional reason for believing that 548 goes back to Theophrastus' work *On Flattery*. But as in the case of Athenaeus 249F, Theophrastus is not named, let alone his work *On Flattery*.

naeus, Theophrastus' contemporary and fellow Peripatetic Clearchus of Soli described the flatterer as a veritable Proteus,⁹¹⁹ because he imitates the posture of the person he flatters and the voice as well (6.72 258A = Clearchus fr. 20 Wehrli). Athenaeus also makes reference to a later Peripatetic Satyrus (c. 200 BC), who tells how Cleisophus flattered Philip of Macedon by wearing a bandage over his right eye and limping about as Philip did (6.54 248F = Satyrus F 24 Schorn). The Dionysius-flatterers are no different. In pretending to have poor eyesight, they are imitating and in that way flattering Dionysius.

15. *Pleasure*

Living a pleasant life is for most people a goal. But what is the pleasure that makes life pleasant? For some people, it is largely a matter of physical comfort: ease and luxury combined with good food, drink and sex. For others, such a life seems too basic or primitive. They involve themselves in community affairs and are prone to become career politicians, who take pleasure in winning elections. Still others deem such a life too hectic and lacking in stability. They may pursue the fine arts like music and painting, which involve highly developed technical skill. Or they may eschew such activity in favor of philosophy, whose intellectual pleasures they extol to the heavens. Such praise may be justified, but most people would be loath to immerse themselves totally in the philosophic life. They would refuse to give up not only the pleasures of eating, drinking and sex but also the pleasures that come with civic involvement and artistic engagement.

The preceding paragraph says nothing new. Human beings have long recognized that pleasures take different forms and that different people prefer different pleasures. The early Peripatetics were no exception. The School's founder, Aristotle, began his philosophic studies within Plato's Academy, where he took part in discussions concerning the good life and in particular the superiority of the life that mixes pleasure with intelligence. We get a fair idea of these discussions from Plato's *Philebus*, in which Socrates is made to advance a replenishment theory of pleasure. At root, the theory is physiological: e.g., the pleasures of eating occur as the body is filled and restored to its natural state (31D8–32B4).

⁹¹⁹ On Proteus, see Homer's *Odyssey* 4.365 and 417–418, where he is said to be an old man of the sea, who assumes the shapes of everything that moves on the earth and also of water and blazing fire. For specific shapes, see 4.456–458.

In the *Rhetoric*,⁹²⁰ Aristotle follows his teacher in that he focuses on restoration and defines pleasure as “a sudden and perceived settling down into the natural state” (1.11 1369b34–35). And by including “perceived” within the definition, Aristotle is calling attention to the fact that pleasure is more than bodily change. It is also psychic (1369b33) in that pleasure is something a man experiences (cf. *Phil.* 43B1–C6, where we are told that many bodily changes occur unnoticed). And when Aristotle subsequently says that pleasure is especially experienced once the process of restoration has achieved the natural state (1.11 1370a4–5), he implies that some pleasures occur apart from a process of restoration. That implication is developed in *Nicomachean Ethics* 7.12,⁹²¹ where pleasure is explained as the unimpeded activity of the natural state. Aristotle explicitly rejects analyzing pleasure as a process and adds that “perceived” should be replaced by “unimpeded” (1153a12–15). In *Nicomachean Ethics* 10.4, Aristotle offers still a different analysis of pleasure. It is said to be a supervenient perfection and likened to the bloom of those who are at the height of their vigor (1174b31–33). Whereas in 7.12 pleasure is analyzed as a kind of activity (unimpeded), in 10.4 pleasure is treated as something distinct from activity. But exactly what it is we are not told.

The two Nicomachean accounts of pleasure have been discussed at length, often with special reference to the relative chronology of the two accounts.⁹²² I eschew that issue and offer only two brief reflections. First, dropping “perceived” in Book 7 is attractive in that it seems to take account of those occasions when we say that we thoroughly enjoyed an activity, but we cannot report any special feeling of pleasure. We may say, e.g., “I was totally absorbed by what I was I doing; the time went by unnoticed.” In contrast, the analysis in Book 10 insists on an additional factor, something bloom-like, which may be challenged on

⁹²⁰ In *Rhetoric* 1.10–11, pleasure is discussed as a topic central to judicial oratory. In 1.10 we are told that action is attributable to seven causes. One of these is appetite, ἐπιθυμία, which is directed toward pleasure. Acting for what is pleasant is typically voluntary and can be the cause of wrong doing.

⁹²¹ Many scholars think that the discussion of pleasure found in *NE* 7.11–14 was originally part of the *Eudemian Ethics*. See, e.g., A.J. Festugière, *Aristote: Le Plaisir* (Paris 1936, repr. 1960) pp. xxv–xliv and G. Lieberg, *Die Lehre von der Lust in den Ethiken des Aristoteles* = *Zetemata* 19 (Munich 1958) pp. 13–15. But there are arguments for thinking that the account of pleasure in Book 7 is the proper Nicomachean account and that found in Book 10 is out of place. See P. Webb, “The Relative Dating of the Accounts of Pleasure in Aristotle’s *Ethics*,” *Phronesis* 22 (1977) pp. 235–262.

⁹²² See Chapter I “Introduction” with n. 11.

the basis of (actual) experience. Second, if pleasure is simply activity albeit unimpeded, how can pleasure be said to promote activity? But that is what Aristotle seems to say in Book 7, when he tells us that the pleasure proper to each activity is not an impediment and then cites contemplation and learning. These activities are said to be intensified by the pleasure proper to them (1153a20–23). That is a problem⁹²³ that does not arise, if one embraces the analysis of Book 10, for there the pleasure is kept distinct from the activity, so that it will not be working an effect on itself when it intensifies and extends the activity.

No text tells us whether Theophrastus analyzed pleasure as either an unimpeded activity or as a supervenient perfection, but we are told that he opposed the Platonic notion of false pleasure (556), much as Aristotle seems to have done.⁹²⁴ He will have followed Aristotle in recognizing that virtue and vice are concerned with pleasure, and that most people regard happiness as pleasant (cf. *NE* 7.11 1152b4–7, 10.1 1172a21–26). Again, like Aristotle, he will have seen the life of pleasure as one of the traditional candidates for the good life (cf. *NE* 1.5 1095b16–17),⁹²⁵ and he will have expressed a strong preference for the life that maximizes intellectual pleasure without excluding other kinds.⁹²⁶ Some of his views were expressed in works, whose titles make explicit reference to pleasure: i.e., *On Pleasure* (436 no. 26–27)⁹²⁷ and *On False Pleasure* (436 no. 28).⁹²⁸ Others were put forward in works like *On Happiness* (436 no. 12)⁹²⁹ and *Ethics* (436 no. 2).⁹³⁰

549 Athenaeus, *The Sophists at Dinner* 12.31 526D (*BT* vol. 3 p. 161.23–25 Kaibel)

Literature: Schweighaeuser (1801–1805) vol. 11 pp. 408–409; Brandis (1860) p. 351; Wehrli (1967–1978) vol. 9 pp. 72–73; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 306–307

⁹²³ If the proper pleasure of an activity is not other than the activity, how can it work an effect? It would seem to be working an effect on itself.

⁹²⁴ See below, the commentary to text 556 with n. 975.

⁹²⁵ See above, Chapter 3 “Titles of Works” no. 16 *On Lives*.

⁹²⁶ 479–480.

⁹²⁷ 549, 550, 551, 553.

⁹²⁸ 556.

⁹²⁹ 552.

⁹³⁰ 554, 555.

Text 549 is found in the middle of the twelfth book of *The Sophists at Dinner*. Athenaeus is addressing Timocrates, who had requested an account of the various people who were renowned for living a life of luxury (τρυφή 510B).⁹³¹ In satisfying that request, Athenaeus runs through a string of peoples beginning with the Persians (513E) and ending with the Cumaeans (528E). Along the way, he focuses on the Ionians and cites the comic poet Callias or Diocles, who made fun of them, describing Ionia as luxurious and richly tabled: ἡ τρυφερά καὶ καλλιτράπεζος Ἰωνία (524F = fr. 5 vol. 1 p. 695 Kock). There follow remarks concerning the people of Abydos, Magnesia, the Ephesis, Samos and Colophon (524F–526D). After that Athenaeus quotes a line of the comic poet Antiphanes, which is said to apply to all Ionians: they are described as “luxuriously cloaked and bent on pleasure” (fr. 91 vol. 2 p. 48 Kock). Theophrastus, too, is cited and the account of the Ionians ends.

The citation of Theophrastus is our text 549. As in the case of Antiphanes, Theophrastus’ words apply generally to the Ionians. The text, however, suffers from a lacuna (line 2). The words διὰ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τῆς τρυφῆς make clear that the excessive luxury of the Ionians was deemed responsible for something, but that something has fallen out in the lacuna. If we follow Schweighaeuser and supply ἀφορμὴν διδόναι τῇ παρουσίᾳ, then Theophrastus will have said that the excessive luxury of the Ionians gave rise to the proverb: presumably, “Ionian luxury.” See Hesychius, *Lexicon* s.v. Ἰωνικόν (no. 1200, vol. 2 p. 384 Latte).⁹³²

We know that Theophrastus took an interest in proverbs. He wrote a work on the subject, i.e., *On Proverbs* (727 no. 14), and several texts exhibit his interest in individual proverbs (710, 737–738). He may well have listed and commented on “Ionian Luxury” in *On Proverbs*, but our text makes reference to *On Pleasure* (line 1). If there is a problem here, it is that Athenaeus twice cites a work *On Pleasure*, whose authorship is said to be in doubt. It is the work of either Theophrastus or Chamaeleon (550.5–6, 553.2). We are left wondering whether the work *On Pleasure*, to which Athenaeus refers in 549 (line 1), is the work of disputed authorship.

⁹³¹ See the commentary to 551 *ad init.*

⁹³² According to Thucydides, *Histories* 1.6.3, the Athenians were among the first to adopt a relaxed form of life including luxurious dress. He says that the older men of the upper classes abandoned this mode of dress only recently (i.e., after the Persian Wars), and that the same mode of dress persisted for a long time among the Ionians due to their kinship with the Athenians. Of especial interest is Heraclides of Pontus fr. 39 Schütrumpf, in which the luxurious habits of the Athenians are viewed as a cause of their success against the Persians. See below n. 943 and Schütrumpf (2009) pp. 78, 81–82, 88–89.

(Athenaeus may have chosen not to record the dispute, or forgotten to do so.) Or is the work in question a quite different work and one securely attributed to Theophrastus? See the commentary on 436 no. 26–27.

550 Athenaeus, *The Sophists at Dinner* 6.105 273B–C (BT vol. 2 p. 106.19–107.1 Kaibel)

Literature: Schweighaeuser (1801–1805) vol. 8 p. 608; Koepke (1856) pp. 43–46; Brandis (1860) p. 351; Scorza (1934) pp. 42–43; Wehrli (1967–1978) vol. 9 p. 72; Giordano (1977) pp. 107–109; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 307–308; Pelling (2000) pp. 176–177

Text 550 is found toward the end of the sixth book of *The Sophists at Dinner*. The topic under discussion is slavery. After Masurius⁹³³ has offered remarks on slavery among the Greeks, including the large numbers of slaves held by the Corinthians, Athenians and Aeginetans (6.101–103 271B–272D), the host of the banquet, Larensis,⁹³⁴ continues the theme by asserting the large number of slaves held by individual Romans. He goes on to speak of uprisings by slaves in Greece, Sicily and Italy, and then mentions two Romans, Scipio Africanus and Julius Caesar, who exhibited moderation in regard to slaves. When they went abroad, they were accompanied by five and three slaves, respectively (6.104–105 272D–273B). What follows is our text 550.

Larensis contrasts Scipio and Caesar with Smindyrides of Sybaris, who is said to have taken along a thousand servants, when he went to the wedding of Agariste, the daughter of Cleisthenes. The reason why he took such a large number of slaves is stated clearly: delicacy and luxury, *χλιδή* and *τρυφή* (lines 1–4). After that, citing a work *On Pleasure* that is attributed to both Chamaeleon and Theophrastus, Larensis reports that Smindyrides wished to show how happily he was living, and that he did so by saying that in twenty years he had seen neither the sunrise nor the sunset. And for him this was something great and wonderful. Larensis then closes his characterization of Smindyrides with an explanation: he used to go to sleep early in the morning (i.e., before the sun actually

⁹³³ A Masurius Sabinus was alive in the time of Tiberius, but the Masurius of Athenaeus' dialogue is not to be identified with him. See Mengis p. 43 and Gulick in the Loeb edition vol. 1 p. xiv.

⁹³⁴ P. Livius Larensis was a *pontifex minor* and *procurator patrimonii*. See Mengis pp. 29–31 and Stein, "Livius (22)" in *Paulys Realencyclopädie* vol. 13.1 (1926) col. 884–885.

appears above the horizon), and he woke up late (i.e., after the sun had sunk below the horizon), being wretched in both cases (lines 4–9).

The story of Smindyrides and the daughter of Cleisthenes is found elsewhere: Herodotus 6.127, Diodorus Siculus 8.19, Athenaeus 12.58 541B–C. It may have been found in the work *On Pleasure*—I am inclined to believe that it was—but that is not stated in our text. Only Smindyrides' claim not to have seen a sunrise or sunset for twenty years is explicitly referred to that work. We may include the initial statement of Smindyrides' motive (he wanted to show how happily he was living [lines 4–5]) as well as the statement of Smindyrides' assessment (he considered his habit something great and wonderful [lines 7–8]). But the final explanation and assessment (he used to go to sleep and to awake at particular times and was in both cases wretched [lines 8–9]) may be an addition by Athenaeus.⁹³⁵ Whatever the case, it is most likely that in the work *On Pleasure* Smindyrides was introduced within a discussion of the relationship between happiness and a life devoted to excessive pleasure (luxury). His claim to happiness will have been rejected and the life of virtue will have been shown to be preferable.

In 550, not to have seen the sunrise or sunset for twenty years is a claim attributed to an individual: namely, Smindyrides. It should be noted that the idea of not seeing the sunrise or sunset appears in other contexts and with reference to other people. In Book 12 of *The Sophists at Dinner*, we find it referred to the people of Sybaris, whose city was located in a hollow and intolerably hot at noon during the summer. Hence most of the inhabitants thought that drinking bouts contributed to their health. And from this, it came to be said that any Sybarite who wished to avoid an early death must see neither the sunrise nor sunset (12.18 519F–520A).⁹³⁶ The idea is also applied to the people of Colophon. They are said to have become so dissolute through drinking, that some of them saw neither the sunrise nor sunset (12.31 526B). It appears that the application to Smindyrides is a specific use of a general idea. We

⁹³⁵ So too the preceding reference to one thousand servants: fishermen, fowlers and cooks (lines 3–4), may be best treated as an addition by Athenaeus, albeit having its roots in some text or tradition. See Pelling p. 177, who suggests that Athenaeus is drawing on his general knowledge and not on a particular source. One thousand cooks and fowlers are mentioned later at 12.58 541B–C, where on first reading one might think that Athenaeus is drawing on Herodotus, for the historian is named at the beginning of the passage. But a glance at *Histories* 6.127 makes clear that Herodotus is not Athenaeus' source for the thousand cooks and fowlers.

⁹³⁶ Smindyrides was from Sybaris, but here (519F–520A) the idea is applied to all the inhabitants of Sybaris.

need not doubt that Theophrastus and/or Chamaeleon attributed the particular use to Smindyrides (including the mention of twenty years), but we may wonder whether they thought that they were reporting what Smindyrides actually said or what came to be attributed to him as a remark in character.⁹³⁷

The authorship of *On Pleasure* is problematic: we read that some attribute the work to Chamaeleon, while others prefer Theophrastus (lines 5–6). The fact that Chamaeleon is mentioned first and Theophrastus second might suggest that Athenaeus favors the attribution to Chamaeleon. And as the lesser-known Peripatetic, perhaps Chamaeleon should be favored. A scribe or librarian, coming upon a roll that lacked an identifying tag, might be all too quick to supply the name of Theophrastus; Chamaeleon might not occur to him. Nevertheless, we should not ignore the fact that later in the *Sophists at Dinner*, Athenaeus acknowledges the disputed attribution, but on this occasion he mentions Theophrastus first (553.2). And on two occasions, he cites *On Pleasure* as a work of Theophrastus; Chamaeleon is not mentioned (549.1 and 551.3). But whatever the truth concerning the texts that report the disputed attribution,⁹³⁸ Theophrastus is likely to have discussed Smindyrides in one or more of his works: if not in *On Pleasure* (436 no. 27), then in *On Lives* (no. 16) or *On Happiness* (no. 12) or *On Dispositions* (no. 1) or *Ethics* (no. 2).⁹³⁹

551 Athenaeus, *The Sophists at Dinner* 12.3 511C–D (BT vol. 3 p. 128.27–129.11 Kaibel)

Literature: Schweighaeuser (1801–1805) vol. 11 pp. 341–342; Koepke (1856) pp. 43, 46–47; Brandis (1860) p. 351; Scorza (1934) pp. 42–43; Wehrli (1967–1978) vol. 9 p. 72; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 307–308

This text occurs toward the beginning of the twelfth book of *The Sophists at Dinner*. Athenaeus has abandoned the fiction of a discussion among diners and addresses Timocrates (12.1 510A), to whom the story of the

⁹³⁷ For completeness' sake, I note that a favorable spin can be put on the idea of never seeing the sunrise or sunset. In Book 6 immediately after 550, Larensis refers to Hestiaeus, who boasted that he had never seen the sunrise or sunset, because he was always busy studying. The boast is described as noble (6.105 273D).

⁹³⁸ Scorza pp. 41–42, Giordano p. 107 and Wehrli (1967–1978) vol. 9 p. 72 favor Chamaeleon.

⁹³⁹ Aristotle mentions Smindyrides in the *Eudemian Ethics* 1.5 1216a15–16.

banquet is being told.⁹⁴⁰ Athenaeus remarks that Timocrates has called for a discourse on those persons who are notorious in regard to luxury and pleasure (τρυφή and ἡδυπάθεια 12.1 510B), and then proceeds to mention various individuals who have expressed a view regarding enjoyment and pleasure (ἀπόλαυσις and ἡδονή 12.2 510B, 12.3 511A). Mentioned are Sophocles, Xenophon, Empedocles,⁹⁴¹ Homer, Menander, Theophrastus, Plato, Heraclides⁹⁴² and Megaclides (12.2–7 510B–513E). What is said concerning Theophrastus is our text 551.

A life devoted to the pursuit of pleasure is compared with that of virtuous activity, and in respect to brilliance and reputation the latter is deemed superior. Smindyrides, Sardanapalus, Ananis⁹⁴³ and contemporary men are cited as examples of persons who lived or are living a life devoted to pleasure. Aristides, Agesilaus and the demigods at Troy illustrate the life of virtuous activity (lines 1–7). In this context, brilliance and reputation are to be understood as well deserved. Theophrastus is aware that praise is useful in the moral training of young people (467.4–7), but he is also aware that the importance of honors and reputation can be exaggerated (1.53–55) and that men can go terribly wrong in pursuing honor to the exclusion of other more important goals.

Text 551 ends by contrasting the life of the demigods with that of contemporary men. The former life is said to have been “lacking in equipment and as it were undiscovered,” while that of the latter is said to be “fitted out with everything for ease and for enjoyment and for the other ways of passing time” (lines 7–10). It is noteworthy that although the demigods are grouped together with Aristides and Agesilaus, their mode of life is explained by reference to a lack of equipment and not by reference to virtuous character. Such a view of the early period (simple

⁹⁴⁰ As Gulick notes in the Loeb edition (vol. 5 p. 293 n. a) Book 12 contains no reference to the diners.

⁹⁴¹ 12.2 510C–D = FVS 31B128 Diels. The Empedoclean lines are cited by Theophrastus 584A.180–187 as part of his argument against animal sacrifice.

⁹⁴² Heraclides is the Academic philosopher who hailed from Pontus. Athenaeus refers to Heraclides' work *On Pleasure* and reports a view that supports a life of pleasure and luxury over one of labor (12.5 512A–D = fr. 39 Schütrumpf). Almost certainly the report draws on a dialogue of Heraclides, in which one speaker is an advocate of pleasure. The advocate quotes Simonides, who asserted that without pleasure the life of the gods would not be enviable (512C–D). That may relate to Theophrastus' work *On the Divine Happiness in Response to the Academics* (436 no. 13). See Chapter III “Titles of Works” no. 13. We should not assume that the advocate is presenting Heraclides' considered view concerning pleasure. See Schütrumpf (2009) pp. 73–74, 89.

⁹⁴³ Ananis was an iambic poet, who lived in the sixth century BC. He is quoted in 7.16 282B–C.

and lacking in technical advances) is traditional (cf. Plato's *Laws* 3.2 678C–D) and was incorporated by Theophrastus into his rejection of animal sacrifice in favor of a simpler form of honoring the gods (see 584A.1–51).

The combination of two adjectives beginning with an alpha-privative, ἀκατάσκευος and ἀνεύρετος (lines 7–8) recalls the combination ἄζηλος and ἄπλουτος in text 512A.1–2. In both cases, the adjectives describe a way of life that is commendable. In the latter case, it is the reforms of Lycurgus that rendered wealth unenviable and unwealth. In the former, it is the early period prior to all manner of technical advances that made for a simple life undisturbed by excessive pleasures. It seems reasonable to say that this repeated use of the alpha-privative in pairs reflects Theophrastus' interest in style (λέξις).⁹⁴⁴

Since 551 mentions Smindyrides, it has been placed immediately after 550, which also mentions Smindyrides. The two texts share luxury as a common theme, and both mention the work *On Pleasure*. Only in 551, *On Pleasure* is attributed to Theophrastus (line 3) without any indication that the authorship of the work is disputed. In 550 we are told that the same work *On Pleasure* is attributed to Chamaeleon and to Theophrastus. As already stated in the preceding comment on 550, it may be that the two texts are referring to one and the same work and that its author was Chamaeleon, but that cannot be demonstrated. In any case, nothing is said in 551 that is incompatible with what we know of Theophrastus' view of pleasure and in particular the luxury that civilization and wealth make possible.

552A Aelian, *Miscellaneous History* 9. 11 (BT vol. 3 p. 104.14–105.2 Dilts)

552B Athenaeus, *The Sophists at Dinner* 12.62 543E–F (BT vol. 3 p. 198.25–199.9 Kaibel)

Literature: Schweighaeuser (1801–1805) vol. 11 pp. 487–495; Brandis (1860) p. 349; Wehrli (1983) p. 494; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 308–309

Text 522A is found in Aelian's miscellanea, bracketed by two short reports. That which precedes tells of Plato's response to certain doctors who advised him to move to the Lyceum, for the Academy was deemed unhealthy. The philosopher refused, saying that he would not move even to Mount Athos in order to live longer (9.10). That which follows

⁹⁴⁴ See above, Section 1 on text 437.

concerns the expulsion of Epicureans. The Romans, we are told, expelled Alcaeus and Philiscus from their city, because the two were introducing the youth to many strange pleasures. In addition, the Messenians are said to have driven out the Epicureans. No details are given (9.12). In between comes text 522A, which focuses on the Ephesian painter Parrhasius. The segment is considerably longer, richer in details and concluded by a statement of Aelian's source: namely, Theophrastus. No particular work is mentioned.

Text 522B occurs within a lengthy survey of individuals who embraced luxurious living.⁹⁴⁵ After recording conflicting views concerning the Spartan Lysander (12.61 543B–C), Athenaeus turns to Parrhasius. He cites Clearchus of Soli (fr. 42 Wehrli) and says that Parrhasius wrapped himself in purple and wore a wreath of gold. The attire is said to have been tasteless and beyond Parrhasius' station as a painter. We are then told that Parrhasius himself claimed to be a man of virtue and did so when inscribing his paintings. He also boasted that his paintings had achieved insurmountable perfection, though nothing done by mortal men is beyond criticism (12.62 543C–E). At this point 522B begins. As in Aelian's parallel text, we are told that Parrhasius was defeated by an inferior painter in a contest concerning Ajax. We also hear of his luxurious dress and the ease with which he worked. The fact that he sang while painting is explicitly referred to Theophrastus' work *On Happiness*.

There are some minor differences between the two sources. In 552A Parrhasius is said to have worn a wreath of gold (lines 1–2). In 552B we hear of a white headband (line 4). In the material that precedes 552B, we are told on the authority of Clearchus that Parrhasius wore a golden wreath (Ath. 543C). That may be thought to support what we read in 552A, i.e., that Parrhasius wore a golden wreath, but it may well be that the painter wore both, albeit on different occasions. The description of Parrhasius' cane and slippers is the same in the two texts. The description of Parrhasius' work habits is briefer in 552B—in 552A we hear that Parrhasius was not reluctant, ἀκοντα, to work; rather, he did so with good spirits, εὐθύμῳς, while humming, ὑποκινυρόμενος (lines 11–13)—but that may only reflect abbreviation by the excerptor of Athenaeus or by Athenaeus himself. Similarly the account of Parrhasius' defeat is briefer in 552B—only in 552A is Parrhasius said to have competed against an opponent who was “not much” inferior (line 4) and after being defeated

⁹⁴⁵ At 12.37 528E Athenaeus concludes his discussion of nations and cities devoted to luxury and turns to the luxury of individuals.

to have responded to an expression of sympathy with exceptional charm, μάλα ἀστείως (line 6)—but again the explanation may be nothing more than abbreviation.

As already indicated above, 552B is preceded by a reference to Clearchus and remarks concerning Parrhasius' luxurious style of life. Verses inscribed on the painter's works are cited to document his offensive behavior, as is his claim to have reached the highest level in his art. Apparently Clearchus represents a more hostile tradition concerning Parrhasius than that embraced by Theophrastus. To be sure, the Eresian does not ignore the luxurious habits of the painter, but he also recognizes his capacity for work and acknowledges his ability to accept defeat in a graceful, witty manner.⁹⁴⁶ In regard to the contest concerning Ajax, the hostile tradition offered a less favorable version. See Pliny, *Natural History* 35.72: *et cum magnis suffragiis superatus a Timanthe esset Sami in Aiace armorumque iudicio, herois nomine se moleste ferre dicebat, quod iterum ab indigno victus esset*, “and when he had been defeated by Timanthes at Samos by a large number of votes, in (a contest concerning) Ajax and the awarding of arms, he said repeatedly in the name of the hero that he was annoyed at having been defeated a second time by an unworthy (opponent).”

Although Athenaeus refers explicitly to Theophrastus' work *On Happiness*, we have for various reasons chosen to place 552A–B within the section on “Pleasure” rather than within that on “Happiness.” First, the defeat of Parrhasius invites comparison with the defeat of Aeschylus to which either Theophrastus or Clearchus referred in a work entitled *On Pleasure* (553). Second, the report concerning Parrhasius' singing while working illustrates Aristotle's assertion that a pain can be eliminated not only by the pleasure opposed to it but also by pleasures that are unrelated to the pain in question (*NE* 7.14 1154b13–14). Aspasius comments that the pleasures of music can remove the pains of hunger (*CAG* p. 156.19–20 = 555.10–11), and on the basis of 552A.13 we can add that a painter may try to lighten his labors through singing and humming. That is what

⁹⁴⁶ That Theophrastus has Parrhasius respond in a witty, urbane manner, ἀστείως, to a comrade is clear enough. Instead of expressing indignation at an unjust loss, Parrhasius first says that he cares little about his own defeat and then expresses sympathy with Ajax. Perhaps we are meant to understand that Parrhasius does not and will not harbor ill feelings regarding his defeat in the way that Ajax did even in Hades (Homer, *Odyssey* 11.543–547). Or is Parrhasius simply masking ill feelings, which will be slow to depart. I prefer the first way of understanding the text, but the second is more in line with the hostile tradition concerning Parrhasius.

Parrhasius tried to do (τὸν κάματον ἐπειρᾶτο ἐπελαφρύνειν [552A.13–14]) and apparently succeeded. That does not mean that Parrhasius was a delicate individual who lacked endurance. On the contrary, relief through singing and humming can be viewed as helpful and more a sign of a serious, energetic character than of τρυφή.

Here a caveat may be helpful. It would be a mistake to think that all work must be painful and that a balancing pleasure is always desirable. On the contrary, Aristotle is correct to argue that work can be pleasurable and that unrelated pleasure can distract an individual and in this way hinder his activity (NE 10.5 1175a30–b24). But distraction is not always a necessary consequence, and in the case of Parrhasius there is no reason to think that singing impeded his painting. Moreover, on occasion singing while working seems to have little or nothing to do with masking pain, either physical or mental. Again Parrhasius may be an example. At least, that is suggested by 552B, in which we read: “he did not produce artistic work without pleasure, but with ease, so that he even sang while painting,” ὥς καὶ ᾄδειν γράφοντα (line 7). Here the construction ὥς plus the infinitive seems to indicate a tendency or natural result. In singing, Parrhasius was not trying to lighten his labor (as in 552A: ἐπειρᾶτο ἐπελαφρύνειν). Rather, his singing was at once a consequence and a manifestation of the ease with which he worked. And if that is correct, the question arises, which text, 552A or 552B, is truer to Theophrastus. My guess is 552A, but I would not be surprised if Theophrastus took account of both possibilities: singing can not only mask the labors of intense work but also be an expression of unimpeded, joyful activity.⁹⁴⁷

On the basis of Athenaeus’ reference to *On Happiness*, texts 552A–B are to be assigned to that work (436 no. 12). It should, however, be noted that Clearchus discussed the luxurious lifestyle of Parrhasius in his *Lives* (Ath. 543C). Theophrastus wrote a work with that title in three books (436 no. 16) and may well have discussed Parrhasius within a section on lives devoted (entirely or partially) to pleasure. And of course, Parrhasius may have appeared in one or the other of Theophrastus’ works *On Pleasure* (436 no. 26 and 27).

⁹⁴⁷ The popular song “Whistle While You Work” comes to mind. There is more than one version, but it seems fair to say that the song assumes a task that is perceived to be mildly painful (laborious or tedious). One version imagines cleaning up: “tidy up the place,” and another has the following verse: “When there’s too much to do,| don’t let it bother you; forget your troubles,| try to be just like a cheerful chick-a-dee.” But such words hardly

553 Athenaeus, *The Sophists at Dinner* 8.39 347E–F (BT vol. 2 p. 263.1–5 Kaibel)

Literature: Schweighaeuser (1801–1805) vol. 9 p. 585; Koepke (1856) p. 47; Brandis (1860) p. 351; Scorza (1934) p. 43; Wehrli (1967–1978) vol. 9 p. 72, (1983) p. 512; Giordano (1977) pp. 107–108; Fortenbaugh (1984) p. 309; Wehrli-Wöhrle (2004) p. 550

This text occurs in the eighth book of *The Sophists at Dinner*. Democritus of Nicomedia⁹⁴⁸ has been discussing fish and has twice mentioned Theophrastus: once in regard to the “dug-out” fish, which is found in the region of the Black Sea (8.2 331C = 363 no. 3 and 4), and again in regard to fish in India that behave like frogs (8.4 332B = 363 no. 1). Democritus is followed by Cynulcus, a Cynic philosopher,⁹⁴⁹ who has long been irritated by the discussion of fish (8.2 331C). Now Cynulcus chooses a fish metaphor in order to belittle the mind of Ulpian. The latter is described as someone who always picks out little fish, while passing over the big cuts (8.39 347D). He refuses to eat anything appropriate to a man and ignores Aeschylus, who said that his tragedies were large slices from Homer’s great dinners (347E). At this point comes our text 553. Cynulcus stays with Aeschylus and calls him a philosopher. We are told that on one occasion when he had been unfairly defeated, he said that his tragedies were dedicated to time (i.e. were intended for all time) and that he would receive his due honor. This anecdote concerning Aeschylus is said to have been reported by either Theophrastus or Chamaeleon in the work *On Pleasure*.⁹⁵⁰

The anecdote is likely to be a fiction, but if it is, it has some basis in fact. We are told that Aeschylus was defeated in a contest by either Sophocles or Simonides and responded by leaving Athens for Syracuse where Hiero was tyrant (*Vita* no. 43 p. 119 Westermann). In Aristophanes’ *Frogs*, Aeschylus is presented as aware of this posthumous fame: “My poetry did not die with me” (868). And that fame is treated as fact in various places (*Vita* no. 68 p. 121 W, *Scholia on Aristophanes’ Acharnians* 10 and Quintilian, *Oratorical Education* 10.1.66).

speak for all cases. Tasks like painting and knitting may be different in that whistling or humming or softly singing do not impede the task and even express the pleasure one takes in the activity. Ultimately the issue is an empirical one.

⁹⁴⁸ On Democritus, see above, Section 1 on 437 n. 2.

⁹⁴⁹ On Cynulcus, see above, Section 1 on 437 n. 1.

⁹⁵⁰ In what follows Cynulcus first cites Clearchus and then Theophrastus in regard to the witty use of a proverb by the cithara-player Stratoniceus (710).

553 relates closely to 552A–B in that it concerns an appropriate and admirable response to defeat. Only in 553 the defeat is explicitly said to be unjust (line 1). One might have expected Aeschylus to be pained and to have become angry, but instead he showed considerable self-control. He was hardly modest—he said that his tragedies are for all time and will be properly recognized—but he did not let a keen sense of personal worth manifest itself in pointless anger.⁹⁵¹ It is for this reason that he is called a philosopher (line 1). Instead of focusing on a past slight, he was able to look forward (to keep events in perspective) and presumably to take pleasure in the thought of deserved recognition at some future time.⁹⁵²

According to 553, either Theophrastus or Chamaeleon reported the anecdote concerning Aeschylus in a work *On Pleasure* (line 2). We may compare 550.5–6, where Chamaeleon or Theophrastus (here named in reverse order) is said to have recorded an anecdote concerning Smindyrides. As the lesser known, Chamaeleon might be preferred, but certainty cannot be achieved. And even if 550 and 553 are assigned to Chamaeleon, it seems certain that Theophrastus wrote a work *On Pleasure* (436 no. 27a). Most likely it contained various anecdotes, one of which may have been a version of that recorded in 553.

- 554 Aspasius, *On Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics* 7.7/8⁹⁵³ 1150b12–13 (CAG vol. 19.1 p. 133.11–15 Heylbut)

Literature: Brandis (1860) p. 351; Rose (1871) p. 105; Zeller (1879) vol. 2 p. 858; Wehrli (1973) p. 493; Becchi (1983) p. 96; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 309–310; Moraux (1984) p. 266

Text 554 is found among Aspasius' comments on Aristotle's discussion of moral strength and moral weakness (ἐγκράτεια and ἀκρασία), and tenacity and softness (καρτερία and μαλακία). According to Aristotle, moral strength and moral weakness are concerned with pleasure. The

⁹⁵¹ According to Aristotle, anger is caused by an apparent slight that is directed toward oneself or one's own, the slight being unjustified (*Rhet.* 2.2 1378a31–32). Theophrastus will have held a similar view. See the commentary on 438.

⁹⁵² Schweighauser vol. 8 p. 585 notes that in *Tusculan Disputations* 2.23 Cicero introduces Aeschylus as not only a poet but also a Pythagorean. According to Gigon p. 492, this reference to Aeschylus as a Pythagorean is unique. In my judgment, it has no bearing on calling Aeschylus a philosopher in 553.

⁹⁵³ In the text-translation volumes, the heading to text 554 refers to *NE* 7.8. That reflects the edition of Bekker. Above I have added a reference to 7.7, which is in accordance with the *Oxford Classical Text* and with my practice in this commentary.

former consists in mastering inappropriate desires for pleasure, while the latter involves being overcome by such desires. Tenacity and softness concern pain. The former is marked by resistance, the latter by giving in (7.7 1150a9–b5). Aristotle tells us that we are not surprised if a person is overcome by powerful and overwhelming pleasures and pains. Indeed, if he offers resistance, he is to be pardoned. We are, however, surprised if a person is overcome by and unable to tolerate those pleasures and pains that normal, healthy people can resist (1150b5–16). It is on these assertions that Aspasius comments in 554.

Following Aristotle (1150b9–10), Aspasius takes note of Philoctetes and Cercyon as characters who were not soft, *μαλακοί* (line 1). To be sure, they were overcome by pain, but only by an overwhelming pain that no ordinary person could be expected to resist.⁹⁵⁴ Aspasius continues by quoting Aristotle (1150b12–13): “but a person (is soft) if he is overcome and unable to resist the pains that most people can” (lines 1–2). Aspasius then adds that it is similar in the case of pleasure. For if someone has tasted ambrosia and then desires it, he ought not to be criticized, but only if he is intensely overcome by pleasure in the way that most men are. The example of ambrosia is explicitly referred to Theophrastus (lines 2–5).⁹⁵⁵

The final words of 554 are problematic: ἀλλ’ εἴ τις σφοδρῶς ἡττᾶται τῶν ἡδονῶν ὥς οἱ πολλοί (lines 4–5). In the text-translation volumes, we translated: “but if someone is intensely overcome by pleasure like most men (then he is [sc. properly faulted]).” Such an assertion is puzzling, for a person is normally to be excused if he succumbs to a pleasure that most men cannot resist. Moreover, Aspasius has said that the case of pleasure is similar to that of pain (lines 2–3). That implies that the person who is open to criticism is the person who succumbs to a pleasure that most people are able to resist. And that suggests that the text has suffered in transmission.⁹⁵⁶ Two possible emendations come to mind. The first is quite simple: supply οὐχ before ὥς (line 5). The second possibility is to replace the words ὥς οἱ πολλοί with the clause ἅς οἱ πολλοὶ ἀντέχουσι

⁹⁵⁴ Philoctetes was bitten on the hand by an adder. He endured the pain for a long time, but was finally overcome and exclaimed, “Cut off my hand.” Cercyon, when told with whom his daughter had committed adultery, was so overwhelmed by pain that he renounced living. See the Anonymous, *Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics* 1150b8–10 (CAG vol. 20 p. 436.33–437.7) and Gauthier and Jolif vol. 2 pp. 641–642.

⁹⁵⁵ Ambrosia is the food of the gods, so that partaking of it is considered an intense pleasure that human nature cannot resist.

⁹⁵⁶ Codex Parisinus 1903 exhibits numerous lacunae and does so in line 5, where an empty space occurs instead of οἱ πολλοί. But the reading οἱ πολλοί can be supplied from other manuscripts. See *Quellen* (1984) p. 309 and Rose (1871) p. 105.

or ἀντέχειν δύνανται. Cf. what Aristotle writes at 1150b1–2 and b12–13. Both possibilities would restore the similarity to which Aspasius refers (lines 2–3).

There is, however, another way to make sense of the text that avoids emendation. It depends on the expression οἱ πολλοί (line 5). In 554 the first occurrence of οἱ πολλοί (line 1) is not pejorative. It refers to many or most persons. We may compare Aristotle's use of the expression at 1150a12–13, b1, 12. A translation like "the majority of men" would be appropriate. The second occurrence of οἱ πολλοί in 554 (line 5) has been translated with "most," which is in line with the first occurrence. But perhaps that is not correct. Theophrastus may have used οἱ πολλοί pejoratively in order to refer to "the masses." Aristotle uses the expression in this sense when referring to the life directed toward pleasure (1.5 1095b16, 19), and Theophrastus may have done the same within a discussion of pleasure. He may have thought of the masses in opposition to the virtuous and said that criticism is properly directed at the person who succumbs to pleasure in the way that the masses do. Such an interpretation avoids emendation and for that reason is appealing, but at the same time Aspasius is made to appear a clumsy commentator. For by introducing the words of Theophrastus into a new context, Aspasius will have introduced a shift in the meaning of οἱ πολλοί and done so within only a few lines and without warning.

The use of the adverb σφοδρῶς in combination with the verb ἡττᾶσθαι (lines 4–5) recurs in the sentence that immediately follows text 554 (not printed in the text-translation volumes). Aspasius writes: εἶκε δὲ ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης τὸ Ξενοφάντῳ συμβάν παράδειγμα τίθεσθαι τῶν ὑπὸ ἡδονῆς σφοδρῶς ἡττηθέντων καὶ συγγνώμης ἀξίων, "Aristotle seems to have included what happened to Xenophantus as an example of persons who are intensely overcome by pleasure and deserve sympathy." Aspasius' comment is intelligible. Aristotle has followed two examples of being overcome by pain with one that concerns being overcome by pleasure. He speaks of men who try to repress laughter but break out in one loud guffaw, ἀθρόον ἐκκαγχάζουσιν, and then adds the example of Xenophantus (1150b11–12).⁹⁵⁷ The shift from pain to pleasure is not unexpected (pleasure was paired with pain only a few lines earlier 1150b7), but Aristotle does not signal the shift clearly. He leaves it to the reader to understand that laughter is pleasant. Hence, Aspasius adds

⁹⁵⁷ Xenophantus was a musician whose singing is said to have had a strong effect on Alexander the Great (Seneca, *On Anger* 2.2.6).

his comment, while replacing ἀθρόον with σφοδρῶς. What interests me here is twofold. First, the recurrence of σφοδρῶς in combination with ἡττᾶσθαι is noticeable. If Aspasius' remarks concerning Theophrastus are based closely on a Theophrastean text, then Theophrastus may well have used σφοδρῶς, and the second occurrence is simply Aspasius making use of the same word. But we cannot, I think, exclude the possibility that the first occurrence of σφοδρῶς is attributable to Aspasius. That said, I want to state my preference for the first alternative. Or more cautiously, I want to underline that the use of σφοδρῶς and cognate forms in regard to pleasure would hardly be new with Theophrastus. To make the point, I cite Plato's discussion of pleasure in the *Philebus*—a dialogue that Theophrastus knew well (see 566 and the commentary thereon)—where we are told that pleasures and pains occur intensely, σφόδρα γίνονται (37C10, cf. 40A12) and that one pleasure or pain may be more intense than another, σφοδρότερα (41E5). And in regard to Aristotle, I cite the *Ethics*, where we read that persons who cannot enjoy other kinds of pleasures pursue those of the body because they are intense, σφοδραί (7.14 1154b2–3).

Second, when a person responds to something intensely, his intensity or vehemence may depend entirely or largely on that to which he is responding: e.g., an exceptionally good joke or ambrosia *qua* food of the gods. But there are people who are naturally intense or vehement. They are born with an intensity of character, innate σφοδρότης, which makes it difficult for them to control themselves.⁹⁵⁸ Aristotle seems to take account of such people when he refers to persons who are unable to resist pleasures and pains on account of their inherited nature (1150b13–14).⁹⁵⁹ Theophrastus will not have overlooked such individuals. He will have recognized that responding too intensely and too often may be due to a physiological condition over which the individual has little control. Sympathy is called for together with some practical advice concerning how best to deal with innate intensity.⁹⁶⁰

⁹⁵⁸ Understood as a temperament, σφοδρότης is apt to manifest itself throughout a person's behavior, not only in response to what is viewed as pleasurable but also in response to painful occurrences like an insult or threat.

⁹⁵⁹ Cf. Aristotle's later remarks concerning melancholic individuals, who on account of their bodily condition are always in a state of intense desire, ἐν ὁρέξει σφοδρᾷ (7.14 1154b13).

⁹⁶⁰ An example of σφοδρότης from the time of Theophrastus might be Polemon in *She who is Shorn*, a comedy by Theophrastus' pupil Menander. For discussion see Fortenbaugh (1974) pp. 434–443.

At first reading one is tempted to assign text 554 to one of Theophrastus' works *On Pleasure* (436 no. 26 and 27). And since Aspasius is commenting on Aristotle's *Ethics*, we may prefer to select *On Pleasure*, like that of Aristotle (no. 26). Nevertheless, we should not overlook the fact that later in his commentary, Aspasius refers to the *Ethics* of Theophrastus (555.7). On the principle of economy, it seems sensible to assign 554 to the *Ethics* (436 no. 2), but to keep in mind that the *Ethics* may have been a composite work, of which *On Pleasure* (or one version thereof) may have been a part.

555 Aspasius, *On Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics* 7.14/15⁹⁶¹ 1154b6–15 (CAG vol. 19.1 p. 156.11–22 Heylbut)

Literature: Brandis (1860) p. 351; Rose (1871) pp. 108–109; Heylbut (1888) p. 198; Mulvany (1919) pp. 18–19; Walzer (1929) pp. 79–80; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1479; Wehrli (1973) p. 494; Kenny (1978) p. 15; Becchi (1983) pp. 96–97; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 311–312; Moraux (1984) p. 266

In text 555, Aspasius⁹⁶² is commenting on Aristotle's discussion of pleasure in Book 7 of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. It is the first of two discussions. The second is found in Book 10. Today the majority of scholars seem to hold that Book 7 is by Aristotle, that it was originally part of the *Eudemean Ethics* and that the *Eudemean Ethics* is earlier than the *Nicomachean Ethics*. That may be the case, but it should be noted that Aspasius thought that the *Eudemean Ethics*, including Book 6 = NE 7, was the work of Eudemus of Rhodes, and that in the centuries before Aspasius the *Eudemean Ethics* appears to have received more attention than the *Nicomachean Ethics*.⁹⁶³ Be that as it may, in NE 7 Aristotle is concerned to establish that there are good pleasures and that the happy

⁹⁶¹ 7.14 accords with the division of chapters in the OCT, and 7.15 with the division in Bekker's edition. I much prefer the division that the OCT marks at 1154a8, for here the phrase *περὶ δὲ δὴ τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν ἐπισκεπτέον* functions as an incipit: it announces a new segment that will focus on bodily pleasures and will continue beyond the place where Bekker marks a new chapter (1154a22). See the explicit references to the body (1154a26, 29) and to growth and black bile (1154b10–11).

⁹⁶² In both of Wimmer's editions of the fragments of Theophrastus (1862 and 1866), text 555 is erroneously attributed to Olympiodorus. The attribution may have arisen through a printing error in the earlier edition. It misled Brandis p. 351 and Regenbogen col. 1479, but for most scholars it has not been a problem.

⁹⁶³ See Chapter 2 "The Sources" no. 15 Aspasius with n. 108 and the introduction to this section on "Pleasure."

life is pleasant. To accomplish this, he denies that pleasure is a process, γένεσις. Rather, it is unimpeded activity, ἐνέργεια ἀνεμπόδιτος (7.12 1153a7–15), and as such it can be the highest good, which is happiness (7.13 1153b7–19). After that Aristotle focuses on the pleasures of the body and argues that they are good up to a point. It is not the enjoyment of necessary pleasures but the pursuit of excess that makes a man bad (7.14 1154a16–17). Next Aristotle moves to gain credence for what he has argued by explaining why the pleasures of the body appear to be more desirable than other kinds. First, we are told that when men experience excessive pain they find relief in excessive pleasures and typically in bodily pleasures, which become quite intense because they are experienced alongside pain (1154a22–b2). Second, Aristotle tells us that intense bodily pleasures are pursued by persons who cannot enjoy other kinds of pleasure. Moreover, experiencing neither pleasure nor pain is said to be painful to such people on account of their nature. Reference is made to the physiologists who say that seeing and hearing are painful, but we have become accustomed to the experience. Growth occurring during youth is said to dispose a person in such a way that he resembles a drunk. And persons whose nature is marked by black bile are said to suffer continuously and as a result to desire pleasure in order to drive out the pain (1154b2–15). Text 555 concerns the second of Aristotle's explanations.

Textual difficulties are apparent. In line 2, some words of Aspasius have fallen out after the lemma πολλοῖς λυπηρόν (= 1154b6). In addition, codex Z (= Parisinus 1903) is marred by several lacunae, which are mostly of little interest,⁹⁶⁴ but one in line 7 concerns the name of Theophrastus.⁹⁶⁵ The text printed in the text-translation volumes is based on codex N (Laurentianus 85.1). There the name of Theophrastus does occur, but dissatisfaction with the text as printed was expressed long ago by Diels, who wanted to supply ὥς καὶ before Θεόφραστος.⁹⁶⁶ The reason for the supplement is clear: the reference to Theophrastus is followed by words taken from *NE* 1154b13–14 and by Aspasius' illustrative example (lines 8–9). If Diels' supplement is accepted, Aristotle becomes the subject of αἰτιᾶται ... λέγων, and Theophrastus is mentioned only as someone who agrees with Aristotle. Nevertheless, Diels' supplement is not entirely satisfactory, for even if Aristotle is taken to be the subject of

⁹⁶⁴ See the commentary to 554 n. 956.

⁹⁶⁵ According to Rose (1871) p. 108, the name of Theophrastus is also missing in Parisinus 1902 and Laurentianus 81.14.

⁹⁶⁶ *FVS* 59 A 94.

αἰτιᾶται ... λέγων ὅτι, what follows is quite awkward. Aristotle is said to criticize Anaxagoras (line 7), and we expect his criticism to follow. Instead, we are offered an illustration of an Aristotelian text that has no direct bearing on Anaxagoras. Therefore, Mulvany has conjectured that words of Theophrastus together with Aspasius' comment on 1154b9–13 have fallen out after λέγων ὅτι. The conjecture is attractive for several reasons. It explains why the words that follow λέγων ὅτι seem out of place; it becomes immediately clear why there is no comment on the interesting material in 1154b9–13; the suspected lacuna occurs shortly after an obvious textual disturbance (line 2) and can be viewed as further evidence that the text of Aspasius has suffered in transmission. Moreover, on the basis of *On Sensation* (265 no. 4), we can gain an idea of what the commentator is likely to have drawn from Theophrastus. For in *On Sensation*, Theophrastus tells us that according to Anaxagoras all sense perception is accompanied by pain (29, cf. 17) and that this view is not supported by actual experience. Indeed, it is unreasonable, for nothing that is natural is tied to pain. Sense perceptions should be compared with thinking, neither of which is always accompanied by pain. The affect of excessive stimulation shows only that sense perception demands a certain symmetry that is suited to the object of perception (31–33).

I am not, however, prepared to follow Mulvany further and to conjecture with him that the phrase ἐν Ἠθικοῖς (line 7) is an error that has somehow replaced a reference to *On Sensation*. It is, I think, far more likely that in his *Ethics* (436 no. 2) Theophrastus has made use of material, that he discussed in greater detail in *On Sensation* or *In Reply to Anaxagoras* (137 no. 30) or *On the (Doctrines) of Anaxagoras* (137 no. 29). Nevertheless, Mulvany's argument is important, for if he is correct in holding that the words of Theophrastus have fallen out, then text 555 cannot be used to support the view of Heylbut and Kenny: i.e., that in discussing pleasure Theophrastus closely followed the words of Aristotle.⁹⁶⁷

By way of warning, I report that when Wehrli composed his article entitled "Die Ethica Theophrasts," he introduced an error into line 7 of 555. After the lemma καὶ ἡ τυχοῦσα (1154b14), he printed the following: τουτέστιν ἥτις οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἰσχυρά. Concerning these words, Wehrli commented that the idea expressed here—any pleasure, even if it is weak, can drive out pain—does not agree with the Aristotelian text and is

⁹⁶⁷ Heylbut (1888) p. 198 and Kenny (1978) p. 15.

either a doxographical mistake or a simple error in the transmission of the text.⁹⁶⁸ Quite apart from the question whether the words cited are properly referred to Theophrastus (they are not), Wehrli's comment rests on a reading, οὐκ, that has no manuscript authority. In a second version of the article, which appeared one year before the original version, we find the correct reading, οὐν, no reference to a doxographical mistake, and a reference to Regenbogen col. 1479, where the false reading occurs. Presumably the reading in Regenbogen is a typographical error that misled Wehrli when he first composed his article.

Since line 7 makes reference to the *Ethics*, which is best construed as a reference to the Theophrastean treatise cited by Plutarch and several commentators (436 no. 2), text 555 may be assigned to that Theophrastean work.

556 Damascius, *On Plato's Philebus* 36C–44A (167–168, p. 81 Westerink)

Literature: Brandis (1960) p. 363; Zeller (1879) vol. 2.2 p. 864 n. 4; Walzer (1929) p. 203; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1484; Westerink (1959) p. xxi; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 312–314; Sollenberger (1984) p. 299

Text 556 is taken from Damascius' commentary on Plato's *Philebus*, or rather from the notes of a student on Damascius' lectures on the *Philebus*.⁹⁶⁹ The focus is on the discussion of true and false pleasure, which is found in *Philebus* 36C–44A, and in particular on the claim that pleasure is like opinion in that it can be both true and false. In the Platonic dialogue, Protarchus is made to question this claim and Socrates to defend it. The latter argues that experiencing pleasure is similar to holding an opinion. Just as the person who holds an opinion always really (ὁντως) holds an opinion, so the person who experiences pleasure always really experiences pleasure. And just as the opinion held can be either true or false, so the pleasure can be either true or false. Protarchus balks at the idea of false pleasure. He is willing to concede that a pleasure may be accompanied by (μετά) a false opinion, and that people ("we") call the

⁹⁶⁸ Wehrli (1973) p. 494 n. 3 and 4.

⁹⁶⁹ Earlier editions of the fragments of Theophrastus assigned 556 to Olympiodorus. See Schneider (1818) pp. 223–224 and Wimmer (1854–1862) vol. 3 p. 184 and (1866) p. 435. Today the fragment is regarded as a note taken by a student during a lecture on the *Philebus* by the Neoplatonist Damascius. See above, Chapter II "The Sources" no. 31 on Damascius.

opinion false, but will go no further. As he puts it, “no one would ever call the pleasure itself false”: τὴν δ’ ἡδονὴν αὐτὴν οὐδεὶς ἄν ποτε προσείποι ψευδῇ (36C6–38A2).⁹⁷⁰

It is on this issue that Theophrastus is cited and said to oppose Plato (556 lines 1–3). Theophrastus, we are told, held that all pleasures are true, for if there is some false pleasure, some pleasure will not be pleasure: εἰ γάρ ἐστὶ τις ... ἡδονὴ ψευδής, ἔσται τις ἡδονὴ οὐχ ἡδονή (lines 2–3). With the immediately following phrase ἢ μάλιστα (line 3), Damascius introduces a reply to Theophrastus.⁹⁷¹ He accepts the parallel treatment of opinion and pleasure advanced in *Philebus* 37A11–B7 and calls attention to the fact that false opinion is nonetheless opinion (line 4). Damascius’ reply runs another five lines, after which he again cites Theophrastus.⁹⁷² The latter is reported to have recognized three uses of “false”: it is used either of a feigned character, ἡθος ἐπίπλαστον, or of a statement, λόγος, or of some existing thing, προᾶγμα τι ὄν. (lines 9–10). After that Theophrastus is said to have asked, “In which way is pleasure false?” and to have observed that “pleasure is neither a feigned character nor a statement nor an existent that does not exist. For such is the false thing, one that is characterized by non-existence” (lines 10–12). The question is rhetorical, and the observation takes the place of a negative response: In none of the three ways is pleasure false. After that come comments by Damascius, this time introduced by ἢ ὅτιον (line 12).⁹⁷³

In rejecting false pleasure, Theophrastus is taking up the position of Protarchus, who in the *Philebus* asserts that no one would call the pleasure false (38A1–2). Theophrastus is also drawing on Aristotle, who in *Metaphysics* 5(Δ).29 focuses on “false,” τὸ ψεῦδος, and offers a tripartite analysis in terms of a thing, προᾶγμα, a statement, λόγος and a man, ἄνθρωπος (1024b17–1025a13).⁹⁷⁴ Combining *Metaphysics* 5.29 with what

⁹⁷⁰ Throughout this portion of the *Philebus*, the emphasis has been on pleasure, but it is clear that the argument also applies to pain. See 36C6–9, 37C4–10, E5–6.

⁹⁷¹ Cf. the use of ἢ μάλιστα in section 27.2 W, where it introduces Damascius’ answer to an initial question.

⁹⁷² In his edition, Westerink makes this second citation begin a new section (i.e., 168), and we have followed him in the text-translation volumes. That is not in itself wrong, but it may obscure the fact that the second citation is to be taken closely with the first. The two citations relate to the same problem. Were the issue a new one, Damascius would have used ὅτι and not ἔτι to introduce the second citation.

⁹⁷³ Cf. the use of ἢ ὅτιον in section 40.3 W, where it introduces the reply of Damascius to the second of two questions.

⁹⁷⁴ Book 5(Δ) of the *Metaphysics* is, as it were, a dictionary in which Aristotle discusses the usage of some 34 words including “false.” Walzer (1929) p. 203 says that Aristotle did

we read in 556, we might flesh out Theophrastus' argument against false pleasure in the following manner. We do not (and should not) speak of false pleasure, for "false" has three fundamental uses and none applies to pleasure. 1) When we call a man false, we are saying something about his character. He may be, e.g., a flatterer, who pretends in word and deed to be a friend when in fact he is an enemy. And he may enjoy the pretense either in itself or on account of expected gain. But we do not for that reason label his pleasure false. Rather we call the man false, in much the same way that we call a straight-talker "true."⁹⁷⁵ 2) We say that a statement is false when it fails to correspond with reality. A person may be pleased by such a statement, whether it be a silent thought or words spoken aloud. But we do not call the person's pleasure false. To be sure the false statement is the (efficient) cause of the person's pleasure, but the cause is not to be confused with its effect. 3) We call a sketch or a dream false, for while they are something (they actually occur), they are not that of which they create the impression. Insane people may enjoy their hallucinations, but it is the hallucinations that we call false and not the resulting pleasure.⁹⁷⁶

According to Regenbogen, text 556 exhibits the empirical-psychological orientation of Theophrastus in contrast to the value-oriented approach of Plato. Theophrastus no longer uses ἀληθής and ψευδής to express opposed values; rather, they are used in regard to what is real and unreal. With this interpretation I am uneasy for two reasons. First, the characterization of Plato's orientation is one-sided. For in the pertinent portion of the *Philebus* (36C–41A), Plato is concerned not only with the value of true and false pleasures (37D, 40B–C, E–41A) but also with the conceptual question how opinion or belief relates to pleasures and pains including emotions like φόβος, "fear" (36C).⁹⁷⁷ Second, Theophrastus' approach does not seem to be especially empirical-psychological. Such a characterization might better suit the vivid picture of opining that is put into the mouth of Socrates. We hear of a silent conversation in which a man puts questions to himself and then answers them. The soul is likened to a book in which an internal scribe writes down opinions, after which an internal painter produces images of what has been written (38A–40B).

not accept the doctrine of false pleasure, and for this reason no trace of the doctrine is found in the *Eudemian* and *Nicomachean Ethics* and the *Magna Moralia*.

⁹⁷⁵ Cf. Aristotle, *EE* 3.7 1233b38–1234a3.

⁹⁷⁶ For an example of pleasure tied to insanity, see the commentary on 436 no. 28, where the story of Thrasyllus is discussed.

⁹⁷⁷ On this issue, see Fortenbaugh (1975a) pp. 9–11 and above, the introduction to Section 2 on "Emotions."

But however we choose to characterize Socrates' account of opining, the approach of Theophrastus in 556 seems to be primarily conceptual.⁹⁷⁸

Damascius' comments on Theophrastus are quite brief (less than seven full lines of text). We might have hoped for more, but in a course of lectures focused on the *Philebus*, we cannot expect an exhaustive report that covers everything that Theophrastus will have said concerning false pleasure, not to mention pleasure in general. Moreover, Damascius seems to have his knowledge of Theophrastus at second hand from Proclus,⁹⁷⁹ whose reports may have been less than generous. In addition, it may be that what 556 reports concerning Theophrastus is not everything that Damascius said in lecture. What we have may be no more than the truncated lecture-notes of a student, who chose to record a bare minimum.⁹⁸⁰

Text 556 is most naturally referred to the work *On False Pleasure* (436 no. 28), but it is at least possible that Theophrastus touched on the subject in one way or another in the work *On False and True* (246 no. 5).⁹⁸¹

16. *Eros*

Love is a familiar topic that for most human beings is a fact of life. Humans are attracted to each other, and when the attraction is physical and sexual, it is often referred to as "erotic" love or simply eros. Sometimes the attraction develops slowly after a long period of interaction, but it may be an immediate response: "love at first sight." The attraction may be moderate and subject to control, but on other occasions it is quite strong and even irresistible. It takes away good judgment and leads to imprudent behavior. That makes for good jokes and airport novels, but it can ruin lives, not just those of individuals but also those of whole families, clans and cities.

The ancient Greeks were quite familiar with the power of erotic love. In Homer's *Iliad*, we read that eros moved Paris to snatch Helen from Lacedaemon. The passion continued and even strengthened once Paris

⁹⁷⁸ What I have just said applies to text 556. I do not want to rule out the introduction of illustrative material that is largely anecdotal. See above, Chapter III "Titles of Works" no. 28 *On False Pleasure* (436 no. 28).

⁹⁷⁹ Westerink p. xxi.

⁹⁸⁰ See above, Chapter II "The Sources" no. 31 on Damascius.

⁹⁸¹ E.g., the tripartite analysis of "false" (lines 9–10) may have been discussed with or without special reference to pleasure.

had Helen within the walls of Troy (3.442–443), but its consequences for the city and its inhabitants were disastrous. Moreover, even the gods are presented as weaker than eros. Zeus is no exception: upon seeing Hera, his senses are said to have been overwhelmed by eros (14.294). What we read in Hesiod is similar. Eros has become the fairest of gods: one who is said to loosen the limbs and overpower the minds and wise counsels of all gods and all men (*Theogony* 120–122).⁹⁸² So too the lyric poets recognize the unmanageable power of love. Sappho speaks of being driven or agitated by eros, which she describes as a sweet-bitter unmanageable beast (118 D) that causes sweating, shaking and pallor (2 D). Both Sappho and Archilochus follow Hesiod in speaking of one who looses limbs (137 D and 196 W, respectively),⁹⁸³ while Anacreon speaks of eros as a burden (PMG 115) and himself as being drunk with eros (PMG 31). A similar picture is found in the tragedians. Masterful is Euripides' depiction of Phaedra's lust for her stepson Hippolytus.⁹⁸⁴ And fascinating, albeit problematic, is the description of Medea as a woman compelled by eros to preserve the life of Jason.⁹⁸⁵ The Sophists too know the dominance of eros. I cite Gorgias, who excuses Helen's behavior on the grounds that she is a victim. Eros, we are told, is a disease, and Helen's behavior is not to be judged mistaken. Rather, it is a misfortune and therefore not subject to blame.⁹⁸⁶ But if Gorgias, Euripides and so many others recognize the overwhelming and often destructive power of eros, we should note that there is in the literature a different picture, according to which eros can be moderate and bring good fortune. Here are two examples from Euripides. In *Iphigeneia at Aulis*, the chorus tells of the twin arrows of eros: one that brings good fortune and the other confusion in life (547–551).⁹⁸⁷ And in lines quoted by Athenaeus, we find eros characterized as the sweetest divinity of all. Young men are enjoined never to flee love, to which is added a word of common sense: do so ὀρθῶς, "correctly" (13.11 561A–B). In Athenaeus, these lines are immediately followed by a similar sentiment attributed to

⁹⁸² Eros as a god that personifies love qua sexual desire is not mentioned in Homer. That begins with Hesiod. For a brief but instructive account of Eros as a divinity, see F. Graf, "Eros" in Brill's New Pauly vol. 5 (2004) col. 37–39.

⁹⁸³ Strictly speaking, Archilochus speaks of desire, πόθος, as one who looses limbs.

⁹⁸⁴ *Hippolytus* 38–41, 121–249.

⁹⁸⁵ *Medea* 526–531; cf. the chorus at 627–630.

⁹⁸⁶ *Helen* 19; on disease, νόσημα, cf. νοσεῖν in Plato, *Phaedrus* 231D.

⁹⁸⁷ Quoted in 559.5–6.

Pindar: he expressed the desire to love and to gratify love κατὰ καιρόν, “in accordance with the moment,” i.e., “appropriately” (13.11 561B).

Against this background, it is hardly surprising to find eros discussed at length by philosophers like Plato and Aristotle. In regard to the former, I limit my remarks to the *Symposium* and the *Phaedrus*, both of which were written after Plato’s second trip to Sicily (367 BC). The *Symposium* is the earlier of the two,⁹⁸⁸ and after the *Republic* it is the best known of the Platonic dialogues. In it we are presented with six speeches: those of Phaedrus, Pausanias, Eryximachus, Aristophanes, Agathon and Socrates. Each of the speeches is intended to praise eros, which is recognized as a god (177A–E). The culmination is reached in the speech of Socrates, who claims to be restating what he has heard from Diotima (201D). We are told of a sublimated love that moves through several stages. At first it is directed toward a single beautiful body and subsequently develops into a love of all beautiful bodies. From there love is elevated to the beauty present in souls and in practices and laws, after which it is directed toward the beauty in sciences and ultimately toward beauty itself (210A–212A).

The *Phaedrus* also recognizes that love need not remain at the level of bodily attraction. Early in the dialogue, Plato has Phaedrus read an address allegedly written by the speechwriter Lysias. It is directed toward a young man and recommends granting sexual favors to someone who is not in the grip of eros. After that Socrates is made to deliver an address whose message is similar but better organized. In particular, Socrates begins by defining eros. He distinguishes an innate desire for pleasure from an acquired judgment that aims at what is best, marks off eros from the desire for food and drink, and then specifies eros as an irrational desire that is directed toward bodily beauty, has great force and overcomes that judgment which leads to right conduct (237C–238C). This indictment of eros is not allowed to stand. Socrates calls his address blasphemous, speaks of eros as a god or divine being and proceeds to purify himself by delivering a palinode (241D–E). Eros is now said to be a kind of divine madness, and the *erastês*, the lover, is presented as a philosophic individual, who finds a beloved of like nature and does everything possible to develop that nature (252E).⁹⁸⁹

Aristotle, in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, touches on eros while discussing friendship based on pleasure and on utility (8.3 1156b1–3, 8.4 1157a3–14, 9.1 1164a3–8), and in the *Eudemian Ethics*, he does much the same

⁹⁸⁸ Lasserre p. 169.

⁹⁸⁹ On the *Timaeus*, in which eros is presented as a bodily drive, see below on 557.

(7.3 1238b32–39, 7.10 1243b14–22).⁹⁹⁰ In *On Dreams*, we are told that when a person afflicted with eros sees someone who resembles his beloved only slightly, then that person thinks that he beholds the beloved (2 460b5–8). And in the *Eudemian Ethics*, a person in the grip of eros—a most irrational passion—is said to endure many dangers, but in doing so he is exhibiting rashness rather than courage. Indeed, so strong is the power of eros that it may motivate a person to slay a tyrant, as it did in Metapontum and is said to have done in Crete (3.1 1229a20–24). What we miss in Aristotle and other Peripatetics is the Platonic idea of a refined, sublimated eros.⁹⁹¹

One of these Peripatetics was Clearchus, who speaks of eros removing orderly beauty from a lover's character (fr. 24 W). He also tells us that a flatterer is not a friend for long and then says that an *erastês* is a flatterer (fr. 21). And Pericles, despite his reputation for intelligence and political influence, threw all Greece into turmoil for the sake of Aspasia (fr. 30). Most interesting may be Clearchus' remarks on frustrated love. He first states that when eros cannot attain its object it comes to an end. He then illustrates the point by reference to animals that were fooled by a statue or painting, attempted to mount the object and subsequently desisted when it became clear that consummation was impossible. After that Clearchus reports the behavior of Cleisophus of Selymbria, who fell in love with a marble statue in a temple on Samos, locked himself in the temple and attempted to have intercourse with the statue. He failed and satisfied himself with a piece of meat (fr. 26). Here we have examples that present eros as goal-directed behavior. Since animals exhibit the behavior, we (as Aristotelians) may want to say that eros need not be based on thought: it can be excited through sensation apart from belief and assessment. But in the case of Cleisophus, we see intelligence brought to bear in means-end deliberation: first as he locked himself in the temple, and later as he sought relief in a bizarre albeit expedient manner.

I skip over Demetrius of Phalerum (fr. 81 no. 7 SOD) and Aristo of Ceos (fr. 10–14 SFOD)⁹⁹² and turn to Arius' compendium of Peripatetic

⁹⁹⁰ See Walzer (1929) pp. 241–242, who cites in addition *EE* 7.1 1235a13 ff., 7.2 1235b18 ff., 7.12 1245a22 ff. and asserts that the *EE* stands in a closer relationship to the Academy than the *NE*. In my judgment, the evidence is not sufficient to permit any firm conclusion concerning the relative dates of the *EE* and the *NE*.

⁹⁹¹ See Walzer (1929) p. 241 and (1939, reprint 1962) p. 56; also Wehrli (1967–1978) vol. 3 p. 54 and Gigon (1987) p. 280.

⁹⁹² At first reading, Plutarch's *Dialogue on Love* 21 766E–F = Aristo fr. 22 SFOD may be thought to contradict the claim that the Peripatetics ignored the Platonic notion

ethics. Two brief remarks are of special interest. The first occurs in a section that carries the heading *Περὶ παθῶν ψυχῆς*, "On the Emotions of the Soul." There eros is divided into three kinds: a good kind that relates to friendship, a bad kind that is concerned with bodily love and a third that is conceived of as a combination of the other two (Stobaeus, *Anthology* 2.7.21 p. 142.24–26 W).⁹⁹³ The second remark follows immediately under the heading *Περὶ φιλίας*, "On Friendship." Erotic friendship is mentioned as one of four or six sub-divisions of friendship and connected with *πάθος* as its *ἀρχή*, source or origin (2.7.22 p. 143.1–8 W).⁹⁹⁴ According to Arnim, these remarks occur in passages that can be referred back to Theophrastus.⁹⁹⁵ More likely is the view of Moraux, who refers this material to one of the numerous post-Theophrastean *Διαιρέσεις*, *Divisions*.⁹⁹⁶ Be that as it may, the surviving fragments of Theophrastus and the reports of later authors make clear that Theophrastus dealt with eros in several different ways. He concerned himself with the definition of eros (557–558) and considered the possibility not only of excess but also of moderation in eros (559). In addition, he included historical and anecdotal material (560–561), discussed beauty, beauty-contests and the behavior of women (562–566) and mentioned the possibility of animals falling in love with human beings (567–568).

Finally, it should be noted that Theophrastus is likely to have discussed eros in various places. Even if his fullest remarks were to be found in the (*Dialogue*) *concerning Love* and the work *On Love* (436 no. 29 & 30), he will have addressed the topic in *Political, Physical, Erotic, Natural Problems* (727 no. 4) and most likely in *On Emotions* and *On Friendship* (436 no. 5 & 23). Whether he took up the topic in *On Melancholy* must remain uncertain, but it is by no means unlikely (328 no. 7).

of sublimated eros. For in this passage we are first confronted with a reminiscence of Plato's doctrine of recollection together with his image of the winged soul, after which we are treated to Aristo's metaphor of a well-shaped foot in a straight shoe. But here the collocation of Platonic elements with Aristo's metaphor is attributable to Plutarch; it is not evidence of Aristo embracing Platonic sublimation. (Although Plutarch fails to identify the Aristo in question as either the Cean or the Chian, I follow the most recent editors, Wehrli and Stork, in identifying this Aristo with the Peripatetic from Ceos.)

⁹⁹³ In what immediately precedes, *ἐρωτομανία*, "erotic madness," is classified as a vicious disposition (Stobaeus 2.7.21 p. 142.22–23 W).

⁹⁹⁴ Cf. Aristotle, *NE* 8.3 1156b1–3.

⁹⁹⁵ Arnim (1926) pp. 69–80.

⁹⁹⁶ Moraux (1973) p. 400.

557 Stobaeus, *Anthology* 4.20.64 (vol. 4 p. 468.4–7 Hense)

Literature: Winckelmann (1836) p. 110; Brandis (1860) p. 352; Zeller (1879) vol. 2.2 pp. 863–864; Mayer (1907–1910) p. 565 n. 169; Walzer (1939, repr. 1962) p. 58; Gutas (1973) p. 263; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 314–316, (2006a) pp. 96–97, (2011a) Chapter 2.2; R. Hunter (2004) col. 41

Text 557 is taken from Stobaeus' *Anthology*. It is one of forty-three excerpts that are brought together under the heading Ψόγος Ἀφροδίτης καὶ ὅτι φαῦλος ὁ ἔρως καὶ πόσων εἴη κακῶν γεγονὼς αἴτιος; "Censure of Aphrodite, and That Eros Is Contemptible, and Of How Many Evils Has Eros Been the Cause?" Our text is immediately preceded by excerpts from Xenophon (Socrates is made to say that a beautiful youth can cause madness not only with a kiss but also when seen at a distance [*Mem.* 1.3.11–13]) and Favorinus (Eros is addressed as a jealous and irrational daemon [fr. 18 Barigazzi]) and followed by excerpts from Prodicus (eros is said to be desire doubled and madness eros doubled [fr. 7 D–K]) and Libanius (Theophrastus called love an emotion of a soul at leisure [*Progymn.* 3 = 558]). All these excerpts are at home under the heading, but it would be a mistake to think that the context in which 557 originally occurred is clearly indicated by one or more of these texts. We are dealing with excerpts from different writings by different authors, who may or may not be approaching the topic of eros in the same way.

Theophrastus defines eros as follows: ἔρως δὲ ἐστὶν ἀλογίστου τινὸς ἐπιθυμίας ὑπερβολή ταχεῖαν μὲν ἔχουσα τὴν πρόσοδον, βραδεῖαν δὲ τὴν ἀπόλυσιν. "Eros is an excess of a certain irrational desire, whose coming is swift and parting slow" (lines 1–2). Here eros is viewed as an extreme: an excess of desire, ἐπιθυμίας ὑπερβολή.⁹⁹⁷ We may compare text 438, in which eros and ἐπιθυμία are distinguished by reference to the more and the less, τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον.⁹⁹⁸ In one respect that creates a difference between the two texts. In 438 ἔρως and ἐπιθυμία are distinct; they are marked off from one another by difference in degree.⁹⁹⁹ In 557 ἔρως is not distinct from ἐπιθυμία; rather, ἔρως is

⁹⁹⁷ Cf. Aristotle, *NE* 9.10, where eros is said to be a certain excess of friendship: ὑπερβολή τις φιλίας.

⁹⁹⁸ Concerning the question whether the relevant portion of 438 can be attributed to Theophrastus, see the commentary on that text.

⁹⁹⁹ See the commentary, above, section 4, on 438, and cf. Prodicus, fr. 7 D–K, cited in the preceding paragraph: There ἐπιθυμία, ἔρως and μανία form a range based on the more and less.

conceived of as a particular kind of ἐπιθυμία. Nevertheless, the two texts are in agreement in that both present eros as a strong form of desire. As a consequence both may be distinguished from 559, according to which eros can be moderate as well as intense. That may appear contradictory, but it is in line with everyday experience and common sense. Since sexual desire is often quite intense and incompatible with sound judgment, eros is apt to be conceived of as a distinct form of desire. But since people can and do experience moderate sexual desire without unwanted consequences, it makes sense to distinguish between intense and moderate eros. Theophrastus will have understood that and seen no objection to working with different conceptions of eros depending on the context. On some occasions, it would be appropriate to treat eros narrowly as an overwhelming force, much as the early poets did. But on other occasions, it would be equally appropriate to work with an inclusive notion of eros: one that recognizes that not all sexual desire need be disruptive. Even within a single work, especially a dialogue, presenting different conceptions of eros might be quite in place. Plato's *Phaedrus* offers a well-known example.

Eros is said to be an excess of a certain irrational desire, ἀλόγιστου τινὸς ἐπιθυμίας (line 1). Comparison of this use of ἀλόγιστος with Aristotelian usage suggests construing ἀλόγιστος as "not-calculating" (*EE* 3.4 1232a17–18) and grouping eros together with emotions like anger and confidence (*EE* 3.1 1229a20–21, *Rhet.* 2.8 1385b29–30, cf. Plato, *Phil.* 47E1–2, 50B7–C1), for each of these πάθη can occur independently of reflection and when intense can prevent consideration of future consequences. This way of interpreting 557 is straightforward and most likely correct. Nevertheless, we should take note of Plato's *Republic* 4.14 439D–E, where the lowest part of the tripartite soul is spoken of as ἀλόγιστόν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμητικόν. Hunger, thirst and sexual desire (ἐρᾶν) are assigned to this part of the soul, which is the seat of bodily drives, while anger *qua* emotion is assigned to a different part, i.e., the θυμοειδές. We should also take note of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* 1.11 1370a18–27, where ἄλογοι ἐπιθυμῖαι are discussed,¹⁰⁰⁰ for these desires are said to arise through the body and not to result from judgment. They are different from desires that are μετὰ λόγου and arise through persuasion. Typical of the ἄλογοι ἐπιθυμῖαι are not only hunger and thirst but also sexual desire (ἐπιθυμία περὶ

¹⁰⁰⁰ The use of ἄλογος instead of ἀλόγιστος need not be significant; cf. *Rhetoric* 1.10 1369a2, 4, where Gaisford's emendation is unnecessary.

τὰ ἀφροδίσια 1370a23).¹⁰⁰¹ Also relevant is Plato's *Timaeus*, where fluidity of marrow and porosity of bone are said to be responsible for sexual excess (86C3–E3).¹⁰⁰² In addition, there is the pseudo-Aristotelian *Problems*, in which lust is attributed to an excess of warm black bile (30.1 953b32–34, 954a32). Theophrastus' definition of eros is almost certainly intended to cover all these cases in which physiological causes play a determining role. But it would be a mistake to think that Theophrastus wished to restrict eros to such cases, for as observed at the beginning of this paragraph the adjective ἀλόγιστος can be applied to πάθη that depend upon belief or opinion, i.e., emotions like anger and confidence. Eros may always have a physiological component, but there are clear cases where judgment triggers erotic desire. A person deems another lovely and thinks that sexual contact will be enjoyable. That assessment combined with a belief about future pleasure arouses eros: it is the efficient cause. In such cases eros may be classified as an emotion, albeit one with a strong physiological component. Moreover, the idea that release from eros occurs slowly (βραδεῖαν δὲ τὴν ἀπόλυσιν, line 2) seems to fit better the mental state of a lover than his physiological condition.¹⁰⁰³ Put differently, Theophrastus seems to label eros ἀλόγιστος, not least because a lover longs for his beloved, even when he has satisfied his bodily needs. Considerations of poor health, lost time and squandered substance are not taken seriously, nor are they capable of removing the pleasant, stimulating memories and expectations that accompany eros. That said, we should not overlook the fact that eros need not be viewed as an enduring state or condition. Aristotle is neither making a factual error nor misusing the Greek language, when he tells us that young people are ἐρωτικοί and then adds that they fall in love quickly and just as quickly lose interest (NE 8.3 1156b1–6).¹⁰⁰⁴ It is clear that erotic relationships take different

¹⁰⁰¹ See Fortenbaugh (1975a, repr. 2002) pp. 84–85.

¹⁰⁰² See Fortenbaugh (1970) pp. 66–68, (repr. 2006c) pp. 34–35.

¹⁰⁰³ Concerning the use of the word ἀπόλυσιν, see Porphyry, *On Claudius Ptolemy's Harmonics* 1.3 p. 65.14 Düring = 716.130 and F. Dirlmeier, “Κάθαρσις παθημάτων,” *Hermes* 75 (1940) pp. 89–91.

¹⁰⁰⁴ See also *Rhetoric* 2.12, where Aristotle says that young people are characterized by desire (they are ἐπιθυμητικοί), and in regard to the body they are especially given to sexual desire. He then adds that youths are changeable and quickly sated in their desires, which are intense but quickly over (1389a4–7). In regard to this passage, we might say that the physiological condition of young people disposes them to be lustful, but any one episode or attachment may end quickly through satiety.

forms. 557 focuses on a particularly disturbing and enduring form and is not to be understood as offering a general definition that is applicable to eros in all its forms.

557 is connected by Winckelmann with a passage in Plutarch's Ἐρωτικὸς, (*Dialogue*) concerning Love, in which intense sexual desire between men and women is compared with excessive indulgence in food (4750C–D). It is true that this focus on intense sexual desire invites comparison with 557, but as Mayer makes clear, the Plutarchan passage is not drawing on Theophrastus or any other early Peripatetic. Rather the argument is fundamentally Stoic in that it emphasizes friendship and virtue.¹⁰⁰⁵ We are told that heterosexual desire is directed toward pleasure and when intense it is on a par with gluttony. It is, therefore, fundamentally different from true eros, which attaches itself to a young and talented soul, that of a male, and brings that soul to virtue through friendship.

If pressed to choose a Theophrastean work to which 557 might be assigned, I would choose the (*Dialogue*) concerning Love (436 no. 29), for I can easily imagine the definition given in 557 being debated by the interlocutors and opposed to a quite different definition that is more favorable. But my choice is little more than a guess. It is quite possible that the definition set out in 557 comes from the work *On Love* (436 no. 30), where it was subjected to careful analysis.

- 558 Libanius, *Preliminary Exercises* 3 (Chriae).4.1–3 (BT vol. 8 p. 97.11–98.9 Foerster)

Literature: Walzer (1939, repr. 1962) p. 58; Gutas (1975) pp. 81, 257–263; Fortenbaugh (1984) 316–317; Overwien (2001) pp. 115, 126

Text 558 occurs in Libanius' *Preliminary Exercises*. It is found among the *chriae*, rhetorical exercises that take their start from memorable sayings. The Greek word χρεία has a variety of meanings; LSJ lists five: I) need or want, II) business or employment, III) use, advantage or service, IV) familiarity or intimacy, and V) pregnant sentence or maxim. Our concern is with the last. Rhetorical exercises called chriae acquired their name from the sayings, which were called chriae, apparently because of their usefulness (LSJ III), especially in education and generally in guiding

¹⁰⁰⁵ Concerning Stoic doctrine, see Diogenes Laertius' *Life of Zeno*, where we are told that the wise man will love (ἐρασθήσεται) youths who exhibit a natural endowment for virtue (5.129) and that love (ἔρως) is an effort at making friends (5.130).

human action.¹⁰⁰⁶ In the case before us, we first have Theophrastus' response to the question "What is eros?" His answer, "An emotion of the soul at leisure" (lines 1–2), is the *chria* proper, i.e., a memorable saying. The exercise follows, beginning with a short introductory section, in which Theophrastus is praised (lines 3–8). Next Theophrastus' answer is paraphrased (8–12), after which Theophrastus is congratulated for a good response, whose correctness is made clear by sound reflections (lines 12–16). The mention of sound reflections paves the way for a string of proofs that are of typical of *chriae*, contribute little to our knowledge of Theophrastus and have not been printed as part of text 558.¹⁰⁰⁷

The introduction is unimaginative. Theophrastus is said to have enjoyed a brilliant reputation in philosophy, to have emulated his teacher Aristotle and to have elucidated his teachings. We also hear that Theophrastus acquired his name due to his excellence in speaking. That is hardly new, but instead of being told that the name was given by Aristotle (1.30–31, 5A, C) we are told that it was given by unnamed persons who admired his speaking (lines 6–8). Most likely that does not represent a considered rejection of the tradition according to which Aristotle bestowed the name.

The subsequent paraphrase is marked by expansive redundancy: "asked" is followed by "demanded to learn" (lines 8–9), "what (is)" by "with what reality its growth is concerned" (lines 9), and "the soul released from cares" by "those (souls) that can be found separated from other activities" (10, 12). In addition, there is an awkward shift from singular to plural, "soul" to "those (souls)" in combination with an expansion that goes beyond the Theophrastean reply: "love vexes those (souls)" (lines 10–12). Redundancy recurs in the section that follows: "what has been said" is repeated in "this statement" (lines 14–15), and in the sections that have not been printed as part of 558. Such expansions together with other stylistic excesses and weaknesses in invention

¹⁰⁰⁶ Cf. Hermogenes, *Preliminary Exercises* 3: *χρεία* ... ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖστον χρησίμου τινὸς ἔνεκα (*RhGr* 2 p. 5.26–27 Spengel) and Aphthoios, *Preliminary Exercises* 3: *χρεία* ... *χρειώδης* δὲ οὕσα προσαγορεύεται *χρεία* (*RhGr* vol. 2 p. 23.2–4). Theon, *Preliminary Exercises* 5, differs from Hermogenes and Aphthonius in saying that a *chria* need not always be useful: *τὴν χρείαν ἐνίοτε μὴδὲν ἔχουσαν βωφελές*, and in this way differs from the maxim which is always useful (*RhGr* vol. 2 p. 96.29–97.1).

¹⁰⁰⁷ On the steps through which a *chria qua* rhetorical exercise develops, see Chapter II "The Sources" no. 26 on Libanius.

prompted Foerster to express great hesitation concerning the attribution of this particular exercise to Libanius.¹⁰⁰⁸

Both text 557 and text 558 may be said to answer the question “What is love?” but they do so in different ways. Text 557 focuses on what occurs during an episode of eros: namely, an excess of irrational desire. That answer is informative, but it does not state everything one might want to know. In particular, the goal of excessive desire is not stated.¹⁰⁰⁹ In context, however, that might not be a problem, for it might be clear that the question concerns sexual relations. Eros is regularly associated with intercourse and the like, so that the person putting the question does not need to be told that eros aims at having sex and not at eating food or quenching one’s thirst. What might have prompted the question is, e.g., a pejorative use of “eros,” and that use is explained by tying eros to excess and irrationality. The answer given in 558 is like that in 557 in that it fails to specify a goal, but it is different in that it does not focus on what occurs during an episode of eros. Instead, there is mention of a condition or circumstance in which eros is apt to occur: namely, leisure. We may compare Aristotle’s discussion of emotions in Book 2 of the *Rhetoric*. There he announces that he will analyze each emotion in terms of how a person is disposed, the object of the emotion and the grounds for feeling the emotion (2.1 1378a22–24). In speaking of how a person is disposed, he is not thinking of what a person experiences during an emotional episode. Rather, he is thinking of the conditions and circumstances that predispose a person to experience a given emotion. For example, a person who is afflicted by sickness or poverty is prone to become angry when his condition is ignored (2.2 1379a10–24)¹⁰¹⁰ and a person who finds himself in a weak position is apt to become frightened if danger presents itself (2.5 1382b33–1383a3). In much the same way, a person who finds

¹⁰⁰⁸ So Foerster, in his Teubner edition, vol. 8 pp. 61–62. Weakness in invention and style are found together, e.g., in the lists of occupations that keep a person busy: the lists are in part repetitious (sec. 4, 6, 7) and also rendered tiresome by a heavy-handed use of polysyndeton (sec. 4–6).

¹⁰⁰⁹ With the phrase “excessive desire,” it might be more natural to speak of an “object” instead of “a goal.” Nevertheless, I have written “goal” in order to focus on the activity that fulfills the desire. “Object” might suggest the person with whom sexual relations are desired. In most episodes of erotic desire, the two do not come apart, but there are times when an individual becomes sexually aroused without a particular object, i.e., partner, in mind.

¹⁰¹⁰ Aristotle includes persons experiencing eros among those who are prone to anger if their condition is treated with disregard (*Rhet.* 2.2 1379a17). Here he is thinking of eros as a condition that predisposes a person to a quite different *pathos*, anger.

himself at leisure and enjoys a strong sense of privilege is apt to seek sexual gratification. And that is especially true of a young man whose body is warm and teeming with semen (2.12 1389a4–6, 19).¹⁰¹¹ None of this would be news to Theophrastus.

If we ask in what work Theophrastus characterized eros as “an emotion of a soul at leisure,” the obvious guess is the (*Dialogue*) on Love. The question-and-answer format suggests a dialogue, and it is possible albeit unlikely that Aristotle, in his like named dialogue, responded to the same question in the same way (codex Neapolitanus II D 22 no. 17 p. 171 Sbordone).¹⁰¹² Nevertheless, it would be wrong to assume that the answer given in our text is unquestionably Theophrastean. A century earlier than Libanius, Diogenes Laertius attributed to the Cynic philosopher Diogenes of Sinope a similar characterization of eros: σχολαζόντων ἀσχολία, “the business of idle men” (6.51). Being only two words long in Greek and involving a play-on-words through the use of an alpha-privative, the version attributed to Diogenes the Cynic may be preferred or at least deemed cleverer than that attributed to Theophrastus. Be that as it may, it is idle to inquire who first expressed the idea in a memorable manner. No philosopher was needed to observe that idle persons are given to eros, and more than likely quite ordinary folk will have enjoyed expressing the idea in ways that appealed to them. In addition, it is impossible to be certain that Theophrastus actually used the words reported by Libanius. For sayings were regularly attributed to well-known persons, in order that they might acquire value, or fit into a collection of sayings organized by author,¹⁰¹³ or contribute details to a biography.¹⁰¹⁴ Moreover, it is not impossible that Theophrastus attributed the saying to, e.g., Aristotle or Theano¹⁰¹⁵ and that later generations

¹⁰¹¹ On eros as a bodily drive, see the commentary on 557. The importance of a person's bodily condition is not peculiar to eros. Cf. fright: an old man whose body has cooled through aging is more apt to become frightened than a warm bodied youth (*Rhet.* 2.13 1389b29–32).

¹⁰¹² Overwien p. 126 rejects the attribution to Aristotle, pointing out that the attribution occurs only in the Codex Neapolitanus II D 22.

¹⁰¹³ For the several collections of sayings that occur in various manuscripts and contain the saying in question or one quite similar, see the upper apparatus of parallel passages to text 558. On an erroneous report by Leo Sternbach, see J. Keaney, “Corrigenda and Addenda to Sternbach's Appendix Vaticana,” *Rivista di Studi Bizantini e Neellenici* 12–13 (1975–1976) p. 126 and my *Quellen* (1984) p. 316.

¹⁰¹⁴ Notable is Diogenes Laertius' biography of the Cynic Diogenes (6.20–81).

¹⁰¹⁵ For the attribution to Theano, see the apparatus of parallel texts to 558 and B. ten Brink, “Anecdota Epicharmi, Democrati, ceterorum in Sylloge Sententiarum Leidensi,”

introduced confusion by overlooking the person to whom Theophrastus assigned the saying and attributing it to Theophrastus himself.

Pressed to say something positive about our Libanius text, I might respond that the text illustrates well how the sayings of famous individuals could be built into rhetorical exercises and in that way transmitted to later generations. But we should not forget that collecting sayings in anthologies began early on, well before a rhetorician like Libanius taught students to work with *chriae*. Indeed, the early Peripatetics were interested in collecting *chriae*. An example is Demetrius of Phalerum, for whom Diogenes lists a work entitled *Chriae* (5.81). In the most recent edition of the fragments of Demetrius, the title is translated *Practical Maxims* and listed among the ethical titles (fr. 81 no. 5 SOD). That is certainly reasonable: many clever sayings including that in our text will have been used effectively in lectures on ethics and in practical exhortations.

559 Athenaeus, *The Sophists at Dinner* 13.14 562E (BT vol. 3 p. 240.5–13 Kaibel)

Literature: Schweighaeuser (1801–1805) pp. 30–31; Brandis (1860) p. 352; Zeller (1879) p. 864; Swoboda (1891) pp. 163–166; Walzer (1939, repr. 1962) p. 58; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 317–318, Arnott (1996) p. 664; Jacob (2000) pp. 106, 551 n. 184

Our text comes from Book 13 of *The Sophists at Dinner*. At the beginning of this book, Athenaeus tells Timocrates, his largely silent interlocutor, that their discussion will concern what was said at dinner about matters of love, περὶ ἐρωτικῶν (13.1 555A). Athenaeus then goes on to report what was said by Larensis, who is hosting the dinner (13. 2 555B–6 558E), Leonides (13.7 558E–10 560F), some unidentified persons (13.11 561A–B) and Pontianus (13.12 561C–562A). Next, Athenaeus turns to Plutarch¹⁰¹⁶ and tells us that he recited verses by Alexis, Eubulus or Ararus and again by Alexis (13.13 562A–E). After that reference is made to Theophrastus and to his (*Dialogue*) concerning Love, Ἐρωτικός (13.14 562E). That is the beginning of our text 559. We read that Theophrastus reported what the tragedian Chaerephon said about wine and love: “Just as wine is mixed with the character of the users, so also is love. And when

Philologus 6 (1851) p. 579. Brink believes that the attribution of the saying in question along with three others to Theano is a mistake. According to Brink, all four should be attributed to Theophrastus.

¹⁰¹⁶ On this Plutarch, see above, commentary on 547 n. 905.

moderate, it (love) is gracious, but when intense and disturbing, most difficult" (lines 1–4). At this point we have marked a lacuna, after which we are told that "the poet did not do badly in dividing his (Love's) powers, for he shoots twin arrows of the Graces: the one bringing good fortune and the other confusion in life" (lines 4–6).

There are several problems here. One concerns the position of our text in the context of *The Sophists at Dinner*. It comes between two quotations of Alexis, neither of which is printed as part of 559: one precedes (13.13 562D–E) and the other follows (13.14 562F). By separating these two quotations, 559 introduces a confusion: the second quotation is introduced by ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος ποιητής, "this same poet" (13.14 562F), which in the received text seems to refer to Euripides, who is quoted in lines 4–6 of 559. In his edition, Kaibel indicates the problem by printing 559 in parentheses. We may suspect a careless scribe who for one reason or another inserted our text between quotations from Alexis. But the confusion may also be attributable to Athenaeus himself. For as Jacob argues, the insertion can be explained by Athenaeus' manner of composition. He compiled a large collection of extracts from earlier authors, and subsequently combined these abstracts, organizing them around various topics, in order to create the dialogue as we have it. From time to time, he would return to material that he had already brought together and introduce a new extract. That could and in the case of 559 may well have led to an awkward separation of related material.

Another problem is presented by the words ὥς τὸν οἶνον τῶν χρωμένων <τοῖς τρόποις> κεράννυσθαι, οὕτως καὶ τὸν ἔρωτα (lines 2–3). A supplement is clearly needed to render these words intelligible, and there can be little doubt that τοῖς τρόποις is the correct supplement, for it is found in Plutarch's *The Oracles at Delphi* 23 406B, where Chaeremon is quoted. In the Loeb edition, Gulick translates "just as wine is mixed to suit the character of the drinkers, so also is the emotion inspired by eros." That is possible (taking τοῖς τρόποις as a dative of advantage or more generally a dative of reference), but it is, I think, more natural to translate "just as wine is mixed with the character of the users, so also is love."¹⁰¹⁷ Here the Plutarch passage is helpful, for prior to the quotation from Chaeremon, we hear of the effect that love has on an individual. When love comes upon someone with musical capacity, it moves that person to verse or song, and when it comes upon a person who lacks

¹⁰¹⁷ That is the translation found in FHS&G. We may compare mixing wine with water (LSJ s.v. κεράννυμι I.1).

such capacity, then it makes the person loquacious (23 405F–406A). Most likely that is the idea that stands behind our text: just as love works a particular effect when combined with a person of a certain sort, so does wine. Or reversing the analogy in accordance with our text 559, just as wine works a particular effect when combined with a certain character type, so does love. And that wine works different effects depending on the character of the affected person is not only a matter of common sense but also clearly stated in text 577B.1–3, where we read that wine does not stimulate base emotions except in the worst of people.¹⁰¹⁸

Still another problem concerns the phrase ὁ ποιητῆς οὗτος, “this poet” (line 4). In the text as transmitted, the phrase refers to Chaeremon (line 1), but the quotation that follows reproduces with considerable accuracy, albeit not complete accuracy, what we find in Euripides’ *Iphigenia at Aulis* 547–551 (quoted below). For this reason editors like Kaibel and Gulick have marked a lacuna after χαλεπώτατος and before διόπερ and understood the phrase ὁ ποιητῆς οὗτος as a reference to Euripides, who was named in the lacuna. In the text-translation volumes, we have done the same.

If one does not mark a lacuna before διόπερ, then one must offer a more complicated explanation. An example is provided by Swoboda who thinks that Athenaeus has not drawn directly on Theophrastus’ (*Dialogue*) concerning Love. Rather, he has drawn on a secondary source, to which the words διόπερ—διαρῶν φησι (lines 4–5) are said to be an addition by Athenaeus, which serves only to cloak the paltriness of the compiler.¹⁰¹⁹ We are told that Chaeremon played a role in the Theophrastean dialogue, and that on the basis of our text, we can say that Chaeremon cited his own poetry (lines 2–3 = fr. 16 Nauck), provided a reminiscence of Euripides’ *Medea* 627–631 ἔρωτες ὑπὲρ μὲν ἄγαν | ἐλθόντες οὐκ εὐδοξίαν | οὐδ’ ἀρετὰν παρέδωκαν | ἀνδράσιν· εἰ δ’ ἄλλος ἔλθοι | Κύπρις, οὐκ ἄλλα θεὸς εὐχαρις οὕτως (lines 3–4)¹⁰²⁰ and reproduced almost verbatim *Iphigenia at Aulis* 547–551: ὅθι δὴ | δίδυμ’ Ἔρωος ὁ χρυσοκόμας | τόξ’ ἐντείνεται χαρίτων, | τὸ μὲν ἐπ’ εὐαίωνι πότμῳ, | τὸ δ’ ἐπὶ συγχύσει βιοτᾶς 547–551 (lines 5–6). Much of what Swoboda asserts may well be correct. In particular, Athenaeus may be dependent

¹⁰¹⁸ The lines in question are attributable to Plutarch (the Theophrastean material follows immediately), but there is no reason to doubt that the view expressed is out of line with Theophrastean doctrine.

¹⁰¹⁹ Swoboda p. 164: “um die Armseligkeit des compilers zu bemänteln.”

¹⁰²⁰ Concerning reminiscences, both in content and verbal, see the following paragraph as well as Swoboda p. 163.

on a secondary source, and the Ἐρωτικός of Theophrastus was almost certainly a dialogue. I am, however, uneasy with the claim that Chaeremon appeared in the dialogue and that our text reflects what he said. I.e., lines 2–6 with the exception of 4–5 are to be attributed to Chaeremon as a speaker in the dialogue. More likely the words Θεόφραστος δ' ἐν τῷ Ἐρωτικῷ Χαιρήμονά φησι τὸν τραγικὸν λέγειν (lines 1–2) mean “Theophrastus, in the (*Dialogue*) concerning Love, says (reports) that Chaeremon says.” In other words, Chaeremon is not speaking for himself.¹⁰²¹ He is the subject of a report, most probably by Theophrastus, who played a role in the dialogue, perhaps the leading role. Moreover, I am reluctant to follow Swoboda and to declare the words διόπερ ὁ ποιητὴς οὗτος οὐ κακῶς αὐτοῦ τὰς δυνάμεις διαιρῶν φησι (lines 4–5) a paltry intervention by Athenaeus. In my judgment, a more likely solution can be found. Here are two possibilities.

First, the simpler solution: Chaeremon is not speaking. Someone else, probably Theophrastus, reports in indirect discourse Chaeremon’s analogy between wine and love (ὥς—οὕτως lines 1–3). Presumably the analogy was well known and for that reason cited. What follows is connected to what precedes (ὅς picks up ἔρωτα line 3), but the speaker is now drawing on Euripides’ *Medea*. That will have been made clear by an explicit reference to Euripides. Stefan Schorn has suggested to me supplying ὥς Εὐριπίδης φησί immediately after εὐχαρις (line 3). That would be appropriate, for the word εὐχαρις occurs in *Medea* 631 and the distinction between two forms of eros (lines 3–4) is present in 627–631. If the supplement is accepted (we must assume a lacuna in line 3 as against line 4), then the words ὁ ποιητὴς οὗτος are a clear reference to Euripides. In addition, there is no reason to characterize the words διόπερ—φησι as an attempt to cover up the paltriness of the compiler. The speaker (Theophrastus) accepts the division of eros into two forms and indicates that with the words οὐ κακῶς, “not badly” (line 4), followed by a new passage from Euripides that speaks of twin arrows, one bringing good fortune and the other confusion (*Iphigeneia at Aulis* 547–551).

A second solution assumes that more has been lost. It posits a lacuna after χαλεπώτατος (as in the text-translation volumes) and assumes that Euripides was mentioned in the lacuna along with Euripidean material that has been lost along with the poet’s name. The Euripidean material

¹⁰²¹ Were Chaeremon the speaker of the lines in question, that might have been made clear by using, e.g., the verb ποιεῖν: Theophrastus “makes” Chaeremon say. See above, the commentary on 489 with n. 451.

that has survived at the end of our text, δίδυμα—βιοτᾶς (lines 5–6) is not an unaltered quotation of *Iphigenia at Aulis* 547–551 (quoted above). Rather, the verses have been transformed into indirect discourse, and individual words have been replaced by others: ὄθι (547) by γάρ (line 5), Ἔρως ὁ χρυσοκόμας (548) by αὐτόν (line 5) and πότμω (550) by τύχα (line 6). These changes were, I suggest, present in the secondary source on which Athenaeus drew, and γάρ will have connected the words δίδυμα—βιοτᾶς with others that are missing in the lacuna: i.e., words that reproduced verses 543–547 of the *Iphigenia at Aulis*—μάκαρες οἱ μετρίας θεοῦ | μετὰ τε σωφροσύνας μετέ | σχον λέκτρων Ἀφροδίτας, | γαλανεΐα χρησάμενοι | μαινολῶν οἴστρον—and did so in indirect speech and with an occasional variation in wording. If that is correct, then the reference of ὁ ποιητῆς οὗτος (line 4) is not a problem: the phrase refers to Euripides, who was named in the lacuna. And the complimentary reference to Euripides—“this poet divides his (Love’s) powers not badly”—is immediately intelligible, for verses 543–547 end with a reference to maddening frenzy (547), thereby indicating that not all love is moderate (543–544). There are two forms of love, which the poet neatly indicates with the metaphor of twin arrows (548–549 = line 5).

Many or most scholars may prefer the first solution: simpler and shorter is (always) better. Even so, the second solution will have served a purpose if it makes clear that we cannot be certain where to mark a lacuna and how much material has been lost. Perhaps only the words ὥς Εὐριπίδης φησί have fallen out, but it is conceivable that whole verses of Euripides and even non-Euripidean material may have vanished.¹⁰²² Moreover, it has not been shown beyond doubt that all six lines of 559 can be embraced as a Theophrastean fragment. It is possible that the Theophrastean material extends only to τὸν ἔρωτα (line 3): i.e., only as far as Chaeremon’s analogy between wine and love, which the Peripatetic reported in his (*Dialogue*) on Love. To be sure, what follows is well joined to what precedes by the relative pronoun ὃς, but that join could have been made by Athenaeus’ secondary source or by Athenaeus himself. Or perhaps the Theophrastean material continues and includes the reminiscence of *Medea* 627–631, but then breaks off in a lacuna along

¹⁰²² The matter becomes even more speculative, when we realize that even if all scholars were to agree that Euripidean verses (whether quoted or transformed into prose) have fallen out before δίοπερ in line 4 (the second solution above), the question would remain: Which verses? Based on what follows in lines 5–6, I suggested verses from the *Iphigenia at Aulis* 543–547, but other verses have been proposed. Wilamowitz suggested fr. 967 Nauck, and Gulick mentions *Hippolytus* 443.

with a reference to Euripides. Wimmer cuts off the fragment in line 4,¹⁰²³ and in my judgment, he cannot be shown conclusively to have erred. Although the notion of twin arrows (line 5) is easily read as a poetical metaphor for moderate and intense eros (lines 3–4), it is not sufficient to prove that the second half of our text is Theophrastean. Being appropriate or compatible with Theophrastean material (lines 1–4) is not the same as being found in and excerpted from a Theophrastean dialogue. But that said, the two solutions offered above create a smooth flow between lines 1–4 and 4–6, and to my mind that speaks for a continuation of the Theophrastean material to the end of the text.

A very different worry is whether 559 is compatible with 557. In the first half of 559, Theophrastus appears to have cited Chaeremon and gone on to speak of both a moderate and an intense form of eros. At first reading that sits awkwardly with 557, where eros is defined as an excess of irrational desire. No moderate form of eros is recognized. Should we, then, say that in 559 Theophrastus introduced a view of eros that he intended to demolish in the course of his (*Dialogue*) on Love? In support of this idea, we might appeal to 486 on marriage and argue that Theophrastus had strong misgivings concerning close emotional attachments, both inside and outside of marriage. But 486 is a highly problematic text, which is misleading if read as a statement of Theophrastus' considered view. (See the commentary on 486.) Moreover, the first half of 559 speaks clearly of a moderate form of love that is gracious, and in the second half (whether Theophrastean or not) a positive form of eros is again recognized. More importantly, 559 refers explicitly to the Ἐρωτικὸς, which was almost certainly a dialogue and as such made room for differing views. The narrow and hostile view of eros found in 557 or one like it may have been presented in the Ἐρωτικὸς and then criticized as too narrow, perhaps by an appeal to ordinary usage or to poets like Euripides.¹⁰²⁴

In conclusion and lest the obvious escape notice, I call attention to the fact that drawing a distinction between moderate and intense forms of love (lines 3–4), which have good and bad consequences, respectively (line 6), need not rule out mixed cases in which joy is countered by pain and vice versa. Cf. Sappho's description of love as "sweet-bitter" (fr. 118 D).

¹⁰²³ Wimmer's fragment number is 107.

¹⁰²⁴ On the poets, see the introduction to this section, above pp. 660–662.

560 Strabo, *Geography* 10.4.12 (CB vol. 7 p. 92.14–93.1 Lasserre)

Literature: Winckelmann (1836) p. 223; Mayer (1907–1910) p. 591 n. 253; Guarducci (1935) p. 279; Fortenbaugh (1984) p. 319

This text occurs in Strabo's *Geography* within his discussion of the island of Crete. In 10.4.7 Strabo takes up the largest and most famous cities on the island. He first discusses Cnossus (10.4.7–10), then Gortyn and its two harbors, Leben and Matalum (10.4.11).¹⁰²⁵ The mention of Leben is the occasion for a short excursus concerning Leucocomas and his lover Euxynthetus, both of whom hailed from Leben. The excursus is our text 560. Strabo cites Theophrastus, referring explicitly to his work Περὶ ἔρωτος, *On Love*, and mentions one of several tasks that Leucocomas is said to have imposed on Euxynthetus: namely, that of fetching "the dog in Praesus" (lines 3–4). It appears that Theophrastus is introduced not only because he told a story concerning two inhabitants of Leben but also because in telling this story he mentioned Praesus and thereby provided Strabo with an easy transition from Gortyn and its harbors to the city of Praesus (10.4.12).

There is, however, a problem, for in what follows immediately on 560, Strabo locates Praesus in two different places. First he tells us that Praesus borders on Leben, and then, referring to what he has said previously (10.4.6), he places Praesus in the eastern part of the island between Samonium and Cherronesus (10.4.12). Apparently Strabo has confused Praesus with Priansus, which is much closer to Leben than Praesus in the East.¹⁰²⁶ But even if that is the case, we are left wondering how Strabo could locate Praesus in two different places without noticing what he was doing.¹⁰²⁷

Although Strabo refers explicitly to Theophrastus' work *On Love*, he does not say anything about the context in which Theophrastus will have mentioned Leucocomas and Euxynthetus. One possibility is that Theophrastus cited the pair in order to illustrate the excessive, arrogant demands that a beloved sometimes imposes on his lover. We may com-

¹⁰²⁵ Gortyn is located roughly in the middle of Crete. Leben and Matalum are below Gortyn on the coast: Leben directly to the south and Matalum to the southwest.

¹⁰²⁶ On the two cities, see, e.g., W. Smith, *Dictionary of Greek and Roman Geography* (London: J. Murray 1873) vol. 2 pp. 666–667.

¹⁰²⁷ Guarducci speculates that the dog referred to by Theophrastus may have something in common with the golden dog that Pandareus is said to have stolen (Antoninus Liberalis, *Collection of Metamorphoses* 36 = *Mythographi Graeci*, vol. 2.1 p. 118). In his notes to the Budé edition of Strabo (vol. 7 p. 139), F. Lasserre rejects the idea.

pare Plutarch's *Dialogue on Love* 20 766C–D, where Leucocomas and Euxynthetes are mentioned in order to support the assertion that Eros responds with quick and strong punishment, should a beloved fail to treat his lover with consideration.¹⁰²⁸ That does not prove that Theophrastus told the story of Leucocomas and Euxynthetes in order to document what follows upon inconsiderate treatment, but a parallel account by the historian Conon lends additional support to the idea. Promachus, we are told, was the lover of Leucocomas and both lived in Cnossus. Promachus is said to have accomplished several difficult tasks but failed to receive the expected reward. Accordingly Promachus took revenge. What Leucocomas had last demanded, a famous helmet, Promachus placed on the head of another beautiful youth. Leucocomas was so affected by jealousy that he committed suicide (Conon ap. Photius, *Library* 186 133a = FGh 26 F 1 [XVI]). This variation together with Plutarch's account makes me think that Theophrastus is likely to have used the story to underline the importance of reciprocity. As in the rest of life, so it is with relationships involving love: reciprocity creates and maintains a strong bond. But if reciprocity is ignored, if an expected return is not delivered, then a different kind of return may follow: namely revenge or retribution.

561 Athenaeus, *The Sophists at Dinner* 13.21 567B (BT vol. 3 p. 250.7–9 Kaibel)

Literature: Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 319–320; Henry (1992) pp. 262–263, (2000) p. 506

Text 561 is found in Book 13 of *The Sophists at Dinner*. Eros is the stated topic (13.1 555A–B), and that is what the diners do discuss. Prior to our text, Plutarch of Alexandria has spoken and made reference to Theophrastus' (*Dialogue*) *concerning Love*, in which the tragedian Chaeremon is reported to have drawn an analogy between wine and love (13.14 562E

¹⁰²⁸ Mayer p. 591 n. 253 criticizes Winckelmann p. 223 for connecting this Plutarchan passage with that in Strabo. Mayer argues that the Plutarchan passage concerns a man and a woman in Cyprus, while the passage in Strabo concerns two males in Crete. In one respect, Mayer's argument is correct. Winckelmann understands the Plutarchan passage to be about a man and a woman. And that is Mayer's understanding as well. But in a different respect, Mayer's argument fails because it is based on a faulty text: τί γάρ ἂν λέγοι τις Εὐξύνθετον καὶ Λευκομάντιδα τὴν ἐν Κύπρῳ. The correct text was established by Rhode—read Εὐξύνθετον καὶ Λευκοκόμαν; τί δὲ τὴν ἐν Κύπρῳ (766C)—so that mention of a woman and Cyprus come after the question concerning Euxynthetes and Leucocomas.

= 559). Myrtilus of Thessaly¹⁰²⁹ speaks after Plutarch and *inter alia* attacks the Stoics and praises beauty. After that Cynulcus, the Cynic philosopher, roundly abuses Myrtilus, saying that he is totally different from Theomander of Cyrene, who according to Theophrastus, in the work *On Happiness*, professed to teach good fortune. Cynulcus goes on to call Myrtilus a teacher of lust, ἐρωτοδιδάσκαλος (13.21 567A = 489) and to state that he is “no different from Amasis of Elis, who, Theophrastus says in the (*Dialogue*) *concerning Love*, was clever in matters of love, περὶ τοὺς ἔρωτας.” The comparison with Amasis is our text (13.21 567B = 561).¹⁰³⁰ It follows 489 without any intervening material.

Both Theomander and Amasis are known only from Athenaeus and in particular from 489 and 561, respectively. The name “Amasis” suggests an eastern (Egyptian) origin. It is possible that Amasis expressed himself on matters of love in some written work, but that cannot be deduced from the few words of our text. The phrase περὶ τοὺς ἔρωτας δεινόν (line 2) may recall Plato’s *Symposium* 198D1–2, 207C3, where the phrase δεινὸς τὰ ἐρωτικά occurs, but there is no good reason to suspect a deliberate reminiscence of the Platonic phrase, and the same is true concerning a comparison between Amasis and Socrates.

The adjective δεινός is often, as here, translated with “clever.” That is understandable, for both δεινός and “clever” and the cognate nouns δεινότης and “cleverness” can be used without a negative connotation, but in context they are frequently used of an intelligent person who lacks a moral compass. Well known is Aristotle’s distinction between φρόνησις and δεινότης, practical wisdom and cleverness, in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. Whereas φρόνησις implies moral virtue, δεινότης does not; and

¹⁰²⁹ As presented by Athenaeus, Myrtilus’ family was of modest means (his father was a boot-maker 13.24 568E). At one point he is compared with the poet of Old Comedy named Myrtilus, but it is not clear whether Athenaeus has borrowed the poet’s name for a fictional character of his own making. Indeed, Mengis pp. 37–38 thinks that the number of details given by Athenaeus concerning Myrtilus’ life suggests that the Myrtilus of *The Sophists at Dinner* may have a foothold in reality.

¹⁰³⁰ In the sentence that follows on 561, Cynulcus calls Myrtilus a pornographer and likens him to the painters Aristides, Pausias and Nicophanes. The sentence is of interest in that it contains the earliest occurrence of the word πορνογράφος (Henry [2000] pp. 398, 504, 506). The fact that the characterization of Myrtilus is continued with a second comparison might encourage extending the Theophrastean fragment to include the sentence. But in my judgment (following Wimmer fr. 108), that would be a mistake. Theophrastean material does not extend beyond δεινὸν γεγονέναι λέγει (i.e. the end of 561).

whereas the deliberations of the φρόνιμος are directed toward commendable goals, those of the δεινός may be reprehensible (6.12 1144a23–b1, 7.10 1152a6–14).

Athenaeus cites two different works of Theophrastus, *On Happiness* (436 no. 12) and the (*Dialogue*) *concerning Love* (436 no. 29), in back-to-back sentences (489.2 and 561.2). That may remind us that remarks concerning eros need not be confined to a work specifically focused on eros. And perhaps more importantly, we cannot assume that when Athenaeus refers to Theophrastus or any other fragmentary author more than once in close proximity, he is drawing on one and the same work of the author in question. Indeed, if he is drawing on a secondary source, then he is dependent on that source and the manner in which the compiler arranged his material.

625 Parthenius, *Love Stories* 18 (On Neaera).1–4 (*Myth. Gr.* Vol. 2.1, suppl. p. 73.17–74 Martini)

626 Parthenius, *Love Stories* 9 (On Polycrite).1–8 (*Myth. Gr.* Vol. 2.1, suppl. p. 56.5–58.20 Martini)

Literature: Dümmler (1887) pp. 180–181; Mittelhaus (1911) p. 35; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1517–1518; Stadter (1965) pp. 93–97; Wehrli (1983) p. 497; Podlecki (1985) p. 240; Mirhady (1992) pp. 157–160; Lightfoot (1999) pp. 220, 418–428, 489–491; Francese (2001) pp. 75, 78, 83–89; Wehrli-Wöhrle (2004) p. 535

We have here two texts that in the text-translation volumes are printed in the section on “Politics” under the heading “Women and War.” They are referred to from the section on “Ethics” under the heading “Eros,” because both texts tell a story in which sexual desire is an important factor. In 625 we read of Neaera, the wife of Hysicreon of Miletus, who became passionate (ἐρασθῆναι line 4) about a friend of her husband, Promedon of Naxos. The friend came for a visit, during which Neaera controlled herself, because her husband was present. But when the friend came again and the husband was not at home, she pressured him into making love. Subsequently the two fled separately to Naxos,¹⁰³¹ and when Neaera refused to return to Miletus, Hysicreon persuaded the Milesians

¹⁰³¹ If I understand the text correctly, the two fled separately. The day after intercourse, Promedon realized the terrible thing that he had done and returned to Naxos. Neaera, fearing the wrath of Hysicreon, followed (625.11–13).

to make war on the Naxians. In 626 we read that the Milesians and their allies were besieging the Naxians, who were holed up in their city. A Naxian maiden named Polycrite, who had been left outside the city, captivated Diognetus, a leader of the allies. At first rejected by Polycrite, Diognetus, being overwhelmed by desire (ἔρωτος κρατούμενος lines 19–20), agreed to betray the besieging forces. The betrayal was a success, except that Diognetus was killed by mistake, and the people of Naxos, in appreciation for what Polycrite had done, so loaded her up with gifts that she was weighed down and suffocated.

A note that occurs in the margin of the manuscript and is printed before the story of Neaera and Promedon in the text-translation volumes¹⁰³² tells us that Theophrastus reports the story in the first book of the work Πρὸς τοὺς καιροὺς, *Regarding Crises* (625.1).¹⁰³³ A similar note says that the story of Polycrite and Diognetus is taken from the first book of Andriscus' Νάξιακά, *Naxian Matters*. The note goes on to say that Theophrastus, too, reports the story in the fourth book *Regarding Crises* (626.1–2). That tells us that Theophrastus presented the stories separately,¹⁰³⁴ much as Parthenius does. However, it does not tell us that Theophrastus completely failed to connect the two stories. They could appear in two separate books along with a comment to the effect that they are two episodes in one continuous story concerning relations between Miletus and Naxos. In addition, it is not clear that Parthenius bases his story of Polycrite and Promedon entirely on Andriscus. The marginal note mentions Theophrastus, and that at least suggests the possibility that the author of the note recognized certain elements in the story that figured prominently or even uniquely in the Theophrastean version. Moreover, the story is concluded with a reference to some persons who say (φασὶ δέ τινες) that Diognetus was burned on the same pyre as Polycrite (626.44–46). That makes clear that Parthenius was prepared to include material from different sources, should the material be suited

¹⁰³² As indicated in the discussion of sources, the presentation of the marginal note in the text-translation volumes might have been better handled. See above, Chapter II “The Sources” no. 5 with n. 46.

¹⁰³³ The Theophrastean title is 589 no. 4b.

¹⁰³⁴ We might try to avoid this conclusion by emending the text. The marginal notes are written in majuscule, so that an alpha “A” could easily be confused with a delta “Δ” or *vice versa*. I.e., both stories might have been found in the first book or the fourth book. But this strikes me as unnecessary speculation. In Diogenes’ catalogue of Theophrastean works, *Politics regarding Crises* is assigned four books, so that there is little reason to suspect the marginal note’s reference to the fourth book. And in Parthenius, the two stories are separated, which suggests that Theophrastus may have done the same.

to his theme (ἐρωτικὰ παθήματα, “sufferings involving love,” as stated in the first sentence of the preface).¹⁰³⁵ And again, we may suspect that Parthenius not only selected material that suited his theme but also shaped it as he chose and even added material on his own. These several considerations should give us pause before we attempt to determine with any accuracy what material is and is not Theophrastean.

In Plutarch’s *The Virtues of Women*, the two stories are made into one, and there are differences from what we read in Parthenius. To be sure, the names of the persons are the same, and love remains a driving force: Neaera is said to have fallen in love (ἡρώσθη) with Promedon, and the same is said of Diognetus in regard to Polycrite (ἐρώσθεις). But in Plutarch, there is no mention of Promedon’s reluctance to give into the advances of Neaera, and the two sail to Naxos together, not one after the other, as Parthenius tells the story. Furthermore, in the Plutarchan version, Polycrite is one among several women and maidens, who were captured. Diognetus treats her as a wedded wife, and Polycrite is able to save his life when the Naxians mount a successful attack. Polycrite’s subsequent death is attributed to the great joy that she experienced when greeted by her fellow citizens (17 254B–E).

After recording this version of the story, Plutarch tells us that it is what the Naxian authors record. In addition, Plutarch records what Aristotle said concerning Polycrite and Diognetus. The former was not taken captive. Diognetus saw her in some other way, fell in love, gave his oath to do what Polycrite might ask, and engaged in betrayal. That is very much the second (half of the) story as presented by Parthenius. The ending, however, is different. The Naxians are said to have been put on an even footing with the Milesians and to have ended the war on favorable terms (254F = fr. 559a Rose³). In addition, Plutarch’s report concerning Aristotle lacks a statement regarding the fate of Polycrite and Diognetus. The omission is partly filled by what Gellius tells us in the third book of the *Attic Nights* (3.15.1 = fr. 559b Rose³). There we read that according to Aristotle, Polycrite expired as a result of sudden and unexpected joy. That relates closely to what Plutarch says. Apparently Aristotle combined elements that appear separately in the reports of Parthenius and Plutarch.

What then did Theophrastus report concerning Polycrite and Diognetus? Forced to guess, I suggest that Theophrastus followed Aristotle and presented Polycrite as a woman who captivated Diognetus with her good

¹⁰³⁵ There is no reason to exclude the occasional use of oral sources. A phrase like “some say” is vague enough to include more than what is written down.

looks (she was never herself a prisoner) and who bound Diognetus by an oath. Theophrastus may also have followed his teacher in having Polycrite die as a result of excessive joy. That would put Theophrastus in line with Plutarch as well as Aristotle. But it is also possible that Theophrastus ignored the fate not only of Polycrite but also of Diognetus. He may have satisfied himself by stating that the war between Naxos and Miletus came to an end. Such an ending would be in line with what Plutarch—but not Gellius—reports concerning Aristotle,¹⁰³⁶ and it might be deemed appropriate in a political writing, whose fuller title is Πολιτικά πρὸς τοὺς καίρους, *Politics regarding Crises*.¹⁰³⁷ For in a writing whose focus is crises that affect the city-state, neither a heartrending description of Polycrite's death in the very moment of her joy nor a romantic account of a shared funeral pyre seems especially relevant. The important point will have been that Polycrite took advantage of a favorable opportunity, and that led to the conclusion of the war.¹⁰³⁸ But even if that is correct, we should remember that Theophrastus was regarded as a popular teacher, so that it is easy to imagine him mixing in some emotion-packed details in order to keep his students' attention.

I leave further speculation concerning the political relevance of 625 and 626 to *Commentary* 7, in which the political fragments will receive their primary discussion. Here I offer a few comments on the relevance of the two texts to ethical issues. First, it is obvious that lust and acts of infidelity can work havoc among ordinary people. And as 625 makes clear, friendship is often a contributing factor to infidelity.¹⁰³⁹ For with friendship comes proximity, time for desire to take hold and opportunities to act. Moreover, in human beings sexual desire is more than a bodily drive that compels action. Neaera falls in love with Promedon, but she

¹⁰³⁶ It is unlikely, but not impossible that Gellius' report concerning Aristotle is drawn from a different source than Plutarch's report. In the latter case, the report offers several details, all of which are appropriate to a fleshed-out version of the Polycrite-Diognetus story. What Gellius offers is minimal. We hear only of Polycrite dying as a result of her joy. Since Gellius seems to have known and cited a version of the ps.-Aristotelian *Problems* that differs from the version we have in the corpus Aristotelicum (see Chapter II "The Sources" no. 17 on Gellius), it is, I think, possible that he is drawing on his version of the *Problems* and in particular a chapter in which the question concerns the deadly consequences of sudden and strong emotion.

¹⁰³⁷ The title is 589 no. 4a.

¹⁰³⁸ In 625 the important point is the infidelity of Neaera. It is an illustration of the way in which a woman's lust can affect an entire city (cf. Helen of Troy). Details concerning the way in which she achieved satisfaction are less relevant, albeit entertaining.

¹⁰³⁹ Hypsicreon and Promedon are introduced as especially close friends, μάλιστα φίλοι (625.2).

makes no advance while her husband is at home. When he is away, she acts but not foolishly. Rather, she proceeds in a calculated manner, first attempting persuasion and only later acting aggressively. Her servants lock the bedroom door, inducements are provided, so that eventually Promedon is compelled (ἡναγκάσθη) to engage in intercourse (lines 8–11). Presumably the compulsion here is not entirely restricted to pressures brought to bear by Neaera. We should also think of an awakened and mounting desire on the part of Promedon. And if that is correct, is he simply a victim? Or is he partially responsible? Or are the inducements such that no normal person can endure, such that giving way after efforts to resist is not only to be expected but also to be forgiven?¹⁰⁴⁰

In 626 we find matters reversed. Now it is a man, Diognetus, that is erotically attracted to a woman, Polycrite. Diognetus is described as stricken with great desire, πολλῷ δὲ ἐχόμενος πόθῳ (line 9); but he is not out of control. He appreciates that Polycrite is a suppliant in a temple and therefore avoids force. Nevertheless, lust seems to have dulled Diognetus' mind, for he swears that he will do whatever he is asked to do. As he soon learns, that involves betraying his troops. The story may serve as a balance to the story of Neaera: a man can be captivated by a beautiful woman in much the same way that a woman can fall in love with a handsome man.¹⁰⁴¹ And in both cases, erotic desire need not but can so take control of the person, that the person acts against his or her better judgment and with disastrous consequences.

562 Athenaeus, *The Sophists at Dinner* 13.89 609E (BT vol. 3 p. 344.25–345.2 Kaibel)

Literature: Fortenbaugh (1984) p. 320

Text 562 occurs toward the end of Book 13 of the *Sophists at Dinner*.¹⁰⁴² The topic of the book is eros (13.1 551A–B). Theophrastus has already been cited four times by three different diners: once by Plutarch of

¹⁰⁴⁰ Cf. Aristotle, *NE* 7.7, where we are told that there is nothing surprising in someone being overcome by strong and excessive pleasures or pains. In fact, being overcome is pardonable, if the person has offered resistance (1150b6–8). Promedon seems a good fit. At first he resists (he is said not to give in), and he succumbs only after the doors are locked and inducements added (625.8–11). Disappointingly the inducements are not described, but we can imagine that they were not trivial.

¹⁰⁴¹ On one reading of 565, the first line offers a similarly balanced view of men and women. See the commentary on 565.

¹⁰⁴² Text 562 occurs at 609C; the book ends just over three pages later at 612F.

Alexandria (559), twice by Cynulcus (489, 561) and once by Myrtilus (567A). Our text 562 follows 567A by some three pages.¹⁰⁴³ Myrtilus is still speaking and will not leave off until he cites Theophrastus two more times (563 and 564).¹⁰⁴⁴

In what immediately precedes our text, Athenaeus has Myrtilus speak of eight women who were famous for their beauty. He cites sources, reports the names of six of the women and comments briefly on each.¹⁰⁴⁵ The last to be mentioned is not identified by name. She is said to have been the daughter of Charmus and to have been taken by Peisistratus for Hippias, who assumed the tyranny in Athens after Hipparchus. That prompts a quasi-footnote: Charmus was the lover of Hippias and established the altar to Eros near the Academy (13.89 608F–609D), after which comes our text. Myrtilus shifts from individual women to groups of women. He cites the third book of Hesiod's *Melampodia*, in which the poet said that Chalcis in Euboea is marked by beautiful women. Myrtilus accepts this characterization and cites Theophrastus as a witness (562). After that Myrtilus cites Nymphodorus who in his *Voyage in Asia* said that women more beautiful than anywhere else are found on the island of Tenedos (not included as part of 562).

On my reading of 562, Theophrastus is cited as an additional witness to what Hesiod says concerning the women of Chalcis. We are not told that Theophrastus actually cited Hesiod. He may have done so, but it would be wrong to assert that he did.

Theophrastus is cited by name, but no Theophrastean work is cited. That is striking not only because Athenaeus often cites Theophrastus by work as well as name¹⁰⁴⁶ but also because works are cited in the lines that immediately surround our text (titles are given for Hesiod and Nymphodorus) and in the preceding discussion of individual women (no

¹⁰⁴³ Text 567A occurs at 606C; 562 occurs some three pages later at 609E.

¹⁰⁴⁴ At the conclusion of Myrtilus' speech, Athenaeus comments on its length (it begins at 13.27 571A and runs with interruption to 13.90 610B). The other diners are said to have marveled at Myrtilus' memory (13.91 610B).

¹⁰⁴⁵ Concerning the six named women, we learn the following: Thargelia was married fourteen times; Anoutis is said to have been licentious; Timosa was the concubine of Oxyartes; Xenopeitheia was killed by the Spartans; Pantica lived in the court of Olympias and was licentious; Phya was given in marriage to Hipparchus by Peisistratus. Of the two who are not named, the first is said to have restored Peisistatus to tyrannical power, and the second to have been the daughter of the former polemarch Charmus.

¹⁰⁴⁶ In regard to ethics, Athenaeus cites by title the work *On Dispositions* (437), *On Flattery* (547), *On Pleasure* (549, 550, 551, 553), the *(Dialogue) concerning Love* (559, 561, 567A) and *On Drunkenness* (569, 570, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576).

less than five titles are given). That may reflect Athenaeus' source, but certainty seems unattainable. If one asks in what Theophrastean work the women of Chalcis are likely to have been mentioned for their beauty, the (*Dialogue*) *Concerning Eros* (436 no. 29) comes to mind, but a different work cannot be excluded.

- 563 Athenaeus, *The Sophists at Dinner* 13.90 609F (BT vol. 3 p. 345.14–17 Kaibel)

Literature: Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 320–321

In Book 13 of the *Sophists at Dinner*, immediately after the report concerning the beautiful women of Chalcis (562) and Tenedos (13.89 609E), Athenaeus has Myrtilus cite the historian Nicias, who in his *History of Arcadia* spoke of a feminine beauty contest that Cypselus instituted after founding a city in the plain of the Alpheius River. The wife of Cypselus is reported to have been the first winner (13.90 609E–F). After that Myrtilus cites Theophrastus concerning a masculine beauty contest that takes place in Elis. Judging the contest is said to be carried out with earnestness, and the winners are said to receive weapons as prizes (563). Myrtilus continues by citing two additional sources. According to Dionysius of Leuctra the weapons are dedicated to Athena, and according to Myrsilus in his *Historical Paradoxes* a crown of myrtle is given to the winner (609F–610A). Neither of these reports is printed as part of 563, and we have no way of knowing whether Theophrastus omitted these details. Perhaps Theophrastus did mention them, but in citing Theophrastus Athenaeus may be following a secondary source that omitted them. Or Athenaeus may have chosen to cite additional sources in order to exhibit learnedness.

Much earlier in Book 13 when Myrtilus first speaks (13.15 563C–13.20 566E), there is mention of a beauty contest between men in Elis. The winner is assigned the task of carrying the vessels of the goddess, the person who finishes second leads the ox, and the third place finisher places the offerings on the fire (13.20 565F–566A). Gulick guesses that the goddess mentioned here is Hera,¹⁰⁴⁷ but comparison with the later passage in which Diogenes of Leuctra is cited (13.90 609F–610A) suggests Athena. In any case, it seems likely that the same beauty contest is being referred to in both passages and that the contest was more than a determination

¹⁰⁴⁷ Gulick in the Loeb edition, vol. 6 p. 57 n. b.

of shapeliness. For the first three finishers played a serious role in the subsequent sacrifice, and the arms which were awarded to winners may have been intended *inter alia* to call attention to an important connection between beauty, soundness of body and military service.¹⁰⁴⁸ We should keep in mind that in *Rhetoric* 1.5 Aristotle connects beauty with usefulness. We are told that in young people beauty is the possession of a body that is fit for exertions involving speed and strength. And in persons in their prime, it is fitness for the exertions of war (1361b7–13). I know of no passage in which Theophrastus is reported to have adopted this view, but it would be surprising, were he of another mind.¹⁰⁴⁹

Text 563 names Theophrastus but not a work.¹⁰⁵⁰ One of the two works on eros is a possibility (436 no. 29 or 30), but if the contest in question was concerned with more than mere shapeliness, then a work on virtue or education is a real possibility (436 no. 7–11).

- 564 Athenaeus, *The Sophists at Dinner* 13.90 610A–B (BT vol. 3 p. 345.22–346.2 Kaibel)

Literature: Schweighaeuser (1801–1805) vol. 7 p. 308; Fortenbaugh (1984) p. 321; Millett (2007) p. 78

Text 564 is found in Book 13 of *The Sophists at Dinner*. It occurs immediately after 563 and the two brief references to Dionysius and Myrsilus that complete the discussion of a masculine beauty contest at Elis. At this point, Myrtilus, who continues to speak, now turns his attention to feminine contests concerning temperance and household management, σωφροσύνη and οἰκονομία. Such contests are said to occur among the barbarians. After that mention is made of feminine contests concerning beauty. They are said to occur among the people of Tenedos and Lesbos. In what follows, we are told that beauty is a matter of fortune or nature, and that it is temperance that ought to be honored, for temperance makes beauty noble. In its absence, beauty is dangerous in that it gives rise to licentiousness.

The report concerning Theophrastus ends with the comment concerning beauty and licentiousness (lines 5–6). Myrtilus stops speaking, and

¹⁰⁴⁸ The goddess Athena is herself closely associated with war. Hence she is often represented with helmet and shield. But as stated above, Dionysius of Leuctra is cited in regard to Athena. Theophrastus may or may not have made reference to the goddess.

¹⁰⁴⁹ The idea is hardly an odd view peculiar to Aristotle or even to the Peripatetic School. See Cicero, *On the Orator* 3.178.

¹⁰⁵⁰ Not naming a work is also true of 562 and 564, both in close proximity to 563.

Athenaeus says that the other diners admired his memory (13.91 610B). We may wonder whether Theophrastus went on to illustrate the connection between beauty and licentiousness, but there is no way to decide. All we can assert is that Athenaeus has already provided some examples, in that only a page earlier he had Myrtilus describe Anoutis and Pantica as not only beautiful women but also licentious. The historians Dinon and Phylarchus are named as sources (609A–C).

Striking is the fact that barbarians are mentioned in regard to feminine contests concerning temperance and household management. In contrast, the people of Tenedos and Lesbos, i.e., Greeks, are named in regard to beauty contests (lines 1–4). That seems to elevate the barbarians over the Greeks, which goes against Greek prejudice. We may compare the Greek tendency to see the barbarians as the cause of drunkenness among the Greeks.¹⁰⁵¹ Or should we say that our text shows Theophrastus reporting the facts in an impartial manner and without an attempt to generalize concerning either Greek or barbarian practices?

The first two sentences of 564 exhibit balance. Myrtilus begins the first sentence with ἐνἱαχοῦ, “in some places,” and then ends the sentence with ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς βαρβάροις, “as among the barbarians” (lines 1–2). The second sentence begins with ἐτέρωθι, “in other places,” and ends with καθάπερ καὶ παρὰ Τενεδίοις καὶ Λεσβίοις, “as among the people of of Tenedos and Lesbos” (lines 3–4). The repetition and progressive specification are hard to overlook. These features may go back to Theophrastus, but equally they may be the work of Athenaeus’ source or Athenaeus himself. Whether such stylistic features are pleasing or painfully obvious may be decided by others. Much depends upon context.

The sentence ταύτην δὲ τύχης ἢ φύσεως εἶναι, τιμὴν δὲ δέον προκεῖσθαι σωφροσύνης, “But this (honor) is (a matter) of fortune or nature” (lines 4–5) is corrupt as transmitted in codex A (εἶναι· τιμὴν δὲ νέον). Our text incorporates the emendation of Schweighaeuser (εἶναι, τιμὴν δὲ

¹⁰⁵¹ See, e.g., Herodotus, who tells us that Cleomenes became a heavy drinker through association with Scythians (6.84) and Chamaeleon, who not only offers the same explanation of Cleomenes’ drunkenness (fr. 11 Martano = 10.29 427B–C) but also tells us that large drinking cups only arrived late in Greece being imported from the barbarians (fr. 10 = 11.4 461B). See, too, Wehrli (1967–1978) vol. 9 pp. 73–74, who cites Clearchus in regard to the corrupting influence of the barbarians. See, e.g., fr. 44 (= Athenaeus 12.57 540E–F), in which we read that Polycrates the tyrant of Samos ruined himself by imitating the soft life of the Lydians. But the Greeks did recognize that not all influences went from barbarian to Greek. At least, Herodotus tells us that the Persians learned from the Greeks the practice of having sexual relations with boys (1.135; cf. Athenaeus 13.79 603A).

δέον)¹⁰⁵² and not that of Kaibel (εἶναι τιμήν, δέον), whom we normally follow in printing passages from Athenaeus. It is possible that corruption is due not to a copyist but rather to Athenaeus or his source, who may have been careless in excerpting Theophrastean material. In any case, it is clear that Theophrastus contrasted the honor that is properly attributed to a virtue like temperance with the honor that people attribute to beauty. The former ought to be the greater, for a person is responsible, at least in large measure, for his moral character. The latter, shapeliness or lack thereof, is to a much greater extent a matter of inheritance, over which a person has no control.

The words τύχης ἢ φύσεως, “fortune *or* nature,” should not be taken as grounds for saying that Theophrastus was unclear concerning the difference between fortune and nature and their relation to bodily beauty. To the contrary, he could distinguish between fortune and nature (503 and 504), and in another context he might well have explained that bodily beauty is primarily a matter of nature. It is possible that fortune is mentioned here, because a child of ugly parents is occasionally and contrary to reasonable expectations quite attractive.¹⁰⁵³ Nevertheless, a different, bipartite interpretation seems preferable. First, from the standpoint of the child an inherited attribute like beauty or ugliness appears to be a matter of chance (his lot in life: something that happily or unhappily falls to him even before his birth), so that conjoining τύχη with φύσις is almost to be expected (cf. Plato, *Protagoras* 323 D1, 5 and *Symposium* 203C5, D3).¹⁰⁵⁴ Second, combining τύχη with φύσις intensifies the contrast between beauty and temperance. In an ethical context, especially in an exoteric writing, such an intensification would be entirely in place.

Since text 564 concerns *inter alia* beauty contests among the inhabitants of two Greek islands, it seems natural to include this text among those brought together under the label “Eros.” It should, however, be noticed that in 564 Athenaeus names no particular work. Perhaps the (*Dialogue*) on Love or the work *On Love* (436 no. 29 and 30) is the ulti-

¹⁰⁵² See Schweighaeuser vol. 7 p. 308.

¹⁰⁵³ Cf. Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* 1.5 1362a2–8, where we are told that fortune is the cause of good things that happen contrary to reasonable expectation: e.g., being beautiful, when all one’s brothers are ugly.

¹⁰⁵⁴ Cf. Isocrates, 15 (*Antidosis*) 292, where τύχη and φύσις occur together in regard to innate eloquence. The passage is of some interest, for it makes clear that eloquence can also be acquired through study and practice, which is true to a much lesser degree of beauty. Moreover, an innate gift does not exclude maintenance and improvement through effort. Both the person who is naturally beautiful and the person who is naturally eloquent do well to engage in appropriate exercises.

mate source of the Theophrastean material, but that cannot be stated with certainty. A different possibility is one of the works on virtue and education (436 no. 7–11) and especially the work entitled *On Education or On Virtue or On Temperance* (436 no. 9a)—a work that on one occasion seems to be referred to simply as *On Temperance* (no. 9c).¹⁰⁵⁵ But whichever work is in fact the source of 564, our text suggests that Theophrastus did not ignore the education of women not only in regard to temperance but also in regard to household management. Indeed, when we consider 564 together with texts like 661 and 662 it seems certain that even though Theophrastus wanted to limit the education of women in certain respects, he recognized the importance of educating them in household management. Today we may deplore any limitations on the education of women, but Theophrastus appears to have followed Aristotle and accepted the idea of role playing within society based on natural endowments.¹⁰⁵⁶

565 Stobaeus, *Anthology* 4.23.42 (vol. 4 p. 582.12–14 Hense)

Literature: Zeller (1879) p. 864; Fortenbaugh (1984) p. 322

Text 565 is found in the twenty-fourth chapter of the fourth book of Stobaeus' *Anthology*. The chapter carries the heading Γαμικὰ παραγγέλματα, "Precepts concerning Marriage" (p. 569.2 Hense). Sixty-four excerpts of varying length make up the chapter. As usual the selections from poets come first (1–31) and those from prose authors follow (32–36).¹⁰⁵⁷ 565 comes early among the prose passages. It is preceded by a short excerpt from Eusebius stating that in marriage the best harmony occurs when both parties practice temperance (fr. 57 Müll.). And it is followed by a longer excerpt from Plutarch: first we hear of Plato's claim that the happiest city is one in which "mine" and "not mine" is least used, after which the claim is applied to marriage (*Precepts concerning Marriage* 20 140D–E).

Our text begins by referring to Theophrastus in the genitive (that is common practice in Stobaeus, cf. 469, 517, 523, 526), after which comes a precept or injunction, to which an explanation or justification

¹⁰⁵⁵ Temperance is mentioned twice in 564 (lines 2 and 5).

¹⁰⁵⁶ On the assignation of roles based on natural capacities (talents), see Fortenbaugh (1977) pp. 137–139, (reprint 2006) pp. 244–247 and (1975a, second edition 2002) pp. 57–61.

¹⁰⁵⁷ No. 37 Epicharmus (fr. 286 Kaibel) is an exception.

is added: Θεοφράστου· οὔτε ὁρᾶν οὔτε ὁρᾶσθαι γυναῖκα καὶ ταῦτα ἐξησκημένην πρὸς κάλλος· ἐπισπᾶται γὰρ ἀμφοτέρω πρὸς ᾧ μὴ δεῖ. “Theophrastus: a woman should neither see (a man) nor be seen (by one), especially when she is beautifully decked out, for both attract toward what is forbidden.” At first reading, one may be tempted to compare, e.g., another Theophrastean text also found in Stobaeus: Θεοφράστου· αἰδοῦ σαυτόν, καὶ ἄλλον οὐκ αἰσχυνθήσῃ, “Theophrastus: Have respect for yourself, and you will not feel shame before someone else” (3.31.10 = 469). Both this text and 565 are short, both give advice and both end with an explanation. But there is a difference: Whereas the text just quoted uses the imperative αἰδοῦ to convey advice, 565 uses two infinitives, ὁρᾶν and ὁρᾶσθαι. It is, of course, possible to use the infinitive as an imperative, but then one expects the negation to be expressed by μὴ and not οὐ as is the case in 565. That suggests to me that 565 offers an excerpt that has been pruned. In what preceded (and has been omitted), there occurred some finite verb like χρεῖ or δεῖ, both of which would take οὐ. And there may have been some reference to marriage that prompted the inclusion of 565 in a chapter entitled “Precepts concerning Marriage.” If we ask why someone, an anthologist, would prune the text, there is an obvious answer. He wanted his excerpt to be an attractive source of pleasure to the reader, and he achieved that by omitting what preceded. For a shorter text is more pleasing than a longer one: the reader learns something quickly and easily which intensifies the pleasure.¹⁰⁵⁸ And by omitting what preceded, he created a text whose stylistic features jump out at the reader. The opening words οὔτε ὁρᾶν οὔτε ὁρᾶσθαι exhibit a balanced construction that involves double repetition: the negative οὔτε is repeated without any variation and the infinitive changes from active to passive, while the stem remains the same, ὁρᾶν and ὁρᾶσθαι. Given the brevity of the verbs (two syllables and three) the repetition of the stem will not be overlooked except by the sleepest of readers. Moreover, the closing phrase of the subsequent explanation, πρὸς ᾧ μὴ δεῖ, mirrors the closing phrase of the injunction, πρὸς κάλλος, and in so doing heightens the artful effect. I do not claim that every reader finds such a combination of stylistic features attractive (it might be viewed as heavy-handed), but it is quite possible that an anthologist found the combination attractive and chose to highlight it by omitting what went before.

¹⁰⁵⁸ The text is in line with Aristotle’s notion of the ἀστεῖον. See the commentary on 566 with n. 1070.

The word ἀμφότερα, “both,” refers to the bipartite phrase οὔτε ὁρᾶν οὔτε ὁρᾶσθαι, and that suggests that two things are to be avoided. The noun γυναῖκα, “woman,” is the subject of the second infinitive, ὁρᾶσθαι, but is it the subject of the first infinitive, ὁρᾶν? Wimmer thinks that it is. He translates 565 as follows: *Mulier nec alios videre nec ipsa videri debet, praesertim quae eleganter ornata fuerit. Utrumque enim ad res inhonestas incitamentum est* (fr. 157 W). In the text-translation volumes, we offer a similar translation (quoted above at the beginning of the second paragraph). On this understanding, there are indeed two things to be avoided: a woman seeing a man and vice versa. Nevertheless, in a footnote to 565, we suggest a different translation of the opening words: “Neither (should a man) see (a woman) nor a woman be seen.” Here γυναῖκα is understood first as the object of the verb ὁρᾶν and then as the subject of ὁρᾶσθαι. Construed that way, the injunction concerns a single phenomenon, expressed in two different ways: the powerful attraction of a woman who is beautifully decked out. In my earlier commentary, I defended this reading of the text, but I now find it less plausible. It is too clever for most readers, who would almost certainly take γυναῖκα as the subject of both infinitives.

It may be helpful to compare a passage in the first book of Ovid’s *Art of Love*. The poet is giving advice on how and where to hunt for approachable women. The passage that concerns us is focused on the theater, where a man will find women in good supply. Ovid writes: *spectatum veniunt, veniunt spectentur ut ipsae: | ille locus casti damna pudoris habet*, “They (women) come to see, they come that they themselves may be seen. That place (the theater) is fatal to their chaste modesty” (1.99–100). In the first line, “women” (understood from *ipsae*) is twice the subject of the verb “to come,” *venire*, and the verb “to see,” *spectare*, is first active¹⁰⁵⁹ and then passive. The parallel with 565 is obvious. Moreover, in what immediately precedes the quoted lines, Ovid speaks of the *cultissima femina* (1.98). Here *cultissima* may refer to the mind: “the smartest,”¹⁰⁶⁰ but it may also refer to physical appearance: “greatly adorned.” If the latter is correct, and I think it is, then the Ovidian text is quite a close parallel to 565. In both texts we are concerned with the woman who is all decked out.¹⁰⁶¹

¹⁰⁵⁹ In 1.99 *spectatum* is the supine with a verb of motion, and as such it takes a direct object in the accusative.

¹⁰⁶⁰ That is the translation of J.H. Mozley in the Loeb edition (1929) p. 19.

¹⁰⁶¹ Caveat: I am not suggesting that Ovid is drawing on Theophrastus. It is a common

What is not immediately clear in either text (i.e., 565.1 and Ovid 1.99) is the object of the first verb of seeing (ὄρεᾶν and *spectatum*). The Ovidian text offers two possibilities. First, since the focus is on the theater, it seems natural to think that the women come to see the spectacle. After *spectatum* we understand some word for theatrical performance. Second, since the women have taken pains to adorn themselves, we may guess that they are going not only to see a play, but also and primarily to see men, i.e., look over and to attract willing men. And if that is correct, then we may want to understand *viros* after *spectatum* and say that the women are contributors to any unseemly act that may occur. There is, however, an apparent difficulty. In the second verse quoted above, the theater is said to present a danger to chaste modesty: *castus pudor* (1.100) and that appears to harmonize poorly with women who have adorned themselves and gone to the theater in the hope of spotting men and attracting them. But perhaps we should recognize that poetry permits minor leaps. Ovid moves from a characterization of women who themselves have a wandering eye and present themselves to the wandering eyes of men (1.99) to a characterization of the theater as a place that threatens women, even women of good upbringing, for in certain circumstances, e.g., a crowded theater, they too occasionally succumb to temptation and participate in behavior that does not befit a women of chaste modesty (1.100).

Returning now to 565, we can say that the Ovidian text encourages understanding a word for man or men, e.g., ἄνδρα or ἄνδρας as the object of ὄρεᾶν. And like the Ovidian text, there is an emphasis on the woman who has taken pains to enhance her appearance. What is missing is a general statement about the theater or any other place that poses a special danger to chaste modesty. Perhaps there was one in either what preceded or what followed 565, but that can no longer be determined. What we do have is a clause introduced by καὶ ταῦτα that heightens the force of the stated injunction.¹⁰⁶² More precisely, the clause tells us that the injunction is of especial importance in regard to women who adorn themselves with a view to beauty. For such women are almost certainly up to no good and will attract the men who see them. But that leaves open

idea that the woman who adorns herself in order to enhance her beauty has an improper goal in mind. See, e.g., Euripides, *Electra* 1072–1075, where the phrase εἰς κάλλος ἄσκει (1073) invites comparison with ἐξησηχημένην πρὸς κάλλος (565.2).

¹⁰⁶² See LSJ s.v. οὗτος C.VIII.2.a.

whether the injunction stops there or applies to women generally (albeit with less urgency) and even to women of high moral standing. And if it does apply, should we say that 565 is evidence of Theophrastus' negative view of women. Here I think we must be careful. To be sure, Theophrastus recognized that beauty in the absence of moral virtue is dangerous (564), and he will have known of women who got into trouble by appearing in public.¹⁰⁶³ But we must remember that we do not know the context from which 565 was taken. It may have been part of a thesis, one half of a school debate (see the commentary on 486), or it may have been part of the (*Dialogue*) on Love. And if so, the injunction may have been put in the mouth of an interlocutor, whose view was subsequently commented on by another figure in the dialogue, perhaps even by Theophrastus. There are too many unknowns here.

566 Diogenes Laertius, *The Lives of the Philosophers* 5.19 (OCT vol. 1 p. 204.16 Long)

Literature: Düring (1957) p. 66; Fortenbaugh (1984) p. 323; Searby (1998) pp. 176–177

Text 566 comes from Diogenes' Life of *Aristotle*. It occurs within a list of most attractive sayings, ἀποφθέγματα κάλλιστα, that are attributed to Aristotle (5.17–21), and within the list it is one among several characterizations of beauty, κάλλος, that are attributed to various persons including Aristotle and Theophrastus (5.19). Here in translation is the relevant segment of text:

He (Aristotle) used to say that beauty (τὸ κάλλος) is better for bringing (people) together than any letter (of commendation). But some say that Diogenes made this definition and that he (Aristotle) said that it is a gift of shapeliness (εὐμορφία). And Socrates (said) a tyranny of short duration, Plato a natural advantage, Theophrastus a silent deception, Theocritus a penalty set in ivory, Carneades a monarchy without bodyguard.

The text may be viewed as falling into two parts. The first includes the sayings attributed to Aristotle, and the second includes those attributed to Socrates, Plato, Theophrastus, Theocritus and Carneades. The second

¹⁰⁶³ A celebrated case is the woman who attended the funeral of her husband's mother, was seen by Eratosthenes and in time became his lover (Lysias, *Orations* 1, *On the Murder of Eratosthenes* 7–8.).

part interrupts the Aristotelian sayings that make up the larger list (5.17–21) and may be an addition by Diogenes himself to the source he transcribed or a marginal note that at some point became part of the text.¹⁰⁶⁴

The Greek text of the second saying attributed to Aristotle has been subjected to emendation. In codex F, one of the three major codices, the text runs as follows: αὐτὸν δὲ τοῦτο δῶρον εἰπεῖν εὐμορφίας. The demonstrative τοῦτο refers to τὸ κάλλος in the first definition, and εὐμορφίας is a descriptive genitive with δῶρον. That is quite intelligible and has the virtue of capturing the essence of beauty: it is above all a matter of shapeliness or good form, εὐμορφία. In addition, the word δῶρον makes clear that beauty is not something acquired by study or practice. It is innate and therefore may be considered a gift of fortune (cf. 564.3–4). The other two major codices, B and P, omit τοῦτο. Perhaps it has simply fallen out, but certain editors are of a different mind. Finding the saying as read in F somewhat flat and influenced by the phrase θεῶν δώρημα in *Nicomachean Ethics* 1.9 1099b11,¹⁰⁶⁵ they accept emendations put forward by Cobet and M. Casaubon and print αὐτὸν δὲ θεοῦ δῶρον εἰπεῖν εὐμορφίαν.¹⁰⁶⁶ Instead of τοῦτο, θεοῦ is read, and εὐμορφίαν, now in the accusative case, has become the subject of the saying. One might translate “and that he (Aristotle) said that good looks is a gift of the god.” Whether one prefers the text of F or the text as emended, we can say that the word εὐμορφία puts the emphasis on physical beauty and the word “gift” is a clear indication that beauty is largely a matter of fortune, i.e., an attribute already determined at birth.

The saying attributed to Theophrastus—σιωπῶσαν ἀπάτην, “silent deceit”—is different. There is no reference to shapeliness or good form, which is essential to beauty. For that reason, I prefer to avoid speaking of this saying as a definition.¹⁰⁶⁷ Instead, attention is focused on a feature that is commonly associated with beauty. But the feature is not essential

¹⁰⁶⁴ Düring (1957) p. 66, Searby p. 176.

¹⁰⁶⁵ Where, however, it is happiness and not beauty, which is under discussion.

¹⁰⁶⁶ So Hicks and Long, the editors of the Loeb and Oxford Classical Text, respectively. Cf. Searby pp. 176–177.

¹⁰⁶⁷ The verb ὀρίσασθαι occurs in regard to the saying attributed to Diogenes. But here, too, the idea expressed, “being better at bringing people together than any letter of commendation,” is not an essential feature in the sense of an attribute that is necessarily present, so that its absence rules out the presence of the *definiendum*.

in the sense that beauty always works a deception and even less so in the sense that beauty is intended to be deceptive. Rather, the saying calls attention to the fact that beauty, without so much as a word, can influence a person and do so to such a degree that the person errs and does what will be regretted at a later time.¹⁰⁶⁸ That fact needs no documentation, but it should be observed that the fact finds expression in clever sayings. I cite Book 13 of Athenaeus' *The Sophists at Dinner*. There we read that Olympias¹⁰⁶⁹ responded to Monimus who asked to marry the beautiful but licentious Pantica: "With your eyes you are marrying and not with your mind" (13.89 609B–C). Our text, too, is a clever saying. Indeed, it satisfies Aristotle's notion of urbanity, τὸ ἀστεῖον. Being only two words long, it has punch and is pleasant in that the hearer or reader learns something quickly.¹⁰⁷⁰

In conclusion, I offer two caveats. First, we should not think that deceit only goes in one direction: a beautiful person so deceives the beholder that he acts in ways that are unwise. It may also happen that the beholder is so affected by desire that he engages in deceit through flattery in order to obtain what he wants. See, e.g., Athenaeus 6.66 255B, citing Clearchus' *Erotica* (fr. 21 Wehrli). Second, focusing on the negative effects that beauty may have on a beholder is one sided. In a full discussion of beauty, perhaps in the (*Dialogue*) *Concerning Love* or in the work entitled *On Love*, Theophrastus will have recognized that while beauty can have a negative effect, it is also one of the bodily goods and as such is desirable.

¹⁰⁶⁸ We may compare text 565, which also recognizes that beauty can have a negative effect on the beholder: we read that a woman who is beautifully decked out attracts a man toward the forbidden. But there is a difference. While the sayings collected by Diogenes including 566 seem to focus on shapeliness (bodily beauty that is natural), 565 takes into account externals: being decked out in an attractive manner.

¹⁰⁶⁹ The mother of Alexander.

¹⁰⁷⁰ See Aristotle, *Rhet.* 3.10 1410b10, 21, 3.11 1412b22–25. Being clever or witty is characteristic of all the sayings concerning beauty that are listed by Diogenes Laertius in *Lives* 5.19. Indeed, being witty is the likely reason why these particular sayings were selected and collected in one place. At very least each of the sayings is brief, and most if not all convey something unexpected, so that learning occurs, albeit in varying degrees. Least witty may be the second saying attributed to Aristotle: "gift of shapeliness," but even here the idea of being a "gift" may cause mild surprise. And the saying attributed to Plato: "natural advantage" includes a consequence of being beautiful, i.e., advantage, which might escape notice. In fact, beauty is not always an advantage, for it can excite envy and unwanted attention.

- 567A Athenaeus, *The Sophists at Dinner* 13.85 606C (vol. 3 p. 337.8–12 Kaibel)
 567B Aelianus, *On the Nature of Animals* 5.29 (BT vol. 1 p. 204.16 Long)
 567C Scholium on Theocritus' *Idyll* 4.31 (a-b, p. 144.17–19 Wendel)

Literature: Joachim (1892) p. 46; Maas (1910) col. 1396–1397; Wendel (1920) p. 106; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1432; Gow (1950) p. 83; Wehrli (1967–1978) pp. 55–56; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 323–324, (2011a) Chapter 2.2; Cole (1992) p. 57; Sharples (1995) p. 130 n. 41; Wehrli-Wöhrle (2004) p. 532

Text 567A is found in the thirteenth book of *The Sophists at Dinner*, in which Athenaeus has Myrtilus discuss eros at length. In what precedes our text, the subject is impossible love. Myrtilus cites Clearchus¹⁰⁷¹ and tells of animals that attempted to make love to works of art. We hear of a bull, a dog, a pigeon and a gander, all of whom are said to have desisted, when it became clear that their desires were impossible. Myrtilus also tells of two human beings who fell in love with statues, and in doing so he cites four different authorities: the poets Alexis and Philemon, Adaeus of Mytilene who wrote a work *On Sculptures* and Polemon or whoever wrote the work *Of Hellas* (13.84 605E–606B). Next Myrtilus lists seven cases of animals falling in love with human beings. The first concerns a cock and the second, which is our text 567A, concerns a goose that falls in love with a boy in Aegium.¹⁰⁷² After that we hear of another goose, a peacock, two dolphins and an elephant. Along the way five different authors are named as sources: Nicander, Clearchus (twice), Theophrastus, Duris and Phylarchus (twice). In regard to all five authors, a work is cited, sometimes by title, sometimes by book number. Regarding Theophrastus, the title (*Dialogue*) concerning Love is recorded (13.85 606B–607A).

Text 567B is found in the middle of the fifth book of Aelian's *On the Nature of Animals*. In what precedes, Aelian has discussed the monkey's capacity for imitation, saying that he saw a monkey driving a chariot (5.26). After that Aelian runs through the diverse natures of eight or nine different animals (nine if the goats on Mimas and those of Illyria are counted separately). He cites seven or eight different sources (eight if the vague "I hear" is counted as referring to a source) including Theophrastus, who is named in regard to fish that pasture on dry land (5.27 =

¹⁰⁷¹ Fr. 26 Wehrli.

¹⁰⁷² Aegium is located in the northern Peloponnesus on the coast of Achaea.

363 no. 1).¹⁰⁷³ Next Aelian turns to the purple coot and says that this animal is not only jealous but also devoted to kin and companions. The idea of devotion is developed by an account of a particular coot that lost its companion and starved itself to death (5.28). That is followed by 567B: we are told of a goose that loved a boy named Amphilocheus. That much is found in Athenaeus. New is a detail: the goose brought the boy presents when he was under guard with exiles from Olenus. In addition, we are told of a lyre player named Glaucus, with whom a ram and a goose fell in love (5.29).

From 567A we learn that not only Theophrastus but also Clearchus made mention of the goose that fell in love with a boy in Aegium. Wehrli (1967–1978) vol. 3 p. 55 thinks that Clearchus has the story from Theophrastus. That is possible: the few details attributed to Clearchus in 567A (line 1) are attributed to Theophrastus in 567B (lines 1–2), but the story may have been well known, so that Clearchus may have introduced it independently into his work (*Matters concerning Love*).

In my earlier commentary, *Quellen zur Ethik Theophrasts*, I observed that in 567A Athenaeus refers only to Theophrastus for the name of the boy and his hometown (lines 2–3). I concluded that at least in these details Theophrastus expressed himself more fully than Clearchus. That is possible, but I am now less certain. For throughout his work, Athenaeus seems to delight in exhibiting learning and that includes mentioning numerous sources. The present context is no exception. As stated above, in reporting cases of impossible love, Athenaeus cites five sources, and in regard to animals that fell in love with human beings, he also cites five sources, two being named twice. It strikes me that this enthusiasm for learning might stand behind the meager report we are offered concerning Clearchus. Athenaeus divided material that both authors reported and in doing so created a convenient way to cite more than one authority.¹⁰⁷⁴

The story of the goose and the boy in Aegium is also mentioned in Pliny, *Natural History* 10.26.51 and Plutarch, *Whether Land or Sea*

¹⁰⁷³ On 5.27 and Aelian's use of "I hear" in this passage, see above, II.3, "The Sources" on Aelian, pp. 60–61.

¹⁰⁷⁴ It might be argued that the report attributed to Clearchus is too meager for easy comprehension. For the sake of his readers, Clearchus will have added further details including the boy's name and his hometown. I am sympathetic to the argument, but it loses considerable force if we allow that the story of the boy and the goose was in all likelihood well known. For if it was, then a few key words (perhaps just "the goose in Aegium") would be enough to remind a reader of the story. And if Clearchus made reference to the story in a list of similar stories, then as brief a reference as possible might be desirable.

Animals are Cleverer 18 972F. Neither of the two texts names Theophrastus, but both agree with Aelian (lines 4–6) in making reference to a ram that fell in love with the lyre player Glauca. They differ from Aelian in that there is no mention of a goose falling in love with Glauca. A scholium on Theocritus¹⁰⁷⁵ also speaks of a ram that fell in love with Glauca. As with Pliny and Plutarch, there is no mention of a goose, and unlike Aelian, Pliny and Plutarch the scholiast explicitly attributes the story to Theophrastus (567C). At first reading, that seems to tell us that the reference to Theophrastus in Aelian should not be restricted to the story of Amphilochus (lines 1–3). It also covers the story of Glauca (lines 4–6). But there are grounds for hesitation. The conjunction καί (line 4) marks the addition of a similar but different story. In both the story of Amphilochus and that of Glauca, an animal falls in love with a human being and in both cases there is mention of a goose. But there is a difference: not only a ram but also a goose is mentioned in connection with Glauca. Moreover, Aelian does not name Theophrastus as his source for the story of Glauca. Rather, he says “as I hear,” ὥς ἀκούω (line 5), and that most likely indicates a change in source. In my earlier discussion of Aelian (above, Chapter II “The Sources” no. 21), I discussed Aelian’s use of ὥς ἀκούω in 4.58, where the phrase clearly marks a change in source. A more challenging case is found in 5.52, where Aelian twice refers to Aristotle and in between says ὥς ἀκούω. It is clear that the references to Aristotle are to *History of Animals* 9.40, where bees are under discussion. The first reference is to 626a21–23, where we read about bees killing a horse. The second is to 626b12–16. It concerns bees that are attacked by other bees and only begin to counterattack when their keeper comes to their defense. In reporting on these passages, Aelian gives us more than we find in Aristotle. He speaks of bees killing not only a horse but the rider as well, and he regards the bees waiting before counterattacking as an indication of forethought and wisdom. In between these reports, Aelian tells us what he hears, ὥς ἀκούω: namely, that toads, frogs, bee-eaters and swallows defeat bees, and wasps frequently do so too. Their victories are, however, Cadmean, for they are stung badly. Here Aelian seems to be responding to Aristotle’s brief remark concerning the toad, which is said to devour bees as they leave their hive (626a31–b1). And that may seem to contradict the idea that Aelian uses ὥς ἀκούω in order

¹⁰⁷⁵ Theocritus, *Idylls* 4.30–31: ἐγὼ δέ τις εἰμὶ μελικτάς, | κεῖ μὲν τὰ Γλαύκας ἀγκροῦμαι, εὐ δὲ τὰ Πύρρον. “I (Corydon) am something of a minstrel, and I play the (songs) of Glauca well, and those of Pyrrhus well.”

to mark a change in source. But I am not certain that it does. For Aelian is not simply reporting what he finds in Aristotle. On the contrary, he adds a string of animals that are not mentioned by Aristotle. If he is not engaged in fantasy, he has the list from some other source, perhaps from conversation with one or more individuals. And if that is the case, then Aelian is almost certainly using ὥς ἀκούω in order to mark a shift from Aristotle to what he has heard.¹⁰⁷⁶ A similar use of ὥς ἀκούω may be present in 567B, Aelian wants to indicate a shift in source and does so by writing ὥς ἀκούω.

We still may wonder whether the addition of the goose to the story of Glauca is not an embellishment added by Aelian. The goose is absent in the scholium as well as Pliny and Plutarch. And we can imagine Aelian adding the goose to create an amusing contrast. The ram suggests power and lust and hence the possibility of conquest, but the goose with his waddle presents a rather ridiculous picture. In my previous remarks on Theocritean scholia (above, Chapter II “The Sources” no. 61), I pointed out that the ancient scholia, to which 567C belongs, have roots as early as the Augustan period, so that one might see 567C as our earliest witness and free of later additions. But I also noted that the scholia have come down to us in abbreviated form, so that it is just as likely and perhaps more likely that a reference to a goose has been lost through abbreviation.

Still another reason for hesitation is the mention of Ptolemy II Philadelphus in 567C. At first reading, that seems almost expected. For it was during the rule of Ptolemy Philadelphus that Theocritus moved to Alexandria and wrote a eulogy of this ruler. But on reflection there is a chronological difficulty. Ptolemy became ruler in 285 BC, when Theophrastus was already dead (at the latest he died in 287/6). In 567C we read that Glauca lived in the time of Ptolemy Philadelphus, γέγονε δ' ἐπὶ Πτολεμαίου τοῦ Φιλαδέλφου (lines 1–2), immediately after which we are told about Glauca and the ram. Strictly speaking there is no contradiction. One could argue that we have here two separate statements. The first tells us only that Glauca lived during the reign of Ptolemy Philadelphus. The second refers to animal lust without giving a date. The ram

¹⁰⁷⁶ Caveat: in speaking of “conversation” and “what he has heard,” I do not want to suggest that the phrase ὥς ἀκούω must refer to an oral report. And in regard to 567B, I do not want to suggest that a written report concerning the lyre player Glauca could not have been found (Pliny and Plutarch have the story at least for the ram). Indeed, at one time Aelian may have read such a report and still written ὥς ἀκούω. What I do want to assert is that in 567B ὥς ἀκούω marks off the report concerning Glauca from what precedes and so from material that is explicitly attributed to Theophrastus.

could have exhibited his affection for Glauca while Theophrastus was still alive. That is possible, but it is not the natural way to understand the scholium. Perhaps we have another example of abbreviation. The original commentary from which the scholium derives will have been fuller and the comment that stands behind 567C will not have suggested that Theophrastus wrote about an incident during the rule of Ptolemy Philadelphus. Or perhaps the epithet Philadelphus is a mistaken addition in the course of transmission. Originally the comment spoke only of Ptolemy, meaning Ptolemy I Soter. Or perhaps the scholiast has misread his source. Wendel suggests that he is drawing on the same source as Athenaeus, Aelian, Pliny and Plutarch, and that this source contained reports concerning both Amphilocheus and Glauca. Theophrastus will have been mentioned only in regard to Amphilocheus and not in regard to Glauca. Aelian correctly maintains the separation, but the scholiast nods and cites Theophrastus for the story of Glauca and the ram.¹⁰⁷⁷ This third explanation is attractive but it may not go far enough. For if we accept the reading of the manuscripts, the scholium seems confused concerning the roles of the Glauca and the ram. Whereas Aelian, Plutarch and Pliny all tell us that a ram fell in love with Glauca, the manuscripts of the scholium have Glauca falling in love with the ram. That may be more titillating, but it is an error, most likely introduced by the scholiast. In the text-translation volumes, we have followed Wendel and printed Hemsterhuys' emendation: ἦν ἐρασθῆναι κριοῦν instead of ἦν ἐρασθῆναι κριοῦ. But perhaps we should have followed Maas col. 1397 and printed the reading of the manuscripts. That would have remind us how unreliable a scholium can be.

Athenaeus not only names Theophrastus as a source but also refers to the work (*Dialogue*) *concerning Love* (567A.2–3). Aelian names Theophrastus but fails to give a title (567B.2). That is not a matter of concern. Even when Aelian offers a report that is noticeably longer than that of Athenaeus, he may fail to name a work that is reported by Athenaeus (cf. 552A.14, 552B.8). Assuming that the (*Dialogue*) *concerning Love* was an

¹⁰⁷⁷ Wendel is following Maas, who suggests that not only the scholiast but also Athenaeus, Aelian, Plutarch and Pliny are drawing on one and the same source which is a Peripatetic collection of stories/reports concerning geese who fall in love with human beings. Wendel thinks that this collective work may have been the Ἀπομνημονεύματα, *Memoranda*, of Lynceus of Samos (a pupil of Theophrastus, 18 no. 10). In this work, Theophrastus will have been named only in regard to Amphilocheus and the goose, and reference will have been made to Theophrastus' Ἐρωτικὸς (as in Athenaeus). In addition, Wendel suggests as possible that the scholiast did not draw directly on the Peripatetic work but indirectly through the *Chronicle* of Apollodorus (2nd cent. BC).

exoteric work, we can say that recording unusual relationships between animals and human beings fits the genre. And describing an animal's behavior in terms that seem appropriate to human beings (bringing gifts to someone under guard) suits a popular work that is not focused on animal psychology. Whether Theophrastus addressed cases like the boy and goose or how he might have addressed such cases in a more scientific work, e.g., *On the Intelligence and Habits of Living Creatures* (350 no. 11) cannot be answered with certainty.¹⁰⁷⁸

568A Pliny, *Natural History* 9.27–28 (CB vol. 9 p. 46.16–22 de Saint-Denis)

568B Gellius, *Attic Nights* 6.8.1–3 (OCT vol. 1 p. 233.22–27 Marshall)

Literature: Joachim (1892) p. 46; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1432; Alpers (1960) pp. 6–20; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 323–324, (2011a) Chapter 2.2, (2011b) pp. 403–405; Holford-Strevens (1989) pp. 200, 230; Cole (1992) p. 57; Sharples (1995) p. 130 n. 41; Anderson (2004) p. 107

Text 568A is found in the ninth book of Pliny's *Natural History*. The subject is water animals. At the beginning of the book, Pliny tells of certain remarkable creatures, especially those of exceptional size (9.1–4). He soon comes to whales and discusses their breathing (9.5–6). That leads on to dolphins, which also breathe (9.6.19) and are said to be the swiftest of all animals (9.6.20). Their affection for their offspring is reported (9.6.22) as is their friendliness toward human beings (9.6.24). A string of striking examples follows. We hear of a dolphin that was brought to the Lucrine Lake, fell in love with a boy and regularly transported him to school. When the boy died of disease, the dolphin expired from longing (9.8.25). Next we hear of a friendly dolphin at Hippo Diarrhytus that had to be destroyed because the people coming to see it were a financial burden (9.8.26). After that we are told of a dolphin at Iasus that was in love with a boy, followed him to shore, was swept on to the sand and expired (9.8.27). Another case in Iasus is reported on the authority of the historian Hegesidemus. This time we are given the boy's name, Hermias. He is said to have drowned while riding a dolphin. The dolphin brought the corpse to land, beached itself and died, admitting responsibility for the boy's death. Pliny adds that according to Theophrastus the

¹⁰⁷⁸ Modern research makes clear that geese can form attachments to human beings (see, e.g. K. Lorenz, S. Kalas and K. Kalas, *Das Jahr der Graugans*, Munich 1979), but in itself that does not answer the question how one best describes the attachments and resulting behavior.

same thing happened at Naupactus.¹⁰⁷⁹ That is our text 568A. There follows a brief reference to similar stories concerning boys and dolphins at Amphilochoi and Taranto, and these stories are said to render plausible what is said about the lyre player Arion (9.8.28).¹⁰⁸⁰

Text 568B is taken from Chapter 8 of Book 6 of Gellius' *Attic Nights*. A heading announces the topic: "A Story Beyond Belief about a Dolphin in Love and the Beloved Boy." The surrounding chapters are quite unrelated: Chapter 7 concerns proper pronunciation and Chapter 9 concerns the proper form of certain verbs. What follows the heading to Chapter 8 is our text. Gellius tells us that dolphins are amorous and loving, and in support of this assertion he cites Apion¹⁰⁸¹ and Theophrastus. Both spoke of dolphins afire with passionate love: Apion referring to the sea around Puteoli and Theophrastus to that at Naupactus. Gellius goes on to say and thereby to emphasize that the passion of the dolphins was not directed toward creatures of their own kind but toward handsome boys. And this passion was expressed in a marvelous and human manner. In what follows (not printed as part of 568B), Gellius cites Apion partly in Greek. We are told of a dolphin that loved a boy and carried him about in the sea. When the boy fell ill and died, the dolphin wasted away from longing, died and was buried in the same sepulcher as the boy (6.8.4–7). Dying as a result of longing, *desiderium*, is a detail that we have already met above in regard to a dolphin that had been brought to the Lucrine Lake (Pliny, *NH* 9.8.25). Clearly such a detail is movable from one story to another and favored by the storyteller, for it adds a human element that makes it easier for the reader to identify with and to be moved by what he reads.¹⁰⁸²

Reports of dolphins falling in love with boys appear to have been common in Theophrastus' time. I cite the Aristotelian *History of Animals*, in which we read that in regard to dolphins many signs of gentleness and mildness are reported and especially of their loves and desires directed

¹⁰⁷⁹ Naupactus is located on the northern coast of the Corinthian Gulf at the straits of Lepanto.

¹⁰⁸⁰ For the story of Arion (he was rescued by a dolphin when forced to jump overboard, while sailing around the Peloponnese), see Herodotus *Histories* 1.23–24, and for comment, see Alpers pp. 7–10.

¹⁰⁸¹ Apion was an Egyptian grammarian, who taught in Rome during the second quarter of the first century AD.

¹⁰⁸² According to Aristotle, the emotion of pity is aroused in a person when he realizes that someone else's suffering could happen to him (*Rhetoric* 2.8 1385b14–1386a3). Hearing the story of the dolphin longing for its beloved, a person recognizes a painful loss that all too often afflicts human beings and could afflict him.

toward boys around Tarentum, Caria and other places (9.48 631a8–11). For our purposes the important point is that 568A and B describe this behavior in a way that contributes to the humanization of animals. I cite the final section of 568B, where we read that the dolphins were not in love with their own kind, *neque hi amaverunt quod sunt ipsi genus* (lines 5–6); rather, they were passionate about boys of liberal form, *pueros forma liberali* (line 6) in a marvelous and human manner: *miris et humanis modis* (lines 7–8). This comment is that of Gellius, and the initial portion is straightforward. Everyone, save the insane or an overly clever sophist, would agree that the dolphins under consideration were *qua* sea animals different in kind from their beloved boys who lived on dry land. But what follows, i.e., that the dolphins were keen on boys of liberal form and manifested their love in marvelous and human fashion is more problematic. To be sure, a dolphin that repeatedly seeks out the same boy and carries him on his back is a marvel. But even if the reports are frequent and correct, do we really want to say that the dolphin is acting in a human manner? And how do we construe the adjective “liberal,” *liberalis*? In this context, it may mean “beautiful.” In the text-translation volumes we translated “handsome.” But perhaps it is used in its primary sense “befitting a free person,” and if that is the case, should we say that dolphins are being credited with a sophisticated judgment that seems to make them human?¹⁰⁸³ Or is Gellius playing with the ambiguity that is built into the word *liberalis*?¹⁰⁸⁴

568A is similar: it too encourages the idea that dolphins act in the way that humans do. For in this text, Pliny speaks of the dolphin staying ashore, admitting, *fatentem*, that it was the cause of the boy’s death (568A.3–4). Plutarch’s parallel account (not printed) gives the same impression even more strongly: the dolphin is said to have deemed it just, *δικαιώσας*, to share in the death for which it shared responsibility (*Whether Land or Sea Animals are Cleverer* 36 984F).¹⁰⁸⁵ Plutarch does not name Theophrastus, and Pliny first cites Hegesidemus (line 1). But

¹⁰⁸³ The idea that there is a form befitting a freeman is Roman, but the basic idea is not restricted to that culture. Cf. Aristotle’s *Politics*, in which we read that nature intends to make the bodies of slaves and those of free men different (1.5 1254b27–31). Also Dichaearchus, fr. 40.4 Mirhady: Pythagoras’ physique is described as free-born, ἐλευθέριος.

¹⁰⁸⁴ On the different senses of *liberalis*, see Lewis and Short, s.v. IIA and B2.

¹⁰⁸⁵ Concerning this report, Alpers p. 13 expresses skepticism: “This is a good example of the great difference there can be between the things that animals can do and the meaning that humans will read into them. ... It is a weakness of human beings to look for a human

in what follows, Pliny tells us that according to Theophrastus the same thing happened at Naupactus.¹⁰⁸⁶ Should we then say that Theophrastus expressed himself in the same way? That is an important question, for were Theophrastus to have done so without significant qualification, then he would be encouraging and perhaps embracing the humanization of animals. But before accepting this conclusion, we should note that neither Pliny nor Gellius cites a Theophrastean work. My guess is that we should take a hint from 567A.2 and say that in all probability the reports of Pliny and Gellius go back to Theophrastus' (*Dialogue*) *concerning Love* (cf. 567A.2). If this work was exoteric, i.e., intended for a readership that extended beyond the Peripatetic school, then there is nothing exciting about Theophrastus reporting such material in a way that might be thought to credit dolphins with intellect. He may have had an interlocutor report such stories, and he may have qualified them at some later point in the dialogue or simply let them pass as local lore. What we want to know is how he expressed himself in his scientific writings. See the preceding commentary on 567A–C *ad fin.* as well as that on 531.¹⁰⁸⁷

17. *Wine*

Wine and more generally alcoholic beverages are used and misused in the modern world. They are viewed by many as a refreshing and appropriate way to relax. Others see them as problematic. The pleasures and benefits of moderate drinking are recognized, but so are the abuses and dependence that all too often follow on immoderate consumption. In response, individuals and whole groups of people have totally rejected the use of alcoholic beverages, while others have introduced regulations in order to control abuse. Age limits are set and certain activities are supposed to be alcohol free. None of this is new. The ancients were fully aware of the joys and sorrows of drinking alcohol and not only introduced regulations but also wrote extensively about drunkenness.

motive in animal actions that have some other, more natural explanation, and when Plutarch speaks of the dolphin's 'thinking it right' to share the boy's death, I believe he is doing exactly that."

¹⁰⁸⁶ Perhaps the copycat phenomenon is at work here. At least Alpers p. 12 says that it is natural for people who hear of marvels occurring elsewhere to claim them for their own district.

¹⁰⁸⁷ Within the commentary on 531, a brief discussion of 362A will be found.

In Greece alcohol abuse occurred not only among ordinary people but also among civic leaders including heads of state. One thinks of Cleomenes, king of Sparta, who is said to have learned to drink unmixed wine through association with Scythians and as a result of drunkenness to have gone mad.¹⁰⁸⁸ Alexander the Great also comes to mind. He drank to such an extent that he not only suffered from impotence but also engaged in erratic behavior that he quickly came to regret: e.g., burning the palace at Persepolis and killing Cleitus, who had once saved his life.¹⁰⁸⁹ The list can be extended, but it is clear that concerned citizens and especially legislators had good reason to address drunkenness. A well-known example is Zaleucus, the fabled lawgiver of the Locrians. He was so disturbed by the unregulated drinking of unmixed wine, that he made it a capital offense for a sick person to drink wine neat without doctor's orders.¹⁰⁹⁰ In Sparta, symposia were looked upon with such suspicion that they were suppressed and made illegal.¹⁰⁹¹ And in Massilia (Marseilles) and Miletus, women were singled out for regulation: they were enjoined to drink water and to avoid wine.¹⁰⁹²

Not surprisingly the issue was addressed by philosophers who concerned themselves with the wellbeing of a citizen population. Plato's *Laws* offers a striking example. There the Athenian Stranger is made to call for a discussion of drunkenness (1.9 637D) and to recognize the benefits of drinking-parties, provided they are presided over by someone who is sober and wise (1.10 640D–641A, 2.13 671D). Properly organized, symposia are said not only to maintain and to increase goodwill among the participants (1.10 640B–D) but also to provide a safe occasion for practicing and testing modesty and self-control (1.15 649A–1.16 650B).

Aristotle was a member of the Academy when Plato wrote the *Laws*, so that it is no surprise to find him mentioning Plato's injunction that a sober person preside over a symposium (Pol. 2.12 1274b12), but he does not follow Plato in arguing that the purpose of a drinking party should be practice and testing in modesty. Rather, he groups heavy drinking together with sleep and says that they "are not in themselves serious pursuits but pleasant, and at the same time they put to rest our cares, as Euripides says" (8.4 1339a17–19; *Bacchae* 381). Nevertheless, Aristotle

¹⁰⁸⁸ Herodotus, *Histories* 6.84, Athenaeus, *The Sophists at Dinner* 10.29 427B.

¹⁰⁸⁹ Plutarch, *Life of Alexander* 38, 50–51.

¹⁰⁹⁰ 579A–B.

¹⁰⁹¹ Plato's *Laws* 1 639D.

¹⁰⁹² 579A–B.

does recognize the need to control heavy drinking, and in the *Politics* he cites a law of Pittacus, whereby the man who assaults another when drunk pays a larger fine than one who commits the same offense while sober. Interesting is the explanation reported for this difference in punishment: since more men are insolent when drunken than sober, Pittacus ignored the fact that drunken men have a greater claim on leniency and focused on expediency (2.9 1274b19–23; cf. *Rhet.* 2.25 1402b9–12). Apparently Pittacus preferred deterrence to retribution.

Looking ahead to Theophrastus, we should take notice of the fact that Aristotle is reported to have written a *Symposium* and a work *On Drunkenness*. The former title appears in Diogenes' catalogue of Aristotelian works (5.22). It occurs early in the catalogue among the exoteric writings and was almost certainly a dialogue.¹⁰⁹³ The few surviving fragments, found in Plutarch and Athenaeus, are not narrowly focused on heavy drinking. Rather, they concern Homer (fr. 99 Rose³), arriving clean at a symposium (fr. 100) and offering sacrifices that are complete and whole (fr. 101).¹⁰⁹⁴ The latter title, i.e., *On Drunkenness* does not occur in Diogenes' catalogue. Instead it is cited seven times by Athenaeus (fr. 103, 104 twice, 106, 107, 110, 111) and once each by Apollonius (fr. 103) and Plutarch (fr. 108). Five of these passages concern heavy drinking: falling backwards as result of drinking barley wine or beer (fr. 106), the role of body heat in causing intoxication (fr. 107), the way drinking affects old men and women (fr. 108) and the use of Rhodian pots and spices to make wine less intoxicating (fr. 110 and 111). To this list we may add two Athenaeus texts that give no title. One recognizes the power of Samagorean wine to make men drunk (fr. 109), and the other offers a derivation of the verb μεθύειν, "to get drunk" (fr. 102). If our evidence were restricted to these passages, we might conclude that Aristotle's work *On Drunkenness* was narrowly restricted to issues of intoxication. But other texts suggest a more inclusive work. Among those that cite the title *On Drunkenness*, two exhibit interest in people who remain free of thirst while eating salty food and while crossing the desert (fr. 103, parallel texts), and one is concerned with the words τραγάλια and τραγήματα, which refer to food served as a dessert (fr. 104). In connection with the last text, we may add one that does not cite *On Drunkenness* but mentions the fig and reports that it was served as a dessert (fr. 105). We might also

¹⁰⁹³ Moraux (1951) p. 33.

¹⁰⁹⁴ Fr. 102 gives no title. The topic concerns the derivation of the word μεθύειν and would be at home in a work entitled *Symposium*.

say that the passage concerned with the derivation of μεθύειν is better placed alongside the two texts that speak of τρογάλια and τραγήματα. All three may be said to exhibit a lexical interest. But however we view the passage concerned with μεθύειν, it seems clear that the work *On Drunkenness* focused on more than intoxication.

A special problem is whether the titles *Symposium* and *On Drunkenness* refer to the same work or two distinct works. In his collection of Aristotelian fragments, Rose prefers the former alternative.¹⁰⁹⁵ He treats *On Drunkenness* as a subtitle and prints the fragments together in a single section. Different is Gigon, who distinguishes between titles that are found in Diogenes' catalogue and those that are missing. He prints the fragments of the two groups separately, so that the fragments of the *Symposium* are separated from those of *On Drunkenness* by some 454 pages.¹⁰⁹⁶ I am inclined to follow Rose and to believe that the two titles refer to a single work. The title *Symposium* is most likely based on the setting of the dialogue, and as with Plato's *Symposium*, the title does not tell us what subject will be discussed by the participants. That would encourage the use of a second title that refers to the subject. It may be that the second title became a proper subtitle, so that later authors might refer to Aristotle's Συμπόσιον ἢ Περὶ μέθης, *Symposium* or *On Drunkenness*.¹⁰⁹⁷ That would be in line with other Aristotelian titles like *Eudemus* or *On Soul* and *Alexander* or *On Settlements*.¹⁰⁹⁸ But it should be underlined that no text attests to the double title *Symposium* or *On Drunkenness*. Moreover, even if the double title is accepted, it does not follow that the mention of drunkenness exhausts the content of the work. It may reflect the incipit and characterize the opening (and/or major) portion of the work, but it does not rule out other topics like those mentioned above.

Theophrastus followed Aristotle in writing a work *On Drunkenness*. It was a dialogue in which heavy drinking, moderate drinking and related topics were discussed. See above, Chapter III "Titles of Books" no. 31 and below, the commentary on 569–579A–B.

¹⁰⁹⁵ The fragments are collected together in Rose³ pp. 97–104 (= fr. 99–111). He is followed by Ross pp. 8–15 (= fr. 1–12). Cf. Hug. "Symposion-Literatur" in *Pauly's Realencyclopädie* 4A (1932) col. 1274 and Bignone vol. 2 p. 540 n. 1.

¹⁰⁹⁶ Gigon (1987) pp. 280–283 (fr. 47–53) and pp. 737–743 (fr. 666–677). Cf. "Bibliographisches zur griechischen Philosophiegeschichte," *Museum Helveticum* 16 (1959) 73.

¹⁰⁹⁷ On double titles, see the introduction to Chapter III, "Titles of Books."

¹⁰⁹⁸ See Moraux (1951) pp. 35, 37–38.

569 Athenaeus, *The Sophists at Dinner* 11.8 463C (BT vol. 3 p. 8.23–29.2 Kaibel)

Literature: Koepke (1856) p. 39; Wehrli (1983) p. 495; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 324–325; Wehrli-Wöhrle (2004) p. 533

Text 569 occurs in Book 11 of *Sophists at Dinner*. Plutarch of Alexandria is speaking.¹⁰⁹⁹ Later in Book 11, he will present the well-known catalogue of drinking vessels.¹¹⁰⁰ At present he is engaged in a playful display of learning, which includes talk of Cup-ville and another place called Cups (11.5–6 461E–462B). There are also lengthy quotations from Xenophanes, Anacreon, and Ion (11.7–8 462C–463C), after which comes our text. We are told that the Seven Wise Men used to hold drinking parties, for wine assuages the despondency, *δυσθυμία* (line 2), of old age, as Theophrastus says in *On Drunkenness*.

The shift from lyric poets to the Seven Wise Men is perhaps abrupt, but the implicit endorsement of symposia harmonizes well with what precedes. More puzzling is whether the explanation attributed to Theophrastus—wine relieves the despondency of old age—was advanced by him in a similar context. I.e., did Theophrastus say that the Seven Wise Men held drinking parties (line 1), because they recognized that wine improves the mood of older men (line 2)? I am inclined to believe that he did, but I want to acknowledge that it is at least possible that the γάρ, “for/because” (line 2), is attributable to Athenaeus, who found a Theophrastean observation useful, even though it was advanced in a different context, e.g., one that had a physiological orientation quite apart from the Seven Wise Men. We may compare the pseudo-Aristotelian *Problems* 30.1, where we read that the cooling of the body that occurs in old age causes despondency and that the warming effect of wine can alter the mood of older men (954b33–955a11). That said, we should not lose sight of the fact that the report concerning Theophrastus is explicitly referred to the work *On Drunkenness*. Athenaeus is reporting what Theophrastus said in a dialogue concerned with drinking, and in such a work mention of the Seven Wise Men, their drinking practices and their explanation of these practices would not be out of place.

¹⁰⁹⁹ This Plutarch is not to be confused with Plutarch of Chaeronea, the philosopher and biographer who is an important source for our knowledge of Theophrastus.

¹¹⁰⁰ References to the forthcoming catalogue are made at 11.1 460A–B, 11.3 460D and 11.5 461E. The catalogue itself begins at 11.32 782D and runs to 11.110 504F.

The mention of despondency and old age recalls Plato's *Laws*, which played a significant role in the development of symposiac literature. In Book 1, the Athenian Stranger is made to introduce the theme of drunkenness (περὶ μέθης 1.9 637D3, 5), and in Book 2 he discusses the so-called Third Chorus of older men, who are between thirty and sixty years of age. The Stranger recognizes that men of this age suffer from despondency and that wine provides relief (2.9 666B5–C2). It does not follow that our Theophrastean text derives from an identical context: one that was concerned with civic arrangements and perhaps made reference to the Stranger's Third Chorus. Our text is, however, closely related to the *Laws* in that it recognizes the effect that old age has on a person's mood and the relief that can be found in wine.

Aristotle, in his dialogue *On Drunkenness*, discussed the effect of wine on both older and younger men. The former are said to become drunk quite quickly because of the weakness of the heat within them. The latter differ in that their bodies are warm, but they too are prone to drunkenness, for they are easily overcome by the heat of the wine which is added to the large quantity already present in their bodies (fr. 107 R³ = Athenaeus 10.34 429C–D). Whatever we think of such physiological explanations, it is clear that Peripatetic works *On Drunkenness* made room for discussion of wine in relation to different age groups and therefore to different bodily conditions. Text 569 is evidence that Theophrastus' dialogue included such a discussion.

570 Athenaeus, *The Sophists at Dinner* 10.30 427C–D (BT vol. 2 p. 429.20–23 Kaibel)

Literature: Schweighaeuser (1801–1805) vol. 5 pp. 392–394; Koepke (1856) p. 39; K. Schneider (1922) col. 1539; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 325–326; Wehrli-Wöhrle (2004) p. 533

Text 570 occurs in Book 10 not long after text 576. In the latter, i.e., earlier text, Ulpian was speaking and the discussion focused on wine-pourers. Subsequently, the subject turned to mixing wine with water in various proportions, and Democritus¹¹⁰¹ began to speak at length (10.28 426C). He quotes passages taken from various authors, including

¹¹⁰¹ This Democritus is a philosopher from Nicomedia. He is not to be confused with the well-known atomist who hailed from Abdera in Thrace and was born c. 460 BC.

Anacreon who called unmixed wine a Scythian potion. There follow references to Herodotus and Chamaeleon, both of whom took note of the effect that heavy drinking had on Cleomenes: he went mad. Finally, we are offered a quotation from a satyr play by Achaëus. The satyrs are indignant at drinking watered-down wine and express their preference for carousing in Scythian fashion (10.29 427A–C). What follows is our text 570. Democritus is still speaking, and the subject shifts to toasts. Citing Theophrastus' work *On Drunkenness*, Democritus says, "the practice of toasting the participants (listeners) was not ancient. Rather, at the start the libation was restricted to the gods, and the cottabus to the persons loved."

The second half of 570 is straightforward: originally libations were poured in honor of the gods; in contrast, shooting the cottabus (flinging drops of wine at a small figure or into a basin) was dedicated to one's beloved (lines 2–3). In the lines that follow, the focus remains on shooting the cottabus (427D–E). The first half, however, is problematic. The manuscript reading ἀκροατῶν (line 1) has been suspected, and Toup proposes reading ἀκρατοποτῶν, "drinkers of unmixed wine." This emendation finds support in the preceding context. Democritus has been speaking about unmixed wine, and the emendation would have him continuing to address this theme. Moreover, the verb ἀκρατοποτεῖν occurs only a few lines before the beginning of 570. Nevertheless, in the second half of the text and in the lines that follow on the second half (427D–E), the focus is not on unmixed wine. Rather it is on libations and the cottabus, so that reading ἀκρατοποτῶν creates an awkward transition to what appears to be a new topic. Hence, a different emendation has been suggested by Casaubon: ἐρῶντων. This emendation finds no support in what precedes, but it does give the text good sense: toasts by lovers are not of long standing; originally lovers expressed their emotion in shooting the cottabus. Moreover, the emendation fits well with what follows immediately on 570: namely, further remarks on the cottabus (427D–E). Nevertheless, there are grounds for hesitation. The remarks on the cottabus are quite brief, after which comes a short passage on rendering to the dead food that falls from the table (427E). And after that the discussion turns back to heavy drinking and the effects it has on one's behavior (10.31 427E–10.32 428E). Perhaps, then, in 570 and the immediately following lines, we are confronted with a segment of text that has been introduced awkwardly into Democritus' speech. There is a certain internal unity: ancient practice included not only libations to the gods and expressing enthusiasm for one's beloved while playing the cottabus but

also remembering the dead when food falls from the table.¹¹⁰² But there is no strong tie to what precedes and what follows. Indeed, it might be argued that the following discussion of heavy drinking and its effects on behavior is a continuation of the discussion that precedes 570.

Since both emendations are problematic, it seems best to stay with the manuscript reading ἀκροατῶν and to adopt Gulick's translation in the Loeb edition: "participants." To be sure, such a use of ἀκροατής would be unusual, but it does make possible a simple interpretation of the text. Theophrastus contrasts toasts among the participants with libations to the gods and shooting the cottabus, in that toasts are comparatively new. How Theophrastus may have developed this idea is lost with the original Theophrastean context. We can only conjecture that *On Drunkenness* contained numerous historical remarks,¹¹⁰³ and that some of them are likely to have been developed in ways that will have interested Theophrastus' readers.

On the word ἐπίχυσις in the sense of "toast," cf. Polybius, *Histories* 16.21.12: ὁ δὲ πυνθανόμενος τὸν γινόμενον ἐκ πάντων ἔπαινον ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ καὶ τὰς ἐν πότοις ἐπιχύσεις, "When he (Tlepolemus) heard the universal praise of himself and the toasts that were drunk to him." On the cottabus, see K. Schneider col. 1528–1541.

571 Athenaeus, *The Sophists at Dinner* 11.18 782A–B (BT vol. 3 p. 18.20–19.2 Kaibel)

Literature: Scheighaeuser (1801–1805) vol. 6 pp. 50–51; Koepke (1856) p. 39; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 326–327

Text 571 follows on 569 and 573. All three texts are found toward the beginning of Book 11 of *The Sophists at Dinner*. 571 follows 573 by c. two and one half pages. That is not immediately clear from the numeration found in the editions: 573 occurs at 465B and 571 at 782A–B. The explanation is that 571 belongs to a segment of text that has been transferred to Book 11 from the epitome, in order to fill a lacuna created when several pages were torn from the primary manuscript, a tenth century codex now held by the Biblioteca Marciana in Venice.

¹¹⁰² Or we may have two segments: the first is 507 plus the subsequent remarks on the cottabus, and the second is the brief remark concerning food that falls off the table. But I much prefer to recognize a single segment concerning ancient practices.

¹¹⁰³ See 571; also 437.3 where, however, the focus is on the work entitled *On Dispositions*.

Plutarch is speaking in preparation for the catalogue of drinking vessels that he will soon offer (beginning 782E). In what precedes, he focuses on the great value that the ancients put on the possession of drinking vessels (11.16 781C–D), on moderate drinking (11.16 781E)¹¹⁰⁴ and on the material and workmanship that enhanced the finest vessels (11.17 781E–782A). Plutarch then turns to the custom of mixing wine, first pouring in the water and then the wine: ἔθος δ' ἦν πρότερον ὕδωρ ἐμβάλλεσθαι, μεθ' ὃ τὸν οἶνον. The custom is documented by quotations from Xenophanes, Anacreon and Hesiod (11.18 782A), after which comes our text 571. Plutarch names Theophrastus, who opposed the practice of his own day to that of ancient times. Whereas Theophrastus' contemporaries poured water on wine, the ancients preferred to pour wine on water, in order that they might have a more watery drink, and having enjoyed such a drink they might have less desire for the remainder (lines 1–4). Still drawing on Theophrastus, Plutarch adds that the ancients used to consume the greatest portion in playing the cottabus (line 5). What follows is unrelated. Plutarch returns to the workmanship that decorated the finest vessels (11.19 782B). That may seem disorderly: The segment that concerns Theophrastus breaks up two segments that are closely related in that they consider fine vessels and their decoration. Nevertheless, we should resist any impulse to rearrange the text. Athenaeus is not writing a carefully ordered treatise, and it is possible that the epitomist has contracted the Theophrastean material or omitted something.

In 571 we read that the ancients poured wine on water in order to have a more watery drink (lines 2–4). The clear implication is that Theophrastus' contemporaries preferred to pour water on wine, and in that way they obtained a stronger drink. Naturally the strength of the mix does not depend directly on which of the two fluids is poured on the other. Rather, it is assumed that whichever fluid is poured into the mixing bowl first is normally of greater quantity than that poured in second. Cf. Hesiod, *Works and Days* 596 which is cited immediately before 571: τρεῖς ὕδατος προχέειν, τὸ δὲ τέταρτον ἰέμεν οἶνου, “pour forth three parts of water and then let flow the fourth of wine.” The translation is in line with that of Schweighaeuser (Zweibrücken) and Gulick (Loeb),¹¹⁰⁵ and it reflects the fact that Athenaeus has Plutarch cite Hesiod after

¹¹⁰⁴ This segment of text is quite short and contains the verb φησί, “he says.” If the subject of the verb is Athenaeus, then we have an indication of the work of the epitomist, who may have shortened the segment considerably.

¹¹⁰⁵ Cf. LSJ s.v. προχέω, citing Hesiod 596: “pour in three parts of water first.”

Xenophanes and Anacreon as still another example of mixing wine and water: first pouring water into the bowl or cup after which wine is added. And the wine is added in a smaller amount in order that the mix be rather watery, which is stated explicitly in the Theophrastean material that follows (line 3). That is almost certainly how Athenaeus intends us to understand the passage in which Theophrastus is cited (i.e., 11.18 taken as a whole). But some scholars have understood Hesiod to be referring to pouring libations,¹¹⁰⁶ and if that is correct Athenaeus is misusing Hesiod. My own inclination is to follow West, who rejects the idea of libations and comments that sunrise and sunset are the times for libations (WD 339, 724), and “they are not such great fun that they deserve a place in this catalogue of pleasures. Nor would the gods want quite so much water, although it appears beside mead and wine in the libation to the dead in Od. 11.26–28.”

Schweighauser argues that the words τοῦ λοιποῦ and τὸ πλεῖστον, “of the remainder” and “the greatest portion” (lines 4–5) refer to wine that is unmixed with water. That is possible. The wine that is poured into the mixing bowl is pure (lines 2–3), but it is equally possible that the reference is to the watery drink (line 3). Indeed, I find the flow of the text in favor of the latter possibility. The participants have enjoyed the watery wine, have little desire for what remains in the mixing bowl and make use of it in playing the cottabus. Moreover, there is no mention of unwatered wine in the discussion of the cottabus at the beginning of Book 15 of the *The Sophists at Dinner*, and if a mention of unwatered wine occurs in 570, it depends upon a dubious conjecture.¹¹⁰⁷ In addition, Dicaearchus explains the λατάγη, which is thrown in playing cottabus, as follows: τὸ ὑπολειπόμενον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐκποθέντος ποτηρίου ὕγρὸν, “the liquid remaining from the cup that has been quaffed” (fr. 106 M = Athenaeus 15.2 666B–C). That the drink whose remainder was used in playing the cottabus was never mixed with water seems unlikely. In any case, we know that the cottabus took different forms¹¹⁰⁸ and perhaps

¹¹⁰⁶ E.g. H. Evelyn-White, who translates “thrice pour an offering of water, but make a fourth libation of wine” (Loeb edition p. 47). See also R. Lattimore, Hesiod (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 1959) p. 89. In support of pouring libations, one might cite Herodotus, *Histories* 7.192, where σπονδὰς occurs together with προχέειν.

¹¹⁰⁷ See the commentary on 570.

¹¹⁰⁸ See Athenaeus 15.4 666E and 15.6 667E with Schneider col. 1532–1538 and S. Usher, “This to the Fair Critias,” *Eranos* 77 (1979) p. 39 n. 2.

should assume that over the centuries (the cottabus was being played as early as the sixth century BC¹¹⁰⁹) variations occurred in the remainder that was used in the cottabus.

572 Athenaeus, *The Sophists at Dinner* 15.48 693C–D (BT vol. 3 p. 534.4–14 Kaibel)

Literature: Schweighaeuser (1801–1805) vol. 8 pp. 76–77, 240–241, Wernicke (1894) col. 746; Fortenbaugh (1984) 327

Text 572 is found in the fifteenth book of *The Sophists at Dinner*. After a lengthy discussion of perfume (ending 15.46 692F), most of the diners call for a cup of wine: some in honor of the Good Daemon, others in honor of Zeus Savior and still others in honor of Hygieia (Health). That prompts a listing of poets who have made mention of wine mixed in honor of these three divinities. The listing is reported by Athenaeus, who is here speaking as a participant in the dinner party. First we hear of poets who referred to Zeus Savior, then of poets who mentioned Hygieia, and finally of poets who referred to the Good Daemon (15.47 692F–693C). In regard to the last, we get a quotation from the comic poet Xenarchus, in which unmixed wine is said to have had a debilitating effect on those who drink it. The mention of unmixed wine comes as something of a surprise, for up to this point we have heard only of mixed wine and mixture (692F, 693B). But the Good Daemon was regularly saluted with a taste of unmixed wine, and in any case, Athenaeus is not concerned with such detail. What interests him is the debilitating effect of unmixed wine, so that he goes on to cite Theophrastus and what he said in his work *On Drunkenness* (15.48 693C–D = 572). A philosopher now replaces the poets and will soon be followed by the atthidographer Philochorus (693D),¹¹¹⁰ who was Theophrastus' contemporary, albeit some thirty years younger.

According to Theophrastus, unmixed wine was served at the conclusion of the dinner proper and was spoken of as a toast to the Good Daemon. Only a little, a mere taste, was served, as if recalling the strength of the wine and the gift of the god. And this was done after a filling dinner, in order that very little might be consumed. Having made obeisance three times, the diners are said to have taken up the wine and to have

¹¹⁰⁹ The earliest reference to shooting the cottabus is in Pindar, fr. 128 Bergk = Athenaeus, 10.30 427D–E.

¹¹¹⁰ The text in question is *FGrH* 328 F 5.

supplanted the god that they might do nothing unseemly and have no strong desire for this drink (572). The subsequent citation of Philochorus is briefer but quite similar.¹¹¹¹ We are told that unmixed wine was served after dinner; a taste was taken, which served to demonstrate the power of the Good God. After that wine mixed with water was served, and for this reason the nymphs were called nurses of Dionysus (15.48 693D). The only addition here is the reference to nymphs, but the idea is not new with Philochorus. It was already traditional and is mentioned by Theophrastus in his work *On Drunkenness* (573).

Earlier in Book 2, a similar report, using the same words, is attributed to Philochorus. There are, of course, minor differences. Mention of the nurses of Dionysus precedes, and the report identifies Amphictyon, king of Athens, as the person who instituted the custom of tasting unmixed wine immediately after dinner and then continuing with wine that is mixed with water (2.7 38C–D). Connecting the custom with early Athenian history suits Philochorus *qua* attidographer. See the commentary on 573. There is also a point of agreement that calls for brief discussion. According to both Book 2 and Book 15, Philochorus will have spoken of the Good God and not the Good Daemon. That differs from what we read in Book 15 concerning Theophrastus. He is reported to have spoken of the Good Daemon. In certain contexts, the distinction between daemon and god may be important. The former might be conceived of as a divine power that is to be distinguished from a god whose individuality invites comparison with that of a human being.¹¹¹² But in the texts that concern us, the Good Daemon and the Good God are one and the same. The mode of address could and did vary,¹¹¹³ which is hardly surprising, for the power of wine was closely identified with the god Dionysus. According to Theophrastus, the toast in honor of the Good Daemon was conceived of as a reminder of both the strength of the wine and the gift of the god

¹¹¹¹ Placing two quite similar reports one after the other may appear unnecessarily redundant, but Athenaeus is not aiming at brevity and will not avoid repetition if it demonstrates learning. For a different example, see 10.29 427B–C, where Athenaeus first cites Herodotus 6.84 and then Chamaeleon fr. 11 M. Remarkable is that the Chamaeleon fragment is not only based on Herodotus but also is closer to the text of the historian than what Athenaeus attributes to him. See Fortenbaugh, “Chamaeleon on Pleasure and Drunkenness” forthcoming in Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities.

¹¹¹² There is also the personal daemon that was thought to guide a man’s life for better or worse, and was closely connected or even identified with his character. See, e.g. S. Johnston, “Demons V,” in Brill’s New Pauly (Leiden: Brill 2004) p. 284 and Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 233–234 on Heraclitus 22 B 119 D–K.

¹¹¹³ See Wernicke col. 746, who cites Pausanias 8.36.5.

(15. 693C–D = 572.1–4). According to Philochorus it was a demonstration of the power of the Good God (2.7 38D, 15.18 693E). And as we read early in Book 15, when unmixed wine is poured and the Greeks call upon the Good Daemon, they are doing honor to the god who discovered wine, and he was Dionysus (15.17 675B). None of this is meant to deny that in a different context (e.g., a work on religion) Theophrastus might want to distinguish carefully between a daemon and a god, but in a dialogue *On Drunkenness* he is prepared to focus on the dangers of unmixed wine and to use a phrase, Good Daemon, which occurred frequently in toasts.¹¹¹⁴ Much the same can be said of Philochorus. As an attidographer, he is recording the establishment of customs and laws that affect the social fabric; he is not concerned with drawing theoretical distinctions between modes of address that can be used interchangeably.

In the preceding paragraph, I have made mention of a passage early in Book 15, where calling on the Good Daemon is related to honoring Dionysus. The passage is problematic, for in it we are told, on the authority of Philonides,¹¹¹⁵ that unmixed wine is served during the dinner and that at this time the Greeks call upon the Good Daemon. After dinner mixed wine is served and Zeus the Savior is called upon (15.17 675B–C). A similar statement is found in Diodorus of Sicily (4.3.4).¹¹¹⁶ These reports do not agree with what we are told on the authority of Theophrastus and Philochorus: namely, that unmixed wine is tasted first after dinner. Perhaps one of these reports should be rejected, or a reconciliation should be attempted, or—and this is my preference—we should resist postulating a single uniform practice for all Greeks at all times. And that holds not only for the time at which pure wine was served but also for toasts (570), mixing wine and shooting the cottabus (571).

573 Athenaeus, *The Sophists at Dinner* 11.13 465B (BT vol. 3 p. 13.2–6 Kaibel)

Literature: Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 327–328

Text 573 follows closely (c. two pages) on 569. Plutarch of Alexandria is still speaking. He has not yet begun the promised catalogue of drink-

¹¹¹⁴ See, e.g., *The Sophists at Dinner* 11.73 486F–487B, where *The Torch* of Antiphanes (4th c. poet of Middle Comedy) is cited twice (fr. 137, vol. 2 p. 68 Kock), and cf. Plutarch, *Table Talk* 3.7 655E and Aelian, *Miscellaneous History* 1.20.

¹¹¹⁵ Philonides was a doctor who lived in the first century AD. Athenaeus cites his work *On Perfumes and Wreaths*.

¹¹¹⁶ Diodorus was a contemporary of Julius Caesar, who wrote a history of the world from mythical times to Caesar's conquest of Gaul.

ing vessels (that begins at 11.32 782D). We hear of different ways in which people drink wine; we also hear of earthenware cups, the use of “madly/madness” in regard to various things including wine, and the consumption of wine by spectators (11.10–13 463E–464F). After that Plutarch tells us that according to the atthidographer Phanodemus¹¹¹⁷ the Athenians mix sweet new wine with water at the temple of Dionysus in the Marshes. Dionysus acquired the epithet “of the Marshes,” Λιμναῖος, because it was here that new wine and water were mixed for the first time, and the nymphs came to be called nurses of Dionysus, τιθῆναι τοῦ Διονύσου, because water increases the wine, when mixed with it.¹¹¹⁸ This mixture, we are told, was pleasing to men who celebrated Dionysus, calling upon him with various names: Flowery, Dithyrambus, Reveller and Bromius (11.13 464F–465A). At this point, Plutarch cites Theophrastus, who in his work *On Drunkenness* said that “the nymphs are truly nurses of Dionysus, τοῦ Διονύσου τροφοί, for¹¹¹⁹ when cut or pruned the vines pour forth a great deal of moisture and naturally shed tears” (465B = 573).

Athenaeus has Plutarch mix learning with playfulness. Reporting what Phanodemus said not only about new wine but also about the names acquired by Dionysus and the nymphs is a demonstration of learning. And the explanation of “nurses” is playful in that an analogy is created between nurses and nymphs (465A). The same can be said of the report concerning Theophrastus. In citing a particular work of the philosopher and in recording his support for speaking of nymphs as nurses, Plutarch is exhibiting learning. And the grounds for support reported by Plutarch are playful. The verb δακρύειν, which in ordinary usage refers to crying, is here used metaphorically of vines that have been pruned (465B). Moreover, Theophrastus is recalling the technical language of botany. For

¹¹¹⁷ Phanodemus was a slightly older contemporary of Theophrastus. The text under consideration is *FGrH* 325 F 12.

¹¹¹⁸ I.e., as nurses (especially wet nurses) help a child grow, so the nymphs *qua* spirits associated with water are credited with increasing the quantity of wine. Nymphs are spirits, on the whole benevolent, that represent the divine powers of mountains, waters and woods. In regard to 11.13 465A–B, it is the association with water that makes the nymphs suitable nurses of Dionysus.

¹¹¹⁹ The conjunction “for,” γάρ (line 2), recalls a similar use of “for” in 569.2. In the latter passage, there is room for doubt concerning who introduced the conjunction: Theophrastus or Athenaeus. In 573 I see little or no reason to doubt that the conjunction and indeed both halves of the text (lines 1–2 and 2–3) are Theophrastean. Or more cautiously, if Athenaeus is drawing on a secondary source, that source presented both halves as Theophrastean.

the noun δάκρυα was used not only of tears but also of the drops of fluid that a plant emits when cut or torn. Such verbal play fits well in an exoteric dialogue, which was the form of the work *On Drunkenness*.

In two other passages in *The Sophists at Dinner*, nymphs are said to be the nurses of Dionysus, Διονύσου τροφοί (2.7 38D and 15.48 693E with the words reversed). In both passages, Athenaeus cites the atthidographer Philochorus.¹¹²⁰ Preceding the first of the two passages, Athenaeus tells us on the authority of Philochorus that the Athenian king Amphictyon learned from Dionysus the mixing of wine with water. As a result men came to drink wine while standing upright, rather than bent over on account of drinking unmixed wine.¹¹²¹ The king built an altar in honor of the “upright” Dionysus and in addition dedicated an altar to the nymphs, the nurses of Dionysus (38C–D). A report concerning Amphictyon suits Philochorus *qua* atthidographer. That Theophrastus, too, connected the nymphs with Amphictyon is possible but quite impossible to prove. In any case, the second passage that cites Philochorus fails to name Amphictyon, though the adverb, τότε, in those days, may be thought to refer back to the time of the king. The passage follows directly on text 572, which makes clear the dangers of drinking more than a little unmixed wine. What Plutarch gives us from Philochorus is entirely in line with this message. We are told that at an earlier time the custom was established that after having eaten everyone tasted unmixed wine and then drank wine mixed with water. And for this reason, the nymphs were called nurses of Dionysus (693D–E).

The play on vines that are pruned and on the word δάκρυα (mentioned above) prompts the question whether *On Drunkenness* contained a significant amount of botanical material. Without more evidence, we cannot answer with any degree of confidence. But perhaps we can say that a botanical fragment that mentions wine and has no exact parallel in the surviving botanical treatises could derive from *On Drunkenness*. I am thinking of 428 (in the text-translation volumes it will be found under the heading “Botany”), where we read that regions marked by pine trees

¹¹²⁰ FG^h 328 F 5b and 5a (Jacoby printing the later text first).

¹¹²¹ “Being upright” (ὀρθοῦς γενέσθαι) contrasts with being bent over as the result of drinking wine without water (ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀκράτου καπτομένου 38C). On this and other uses of “upright” (ὀρθός), see K. Niasas, “Athenaeus and the Cult of Dionysus Orthos,” in *Athenaeus and His World*, ed. D. Braund and J. Wilkins (Exeter: University Press 2000) pp. 466–475.

produce vines that give sweet wine. Theophrastus is said to explain this by the warmth of the soil. “For in general the pine tree grows in places where there is clay, and clay is warm, and for this reason it assists in concocting wine.” Whatever we think of this explanation, it is, I think, clear that Theophrastus will have had more than one occasion in *On Drunkenness* to introduce botanical material such as that found in 428.¹¹²² And that is true, whether he seized on the occasions or let them pass.

574 Athenaeus, *The Sophists at Dinner* 10.22 423F–424A (BT vol. 2 p. 421.25–422.1 Kaibel)

Literature: Schweighaeuser (1801–1805) vol. 5 p. 365; Koepke (1856) p. 39; Gudeman (1934) pp. 430–431; Ussher (1960) pp. 57–58; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 328–329

Text 574 is found in the tenth book of *The Sophists at Dinner* and is part of a transitional passage. The diners have finished eating, and it is time for the symposium proper to begin. Athenaeus has Ulpian mark the transition by saying, “Since we have dined, δεδείπναμεν, let us, in accordance with what Plato says in the *Philebus*, mix (a bowl of wine) while we pray to the gods.” The quoted sentence is divided into two parts that are separated by half a page. First we get the since-clause (10.20 422E), then Ulpian digresses to exhibit his knowledge of the verb δειπνεῖν and other verbs of eating. After that we get the consequent (10.21 423A–B). There follow remarks on mixing wine and water, in which Ulpian refers to wine-pourers, οἰνοχόοι,¹¹²³ and uses the words “more unmixed,” ἀκρατέστερον, “ladle,” κύαθος, and “purer,” ζωρότερον, (423B–C). Still eager to exhibit his knowledge, Ulpian launches into a discussion of these

¹¹²² We must, however, be cautious. Pliny, *Natural History* 36.156 = 413 no. 107 furnishes a clear example. We read, “Theophrastus says that tipplers in a drinking contest take this powder (made from pumice-stone) first, but unless they fill themselves with a whole draught, they run a risk; and that it has so great a power that new wine stops bubbling when pumice is added.” The mention of a drinking contest and of new wine together with the absence of an exact parallel in one of Theophrastus’ botanical treatises might be thought to justify attributing the Theophrastean material to *On Drunkenness*. That would, however, be a mistake. Pliny is drawing on *Research on Plants* 9.17.3, but without attention to detail. In particular, whereas Theophrastus wrote of a contest concerning the drinking of hellebore and the use of pumice-stone as prophylactic against the purgative effect of hellebore, Pliny makes the contest one of drinking wine, to which he relates the use of pumice-stone. See Sharples, *Commentary* vol. 5 (1995) p. 177 on 413 no. 107.

¹¹²³ Ulpian is drawing on Plato’s *Philebus* 61B–C, where wine-pourers are mentioned.

items beginning with ζωρότερον. He lists various meanings: “stronger” (“unmixed”), “warm,” “well-mixed,” “many years old” (10.22 423D–E), after which several lines of the comic poet Diphilus are quoted. In these lines εὐζωρότερον occurs in the sense of “stronger,” i.e., “not watery” (423 D–F).¹¹²⁴ Finally Ulpian cites Theophrastus, who in his work *On Drunkenness* said that what is mixed is called ζωρότερον. In support, Theophrastus quoted two verses of Empedocles (31B5 DK). That is our text 574.¹¹²⁵

The meaning recognized by Theophrastus is out of line not only with what precedes in Athenaeus but also with other occurrences elsewhere (see LSJ *s.v.* ζωρός), so that corruption has been suspected. Gudeman suggests that μή has fallen out in front of κεκραμένον (line 2), and Steinmetz includes our text in a list of passages that exhibit ζωρότερον in its usual meaning of stronger or unmixed.¹¹²⁶ I am, however, reluctant to embrace emendation and to deny that Empedocles used the adjective of things that were once unmixed but now had changed and become mixed (line 4).¹¹²⁷ Theophrastus knew the work of Empedocles well (he wrote a monograph *On Empedocles*, Diogenes Laertius 5.43 = 1.103 = 137 no. 28) and in *On Drunkenness* may well have referred to Empedocles to verify an unusual use of the adjective ζωρός/ζωρότερον. That need not mean that Theophrastus regarded only this use as correct. Indeed, in his *Characters*, Theophrastus uses the adjective in the usual sense of “pure” or “unmixed”: the boor is said to drink unmixed wine: ζωρότερον πιεῖν (4.9 St.). I am, therefore, inclined to believe that in *On Drunkenness*, within a discussion of mixing wine and water (see 571–573), Theophrastus took note of an unusual use of ζωρότερον. We know that he took an interest in lexical matters,¹¹²⁸ and may have anticipated Ulpian in commenting upon ζωρότερον.

¹¹²⁴ Diphilus of Sinope was a contemporary of Theophrastus. The lines quoted are fr. 58 vol. 2 p. 559 Koch.

¹¹²⁵ Less than a page later, when Ulpian takes up wine-pourers, οἰνοχόοι, Theophrastus is cited again (10.24 424E–F = 576).

¹¹²⁶ Gudeman pp. 430–431; Steinmetz (1969b) vol. 2 p. 67.

¹¹²⁷ See D. O’Brien, “Empedocles fr. 35.14–15,” *Classical Review* n. s. 15 (1965) pp. 1–4 and *Empedocles’ Cosmic Cycle* (Cambridge: University Press 1969) pp. 117, 267.

¹¹²⁸ Theophrastus wrote a work Περὶ λέξεως (666 no. 17a), and Athenaeus reports (15.15 673E–F = 437) that Adrastus wrote at length on Theophrastus’ own λέξις in the work *On Dispositions* (436 no. 1).

575 Athenaeus, *The Sophists at Dinner* 11.97 497E (BT vol. 3 p. 97.5–7 Kaibel)

Literature: Koepke (1856) pp. 39, 41–42; Scorza (1934) pp. 39–41; Wehrli (1967–1978) p. 73; Giordano (1977) pp. 111–112; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 329–330

This text occurs in the famous catalogue of drinking vessels that occupies most of Book 11 of *The Sophists at Dinner* (11.32 728D–11.110 503F). Early in the book, Athenaeus has Ulpian refer to the catalogue (11.1 460A–B, 11.3 460D), which is subsequently presented by Plutarch. Before beginning the catalogue, Plutarch has occasion to mention Theophrastus three times (11.8 463C = 569, 11.13 465B = 573, 11.18 782A–B = 571). Within the catalogue, he mentions Theophrastus once. That occurs within the discussion of the rhyton (11.97 496F–497F),¹¹²⁹ which may be characterized as a display of grammatical and literary learning. The quantity of the upsilon is reported, as is the accent of the final syllable. The vessel is said to resemble a horn, the manner in which it discharges fluid is described, and the derivation of its name from *rhysis* “flow” is reported. There are also citations from various poets. Our text 575 comes toward the end and is quite short. We are told that according to Theophrastus in his work *On Drunkenness*, the rhyton was assigned to the heroes alone. The immediately surrounding material is unrelated: a quotation from the *Epigrams* of Hedylus precedes and what Dorotheus of Sidon says about the structure of the rhyton and the derivation of its name follows.

Related material is found much earlier in Book 11, Athenaeus has Ulpian discuss whether the ancients drank out of large cups. He first cites Dicaearchus’ work *On Alcaeus* for the view that the ancients used small cups and drank rather watery wine (11.4 460F–461A). After that Ulpian cites Chamaeleon’s work *On Drunkenness* and quotes him at some length. Initially the focus is on men of wealth and power who find pleasure in drinking wine. We are told that among such men large cups became popular, but among the ancient Greeks large cups were not fashionable. They arrived only recently being imported from the barbarians. At this point the text is corrupt, but not hopelessly so. It is clear that Chamaeleon introduces material evidence (painting and the like), treats the rhyton as an exception and tells us that it was assigned only to the heroes. Chamaeleon concedes that the attribution is puzzling and proceeds to

¹¹²⁹ The rhyton was a drinking vessel that took the form of a horn or an animal’s head. See G. Richter and M. Milne, *Shapes and Names of Athenian Vases* (New York: Plantin 1935) pp. 28–29 and H. Gross, “Rhyton,” *Der Kleine Pauly* vol. 4 (1972) col. 1426–1427.

offer an explanation. Since the demigods, i.e., the heroes were thought to be bad tempered and ready to give blows, they were represented as drinking from large cups that held much wine, in order that they might not seem to be acting in character but from drunkenness (461B–C). The explanation is hardly satisfying. For drinking heavily and as a result manifesting aggressive behavior on a regular basis is a sign of bad character: namely, intemperance. It is possible that Theophrastus offered a similar explanation in his work *On Drunkenness*, but that is not said in our text and without further evidence the explanation should not be attributed to Theophrastus.¹¹³⁰

There is a striking similarity in wording between the Theophrastean text, τὸ ῥυτὸν φησιν ὀνομαζόμενον ποτήριον τοῖς ἥρωσι μόνοις ἀποδίδοσθαι (575) and that of Chamaeleon, τὸ γὰρ ῥυτὸν ὀνομαζόμενον μόνοις τοῖς ἥρωσιν ἀπεδίδουσιν (Chamaeleon fr. 10 M¹¹³¹). That might suggest that we are dealing with a single text that occurred in a work *On Drunkenness* that was assigned now to Theophrastus and now to Chamaeleon, in the same way that a work *On Pleasure* was attributed to both Theophrastus and Chamaeleon (550.5–6 and 553.2). But the suggestion is to be resisted. The dispute in regard to *On Pleasure* is not sufficient to raise serious doubt concerning a Theophrastean work *On Drunkenness* and the attribution of 575 to that work. Indeed, 575 and Chamaeleon fr. 10 together are evidence that the early Peripatetics, in their exoteric writings, did not hesitate to introduce the same material and on occasion to express themselves in similar language.¹¹³²

576 Athenaeus, *The Sophists at Dinner* 10.24 424E–F (BT vol. 2 p. 423.15–424.1 Kaibel)

Literature: Schweighaeuser (1801–1805) vol. 5 pp. 372–373; Rose (1863) p. 116; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1485; Wehrli (1967–1978) vol. 10 pp. 35–36; Fortenbaugh (1984) p. 330

Text 576 occurs in Book 10 of *The Sophists at Dinner* less than a page after text 574. Both texts are part of a transition from the diners' ban-

¹¹³⁰ Wehrli (1967–1978) vol. 9 p. 73.

¹¹³¹ M refers to Martano's edition of the fragments of Chamaeleon forthcoming in Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities.

¹¹³² See the above, Chapter III "Titles of Books" no. 31 *On Drunkenness*. Scorza pp. 40–41 makes the point, but he errs when he cites Athenaeus 11.96 496F and says that Aristotle, too, discussed the rhyton in his work *On Drunkenness*. Aristotle may have done so, but the passage cited by Scorza concerns a drinking vessel called *rhodias*.

quet to their symposium. Ulpian is the speaker. He has referred to wine-pourers and used the words ἀκρατέστερον, κύαθος and ζωρότερον (10.21 423B–C). Making a display of erudition, he has discussed the last three items (10.22 423D–10.24 424E), and in 576 he turns to wine-pourers. Citing Homer’s *Odyssey* 15.141, he tells us that among the ancients the boys of noblest birth used to pour wine (lines 1–3). After that he leaps forward in time to the fifth century, saying that the poet Euripides was one of the boys who poured wine (line 4). That statement is supported by reference to Theophrastus and what he says in *On Drunkenness*. The Theophrastean material begins with πυνθάνομαι δ’ ἔγωγε καὶ Εὐριπίδην τὸν ποιητὴν οἶνοχοεῖν Ἀθήνησι τοῖς ὀρχησταῖς καλουμένοις, “I hear that even the poet Euripides poured wine at Athens for the so-called Dancers” (lines 5–6). That is almost certainly a verbatim excerpt from a dialogue, i.e., the Theophrastean dialogue *On Drunkenness*. The occurrence of the strengthened form ἔγωγε suggests a speaker who wishes to emphasize what he is about to say,¹¹³³ and the vague reference conveyed by πυνθάνομαι, as against an accurate citation, suits a dialogue in which live conversation is being imitated.¹¹³⁴ Who, then, is the speaker? My guess is Theophrastus (he will have taken the lead role in the dialogue), and by using the strengthened form ἔγωγε, he asserts his authority or signals that his words will merit attention. That guess is encouraged by the flow of our text: “Theophrastus says ... I at least,” but I want to acknowledge that Athenaeus introduces the Theophrastean excerpt in a formulaic manner: “Theophrastus in the work *On Drunkenness* says,” and this formula tells us no more than what follows is taken from a Theophrastean work entitled *On Drunkenness*. In our text, it is conceivable that the speaker was not Theophrastus but someone else whose identity has been lost along with the dialogue.

The subsequent remarks—those concerned with dancing round the temple of Delian Apollo, the dress of the dancers, the Thragelia and the Temple of the Laurel Bearer (lines 6–10)—all follow without

¹¹³³ LSJ s.v. ἔγω explain ἔγωγε as a strengthened form that might be translated “I at least,” “for my part,” “indeed,” “for myself.”

¹¹³⁴ Given the preceding sentence καὶ Εὐριπίδης δ’ ὁ ποιητὴς ἐν παισὶν ὄνοχόησε, “Even Euripides the poet was one of the boys who poured wine” (line 4), the words καὶ and τὸν ποιητὴν (line 5) are apt to seem unnecessarily repetitious, but the repetition is easily explained if we are offered a verbatim excerpt. In fact, the occurrence of καὶ and ὁ ποιητὴς in the preceding sentence is likely to have been influenced by what follows. I.e., when Athenaeus wrote line 4, he was already looking at the Theophrastean excerpt that would follow.

interruption, so that it is reasonable to believe that the excerpt continues verbatim until Athenaeus makes reference to Hieronymus of Rhodes (line 10). That seems to be the judgment of Gulick, whose Loeb text we have followed in placing quotation marks before *πυνθάνομαι* (line 5) and after *περὶ τούτων* (line 10).¹¹³⁵

At the end of the Theophrastean material, we read, “And there is preserved at Phlya in the temple of the Laurel Bearer a *γρᾶφή* concerning these matters” (lines 9–10). The Laurel Bearer is Apollo and Phlya is the birthplace of Euripides. Problematic is the meaning of *γρᾶφή*. Casaubon and Gulick understand *γρᾶφή* to refer to a painting of the ceremonies that were held in honor of Apollo.¹¹³⁶ Wimmer and Wehrli think rather of an inscription.¹¹³⁷ Either way, we can say that our text illustrates Theophrastus’ interest in documentary material as well as Ulpian’s eagerness to exhibit his learning.

In the final sentence, we are told that the facts reported by Theophrastus in *On Drunkenness* are also reported by Hieronymus in his work *On Drunkenness*. That tells us that the works of the two Peripatetics overlapped in regard to content. Later in Book 10, Athenaeus cites Hieronymus’ *Epistles* for a report concerning what Theophrastus said about the impotence of Alexander the Great (578). The *Epistles* is not to be confused with Hieronymus’ work *On Drunkenness*, and there is no mention of Theophrastus’ work *On Drunkenness*. Nevertheless, we are provided with a clear statement that Hieronymus did draw on Theophrastus. Should we say that 576 is also evidence of Hieronymus borrowing material from Theophrastus? Perhaps,¹¹³⁸ but 576 does not make the point explicitly. It is possible that in this case the two Peripatetics drew on the same source or different sources. Be that as it may, it is clear that in their dialogues the early Peripatetics were not averse to reporting the same material, especially when it focused on a well-known individual and would appeal to the anticipated readership.¹¹³⁹

¹¹³⁵ Caveat: in the Loeb edition, vol. 4 (no. 235) p. 423, the quotation marks in the translation do not correspond to those in the Greek text. In the translation, the cut off comes after “so-called Dancers” = line 5.

¹¹³⁶ Casaubon ap. Schweighaeuser vol. 5 p. 373 and Gulick, Loeb edition.

¹¹³⁷ Wimmer fr. 119 and Wehrli (1967–1978) vol. 10 p. 36.

¹¹³⁸ Rose (1863) p. 116 and Regenbogen col. 1485 believe that Hieronymus made use of Theophrastus.

¹¹³⁹ I am thinking, e.g., of stories concerning Sardanapalus and Smindyrides within dialogues focusing on the pleasures of luxury (550, 551).

577A Plutarch, *Table Talk* 5.5.2 679A (BT vol. 4 p. 164.17–23 Hubert)

577B Plutarch, *Table Talk* 7.10.2 716A (BT vol. 4 p. 255.20–256.3 Hubert)

Literature: Gudeman (1934) p. 361; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 330–331; Theodorsson (1989–1996) vol. 2 p. 188, vol. 3 p. 142; Millett (2007) p. 88

We have here two texts, both taken from Plutarch's *Table Talk*. 577A is from the fifth book and concerns the number of guests that should be invited to a symposium. Plutarch begins the discussion by pointing out that a large gathering prevents the guests from talking with each other and generally enjoying each other's company (678C–D). After that Plutarch's grandfather Lamprias speaks against inviting large numbers of guests. He first addresses the need for adequate space and provisions (678D–679A) and then says that even when space and provisions are adequate, large numbers of guests are to be avoided, for they hinder conversation. That is the beginning of text 577A. In the remainder, Lamprias says that "it is less evil to remove from dinner the fellowship of wine than of words. And for this reason, too, Theophrastus in jest calls barbershops wineless symposia on account of the chatter of those sitting there."

Theophrastus is said to have called barbershops wineless symposia (αἰνοῦα συμπόσια) on account of the chatter (λαλιά) of those present (lines 4–5).¹¹⁴⁰ According to Lamprias, Theophrastus expressed himself in jest (παίζων line 4). If that is correct, we need not see in Theophrastus' words a condemnation of the chatter that goes on in barber-shops. Rather, Theophrastus was playing with a metaphor in which the transferred word, "symposia," is qualified by a negative epithet, "wineless." This particular form of the metaphor was discussed by Aristotle (*Poetics* 21 1457b31–34¹¹⁴¹), and on some occasion Theophrastus will have used it in regard to barbershops in order to create a light touch. Unclear is whether Theophrastus' use of the metaphor corresponded to that of Lamprias. Our text may suggest that—διὸ καὶ Θεόφραστος, "for this reason, too, Theophrastus" (lines 3–4)—but more likely we have a case of Plutarch introducing the words of a famous person quite apart from their original context. In what precedes 577A, there are quotations

¹¹⁴⁰ The connection between barbershops and chatter is a commonplace. See, e.g., Aristophanes, *Wealth* 337–338 and Menander, *The Samian Woman* 510–513.

¹¹⁴¹ In the *Poetics* passage, Aristotle's example of a negative epithet is "wineless" (1457b34). See also *Rhetoric* 3.6 1408a1–9, and in FHS&G see App. 9.51–53. 57–59 (vol. 2 p. 614).

from Plato, Hesiod and Anaxagoras (678D–679A), none of which has a direct connection with symposia, let alone limiting the number of guests. To be sure, 577A does introduce a metaphor that mentions symposia, but there is little reason to think that the original Theophrastean context concerned limiting the number of participants. Be that as it may, the Theophrastean metaphor, as used by Lamprias, is striking, for it suggests that a lively conversation is possible without wine. A barbershop automatically limits the number of discussants: proximity without overcrowding, not wine, is fundamental for good conversation.

Text 577B is found in the seventh book of *Table Talk*. It is not concerned with the number of guests at a symposium but rather with the effect that wine has on individuals. The topic is introduced by Nicostratus, Plutarch's Athenian host. He expresses a negative view of the effects of wine on clear thinking. It is said to stir up emotions that make one's judgment unstable and precarious and to make a man of lesser intelligence unwilling to follow those who are prudent. In addition it is loud-voiced and produces random chatter (7.10.1 714E–715A). In response, Plutarch's brother defends drinking as against drunkenness (7.10.2 715D). He says that Aeschylus composed his tragedies while drinking¹¹⁴² and quotes Plato's *Timaeus* 60A, where we read that wine heats the soul as well as the body. That is interpreted to mean that wine promotes discourse, driving out fright which impedes deliberation and smothering other ignoble emotions (715D–E). Our text 577B continues this line of defense. We are told that "it is not necessary to fear wine as a stimulus of the emotions, for it does not stimulate the basest (emotions), except in the worst people, whose deliberative faculty is never sober." After that comes a comparison: "Just as Theophrastus used to call barbershops wineless symposia on account of the chatter, so a wineless and sullen drunkenness always inhabits the souls of the uneducated, stirred up by some anger or ill-will or contentiousness or illiberality."

Here Plutarch's brother uses the Theophrastean phrase "wineless barbershops" as part of a damning description. It introduces and is viewed as comparable to the sullen drunkenness that inhabits the souls of the uneducated, ταῖς τῶν ἀπαιδευτῶν ἐνοικεῖ ψυχαῖς (lines 3–5). I.e., the chatter, λαλιά (line 4) that takes place in a barbershop is no more admirable than

¹¹⁴² Aeschylus is here said to have composed while drinking. Elsewhere he is said to have composed while drunk. Cf. Chamaeleon fr. 43A–B M, and for comment see Fortenbaugh, "Chamaeleon on Pleasure and Drunkenness" forthcoming in Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities.

the prattle of the worst individuals whose deliberative faculty is never sober, οὐδέποτε νήφει (line 2).¹¹⁴³ So much is clear, but we cannot conclude automatically that Theophrastus condemned barbershops and used the phrase “wineless symposia” in much the same way that we find it used in 577B. For in citing Theophrastus, Plutarch wants to present his phrase “wineless drunkenness,” ἄοινος μέθη, as a variation on “wineless symposia,” ἄοινα συμπόσια. He is not concerned with the original use of the Theophrastean phrase; rather, he cites Theophrastus in order to exhibit learning,¹¹⁴⁴ while offering a humorously clever characterization of souls that lack education.

In *Quellen zur Ethik Theophrasts* (1984) p. 86, I printed a third text found in Arsenius’ *Violetum* p. 63 line 17 Walz: ἄοινον μέθην ὁ Θεόφραστος τὰ κουρεῖα ἐκαλεῖ, “Theophrastus used to call barbershops wineless drunkenness.” The text was not included in the text-translation edition (FHS&G), for Arsenius (c. 1465–1535) belongs to the Renaissance and therefore is later than our cut off date for inclusion (see vol. 1 p. 5). Nevertheless I have printed it here, because it well illustrates how easily a quotation can be corrupted. A careless excerptor has confused the Theophrastean phrase with Plutarch’s variation and attributed the latter to Theophrastus.

Neither 577A nor 577B mention a Theophrastean title. It is tempting (plausible) to assign Theophrastus’ words to *On Drunkenness*. Assuming that the work was a dialogue, Theophrastus may have been speaking in his own person and created a light moment by describing barbershops as wineless symposia. Nevertheless, the Theophrastean material in 577A–B is limited to a single phrase that does not mention drunkenness. Moreover, as reported, Theophrastus’ words have barbershops as their subject, and that opens the door to other possibilities. A dialogue like *Concerning Social Interaction* comes to mind, but the matter is best left undecided.

1.42–44 Diogenes Laertius, *The Lives of the Philosophers* 5.40 (RUSCH vol. 2 p. 14.8–10 Sollenberger)

Literature: Kindstrand (1976) 129, 294; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 331–332; Sollenberger (1984) pp. 203–205; Gutas (1985) pp. 93–94

¹¹⁴³ Cf. the use of λαλιά at 7.10.1 715A. On λαλιά, see 452, 486 and 662.

¹¹⁴⁴ Note the earlier references to Aeschylus and Plato, mentioned in the preceding paragraph.

Text 1 begins the *Vita* section in the text-translation volumes. The passage under consideration (lines 42–44) occurs among a list of Theophrastean sayings. It is the second of three and runs as follows: πρὸς δὲ τὸν ἐν τῷ συμποσίῳ σιωπῶντα τὸ ὅλον ἔφη, “εἰ μὲν ἀμαθὴς εἶ, φρονίμως ποιεῖς, εἰ δὲ πεπαίδευσαι, ἀφρόνως.” We have translated: “To a man who remained wholly silent at a symposium, he said, ‘If you are uneducated, you are behaving sensibly, but if you are educated, foolishly.’”

The saying recurs often in the gnomological literature,¹¹⁴⁵ where the person being addressed is described as young as well as silent. A similar saying (without reference to the age of the addressee) is attributed to Simonides by Plutarch (*Table Talk* 3.1.1 644E) and to Bion (with reference to his youth) in the *Gnomologium Vaticanum* (no. 159). The latter attribution is explained by Kindstrand as follows. Bion, who is said to have been a student of Theophrastus, will have repeated the saying of his teacher, perhaps without naming him, so that the later tradition credited Bion with a saying taken from Theophrastus. In regard to Theophrastus and Simonides, we can imagine a like attribution. Theophrastus introduced the words of Simonides into one of his works, perhaps an exoteric work like *On Drunkenness*, and did so without naming Simonides. Theophrastus’ immediate audience may have recognized the borrowing, but in time the saying came to be attributed to Theophrastus. That is, of course, speculation and best not continued. Moreover, it is possible that the saying in question originated in popular wisdom. The attribution to Simonides and Theophrastus would then be an example of assigning a clever saying of unknown authorship to some well-known figure.¹¹⁴⁶

The antithetical character of the saying is emphasized through the use of the cognate words φρονίμως and ἀφρόνως. Our translation also makes use of cognate words, but curiously does so by translating words which are not cognate as though they were: “uneducated” and “educated” are used to translate ἀμαθής and πεπαίδευσαι. More important is the fact that φρονίμως and ἀφρόνως give the saying a measure of elegance

¹¹⁴⁵ See the upper apparatus of parallel texts to 1.42–44 (vol. 1 p. 24 FHS&G). The Arabic versions are no. 118 Rosenthal and no. 25 Gutas. On the Arabic depend the Spanish and Latin versions: see above, the commentary on 454.

¹¹⁴⁶ From what has been said, it is clear that 1.42–44 is an example of a moveable saying: it can be moved from one well-known person to another. It also illustrates how the same saying can be moved from one situation to another. Whereas in Diogenes Laertius, a symposium is the stated context (1.40–41), in the *Depository of Wisdom Literature* an assembly is the context (no. 25.2, Gutas [1985, repr. 2000] p. 93). And, of course, the situation or context can be omitted as in Mubaššir’s anthology (no. 25.1 Gutas).

that is both effective and tasteful. The same cannot be said of the later version found in the *Gnomologium Vaticanum*; ὁ αὐτὸς ἐν συμποσίῳ νεανίσκον τινὰ βλέπων ἡσυχίαν ἄγοντα ἔφη· εἰ μὲν ἀπαιδευτος ὢν σιωπᾶς, πεπαιδευμένος ὑπάρχεις· εἰ δὲ πεπαιδευμένος, ἀπαιδευτῶς σιωπᾶς (333 Sternbach). Here the number of cognate words is increased: παιδ- occurs four times. The verb σιωπᾶν is now found in the saying itself and repeated in the same form, σιωπᾶς. Being paired with ἀπαιδευτος and ἀπαιδευτῶς first in the protasis and then in the apodosis, it creates a kind of chiasmus. In addition, the number of words involving the letter pi (seven, of which two have pi twice) does not pass unnoticed. So much attention to style may be thought to add punch to a clever saying, but I prefer to speak of excess: a rhetorical display that actual detracts from the clever admonition as formulated by Theophrastus.

A closely related address to a youth may be found in the florilegium Ἄριστον καὶ πρῶτον μάθημα 87 Schenkl (= Wiener Studien 11 1889 p. 26): νεανίσκου ἐν συμποσίῳ πολλὰ λαλοῦντος τις τῶν συνανακειμένων εἶπεν· εἰ τοσαῦτα ἐφρόνεις, ὅσα λαλεῖς, οὐκ ἂν τοσαῦτα ἡσχημόνεις, “When a youth was chattering at length during a symposium, one among those reclining together said, ‘If your wisdom were as great as your chatter, your unseemliness would not be as great (as it is).’” On the importance of educated conversation during a symposium, see, e.g., Plato’s *Protagoras* 347C–D (= Athenaeus, *The Sophists at Dinner* 3.51 97A–B) and *Symposium* 176E.

578 Athenaeus, *The Sophists at Dinner* 10.45 434F–435A (BT vol. 2 p. 445.27–446.8 Kaibel)

Literature: Regenbogen (1940) col. 1485, 1540–1541; Wehrli (1967–1978) vol. 10 p. 40; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 332–333; Dalby (2000) pp. 375–376, 580 n. 17; Sharples (2006) pp. 310–311

Text 578 occurs in Book 10 of *The Sophists at Dinner*. Democritus of Nicomedia, who began speaking at 10.28 426C, is still the speaker.¹¹⁴⁷ In what precedes our text, he has commented on the words φίλοινος, φιλοπότης and κωθωνίστης,¹¹⁴⁸ and discussed *inter alia* the drinking of Nestor, Alexander the Great and Darius (10.42 433B–10.45 434D). After brief remarks on acceptable practices in India and Persia (434D–F),

¹¹⁴⁷ Democritus has already referred to Theophrastus at 10.30 427C–D = 570 and 10.33 429A–B = 579B.

¹¹⁴⁸ “Lover-of-wine,” “lover-of-drink” and “cup-addict.”

Democritus returns to Alexander. He cites the *Historical Notes* of Carystius of Pergamum and tells us that Alexander drank to such an extent that he caroused in a chariot drawn by asses. Still citing Carystius, Democritus adds that the Persian kings engaged in similar carousing (434F). Then comes our text 578. Democritus now speaks for himself (he is no longer dependent on Carystius) and suggests a connection between Alexander's excessive drinking and his lack of desire for sexual activity.¹¹⁴⁹ By way of explanation, he refers to the pseudo-Aristotelian *Problems*, in which the semen of heavy drinkers is said to be watery.¹¹⁵⁰ After that Democritus cites Hieronymus, who reported what Theophrastus said concerning Olympias' futile attempt to arouse her son's interest in sexual activity. That concludes 578, after which Democritus turns to the drinking of Philip of Macedon, the father of Alexander.

Democritus cites Hieronymus for the Theophrastean material that he conveys. Problematic is whether the phrase "in the *Epistles*" (line 3) refers to a collection of letters by Hieronymus or by Theophrastus. Wehrli prefers Theophrastus. He argues that the appeal to Hieronymus makes sense, if the Theophrastean source is not a well-known work but rather a remote or little-known writing such as a letter might be.¹¹⁵¹ This argument is by no means foolish, but I am not convinced. As I read the sentence in question, it seems most natural to take "in the *Epistles*" with the preceding reference to Hieronymus: a break or pause is felt after ἐν ταῖς Ἐπιστολαῖς and before Θεόφραστον.¹¹⁵² Moreover, just as in the preceding cases of Carystius and pseudo-Aristotle, so here Democritus cites both the author and the title of his source: namely, Hieronymus and his *Epistles*. My preference, therefore, is to follow, e.g., Schweighaeuser

¹¹⁴⁹ In writing "suggests," I am taking account of μήποτε, "perhaps" (LSJ s.v. I.3, citing Aristotle, *NE* 10.1 1172a33). Within the context of the dialogue, the suggestion is advanced by Democritus, and he does so without reference to a source (after the remark concerning Persian kings, Carystius is no longer in play). If we choose to ignore the dramatic fiction, then we might say that Athenaeus makes the suggestion. See Sharples (2006) 310–311.

¹¹⁵⁰ See *Problems* 3.4 871a23–26, 3.11 872b15–25, 3.33 875b39–876a14. Although these passages are relevant to Alexander's condition, they do not mention him. In the absence of further evidence, it appears that Athenaeus, through the character of Democritus, has made the connection with Alexander. Alternatively, Athenaeus may have chosen to have Democritus speak without naming a particular predecessor who made the connection and was known to Athenaeus. See the final paragraph of this comment.

¹¹⁵¹ Wehrli (1967–1978) vol. 10 p. 40.

¹¹⁵² Cf., e.g., 574.1, 575.1, 579B.4. In these passages, we have indirect discourse dependent upon φησί, and one word or phrase belonging to the indirect discourse precedes φησί. The remainder follows. The same is true in 578.3–4.

in the Zweibrücken edition and Gulick in the Loeb edition,¹¹⁵³ and to understand *Epistles* as the title of a collection of letters by Hieronymus.

In the portion of our text that deals specifically with Theophrastus (lines 3–8), there is no mention of either wine or drunkenness. We are told only that Alexander's condition in regard to sexual activity was so poor that his mother encouraged intercourse with the Thessalian courtesan Kallixeina. That might raise doubts concerning the place of 578 within a section labeled "Drunkenness." Perhaps the preceding section on "Eros" would be more suitable. Or perhaps 578 belongs in a section devoted to historical material. Nevertheless, we can, I think, assert that the text is well placed, for the context in which it occurs strongly suggests that Alexander's lack of sexual drive is to be understood as the effect of heavy drinking.

The causal connection between Alexander's drinking and lack of drive is made explicit in Plutarch's *Table Talk* (διό 1.6 623E), but without a reference to Theophrastus. To be sure, Theophrastus is named only a few lines later, but the focus has shifted to the fragrance of Alexander's body and the role of heat in producing fragrance (623E–F).¹¹⁵⁴ Hence, the Plutarchan text provides little help in regard to 578. We can, however, say that by Plutarch's time Alexander's lack of sexual appetite was connected with heavy drinking. Athenaeus, writing after Plutarch, would be aware of the connection and may have decided on his own to insert a story reporting sexual dysfunction into a context concerning drunkenness. Nevertheless, I am inclined to believe that the connection was made much earlier in the time of Theophrastus. The pseudo-Aristotelian *Problems* dates to the early Peripatos¹¹⁵⁵ and makes the connection between drunkenness and impotence. It would be surprising if someone in the Peripatos did not single out Alexander as an especially good example. Indeed, Theophrastus may have done so—is likely to have done so—in his work on *Drunkenness*. And perhaps in some other work as well: e.g., the *Callisthenes*, in which a less than favorable picture of Alexander will have been presented.

¹¹⁵³ I add Stephan White, the most recent editor of the fragments of Hieronymus (fr. 30 in RUSCH vol. 12, p. 155).

¹¹⁵⁴ Cf. Plutarch's *Life of Alexander* 4.3.

¹¹⁵⁵ The *Problems* is not a Theophrastean work, but it contains Theophrastean material (e.g., Book 2 draws on Theophrastus' work *On Sweat*). On the relation (priority) of Theophrastus to the *Problems*, see Flashar (1962) pp. 321–322, 335–336, 356–358.

579A Aelian, *Miscellaneous History* 2.37–38 (BT p. 34.7–17 Dilts)

579B Athenaeus, *The Sophists at Dinner* 10.33 429A–B (BT vol. 2 p. 433.7–9 Kaibel)

Literature: Koepke (1856) pp. 39–40; Dareste (1870) p. 293; Hager (1876) p. 6; Mittelhaus (1911) pp. 35–36; Bickel (1915) pp. 164, 218; Scorza (1934) p. 37; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1485; Wehrli (1967–1978) vol. 9 p. 75, (1983) p. 495; Szegedy-Maszak (1976) pp. 115–116; Fortenbaugh (1984) pp. 333–335; Wehrli-Wöhrle (2004) p. 533

We have here two closely related texts. The fuller, **579A**, is that of Aelian. It occurs in the second book of his *Miscellaneous History*, and deals with legislation concerning wine. Two parts may be recognized. The first focuses on the Locrian law-giver Zaleucus and his legislation concerning the therapeutic use of wine unmixed with water (lines 1–5). The second tells of a law in Massalia, i.e., Marseilles, that forbids women to drink wine. The same law is said to be in effect in Miletus. Theophrastus is named in regard to Miletus (lines 6–9). Aelian continues his comments on wine with a brief report concerning the Romans. Among most Romans, there was a law in force forbidding the drinking of wine by both free women and female slaves, and also by well-born youth until the age of thirty-five. These remarks on the Romans are not printed as part of **579A**, but they belong to and conclude what I have called the second part of our text. The material that surrounds the two parts is quite unrelated. In what precedes, the focus is on Socrates and a clever remark of his during sickness (2.36). And in what follows, attention is turned to Crete and the use of music in the education of freeborn youth (2.39). That is in line with Aelian's policy of varying his topics in order to keep the interest of his reader.¹¹⁵⁶

Text **579B** is less full. It is found in the tenth book of *The Sophists at Dinner* less than two pages after text **570**. Between the two texts, Athenaeus has Democritus speak of heavy drinking and its effects on behavior. In the lines that immediately precede **579B**, Democritus is focused on well-known poets. We are told that the tragedian Aeschylus was drunk when he composed his plays, and that the lyric poet Alcaeus and the comic poet Aristophanes also composed their work while drunk (10.33 428F–429A). At this point **579B** occurs. We hear of the legislation of Zaleucus (lines 1–3) and of the laws concerning women in Massalia

¹¹⁵⁶ See above, Chapter II “The Sources” no. 21 on Aelian.

and Miletus (lines 3–5). After that Democritus again focuses on a well-known poet. This time it is Anacreon, who is said to have composed his poems while sober (429B). Anacreon's sobriety contrasts with the drunkenness of Aeschylus, Alcaeus and Aristophanes, but in all four cases the basic theme is the same: i.e., the condition of the poet when composing his verses. It appears, then, that 579B interrupts the flow of the dialogue. How it came to be so awkwardly placed is unclear.

In both 579A and B, Theophrastus' name is first introduced at the end in connection with the report concerning the women of Miletus (lines 7 and 4, respectively).¹¹⁵⁷ The question arises: How much, if any, of the preceding material is attributable to Theophrastus? All scholars agree that the immediately preceding report concerning the women of Massilia should be assigned to Theophrastus. The topic is the same; only the city is different. Both texts flow smoothly, and in 579A (line 7) the use of καί, “also,” binds the two reports together.¹¹⁵⁸

Concerning the opening portion of the two texts (lines 1–5 of 579A and lines 1–3 of B), scholars are not in agreement. Schneider (fr. VI.3) and Wimmer (fr. 117), who know only the text of Athenaeus, 579B, attribute to Theophrastus not only the report concerning the women of Massalia and Miletus but also the preceding report concerning the legislation of Zaleukos. This attribution may be correct, for with the words παρὰ δὲ Λοκροῖς (line 1), Athenaeus shifts from poets to law-givers (the interruption begins), and legislation continues to be the subject throughout both texts. Nevertheless, Dareste, Hager and Szegedy-Maszak disagree. They know the text of Aelian and do not print the report concerning Zaleucus in their fragment collections.¹¹⁵⁹ Both Athenaeus and Aelian will have drawn on the same secondary source, in which Theophrastean material is combined with material from other authors. That the same secondary source is being drawn upon is suggested not only by the shared report concerning Zaleucus, with which both 579A

¹¹⁵⁷ The end of text 579A is corrupt, and various emendations have been proposed. See the *apparatus criticus* to lines 8 and 9. Certain is that Theophrastus made mention of the women of Miletus, because in his time the prohibition against drinking wine was still in effect. We may compare 579B, where the phrase ἔτι καὶ νῦν, “even now,” (line 4) emphasizes that the prohibition continued to be in effect.

¹¹⁵⁸ I doubt, however, that much weight can be attached to this use of καί, for it may have been inserted by Aelian and not be Theophrastean in origin.

¹¹⁵⁹ Cf. Mittelhaus p. 36. Although the name of Theophrastus is introduced with the report concerning Miletus, the flow of the passage suggests strongly that the preceding report concerning Massilia is also Theophrastean.

and B begin, but also by what follows on these texts: namely, a report in similar wording concerning Roman women and youth.¹¹⁶⁰

In my earlier commentary on the ethical fragments (1984) pp. 333–335, I endorsed this view but now see some reason for hesitation. It is that Chamaeleon, Theophrastus' contemporary and fellow Peripatetic, not only wrote a work *On Drunkenness* but also discussed therein the legislation of Zaleucus. At least, Clement of Alexandria tells us that in *On Drunkenness* Chamaeleon spoke of Zaleucus obtaining laws from the goddess Athena.¹¹⁶¹ What is said about the goddess may defy belief, but it is not absurd to suppose that Chamaeleon discussed certain laws that were traditionally attributed to Zaleucus and that among them was the peculiarly harsh law concerning sickness and wine, about which we read in 579A–B. I am speculating now, but I find it hard not to ask whether Theophrastus, in his work *On Drunkenness*, not only referred to Zaleucus but also to the law concerning sickness and wine. We know that on occasion the early Peripatetics made use of the same material in their dialogues—both Chamaeleon and Theophrastus discussed the rhyton in their works *On Drunkenness*¹¹⁶²—and may have done so in regard to the legislation of Zaleucus. But that said, there is a different possibility. The secondary source, on which both Aelian and Athenaeus seem to have drawn, had the material concerning Zaleucus from Chamaeleon, who will have included it in his work *On Drunkenness* as part of an argument against the unregulated consumption of wine, especially wine unmixed with water. Perhaps Chamaeleon's name was omitted in the secondary source or was not reported by Aelian and Athenaeus. On this hypothesis, Theophrastus remains out of the picture and should be left out.¹¹⁶³

Dareste and Hager believe that the Theophrastean material found in our two texts originally occurred in a political writing, most likely the 24 book work entitled *Laws*, in alphabetical order (589 no. 17a).¹¹⁶⁴

¹¹⁶⁰ To be sure, the two reports differ in regard to the age at which Roman youth are said to be old enough to begin drinking wine—35 in Aelian and 30 in Athenaeus—but the difference seems unimportant in comparison with the similarities and is likely to have arisen through a scribal error. The words *πέντε καὶ* were passed over and so omitted from the text of Athenaeus.

¹¹⁶¹ Clement, *Patchwork* 1.26 = Chamaeleon fr. 13 M.

¹¹⁶² Chamaeleon fr. 10 M and Theophrastus 575.

¹¹⁶³ See Scorza p. 37, Giordano p. 117, Wehrli (1967–1978) vol. 9 p. 75 and Fortenbaugh, "Chamaeleon on Pleasure and Drunkenness" forthcoming in Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities.

¹¹⁶⁴ Dareste (1870) p. 293, (1893) p. 312 and Hager pp. 6, 24.

Mittelhaus prefers *Politics regarding Crises* (589 no. 4a).¹¹⁶⁵ In contrast, Schneider, Bickel and Szegedy-Maszak prefer an ethical writing: namely, *On Drunkenness*.¹¹⁶⁶ The last named scholar points out that 579B occurs in Book 10 of *The Sophists at Dinner*, in which drunkenness is discussed. In four or more accurately five places within this book, Theophrastus is named, and in three of these places the title *On Drunkenness* occurs (570.2, 574.1, 576.5). In such a context and on the assumption that Athenaeus is unlikely to change his source without indicating the change, Szegedy-Maszak concludes that the Theophrastean material found in 579A and B is drawn from *On Drunkenness*. This conclusion is likely to be correct, but two comments seem in order.

First, while it is reasonable to believe that a single Theophrastean writing stands behind the reports of Aelian and Athenaeus concerning the women of Massilia and Miletus, it may be that Theophrastus discussed their abstinent behavior in more than one work. Indeed, I find it likely that the topic was discussed not only in *On Drunkenness* but also in the *Laws*. We may compare Plato's *Laws* 1.9 637E, in which the Athenian Stranger is made to oppose the heavy drinking of Scythian and Thracian women to the abstinence of Spartan women. We are not told that Theophrastus contrasted these women and their drinking habits, but it is easy to imagine him doing so in his *Laws* as well as in *On Drunkenness*.

Second, if (as already suggested) Athenaeus is drawing on a secondary source (the same source on which Aelian is drawing), then it may be true (as Szegedy-Maszak believes) that throughout Book 10 Athenaeus does not change his immediate source, but that source may be reporting material from more than one Theophrastean work.¹¹⁶⁷ Moreover, one of the texts in Book 10 that lacks a reference to *On Drunkenness* focuses on flattery (548.1). Its original home may have been *On Drunkenness*, but *On Flattery* seems equally possible and indeed more likely (436 no. 25).¹¹⁶⁸ These considerations hardly refute the assignation of 579A–B to *On Drunkenness*—indeed, I accept it—but they are reason for reflection before claiming certainty.

¹¹⁶⁵ Mittelhaus pp. 35–36.

¹¹⁶⁶ Schneider p. 196, Bickel pp. 164, 218 and Szegedy-Maszak pp. 115–116.

¹¹⁶⁷ The situation can be even more complicated, for the secondary source may itself be drawing on an intermediate source. Cf. 578.3, where Athenaeus cites Hieronymus' *Epistles* for what Theophrastus says about Alexander's lack of sexual desire. It may be 1) that Athenaeus is drawing directly on the *Epistles*, already a secondary source, but it is also possible 2) that Athenaeus is drawing on a secondary source that cites the *Epistles*, now an intermediary between the primary secondary source and the text of Theophrastus.

¹¹⁶⁸ For this reason 548 has been placed in the section on "Flattery."

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY

Theophrastus, Aristotle's pupil and second head of the Peripatetic School, was a popular teacher. He is said to have had roughly 2,000 students (1.16). He was also a prolific writer. The catalogue of Theophrastus' writings preserved by Diogenes Laertius in his *Life of Theophrastus* lists c. 224 titles (1.68–291). His surviving works include two multi-book treatises on botany, eight scientific opuscula, a short work on first principles (the so-called *Metaphysics*), a doxographical work on sense-perception and the *Characters*. Aside from the last, none of Theophrastus' writings on ethical topics has survived intact, so that we must turn to secondary sources in order to gain knowledge of Theophrastus' teachings on ethics. These sources (those that are printed in the text-translation volumes as against those that are listed in the apparatus of parallel texts) number 69. Some belong to the Roman Republic, while others belong to the Empire and the Middle Ages. Some source authors wrote in Greek, but there are also Latin and Arabic sources; even one in Italian. Moreover and most important, the sources vary greatly in their reliability. Late collections of excerpts and sayings must always be approached with caution, but even earlier, respected authors like Cicero and Plutarch may write in ways that are misleading. Each source author needs to be evaluated not only in regard to general reliability but also in regard to particular assertions in particular contexts.

Most likely Diogenes' catalogue of Theophrastean writings derives from the work *On Theophrastus* by Hermippus of Smyrna (2nd half of the 3rd cent. BC). The catalogue divides into five lists plus two addenda. The lists probably represent different purchases by the library in Alexandria. In the text-translation volumes, 30 titles have been identified as ethical (436 no. 3–16, 18–33), and two others have been referred to as especially relevant to ethics (666 no. 10 and 727 no. 4). But ethics is a field that relates closely to psychology, politics, rhetoric and poetics so that neat divisions are not possible. Omitted from Diogenes' catalogue are *On Dispositions* and *Ethics* (436 no. 1 and 2). One or both may reflect the work of Andronicus of Rhodes (2nd half of the 1st cent. BC), who is said to have divided the works of Aristotle and Theophrastus into treatises,

bringing together smaller, related works to create larger, collective ones. Also omitted from Diogenes' catalogue is *On Marriage* (436 no. 17), to which only St. Jerome refers.

Problematic is whether the titles occurring in Diogenes' catalogue and in other source texts are Theophrastean in origin. An affirmative answer is encouraged by the fact that the assignation of titles appears to have begun in the fourth century, and the use of titles would have helped Theophrastus organize his library including that of Aristotle, which he inherited. A different concern is the occurrence of double and triple titles. Diogenes' catalogue lists *Callisthenes* or *On Grief*, while Cicero and Alexander refer simply to *Callisthenes* (436 no. 15). The shorter title may focus on the person whose fate sets the work in motion, while the fuller title takes account of the subject of the work as a whole. Diogenes' catalogue also lists *On Education* or *On Virtue* or *On Temperance*, while *On Education* and *On Temperance* occur elsewhere (436 no. 9). In this case, Diogenes' title mentions the general subject first. The subject that is apt to have had pride of place within the work comes last.

Theophrastus' writings took different forms. There were esoteric works intended for use within the school. Often they will have been treatises that formed the basis for a course of lectures. There were also exoteric works that were intended for a wider audience. On the whole the latter were written in a popular style and in dialogue form. But this division of Theophrastus' writings is an oversimplification. There were also collections of materials that might be introduced into lectures as well as studied before and after lecture. In addition, there were essays and addresses, like *Exhortation* (or *Protrepticus* 436 no. 33), which were written with a larger public in mind and were not dialogues. Some works were dualizers in that they could play a role both outside and inside the school. An example is the *Characters* (436 no. 4). It is a collection of thirty brief descriptions of unattractive behavioral regularities. Its humorous qualities suit the work for circulation outside the school, but it could also enliven Theophrastus' lectures, especially when he was discussing character traits like loquacity and complaisance, which are not tied to any one goal.

From the titles reported in our sources it is clear that Theophrastus covered a wide range of ethical topics including the emotions, *πάθη*. We read of a monograph entitled *On Emotions* (436 no. 5), and on the basis of various reports we can say with confidence that Theophrastus treats emotion very much in the way that Aristotle does. In particular, he recognizes that emotion is a complex phenomenon that involves thought or belief, bodily changes, and in many cases goal-directed behavior. E.g.,

anger involves the thought of outrage (446, 542), which is the cause not only of changes in temperature, countenance and voice (271, 447, 719A–B) but also of action directed toward revenge (526, 527A–B). Fear is different in that it involves the belief that danger is imminent and has safety as its goal. In closely related emotions like faultfinding, anger and rage, Theophrastus introduces difference in degree to distinguish between the emotions (438). The person who finds fault typically differs from the angry individual in that he is moved by a lesser offense and hardly concerns himself with revenge. In contrast, the person who becomes enraged exceeds the angry individual both in believing that serious outrage has occurred and in desiring maximum revenge.

Theophrastus adopts a negative view in regard to certain emotions like envy and *Schadenfreude* (443–444). He also recognizes that rage can diminish a person's capacity to achieve revenge (526) and that other emotions like fear and appetite can be troublesome (440A, 441–442). Nevertheless, Theophrastus does not reject emotional response as in itself bad. On the contrary, he recognizes that the good or virtuous man is angered by evils (446), and in general a person of moral virtue, ἡθικὴ ἀρετή, responds to his situation in ways that are appropriate.

Three titles in Diogenes' catalogue make explicit mention of virtue (436 no. 7–9). In these works and elsewhere, Theophrastus will have analyzed courage, good temper and the other moral virtues as mean-dispositions relative to us, μεσότητες πρὸς ἡμᾶς. Unlike the coward and the rash individual, a person of courage responds to danger as he ought, and unlike individuals who are irascible and lack feeling, a good tempered or gentle person responds to outrage appropriately. A similar analysis holds in regard to bodily pleasures. Unlike the insensitive person who fails to desire what is in accordance with nature, κατὰ φύσιν, and the intemperate individual who is marked by excessive desire, the temperate individual manages hunger and thirst well. He enjoys pleasures to the extent he ought and in accordance with nature (449A).

Theophrastus does not ignore the importance of moral education, παιδεία, in producing good character. Indeed, in the absence of an early training in values, bad habits are acquired that are difficult if not impossible to undo in later life (465). With this in mind, Theophrastus wrote a work *On Bringing up Children* and another on the same topic with a different treatment (436 no. 10–11). As mentioned above, he also wrote a work entitled *On Education* or *On Virtues* or *On Temperance* (436 no. 9a), in which temperance is apt to have been treated first, for it is concerned with bodily pleasures, to which young people are especially susceptible.

Like Aristotle, Theophrastus seems to have assigned music a role in moral education, for music is not only pleasant but also expressive of character. But Theophrastus seems to have significantly limited this role (720). Details are not reported, but we can imagine that Theophrastus followed Plato and Aristotle in holding that music is more effective when combined with words that convey sound moral principles. In addition, Theophrastus understands that young people are naturally ambitious. For that reason, he recommends allowing them to take pride in good repute, for virtues are established and developed through praise of things done rightly (467).

Early education is primarily concerned with emotions and the acquisition of moral principles that are action-guiding. E.g., in acquiring courage one learns not only to confront danger steadfastly but also to do so because steadfastness in the face of danger is noble, καλόν. And in acquiring good temper, one learns not only to control one's anger but also to take revenge for inexcusable outrage because it is right and proper to do so. Stated generally, the person of moral virtue makes a *per se* choice. He chooses virtuous actions as good in themselves. This concern with motivation is not only Aristotelian but also a matter of everyday concern. Theophrastus is no exception, but he also exhibits an interest in behavioral regularities apart from deeper lying beliefs and motives. This is strongly suggested by his treatment of social dispositions. In order to illustrate the mean relative to us, Theophrastus cites the garrulous person who says too much, his opposite who says too little and the person in the middle who lays hold upon due measure, the καιρός (449A). No text suggests that the behavior of these individuals is tied to a single motive let alone *per se* choice. In addition, Theophrastus makes fun of the babblers and sees the tongue as a troublemaker (451–452), but again motivation is not taken into account. Moreover and most strikingly, in the *Characters* Theophrastus depicts the run-on chatter of garrulous and loquacious individuals without calling attention to some one motive that underlies such offensive behavior. (436 no. 4, sketches 3 and 7). In the work *On Dispositions* (436 no. 1), Theophrastus may have developed a general notion of good and bad manners, i.e., behavioral regularities that cut across a person's behavior and are important to social interaction, but that cannot be demonstrated.

There is more to education than training in emotional response and in modes of social interaction. A person must also learn to reason correctly, and that means *inter alia* acquiring φρόνησις, practical wisdom, which Theophrastus views as inseparable from moral virtue (449A, 460). For

it is practical wisdom, which enables a person both to deliberate well concerning the particular situation and to reflect upon competing moral principles. Concerning the particular situation, revenge may serve as an example. A person who has been insulted may be quite justified in feeling angry and seeking revenge, but without practical wisdom he may choose a wrongheaded course of action and fail to achieve his goal (526, 527A–B). In regard to competing principles, justice and the value placed on friendship may be examples. The person who has been taught that justice is an overriding consideration and that justice embraces all the moral virtues (529A–B) may still wonder how justice relates to friendship, especially when maintaining friendship involves tolerating injustice (534). Here practical wisdom is needed, for it enables a person to reflect upon the general issue and to resolve it in a way that can withstand the test of case studies, both real and imagined.

Practical wisdom is not to be confused with σοφία, theoretical wisdom. Both are required of the τέλειος ἀνὴρ, the perfect man, for this person not only investigates how one ought to live and acts accordingly, but he also investigates the heavens and inquires whether the universe is infinite and whether there is anything outside the universe (479). The latter is the sphere of theoretical wisdom and requires leisure. Practical wisdom creates leisure and in this way may be said to serve theoretical wisdom. But it is the latter, theoretical wisdom, which is exercised in the investigation of the heavens and generally in the contemplation of things that are most valuable, θεωρία τῶν τιμιωτάτων (461).

Theophrastus saw a close connection between the life of contemplation and happiness, εὐδαιμονία. He wrote two works that make explicit mention of happiness. One is *On Happiness* (436 no. 12), and the other is *On the Divine Happiness in Response to the Academics* (no. 13). The former was a dialogue, which Cicero cites on at least two occasions (496, 498). The latter may have been a treatise in which Theophrastus criticized the Academic idea that god does not experience pleasure. There were other works as well, e.g., *On Lives* and *On Good Fortune* (436 no. 16 and 14), in which Theophrastus is likely to have discussed happiness and to have recognized the life of contemplation as the surest route to happiness. He will have pointed out that contemplation involves intellect, νοῦς, which is a person's most divine part (721) and that it is through contemplation that a person likens himself to god as far as possible (482–483). The qualifier is important: in the case of human beings continuous contemplation is impossible. However much praise Theophrastus may have heaped on the leisured life of contemplation (481),

he never loses sight of the fact that human happiness requires not only moral virtue and practical wisdom but also bodily and external goods (480A–B), both of which are subject to unforeseen shifts in fortune, τύχη.

Among the external goods, Theophrastus recognizes the importance of wealth, πλοῦτος. Diogenes' catalogue of Theophrastean writings lists a work *On Wealth* (436 no. 19), and not a few of the surviving fragments are focused on the topic. Following Aristotle, Theophrastus regards wealth as a tool, ὄργανον, which is important to living a happy life (507). But he is also clear that the unlimited accumulation of wealth serves no purpose, and excess becomes an actual impediment to achieving happiness (509). We are told to accustom ourselves to live on a little, in order that we shall not do anything shameful for the sake of money (510). We should use money to acquire wisdom (Democritus is an example, 513) and to assist others who are in need. Acts of generosity have a side benefit: they increase a person's reputation and influence (514–515). An increase of this kind does not take away from the nobility of generosity. Magnificence, μεγαλοπρέπεια, is compatible with greatness of soul, μεγαλοψυχία.

Theophrastus sees in education a defense against unexpected loss of wealth and other adverse changes in a person's circumstances (491), but he also is keenly aware that fortune, τύχη, can be overwhelming. Indeed, he describes fortune as aimless and inscrutable, ἄσκοπος, adding that it is capable of turning upside down apparent prosperity (488). Debilitating illness can occur quite unexpectedly (462–463), and shipwreck, literal and metaphorical, can reduce a person to poverty. Since evils like these can and do befall good men, it follows that not all good men are happy (493). Here Theophrastus is not departing from Aristotelian doctrine, though he may have expressed himself more fully and forcefully than his teacher (498), perhaps in opposition to the Stoics who held that happiness depends on virtue alone (492, 497).

In addition to fortune, Theophrastus also takes note of fate, εἵμαρμένη, conceived of as the nature, φύσις, of each individual (503). It is said to be the cause of an ordered pattern of behavior, which can have catastrophic consequences for the life of an individual (504). In the *Callisthenes* (436 no. 15), Theophrastus is said to make this clear. Details are few, but we can imagine Theophrastus combining nature (innate temperament in the form of lethargy) with misfortune (becoming involved with Alexander the Great) in order to explain the death by execution of the eponymous historian (505).

The man who combines moral virtue with practical wisdom is not inoculated against misfortune. Nevertheless, he can and will make choices that are conducive to happiness. Will he then choose to marry? In his work *Against Jovinian*, Saint Jerome refers to Theophrastus' little golden book *On Marriage* (436 no. 17a), presents Theophrastus as a misogynist and records a variety of reasons why the wise man does not marry. In particular, a wife impedes philosophic study, continually needs money and utters garrulous complaints all night long (486). The report is not to be taken at face value. Perhaps it derives from a school exercise, a thesis, but whatever its origin, other texts make clear that Theophrastus is not a misogynist, who looks upon women as an impediment to a happy life in which contemplation has its proper place. On the contrary, he recognizes that women play an important role in household management and for that reason finds it necessary that they receive a suitable education in letters (661–662). In addition, he recognizes the benefits of family life, stating that a man should take good care of his wife, for she will return kindness in times of sickness and in the daily management of the household. Similarly children who have been well cared for will return the service as their father grows old (523).

If wife and children are important to well-being, so are friends. Theophrastus understood that and wrote a work *On Friendship*, *Περὶ φιλίας*, which was three books or rolls long (436 no. 21). In it Theophrastus is said to prefer friendship to all other forms of affection and to witness to its rarity in human affairs (532). Rarity here refers to friendship based on virtue, which is one of three kinds of friendship recognized by both Aristotle and Theophrastus: those based on virtue, on pleasure and on utility. All three are compatible with one partner being superior to the other. Most likely Theophrastus developed this idea by reference to ruler and ruled, husband and wife, father and son. In regard to the last pair, Theophrastus may have appealed to what is in accordance with nature, *κατὰ φύσιν*. A father naturally wishes good things for his son, and he does so for the sake of the son. Pleasure and utility may follow naturally, *φυσικῶς*, for the father, but they are a happy consequences and not of primary concern (533). In addition, Theophrastus accepts assisting a friend contrary to the law, when the assistance far outweighs the loss of honorable reputation that follows upon acting contrary to the law. He recognizes that laws are general and cannot take account of every possible situation, so that there are occasions when strict adherence to the law is to be ignored (534, 629–630).

The proverb “the possessions of friends are common” is applied to the friends of a friend as well as to riches (535–537). We are enjoined *inter alia* to test a person before making him a friend (538A–F), to assist an unfortunate friend without waiting to be called upon, and not to hurt a friend even with a joke (546). The instability of young people is observed (539) as is the incompatibility of friendship with envy and ill will (540) and the frequency with which excessive affection becomes the cause of hate (542). The injunction “Beware of a charming friend whose word is always pleasant” (546) is easily understood as a warning against confusing a true friend with a flatterer, κόλαξ. Theophrastus wrote a work *On Flattery*, Περί κολακείας (436 no. 25, 547), in which he may have discussed not only how the flatterer differs from a friend but also how the flatterer relates to the obsequious or complaisant individual, the ἄρεσκος. Both are sketched in the *Characters* (2 and 5).

Theophrastus will have realized that friendships, not just those based on virtue but also pleasure and utility friendships, are limited in number. Guest friendships may be established with persons abroad (515), but the vast majority of persons, Greeks as well as barbarians, will always be strangers to each other. Nevertheless, Theophrastus holds that all human beings are related to each other. This relationship, οἰκειότης, is not to be confused with Stoic οἰκείωσις. The latter takes its start from an innate impulse toward self-preservation, which is modified over time, so that an individual comes to realize that the possession of virtue is more important and congenial, οἰκεῖον, than soundness of body. The former is a reciprocal relationship based on shared attributes: psychic, bodily and behavioral. Of special interest is the fact that Theophrastus does not restrict this relationship to human beings. Rather, he extends it to animals, telling us not only that animals are like humans in regard to skin, flesh and bodily fluids but also that animals have souls that are not naturally different. As reported by Porphyry, animals are not different in their desires, angry impulses, calculations and above all in their sensations (531). If the mention of calculations, λογισμοί, can be pressed, then Theophrastus will have departed dramatically from Aristotle, but other relevant texts do not settle the issue (362A, 365A–D), and the emphasis (“above all”) placed on sensations, αἰσθήσεις, suggests that this was central to Theophrastus’ thinking when he argued for a natural relationship between men and animals.

This relationship stands behind Theophrastus’ aversion to animal sacrifice. In the work *On Piety*, Περί εὐσεβείας (580 no. 3), he argues that sacrifices should cause no harm and that sacrificing an animal does harm.

It robs the animal of its soul, and that is unjust. Theophrastus recommends sacrificing fruits and leaves and other kinds of vegetable matter, and in doing so he warns against excess. It is the mean in relation to us, the μεσότης πρὸς ἡμᾶς, which is acceptable. Moreover, three reasons for performing a sacrifice are recognized: honoring the gods, making a return for some benefit, and deflecting evils or acquiring goods. A pious individual may sacrifice for all three reasons, but he will understand the primary importance of honoring the gods. When appropriate (frequently), he will choose to honor the gods *per se*, doing so independently of any other consideration (584A).

According to Theophrastus, the life of men is held together by kindness, honor and vengeance, εὐεργεσία, τιμή and τιμωρία (517). Honor here need not exclude honors shown to the gods, but together with kindness and vengeance the focus is almost certainly on honor shown to fellow citizens not only in election to civic office but also in various kinds of praise within communities that vary in size. In this regard, Theophrastus is clear that giving praise as well as assigning blame belongs to the person who has learned to distinguish between what is good and bad (522), i.e., has acquired practical wisdom. Theophrastus offers recommendations concerning how best to achieve revenge (527A–B), but he also emphasizes that kindness is noble and advantageous (518). He holds that it is better to remember by whom one has been well treated than by whom one has been ill-treated, and that expressing thanks belongs to a better character than avenging oneself (525). Given these observations, it is hardly surprising that Theophrastus wrote works entitled *On Kindness*, *On Vengeance* and *On Ambition* or *Love of Honor* (436 no. 24, 21, 22).

Pleasure, ἡδονή, has already been mentioned in connection with virtue, education, the divinity and friendship. Theophrastus was keenly interested in the topic and wrote three works, whose titles make explicit mention of pleasure. They are *On Pleasure* like (that of) Aristotle, *On Pleasure*, another work and *On False Pleasure* (436 no. 26–28). Of the first two, one is likely to have been an esoteric treatise, perhaps similar to one of the accounts of pleasure that we find in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*. The other will have been a dialogue. The anecdotal material that is preserved for us by Athenaeus and Aelian (550, 552A–B, 553) would be most at home in a dialogue, but it can find place in a school treatise. The third work will have been influenced by Plato's *Philebus* and on-going discussion in the Academy concerning pleasure and pain and their relationship to opinions and beliefs that are either

true or false. A single text reports that Theophrastus rejected the notion of false pleasure on conceptual grounds (556).

Theophrastus will have discussed pleasure in other works like *On Emotions*, *On Education* and *On Happiness*. The same holds for *Ethics*. Texts 554–555 (on desiring ambrosia and a criticism of Anaxagoras) are likely to derive from that work, and if it was made up of various shorter treatises, then it may have incorporated *On Pleasure* like (that of) Aristotle (436 no. 26). Of special interest is *On the Divine Happiness in Response to the Academics* (436 no. 14, already mentioned above), for in this work Theophrastus may have argued that not being subject to change the gods enjoy continuous contemplation, which being unimpeded is always pleasant.

Like pleasure, eros or love is referred to in three different titles. They are (*Dialogue*) *concerning Love* (436 no. 29), another (work) *On Love* (436 no. 30a–b) and *Political, Natural, Erotic, Ethical Problems* (727 no. 4). Most likely the first was a dialogue, the second a treatise and the third a collection of problems that made use of the διὰ τί format and included discussion of eros as a physiological condition. Theophrastus recognizes that the attraction of beauty can be troublesome (565–566) and that eros is apt to vex the souls of persons at leisure (558). On one occasion, he characterizes eros as an excess, ὑπερβολή, of irrational desire (558), but on another he recognizes that eros need not exclude moderation (559). Historical and anecdotal material is found in several texts (560–561, 625–626). We hear of a beauty contest for men in which the prizes are weapons; the emphasis might be on fitness for battle (563). In regard to women, Theophrastus recognizes contests concerning beauty, which he attributes to fortune and nature. He also recognizes contests that concern temperance and household management, for which honor ought to be the reward (564). In addition, there are reports concerning animals that are said to fall in love with human beings (567–568). How these reports relate to Theophrastus' considered, scientific view of animal behavior is problematic.

Symposia, drinking and drunkenness were discussed by several members of the early Peripatos including Theophrastus. He wrote a work entitled *On Drunkenness*, Περί μέθης (436 no. 31), which will have been a dialogue. The setting was a symposium and Theophrastus seems to have played a prominent part. Themes closely tied to symposiac drinking were discussed: e.g., the proper use of mixed and unmixed wine (571, 572), toasts, pouring libations, playing the kottabus (570) and drinking vessels (575). Theophrastus also emphasized the importance of edu-

cated conversation (577A–B, 1.42–44). He mixed folklore with botany (573), cited Empedocles regarding the meaning of the adjective ζωρός (574), reported that Euripides in his youth poured wine for the so-called Dancers and in this context cited a document preserved at Phyla (576). In addition, he took note of the fact that wine relieves the despondency of old age (569). That introduces a physiological perspective, which is also present in still another text, this time one that does not refer explicitly to *On Drunkenness* and connects the impotence of Alexander the Great with heavy drinking (578). Both of these texts can be related to the pseudo-Aristotelian *Problems*. There are two further texts that make no mention of *On Drunkenness*. They document Theophrastus' interest in legislation that prohibits the drinking of wine by women (579A–B). These texts may go back to *On Drunkenness*, but a political writing like the *Laws* (589 no. 17) cannot be excluded. Indeed, Theophrastus may have discussed women and wine in both ethical and political writings.

From what has been said above, it is clear that Theophrastus' writings on ethics covered a wide range of topics. In closing it should be added that the writings were of interest not only in regard to ethical doctrine narrowly construed but also in regard to matters of history/investigation, ἱστορία, and style, λέξις. Indeed, the Peripatetic Adrastus (2nd cent. AD) is reported to have written five books *On Questions of History and Style in the On Dispositions of Theophrastus* (437). The surviving evidence concerning *On Dispositions* is meager, but the larger collection of ethical texts makes clear that Theophrastus' writings included considerable historical material: not only political and military matters but also, e.g., social customs, religious practices, the work of earlier poets and artists. That is hardly surprising for history provides examples that not only elucidate ethical doctrines but also serve as empirical tests, which may be used to support or to discredit a particular doctrine. In addition, Theophrastus' writings included passages that exhibited an interest in elevated style. Again, that is hardly surprising for Theophrastus wrote a work *On Style* (666 no. 17a) in which he recognized the importance not only of correct Greek, clarity and appropriateness but also of ornamentation (684). His diction is cited occasionally by lexicographers (449B, 464, 494A–B), and Cicero refers to Theophrastus repeatedly as someone who wrote in an attractive manner (5B, 50–54, 497). Cicero may be responding to Theophrastus' style in the exoteric works, but it would be wrong to think that Theophrastus' esoteric writings never made room for an elevated style.

CHAPTER SIX

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF MODERN LITERATURE

The following bibliography is arranged alphabetically by author. When an author is cited for more than one work, the entries are arranged by date of publication. In the exceptional case, where two works by same author appeared in the same year, the works are ordered alphabetically by title: e.g., Jones (1952a) = "Aristotle etc." and Jones (1952b) = "Theophrastus etc." In the preceding commentary, the works cited below are most often referred to by author or author plus date.

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CHAPTER SEVEN

INDICES TO THE TITLES AND TEXTS

1. Important Words

Greek

- ἄβελτερία**] silliness (of the sick Pericles) 463.9
- ἀγαθός**] good (person) 467.1, 507.2, 3, 518.7; good (things) 443.3, 460.4; (a person's or thing's own good) 444.2, 507.2, 3, 4; (the glorious) 467.10; (what accords with nature) 501.7, 507.4; the tongue being good or bad 451.1
- ἄγαν**] too much 467.7
- ἄγνοια**] ignorance; (friendship bears) 540.1; (cause of being killed) 626.40
- ἄγνώμων**] senseless; neut. sing. subst. senselessness 465
- ἀγωγή**] training, upbringing; (in a title) 436 no. 10; pl. 531.23
- ἄγών**] contest (beauty) 563.1
- ἀγωνίζεσθαι**] to compete 552A.3, 5, B.1
- ᾄδειν**] to sing 552A.13, B.7
- ἀδελφός**] brother; pl. (of Democritus) 513.6, 7; (regarding friends) 535.3
- ἀδιάφορος**] not different (of souls) 531.17
- ἄδνεῖν**] to do wrong 441.10; pass. partic. (of persons wronged when their property is taken against their will for sacrifice) 485A.112
- ἀδικία**] injustice 490.4
- ἄδικος**] unjust; (to destroy animals that do no harm) 584A.202; pl. (of irrational animals) 584A.199
- ἄδικως**] unjustly (defeated) 553.1, (in a verse; rich) 529A.3
- ἄδολεσχεῖν**] to talk idly, to babble 449A.2
- ἄζηλος**] unenviable (wealth) 512A.1, B.4
- ἄηδώς**] without pleasure 552B.7
- ἄθνατος**] immortal; comp. 440C.2
- αἰδεῖσθαι**] to be ashamed; to respect (yourself), impv. 469.1; to revere, partic. (Zeus) 625.9
- αἰρεῖν**] to take; mid. to choose (the best life) 465.9, (friends) 538A.1, 2
- αἵρεσις**] choice (of life style) 465.7
- αἰσθησις**] sensation; pl. 531.19; pl. the senses 555.5
- αἰσχρός**] shameful 510.2, 518.8
- αἰσχύνεσθαι**] to feel shame 469.1
- αἰτία**] accusation, blame; pl. 440A.14; cause; pl. (regarding choice, nature and fate) 503.1, 3; (of a pattern of behavior) 504.4
- ἀκατάσκευος**] without preparation, unequipped (of a life) 551.7
- ἀκολασία**] intemperance 449A.9 564.6; (music contributes to) 720.2
- ἀκόλαστος**] intemperate 449A.17, 555.11; comp. 441.6
- ἄκρατος**] unmixed (wine) 572.1, 574.4, 579A.3, B.2, 626.24
- ἀκρίβεια**] exactness (relaxation of) 534.68

- ἀκριβής**] exact; pl. (of persons) 538F.5
ἄκων] reluctant 552A.11; (not applicable to plants when their fruits are taken) 584A.118
ἀλάβαστρον] alabaster perfume-vase; pl. 472.1–2
ἀλγεῖν] to feel pain or grief 555.12
ἀλγεινός] grievous 555.3
ἀλήθεια] truth 558.16
ἀληθής] true (pleasure) 556.1, 2, (saying) 465.21
ἀληθῶς] truly (strange) 465.7
ἄλλοτριος] belonging to another; pl. unrelated (persons) 538F.1
ἄλόγιστος] unreasonable 526.2
ἄλογος] irrational (pleasure) 556.14, (desire, love) 557.1; unreasonable (of a view concerning music) 721A.6; of animals 584A.199
ἄλς] salt; pl. (in a proverb) 538F.3
ἄλυσιτελῶς] in a manner not beneficial 526.10
ἄμαθής] uneducated 1.43
ἁμαρτάνειν] to err 473.3; neut. passiv. partic. 441.8
ἁμαρτημα] error. mistake; pl. misdeeds 441.1, 526.4, 538F.5
ἁμαρτία] error, mistake; (friendship tolerates) 540.1; pl. (caused by pleasure) 441.6; (irritated by one's own) 473.1
ἁμβροσία] ambrosia 554.4
ἀμείβειν] to exchange; mid. to repay 523.9
ἁμεταμέλητος] not to be regretted 518.9
ἄμπελος] (grape) vine 573.2
ἀμύνειν] to ward off; mid. to defend oneself 526.9
ἀναγκάζειν] to compel; masc. pass. partic. (by pain) 441.9
ἀνάγκη] necessity 503.3
ἀναγκαῖος] constraining; necessary; superl. (of women's education) 662.1; neut. pl. things necessary (to be said) 449A.3
ἀναισθησία] insensitiveness 449A.9
ἀναλγησία] lack of feeling 449A.10
ἀνάληγτος] lacking in feeling 449A.20
ἀνάλογος] proportionate; **κατὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον**] proportionately (equal) 449A.25
ἀναξίως] undeservedly (to suffer) 518.6
ἀναπόβλητος] unlosable (denied in the case of virtue) 462.5, 7
ἀνδρεία] courage 449A.10
ἀνδρεῖος] courageous 449A.22
ἀνελευθερία] illiberality, lack of generosity 449A.11, 577B.6
ἀνεπιθύμητος] lacking in appetite 449A.15
ἄνεσις] relaxation (and music) 721A.3
ἀνεύρετος] undiscovered (of a life) 551.8
ἀνὴρ] man; husband (in relation to his wife *qua* friend) 533.9, 13–14
ἄνθρωπος] man, human being; (good and bad concerning man) 522.2; pl. (wicked) 444.1; (related to each other and to animals) 531.12; (in relation to pleasure) 555.12
ἀντακολουθία] reciprocal implication 449A.32
ἀντέχειν] to endure (pain) 554.2
ἀντιμεταβολή] transposition 538D.1
ἀξία] worth; **κατ' ἀξίαν** according to merit/worth 449A.28, 584A.100
ἀξιούν] to deem worthy, (oneself) 449A.23
ἄοινος] wineless (of the drunkenness of uneducated souls) 577B.4; pl. (of conversations in a barber-shop) 577A.4, B.3
ἀπαίδευτος] uneducated; (and handsome) 472.1; (and harshness) 518.7; pl. (and drunkenness) 577B.5

ἀπακριβοῦσθαι] to be highly finished; pf. pass. partic. (of the completely good man) 467.1, (of souls) 531.19–20
ἀπάτη] deceit; (silent: regarding beauty) 566.1
ἀπιστία] mistrust (a cause of anger) 542.1
ἀπόλαυσις] enjoyment (of plentiful provisions) 512A.4, 551.9, (of wine with water) 571.4
ἄπλουτος] unwealth (of wealth) 512A.2, B.3
ἀπλῶς] simpliciter, without qualification 504.3
ἀπολαυστός] enjoyable 511.3
ἀπουσία] absence (of anything pleasant) 556.16
ἀπρόετος] not lavishing (money) 449A.26
ἀργός] lazy; comp. (of women whose education has gone beyond what is useful) 662.3
ἀρετή] virtue 490.2, 4, 449A.5, 31, 460.1, 3, 5, 6, 467.5, 501.2, 7, 518.8; 9, 9a; (not unlosable) 462.5; (lost on account of disease) 463.6; (blushing) 470.2; (in relation to music) 720.1; (the basis of friendship) 533.4; excellence (in regard to speaking) 558.6; (in a verse/proverb) 529A.4, B.1; (in a title) 436 no. 7, 8
ἀρκεῖν] to be sufficient (of wealth) 512B.2
ἀριθμός] number; *κατὰ ἀριθμόν*] arithmetically equal 449A.25
ἄριστος] best (the mean relative to us) 449A.1; (life) 465.6, 9, 476.2; pl. (friends and relatives) 465.8
ἄρχειν] to rule 479.8; (political science does not rule the gods) 461.4; act.-pass. (between friends) 533.5, 10–11, 13; to start (in regard to appropriate action and happiness) 501.1, 3

ἀρχή] beginning (of desires, appetites and feelings of anger) 271.4; (of judgments and speculations) 271.5; (of a certain pattern of behavior) 504.4; starting point (of appropriate action) 501.2, 4; pl. principles, elements (of the living body) 531.14, (of the soul) 531.21; sources (of music) 719A.3
ἀρχηγός] (adj.) beginning; (noun) founder; pl. (of the race) 531.8
ἄσεβειν] to commit sacrilege; pass. to be treated impiously (of Hypsicreon) 625.15
ἄσκεπτος] unreflecting; pl. (concerning the best life) 465.5
ἄσκοπος] aimless (of fortune) 488.2
ᾠσμα] song 555.10
ἄστειος] refined 440B.5; adv. with wit, charm 552A.6
ἀστόχαστος] not aimed; hard to guess at 539.1–2
ἀσφαλής] unfailing, secure 490.7
ἀσφαλῶς] safely; (making a trip, being a metaphor for life) 465.12
ἄσχημονεῖν] to do something unseemly (on account of the sound of a trumpet) 726.9; (avoid by drinking little unmixed wine) 572.7
ἄσωτία] prodigality 449A.11
ἀτυχεῖν] to be unfortunate, suffer misfortune 488.1, 518.6; (partic. of virtue) 518.8
αὐλός] aulos, flute (used to cure a man unable to endure the sound of the trumpet) 726A.11
ἀφορμή] starting point, origin; pl. (of love) 558.14
ἄφροδίσιος] belonging to the goddess of love; pl. sexual activity 578.1, 4
ἄφρόνως] foolishly 1.44

- βαδίζειν**] to walk; (in a dainty manner) 449B.2; to go (on a journey) 465.11; partic. (the road of life) 465.16
- βάρβαρος**] barbarian (person) 531.9, 564.2; barbaric (not being disposed to kindness) 518.16
- βασιλεύς**] king (Agesilaus) 551.4
- βιβλίον**] book, (written by Hephaestion) 437.7, (disputed authorship) 550.6; pl (written by Adrastus) 437.2
- βίος**] life 440A.4, 465.5, 8, 13, 487.1, 504.6 twice, 517.2, 523.4; (best) 476.2; (perfect and whole) 501.9; (trustworthy on account of orderliness) 521.1, 2; (of action) 481.3; (pleasant) 551.1; pl. 518.4, (in a title) 1.87, 436 no. 16
- βλάβη**] harm (done to animals when sacrificed) 584A.108; pl. (resulting from taking the wrong road in life) 465.16
- βλάπτειν**] to harm 526.7, 584A.197
- βλαστάνειν**] to sprout; partic. (of virtues) 467.5
- βοηθεῖν**] to assist (a friend) 534.11
- βούλεσθαι**] to wish (to do) 502.5 twice, (good things for one's son) 533.16, (to be seen with eminent men) 547.3, (to show how happily he was living) 550.4
- βουλεύειν**] to deliberate; mid. (concerning oneself) 465.21; partic. (what ought to be done) 626.21; neut. partic. the deliberative faculty 577B.2–3
- βούλησις**] wish; pl. (of parents) 523.4
- βραδύς**] slow (release from love) 557.2
- γάμος**] wedding 550.2
- γέλοιοις**] ludicrous; n. pl. jests 453.1
- γένος**] race 531.8, 12, 25; class or kind (of a metal: gold) 534.60
- γέρον**] old man; pl (fifth age of) 464.1
- γεῦσις**] taste 572.4
- γῆ**] land 531.5; earth 531.27
- γῆρας**] old age 569.2, in a title 1.88, 436 no. 18
- γηροτροφεῖν**] to care for aged (parents) 523.4
- γι(γ)νώσκειν**] to know; 2nd aor. imper. 468.6
- γλῶσσα**] tongue (being good or bad) 451.2
- γονεύς**] begetter; pl. parents (biological) 532.3 (the heavens and earth) 531.27
- γονή**] semen 578.3
- γνώμη**] judgment, pl. 487.2
- γράμμα**] letter; pl. (in which women need to be educated) 662.1
- γράφειν**] to write; to paint 552B.7
- γυνή**] woman (beautifully decked out) 565.1; wife (in relation to her husband) 523.7, 533.9, 13–14, (Neaera) 625.4; pl. (do not drink wine) 579A.7, 9, 579B.3; (good-looking) 562.2; (judged regarding temperance, household management and beauty) 564.1; (clever in household management) 661.1; (need education in letters) 662.1; (hung an amulet around the neck of Pericles) 463.8
- δαίμων**] demon, divine power 626.6
- δάκνειν**] to bite; to irritate; pass. 673.1, 2
- δακρύειν**] to shed tears (of grape vines) 573.3
- δανείζειν**] to loan money, partic. 325.12
- δαπανᾶν**] to spend; partic, 449B.3
- δειλία**] cowardice 449A.10
- δεινός**] clever (in matters of love) 561.2; (in household management) 661.1
- δεινότης**] cleverness (in speech) 521.1
- δεῖπνον**] meal 512A.3, 5

- δέον**] needful, right; pl. (actions) 479.3; **ἐν δέοντι**] on the right occasion 534.68
- δεσπότης**] master; pl. (in relation to their slaves) 462.8 (twice), 9
- διαβολή**] slander (and envy) 445.1
- διαγωγή**] way of life; pl. ways of passing time 551.10
- διάθεσις**] condition; (in relation to ἔξις) 438.3 (that accords with nature) 507.5
- διαίρειν**] to divide (love's powers) 559.5
- διαίρεσις**] division, classification 438.1
- διάνοια**] mind (disturbed in old men) 464.2, (disturbed for a long time) 726A.4
- διαταράττειν**] to disturb (of love) 559.4
- διαφορά**] difference (between contraries and possession and privation) 462.3, (in respect to the more and less) 438.6, 8; pl varieties (of virtue) 436 no. 7, 460.6
- διάφορος**] different; neut. in a title 436 no. 11
- διδάσκαλος**] teacher; (of Aristotle in relation to Theophrastus) 558.2
- δίκαιος**] just (person) 449A.23, 34; neut. sing. (to bring an accusation) 465.6, (to pity) 518.5; **παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον**] contrary to what is just 534.11
- δικαιοσύνη**] justice 449A.11, 529B.2, (of nature and of the city) 523.7, (in a verse/proverb) 529A.4, B. 1
- δίκη**] justice, penalty 526.6, 8
- δοκιμάζειν**] to test (potential friends) 538A.1, 2; to approve (of judging potential friends) 538E.1
- δόξα**] opinion (false) 556.4, 15; reputation 440B.6, 467.1, 4, 551.2, 6, 558.4
- δοῦλος**] slave; pl. (in relation to their masters) 461.8
- δύναμις**] power 490.4; pl. (of love) 559.5
- δυσθυμία**] despondency 569.2
- δυσλόγιστος**] difficult to calculate 487.1
- δυσμένεια**] ill-will; (friendship does not bear) 540.2; (in the souls of the uneducated) 577B.6
- δυστυχής**] unfortunate; comp. 443.1
- δυστυχεῖν**] to be unfortunate, wretched 550.9
- δύσφημος**] shameful; comp. pl. (of emotions) 438.11
- ἐγκαλεῖν**] to bring accusation against; to reproach 464.6
- ἐγκλημα**] complaint, reproach 441.7
- ἐθίζειν**] to habituate, to accustom 510.1
- εἰδοποιεῖν**] creates a special form; (practical reason gives the just man his special form) 449A.35
- εἶδος**] form (of the moral virtues) 449A.31; kind (of emotion) 438.2, 5, 9, 12; pl. (of friendship) 533.2
- εἰμαρμένη**] fate 502.3, 503.2, 504.1, 2, 7, 9, (in a title) 10
- ἐκούσιος**] voluntary; neut. sing. as subst. 502.4
- ἐκστασις**] displacement; pl. disturbances (of the mind) 726A.4
- ἐκτίμησις**] showing honor (to the gods) 584A.221
- ἐλεεῖν**] to pity 518.6
- ἐλλείπειν**] to be deficient, to fall short (of the mean in regard to emotions) 449A.13
- ἐλευθέριος**] free; (of pursuits appropriate to free men) 461.10; adv. (raised) in a liberal manner 465.4; generous 449A.25
- ἐλευθεριότης**] liberality, generosity 449A.11

- ἐμμένειν**] to remain steadfast 476.3
ἐμπειρία] experience (acquaintance with another person) 542.11
ἐνθουσιασμός] inspiration (alters the voice) 719A.4
ἐνοικεῖν] to inhabit (of the soul in the body) 440A.9
ἐνδοξος] held in esteem (of men) 547.4; glorious (the noble [and reversed]) twice 467.10; superl. (city) 465.8
ἐνέργεια] activity (of deciding and speculating in the soul) 271.6
ἐνοίκιον] rent (paid by the soul to the body) 440B.9, C.4
ἐνοχλεῖν] to vex (of love) 558.11
ἐντυχία] conversation; pl. meetings 449A.2
ἐξακριβοῦν] to make accurately; neut. pass. partic. as subst. precision 662.3
ἐξεταστής] examiner; pl. (of faults) 538F.5
ἔξις] disposition; (in relation to διάθεσις) 438.3; (moral virtue or vice) 449A.5, 13, 22; (practical wisdom) 460.3
ἐξιστάναι] to displace, to change; pass. partic. driven (mad by the sound of the trumpet) 726A.8
ἐξουσία] resource(s) 465.4; power 467.9; opportunity (to change) 465.17
ἐξωθεν] from outside (whence the intellect comes) 271.1
ἐξωτερικός] external; (for readers outside the Peripatetic School) 498.2
ἐπάγειν] to adduce (examples) 438.6, 449A.8
ἐπαινεῖν] to praise (Democritus) 513.7, (Theophrastus) 518.8; (and blame) 522.1
ἔπαινος] praise 518.10
ἐπίδειξις] display (of plentiful provisions) 512A.4
ἐπιθυμεῖν] to desire (to be unnoticed) 513.2; (ambrosia) 554.4, partic. (moderately) 449A.18
ἐπιθυμητικός] given to appetite 449A.15
ἐπιθυμία] appetite, desire 440A.11, 531.17, 572.7; (less intense than lust) 438.10; (irrational) 557.1; (compared with rage) 441.3, 5, 11; (as bodily motion) 271.3
ἐπιληψία] epilepsy (cured by playing the aulos) 726A.5
ἐπίπλαστος] feigned (character) 556.10, 14; (pleasure) 556.14
ἐπιπόνως] laboriously 552A.12
ἐπιστήμη] knowledge; technical knowledge, skill 552A.13
ἐπιτείνειν] to stretch; pass. to be intensified 559.3
ἐπιχεῖν] to pour in/on (of wine) 571.2
ἐπίχσις] pouring in; filling (cups for a toast) pl. 570.1
ἐπτά] seven (wise men) 569.1
ἐρᾶν] to love; (of a goose) 567B.2; (of men) B.4; pass. partic. (of the beloved in shooting the cottabus) 570.3
ἐρᾶσθαι] to love; (of a goose) 567A.1, B.2, (of a ram and a goose) 5, (of a ram) C.2, (of a human) 625.4
ἐραστής] lover 560.1
ἔρως] eros, lust, (more intense than friendship) 438.10; love 557.1, 558.1, 9, 11; 558.3; 559.3 626.19; (in a title) 1.98, 436 no. 30a–b, 560.2; pl. 561.2
ἐρωτικός] erotic, of love; sing. (in a title) 559.1, 561.1, 567A.2; neut. pl. (emotions) 558.11; (in a title) 1.224, 567A.2, 727 no. 4
ἐταῖρα] courtesan 578.6
εὐγενής] well-born; superl. 576.1
εὐγνώμων] sensible; neut. acc. (as subst.) good sense 626.19

εὐδαιμονία] happiness 501.5, 550.8;
 (in a title) 1.99, 261, 436 no. 12a,
 13, 489.2, 494A.1, 552B.8
εὐδαιμόνως] (living) happily 550.4
εὐεργεῖν] to treat kindly; pass.
 518.14
εὐεργεσία] kindness (holds life
 together) 517.2, (the equal of
 the gods) 518.2; (returned by a
 wife) 523.11; pl. (be ready with)
 518.15; (return in accordance
 with value) 584A.99
εὐσέβεια] piety (continual)
 584A.131, 143
εὕμερία] prosperity 488.4
εὐθύμως] with good spirits 552A.12
εὐκοσμία] orderliness (produced by
 graceful emotions?) 720.5
εὐνοια] goodwill (in relation to
 friendship) 438.9, 538F.3
εὐπειθής] obedient (to parents)
 523.4
εὐπρεπής] good-looking (women)
 562.2
εὐπορία] wealth 523.3
εὐπορος] rich; superl. 512B.5
εὐσεβεῖν] to live, act piously, (in a
 verse) 529A.2
εὐταξία] orderliness (in life) 521.2
εὐτέλεια] cheapness 512A.3
εὐτυχία] good fortune 489.3, (in a
 title) 436 no. 14
εὐφημία] good reputation 518.12
εὐχαρις] gracious; (of moderate
 wine) 559.3
εὐχαριστεῖν] to express thanks
 525.2
ἐφειτός] desirable; neut. sing.
 (object) sought 507.4
ἐχθρός] hated; subst. enemy 526.6,
 10
ζηλοτυπία] jealousy; (cause of
 anger) 542. 2; pl. (a debit for the
 soul) 440A.11
ζηλωτής] one who emulates 558.4
ζημία] penalty (of death) 579A.4

ζῆν] to live; (on a little) 510.1;
 (happily) 550.5
ζωγράφος] painter (Parrhasius)
 552A.1
ζωή] life (counterfactual, of wealth)
 507.1, 6
ζῷον] animal, living creature 504.3,
 531.13, 16, 20, 25, 26, 555.3, 5;
 (not to be sacrificed) 584A.107,
 108; (related to man) 584A.192;
 (irrational) 584A.199
ζωρός] pure, unmixed; but (in
 Empedocles) mixed 573.4; comp.
 573.1
ἡδεσθαι] to be pleased, feel pleasure
 555.1; (Schadenfreude) 444.2; (in
 response to jokes) 453.2
ἡδονή] pleasure; (overcome by)
 441.5, 554.3, 5; (alters the voice)
 719A.4; (drives out pain) 555.8,
 10, 13; (basis of friendship) 533.
 4, 12; (true and false) 556 passim;
 (in a title) 1.116, 1.117, 1.175,
 436 no. 26, 27, 28, 549.1, 550.5,
 551.3, 553.2
ἡδύς] pleasant (friendship) 533.18;
 (life) 551.1, (nothing present)
 556.17; **ἡδέως**] with plea-
 sure (vote condemnation)
 440A.5
ἡθικός] ethical, moral; pl. (virtues)
 449A.31, 33, 460.1, 3; (in a
 title) 436 no. 2a, 3, 4a, 437.4,
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 (false, feigned) 556.9. 11, 14;
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 (shared) 531.11, (more affable
 and compliant) 465.3, (generation
 of) 531.22; in a title 436 no. 1,
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ἡλικία] time of life; (old men) 464.1;
 (youth) 539.2

- ἡμερος]** tame; cultivated; refined (soul) 518.6, disposed to act kindly 518.16
- ἡμεροῦν]** to tame (souls) 465.2
- ἡμίθεος]** demigod; pl. 551.6
- ἥρω]** hero; pl. 575.2
- ἦττα]** defeat 552A.12
- ἦττάσθαι]** to be defeated (of Parrhasius the painter and Ajax) 552A.4. 6, 9, B.2, 3, (or the tragedian Aeschylus) 553.1; overcome (by pain) 554.2; (by pleasure) 544.5
- θάνατος]** death for drinking unmixed wine 579A.4
- θαυμάζειν]** to admire; perf. partic. (the speech of Theophrastus); pass. (of wealth) 512B.1, (of one's relationship to the divinity) 523.1
- θαυμαστός]** wonderful 550.8
- θεῖος]** divine, comp. (of intellect) 271.6; neut. as a subst. 523.2, 3; (in a title) 1.261, 436 no. 13
- θεός]** god 449A.22, 483.1, 3, 4, 490.5, 572.4, 7; pl. 460.2, 3, 4, 471.1, 518.2, 570.3
- θεωρεῖν]** to contemplate 479.6
- θεωρητικός]** (man) who contemplates 479.3, 5; (life) of contemplation 481.4; neut. pl. objects of contemplation 479.7
- θεωρία]** contemplation, speculation (referred to the soul) 271.4; (by theoretical wisdom of things most valuable) 461.11
- θηλυς]** feminine; effeminate comp. (of a man overcome by pleasure) 441. 6
- θηριότης]** bestiality (more intense than anger) 438.10
- θηριώδης]** savage, brutal; neut. sing as subst. brutality (of soul) 465.2
- θνητός]** mortal, comp. 440C.2
- θρασύτης]** rashness 449A.10
- θύειν]** to sacrifice 523.2; 584A.105,
- θυμός]** anger (in general) 518.15; rage (not differentiated from ὄργη) 441.3, 526.2, 6; (more intense than ὄργη) 438.7
- θυμοῦσθαι]** to be angry, partic. 441.3
- ἰᾶσθαι]** to cure (sciatica by playing the aulos) 726A.4
- ἰατρεύειν]** to cure (ills of soul and body) 726A.3
- ἴδιος]** one's own, particular (human nature) 504.4; **κατὰ τὸ ἴδιον]** on account of its/their peculiar character 449A.33. 35–36
- ιδιότης]** specific character 438.4
- ιδίωμα]** peculiarity; pl. (in a title) 436 no. 4b
- ἱερόν]** sacred place, temple 626.6, 10
- ἰκετεία]** supplication 572.6
- ἴσος]** equal; neut. sing. as subst. the equal (portion) 449A.25 twice
- ἰστορεῖν]** to inquire; to record or report 550.5, 552A.7, 567A.1
- ἱστορία]** research, history; in a title 473.3
- ἰσχιάς]** sciatica (cured by playing the aulos) 726A.5
- καθαίρειν]** to cleanse, purify; middle partic. (regarding character when sacrificing) 584A.154
- καθαρός]** clean, pure (of character) 542.12; (important when sacrificing to the gods) 584A.158
- καθήκων]** appropriate; neut. sing. (action) 501.1
- καθιστάναι]** to set down; to restore (a man's sanity) 726A.8
- καθόλου]** universal; with def. art. (of human nature) 504.2
- καιρός]** time (fixed) 488.4; critical moment, crisis acc. pl. (in a title) 625.1, 626.2; sing. due measure (in speech) 449A.3; **κατὰ καιρόν]** according to the moment; appropriately 449A.30

- κακία**] vice; pl. (naturally expelled) 720.3
- κακοδαιμονία**] unhappiness 440A.3
- κακοποιός**] evil-doer (of men and animals) 584A.194, 199, 205, 213
- κακός**] bad, evil; (person) 507.6; the tongue being good or bad 451.1; (removal of conversation from a dinner) 577A.3; neut sing. vice 529B.1; pl. (of the body) 440A.14, (suffered by the body) 440B.10; troubles (one's own) 443.3, (of others) 444.2, (of the Naxians) 626.21; superl. (of people) 577B.2; **κακῶς**] badly 440A.4, 8, 463.8, 522.2, 524.1 twice, 526.8
- καλλιγύναιξ**] with beautiful women 562.1–2
- κάλλος**] beauty (contest) 563.1, 564.3; (when noble) 564.5; (well decked out) 565.2
- καλός**] beautiful; (of encyclopedic learning) 489.1; noble 467.3, 10, 518.5, 10, 564.5, 572.8; of Adrastus 437.1; pl. fine things (in this world) 490.7; **καλὰ καγαθὰ**] noble and good (actions) 449A.36; **καλῶς**] well 522.2, 523.4, 7, 524.1; **κάλλιστα**] superl. adv. (of laws that have been laid down) 579A.1
- κανόν**] ruler, straight stick 449A.19
- καρπός**] fruit; pl. (used in sacrifice) 584A.98; (provided by the gods) 584A.103, 107; (taking from others for use in sacrifice) 584A.111, 112; (released by plants and taken for sacrifice) 584A.119 twice; sing. (of honey taken from bees) 584A.121
- καταισχύνεσθαι**] to be ashamed (of one's jokes) 453.2
- καταμαντεύεσθαι**] to prophesy; (concerning young people) 539.1
- καταναγκάζειν**] to constrain; neut.sing. pass. partic. as subst. 502.4–5
- καταστροφή**] ruin (of lives) 504.6
- καταύλησις**] playing the aulos (cures sciatica) 726A.5
- καταφρονεῖν**] to despise 490.6
- κατηγορεῖν**] to accuse; to blame 522.1
- κατορθοῦν**] to set upright; to succeed (in making correct judgments) 487.3
- κεραννύναι**] to mix; pass. (wine with water) 559.2; (wine with character) 574.2
- κεφαλοτομεῖν**] to cut-off-the-head 494A.1, 494B.1
- κινεῖν**] to move (of wine as a stimulus) 577B.1 twice; (of music's effect on the soul) 721A.6; pass. changed (of changed character) 463.5
- κίνησις**] motion; pl. 271.9; (bodily) 271.3; (in a title) 1.125, 137 no. 2, 271.2
- κινητικός**] capable of moving (music in relation to the body) 720.4
- κοινός**] common; with def. art. (of human nature) 504.2; pl. (of the heavens and earth as parents) 531.27; (of the possessions of friends) 535.2 twice; affable (dispositions) 465.3
- κοινότης**] community (of meals) 512A.2
- κοινωνεῖν**] to share (of men and animals) 531.5, 12
- κοινωνία**] communion, fellowship (of wine and words) 577A.3
- κολάζειν**] to chasten 526.10; to punish 584A.198
- κολακεία**] flattery (in a title) 547.2
- κόλαξ**] flatterer (of the dancer Cleonymus) 547.2
- κολακεύειν**] to flatter (Dionysius' tyranny) 548.1

- κότταβος**] game involving wine 570.3, pl. 571.5
κουρτεῖον] barbershop, pl. 577A.4, B.3
κρᾶσις] mixture (of primary elements) 531.24; mixing (wine) 571.1
κρίος] ram (that fell in love with Glaucā) 567B.5, C.2
κρίνειν] to judge (which life is best) 465.10; (potential friends) 538E.1 twice, F.2 twice
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λαλιά] chatter 577A.4, B.4
λάλος] loquacious; (avoiding a babbler) 452.1; pl. (of women whose education has gone beyond the useful) 662.3
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λιποθυμία] fainting (cured by music) 726A.3
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λυπεῖν] to pain; partic. (oneself) 526.7; pass. to be pained 443.4, 555.1, 12
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λυπηρός] painful 555.2; 556.14

μάγος] priest; pl. (Indian) 513.4
μαίνεσθαι] to rage; to be mad (on account of the sound of the war-trumpet) 726A.10
μακάριος] blessed 490.6, comp. 440C.1
μαλακός] pl. soft (persons) 554.1
μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον] more and less (differing in respect to) 438.5–6, 8
μανία] madness (as a consequence of excessive political ambition) 467.8
μανθάνειν] to learn, study (in order to become intelligent) 471.3
μεγαλοπρέπεια] magnificence 449A.12
μεγαλοπρεπής] magnificent 449A.28
μεγαλοψυχία] greatness of soul 449A.11
μεγαλόψυχος] great of soul 449A.26
μέθη] drunkenness; (wineless) 577B.4; pl. drinking bouts 440A.6; (in a title) 1.135, 436 no. 31, 569.3, 570.2, 572.1, 573.1, 574.1, 575.1, 576.5, 11
μεθύειν] to be drunken 526.3
μειράκιον] boy (blushing) 470.1

μέλος] song, tune (moves the body)
720.4

μέμφεσθαι] to fault (not properly)
554.4; partic. (moderately) 542.7

μέμψις] fault-finding 438.6

μέσος] in the middle, (disposition)
449A.21; neut. sing. subst. mean
(relative to us) 449A.1; n. pl.
average (neither virtuous nor
vicious persons) 533.11

μεσότης] mean (relative to us)
449A.4, 5; pl. mean (dispositions)
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μεταβολή] change; (regarding
virtue) 462.6; pl. (typical of
youth) 539.2; (of a disease) 463.3

μεταμέλεσθαι] to regret (one's
behavior) 473.2

μεταφορά] metaphor (of the relation
between body and soul) 440B.9

μετριάζειν] to be moderate (of love)
559.3

μέτριος] moderate; (with οὐ of
an answer) 542.7; neut. pl.
(possessions) 512B.3

μετρίως] (complain) moderately
542.7

μικροπρέπεια] shabbiness 449A.12

μικροψυχία] smallness of soul
449A.12

μιμητικός] imitative (music) 721A.4

μισεῖν] to hate; (with reason, not
passion) 538E.2, (caused by too
much affection) 542.8

μισθός] pay, fee; pl. (rent paid to the
body by the soul) 440A.10

μνημονεύειν] to remember (good
and bad treatment) 524.2, 525.1

μοχθηρία] wickedness 584A.197

μοχθηρός] wicked 444.1

μῦς] mouse (showed Diogenes how
to handle circumstances) 511.1

μουσική] music (harmonizes the
soul) 721A.7; (cures ills of soul
and body) 726A.2; subject of a
book by Theophrastus 719A.2–3,
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μουσικός] musical; (the) musician
(Aristoxenus) 726.6

νεανίσκος] youth, young man 471.1,
2

νέος] young; (and ambitious) 467.3;
pl. (people) 539.1

νήφειν] to be sober 577B.2

νόμιμος] lawful; neut. sing. with def.
art. custom (regarding women
and wine) 579B.5; neut. pl. (in
regard to friendship) 533.6

νομοθετεῖν] to legislate 479.9

νόμος] law 533.7; (laid down by
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unmixed wine) 579A.2, B.3;
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of the city) 523.6

νοσεῖν] partic. to be sick 463.6,
556.8, 579.3

νόσος] sickness (affected the body of
Pericles) 463.2; pl. 523.10

νοῦς] mind, intellect 471.1, (better
and more divine) 271.7; (take to
mind, consider) 626.19; (have)
sense 518.11

ξενία] hospitality; hospitable
reception 542.5

ξένος] guest-friend (Promedon)
625.5

ὁδός] road; travelling 513.6;
metaph. (way of life) 465.11

οἰκεῖος] related (of men and
animals) 531.2, 4, 6, 10, 24,
584A.192, 4; one's own, peculiar
(nature) 504.1, (good) 507.2,
(activities) 461.5

οἰκειότης] relationship (of emotion
between men and animals)
531.21; (which speaks against
animal sacrifice but is compatible
with destroying men and animals
that do evil) 584A.195

οἰκείως] properly 501.8

- οἰκέτης**] household slave; pl. (more generally) slaves 526.5
οἰκονομία] household management (by a wife) 523.10; (in which a woman needs to be educated) 662.2 (contests among women) 564.2
οἰκονομικός] of household management; neut. pl. 661.2
οἰκτεῖρειν] to pity 626.16
οἶκτος] pity 518.6
οἶνος] wine 559.2; 569.2, 571.2, 3, 572.1, 577A.2, B.2, 579A.3
ὀλιγωρεῖν] to disdain 523.6
οἰνοχοεῖν] to pour wine 576.1, 4, 6
ὁμοειδής] of the same kind (emotions) 438.8
ὁμιλία] social interaction; (manner of) 519.1; pl. (drinking) parties 569.1
ὁμιλεῖν] to interact; (to use wine) 579A.6
ὁμοιοῦσθαι] to liken (oneself to god) 483.3, 584B.3
ὄργανον] tool; (the body) 440A.7; (wealth) 507.3
ὀργή] anger; (less intense than θυμός) 438.6; rage (used synonymously with θυμός) 526.1; (caused by insult and jealousy) 542.3; (in the souls of the uneducated) 577B.5; pl. (bodily motions) 271.3; angry impulses 531.18
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ὀργιλότης] irascibility 449A.10
ὀρέγεσθαι] to desire 449A.16, (wine) 571.4
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ὀρίζειν] to determine (the mean) 449A.6, partic. 449A.19; pass. 449A.4, 5
ὀρμαῖν] to drive; middle/pass. to rush (to do wrong) 441.10; to be driven (to do harm) 584A.202
ὄρμη] drive, (sexual) 578.1; pl. impulses (angry) 526.4
ὄρος] definition (of intellect) 271.8
ὀρχεῖσθαι] to dance 576.6
ὅσιος] holy (of sacrifice) 584A.109; (not holy the person who sacrifices the property of another, who sacrifices what is more honorable than fruit) 584A.110, 113; **ὀσίως**] adv. 584A.113
ὀσιότης] holiness 523.3
οὐρανός] the heavens 531.27
ὄχλος] the mass; pl. 524.1
ὄψις] spectacle (of plentiful provisions) 512A.4
παθητικός] being concerned with emotion (of the moral virtues) 449A.31
πάθος] affections; (of the body and causing loss of virtue) 463.6; emotion (excessive and deficient) 449A.13; passion, emotion, (of love) 558.1, 11, 13; (opposed to reason) 538E.2; pl. (shameful) 438.11; (of the soul) 440A.2, B.12; wine stimulates 577B.1; (stimulates song) 719B.4; (supplied: sources of music) 719A.4; (supplied: graceful) 720.4
παιδεία] education; in a title 436 no. 9a; tames the soul 465.1
παιδεύειν] to educate; pf. pass. 1.44
παίδευσις] education (of women) 662.2
παῖς] boy (with whom a goose fell in love) 567A1, 2, B.1, 3; pl. (one's own) children 523.7; (wine pourers) 576.1, 4; (in a title) 436 no. 10
παντέλειος] all-perfect (of the intellect) 271.7
παράδειγμα] example; pl. (of things differing by the more and less) 438.6, (of virtues and vices) 449A.9
παραινεῖν] to exhort, to advise 535.3

- παραμελεῖν**] to disregard, to neglect; pass. partic. (a hospitable reception) 542.5
- παραινθεῖσθαι**] to encourage; relieve (despondency) 569.2
- παρὰφροσύνη**] derangement (as a consequence of excessive political ambition) 467.9
- παρθένος**] maiden 626.5
- παροιμία**] proverb 529A.5 twice, 529B.2, 549.2
- παροιμιάζειν**] to make proverbial; mid. To speak in, quote proverbs 529A.1
- πάσχειν**] to suffer; (with εὖ and κακῶς) to be well and poorly treated 518.10, 524.2, 525.1; (on account of the sound of the war-trumpet) 726A.10
- πατήρ**] father (in relation to son *quia* friend) 533.9, 14, 16
- πατρικός**] paternal (superiority over a son) 533.8
- πείθειν**] persuade 625.8, 16, 17; pass. 626.11, 33, 35
- πένης**] poor person 512A.5
- περίεργος**] over-careful; meddlesome; pl. (of women whose education has gone beyond what is useful) 662.4
- περίστασις**] circumstances 511.3–4
- πίνειν**] to drink (wine) 571.3
- πικρός**] sharp; pl. harsh (of persons) 538F.5
- πιστεύειν**] to trust; pass. to be trusted 467.2
- πίστις**] trust (in a person) 542.11
- πιστοῦν**] to make trustworthy 521.1
- πλημμελεῖν**] to make a false note; pl. pass. partic. discordant actions 441.3
- πλούσιος**] rich 512A.5, B.3
- πλουτεῖν**] to be rich, (in a verse) 529A.3
- πλοῦτος**] wealth 490.4, 507. 1, 3, 6, 512A.1, B.2, 3; in a title 1.222, 436 no. 19a, 516.3
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- πόλις**] city; (opposed to φύσις) 523.6
- πολίτης**] citizen 531.4
- πολιτικός**] political; (political science in relation to the gods) 461.1, 2; pl. (ambitions) 467.8; in a title 727 no. 4
- πολύς**] many; pl. most (men, the multitude) 554.1, 5, 555.1, 3
- πονεῖν**] suffer distress 555.3, 5
- πόνος**] labor 558.5; distress 555.6
- πράγμα**] thing (existing or non-existent) 556.10, 12; pl. activities (whose absence exposes the soul to love) 558.12
- πρακτέον**] one must do, act; (not in anger) 526.1; pl. (directed by practical wisdom) 461.10
- πρακτικός**] given to action; (practical wisdom) 460.3; (the man of practical wisdom) 449A.36; (the perfect man) 479.3, 10; (the active life) 481.3; (practical matters/affairs) 460.2
- πράξις**] action 519.2; affair 626.31
- πρᾶος**] gentle 449A.20
- πραότης**] gentleness 449A.10
- πράττειν**] to act 479.9; partic. 473.3; to do (with direct obj.) 441.10, 473.2, 502.5, 523.12, 510.2
- προαδικεῖν**] to treat unjustly first; masc. sing. pass. partic. 441.8–9
- προαιρεῖσθαι**] to choose 465.19, 476.2, 626.14
- προαίρεσις**] choice 503.1, 3
- προαιρετικός**] involving choice; fem. sing. (virtue) 449A.5
- πρόβλημα**] problem; pl. in a title 727 no. 4
- πρόγονος**] ancestor; pl (the same) 531.7, 11
- προετικός**] emitting easily; lavish (in giving money) 449A.26
- πρόνοια**] forethought 626.2
- προπάτωρ**] forefather; pl. 531.3

- προσδιαρθροῦν**] to distinguish besides (of the choice *qua* cause) 503.1
- προσηγορία**] name; pl. (of the moral virtues) 460.7
- προσήκων**] belonging, fitting, proper (honor) 553.3; **κατὰ τὸ προσηκόν**] in accordance with propriety 449A.18
- προσκυνεῖν**] to make obeisance 572.6
- προσποιεῖσθαι**] to pretend (to be blind) 548.2
- πρόφασις**] motive 513.11
- ῥαδίως**] with ease 552A.12, B.7
- ῥαστώνη**] ease 551.9
- ῥυθμίζειν**] to produce rhythm, measured motion; to harmonize (souls) 721A.7
- ῥυτόν**] (drinking vessel called the) rhyton 575.1
- σαλάκων**] pretentious 449B.2; extravagant 449B.4
- σαλακωνεύειν**] to behave pretentiously; aor. act. inf. 449B.1
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- σάλπιγξ**] trumpet (its sound drove a man mad) 726A.8, 12
- σιωπᾶν**] to be silent; (at a symposium) 1.43; (the deceit of beauty) 566.1
- σκοπεῖν**] to consider (what is the best life) 465.10
- σοφιστής**] wise man; pl. (Indian) 513.4
- σοφία**] theoretical wisdom; (in relation to practical wisdom) 461.7, 11
- σοφός**] wise; pl. (generally of men) 518.2; (the seven) 569.1
- σπένδειν**] to make a drink offering 570.2
- σπουδαῖος**] good, virtuous 449A.14, 462.4, 533.5, 8, 9, 10, 11
- στοιχεῖον**] element; pl. (of happiness) 501.5; (primary in living things) 531.14
- συμπληροῦν**] to fill up (a perfect and complete life) 501.9
- συνπόσιον**] symposium 1.43; pl. metaphorically of barbershops 577A.4, B.4
- συμποτικός**] involving drink 569.1
- συγγενής**] akin (men and animals) 531.10, 13, 24
- σύγκρισις**] comparison (of mistakes) 441.1
- σύγχυσις**] confusion (caused by love) 559.6
- συμβεβηκός**] accidental; **κατὰ συμβεβηκός**] *per accidens* 449A.34
- σύμφυτος**] naturally present; pl. (of fluids) 531.16
- συνάχθεσθαι**] to sympathize 552A.7, 8, B.2, 3
- συνέχειν**] to hold together (the lives of men) 517.1, 518.2
- συνεχής**] continuous; (sacrifice) 584A.131, 143
- συνήθης**] customary; usual (inflection of voice) 719A.5
- συνουσία**] social interaction 577A.2
- συστολή**] contraction; (caused by rage) 441.1
- σφοδρός**] intense (pleasure) 555.13; **σφοδρά**] neut. pl. as adv. 513.2; **σφοδρῶς**] adv. 554.4
- σχολάζειν**] to be at leisure (of the soul) 558.1–2
- σχολή**] leisure (of the masters of slaves) 461.9; (of theoretical wisdom for contemplation) 461.11; dat. sing. over a period of time 526.9; pl. lectures, in a title 436 no. 3
- σῶμα**] body; (worn out by disease) 463.3; (to exert) 440B.2; (in relation to soul) 440A passim, B.7, 9, 10, 12, C.4; pl. (bodily affections cause loss of virtue)

- 463.6; (of men and animals)
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- τελείν**] to complete; to pay (a high rent to the body) 440B.9
- τέλειος**] perfect (man) 479.2, (life) 501.8
- τέλος**] end; completion (of deciding and speculating in the soul) 271.6; pl. (of political science) 461.6
- τέχνη**] art, craft 552A.12, B.7; pl. 551.8
- τιμᾶν**] to honor (the divinity) 523.2; pass. (beauty) 564.3; (less than is appropriate) 542.10
- τιμή**] honor (holds life together) 517.2; (for deeds) 519.1; (for tragedies) 553.3; (for temperance) 564.5; (shown to the gods, a motive for sacrificing) 584A.217, 227
- τίμιος**] valued; of high price (gold compared with bronze) 534.62; superl. pl. (of the objects contemplated by theoretical wisdom) 461.11; (of good deeds) 584.103; (of sources of sacrifice) 584A.103
- τιμωρεῖν**] to take vengeance; mid. (for oneself) 526.8, 525.2
- τιμωρία**] vengeance, retribution (holds life together) 517.2; pl. 526.4
- τραγωδία**] tragedy 553.3
- τραγωδοποιός**] tragedian, (Antiphon) 437.6
- τρεῖς**] three (sources of music) 719A.4
- τρόπος**] character; pl. 559.2
- τροφή**] food; (shared, the same) 531.11, 25
- τροφός**] nourisher; fem. pl. nurses 573.1
- τροφᾶν**] to engage in luxury 551.4
- τροφή**] delicacy, luxury 549.2, 550.2, 552B.4
- τυγχάνειν**] to happen; aor. partic. neut. sing. subst. chance 465.9
- τυμβογέρον**] tomb-old; pl. (the fifth age) 464.1
- τύχη**] fortune 487.2, 3, 488.2, 490.2, 3, 7, 503.3, 559.6; affects character 463.5; (with nature in regard to beauty) 564.4
- ὔβρις**] outrage 440A.13
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- ὕδροποτεῖν**] to drink water (of women in Massilia) 579A7, B4
- ὔδωρ**] water (mixed with wine) 571.2, 3
- υἱός**] son (in relation to father *qua* friend) 533.9, 14, 16
- ὑπερβάλλειν**] to exceed (the mean in regard to emotions) 449A.13; (in appetites) 449A.17
- ὑπερβολή**] excess (of luxury) 549.2, 558.1
- ὑπερέχειν**] act.-passiv. to be superior-inferior (in a friendship) 533.7, 12–13
- ὑπεροχή**] superiority (in a friendship) 533.1, 3
- ὑποκινύρεσθαι**] to hum (to lighten toil) 552A.13
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- φᾶῤλος]** (*cont.*) bad (act) 449A.36, 473.2; superl. basest (emotions) 577B.2
- φθονεῖν]** to envy 440B.5; partic. 443.3
- φθονερός]** envious 443.1
- φθόνος]** envy; (and slander) 445.1; (friendship does not bear) 540.1
- φιλάργυρος]** fond of money, (of Simonides) 516.2
- φιλανθρώπως]** in a humane manner; (positive and negative context) 523.9, 13
- φιλαπεχθημόνος]** with hostility 523.13–14
- φιλεῖν]** to love; to be friends (on the basis of utility) 533.15, (according to nature) 533.17; to make friends (after judging them) 538F.1, 2; to feel affection (excessively) 542.8, 9
- φιληδονία]** fondness for pleasure; pl. 440A.7
- φιλία]** friendship; (different from goodwill) 438.9; (involving superiority) 533.1, 2, 3, 17, (at birth the beginning of) 538F.4; (bears ignorance and mistakes) 540.1; in a title 436 no. 23a
- φιλικῶς]** on friendly terms 523.13
- φιλοθύτης]** one who is fond sacrifices 523.2
- φιλονεικεῖν]** to engage in rivalry 440B.6
- φιλονεικία]** contentiousness 526.3, 577.B6
- φίλος]** dear to (rage) 526.6; (subst.) friend; pl. 533.5, 6 twice, 12, 14; 535.2 twice, 3; 538A.1; friends (of Pericles) 463.7; (of Parrhasius) 552B.2; dual, of Hypsicreon and Promedon 625.2
- φιλοσοφία]** philosophy 441.7, 479.2, 558.3
- φιλόσοφος]** philosopher; (Aristotle) 460.2; (Plato, Aristotle, Theophrastus) 502.2; (Aeschylus) 553.1
- φιλοτιμία]** ambition, pl. (political) 467.8
- φιλότιμος]** ambitious (of a young person) 467.3
- φοβεῖσθαι]** to be frightened 449A.22
- φόβος]** fear; pl. 440A.10; (cured by music) 726A.4
- φρονεῖν]** to think, to be intelligent 531.23
- φρόνημα]** mind; pride (contributes to the development of virtues) 467.7; proud spirit (of Pericles) 463.4
- φρόνησις]** practical wisdom; (in relation to moral virtue) 449A.32, 33, 460.2 twice, 5; (in relation to theoretical wisdom) 461.7
- φρόνιμος]** having practical wisdom 449A.6, 34, 35, 526.1; comp. 523.121; **φρονίμως]** adv. sensibly 1.43, 523.12
- φροντίς]** care; pl. (free of) 558.10
- φῦλον]** race, class; pl. (of living creatures) 531.23
- φῦναι]** to bring forth, beget; intrans. to grow; particip. (of virtues) 467.4; issue naturally (from) 531.6; pf. to be naturally, by nature 531.14, 17, 21
- φυσικός]** physical; natural (of friendship between father and son) 533.17; neut. pl. in a title 727 no. 4; **φυσικῶς]** adv. naturally (some vices expelled) 720.3; (friendship occurring between father and son) 533.18
- φύσις]** nature 501.2, 5, 9; nature of an individual person 465.18, 503.2, 3, 504.1, 4, 584A.197; (of animals that do harm) 584A.199, 201, 205; dat. (of relationship between living creatures) 531.2, (husband ruling wife) 533.10; (giving rise to friendship) 538F.2;

- (in regard to beauty) 564.4;
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φυσιόλογος] physiologist 555.4
φυτόν] plant 531.15
φωνή] voice (altered by emotion) 419.6; sound (of the trumpet drove a man mad) 726A.8, 12
ψευδής] false (pleasure) 556.2, 3, 11, 13; (in a title) 1.175, 436 no. 28; (opinion) 556.4; (character, statement or existing thing) 556.9, 12, 15
ψεῦδος] falsehood (prevailing for a short while) 445.1
ψυχή] soul (seat of judgment and speculation) 271.5; (in relation to the body) 440A passim, B. 8, 10 twice, C.4; (seat of proud spirit) 463.4; pl. (not different in men and animals) 531.17, (different in finish) 531.19; (of educated and uneducated men) 518.6, 577B.5; (in regard to emotion) 558.1; (free of cares) 558.10; (music harmonizes) 721A.7; (psychic ills cured by music) 726A.3; (of which animals are deprived in sacrifice) 584A.114, 120
- χαλεπαίνειν**] to be angry 542.10
χαλεπός] difficult; superl. (of love) 559.4
χαλεπότης] harshness 518.7
χαλκός] bronze 534.62, 63
χαρακτήρ] stamp; character, pl. (in a title) 436 no. 4a–c
χαρίζειν] to gratify 626.14
χάρις] favor 518.3, 9, 14, 534.67, 584A.100, 111; gratitude (as a motive for sacrificing to the gods) 584A.217, 228; charm 519.1
χαυνότης] vanity 449A.12
χὴν] goose (that loves) 567A.1, B.2, 3, 5
χλιδή] delicacy 550.2
χρεία] need, want (as motive for sacrificing to the gods) 584A.217, 232
χρήμα] thing; pl. material things 513.10; money 510.2
χρήσιμος] useful, beneficial; (the basis of friendship) 533.4, 12; (accompanies friendship) 533.19; (regarding wine) 572.8
χρῆσις] use (of wealth) 512A.3, B.1
χρηστός] useful 440B.5
χρυσίον] gold 534.62 twice
χωρισμός] separation (of intellect) 271.8
- ὠμότης**] savagery (more intense than anger) 438.10
ὠφέλιμος] useful, beneficial 501.7

Latin

- absurde**] absurdly (stated by Theophrastus) 514.9
absurdum] absurd (of an assertion) 439.3
activus] active (capacity) 439.2
adfectio] emotion; pl. (stimulates song) 719B.4
adulter] adulterer, pl. 486.36
- adversus**] adverse; pl. (res) adverse circumstances, misfortune(s) 498.8, 505.2
aemulari] (in a bad sense) to be envious 484.2
aemulatio] (in a bad sense) envy 484.4
aequabilitas] equable state (of mind) 447.24, 25, 39

- aequivocatio**] equivocity, ambiguity 447.27
- aequivocus**] equivocal (words) 447.16; adv. 447.20
- affectus**] emotion, passion 446.5, 8
- alacritas**] (excessive) eagerness 506.1
- amare**] to love (a woman) 486.46, (of dolphins toward boys) 568B.6
- amasius**] loving; pl. (of dolphins) 568B.1
- amicitia**] friendship 534.34, 543.4; (in a title) 436 no. 23b, 532.1, 534.19, 546.1, 3, 8
- amicus**] friend; (in the context of marriage) 486.19, 75; (not lacking to the educated person) 491.6; (assume the debts of) 514.6; (assisting contrary the law) 534 passim; (in sayings) 546.3 twice, 4 twice, 5, 6, 7 twice, 8, 9
- amor**] love (of another woman) 486.20; affection (of friendship) 543.4; pl. (of dolphins toward boys) 568B.5
- ample**] abundantly, splendidly (of Theophrastus on happiness and fortune) 493.4
- angere**] to press tight; pass. to be distressed 505.4
- anima**] soul; (in an analogy concerning friendship) 546.2; pl. (moved by music) 721B.5
- animus**] soul (in which occur passions/disturbances) 447.7, 33 twice, 44, 47; (of the wise man) 448.2; mind/thoughts (free) 486.64
- appetitus**] desire (for riches and glory) 468.4
- arbitrium**] judgment; (free choice) 439.1, 7
- auctoritas**] authority (of the master in relation to a slave) 486.53, (of the apostle) 486.4
- aureolus**] golden (of a book) 486.17
- avis**] (rare) bird 486.61
- beatitudo**] happiness 447.49, 59, 480B.6
- beatus**] happy, blessed 447.38, 53, 484.3, 492.9, 493.11, 495.2, 6, 494.8, 499.8; **beata vita** 475.3, 480B.6, 492.2, 493.10, 12, 495.4, 497.7, 498.5, 11; superl. **beatissima** 492.3; (in a title) 436 no. 12b, 496.1, 498.9; the word "beatus" 499.9; **beate**] (to live) happily 497.5
- beneficium**] good deed, favor; pl. 486.56
- beneficus**] beneficent (desire) 447.55
- blandus**] flattering charming (friend) 546.5
- bonus**] good (man, pl. men) 446.6, 486.63, 493.16; (friend) 546.6; (wife) 486.60; neut. sing. (unique and single) 497.9; (great) 500.8; (highest) 480A.4, 480B.3, 498.1; neut. pl. 497.8, 500.7; (three kinds) 493.8; (bodily and external) goods 480B.7; **melior**] comp. (man) 446.7
- caelestis**] celestial 484.10
- caput**] head; capital punishment 534.32, 35
- caritas**] affection 532.2
- carmen**] song (stimulated by emotion) 719B.3, 6
- castitas**] chastity (of the pagans) 486.6, 44
- casus**] falling down; event, accident, pl. (of fortune) 491.8
- circumstantia**] circumstance 534.73
- civis**] citizen 491.7
- coagulum**] that which causes to thicken or bond (of fidelity in regard to friendship) 546.8
- cogitatio**] thought 486.65
- cognitio**] acquiring knowledge, examination 482.2, 484.12
- cognoscere**] to acquire knowledge 484.10

- commentarium]** commentary, pl. 498.3
- commotio]** commotion (of the soul) 447 passim
- complere]** to fill up; pass. (in regard to happiness) 480B.6
- conquestio]** complaint, pl. 486.16
- consentaneus]** neut.sing. according to reason 493.22
- consilium]** deliberation; deliberate judgment (opposed to fortune) 493.22; (opposed by bodily passion) 448.3
- constanter]** consistently (of an argument) 493.5, comp. 493.21
- constantia]** equable state (of the soul/mind) 447 passim
- constare]** to stand with; (sibi) to be consistent 492.7
- contemplari]** to contemplate 484.6–7
- contemplatio]** contemplation 482.2
- continentia]** moral strength 439.5
- continens]** of moral strength 439.6
- controversia]** controversy (between Theophrastus and Dicaearchus) 481.1
- corporalis]** bodily (passion) 448.2
- copiose]** copiously, at length 499.5, (of Theophrastus on virtue and happiness) 492.6–7
- corpus]** body 484.1, 3, 493.23; gen. or in + abl. bodily (goods) 480B.6, 493.21, (evils) 492.8, 493.15, (torture) 495.4; (outside the) body 493.22; (in an analogy concerning friendship) 546.2
- cruciare]** to torture 493.11
- cruciatus]** torture 493.2, 495.4
- cupiditas]** desire 484.2, 4; (to live happily) 475.3; (of seeing the truth, of knowledge) 484.8, 11, 13
- decorus]** fitting (homes open to illustrious guests) 515.2
- definitio]** definition (of equable state) 447.15 twice, (of terrestrial dog) 447.27, (of quadripartite disturbance) 447.29, (of obscuration) 447.41, (of equability of mind) 447.42
- deformis]** misshapen, ugly (wife) 486.25, 47
- delphinus]** dolphin: sing and pl. (loved a boy) 586A.3, B1.5
- delicatus]** delicate; comp. (of Theophrastus' view concerning virtue and happiness) 498.11
- deplorare]** to deplore 505.3
- despicere]** to disdain (the accidents of fortune) 491.8
- deus]** god 486.66; pl. 482.2; (of Zeno) 492.3
- dignus]** worthy; superl. (of the wise man) 482.3
- diserte]** eloquently, (of Theophrastus on virtue and happiness) 492.6
- dispensatio]** management (of the household) 486.51
- dissimulare]** to feign (of an enemy) 527B.4
- dives]** rich (husband) 486.9, (wife) 486.23
- divitia]** wealth; pl. (object of desire) 468.4; (makes possible large outlays) 514.11; in a title 436 no. 19b, 514.9
- docere]** to teach; perf. pass. partic. educated 491.4, 5, superl 486.20
- doctrina]** teaching; pl. education 491.8
- dolere]** to suffer pain 527A.4; to be grieved 505.1, 2
- dolor]** pain 495.3, 527A.3; pl. (bodily) 493.14, 499.2, 7
- domina]** mistress 486.31, (in control of a household) 486.54
- dominus]** master (in relation to a slave) 486.53
- domus]** house (managed by a wife) 486.37, 51; locat. 486.72
- dulcis]** sweet, pleasant (of what a friend says) 546.6

- elate]** in a lofty manner (of Theophrastus on happiness and fortune) 493.4
- electio]** choice (of a wife) 486.24
- elegans]** elegant; superl. (of Theophrastus' style) 493.7
- eligere]** to choose (friends as heirs) 486.76
- eloquens]** eloquent; pl. (of certain Peripatetics) 499.5
- eruditus]** learned; superl. (of Theophrastus) 493.7
- ethicus]** ethical (of philosophers) 439.3; (of philosophy) 439.10; (in a title) 439.5
- eventus]** (unfortunate) outcome 506.2
- enthusiasmos]** Gk. ἐνθουσιασμός, inspiration (induced by song, divine madness) 719B.8
- exemplum]** example; pl. (of liberality) 514.12; (the certain evidence of) 534.42
- exhibere]** to hold out, exhibit; grant (to a friend) 546.7, pass. 546.8
- expostulatio]** complaint; pl. (mutual) 543.1
- externus]** neut. pl. external (goods) 480B.7; fem pl. (of things or matters) 493.23
- facetiae]** witticisms 486.49
- facultas]** capacity (for large gifts) 514.11
- falsus]** false (opinion as a cause of emotion) 447.6, 9
- fama]** reputation 534.32, 35, 48
- fames]** hunger 447.5, 49
- familiaris]** member of a household; pl. 491.6
- felicitas]** good luck 491.8
- fidelis]** faithful (slave) 486.52
- fides]** faith, trust (in a wife) 486.38; fidelity (of a friend) 546.8
- filius]** son (not taking his father's name straightway) 486.70
- finis]** pl. limits (to helping friends) 534.28
- foedus]** ugly (of a wife) 486.45
- formosus]** shapely, good looking (wife) 486.48
- fortuna]** fortune 493.15, 19, 22, 23, 495.3, 498.10, 505.5; gen. (difficulties and evils of fortune) 491.1, 7, 492.8, 493.15; abl. sing. by (any) chance 534.31
- fortunatus]** fortunate (friend) 546.4
- fructus]** fruit (of riches) 514.11, (of liberality) 514.12
- garrulus]** garrulous (complaints) 486.16
- gratia]** favor 515.7; friendship 543.1
- genus]** kind; (of generosity) 515.4; (different in) 534.50; general nature (of a matter or issue) 534.26; pl. (four kinds of mental disturbance) 447.18, (three kinds of goods) 493.8; (two kinds of books) 498.1; (two kinds of lavish givers) 514.1; (opposed to individual cases) 534.42, 52
- gloria]** glory (object of desire) 468.4
- hereditas]** heirship, inheritance 486.57, 77
- heres]** heir, pl. 486.69, 75
- homo]** man, person; (in an analogy concerning friendship) 546.3
- honestas]** moral rectitude 480B.5; honor 534.46, 47, 50, 54 twice, 55
- honeste]** honorably (having great power) 515.5
- honestus]** noble; honorable 500.6; (in contrast to the advantage of a friend) 534.57; (parents) 486.9; (in Zeno's doctrine) 497.8
- honore]** to honor, respect; pass. (a woman) 486.17; gerundive (a wife's nurse) 486.33
- hortari]** to urge (men to be educated) 491.4
- hospes]** guest 515.3, 6

- hospitalis]** hospitable (of Cimon) 515.8
hospitalitas] hospitality (praised) 515.1
humilis] insignificant (enemy) 527B.2
- iacere]** to lie fallen (of virtue) 492.11; has collapsed (of Peripatetic doctrine) 496.9
illustris] illustrious; pl. (persons/guests) 515.3 twice
imbecillus] weak; (virtue) 497.4; neut. comp. as adv. (respond to pain) 499.2
immortalis] immortal; pl. (friendships) 546.2
impetus] stimulus (to song provided by emotion) 719B.3
incendere] to set on fire; perf. pass. partic. (with a desire for happiness) 475.3, (for knowledge) 484.13
infamia] bad repute 534.44
infortunatus] unfortunate (friend) 546.5
ingenium] natural capacity; intelligence 486.49
ingenuitas] uprightness, (of Theophrastus) 497.2
inimicus] enemy 546.4, 9, 527A.1 twice, 3, 527B.1 twice, 2, 4, 4–5
iniquus] unjust (desire) 436.36
iniuria] injustice, wrong 486.42
inpudicus] immodest, unvirtuous (of a wife) 486.43
invidere] to feel envy 505.1
invidia] envy; ill-will 446.2
iocus] joke (offensive) 546.7
ira] anger (induced by song) 719B.8
iracundus] irascible; comp. 446.7
irasci] to be angered (on account of wrongs to one's own) 446.1, 4; (by evils) 446.7; (of a friend) 546.7
iudicium] judgment, discretion 486.76
iurgium] quarrel; pl. 486.39
- ius]** justice 534.7, 13
iustitia] justice 534.66
iustus] just (passion) 446.5; pl. (desires) 534.31
- lacrima]** tear, pl. 486.57
laedere] to hurt; offend (a friend) 546.7, pass. partic. (a friend) 546.6
languere] to be weak, sick 486.58, 59
languidus] weak, faint; neut. comp. more fainthearted (what Theophrastus says about fortune) 493.20
languor] weakness, sickness 486.51
largus] abundant; pl. persons who make large gifts 514.1
laudabilis] praiseworthy (of an equable state of mind) 477.58; (for its own sake) 500.7
laudare] to praise (knowledge) 480B.4; pass. (knowledge) 480A.3, B.2; (a great good) 500.9; (hospitality) 515.1; gerundive (a wife's beauty) 486.30, (splendid service) 514.10
lex] law 534.7
liber] free (choice) 439.1, 7; (mind) 486.64
liber] child, pl. 486.67
liberalis] generous; pl. one of two kinds of people who make large gifts 514.2, 5
liberalitas] generosity 486.49, 514.12, 515.4
libido] lust 486.35
limatius] more refined (style of writing) 498.2
loquax] talkative (enemy) 527B.3
- magnificentia]** magnificence 514.10
maleficus] pernicious (desire) 447.6, 9
malus] bad; neut. pl. evils 446.7, 492.8, 493.14, 15, 16, 495.6, 496.3, 4, 8, 499.9; adv. (of living) 493.3

- matrimonium**] marriage 486.10
mediocris] moderate (passion) 447.51
mens] mind 447 passim, 484.15
misereri] to feel pity 505.1
mollis] soft; comp. (of Theophrastus' view concerning virtue and happiness) 498.12
moratus] mannered, of morals 486.9
mores] modes of conduct, morals 486.73, 500.2; (in a title) 498.14
mori] to die (son before the father) 486.73, (father too slowly) 486.74
mos] custom 534.13; pl. 500.2; morals, character 486.73; (in a title) 498.14
motus] motion (of the body) 721B.3; of the soul 721B.4
musica] music (consists in voice et al.) 721B.2
- natura**] nature; abl. by nature (endowed) 484.7
naturalis] natural; pl. (hunger and thirst) 447.5
necessarius] necessary; neut. pl. things necessary (for a man) 492.5
nocere] to harm 527A.2, 3, 527B.5
nomen] name; (proper noun) 486.67, 70, 72; common noun 447.20, 63, 65; pl. 486.35; abl. sing. in terminology 447.57
nuptiae] marriage 486, 11, 26; (in a title) 486.7
- obscuratio**] obscuratio (of the mind) 447 passim
occidere] to kill; pass. (for a friend) 546.9
oculus] eye; pl. (indicate emotion) 447.11
odium] hate 446.8, 486.20, 39; pl. 527B.3
offendere] to do harm 527B.4
opinio] opinion; (false, in relation to emotion) 447.6, 9
- ops**] power; resources; pl. 515.6
oratio] speech; conversation (with friends) 546.3
ornare] to embellish; (of riches and glory) 468.5
os] mouth (indicates emotion) 447.11
- particula**] small part; pl. (of the Academic-Peripatetic ethical system) 480A.1
passio] passion (of the mind or soul) 447.22, 44, 47-48; (vile) 439.6; (bodily) 448.2, 3; pl. (resisted by the man of moral strength) 439.7; (psychic opposed to physical) 439.8-9
passivus] passive (capacity) 439.2
pater] father 486.71
patientia] patience (in exacting revenge) 527A.4
pauper] poor (wife) 486.23
peccare] to sin
pecunia] money 491.4, pl. 514.3
peregrinus] stranger 491.5-6
per se] for its/their own sake; (to be sought) 500.6, (praiseworthy) 500.7
perturbatio] disturbance (of the mind) 447 passim
philosophia] philosophy; (of fathers and grandfathers) 484.12; (its practitioners) 534.9; (of Theophrastus) 534.16; (bringing about happiness) 475.2; (hindered by marriage) 486.12; (what ought to be considered) 498.6
philosophus] philosopher; (any other than Theophrastus) 493.20, (Favorinus) 534.65; pl. (ethical) 439.4; (other than Theophrastus) 493.7, 18
placidus] calm; comp. 446.8
popularis] public (spectacles) 514.10-11
populariter] (written) in a popular manner 498.2

- potentia**] capacity 439.2; power (object of desire) 468.2
- praeceptum**] precept 534.81
- praeclare**] excellently (stated by Theophrastus) 514.9
- praedicare**] to predicate (correctly, universally, appropriately) 447.21, 25, 61, 62, 66
- princeps**] leader (of the Peripatetics) 447.3
- probitas**] integrity, (of Theophrastus) 497.2
- prodigus**] prodigal; pl. one of two kinds of people who make large gifts 514.1, 2
- pudicitia**] modesty 486.5–6, 41
- pudicus**] modest, virtuous (of a wife) 486.43, 44
- puer**] boy (loved by a dolphin) 586A.1, B.6
- pulcher**] beautiful (wife) 486.8, 45
- pulchritudo**] beauty 486.30, 484.11
- quadripartitus**] quadripartite (mental disturbance) 447.20–21, 29
- quiescere**] to remain quiet; to be at leisure 481.7
- quietus**] quiet (life) 482.1
- rarus**] rare (bird) 486.61, (friendship) 532.2; **raro**] rarely (in a marriage) 486.10
- requiescere**] to be at leisure 481.6
- rota**] wheel (for torture) 493.11
- sapiens**] wise 448.1, 482.3, 486.8, 11, 62 492.9, 495.1, 498.7
- sapientia**] wisdom 448.3, 493.19, 498.11, 534.6
- schola**] leisure; pl lectures 493.18
- scientia**] knowledge 480A.3, 480B.1, 2
- secundus**] second; pl. (res) favorable circumstances, prosperity 505.2, 6
- senectus**] old age 486.68, 72
- sententia**] thought, idea, opinion 447.55, 66–67, 4, 480.2, 491.3, 541.2; expressed in words, saying (concerning fortune) 493.19; pl. (on friendship) 546.1
- servus**] slave 486.33, 52
- signum**] sign; pl. (facial indicating emotion) 447.11
- similis**] similar; superl. (to the life of the gods) 482.3
- sitis**] thirst 447.5, 49
- solitudo**] loneliness; (escape from) 486.52
- solus**] alone (the wise man) 486.62, 66 twice
- studium**] pl. studies that make up a contemplative life 481.8
- sua sponte**] (praised) on its own 500.9
- suavis**] pleasant (wife) 486.60, (the speech of Theophrastus) 497.1
- summus**] highest; neut. sing. the highest (good) 480A.4, 480B.3
- taciturnus**] silent (enemy) 527B.4
- tempus**] time; pl. (variations affect what one ought to do) 534.73, 79
- timere**] to fear (in regard to friendship) 546.4
- timor**] fear 491.7
- torquere**] to whirl around; to put to the rack; pass. 493.10
- tranquillitas**] tranquility (of mind) 477.57
- tres**] three (kinds of goods) 493.8
- tripertitus**] threefold (power of song) 719B.7
- tristis**] sad; pl. unfortunate (consequences) 506.2
- turbidus**] turbid (commotion in the soul) 447.9
- turpis**] shameful, vile; (of passion) 439.6; **turpiter**] (the peacock bares its rear-end) 468.4
- turpitude**] disgrace 534.33, 44

- ultio**] revenge 572A.3
utilis] advantageous (resources and influence) 515.5, (for a friend) 534.56, (for reconciliation) 543.2
utilitas] advantage of a friend 534.3, 45, 48, 50, 55
uxor] wife 486.8, 13, 24, 28, 43, 52, 54, 61, 67
venerius] amorous; pl. (of dolphins) 568B.1
venia] forgiveness 534.34
verbum] word; pl. (unambiguous) 447.16, (use of) 447.64; (in a demonstration) 447.45; (taken from Theophrastus' book) 543.3; **ad verbum**] literally 541.3
vernacula] female slave, pl. 486.56
verus] true (opinion) 447.55, 66; neut. sing. truth, reality 484.8
vindicta] revenge 527A.1, 527B.1
vir] man; husband 486.55
virtus] virtue 447.50, 52, 497.4, 498.12, 498.16; (fundamental to happiness) 480B.5, 499.4; (Antiochus) 492.4, 10; (Zeno of Citium) 492.1, 3, 5, 10, 497.6, 7; (Aristo of Chios) 500.13; power (tripartite, of song) 719B.7
vita] life 493.19; (happy) 475.3, 480B.5, 493.9, 495.4, 497.7; (in a title) 436 no. 12b; (quiet) 482.1; (most similar to that of the gods) 482.3; (desirous of power) 468.1; (unstable, infirm) 491.10
vitium] vice 447.50, 51; (Aristo of Chios) 500.15; generally defects 486.26
vivere] to live, (happily) 497.5, (with an enemy) 546.9
voluntarius] voluntary (of passion) 447.49, 54
voluntas] will 447.52; wish; (of a husband) 486.55; (just and unjust: of friends) 534.30, 31, 36, 38; (beneficent desire) 447.56; (pernicious desire not essential to emotion) 447.6, 10
voluptas] pleasure (induced by song) 719B.8
vox] voice (in which music consists) 721B.2, 3
vultus] countenance (where signs of emotion appear) 447.11

Italian

- buono**] good 455.1
corrompere] to corrupt 455.1
costume] custom; pl. (good) morals 455.1

Arabic

- ʿdb**
addaba] to educate 466B.6
adab] education; in a title 436 no. 9b; 457.2
adīb] educated man 454
ʿṣl
aṣālatu (l-raʿy)] soundness (of judgment) 457.3

- bdr**
bādara] to do something without delay 458.2
brr
birr] piety 456.2
barr] pious 456.2
bṭr
abṭara] to make haughty and insolent 458.1

- scipidezza**] insipidity; pl. tastelessness (of bad story telling) 455.1

blġ

balġ] eloquent man 456.1

balāġa] eloquence 457.2

ġhd

ġahd] distress 456.2

ġhl

ġāhil] ignorant man 485.3

ġwd

ġūd] generosity 457.2

ġwhr

ġawhar] substance 520.2

ħsb

ħisba] consideration (of reward in the afterlife) 457.2

ħsn

ħasan] good 508

maħāsin, *pl. of* maħsana] good qualities (of character) 454**ħfz**

ħafīza] to memorize 466B.7

ħqq

ħaqq] rectitude 456.2

ħkm

ħikma] philosophy 485.2; 509.1

ħll

ħalla] to solve (problems) 466B.8

ħlqaħlāq, *pl. of* ħulq] moral character, natural disposition; ethics 466A.1–2

aħlāqī] of ethics, belonging to ethics 466B.2

ħyr

al-ħayr] the good 520.1

al-ħayrāt] the good things 442.2

dbr

tadbīr] management 457.1; 466B.7

tadabbara] to manage oneself, one's own affairs 466B.7

dry

dārā] to deal with gently 459

dwrdawā'ir, *pl. of* dā'ira] calamities 458.2**r'y**

ra'y] judgment 457.3; view, opinion 466B.8

rħw

raħā'] comfort 456.2–3

rwd

rāda] to train 466b.3

irtāda] to train oneself, to be trained 466B.6

zmn

zamān] time 459

skn

istakana] to become abject and humble 458.1

sltn

sulṭān] rule (reign) 457.1

sw'masāwi', *pl. of* masā'a] bad qualities (of character) 454**šbb**

šabība] youth 458.2

šrr

šarr] evil 520.1

al-ašrār, *pl. of* šarr] evil people 545.1**škk**šakk, *pl. of* šukūk] aporia 466B.8**šhw**

šahwa] desire 442.1

šdq

šādaqa] to become friends with someone 544.1

šidq] truth 456.1; 457.2

šadīq, *pl. of* ašdiqā'] friend 537.1–2**šr'**

šara'a] to throw down 528.1–2

širā'ī] wrestling 474.1; 528.1

mušāri'ī] wrestler 528.1

šlh

išlāh] improvement, amelioration 466A.1–2

šwbmašā'ib, *pl. of* mušība] misfortunes

ḍbṭ

ḍabt] control (of anger) 442.1

ṭbb

ṭabīb] doctor, physician 528.1

‘dl

‘adl] justice 457.1

‘dw‘ādā] to be enemies with, contract
the enmity of someone 544.1**‘ḍr**

a‘ḍar] more excusing 456.2

‘rḍ

‘araḍ] accident 520.2

‘ql

‘āqil] intelligent man 459

‘lm

‘allama] to teach 474.1–1

‘ālim] one who has learned, learned
485.3

mu‘allim] teacher 474.1

‘ilm] knowledge 485.4; 537.1

‘ālam] world 485.1

‘wd

‘awwada] to accustom 466B.3, 7

‘ādāt, *pl. of* ‘āda] habit, -s 466B.3, 7**ġbṭ**iġtabaṭa] to feel (self-)satisfaction
457.1**ġḍb**

ġaḍab] anger 442.1

ġny

ġaniya] to be rich 509.2

ġinan] wealth 457.1; 458.1; 508;

509.1–3

ġaniy] rich 456.2; 485.4–5

fḍl

faḍl] virtue 456.3

fāḍil] virtuous 466B.3; excellent
485.2**fīl**

fīl] deed, act 520.1–2

fqr

faqīr] poor 485.4

falsafa] philosophy 466B.4, 6

faylasūf] philosopher 466B.6

fwq

fāqa] indigence 458.1

qwl

qawl] talk 520.2

ktb

kitāba] handwriting 474.1–2

kḍb

kiḍb] lie 456.1

kḥ

mukāfa’a] recompense 520.1

kml

al-kāmil] the perfect man 458.1

mwłmāl] possessions, property 509.1;
537.1**nṭq**

mantīq] speech 457.2

ysr

mūsir] prosperous, rich 537.1

2. *Titles of Books**Theophrastean Greek*

ἄλλο διάφορον (Περὶ παίδων
ἀγωγῆς)] 1.282, 436 no. 11

ἄλλο Περὶ ἔρωτος] 1.98, 436
no. 30a

Ἀρετῶν διαφοραί] 1.84, 436 no. 7

Ἐρωτικός] 1.97, 436 no. 29, 559.1,
561.2, 567A.2

Ἠθικά] 436 no. 2a, 463.5, 555.7,
529A.6, B.4

Ἠθικαὶ σχολαί] 1.200, 436 no. 3

Ἠθικοὶ χαρακτῆρες] 1.201, 436
no. 4a

Καλλισθένης ἢ περὶ πένθους]
1.123, 436 no. 15a–b, 504.9

Μεγαρικός] 1.129, 436 no. 20,
511.2

Ὅμηλικός] 1.219, 436 no. 32

Περὶ τῶν ἀδικημάτων] 1.188, 666
no. 10

Περὶ ἀρετῆς] 1.180, 436 no. 8

Περὶ βίων] 1.87, 436 no. 16

Περὶ γήρως] 1.88, 436 no. 18

Περὶ ἔκουσίου] 1.106, 436 no. 6

Περὶ ἐνθουσιασμῶν] 726A.1–2

Περὶ ἔρωτος] 436 no. 30b, 560.2;
see ἄλλο above

Περὶ εὐδαιμονίας] 1.99, 436
no. 12a, 489.2, 494A.1, 552B.8

Περὶ εὐτυχίας] 1.197, 436 no. 14

Περὶ ἡδονῆς] 436 no. 27b, 549.1,
551.3, by either Theophrastus or
Chamaeleon 550.5, 553.2

Περὶ ἡδονῆς ἄλλο] 1.117, 436
no. 27a

Περὶ ἡδονῆς ὡς Ἀριστοτέλης]
1.116, 436 no. 26

Περὶ ἡθῶν] 436 no. 1, 437.3; 516.1–
2, 529A.6, B.3

Περὶ κινήσεως] 1.125, 137 no. 2,
271.2

Περὶ κολακείας] 1. 206, 436 no. 25,
547.1

Περὶ μέθης] 1.135, 436 no. 31,
569.3, 570.2, 572.1, 573.1, 574.1,
575.1, 576.5

Περὶ παθῶν] 1.155, 436 no. 5, 438.7

Περὶ παιδείας ἢ περὶ ἀρετῶν ἢ
περὶ σωφροσύνης] 1.283, 436
no. 9a

Περὶ παίδων ἀγωγῆς] 1.281, 436
no. 10; see ἄλλο διάφορον above

Περὶ πλούτου] 1.222, 436 no. 19a,
516.3

Περὶ σωφροσύνης] 436 no. 9c

Περὶ τῆς θείας εὐδαιμονίας πρὸς
τοὺς ἐξ Ἀκαδημείας] 1.261, 436
no. 13

Περὶ τιμορίας] 1.160, 436 no. 22

Περὶ φιλίας] 1.165, 436 no. 23a

Περὶ φιλοτιμίας] 1.166, 436 no. 21

Περὶ χάριτος] 1.240, 436 no. 24

Περὶ ψευδοῦς ἡδονῆς] 1.175, 436
no. 28

Προβλήματα πολιτικά, φυσικά,
ἐρωτικά, ἡθικά] 1.224, 727 no. 4

Πρὸς τοὺς καιρούς] 589 no. 4b,
625.1, 626.2

Προτρεπτικός] 1.262, 284, 436
no. 33

Χαρακτῆρες] 436 no. 4c

Χαρακτῆρες ἡθικοί] 1.241, 436
no. 4a

Χαρακτῆρες περὶ ιδιωμάτων] 436
no. 4b

Latin

aureolus liber De nuptiis] 436
no. 17a & b, 486.7
Callisthenes] 436 no. 15c, 493.18
De amicitia] 436. no. 23b, 532.1
534.19
De beata vita] 436 no. 12b, 496.1,
498.9; see also 493.9–10

De divitiis] 436.19b, 514.9
Moralia] 436 no. 2b, 468.6
De nuptiis] 436 no. 17c, see
aureolus liber above
liber Commentorum] 727 no. 9a,
448.1

Arabic

Kitāb al-adab] 3A.6, 3B.8, 436 no. 9b

Non-Theophrastean Greek

Ἀπομνημονεύματα] by Xenophon
437.8

Ἐπιστολαί] by Hieronymus of
Rhodes 578.2

Ἑρωτικά] by Clearchus 567A.2

Ἡθικά Νικομάχεια] by Aristotle
437.4

Μελαμποδία] by Hesiod 562.1

Ναξιακά] by Andriscus 626.1

Περὶ εἰμαρμένης] by Polyzelus
504.10

Περὶ ἡδονῆς] by either Chamaeleon
or Theophrastus 550.5, 553.2

Περὶ μέθης] by Hieronymus of

Rhodes 576.11

Περὶ τοῦ λυγίνου στεφάνου] by
Hephaestion 437.9

Περὶ τοῦ παρὰ Χενοφῶντι ἐν
τοῖς Ἀπομνημονεύμασιν
Ἀντιφῶντος] by Hephaestion
437.8

Περὶ τῶν παρὰ Θεοφράστῳ ἐν τοῖς
Περὶ ἡδῶν κατ' ἱστορίαν καὶ
λέξιν ζητουμένων 'καὶ περὶ τῶν
ἐν τοῖς Ἡθικοῖς Νικομαχείοις
Ἀριστοτέλους] by Adrastus
437.2–5

Ὑψιπύλη] by Euripides 490.7

Φυσικά προβλήματα] by Aristotle
578.2

Latin

De amicitia] by Cicero 534.19

Ethica Nicomachica (*sic.*)] by Aristotle 439.5

3. *Gods, Persons, Groups of People,
Places and Festivals Named or Referred to*
(by "the same," or a pronoun or a third person ending, etc.)
in Greek, Latin or Arabic Texts

- Academy]** (those from the) Academy, in a title 1.261, 436 no. 13; (Old) 500.9
- Achaea]** region in which Aegium is located 567B.1
- Achilles]** in a painting, competing for his arms 552A.5
- Adrastus]** Peripatetic philosopher, whose work Hephaestion is said to have plagiarized 437.2; *possibly* cited regarding the beginning of studies 466A.1
- Aegium]** where a goose fell in love with a boy 567A.1, 567B.1, 3
- Agariste]** the daughter of Cleisthenes] 550.2
- Agathos Daimôn** (Good Daemon)] 572.2
- Agasilas]** no one calls his life pleasant 551.4
- Ajax]** subject of a painting 552A.5, B.1, 3
- Alexander the Great]** could not handle prosperity 505.3–4; lacking sexual drive 578.4, 8
- Amasis]** the Elian, who was clever in matters of love 561.1
- Amphilochus]** from Olenus, with whom a goose fell in love 567A.2, B.2
- Ananis]** obscure in reputation 551.5
- Anaxagoras]** animals are always experiencing distress 555.4, 7
- Andriscus]** wrote a history of the Naxians 626.1
- Antiochus]** 492.2
- Antiphon]** tragic poet about whom Adrastus, Hephaestion and Xenophon wrote 437.5, 7, 8
- Apion]** historian, who recorded the amorous behavior of dolphins 568B.3
- Apollo]** 576.7, 8
- Argive]** of Argos, whence the dancer and flatterer Myrtus hailed 547.1
- Aristides]** no one calls his life pleasant 551.1
- Aristo of Chios]** 500.13
- Aristotle]** 483.4; father of Nicomachus 498.13; said to be the author of the *Nicomachen Ethics* 498.14; teacher of Theophrastus 588.4; head of the Peripatetics before Theophrastus 447.3; teacher of Hieronymus of Rhodes 576.10; mentions the name of fate 504.7; on watery semen 578.2
- named together with Theophrastus regarding the divisions of philosophy 479.1; praising knowledge 480A.2, 480B.1; on happiness 480B.4, 482.1, 4 (referred to), 498.5, 8 (referred to); on virtue being lovable 462.7; on virtue and fortune 490.1; regarding what is good 500.10; regarding nature and what accords with nature 501.3; regarding fate 502.2; on misfortunes and unjust acts 530.5; referred to together with Anaxagoras regarding continuous pain 555.2, 6; on qualified pleasures 556.7; mentioned together in the title of a work by Adrastus 437.4–5; mentioned in regard to the Theophrastean title *On Pleasure* 1.116, 436 no. 26

- Aristoxenus]** Peripatetic, known as “the musician” who used the aulos to restore a man 726A.6; music consists in voice and bodily movement 721B.3
- Artemis]** goddess by whom Diognetus swears 626.14
- Athenians]** 512B.5, 576.7
- Athens]** 515.7, 576.6
- Atticus, Titus Pomponius]** 481.7
- Babylon]** visited by Democritus 513.4
- Caesar Augustus]** in whose time dolphins were seen to be passionate about boys 568B.2–3
- Callias]** expl. of an individual human being 504.4; richest of the Athenians 512B.4
- Callisthenes]** his death 505.3, 4; named in a title 436 no. 15, 493.18, 504.9
- Callixeina]** a Thessalian courtesan 578.5
- Canidius]** on Cyprus with Cato the Younger 542.2, 7, 10
- Cato]** the Younger, about whom Munatius Rufus wrote 542.1, 6
- Chaeremon]** the tragedian: wine and love compared 559.1
- Chalcis]** in Euboea, where the women are beautiful 562.1
- Chaldaeans]** visited by Democritus 513.3
- Chamaeleon of Pontus]** named together with Theophrastus concerning the authorship of *On Pleasure* 549.5, 553.2
- Chilo]** a Spartan and one of the seven sages, who decided to help a friend in a capital case contrary to what is right 534.1, 6
- Chios]** where a ram and a goose fell in love with Glauca 567B.4, C.1
- Cicero]** Marcus Tullius Cicero cited in regard to his work *On Friendship* 534.4, 29, 27, 40, 543.4; Tully rendered the words of Theophrastus more according to sense 541.3
- Cimon]** the Athenian practices hospitality 515.7
- Cleisthenes]** father of Agariste 550.2
- Cleonymus]** dancer and flatterer 547.2
- Cyrene]** see **Theomander**
- Damasippus]** father of Democritus of Abdera 513.5
- Delian]** Apollo 576.7, 626.6
- Delphi]** 483.1
- Democritus]** of Abdera, opposed to Theophrastus regarding the relation of body to soul 440A.2, B.7, anecdote concerning his travels 513.1, 7
- Dicaearchus]** controversy with Theophrastus 481.2, 5
- Diogenes]** of Sinope 511.1
- Diognetus]** leader of the Erythreans 626 passim
- Dionysius]** Sicilian tyrant flattered by his comrades 548.2
- Dionysius-flatterers]** comrades of the tyrant 548.4
- Dionysus]** in relation to the Nymphs 573.1
- Elia]** from Elis: of Amasis, who was clever in matters of love 561.1; pl. of the people who held a male beauty contest 563.1
- Epaminondas]** of Thebes opposed to the wealthy Ismenias 512B.6
- Erillus]** on the highest good 480A.3, 480B.1
- Euboea]** at Chalcis the women are beautiful 562.1
- Eudemus]** named together with Theophrastus concerning friendship involving superiority 533.3

Euripides] on fortune 490.7; on men and animals 531.26; poured wine 576.5; on love 559.4

Euxynthetus] of Leben, lover of Leucocomas 560.1, 3

Favorinus] of Arles (his definition of favor) 534.65

Glauca] an attractive musician with whom a ram and a goose fell in love 567B.4, C.1

Graces] 559.6

Greeks] cited for a kind of torture 493.12; how they drank wine 571.2; related to one another 531.9; Greek (friends) addressed in Athenaeus 550.1; how Greeks use the words *πάθη* and *ἐνθουσιασμός* 719B.4, 9

Hegesidemus] historian who wrote about a dolphin at Iasus 568A.1

Hephaestion] accused of plagiarizing the work of Adrastus 437.1

Heraclitus] 483.2

Hermias] a boy who died riding a dolphin 568A.2

Hesiod] author of *Melampodia* 562.1

Hieronymus] of Rhodes 576.10, 578.3

Hippocrates] cited regarding the beginning of studies 466A.3

Hypsicleon] of Miletus, cuckold husband of Neaera 625.2, 6, 13, 14, 15, 17

Hypsipyle] of Lemnos, named in a title 490.7

Iasus] in Caria, Asia Minor, where the boy Hermias lived 586A.1

Indians] their wise men visited by Democritus 513.4

Ionians] cited for excessive luxury 549.1; the women disregard an injunction to avoid alcohol 579A.8

Ismenias] the most well off of the Thebans 512B.5

Juno] protector of the peacock 468.1

Lacedaemonian] see **Spartan**

Laciad] a person belonging to the same district in Athens as Cimon 515.8, 9

Leben] whence Leucocomas and Euxynthetus hailed 560.1

Lesbos] (the people of) 664.4

Leucocomas] of Leben, beloved of Euxynthetus 560.1, 3

Locrian] of Zaleucus 579A.1; pl. the Western Locrians who received laws from Zaleucus 579A.2, B.1

Lucius Cicero] 475.1

Massalian] of a law that forbids the women of Massilia to have anything to do with wine 579A.6, B.3

Megarian] Megarian (dialogue) 511.2

Menelaus] like a merchant 513.8, his son 576.2, 3

Milesian] Hypsicreon 625.2; pl. people who had a law forbidding women to have anything to do with wine 579A.8, 9; fought against the Naxians 625–626 *passim*

Miletus] where the custom is that women drink water 579B.4, whence Hypsicreon hailed 625.3

Munatius] friend of Cato the Younger and author of a work about him 542.1

Myrtilus] 489.1

Myrtus] the Argive, who removed the flatterer Cleonymus 547.1

Naupactus] where dolphins were seen to be passionate about boys 568A.5, B.4

- Naxian]** Promedon 625.2; pl. 625–626 passim
- Naxos]** island from which Promedon hailed 625.12, 13
- Neaera]** wife of Hypsicreon 625.4, 7, 10, 13
- Nicomachean]** of Nicomachus; (in a title) 437.4
- Nicomachus]** son of Aristotle: possibly author of the *Nicomachean Ethics* 498.13
- Nicostratus]** raised difficulties concerning the difference between contraries and possession and privation 462.1
- Nymphs]** in relation to Dionysus 573.2
- Odysseus]** like a merchant 513.8; in a painting, competing for the arms of Achilles 552A.5
- Olenus]** in the Peloponnesus, whence the family of Amphilo-chus 567A.3, B.1. 2
- Olympias]** mother of Alexander the Great 578.5
- Parrhasius]** the painter is defeated in competition 552A.1, 7
- Pasiphae]** (emended text) whose oracle was consulted by Aristoxenus 726.7
- Pericles]** whose character was altered by the plague 463.1, 7
- Peripatetic]** philosophy 534.15–16; pl. led by Aristotle and after him by Theophrastus 477.3; they divided philosophy 479.1–2; on happiness 480B.5, 496.9; on pain and virtue 499.1
- Philip]** King of Macedonia and father of Alexander the Great 518.1, 578.7
- Phocylides]** elegiac and hexameter poet of Miletus 529A.7 twice, 8, B.4, 5
- Phoenician]** merchants 513.9
- Phyla]** 576.9
- Piso, Marcus]** 475.1
- Plato]** named together with Aristotle and Theophrastus regarding fate 502.2; opposed by Theophrastus regarding true and false pleasure 556.1; cited regarding the beginning of studies 466A.2, 466B.6
- Plexippus]** stage figure in Anitiphon 437.6
- Polemon]** head of the Academy 314–276 BC. 500.10, 501.4
- Polycles]** Naxian and brother of Polycrite 626.32
- Polycrite]** Naxian maiden 626 passim
- Polyzelus]** named together with Theophrastus regarding fate 504.9
- Praesus]** city on the island of Crete 560.4
- Promedon]** of Naxos 625.2, 3
- Ptolemy Philadelphus]** Glauca's contemporary 567C.2
- Puteoli]** in Campania, where dolphins were passionate about boys 568B.3
- Pythagoras]** 483.2
- Rhodian]** of the island of Rhodes; Hieronymus 576.10
- Samos]** where Parrhasius competed 552A.3, B.1
- Sardanapalus]** 551.2
- Simonides]** the lyric poet 516.1
- Smindyrides of Sybaris]** 550.1, 551.1
- Socrates]** example of an individual human being 504.3, opposed to the wealthy Callias 512B.6; music consists in voice alone 721B.2
- Solomon]** on deeds laid bare (*Ecclesiastes* 11.27) 468.7
- Sossius]** The dedicatee of Plutarch's *Table Talk*, who as an interlocutor refers to Theophrastus on the sources of music 719A.1.

Spartan] of the sage Chilo 534.1; pl.
their king Agesilaus 551.4
Speusippus] head of the Academy
347–339 BC. 500.10
Stoics] their doctrine of the
emotions 447.58
Sybaris] whence Smyndyrides hailed
550.1, 552.2
Taurus] Platonist who taught
Aulus Gellius in the mid-second
century AD 543.2
Telamon] father of Ajax 552A.8
Tenedos] the people of 564.4
Thargelia] festival of Apollo and
Artemis 576.9, celebrated by the
Milesians 626.23
Thebans] 512B.5
Thebes] where a man was driven
mad by the sound of the trumpet
726A.8
Theognis] elegiac poet of Megara
529A.1, 8. B.2, 5
Theomander of Cyrene] 489.1–
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Theophrastus] brilliant reputation
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EMOTION] difference in degree
438.7; bodily motions 271.2;
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B.1; music cures many
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VIRTUE AND VICE] the mean
relative to us 449A.1; extrava-
gance 449B.2–3; the tongue
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avoiding a babbler 452.1;
acceptable jokes 453.1; edu-
cated conversation 454.1;
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457.1; the perfect man 458.1;
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ical wisdom 461.1; virtue is
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462.6, 463.4; disturbed old
men 464.1

**EDUCATION, EXHORTATION
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721B.4; establish virtues
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470.1; intelligence through
study 471.1; handsome and
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irritated with oneself 473.1;
an incompetent teacher
474.1

HAPPINESS] his doctrine
475.2, 495.3, 496.1; difficult
to remain steadfast 476.1;
importance of education
491.3–4; the benefits of
philosophy 485.1; fortune
488.3, 493.1, 17; good
fortune 489.2; pessimistic
saying 477.1, 478.1; his use

- HAPPINESS] (*cont.*) of *kephalotomein* 494A.1, 494B.1
- MARRIAGE] wrote a work on marriage 486.7, 79
- FATE AND NATURE] the voluntary and fate 502.2; choice, the nature of the individual and fate 503.1, 504.8; Callisthenes in relation to Alexander 505.2–3; excessive eagerness 506.1
- WEALTH] *qua* tool 507.1, 508.1; of less value than philosophy 509.1; living economically 510.1, 511.1, 512A.2, B.4, 513.7; alleged praise of outlays for spectacles 514.8; on wealth and hospitality 515.1, 7; Simonides mentioned as fond of money 516.2
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- NATURAL RELATIONSHIP] all men are akin to each other and to animals 531.1; orders not to sacrifice living creatures 584A.93
- FRIENDSHIP] preferred to affection 532.1; superiority among friends 533.3; doing wrong to help a friend 534.4, 16, 20, 24, 39, 59, 69, 76; friends in common 535.1; wealth and friendship 536.1, 537.1; making friends 538A.1, B.3, C.1, D.1, E.1, F.1; the character of youth 539.1; tolerating mistakes 540.1; love is blind 541.3; excess in friendship 542.8; reconciliation 543.3; the family of an enemy 544.1; mutual benefit 545.1; sayings concerning friendship 546.1
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- WINE] relief in old age 569.3;
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- Xenocrates] head of the Academy
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- Xenophon] author of the *Memora-
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CHAPTER NINE

CORRIGENDA AND ADDENDA IN THE TEXT-TRANSLATION VOLUMES

The following corrections and additions are limited to 1) material printed in the section on “Ethics,” texts occurring elsewhere that are referred to within the section on “Ethics,” and 2) references in the indices that concern ethical material. All relate to the second of the text-translation volumes, and all need to be made in the volume dated 1992, i.e., the first printing, which is more widely distributed than the second printing of 1993. Corrections and additions that were made in response to the first printing and are incorporated into the second printing are signaled below by the use of smaller font.

1. *The “Ethics” Section and Texts Referred to from that Section*

439 page 266, at the beginning of the first line of the upper apparatus of parallel texts, change “6” to “5”

443 page 270, in the heading read “p. 717” instead of “p. 714”

444 page 270, line 3 fb in the apparatus of parallel texts, read: “*ps.-Maximi Confessoris*”

444 page 270, line 1 fb in the apparatus of parallel texts, read: “*ps.-Antonius Melissa*”

447 page 276, line 60 of the text, read “perturbationem”

449A page 280, line 3 of the text, read “μεγαλοπρεπῆ”

449A page 280, line 35 of the text, read: “εἰδοποιεῖ”

449A page 280, line 9 of the critical apparatus, change the first word to read: “ἐπὶ”

After 449B page 280 on a separate line add “vid. 738.5”

After 449B page 281 on a separate line add “see 738.5”

450 page 282, line 3, after “1 2.1” insert “P.Herc. 222, col. 12.2–3 (Cerc t. 11 [1981] p. 109 Gargiulo) et”

Change “P. Herc. 222, col. 12.2–3” to “P. Herc. 222, col. 12.1–3”

450 page 282, line 4, read: “2 2.10] P. Herc. 222 col. 6.7 (Cerc t. 11 [1978] p. 107 Gargiulo), sed coniunctio cum opusculo Theophrasti tenuissima est; vid. commentarium”

450 page 282, line 5 at beginning after “3” read “5.1–10”

450 page 283, line 3, after “1 2.1” insert “P.Herc. 222, col. 12.2–3 (Cerc vol. 11 [1981] p. 109 Gargiulo) and”

Change “P. Herc. 222, col. 12.2–3” to “P. Herc. 222, col. 12.1–3”

450 page 283, line 4, read: “2 2.10] P. Herc. 222 col. 6.7 (CErc vol. 11 [1978] p. 107 Gargiulo), but the connection with Theophrastus’ work is very slight; see the commentary”

450 page 283, line 5 at beginning after “3” read “5.1–10”

451 page 282, line 12 = line 1 of the text, instead of ἐρωτητεῖς, read ἐρωτηθεῖς

454 page 285, line 2 of the translation, last word: instead of “evil” read “bad qualities”

461 page 289, lines 5–6 fb, read: “in regard to the gods, concerning the construction of their temples and their worship”

465 page p. 292, line 7 of text, first word, read: “ὥς”

465 page 293, line 3 of the translation, first word, read: “further”

465 page 294, line 2 of the *apparatus criticus*, after “7” read: “ὥς L: ὥστ’ ed. Wachsmuth (fort. error typographicus, qui ex ὥστ’ v. 5 dependet)” followed by space

469 page 298, line 1 of apparatus of parallel texts, read: “ps.-Maximi Confessoris”

476 page 300, line 2fb, read “κρίναι”

478 page 303, line 2 of the translation, read “was” instead of “is”

482 page 307, line 3, insert “most” before “worthy”

483 page 307, line 2 of the apparatus of parallel passages, read “vid. 77”

After 486 page 314, on a separate line add “vid. 486.5 in Commentario 6.1 p. 415–416”

After 486 page 315, on a separate line add “see 486.5 in *Commentary* 6.1 p. 415–416”

492 page 319, line 8 of the translation, add footnote no. “1” after “eloquent” and below in the note write “Or ‘clear.’”

506 page 330, line 1fb, read “eventuum”

510 page 335, at end of apparatus of parallel passages, add “; *etiam sine nomine auctoris in cod. Patm. 263 (Malgarini, Elenchus t. 5 [1984] p. 191 no. 127)*”

519 page 340 in the heading, read: “ps.-Maximus Confessor”

519 page 341 in the heading, read: “ps.-Maximus Confessor”

520 page 343, line 2 of the translation, delete “(done)”

523 page 342, delete the last line of Greek

- 523 page 344, lines 2–3, move line no. “10” down one to the line ending with “πειρῶ”
- 525 page 345, lines 1–2, read “one ought more to remember by whom one has been well-treated than (to remember) by whom”
- 531 page 351, line 6 read “habits” instead of “customs”
- 531 page 352, at the beginning of the apparatus of parallel passages, add “19–20 *vid.* 354 v. 1–4”
- 531 page 353, line 8, read “habits” instead of “customs”
- 533 page 354, second line of the apparatus of parallel passages, replace “EE 7.4 1239a1–12” with “EE 7.3 1238b15–7.4 1239a12”
- 534 page 358, line 1, read “hunc” instead of “huic”
- 536 page 360, line 1, read “diceret” instead of “dicerent”
- 540 page 367, line 1, place footnote marker “1” at end of sentence, and in the space below add the footnote “¹ Or ‘Friendship brings (causes) ignorance and mistakes, but it does not bring envy and ill-will.’”
- 543 page 368, line 4, read “ipsius” instead of “issius”
- 557 page 382, first line of the apparatus of parallel passages, read “*ps.-Maximi Confessoris*”
- 564 page 387, line 6 of the translation, read “or” instead of “and”
- 567B page 388, line 5 of the Greek text, read “ἡρόσθησαν”
- 573 page 393, line 2 of the translation, read “Dionysus” instead of “Dionysius”
- 579A page 397, lines 5–6 of the translation, read “because, when he was ordered not to drink, he did so”
- 610 page 458, line 1 of text, read “αὐτὸς” (smooth breathing)
- 625 page 468, line 3 fb, at the beginning of the critical apparatus after “1” add “*haec verba in mg. occurrunt*” plus space before the next entry
- 625 page 469, at the end of the first line of the text (after “in book 1 of *Regarding Crises*”) mark a footnote (no. “1”), and below on the same page in the footnote write “These words are not part of the main text; they are found in the margin.”
- 626 page 471, at the end of the third line of the text (after “in the 4th book of *Regarding Crises*”) mark a footnote (no. “1”)

626 page 472, at the beginning of the first line of the critical apparatus, write: “1–2 *haec verba in mg. occurrunt*”

626 page 473, in a new footnote corresponding to the footnote number added on page 471 (no. “1”), write “These words are not part of the main text; they are found in the margin.” Each of the footnotes that are already present change their number by one: i.e., “1” becomes “2” and so on.

726A page 580, in left margin, move section no. “3” up one line: from line 11 to line 10.

738.5 page 596 after 738, print the new text that is found in the present volume after the commentary on 449B

738.5 page 597 after 738, print the translation that is found in the present volume after the commentary on 449B

2. References in the Indices

page 620, col. 2, line 4, read “117-579B”

page 621, col. 3, line 9fb, read “579B-117” and move down three lines and place below “150, 151”

page 628, upper half, col. 3, line 6, read “A IA-app. 584A”

page 628, upper half, col. 4, line 1, read “A IB-579A”

page 628, upper half, col. 4, line 4, read “no. 6”

page 628, upper half, col. 4, line 6, read “no. 7”

page 628, lower half, col. 1, between line 1 and 2, insert “579A-A IB”

page 628, lower half, col. 1, line 2, read “app. 584A- A IA”

page 628, lower half, col. 4, line 4, delete “679A-A IA”

page 628, lower half, col. 4, line 5, read “no. 6”

page 628, lower half, col. 4, line 7, read “no. 7”

page 635, Anonymus, 8th entry (In Arist. EN), read “exeunte saec. 2 a.D.” instead of “saec. 12 a.D.”

page 644, after Barlaamus, add new entry “BARTHOLOMAEUS DE BRUGIS, Quaestiones in Aristotelis Oeconomica 2, cod. Parisinus 16089 fol. 132^r col. 2 (CAG vol. 19 p. ix.7–12 Heylbut)—486.5”

page 645, Burlaeus, 7th entry, read “app. 532” instead of “app. 512”

page 662, Gellius, 1st entry, read “app. 534” instead of “app. 514”

page 668, Ioannes Lydus, 2nd entry, read “490” instead of “49D”

page 673, Maximus Confessor, change heading to read “ps.-Maximus Confessor (saec. 10–11 a.D.)”

page 678, Philodemus, De adulatione, delete first entry and make two: “P.Herc. 222 col. 6.7 (CErc t. 11 [1981] 107 Gargiulo) ... 450 no. 2” and “P.Herc. 222 col. 12.2–3 (CErc t. 11 [1981] 109 Gargiulo) ... 450 no. 1”

Change “P. Herc. 222, col. 12.2–3” to “P. Herc. 222, col. 12.1–3”

page 692, Scholia, after line 8 fb and before line 7 fb, insert “In Euripidis Hippolytum” and on a new line indented insert “265 (vol. 2 p. 39.3–8 Schwartz)” and on the same line to the right print “738.5”

page 694, Scholia, line 8 at right, before “567C” delete “app.”

